british social attitudes: the 21st report (british social attitudes survey series)

British Social AttitudesEdited by Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Catherine Bromley,Miranda Phillips

Rures adquireret apparatus bellis.Bellus oratori deciperet quinquennalis concubine. Bellus zothecas corrumperet

fiducias, et quadrupei fortiter adquireret oratori, ut aegre verecundus concubine insectatoratori, quod Medusa deciperet vix adlaudabilis cathedras, semper Augustus senesceretlascivius fiducias. Verecundus suis suffragarit plane quinquennalis catelli. Pessimus saetosusapparatus bellis fermentet gulosus ossifragi, iam adlaudabilis chirographi agnascorparsimonia fiducias.

Chirographi corrumperet concubine, et ossifragi amputat fiducias, etiam perspicaxumbraculi suffragarit Caesar, iam gulosus zothecas adquireret optimus tremulus matrimonii,etiam concubine iocari catelli. Saetosus oratori deciperet fragilis fiducias. Oratori divinussuffragarit Medusa. Rures senesceret matrimonii, semper Caesar neglegenter conubiumsantet saetosus oratori, ut Octavius praemuniet Medusa, et adfabilis cathedras miscere satisgulosus oratori. Zothecas fermentet cathedras. Chirographi miscere rures, quod aegresaetosus oratori circumgrediet vix adfabilis cathedras. Fiducias spinosus suffragarit Augustus,utcunque satis pretosius catelli insectat Caesar. Augustus suffragarit ossifragi, et apparatusbellis adquireret suis. Fiducias divinus imputat rures. Plane quinquennalis agricolaeneglegenter circumgrediet fiducias. Chirographi iocari bellus rures, quod perspicax syrtessatis frugaliter insectat utilitas ossifragi. Fiducias agnascor gulosus apparatus bellis,quamquam verecundus matrimonii vocificat cathedras. Zothecas aegre divinus fermentetfiducias, semper Octavius agnascor saburre, quod lascivius syrtes senesceret quadrupei.Saburre iocari ossifragi.

Augustus neglegenter senesceret Caesar, iam catelli pessimus libere conubiumsantet gulosus syrtes, etiam saburre adquireret pretosius fiducias, quamquam Octavius aegrespinosus agnascor concubine, semper pessimus fragilis saburre amputat pretosius oratori,etiam zothecas circumgrediet agricolae, quod perspicax concubine agnascor fiducias,quamquam adlaudabilis umbraculi infeliciter praemuniet verecundus catelli, iam syrtesimputat adfabilis chirographi. Quinquennalis agricolae circumgrediet quadrupei.

Medusa lucide amputat satis perspicax syrtes is carried out by Britain’s largestindependent social research institute, the National Centre for Social Research. It provides anindispensable guide to political and social issues in contemporary Britain.

The 21 s tREPORT

www.natcen.ac.uk

British SocialAttitudes

EDITORS

Alison ParkJohn CurticeKatarina ThomsonCatherine BromleyMiranda Phillips

The 21 s tREPORT

2004

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British Social Attitudes

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London . Thousand Oaks . New Delhi

www.sagepublications.com SAGE

BSA 2004 a/w2 11/10/04 2:31 PM

British SocialAttitudes The 21 s t

REPORT

BSA 21st prelims 1 20/10/04 12:24 PM Page 1

British SocialAttitudes The 21ST

REPORT

EDITORS

Alison ParkJohn Curtice

Katarina ThomsonCatherine Bromley

Miranda Phillips

London . Thousand Oaks . New Delhi

BSA 21st prelims 1 20/10/04 12:24 PM Page 2

The National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) is an independent, non-profitsocial research organisation. It has a large professional staff together with its owninterviewing and coding resources. Some of NatCen’s work – such as the surveyreported in this book – is initiated by NatCen itself and grant-funded by researchcouncils or charitable foundations. Other work is initiated by government departmentsor quasi-government organisations to provide information on aspects of social oreconomic policy. NatCen also works frequently with other institutes and academics.Founded in 1969 and now Britain’s largest social research organisation, NatCen has ahigh reputation for the standard of its work in both qualitative and quantitative research.NatCen has a Survey Methods Unit and, with the Department of Sociology, Universityof Oxford, houses the Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends (CREST).

The contributors

Catherine Bromley Senior Researcher at the Scottish Centrefor Social Research, part of NatCen, andCo-Director of the British SocialAttitudes survey seriesJohn CurticeResearch Consultant at the ScottishCentre for Social Research, part ofNatCen, Deputy Director of CREST andProfessor of Politics at StrathclydeUniversityHelen CooperResearch Fellow in Psychology at theUniversity of SurreySonia ExleyResearch Assistant in the Department ofSociology and a member of NuffieldCollege, OxfordChris Fife-SchawSenior Lecturer in Psychology at theUniversity of SurreyAnthony HeathProfessor of Sociology at the Universityof OxfordMark JohnsonResearcher at NatCen and Co-Director ofthe British Social Attitudes survey seriesLauren McLarenLecturer in Comparative Politics at theUniversity of NottinghamPippa NorrisMcGuire Lecturer in ComparativePolitics at the John F. Kennedy Schoolof Government, Harvard University

Alison ParkResearch Director at NatCen and Co-Director of the British Social Attitudessurvey seriesMiranda PhillipsSenior Researcher at NatCen and Co-Director of the British Social Attitudessurvey seriesMark SandfordResearch Fellow in the Constitution Unitat University College, LondonRichard ShepherdProfessor of Psychology at theUniversity of SurreyPatrick SturgisLecturer in Sociology at the Universityof SurreyPeter Taylor-GoobyProfessor of Social Policy at the Schoolof Social Policy, Sociology and SocialResearch, University of KentKatarina ThomsonResearch Director at NatCen and Co-Director of the British Social Attitudessurvey seriesJames TilleyLecturer in Quantitative Political Scienceand Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford

© National Centre for Social Research 2004

First published 2004

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List of tables and figures xi

Introduction xvii

1 The work-centred welfare state Peter Taylor-Gooby 1 Work for those who can? 4 ‘Carrots’ 4 ‘Sticks’ 7 Whose rights, whose responsibilities? 11 A new culture of welfare? 14 Conclusions 19 Notes 20 References 20 Acknowledgements 21 2 Has modern politics disenchanted the young? Alison Park 23 Parties and politics 24 Political engagement 24 “There’s no point to politics” 27 Differences in political engagement: lifecycle or generation? 29 Political interest 29 Party attachment 32 Why are young people turned off politics? 34 Conclusions 38 Notes 39 References 41 Acknowledgements 42 Appendix 43

Contents Contents

BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES

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3 Teenagers on family values Miranda Phillips 49 Gender roles and working women 51 Relationships: cohabitation, marriage and lone parenthood 57 Sexual behaviour 63 Conclusions 68 Notes 69 References 70 Acknowledgements 71 4 Can Britain close the digital divide? Catherine Bromley 73 Who is on-line? 74

How do people use the internet? 78 Location, location, location 79 What do people use the internet for? 80 Why aren’t more people on-line? 83 Likely internet use in the future 83 Why don’t people use the internet? 84 Attitudes towards the internet 87 Can the digital divide ever be closed? 91 Conclusions 93 Notes 94 References 95 Acknowledgements 95 Appendix 96

5 e-politics? The impact of the internet on political trust and participation John Curtice and Pippa Norris 99 Uses of the web 100 Political trust 101 Political participation 108 Conclusions 113 Notes 114 References 114 Acknowledgements 115 Appendix 116

Contents

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6 Genomic science: emerging public opinion Patrick Sturgis, Helen Cooper, Chris Fife-Schaw and Richard Shepherd 119 The shape of public opinion toward genomics 121 GM foods 121 Genetic databases 123 Public trust 125 Human genomics 126 How attentive are we to modern genetic science? 131 Attentiveness and enthusiasm about genomics 134 Conclusions 137 Notes 138 References 139 Acknowledgements 140 Appendix 141 7 Dimensions of British identity James Tilley, Sonia Exley and Anthony Heath 147 The concept of national identity 148 The historical background 148 Civic versus ethnic dimensions 149 Where does Britain fit in? 150 Just how ‘fuzzy’ is British national identity? 151 Defining civic and ethnic national identity in the British context 152 The distribution of civic and ethnic national identity in Britain 153 National identity and generational change 155 Conceptions of national identity and patriotic views 158 Conclusions 160 Notes 161 References 162 Acknowledgements 164 Appendix 165 8 Understanding the rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson 169

Are anti-immigration sentiments increasing? 172 National pride 174 Conceptions of Britishness 177 Racial prejudice 180

Prejudice against Muslims 182

Contents

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Goldthorpe schema 227 Industry 227 Party identification 228 Attitude scales 228 Other analysis variables 230 Sampling errors 230 Analysis techniques 233 Regression 233 Factor analysis 235 International Social Survey Programme 235 Young People’s Social Attitudes survey 236 Sample design 236 The questionnaire 236 Weighting 236 Fieldwork 237 Notes 237 References 238 Appendix II: Notes on the tabulations in the chapters 241 Appendix III: The questionnaires 243 Subject Index 343


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Economic and social consequences of immigration 184 Economic consequences of immigration 185 Social consequences of immigration 187 The portrayal of immigration by politicians and in the media 188 Newspapers 191 Interest in politics 192 Education 193 Party identification 194 A more complex picture 195 Conclusions 196 Notes 197 References 198 Acknowledgements 200 9 Does England want devolution too? John Curtice and Mark Sandford 201

Levels of support for devolution 202 Why so little enthusiasm? 206 Knowledge and awareness 206 Are the arguments in favour of devolution getting through? 209 The political debate 213 Conclusions 216 Notes 217 References 217 Acknowledgements 219 Appendix I: Technical details of the survey 221 Sample design 221 Selection of sectors 221 Selection of addresses 222 Selection of individuals 222 Weighting 223 Questionnaire versions 224 Fieldwork 224 Advance letter 225 Analysis variables 225 Region 225 Standard Occupation Classification 225 National Statistics Socio -Economic Classification (NS-SEC) 226 Registrar General’s Social Class 226 Socio-Economic Group 227

Chapter 1 Table 1.1 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages? 5 Table 1.2 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages,

by position on the left–right scale 5 Table 1.3 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages,

by social class 6 Table 1.4 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages, by region? 6 Table 1.5 Benefit sanctions for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work 8 Table 1.6 Support for cutting or stopping benefits for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work, by position on the left–right scale 8 Table 1.7 Support for cutting or stopping benefits for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work, by social class 9 Table 1.8 Support for cutting or stopping benefits for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work, by region 9 Table 1.9 State versus personal responsibility 13 Table 1.10 Support for government responsibility for welfare, by position on the left–right scale 14 Table 1.11 Attitudes towards welfare, 1987-2004 15 Table 1.12 Attitudes towards welfare by position on the left–right scale, 1987and 2003 16 Table 1.13 Attitudes towards welfare by social class, 1987 and 2003 17 Table 1.14 Attitudes towards welfare by region, 1987 and 2003 18 Figure 1.1 Benefits for the unemployed are too high or too low, 1983-2003 10 Figure 1.2 Attitudes to taxation and spending, 1983-2003 12 Chapter 2 Table 2.1 Political interest, 12–19 year olds (1994–2003) and adults (2003) 24 Table 2.2 Political interest, 1986–2003 25 Table 2.3 Party attachment, 12-19 year olds (1994–2003) and adults (2003) 26 Table 2.4 No party attachment, 1983–2003 27 Table 2.5 Views about voting in general elections, 1998 and 2003 28 Table 2.6 Views about politics, 1998 and 2003 28 Table 2.7 Political interest among young people, cohort analysis, 1994–2003 30 Table 2.8 Political interest among adults, cohort analysis, 1986–2003 31

List of tables and figures


xii

Table 2.9 No party attachment among young people, cohort analysis, 1994–2003 32 Table 2.10 No party identification among adults, cohort analysis, 1986–2003 33 Table 2.11 Political interest (12–19 year olds) by adult political interest, 2003 and change since 1994 36 Table 2.12 Views about politics, by parental political interest, 2003 and change since 1998 37 Table 2.13 Attitudes to voting (12–19 year olds) by adult political interest, 2003 and change since 1998 38 Figure 2.1 Groups most likely to be interested in politics or identify with a party, 1994 and 2003 35 Chapter 3 Table 3.1 Attitudes towards working women and gender roles, young people and adults 52 Table 3.2 Attitudes towards working women and gender roles, young people and adults, 1994 and 2002/3 53 Table 3.3 Young people’s attitudes towards gender roles, by age 54 Table 3.4 Family life suffers if woman has full-time job, cohort analysis, 1994–2003 55 Table 3.5 Man’s job to earn money, woman’s job to look after home and family, by household income 56 Table 3.6 Young people’s attitudes towards gender roles, by whether their mother has a paid job 57 Table 3.7 Attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, young people and adults 58 Table 3.8 Attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, young people and adults, 1994 and 2002/3 59 Table 3.9 Young people’s attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, by sex 60 Table 3.10 Young people’s attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, by whether belongs to a religion 61 Table 3.11 One parent can bring up a child as well as two, by family type 61 Table 3.12 Young people’s attitudes towards family type, by parental education 62 Table 3.13 Attitudes towards sexual relationships, young people and adults 64 Table 3.14 Young people’s attitudes towards sexual relationships, by age 65 Table 3.15 Young people’s attitudes towards sexual relationships, by whether religious 66 Table 3.16 Young people’s attitudes towards pre-marital sex, by parent’s view 67


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Chapter 4 Table 4.1 Home internet access and personal use, 2000 and 2003 75 Table 4.2 Personal internet use, by age, 2000 and 2003 76 Table 4.3 Personal internet use, by sex, 2000 and 2003 77 Table 4.4 Personal internet use, by highest educational qualification, 2000 and 2003 77 Table 4.5 Where do people use the internet? 79 Table 4.6 Location of personal internet use, by age, household income and social class 80 Table 4.7 What people use the internet for 81 Table 4.8 Reasons for using the internet, by age, education, household income, social class and sex 82 Table 4.9 Reasons for not using the internet 85 Table 4.10 Reasons for not using the internet by age, education, income, gender, and desire to use the internet in the future 86 Table 4.11 Attitudes towards the internet by current and future usage (i) 88 Table 4.12 Attitudes towards the internet by current and future usage (ii) 88 Table 4.13 Attitudes towards the internet by reasons for not using it 89 Table 4.14 Trust in the internet as a source of information by current and future usage 90 Table 4.15 Current and potential internet users, by age, education and sex 92 Chapter 5 Table 5.1 Political trust by length of internet use 102 Table 5.2 Trends in political trust by internet use, 2000–2003 104 Table 5.3 Political efficacy by length of internet use 105 Table 5.4 Trends in political efficacy by internet use, 2000–2003 107 Table 5.5 Political action by length of internet use 109 Table 5.6 Trends in political participation by length of internet use, 2000–2003 110 Table 5.7 Number of political actions undertaken, by length of internet use and political interest, 2003 111 Table 5.8 Number of political actions undertaken, by length of internet use and political interest, 2000 112 Table 5.9 Political action, by length of internet use amongst 18–24 year olds 112 Table 5.10 Trends in political efficacy, 1998–2003 113 Chapter 6 Table 6.1 Attitudes towards GM foods, 1999 and 2003 122 Table 6.2 Appraisals of GM food risks, 1999 and 2003 123 Table 6.3 Support for the use of databases for human genetic information 124 Table 6.4 Perceived likelihood that insurance companies and employers will use genetic data within the next 25 years, 1996, 2000 and 2003 125 Table 6.5 Trust in modern genetic science 125


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Table 6.6 Extent to which various traits are perceived as genetically determined, 1998, 2000 and 2003 127 Table 6.7 Attitudes towards gene therapy, 1998, 2000 and 2003 128 Table 6.8 Attitudes towards prenatal genetic testing, by religious affiliation 129 Table 6.9 Attitudes towards human cloning 131 Table 6.10 Attentiveness to genes and genetics 132 Figure 6.1 Groups more likely to be attentive towards modern genetic science 133 Figure 6.2 Relationship between attitudes to genomics and education, knowledge and attentiveness 136 Chapter 7 Table 7.1 Importance of different aspects of ‘being British’, 1995 and 2003 152 Table 7.2 Distribution of scores on the ethnic and civic national identity scales 154 Table 7.3 Distribution of conceptions of national identity, 1995and 2003 154 Table 7.4 Conception of national identity by generational group 156 Table 7.5 Patriotism score by conception of national identity 159 Figure 7.1 The two dimensions of national identity 151 Chapter 8 Table 8.1 Views on whether the number of immigrants should be increased

or reduced, 1995 and 2003 172 Table 8.2 Views on whether Britain should take stronger measures to exclude

illegal immigrants, 1995 and 2003 173 Table 8.3 National pride and anti-immigration hostility 175 Table 8.4 Sources of national pride, 1995 and 2003 176 Table 8.5 Components of Britishness and anti-immigration hostility 178 Table 8.6 Components of Britishness, 1995 and 2003 179 Table 8.7 Perceptions of prejudice and anti-immigrant hostility 180 Table 8.8 Perceptions of prejudice in society, 1994–2003 182 Table 8.9 Anti-Muslim hostility and anti-immigration hostility 184 Table 8.10 Perceived economic consequences of immigration and anti-immigration hostility 185 Table 8.11 Perceived economic consequences of immigration, 1995 and 2003 186 Table 8.12 Perceived social consequences of immigration and anti-immigration hostility 187 Table 8.13 Changes in perceived social consequences of immigration, 1995 and 2003 188 Table 8.14 Anti-immigration hostility by stance of newspaper, 1995 and 2003 192 Table 8.15 Anti-immigration hostility by interest in politics, 1995 and 2003 193 Table 8.16 Anti-immigrant hostility by education, 1995 and 200 194 Table 8.17 Anti-immigration hostility by party identification, 1995 and 2003 195 Figure 8.1 Immigration: the statistics 171


xv

Figure 8.2 Self-reported racial prejudice: per cent who see themselves as “very prejudiced” or “a little prejudiced”, 1983–2003 181

Figure 8.3 The Times immigration-related articles 190 Chapter 9 Table 9.1 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, 1999–2003 205 Table 9.2 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by region 206 Table 9.3 Awareness of work of regional chamber or assembly, by region 207 Table 9.4 Responses to knowledge quiz about devolution 208 Table 9.5 Attitudes towards regional devolution, by whether assemblies give people more say 209 Table 9.6 Attitudes towards regional devolution, by whether assemblies improve region’s economic prospects 209 Table 9.7 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by regional pride 210 Table 9.8 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by subjective income 211 Table 9.9 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by position on left–right scale 212 Table 9.10 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by perceptions of how well British government works 213 Table 9.11 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by party identification 214 Table 9.12 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by party identification in the north of England 215 Table 9.13 Attitudes towards different ways of governing Scotland, by party identification 216 Appendix I Table A.1 Distribution of unscaled and scaled weights 223 Table A.2 Response rate on British Social Attitudes, 2003 224 Table A.3 Complex standard errors and confidence intervals of selected variables 232 Table A.4 Response rate on the Young People’s Social Attitudes survey 237

This volume, like each of its annual predecessors, presents the results andinterpretations of the latest British Social Attitudes survey – the 21st in the seriesof reports on the studies designed and carried out by the National Centre forSocial Research (NatCen). The series has a widely acknowledged reputation as painting an authoritativeand impartial picture of contemporary British values. Its reputation owes a greatdeal to its many generous funders. We are particularly grateful to our corefunder – the Gatsby Charitable Foundation (one of the Sainsbury FamilyCharitable Trusts) – whose continuous support for the series from the start hasgiven it security and independence. Other funders have made long-termcommitments to the study and we are ever grateful to them as well. In 2003,these included the Departments for Education and Skills, Health, Transport,Trade and Industry, and Work and Pensions, and the Office of the Deputy PrimeMinister. Our thanks are also due to the Leverhulme Foundation, the NuffieldFoundation, the Institute of Philanthropy and the Hera Trust. Indeed, so manyfunders came forward in 2003 that the survey was run with a larger than usualsample to allow the inclusion of ever more modules of questions. We are particularly grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council(ESRC) who provided funding for three sets of questions in the 2003 survey.These covered: the impact of internet use on social and political engagement(funded as part of the ESRC’s ‘e-society’ Programme); devolution and nationalidentity (funded as part of the ESRC’s Devolution and Constitutional ChangeProgramme); and attitudes towards genetic technologies. The ESRC alsosupported NatCen’s participation in the International Social SurveyProgramme, which now comprises over 40 nations, each of whom help todesign and then field a set of equivalent questions every year on a rotating set ofissues. The topic in 2003 was national identity and these questions can be seenat the start of version B of the self-completion questionnaire in Appendix III. As always, the British Social Attitudes survey is developed in co-operationwith its sister survey, Scottish Social Attitudes. This year two groups ofquestions, those on devolution and national identity and those on attitudes to

Introduction

BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDESxviii

immigration, were asked on both surveys in order to enable Scottish/Englishcomparisons. We were delighted to be able to repeat in 2003 the Young People’s SocialAttitudes survey, a survey of 12 to 19 year olds living in the same households asadult British Social Attitudes respondents. This followed similar exercises in1994 and 1998. Our thanks are due to the Children, Young People and FamiliesDirectorate in the Department for Education and Skills for the funding whichenabled us to do this. For those of you who want more information than is available in this Report,we draw your attention to a useful internet resource. Developed by the Centrefor Comparative European Survey Data at the London Metropolitan University,the web site allows contents based or free text search of all British SocialAttitudes questionnaires since 1983 and will produce tables and charts for thequestions you are interested in. We would like to thank Professor Richard Topffor all his hard work in bringing this to fruition. This facility can be accessed athttp://www.britsocat.com/. The full datasets also continue to be deposited at theUK Data Archive (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/). The British Social Attitudes series is a team effort. This year, the group bidsfarewell to Lindsey Jarvis, our valuable colleague who has been an editor and/orauthor for the last four Reports. At the same time, we are pleased to welcometwo new team members, Miranda Phillips and Mark Johnson. The researchers who design, direct and report on the study are supported bycomplementary teams who implement the sampling strategy and carry out dataprocessing. They in turn depend on fieldwork controllers, area managers andfield interviewers who are responsible for getting all the interviewing done, andon administrative staff to compile, organise and distribute the survey’sextensive documentation. In this respect, particular thanks are due to PaulineBurge and her colleagues in NatCen’s administrative office in Brentwood.Other thanks are due to Sue Corbett and Sandra Beeson in our computingdepartment who expertly translate our questions into a computer-assistedquestionnaire. Meanwhile, the raw data have to be transformed into a workableSPSS system file – a task that has for many years been performed with greatcare and efficiency by Ann Mair at the Social Statistics Laboratory at theUniversity of Strathclyde. Many thanks are also due to Lucy Robinson andFabienne Pedroletti at Sage, our publishers. As always, we must praise above all the anonymous respondents across Britainwho gave their time to take part in our 2003 survey. Like the 53,000 or sopeople who participated before them, they are the cornerstone of this enterprise.We hope that some of them will one day come across this volume and readabout themselves with interest.

The Editors

Peter Taylor-Gooby∗

Whatever else historians of the future say about the New Labour governments elected in 1997 and 2001, they will be judged as having implemented one of the most active, radical and thoroughgoing reform programmes in public policy of any UK government. The reforms range from a policy of shifting from 60 per cent public to 60 per cent private provision in the largest single area of state spending – pensions – to the biggest expansion of education from pre-schooling to further and higher education ever undertaken, affecting more people than the post-1944 expansion. To bolster the incomes of those in work they introduced Britain’s first ever minimum wage as well as a system of negative income tax (administered via Tax Credits) available in the first instance to families with children, and from 2003 to all working people, subject to eligibility. As well as raising the incomes of those in work, the last few years have also seen a radical expansion of government activity in relation to childcare for working parents and work–life balance policies. This chapter focuses on the cornerstone of this ‘new welfare settlement’ – the emphasis on mobilising as many people as possible into paid work. It offers an approach to the way in which government discharges its welfare responsibilities that is in tune with social and economic change, fits with the direction of the EU European Employment strategy and represents a significant new departure in Labour Party welfare state policy. The Prime Minister has summarised the guiding principles of this new settlement in a series of Fabian Society pamphlets, speeches and lectures (1994, 1998, 2001, 2003). These identify four underlying themes: the equal worth of individuals, equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome, the claim that rights entail responsibilities, and the view that the state should be enabling rather than providing (1998, 2003). Such themes form the bedrock of the kind of thinking encapsulated by the ‘Third Way’, a philosophy which has heralded a ∗ Peter Taylor-Gooby is Professor of Social Policy at the School of Social Policy,

Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent.

The work-centred welfare state 1


2

shift in centre-left assumptions about the role of government (Giddens, 1998; Driver and Martell, 2002). Rather than providing extensive passive benefits to meet the needs of its citizens as a whole, government should seek to empower people and equip them to take the opportunities available in a flexible modern economy, and this includes maximising engagement in paid work. The responsibility to seize such opportunities ultimately lies with the citizens; as the guiding mantra of this approach states: “Work for those who can, security for those who can’t” (DSS, 2000: v). This vision was set out in Tony Blair’s 2003 Fabian Society annual lecture as:

a modern welfare state with people at work not on benefits; and where rights were matched by responsibilities [in a] something for something rather than something for nothing social contract (Blair, 2003: 2).

This approach seeks to achieve economic goals through the mobilisation of all citizens who can enter paid work, and social goals by ensuring that they are in a position to pursue jobs and receive a fair return. It enables the government to follow up the 1994 Commission on Social Justice report, which argued that “Britain needs to change if it is to find its place in a changing world” (1994:91), and that a central part of that process must be a redirection of the social policy effort to support economic competitiveness. The first paragraph of Labour’s 1997 manifesto set out the programme of “building a modern welfare state, of equipping ourselves for a new world economy” (Labour Party, 1997:1). The argument goes that the ‘New Welfare State’, directed at supporting citizens into paid work, contributes to individual income and opportunity at the same time as it enhances economic competitiveness through the provision of a flexible, available labourforce, assisting economic success in a more globalised and competitive world. There is a further aspect to the new policies. These are not simply directed at changes in provision, but are also concerned to alter fundamentally the way people think about entitlement and the role of government. The Prime Minister states:

the challenge for us now is to make our progressive changes across the board irreversible ... we have to make the cultural changes necessary as well as the policy changes (Blair, 2003: 12).

There are a host of questions in British Social Attitudes which lend themselves to examining public views on these issues, and the developing story of changing opinions has been charted from a number of perspectives in previous British Social Attitudes Reports (for example, Hills, 2001; Taylor-Gooby and Hastie, 2002; Sefton, 2003). In the most recent survey, there are three areas which enable us to examine how far people endorse and support the New Labour approaches. The first of these is concerned with the government’s efforts to move people off benefits and into paid work. The second area addresses the issue of state versus personal responsibility for welfare. Finally, we consider

The work-centred welfare state

3

how far it might be appropriate to talk of ‘a new culture of welfare’ in the terms advanced by the Prime Minister. Throughout this chapter we examine the extent to which government policies accord with public thinking. We do this first by looking simply at overall patterns of support for various aspects of welfare policy. We then go on to consider the pattern of attitudes across different social groups. New Labour succeeded in elections in 1997 and 2001 partly because groups who had not supported the party in the past were attracted by its new policies (though we must not discount the added advantage afforded to them by disarray among the opposition parties). One central question addressed in this chapter, therefore, is the extent to which New Labour policies of the kind discussed above attract support from all social groups. Is it the case that such policies appeal to voters across the political spectrum, including those beyond Labour’s more traditional electoral heartlands, namely those who hold left-wing political views, working- class people, and those living in northern England, Scotland and Wales? Or are some groups decidedly more lukewarm than others about the prospect of renegotiating Labour’s traditional approach to social welfare? The important issue for the party is, of course, to attract new groups in the centre, the middle classes, and the south of England, while not alienating traditional supporters. To explore this we split the population in three ways. The first is by its political views from left to right. The British Social Attitudes survey includes a number of questions designed to measure people’s views on government intervention in the economy, the role of income redistribution, and relations between management and workers. These questions cover issues different to those about welfare that we are analysing in this chapter. Taken together, the responses people give to these questions can be used to form a scale which spans a spectrum ranging from very left-wing (where those most likely to favour a strong role for government and to express concerns about the balance of power between society’s haves and have-nots would be located) to very right-wing (where those most likely to support individualism and the role of the market would be located). More details of the left–right scale are given in Appendix I of this report. We use this scale to see whether New Labour’s welfare policies might attract new groups in the centre, without antagonising voters on the left. Secondly, we split the population by social cla ss. As discussed in The 20 th Report, social class continues to be an important dividing factor in political attitudes in Britain today (Park and Surridge, 2003). Thirdly, we analyse by region. Here we distinguish between the Labour heartlands of Scotland, Wales1 and the north of England on the one hand, and the South East and South West on the other.2 As with the left–right scale, we are looking for evidence that support for New Labour welfare policies extends beyond its traditional powerbase and into the middle classes and the south of England. We start by looking at the issue of encouraging all those who can work to do so.


4

Work for those who can? There are two main aspects to the government’s policies in this area: first, a range of policies designed to ‘make work pay’, drawing mainly on American rather than European experience (Walker and Wiseman, 2003). These policies include holding down the rates of benefits for those out of work, so that Income Support fell from 22 per cent of median earnings in 1997 to 19.5 per cent by 2001 and continues to do so (NPI/Rowntree, 2003) and introducing a minimum wage and various top-up benefits, mainly through an innovative Tax Credit system to ensure that those on low wages can command an adequate income. The second aspect of work policies concerns new measures to ensure that all claimants actively pursue paid work and particularly to expand the range of those to whom the expectation of work is brought home. Thus groups sometimes considered marginal to the labour force such as lone parents, carers, or sick and disabled people are now often included among those for whom paid work is seen as appropriate. To put it crudely, these policies include both carrots and sticks. The survey includes questions relevant to both these aspects and we begin by looking at the former. ‘Carrots’ One significant way of making paid work attractive for those on the margins of the labour market is the system of tax credits now paid to low-income families and individuals. The concept of supplementing the incomes of low-paid families is not new to Britain: 1971 saw the introduction of the Family Income Supplement which was later replaced by Family Credit, an in-work benefit. In 1999, Family Credit was replaced by the Working Families Tax Credit and the Children’s Tax Credit, paid via employers to the main carer of each family’s child or children. At the same time other tax credits, such as the Disabled Persons Tax Credit, were introduced with the intention of targeting specific groups experiencing disadvantage within the labour market. In April 2003 the system was simplified somewhat and these various credits were replaced with just two, the Working Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit, which for the first time extended eligibility to some adults without children.3 To examine attitudes to this policy we asked whether the government should top-up the wages of three types of low-income families. The example below shows the question we asked about couples with children; this was followed by similar questions about couples without children and lone parents.

Some working couples with children find it hard to make ends meet on low wages. In these circumstances, do you think … … the government should top-up their wages, … or, is it up to the couple to look after themselves and their children as best they can?


5

Table 1.1 presents the responses people gave to these questions. The most striking thing to note is the strong (though not overwhelming) support for government topping up the wages of parents with children, slightly more marked in the case of lone parents, and the comparatively low support for such a policy for people without children. In each case a noticeable proportion (of just over one in ten) were unable to choose between the options offered, indicating some uncertainty in judgements on this issue – possibly because respondents found the distinction between government top-ups and “looking after themselves” too stark. However, there is a clear indication that, when it comes to people in work, the majority view is that state help should be limited to cases where vulnerable groups, such as children, are involved. While this fits with the main thrust of current government policy, as noted above, the Working Tax Credit is now available to certain low-paid workers without children.

Table 1.1 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages?

Government should top-up

Individuals should look after

themselves

Can’t choose

Lone parent % 66 22 12 Couple with children % 59 29 12 Couple with no children % 26 63 10

Base: 2649

As discussed earlier, in order for New Labour to maintain its broad electoral appeal its policies need to garner the support of people who are not naturally inclined to vote Labour while at the same time keeping its traditional supporters happy. As Table 1.2 illustrates, it would seem that income top-ups – for people with children at least – fulfil both these criteria. Although people on the left and centre of the political spectrum are more likely to support such a system than are people on the right, majorities of all groups across the political spectrum are in favour of income top-ups for families with children. Table 1.2 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages, by position on the left–right scale

% who say the government should top up the wages of:

Left Centre Right

Lone parent 71 68 61 Couple with children 67 60 53 Couple with no children 33 24 22

Base 813 808 956


6

Quite why low-paid workers without children are seen as less deserving remains unanswered. It is possibly a reflection of the fact that the case for such a policy has not been made as forcibly as it has been for low-paid working parents, or it could be that people have particular concerns about the impact on children of low pay. Having established that policies to make work pay attract support across the political spectrum, we now look in greater detail at the views of those who have traditionally been regarded as Labour’s core supporters – working-class people and those living in Scotland, Wales and the north of England. Table 1.3 looks at support for income top-ups across the social classes. While there is a hint that people in jobs which have been traditionally classified as working class are slightly keener on such policies, the differences are not significant. Table 1.3 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages, by social class


Managerial / profes-

sional

Inter-mediate

Self-employed

Lower super-

visory and technical

Semi-routine and

routine

Lone parent 66 66 62 67 69 Couple with children 59 57 55 61 63 Couple with no children 26 24 24 28 28

Base 928 323 195 345 791

The geography of people’s attitudes on this matter is more varied. Looking at Table 1.4, we find that it is indeed the case that people in the south of England are less likely to support these policies than are those in the more traditionally Labour-oriented parts of the UK. However, as we saw before in rela tion to the left–right scale, a majority of those living in the south are also in favour of income top-ups for working parents.

Table 1.4 Should the government top up the incomes of families on low wages, by region


Scotland and Wales

North West, North East, Yorkshire and the Humber

South West and South East

Lone parent 71 68 61 Couple with children 66 61 54 Couple with no children 33 28 22

Base 435 632 572


7

Policies which offer the potential to increase the rewards of work for certain groups are clearly widely popular. Whether there is the same kind of support for the ‘stick’ side of the equation is explored next. ‘Sticks’ A second set of questions reflect a more punitive direction in policy and ask what sanctions, if any, should be used to punish benefit claimants who fail to attend an employment-focused interview. Such interviews play a central role for the government’s New Deal policies and are effectively being introduced for all claimants of working age through the new Jobcentre Plus and Single Gateway benefit application system. An adviser encourages the claimant to move into paid work and discusses the support, training and in-work benefits available. For young people aged 18–24 and those unemployed for long periods (the length varies according to the claimant’s age), participation in New Deal is a condition of receiving benefits. The interviews are now compulsory for lone parents and those on incapacity benefit. As the minister responsible for developing the approach put it:

Why are we setting up Jobcentre Plus? The main reason is so we can provide everyone with the help they need to get into work, or if they lose their job – to get back as quickly as possible. It is a work first approach (Darling, 2002).

To test the extent to which the public supports the general direction of this approach we presented respondents with three examples of potential benefit recipients: a lone parent, someone on long-term sickness or disability benefits, and a carer on benefits. Taking the example of the lone parent, the question asked:

Suppose a lone parent on benefits was asked to visit the job centre every year or so to talk about ways in which they might find work. Which of the statements on this card comes closest to what you think should happen to their benefits if they did not go?

Their benefits should not be affected Their benefits should be reduced a little Their benefits should be reduced a lot Their benefits should be stopped

The idea that benefits should be cut for those who don’t attend the interview carries the implication that members of the group should be making every effort to pursue work opportunities. At present, such sanctions are being implemented for lone parents and for some groups of sick and disabled people, but are not anticipated for carers.


8

As Table 1.5 outlines, there is a fairly distinct split between attitudes towards lone parents on the one hand, and sick or disabled people and carers on the other. Only one in six say that lone parents’ benefit should not be affected if they fail to attend an interview at the job centre and just over a quarter favour the most severe sanction on offer – the withdrawal of state benefits. In contrast, four in ten say that sick or disabled people should avoid any sanctions, and half say this of carers, while only around one in eight would stop the benefits of these groups altogether if they failed to make this effort to pursue work. We have already seen that public support for income top-ups for working lone parents is pretty widespread, we now see that a majority also agree that they should be actively seeking work.

Table 1.5 Benefit sanctions for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work

Benefits for people failing to attend job centre interviews should be…

… not affected

… reduced a little

… reduced a lot

… stopped

Lone parent % 17 38 14 27 Sick or disabled person % 41 32 9 13 Carer on benefits % 48 28 7 13

Base: 3272

Tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 look at attitudes to compulsory New Deal interviews across our social groups. First, we look at these views by people’s left–right position.

Table 1.6 Support for cutting or stopping benefits for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work, by position on the left–right scale

% who say benefits should be cut a lot or stopped

Left Centre Right

Lone parent 42 42 45 Sick or disabled person 22 21 24 Carer on benefits 19 19 21

Base 813 808 956

We saw before that, although there was majority support for income top-ups for lone parents, this policy is more popular amongst those at the centre and left of our scale. When looking at the more punitive side of welfare policy it would not


9

be unreasonable to suggest that here the reverse might be true – that those on the right of the scale would be most likely to support significant benefit sanctions for those not taking advantages of opportunities to help them find work. As Table 1.6 reveals, however, this is not the case. People at the left, centre and right of the scale have very similar views about benefit sanctions, and this is true for all three examples of claimants. We find the same when it comes to social class and region in Tables 1.7 and 1.8. People in managerial professions and those in routine occupations have very similar views on this matter. Those in the traditional Labour heartlands of Scotland, Wales and northern England are as likely to support – or oppose – severe benefit sanctions as are those in southern England. Table 1.7 Support for cutting or stopping benefits for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work, by social class


Managerial / profes-

sional

Inter-mediate

Self-employed

Lower super-

visory and technical

Semi-routine and

routine

Lone parent 42 44 47 43 40 Sick or disabled person 26 21 27 23 19 Carer on benefits 22 18 23 20 18

Base 1093 389 247 426 1012

Table 1.8 Support for cutting or stopping benefits for those failing to visit the job centre to talk about ways of finding work, by region


Scotland and Wales

North West, North East, Yorkshire and the Humber

South West and South East

Lone parent 39 41 44 Sick or disabled person 24 23 23 Carer on benefits 19 20 20

Base 537 758 700

One of the underlying principles of New Labour’s welfare policies is that those in work, even at the lower end of the pay scale, should be better off than those out of work and that people should not be caught in what is commonly termed the ‘benefit trap’ whereby potential earnings don’t cover what a claimant loses in benefit by going back to work. The following question, asked as part of the survey series since it began, can help us gauge the extent to which people think this is indeed the case. It is also a useful barometer of people’s general level of sympathy for unemployed people.


10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Too low and cause hardship Too high and discourage work

Opinions differ about the level of benefits for unemployed people. Which of these two statements comes closest to your own view ...

... benefits for unemployed people are too low and cause hardship, or, benefits for unemployed people are too high and discourage them from finding jobs?

One-third (34 per cent) believe that benefits are too low, while slightly more, four in ten (40 per cent) say they are too high. A substantial minority (17 per cent) opted to say neither answer is correct. The largest single group in the population thinks that unemployed people are discouraged from finding work by overly generous benefits and, by implication, that benefit rates should perhaps be reduced even further. This has not always been the case. As seen in Figure 1.1, the proportion of respondents who think that benefits are too low outnumbered those who thought they were too high throughout the period 1983–1997. As discussed in last year’s Report, attitudes towards benefit claimants tend to harden during periods of economic growth and soften during a recession, and this can be seen in the shape of the curve in Figure 1.1. It is hardly surprising to see an upturn in the proportion saying that benefits are too high after 1997. Nevertheless, the position in 2003 is very different to that of the late 1980s, which were also years of economic growth, so there appears to be a real shift in attitudes over and beyond that which can be explained by the economic cycle (Sefton, 2003). We shall return to these changes in attitude towards benefit claimants in the last section of the chapter where we look at whether there has been a shift to a new culture of welfare. Figure 1.1 Benefits for the unemployed are too high or too low, 1983–2003


11

The question here is whether policies that make sure work pays attract support across the political and social spectrum. The answer is fairly complex. It is certainly the case that those on the left, working-class people, and people living in traditionally Labour parts of the UK are the most likely to take the view that benefits are too low and cause hardship. For example, four in ten (40 per cent) on the left of the left–right scale say this compared with one in four (26 per cent) of those on the right. However, it is not true that those in managerial professions, and those in southern England are more likely than their respective counterparts to say that benefits are too high and discourage unemployed people from finding work. Here, the differences between our key groups are not significant. While there is a quite predictable social pattern surrounding views about hardship, it is not clear that any one group particularly supports cutting benefits to counter disincentives. Given that traditional Labour supporters are concerned about the hardship benefit recipients suffer, any attempt to cut them further could potentially face significant opposition. Whose rights, whose responsibilities? We turn now to the second of the three elements of New Labour’s welfare agenda we set out to explore in this chapter. This centres on the issue of where responsibility lies for various aspects of public policy. We start by looking at another of our long-standing questions which concerns itself with the issue of taxation and public spending. Arguably one of the biggest responsibilities placed on citizens by all governments is the requirement to pay taxes to fund public spending. Since the start of the survey series, we have been asking this question:

Suppose the government had to choose between the three options on this card. Which do you think it should choose?

Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as now Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits

Figure 1.2 shows how views on this have changed over time. Every year since 1987 those wanting to increase taxes and spending have been in the majority, while the proportion who actively support tax and spending cuts has always been a small minority, standing now at six per cent. Two years stand out however. In 2000 and, most recently, in 2003 the proportion in favour of increases drops to half (51 per cent in 2003), while those opting for the status quo rises to around four in ten.


12

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Reduce taxes, spend less Keep taxes and spending same Increase taxes, spend more

Figure 1.2 Attitudes to taxation and spending, 1983-2003 The decline in support for further taxes in 2003 may reflect awareness of the particularly well-publicised increase in National Insurance contributions to finance higher NHS spending which was implemented three months before the 2003 survey began. However, this does not explain the drop in support seen in 2000. In general, answers to this question indicate a continued acceptance of a major role for a tax and spend welfare state and the concomitant responsibilities for taxpayers that go with that. The very low support for real cuts is most striking, but the fact that support for increased spending does on occasion waver suggests that Labour cannot take for granted that it has the public with them on this matter at every instance. Having looked at an area where responsibility lies most heavily with citizens, we turn now to look specifically at state versus private responsibility for a range of social needs. Table 1.9 outlines various scenarios we presented to our respondents. The suggested options in terms of who should be responsible for providing each need were: the government, as in the traditional welfare state; employers (which might reflect a shift towards a more corporatist European model, as advocated in Frank Field’s unsuccessful proposals for pension reform in 1998, see Economist, 1998), or the individuals themselves and their families, as in the liberal market approach advocated by right-wing Conservatives. There appears to be a fairly consistent pattern of answers. In all cases, the government is seen as bearing the major responsibility – in fact, only when it comes to provision in retirement does support for government responsibility fall below four-fifths. It is interesting to note that most of those who advocate non-state responsibility in this area suggest that individuals or families should shoulder this burden, and just one in ten advocate employer responsibility (presumably through occupational pensions although it is difficult to know exactly how respondents interpreted this answer option).


13

Table 1.9 State versus personal responsibility

Who should be responsible for … The government

Employers

Individuals and their families

... paying for the care needs of elderly people in residential homes*

%

84

–1

13

… paying the cost of health care when someone is ill

%

83

7

8

… ensuring that people have enough to live on if they become sick or disabled

%

83

8

7

… ensuring that people have enough to live on if they become unemployed

%

81

3

14

… ensuring that people have enough to live on in retirement*

%

58

11

29

Base: 3272 *Base: 4432

Note: 1. The employer option was not offered for this scenario Table 1.10 looks at the views of those who believe the government should be responsible by their left–right position. The most striking feature of this table is that, with the exception of retirement provision, attitudes are fairly similar across the political spectrum. Even though those on the left are slightly more likely to endorse the state’s role than the centre and the right, there is overwhelming support for the role of government amongst all three groups. As was the case with the population as a whole, support for the state taking the lead role in providing a decent standing of living in retirement is rather weaker overall, and just under half of those on the right of the scale support this. As responsibility for care of the elderly, sick and unemployed is so overwhelmingly seen as lying with the government, there is little value in extending this analysis much further. However, it is interesting to note that for retirement provision we find that support for government responsibility is strongest amongst traditional Labour supporters (those in routine occupations, and people living in Scotland, Wales and northern England). As already discussed, New Labour has presided over a major shift towards employer and individual responsibility for pensions, and while it appears to have the backing of less traditional supporters for this kind of approach, the policy doesn’t sit comfortably with its heartland voters.


14

Table 1.10 Support for government responsibility for welfare, by position on the left–right scale

% who say the government should be responsible for …

Left Centre Right

... paying for the care needs of elderly people in residential homes*

89

86

80

… paying the cost of health care when someone is ill

87

86

81

… ensuring that people have enough to live on if they become sick or disabled

85

83

80

… ensuring that people have enough to live on if they become unemployed

86

80

79

… ensuring that people have enough to live on in retirement*

68

60

47

Base *Base

813 1101

808 1128

956 1302

Having looked at the role of work within the welfare system, and the role of government writ large, we turn now to our third line of enquiry, that is whether New Labour has managed to engineer a broad shift in thinking about welfare. A new culture of welfare? As pointed out in the introduction, New Labour has been actively pursuing a shift in the way Britain thinks about its welfare state and the nature of the duties the state has towards its citizens, and vice versa. The Attlee ideal was for cradle-to-the-grave care supported by a large network of universal entitlements. The new approach stresses the idea that the state has a duty to provide support when needed, but also encourages people to support themselves whenever possible. We have already seen that New Labour-style welfare policies, such as the limiting of benefits for those not actively seeking work and the topping up of wages for parents on low incomes, attract support from across the political spectrum. Can we go on to show that there has been a wholesale shift in people’s thinking about the welfare state of the kind that Blair has been seeking to advance? To investigate this, Table 1.11 looks at some broad attitudinal statements designed to measure people’s attitudes to the welfare system in general, rather than specific policies, and compares them with what people thought in the past. The first three rows cover issues such as the desirability of increased benefits, whether welfare recipients are genuinely deserving, and the question of whether the welfare state acts as a disincentive to people looking after themselves. The


15

bottom two rows include the question on whether benefits are too low which we have already examined, and also a measure of perceptions of welfare fraud. If people have indeed come round to Blair’s way of thinking then we should see a hardening of attitudes towards welfare recipients. This certainly appears to be the case: for example, almost six in ten supported the idea of having higher welfare benefits in the early 1990s, whereas since 1998 the figure has consistently been just over four in ten. A similar pattern is evident when it comes to the question of whether the welfare system prevents people from fending for themselves. In the early to mid-1990s, just over one in four agreed with this proposition, whereas since 1998 it has been as high as four in ten. The bottom two rows of the table are also very interesting. As already seen in Figure 1.1, the proportion who say that unemployment benefits are too low has tended to decline over time. In this table we can contrast that with the proportion who think that “many people falsely claim benefits” which has tended to increase, rising from two-thirds in 1987 to over three-quarters in 2003. People’s views of welfare, and of welfare recipients in particular, have certainly hardened in the past few years. It is possible that some of this tougher stance on benefit recipients is due to the better economic circumstances in recent times and, if so, attitudes may soften again if there were to be another recession. Unfortunately, most of the questions in Table 1.11 were not asked before 1987 but, as we saw earlier in relation to Figure 1.1, there does seem to have been a more fundamental shift in attitudes, over and above what can be explained by the economic cycle. Table 1.11 Attitudes towards welfare, 1987-2004

% agree 1987 1991 1994 1998 2001 2003

Government should spend m ore money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes

55

58

50

43

43

43

Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help

31

26

26

32

32

39

If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet

33

26

27

40

39

42

Base 1281 2481 2929 2531 2795 873

Many people falsely claim benefits 67 69† 72 83 80 78 Unemployment benefit is too low and causes hardship

51

50†

53

29

37

34

Base 2847 2797 3469 3146 3287 3272

†Figures for 1990


16

However, in order to be sure that this represents a widespread shift in values, we also need to demonstrate that they are now held by all social groups. After all, it could simply be the case that some groups have become a lot more critical in their thinking while the views of others have remained the same. For Labour to gain any electoral advantage from such a shift in thinking, it needs to have occurred amongst both traditional and non-traditional Labour supporters. We pursue this analysis by looking once more at the left–right-scale, social class and region. Table 1.12 looks at the views of those on the left, centre and right of our scale in 1987 and 2003 respectively. Some interesting trends stand out. The most obvious is in relation to the issue of increased spending on “benefits for the poor” and the level of unemployment benefits (the first and last rows in the table). Although the proportion in favour of welfare recipients has declined amongst all groups, it is the case in both years that a majority of those on the left support this. However, the size of the gap between those at the far ends of our spectrum is smaller in 2003 than was the case previously. The second and third rows in the table show a quite different pattern. On the question of whether or not social security recipients genuinely deserve help, there was no significant difference of views across the political spectrum in 1987, but in 2003 we can see that those on the left are now the most likely to believe that recipients don’t really deserve help. On the question of whether the generosity of benefits inhibit people from “standing on their own two feet” there has been a reverse in opinion: in 1987 those on the right were the most likely to take this view; by 2003 it switched to being those on the left. Table 1.12 Attitudes towards welfare by position on the left–right scale, 1987 and 2003

1987 2003

% agree Left Centre Right Left Centre Right

Government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes

76

57

35

63

44

29


32

28

33

47

38

33


28

27

42

48

43

37

Base 419 361 493 265 272 320

Many people falsely claim benefits 66 65 71 77 79 77 Unemployment benefit is too low and causes hardship

64

56

34

40

37

26

Base 868 677 914 813 808 956


17

Turning to look at social class, Table 1.13 also shows that unsympathetic views about welfare have become more common across the board. For example, whereas in 1987 a majority of both middle- and working- class people 4 favoured increased spending on welfare benefits, by 2003 support had fallen to around two-fifths in both groups. Closer inspection of the figures reveals some interesting patterns, many of which echo what we saw above. Take the issue of whether welfare benefits prevent people from “standing on their own two feet”, in 1987 around a third of both classes agreed with this statement, by 2003, however, we find that not only has a gap opened up between middle- and working-class people’s views (of 12 percentage points) but it is the views of working-class people that stand out as being particularly strident. On the issue of whether welfare recipients are genuinely deserving we find that working-class people have actually always tended to be the most doubtful and have become more so. This echoes the finding in The 20 th Report that Labour supporters have moved to the right on a variety of issues under Tony Blair’s leadership, whereas Conservative supporters have not necessarily changed their views (Curtice and Fisher, 2003). On the other hand, however, in both 1987 and 2003, working-class people were more likely than middle-class people to say that unemployment benefit is too low and causes hardship. Table 1.13 Attitudes towards welfare by social class, 1987 and 2003

1987 2003

% agree Middle class

Working class

Middle class

Working class


55

61

40

43


27

36

32

44


31

33

39

51

Base 320 443 223 197

Many people falsely claim benefits 62 66 73 80 Unemployment benefit is too low and causes hardship

48

55

31

40

Base 675 1026 768 813

As Table 1.14 illustrates, there is an equally complex pattern when we look at views across the regions. On the issue of welfare spending there has been a


18

quite marked decline in support for an increase amongst those living in Scotland, Wales and the north of England, whereas for those living in the south, views are pretty much unchanged since 1987. A similar pattern is evident for the question about whether welfare recipients are genuinely deserving. When it comes to the question of people standing on their own two feet we see a slightly different trend. There was a small increase between 1987 and 2003 in the proportion of those in Scotland, Wales and the south of England agreeing with the proposition, but in the north of England the change is much more marked – in 1987 just three in ten said this, compared with over four in ten in 2003. The biggest shift in attitudes is for the question about levels of unemployment benefit. In this period the proportion of those in Scotland and Wales who say they are too low halved (from almost two-thirds to a third), and there was a similar, though not quite so sharp, decline amongst those living in the north of England. Table 1.14 Attitudes towards welfare by region, 1987 and 2003 1987 2003

% agree Scot-land / Wales

North

South

Scot-land / Wales

North

South


62

58

45

51

40

43


28

31

36

39

37

39


29

30

40

33

44

43

Base 194 366 341 153 212 183

Many people falsely claim benefits 66 66 70 82 77 77 Unemployment benefit is too low and causes hardship

62

60

38

32

39

28

Base 445 797 753 537 758 700

On most of these measures, the views of those in the more traditional Labour heartlands have changed so much that the difference between them and their southern English counterparts has narrowed or even disappeared. The biggest change overall has been on whether unemployment benefit is too low. This could possibly reflect changes in the economy across Britain rather than a change in people’s cultural values about welfare per se, but, on balance, the analysis here does seem to suggest that the kind of welfare system New Labour has been keen to promote has gained broad support.


19

It is not possible to draw simple conclusions from these analyses. While the new culture of welfare promoted by Blair has attracted criticism on the left, certain elements of it strike a chord with Labour’s traditional support base. Given the increased perception that Britain’s welfare system is subject to abuse, recent increased efforts to clamp down on fraud will probably have been much welcomed by both traditional Labour supporters and those beyond its normal reach. The views of those on the political left and right can no longer be assumed to follow traditional patterns on a number of issues. For example, those on the left still favour a tax and spend approach to welfare, but are now a lot more circumspect when it comes to the desirability of overly generous provision, largely due to concerns about fraud. Conclusions We have discovered that when it comes to New Labour welfare policies such as tax credits and the promotion of work as an alternative to welfare, the public largely support the new approach. True, they are keener on ‘carrots’ such as income top-ups than ‘sticks’ such as benefit sanctions for those not co-operating with efforts to enhance people’s employability, but views on both issues are similar across all the social groups examined. However, the recent extension of the tax credit system to adults without children has low levels of support, and this will be worth monitoring in future. We also find that Britain is still very much wedded to the idea of government responsibility for a broad range of policy areas, such as health care, support for those out of work through sickness or disability, and the care needs of older people in nursing homes (something which is not current policy in England and Wales, though it is in Scotland). Only when it comes to pensions do we find any appetite for an increased role for individuals or employers, though Labour’s more traditional support base is far from happy with this prospect. The issue of whether New Labour has succeeded in bringing about a radical shift in the way we think about welfare overall is harder to interpret and there is certainly more analysis to be done before a definitive answer can be reached. However, on the evidence presented here, it seems that the more guarded approach to welfare that Labour has recently pursued, coupled with a shift in emphasis towards personal responsibilities as well as rights, has been broadly popular. Not only has it brought the party platform closer to the views of many on the centre and right of the political spectrum, but in some cases there has also been a sea change in the views held by those on the left. Labour has succeeded in realigning its policy stance so that it now fits more closely the views of a wider section of the electorate, in keeping with its new status as a centrist rather than a left political party.


20

Notes 1. Despite the presence of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, Labour remains

the dominant party in Westminster elections. Labour has won every UK general election in Scotland since 1959 (Bromley, 2005 forthcoming), as it has done in Wales throughout the post-war era. In fact, since 1945 the Welsh Labour Party has only once secured less than 40 per cent of the vote (in 1983) (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2005 forthcoming).

2. London and Eastern England are difficult to classify in these terms: while there is a strong Labour vote in these areas, it is less strongly associated with the legacy of an industrial powerbase than is the case in Scotland, Wales or northern England, and these areas are therefore excluded from the analysis.

3. The Working Tax Credit provides support for families with children, and disabled adults provided they work more than 16 hours per week. There is a further incentive built-in to encourage these groups to work for 30 hours a week or more. Adults over 25 who are not disabled and do not have children are also eligible for the Working Tax Credit providing they work more than 30 hours a week. The Child Tax Credit brings together elements of all four previous tax credits, plus Income Support and Job Seekers Allowance, and is payable to all families regardless of whether they are in work, subject to eligibility (for greater detail see HM Treasury, 2002).

4. In the earlier tables in the chapter, social class was shown in terms of the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification, which is the most recent social class definition. However, this is not available for the older datasets, so in the tables investigating change since 1987, we revert to a classification based on the Goldthorpe schema. Appendix I to this Report contains further information about these classifications.

References Blair, A. (1994), Socialism, Fabian Society Pamp hlet 565, London: Fabian Society Blair, A. (1998), The Third Way, Fabian Society Pamphlet 588, London: Fabian Society Blair, A. (2001) ‘Power of community can change the world’, Labour Party Conference,

Brighton, 2001 Blair, A. (2003), ‘Progress and Justice in the 21st Century’, Fabian Society Annual

Lecture, 2003 Bromley, C. (2005 forthcoming), ‘Devolution and Electoral Politics in Scotland’, in

Jeffery, C. and Hough, D. (eds.), Devolution in Comparative Context , Manchester: Manchester University Press

Commission on Social Justice (1994), Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal , London: Vintage

Curtice, J. and Fisher, S. (2003), ‘The power to persuade: a tale of two Prime Ministers’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 20th Report – continuity and change over two decades, London: Sage

Darling, A. (2002), ‘The New Deal – Interview’, Pioneer, 7, January.


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Department of Social Security (2000), The Changing Welfare State: Social Security Spending, London: HMSO

Driver. S. and Martell, L. (2002), ‘New Labour, Work and the Family’, Social Policy and Administration , 36(1): 46–61

The Economist (1998), ‘Field of Dreams’, 28th March: 39–41 Giddens, A. (1998), The Third Way, Polity Press, Cambridge HM Treasury (2002), The Child and Working Tax Credits, London: HM Treasury Hills, J. (2001), ‘Poverty and social security: What rights? Whose responsibilities?’, in

Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 18th Report – Public policy, social ties, London: Sage

Labour Party (1997), New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better, Election Manifesto NPI/Rowntree (2003), Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion, London: New Policy

Institute Park, A. and Surridge, P. (2003), ‘Charting change in British values’, in Park, A.,

Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 20th Report – Continuity and change over two decades, London: Sage

Sefton, T. (2003), ‘What we want from the welfare state’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 20 th Report – Continuity and change over two decades, London: Sage

Taylor-Gooby, P. and Hastie, C. (2002), ‘Support for state spending: has New Labour got it right?’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds), British Social Attitudes: the 19th Report, London: Sage

Walker, R. and Wiseman, M (2003), ‘Reforming US welfare again and again’, Social Policy and Society, 2(2): 109–112

Wyn Jones, R. and Scully, R. (2005 forthcoming), ‘Devolution and Electoral Politics in Wales’, in Jeffery, C. and Hough, D. (eds.), Devolution in Comparative Context, Manchester: Manchester University Press

Acknowledgements The National Centre for Social Research is grateful to the Department for Work and Pensions, and its predecessors, for their financial support which enabled us to ask most of the questions reported in this chapter over the years, although the views expressed in the chapter are those of the author alone.

Alison Park ∗

Considerable concern has been expressed over the last decade about the extent to which young people appear to be becoming increasingly disengaged from conventional politics (see, for example, Bentley and Oakley, 1999). Fear about youth disinterest and apathy increased further still after the 2001 general election, in which it emerged that turnout among young people had fallen even more sharply than it had among older groups (Bromley and Curtice, 2002; Clarke et al., 2004). A range of initiatives have been promoted as ways of increasing young people’s political awareness and engagement, most notably Citizenship teaching, introduced in 2002 as a compulsory element within the National Curriculum in English secondary schools, following recommendations from the Advisory Group on Citizenship (1998). Experiments with new voting methods have also taken place, although their impact upon young people’s willingness to vote has been mixed (Electoral Commission, 2002). This chapter examines the political engagement of young people, and traces how this has changed over the last decade. It largely does so by focusing upon the Young People’s Social Attitudes surveys that took place in 1994, 1998 and 2003. Each survey involved interviews with young people aged between 12 and 19 who lived in the same households as adult British Social Attitudes respondents, allowing us to examine not only young people’s views about politics but also how they relate to those of their parents. The chapter begins by assessing the extent to which young people really have become increasingly disinterested in, and disillusioned with, contemporary politics. In so doing, it examines the significance of age differences in political engagement in order to see whether young people now, as in the past, simply tend to become more interested in politics as they get older. Finally, it focuses upon those young people who are least engaged in an attempt to examine what our findings imply for the future. ∗ Alison Park is a Research Director at the National Centre for Social Research and is

Co-Director of the British Social Attitudes survey series.

Has modern politics disenchanted the young? 2


24

Parties and politics We begin by examining how interested young people are in politics, and the extent to which they identify with Britain’s political parties. In particular, we consider how their levels of engagement differ from those found among older groups, and whether they have changed over time. We then examine the views young people have about politics and their attitudes towards voting. Political engagement It is certainly true that young people are less interested in politics than adults. As Table 2.1 shows, while 30 per cent of adults express “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of interest in politics, the same is true of only eight per cent of young people. Moreover, young people’s interest has declined over the last decade. In 1994, when we carried out our first survey of 12 to 19 year olds, 38 per cent had at least some interest in politics; now only 31 per cent do so. And, while in 1994, just over a quarter said they had no interest in politics at all, this now applies to over a third of young people.

Table 2.1 Political interest, 12–19 year olds (1994-2003) and adults (2003)

12–19 year olds Age 18+

1994 1998 2003 2003

% % % %

A great deal/ quite a lot of interest 12 10 8 30 Some interest 26 24 23 33 Not very much interest 32 32 32 25 None at all 27 34 36 13

Base 580 474 663 4432

Questions about political interest have been asked on the British Social Attitudes survey of adults since the mid-1980s, allowing us to set these findings in a wider context. As Table 2.2 shows, there has been no equivalent decline in political interest among adults over this period. True, the proportion of adults expressing at least “some” interest in politics has fluctuated over the years but, at 63 per cent now, it differs little to the level found in 1986. However, it is clear that political interest has fallen among the youngest adults in our sample, those aged between 18 and 24. Among this group, the proportion expressing at least some interest in politics has declined by over ten percentage points, an even sharper fall than that which has occurred among 12–19 year olds. The table also suggests that political interest was at something of a high point in the mid-1990s, at 67 per cent among adults as a whole and 58 per cent among

Has modern politics disenchanted the young?

25

young adults. So, while it is clear that political interest among young people has fallen since 1994, this might at least partly reflect particularly high levels of interest that year.

Table 2.2 Political interest, 1986-2003

% a great deal/ quite a lot/ some interest in politics

1986 1991 1994 1998 2003

12–19 year olds n/a n/a 38 34 31 All adults 60 63 67 65 63 Adults aged 18–24 52 52 58 50 41

Base (12–19 year olds) – – 580 474 663

Base (all adults) 1548 1445 2302 3146 4432

Base (adults aged 18–24) 239 166 199 321 348

n/a = not asked

There have been more dramatic changes in the extent to which young people ‘identify’ with political parties – that is, in the extent to which they feel an emotional attachment to one party rather than another. Such attachment is thought to develop at a young age and then be consolidated during early adulthood, particularly once an individual reaches voting age (Butler and Stokes, 1969). Others, however, dispute the extent to which party loyalties remain fixed over a person’s lifetime, arguing that, although people might well feel a loyalty to one party over another, this can change in response to current political reality (Clarke et al., 2004). Here, however, our interest is largely in whether young people feel an attachment to any political party (rather than in which party), and the extent to which this has changed over time. To establish party attachment, we asked young people whether they think of themselves as a supporter of any one political party (and, if so, which). We then asked those who did not whether they think of themselves as a little closer to one party than another (and, if so, which). Finally, those who neither support nor feel close to a particular party were asked who they would hope to win a general election if there was one held the next day (and, if so, which). Combining responses to these three questions gives us a measure of party attachment. Similar questions were also asked of adults, allowing us to compare their responses to those of young people.1 Table 2.3 shows the proportion of young people who support or feel close to a particular party, as well as the proportion who would not hope that any party would win a general election, or who ‘don’t know’ who they would hope to win. It also shows, for 2003, adult responses to these questions. Two key points emerge. Firstly, as in 1994 and 1998, far fewer young people than adults support or feel close to a political party. In 2003, only eight per cent of young people supported a party (compared with over a third of adults), while a further


26

13 per cent felt closer to one party than another (compared with over a quarter of adults). As a result, over three-quarters of young people neither support nor feel close to a party, double the rate found among older groups. This is not, in itself, surprising, given that theories of party identification stress its development from childhood into early adulthood. Secondly, young people are much less likely than adults to be able to say who they would support if there was a general election the next day. As Table 2.3 shows, they are four times more likely than adults not to know who they would support in a general election, and are twice as likely to say that they would not support any political party. Moreover, the proportion of young people in these two categories has increased significantly since 1994, the most notable change being the considerable rise in the numbers of young people who say they would not hope any party would win an election, up nearly fivefold from six per cent in 1994 to 29 per cent in 2003.

Table 2.3 Party attachment, 12–19 year olds (1994–2003) and adults (2003) 12-19 year olds Age 18+

1994 1998 2003 2003

% % % %

Supports a particular party 21 15 8 35 Not a supporter, but feels closer to one

party than another

22

20

13

26 Would not hope any particular party to win

a general election

6

9

29

16 Don’t know who would hope to win a

general election/other answer

26

30

32

7

Base 580 474 663 4432

When it comes to which party young people support, feel closer to, or would hope to win a general election, the Labour Party is by far the most popular, supported by one in five 12–19 year olds. One in eleven support the Conservative Party, and one in sixteen the Liberal Democrats. Only one in a hundred young people opt for the Green Party, suggesting the view that the young find green politics more engaging than the mainstream agenda is misplaced. Given the substantial decrease we have seen in the proportion of young people who identify with any political party, it is not surprising that there has been a decline in the popularity of each of these parties since 1994. The Labour Party has suffered most; down from 35 per cent in 1994 to 21 per cent now, although Conservative and Liberal Democrat identification has also fallen. These changes are notably more pronounced than those found among adults over the same period. In 1994, for instance, 40 per cent of adults identified with the Labour Party, compared with 37 per cent in 2003.


27

The increase in the proportion of people who feel no attachment to any political party is not a recent phenomenon (Crewe and Thomson, 1999); nor has it by any means been confined to the young, although its increase has been slightly less dramatic among adults (Bromley et al., 2001). This is demonstrated in the next table, which shows that one in ten adults in 1983 had no party attachment (this measure combines those who say they do not know who they would support in an election and those who say they would not support any party). By 2003, this had doubled, and now stands at one in five adults, with a particularly marked jump taking place between 1998 and 2003. This falling off in party attachment has been more marked still among young adults, aged between 18–24. In 2003, 41 per cent of 18–24 year olds fell into this category, nearly three times the proportion who did so in 1983. And, as we have already seen, a similarly stark change has taken place among young people aged between 12–19.

Table 2.4 No party attachment, 1983–2003 % with no party attachment

1983 1986 1991 1994 1998 2003

12–19 year olds n/a n/a n/a 32 39 61 All adults 10 11 10 12 14 21 Adults aged 18–24 15 18 13 18 25 41

Base (12–19 year olds) – – – 580 474 663

Base (all adults) 1761 3100 2918 3469 3146 4432

Base (adults aged 18–24) 211 436 318 289 241 348

n/a = not asked “There’s no point to politics” So far we have seen that young people are less interested in politics than before, and that they are less likely to identify with any of Britain’s political parties. What, then, is their view of politics and voting? Might, for instance, the rapid decline in party identification reflect an increasing disillusionment with British party politics? And is it likely to affect young people’s willingness to turn out and vote in future elections? None of the young people interviewed in 2003 would have been old enough to vote in 2001, but all will be entitled to cast a vote at one or both of the next two general elections. And, as we explored earlier, considerable concern exists about the extent to which they will make use of this vote. To examine their views, we asked young people to choose one of the three following views about voting in a general election: “it’s not really worth voting”; “people should vote only if they care who wins”; and “it is everyone’s duty to vote”. As seen in


28

Table 2.5, in 2003, as in 1998, we found the instrumental view to be the most popular – that people should vote only if they care about the outcome. The view that it is an individual’s ‘civic duty’ to vote is less common now than in 1998, having fallen from 36 to 31 per cent, though this change is not quite statistically significant. However, less than one in ten young people think there is no point to voting at all.2

Table 2.5 Views about voting in general elections, 1998 and 2003 1998 2003

% %

It’s not really worth voting 7 9 People should vote only if they care who wins 55 59 It is everyone’s duty to vote 36 31

Base 474 663

In order to examine views about politics more generally we also asked young people whether they “agree”, “disagree” or “neither agree nor disagree” with three negative assertions about British politics. Table 2.6 shows the proportion who disagree with these statements – that is, who take the least disenchanted view. Nearly half disagree with the notion that politics has “no point”, over six in ten disagree that voting is “a waste of time”, and just under a third disagree with the assertion that there is no “real difference” between Britain’s main political parties.3 In all cases, fewer young people disagree than did so in 1998. The relatively small sample size means that changes of this magnitude are not statistically significant – with the exception of the fall in the proportion who disagree that voting is a waste of time – but they all point in the same direction: towards increasing disenchantment about politics and voting.

Table 2.6 Views about politics, 1998 and 2003 % who disagree 1998 2003

There’s no point to politics – in the end, everything goes on just the same

52

47

Voting in elections is a waste of time 68 62 There isn’t any real difference between the main

political parties in Britain

37

32

Base 474 663

So far we have seen evidence of a significant decline in young people’s interest in politics since 1994 (although it is reasonable to think that 1994 might have


29

been a year in which levels of political interest were particularly high), and a sharp fall in the extent to which this age group identify with Britain’s political parties. Moreover, there are tentative hints of an increased disenchantment in their overall views about politics and voting. Differences in political engagement: lifecycle or generation? We have seen that levels of political engagement among young people, as measured by their interest in politics and their party identification, are substantially lower than those found among adults. Of course, this might simply reflect the fact that interest and identification increase as a person gets older (Heath and Park, 1997). Alternatively, they might be the product of deep-rooted differences between particular generations; differences which, if they remain constant, could have profound implications for future levels of political engagement in Britain. Political interest We begin by considering political interest. Earlier, in Table 2.1 we saw that levels of interest were markedly lower among young people than they were among adults, and that they had declined over time. But this is not necessarily surprising; after all, none of the young people we interviewed will have yet had the chance to vote in a general election, and we might expect that concerns about issues such as interest and mortgage rates, Council Tax, or the state of local hospitals might loom less large for them than they do for older groups. For some, the older members of our group of young people, these issues will increasingly matter soon; for those aged 12–15 they will no doubt appear somewhat more remote. As our surveys of young people did not involve interviewing the same groups of people in 1994, 1998 and 2003, we cannot use them to track how an individual’s interest might change as they get older. However, by combining information from the Young People’s Social Attitudes surveys with that from the adult British Social Attitudes surveys carried out in the same years we can track levels of political interest among particular cohorts of young people (that is, people born during the same period). For example, we can track how political interest has developed over time among those young people aged 12–15 in 1994 by looking at 16–19 year olds in 1998 and 21–24 year olds in 2003. This analysis is shown in Table 2.7. Each cohort’s years of birth are described in the first column of the table. Each row then traces the level of interest found among a particular cohort in 1994, 1998 and 2003, in order to see whether, as they get older, their political interest increases. Take the cohort born between 1979 and 1982 (who are highlighted in bold in the table). In 1994, when they were 12–15, just over a third (34 per cent) were interested in politics. Four years later, in 1998, their interest had grown only slightly. But between the ages of


30

16–19 and 21–24, their interest increased markedly, from 38 to 46 per cent. Exactly the same shift, at the same age, occurred among the preceding cohort (born between 1975 and 1978), whose interest increased from 45 per cent in 1994 (when they were 16–19) to 56 per cent in 1998 (when they were 20–23). Certainly, therefore, young people’s interest in politics increases as they get older, with the most marked increase taking place between their late teens and early twenties. Table 2.7 Political interest among young people, cohort analysis, 1994-20034

% with at least some

interest in politics 1994 1998 2003

All 12–19 year olds 38 34 31

Cohort (age in brackets) (age in brackets) (age in brackets)

1975–1978 45 (16–19) 56 (20–23) 57 (25–28) 1979–1982 34 (12–15) 38 (16–19) 46 (21–24) 1983–19865 – 30 (12–15) 39 (17–19) 1988–1991 – – 29 (12–15)

However, we should not just focus upon the fact that political interest increases with age – we also need to consider the level of interest young people show at a particular age. After all, even if interest does develop at a steady pace as a person gets older, if their in itial interest at 12–15 is lower than that found among previous cohorts, each generation of young people will be successively less interested in politics than their predecessors (unless their interest increases sufficiently to allow them to ‘catch up’). When we focus on this comparison, we see that, while 12–15 year olds in 1998 were significantly less interested in politics than the same age group in 1994, there is no significant difference between the levels of interest displayed by this age group in 1998 and 2003. In 1998, for instance, 30 per cent of 12–15 year olds had some interest in politics; in 2003, this applied to 29 per cent of this age group. As we have already suggested that our 1994 readings might represent something of a high point in political interest, this appears to provide little evidence of marked generational differences in political interest among young people over the last decade. So it seems clear that young people’s political interest does indeed increase as they get older. Moreover, there is little here to suggest that over this period successive generations of young people are becoming less interested in politics. There is, however, an important caveat to this conclusion. If we look at the 1979–82 cohort in 2003 (when they were aged 21–24), we can see that the proportion who were interested in politics, 46 per cent, is markedly lower than the 56 per cent found among the previous cohort in 1998 when they were at a similar age (20–23). This suggests that, before we rule out any evidence of


31

generational change, we also need to examine levels of political interest among young adults, and how these have changed over time. Is there any evidence here that successive generations of young adults are becoming less interested in politics? We can do this by carrying out similar analyses using the adult British Social Attitudes survey, which gives us the additional advantage of being able to look back over a longer time period. Table 2.8 is based upon a similar analysis of different cohorts of people and focuses on their political interest in 1986, 1996 and 2003. It shows that an upsurge in political interest takes place when people move from their twenties to their early thirties. The clearest example of this phenomenon can be found in the cohort born between 1959 and 1968 (highlighted in bold in the table). In 1986, when this group were in their late teens and twenties, 53 per cent had at least some interest in politics. Four years later, as they moved into their late twenties and early thirties, 61 per cent were interested, increasing further still to 66 per cent as the cohort entered their late thirties and early forties in 2003. Shifts of a similar magnitude, at the same sort of age, are evident among the previous and subsequent cohorts. By contrast, political interest does not appear to increase as substantially after a cohort reaches its mid-forties. This does not, however, mean that we can automatically expect interest among young adults to remain at the levels it has been in the past. For, as the more eagle-eyed reader will have already spotted, the youngest cohort in our table, born between 1979 and 1985, have a lower level of interest than any cohort before them (41 per cent). Consequently, the ‘generation gap’ between the levels of interest shown by the oldest and youngest age groups in each year has grown markedly since 1986. Then, the difference between the interest shown by these two groups stood at just nine percentage points; now, it is three times larger, at 28 points. Table 2.8 Political interest among adults, cohort analysis, 1986-2003 6

% with at least some

interest in politics 1986 1996 2003

All 60 63 63


1979–1985 * * 41 (18–24) 1969–1976 * 49 (18–27) 56 (25–34) 1959–1968 53 (18–27) 61 (28–37) 66 (35–44) 1949–1958 63 (28–37) 69 (38–47) 68 (45–54) 1939–1948 65 (38–47) 69 (48–57) 69 (55–64) 1929–1938 65 (48–57) 71 (58–67) 69 (65–74) 1919–1928 57 (58–67) 61 (68–77) * 1909–1918 62 (68–77) * *

‘Generation gap’ 9 points 12 points 28 points


32

These analyses clearly show that political interest does indeed develop as a person gets older, particularly during their twenties and thirties. However, there is evidence that the levels of interest now found among some younger generations are so low that they will need to increase substantially over the next decade or so if these groups are to ‘catch up’ with previous generations.

Party attachment Earlier, in Table 2.3, we saw that far fewer young people than adults are able to say which political party they favour, something that should not surprise us unduly, as the attachment that people might feel to one party over another is likely to develop during early adulthood as people vote for the first time and begin to take more of an interest in politics. However, we also saw a very sharp increase between 1998 and 2003 in the proportions of young people who do not feel attached to any political party. Cohort analysis along the same lines to that conducted earlier for political interest does provide some evidence that attachment to a particular political party increases as young people get older. If we focus upon the cohort born between 1975 and 1978 (highlighted in bold in Table 2.9), we can see that the proportions who felt no party attachment fell from 29 per cent during their late teens to 23 per cent during their early twenties. However, this cohort was clearly affected by the dramatic upsurge since 1998 in the proportions of young people with no party attachment; by their late twenties, this applied to a third of this group. The same pattern is evident among the two subsequent cohorts, although it is worth noting that levels of non-attachment were already very high in 1998 among the cohort born between 1984 and 1987. The table also clearly shows that the level of non-attachment among the youngest age groups in our surveys has increased markedly, from just under a third in 1994 to two-thirds in 2003.

Table 2.9 No party attachment among young people, cohort analysis, 1994-20037

% no party attachment 1994 1998 2003

All 12-19 year olds 32 39 61


1975–1978 29 (16–19) 23 (20–23) 32 (25–28) 1979–1982 32 (12–15) 29 (16–19) 41 (21–24) 1983–19865 – 44 (12–15) 46 (17–19) 1988–1991 – – 66 (12–15)


33

When we replicate this analysis using data from the British Social Attitudes survey over a longer time period, the same pattern emerges. Among younger cohorts, the period between 1986 and 1994 is marked by a decline in the proportion who felt no attachment to a particular party, compared with considerable stability among older groups, exactly what we would expect if party attachment develops during young adulthood. Between 1994 and 2003, however, there is an increase among all cohorts in the proportions who display no party attachment. Moreover, the age gradient in non-attachment has become more pronounced, as measured by the gap between the measures for our oldest and youngest groups in any single year, from nine points in 1986 to 26 points in 2003. Table 2.10 No party identification among adults, cohort analysis, 1986-2003 8

% no party identification 1986 1994 2003

All 11 12 21


1977–1985 * * 39 (18–26) 1969–1976 * 19 (18–25) 25 (27–34) 1959–1968 17 (18–27) 13 (26–35) 23 (35–44) 1949–1958 11 (28–37) 12 (36–45) 18 (45–54) 1939–1948 10 (38–47) 7 (46–55) 15 (55–64) 1929–1938 8 (48–57) 8 (56–65) 13 (65–74) 1919–1928 9 (58–67) 8 (66–75) * 1909–1918 8 (68–77) * *

‘Generation gap’ 9 points 11 points 26 points

In summary, it is clear that both political interest and favouring a particular party, rather than none at all, increases as a person gets older. This process is very clear in relation to political interest, although there are some signs that it has not been of a sufficient magnitude to allow younger generations to ‘catch up’ with previous generations. As a result, there is now a more marked age gradient to political interest than ever before. Unless this gradient diminishes, overall levels of political interest in Britain do seem likely to fall over the next few decades, as older, more engaged generations die out and are replaced by ones with lower levels of interest in politics. Added to this, the last few years have seen a more rapid fall in party attachment among the young than among older age groups, meaning that younger groups now lag substantially behind their older counterparts. Again, if this gap between older and younger generations fails to close, the extent to which people feel attached to any party, rather than none at all, is likely to decline over time.


34

Why are young people turned off politics? The fact that levels of party attachment among both younger and older groups have changed so rapidly over the last decade leaves open the question as to whether this is as much a response to short-term political reality as a stable long-term trend. It is to this question that we now turn. To shed some light on the changes we have found, we need to identify the factors most strongly associated with these forms of political engagement, allowing us to gain a better understanding of those who are most and least engaged. In so doing, we also need to establish whether levels of engagement have fallen most sharply among particular groups of young people. Is it, for instance, the case that interest and attachment have fallen the most among those young people traditionally most likely to be politically engaged? Or is the decline most marked among those groups who in the past have proved particularly disinterested in politics? We do this by using multivariate analysis techniques (logistic regression) which allow us to assess the relative importance of a range of factors in predicting a young person’s interest in politics or their likelihood of identifying with a political party. The advantage of this method over simple cross-tabular comparisons of different groups is that it allows us to assess the importance of a range of different characteristics while taking account of their relationship with each other (an important advantage, as many of the characteristics we are interested in are themselves interrelated). Further details of this form of analysis can be found in Appendix I of this Report. We included seven characteristics in each of our analyses and compared their importance with those found in 1994. Some of the characteristics relate to the young person (their age, sex, and own interest in politics or party identification), while others relate to the parent who we interviewed as part of the British Social Attitudes survey that year (their educational attainment, political interest and party identification) or to the household within which they both live (household income).9 Age, sex, parental education and household income were selected as they have previously been found to be related to political interest and party identification among young people (Park, 1995, 1999; Egerton, 2002). And adult political interest and party identification were included so as to explore the relationship between the political engagement of parents and their children. Figure 2.1 describes the factors that emerged as significantly associated with political interest in 1994 and 2003, with the group who were most likely to be interested in politics or to identify with a party shown in brackets. The top half of the table focuses upon characteristics associated with young people themselves; the bottom lists characteristics associated with their parents. In 1994, three characteristics were significantly associated with a young person’s political interest: party attachment, age and parental educational background. The young people most likely to be interested in politics were those who already had an attachment to a party, 16–19 year olds, and those whose parent was a graduate (or had another higher education qualification). Meanwhile, those young people most likely to have formed an attachment to a party were those who were politically interested and whose parent identified with a political party themselves.


35

The picture in 2003 is, however, slightly different. Now, just two characteristics are significantly associated with a young person’s political interest: whether he or she already has an attachment to a political party, and their parent’s interest in politics. The young people most likely to have at least some interest in politics are those who had an attachment to a particular party, and whose parent has a great deal or quite a lot of interest in politics. Once these two factors are taken into account, none of the other characteristics we included in our analysis proved to be significantly associated with whether a young person was interested in politics (including age and parental education, both of which were important in 1994). Parental political interest is also significantly associated with whether a young person had formed an attachment to a political party, as is the young person’s own interest in politics. Age, sex and the educational background of their parent are also associated with party attachment. The young people most likely to have an attachment to a particular party were those with a parent who has a great deal or quite a lot of interest in politics, who themselves have at least some interest in politics, are aged 16–19, male and whose parent has a higher education qualification. Details of the analyses described in Figure 2.1 can be found in the appendix to this chapter. The most noteworthy finding to emerge here is the important role that parental political interest (which we can see as a reflection of the likely political stimulation that young people receive at home) now appears to play in shaping their engagement with politics. Those whose parents are interested in politics are both more likely to be interested in it themselves, and to have formed an attachment to a particular political party. In 1994, whether or not a young person’s parent was interested in politics was not related to their own engagement once other factors were taken into account; now, this relationship is a very important one. Figure 2.1 Groups most likely to be interested in politics or identify with a party, 1994 and 2003 Political interest Party identification

1994 2003 1994 2003

Young person:

Party identification (identifier)


Political interest (some)

Political interest (some)

Age (16–19) Age (16–19)

Sex (male)

Parental: Education (higher education)

Political Interest (great deal/quite a lot)


Political Interest (great deal/quite a lot)

Education (higher education)


36

If we look at young people’s attitudes towards voting, a similar pattern emerges. In 1998, when we first asked this question, only two characteristics were significantly related to a young person holding the view that “it is everyone’s duty to vote”: their own level of political interest and whether they had an attachment to a political party or not. Young people who were interested in politics, and who had an attachment to a party, were the most likely to believe that it is everyone’s civic duty to vote. Beyond these two factors, none of the other characteristics of the young person or their parent was associated with variations in their views. In 2003, however, while young people’s own political interest and attachment remain associated with their views about voting, so too is their parent’s level of interest in politics. Most notably, those whose parent has no interest in politics are significantly less likely to think everyone has a duty to vote (further details of this analysis can be found in the appendix to this chapter). Table 2.11 sheds some light as to how the changes described in Figure 2.1 might have come about. The first column shows levels of political interest among young people with a parent who is themselves interested in politics. Of this group, nearly half express at least some interest in politics, while only a fifth say they have no interest. The third column shows levels of interest among young people whose parent has little or no interest in politics; under a quarter of this group have some interest in politics, and nearly half have no interest at all. This, of course, confirms the findings of our multivariate analysis. However, the more interesting observation relates to the changing levels of interest among these two groups since 1994. Political interest among young people with politically interested parents has changed little since then. But it has fallen dramatically among those whose parents are not interested, with a 15 percentage point rise in the proportion expressing no interest in politics whatsoever (from 32 to 47 per cent). (Very similar findings apply when we examine the relationship between parental political interest and whether or not a young person favours a political party, rather than no party at all.) Table 2.11 Political interest (12–19 year olds) by adult political interest, 2003 and change since 1994 Parental political interest

Great deal, quite a lot

Change 1994–2003

Not much, none

Change 1994–2003

Young person’s political interest

%

%

Great deal/ quite a lot/ some 48 +2 23 -6 Not very much 32 -2 31 -6 None 20 -1 47 +15

Base 147 212

Note: Based on all young people for whom parental data is available.


37

Why might interest and party attachment have fallen most among those who receive the least political stimulation at home? A strong possibility is that this group, more than any other, are simply not being engaged by current political reality. This assertion is given weight by Table 2.12 which shows that, while views about politics among those with politically interested parents have barely changed since 1998, they have changed significantly among those whose parents are not interested. For example, only a fifth of those with disinterested parents disagree with the view that there “isn’t any real difference between Britain’s main parties”, down 11 points since 1998, when a third disagreed. They are also markedly less likely than they were in 1998 to disagree with the view that there is “no point” to politics or that voting is a simply a “waste of time”.

Table 2.12 Views about politics, by parental political interest, 2003 and change since 1998

Parental political interest


Change 1998-2003

Not much, none

Change 1998-2003

% who disagree

No point to politics – all goes on the same

66

+3

30

-10

Voting is a waste of time 77 -2 46 -9 No real difference between

main political parties

45

-3

22

-11

Base 147 212

Note: Based upon all young people for whom parental data is available

Parental political interest has, it seems, helped ‘protect’ some young people from an increasing disillusionment with politics. However, as Table 2.13 shows, while young people with politically interested parents are more likely than those with disinterested parents to think that everyone has a duty to vote, even they are less likely to think this than they were five years ago. In 1998, 45 per cent of young people with politically interested parents thought people had a civic duty to vote; now, only 38 per cent do, a fall of seven percentage points.


38

Table 2.13 Attitudes to voting (12-19 year olds) by adult political interest, 2003 and change since 1998 Parental political interest


Change 1998-2003

Not much, none

Change 1998-2003

% %

It’s not really worth voting 3 + 2 16 + 4 People should vote only if they

care who wins

57

+ 6

62

+ 4 It is everyone’s duty to vote 38 - 7 22 - 3

Base 147 212

Note: based on all young people for whom parental data is available The important role that parental political interest appears to play in shaping young people’s attitudes towards politics (and, to a lesser degree, their views about voting) provides some clues as to how opinions might change in the future. Previous research among the British Social Attitudes survey of adults found that a large part of the decline in turnout between 1997 and 2001 was accounted for by a sharp fall among those who were least interested in politics, a drop which can in turn be partly explained by their belief that little was at stake in the 2001 election, as well as by the perception that the outcome was rather obvious (Bromley et al., 2004). Our findings suggest that the children of this particularly disinterested group might be responding to the political reality of the last five years by becoming less interested and more disenchanted themselves. In contrast, young people whose parents are more politically engaged appear to have been shielded from this process, no doubt partly because of the political stimulation they receive at home. As a result, a gulf is opening up between the attitudes expressed by young people living in the most and least politically engaged homes, and could potentially widen further still unless changes to current political reality convince their parents that politics has a purpose. Perhaps, for instance, if political competition was greater and there was an increased sense that different parties stand for very different things, willingness to vote, particularly among those who are less interested in politics, might increase substantially (Sparrow, 2003). And, if this takes place, we might reasonably expect to see levels of political engagement among the children of this group, those living in the least politically interested homes, increase too. Conclusions Is modern politics disenchanting young people? Certainly, since 1994 there has been a significant fall in the interest that young people express in politics, and


39

an even sharper drop in the extent to which they favour any of Britain’s political parties. There are hints of an increased disenchantment in their overall views about politics and voting, and it is clear that this applies particularly to those living in less politically interested homes. Moreover, while it is clear that both political interest and favouring a particular political party (rather than the ‘no’ party) increases as a person gets older, there is a question mark over the extent to which the engagement of current generations of young people will catch up with the generations which preceded them. And, unless they do, overall levels of political interest and party attachment in Britain are likely to fall gradually over time. It also seems clear that current political reality plays a role in young people’s engagement in politics, leaving open the possibility that, in a more stimulating political climate, their interest and willingness to favour a party rather than no party at all might increase. However, if this is to happen, it is those young people who receive little political stimulation at home who must be engaged, a group which has shown a marked decline in enthusiasm for politics over the last five years. That said, it is not just these groups of young people who need to be convinced; even those in the most politically engaged homes are less likely now to think it important that everyone vote, rather than just those who care about an election’s outcome. To some extent, these issues might be addressed through endeavours in other arenas, most notably school. Indeed, the recent entry of Citizenship education onto the National Curriculum provides one example as to how this might be achieved. But it is also apparent that it is just as important to focus upon the political stimulation that young people receive at home. And the all important key to this must lie in the hands of those within British politics, and in their ability to convince the electorate, particularly its less interested components, that politics is indeed exciting. In this sense, then, their job is as much to attract everybody to politics as it is to engage young people in particular. Notes 1. The final question in this series asked of adults differs slightly from that asked of

young people. It asks “if there were a general election tomorrow, which party do you think you would be most likely to support” (rather than “which party would you hope would win”).

2. This is in sharp contrast with adult views. When we last asked a similar question on British Social Attitudes in 2001, 65 per cent took the ‘civic duty’ view, 23 per cent the instrumental view, and 11 per cent thought that it was not worth voting.

3. Intriguingly, there has been a marked increase in the proportion who “neither agree nor disagree” with the statement “there isn’t any real difference between the main political parties in Britain”, or who did not know how to answer this question. In 1998, these responses accounted for 25 per cent of young people, compared with 38 per cent in 2003. It is unclear how this change should be interpreted, although it does imply that, for a substantial number of young people, the differences between Britain’s political parties are far from clear.


40

4. The bases for this table are as follows:

1994 1998 2003

All 12–19 year olds 580 474 663

Cohort

1975–1978 234 134 261 1979–1982 346 216 223 1983–1986 – 258 169 1988–1991 – – 417

5. This cohort was aged 17–20 in 2003. However, the Young People’s Social Attitudes

survey only interviews the 12–19 age group (meaning we can only consider the views of those aged 17–19 that year). A similar problem affects the British Social Attitudes survey of adults; as eligibility for this survey starts at the age of 18, we would be restricted to analysis of the views of 18–20 year olds.


1986 1996 2003

All 1548 3620 4432

Cohort

1979–1985 * * 348 1969–1976 * 473 749 1959–1968 310 812 879 1949–1958 303 621 759 1939–1948 294 527 669 1929–1938 248 450 550 1919–1928 187 468 * 1909–1918 133 * *


1994 1998 2003

All 12–19 year olds 580 474 663

Cohort

1975–1978 234 134 261 1979–1982 346 216 223 1983–1986 – 258 169 1988–1991 – – 417


41


1986 1996 2003

All 3100 3469 4432

Cohort

1979–1985 * * 348 1969–1976 * 344 749 1959–1968 582 788 879 1949–1958 608 596 759 1939–1948 578 523 669 1929–1938 508 477 550 1919–1928 414 430 * 1909–1918 288 * *

9. These analyses, and Tables 2.11 to 2.13, are based only upon the 89 per cent of the

sample of young people for whom parental information is available by way of the British Social Attitudes survey (in the remaining 11 per cent of cases, the adult interviewed was not the parent of the young person).

References Advisory Group on Citizenship (1998), Education for citizenship and the teaching of

democracy in schools, London: Qualifications and Curriculum Authority Bentley, T. and Oakley, K. with Gibson, S. and Kilgour (1999), The Real Deal: What

young people really think about government, politics and social exclusion, London: Demos

Bromley, C. and Curtice, J. (2002), ‘Where have all the voters gone?’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 19th Report, London: Sage

Bromley, C., Curtice, J. and Seyd, B. (2004), Is Britain facing a crisis of democracy? London: Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends

Bromley, C., Curtice, J. and Seyd, B. (2001), ‘Political engagement, trust and constitutional reform’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 18th Report – Public policy, social ties, London: Sage

Butler, D. and Stokes, D. (1969), Political Change in Britain , London: Macmillan Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. and Whiteley, P. (2004), Political Choice in

Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press Crewe, I. and Thomson, K. (1999), ‘Party loyalties: dealignment or realignment?’ in

Evans, G. and Norris, P. (eds.), Critical Elections: British parties and voters in long-term perspective, London: Sage


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Egerton, M. (2002), ‘Political partisanship, voting abstention and higher education: changing preferences in a British youth cohort in the 1990s’, Higher Education Quarterly, 56(2): 156–177

Electoral Commission (2002), Modernising elections – a strategic evaluation of the 2002 electoral pilot schemes, London: Electoral Commission

Heath, A. and Park, A. (1997), ‘Thatcher’s children?’, in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A., Brook, L., Thomson, K. and Bryson, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 14 th Report – The end of Conservative values? , Aldershot: Ashgate

Park, A. (1995), ‘Teenagers and their politics’, in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A., Brook, L. and Ahrendt, D. (eds.), British Social Attitudes – the 12 th Report, Aldershot: Dartmouth

Park, A. (1999), ‘Young people and political apathy’, in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A. and Thomson, K. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 16th Report – Who shares New Labour values? , Aldershot: Ashgate

Sparrow, N. (2003), ‘The No party’, Reform, Autumn 2003 (www.reformbritain.com) Acknowledgements We are grateful to the Children, Young People and Families Directorate in the Department for Education and Skills for funding the 2003 Young People’s Social Attitudes survey. Responsibility for analysis of this data lies solely with the author.


43

Appendix The following tables show the results of the logistic regression models described in Figure 2.1 and the accompanying text. The heading for each model defines the dependent variable – that is, the characteristic which the model seeks to predict, and the table shows the results for all variables that were significant in predicting the dependent variable. A negative B coefficient means that the characteristic is associated with the dependent variable being less likely than average; a positive characteristic means it is more likely than average. The table also shows the significance of the results; in all cases, our criteria for significance was 0.05. The order in which each characteristic was selected is listed at the foot of the table, as are those variables included in the model which did not emerge as significant. 1994: A great deal, quite a lot or some political interest

B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B)

Age

12-15 -.453 .139 10.598 .001 .636 16-19 .453 .139 10.598 .001 1.573

Parental education 11.526 .009

Degree/HE .720 .241 8.950 .003 2.054 A level -.098 .347 .080 .777 .907 GCSE/O level -.238 .242 .966 .326 .788 None -.384 .218 3.099 .078 .681

Young person’s party attachment

No party attachment -.643 .174 13.631 .000 .526 Party attachment .643 .174 13.631 .000 1.903

Constant -.809 .189 18.360 .000 .445

Base: 285

Variable(s) entered on step 1: young person’s party attachment Variable(s) entered on step 2: age Variable(s) entered on step 3: parental education

Variables included but not selected as significant: sex, parental political interest, parental party attachment, household income


44

2003: A great deal, quite a lot, or some political interest


Parental political interest 13.097 .004

A great deal/quite a lot .550 .177 9.659 .002 1.733

Some .069 .162 .180 .671 1.071 Not much -.144 .200 .514 .473 .866 None -.475 .251 3.570 .059 .622



Constant -.850 .115 54.523 .000 .427

Base: 524

Variable(s) entered on step 1: young person’s party attachment Variable(s) entered on step 2: parental political interest

Variables included but not selected as significant: young person’s sex, young person’s age, parental party attachment, parental education, household income

1994: Has attachment to a political party


Parental party attachment

No party attachment .494 .179 7.597 .006 1.638 Party attachment -.494 .179 7.597 .006 .610


Not a lot, none -.687 .171 16.077 .000 .503 A great deal, quite a lot, some .687 .171 16.077 .000 1.988

Constant .922 .203 20.531 .000 2.514

Base: 285

Variable(s) entered on step 1: young person’s interest in politics Variable(s) entered on step 2: parental party attachment

Variables included but not selected as significant: young person’s sex, young person’s age, parental political interest, parental education, household income


45

2003: Has attachment to a political party


Young person’s age

12-15 -.375 .104 12.958 .000 .687 16-19 .375 .104 12.958 .000 1.455

Parental education 9.602 .022

Degree/HE .343 .170 4.048 .044 1.409 A level .235 .207 1.287 .257 1.265 O-level/GCSE -.419 .169 6.163 .013 .658 None -.159 .224 .501 .479 .853


Great deal/quite a lot interest .653 .191 11.721 .001 1.922

Some -.154 .161 .916 .338 .857 Not very much -.013 .194 .004 .947 .987 None -.486 .250 3.781 .052 .615

Young person’s sex

Man .266 .101 6.851 .009 1.304 Women -.266 .101 6.851 .009 .767


Not a lot, none -.644 .107 36.300 .000 .525 A great deal, quite a lot,

some .644 .107 36.300 .000 1.904

Constant -.148 .124 1.433 .231 .862

Base: 524

Variable(s) entered on step 1: young person’s political interest Variable(s) entered on step 2: parental political interest Variable(s) entered on step 3: young person’s age Variable(s) entered on step 4: young person’s sex Variable(s) entered on step 5: parental education Variables included but not selected as significant: parental party identification, household income


46

1998: Belief that it is everyone’s duty to vote






some .318 .123 6.647 .010 1.375

Constant -.619 .133 21.669 .000 .538

Base: 350

Variable(s) entered on step 1: young person’s party attachment Variable(s) entered on step 2: young person’s interest in politics

Variables included but not selected as significant: young person’s sex, young person’s age, parental political interest, parental party attachment, parental education, household income.


47

2003: Belief that it is everyone’s duty to vote



Great deal/quite a lot interest .260 .183 2.026 .155 1.298 Some .464 .158 8.629 .003 1.591 Not very much -.083 .200 .172 .679 .921 None -.642 .263 5.957 .015 .526



some .335 .108 9.627 .002 1.397



Constant -.805 .121 44.506 .000 .447

Base: 517

Variable(s) entered on step 1: young person’s political interest Variable(s) entered on step 2: young person’s party attachment Variable(s) entered on step 3: parental political interest

Variables included but not selected as significant: young person’s sex, young person’s age, parental party attachment, parental education, household income

Miranda Phillips ∗

The last two decades have seen a so-called ‘revolution’ in behaviour relating to gender roles and the family, marriage and sex. Women’s employment rates are at their highest point since the First World War, a development which fundamentally challenges traditional gender roles – the notion of man as ‘breadwinner’ and woman as ‘homemaker’. Indeed, the most recent increase in labour market participation has been concentrated among mothers with young children. Dramatic changes have also taken place in relation to marriage, cohabitation and divorce – changes which, according to some, signal a regrettable decline in ‘family values’. And, the age at which young people have their first sexual experience appears to be markedly lower now than it was in previous decades (Wellings et al., 2001). Previous British Social Attitudes Reports have found that adult attitudes towards gender roles, marriage and sex have been moving hand in hand with social trends, towards increased tolerance and liberalism. The British public are now less attached to the idea of traditional gender roles, more supportive of working women, more accepting of cohabitation, and more permissive in their attitudes towards sexual behaviour. We know little, however, about young people’s views – a group who are likely to have experienced the impact of these changes directly, without necessarily having yet been able to benefit personally from the increased choice and independence that some of them offer. How might we expect young people’s views on these issues to differ from those held by adults? Much of the literature asserts the distinctiveness of younger groups, with adolescence being seen as an important phase in an individual’s life (Davis, 1990). Research among adults has found that the views of younger generations differ radically to those held by their elders (for example, Park, 2000; Crompton et al., 2003). In general, the young appear to have more liberal, tolerant and unconventional attitudes than older groups , ∗ Miranda Phillips is a Senior Researcher at the National Centre for Social Research,

and is Co-Director of the British Social Attitudes survey series.

Teenagers on family values 3


50

though the findings are varied. Partly, this is likely to reflect the different circumstances within which particular generations have come of age, as well as current social reality. If this is the case, we might expect to find quite dramatic differences between the views of young people and adults on issues relating to gender roles, relationships and sex. After all, many more young people now than before have mothers in paid employment, will have experienced the breakdown of their parents’ relationship, or live in a family headed by a single parent. Others argue that the distinctiveness of youth reflects their desire for independence, and their consequent challenging of adult norms and rules. This is often cited as an explanation for adolescent rebellion, risk-taking and deviant behaviour. This characterisation of young people is often seen in the media, which has a tendency to focus upon rather negative stereotypes, as suggested by reporting about ‘yobs’, ‘tearaways’, and more recent coverage of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs). However, some suggest that young people are not quite as distinctive in their attitudes and values as we might imagine. Key cognitive and psychological developments occur during later childhood and teenage years, leading to increased cognitive ability and an increased capacity for weighing up sides of an argument, developing abstract thought, and empathising with other people’s views (see, for instance, Coleman and Hendry, 1999). In this sense, young people’s attitudes might be expected to crystallise during their teenage years, and then converge with those of young adults. Adolescence can thus be seen as a period of transition during which a young person leaves childhood behind and looks ahead to adult life. Some studies have found notable consensus between the attitudes and values of adults and young people (for example, McGrellis et al., 2000), and have argued that the notion of a ‘generation gap’ has been overstated (Davis, 1990). This chapter explores young people’s attitudes towards three issues which broadly relate to families and relationships: gender roles and female employment; marriage and parenthood; and sexual behaviour. It makes use of data from the Young People’s Social Attitudes surveys of 1994, 1998 and 2003, each of which involved interviews with young people aged between 12 and 19 who lived in the same households as adult British Social Attitudes respondents. This allows us to examine not only young people’s views, and how they have changed over time, but also how they relate to those of their parents. The chapter begins by exploring whether teenagers and adults really do have markedly different views, allowing us to assess how distinctive young people’s attitudes really are. It then considers how young people have responded to the dramatic societal changes of the last few decades, exploring whether their views, like those of adults, have become increasingly liberal, or whether they have remained static or even hardened. Where we find differences between young people and adults, we explore whether this can best be seen as a response to the reality of growing up in modern Britain, teenage rebellion, or simply part of a smooth ‘transition’ to adulthood (although these three explanations are not, of course, mutually exclusive). To assess this, we are helped by the fact that we can compare young people’s views with those of younger adults interviewed as part of the British

Teenagers on family values

51

Social Attitudes survey. Moreover, on some issues, we can compare young people’s views with those held by their parents, allowing us to see how much influence parental views have. The chapter also examines variations among young people, allowing us to assess whether the views of particular groups differ. In particular, we examine whether young people with direct experience of some of the issues in question (for example, those living in one-parent families or who have working mothers) have distinctive views, as well as whether there are differences between boys and girls, or those from different socio-economic and religious backgrounds. Gender roles and working women Female employment now stands at a record high level, following an increase of 1.39 million women in employment between 1992 and 2002 (Duffield, 2002). Moreover, the increased female participation in the labour market during the 1990s was entirely concentrated among women with children, and was particularly marked for women with very young children (Dench et al., 2002). Indeed, women are now more likely to return to work after childbirth than at any time in the past. These labour market trends will clearly have an impact on family life, and also upon the traditional stereotype of man as ‘breadwinner’; Crompton et al. (2003) found that the proportion of couples where the man was the sole breadwinner fell from a third in 1989 to a sixth in 2002. Such dramatic societal changes have been accompanied by changes in people’s attitudes towards both working women generally and gender roles. However, Crompton et al. (2003) found that much of this change in people’s views happened before the mid-1990s; since then, there is evidence of an apparent slowing down (or even reversal) of the trend towards more liberal views, leading them to speculate that we might be witnessing a very slight ‘backlash’ against working mothers. So we begin by exploring how young people have responded to this historically high rate of female employment and, in particular, whether the increased propensity of women to combine motherhood and paid work has had a positive or negative effect on the views of young people. Do young people’s attitudes mirror those of adults, becoming more supportive over time, or can we find evidence of the possible backlash that has been suggested? To assess this, we asked young people how much they agreed or disagreed with the four following statements – two which focus specifically on working mothers and the impact this might have on families and children, and two which concern women’s employment more generally:

A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her child as a mother who does not work All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family


52

In Table 3.1 we show the proportion of young people who take the most ‘liberal’ view of each of these statements, as well as the proportion of adults who took these views when we last asked these questions in 2002.1 This shows that teenagers are clearly more liberal in their attitudes than adults; on three out of the four statements, the proportion of young people taking the most liberal view is around ten percentage points higher than it is among adults. The difference is most marked in relation to whether working mothers can have “just as warm and secure” a relationship with their children as mothers who do not have paid work – nearly eight in ten young people agree that they can, compared to 64 per cent of adults. The one exception to this pattern is in responses to the statement that “having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person”, where the views of adults and young people do not really differ. Table 3.1 Attitudes towards working women and gender roles, young people and adults

12–19 (2003)

All adults (2002)

% agree

Working mother can have as warm and secure a relationship with child as a non-working mother

78

64

Job is best way for woman to be independent 50 53

% disagree

Family life suffers if woman has a full-time job 52 43

Man’s job to earn money, woman’s job to look after home and family

73

63

Base 663 1960

How have young people’s views changed over the last decade? Here the pattern is mixed. Young people are more supportive now of working mothers and are less likely to see this as having a detrimental impact on family life. As Table 3.2 shows, there has been a nine percentage point increase in the proportion who think that a working mother can have just as good a relationship with her child as a mother who doesn’t work, from 69 to 78 per cent. And more young people now disagree with the view that family life suffers if a woman has a full-time job. However, when it comes to the more general statements about women working, young people’s opinions appear to have hardened somewhat. First, in relation to ‘traditional’ gender roles, fewer young people now disagree with the view that it is a man’s ‘job’ to be breadwinner and a woman’s to be homemaker than did so in 1994. And there has been an 11 percentage point decrease since


53

1994 in the percentage agreeing that a job is the best way for a woman to be independent, down from 61 to 50 per cent. However, this cannot necessarily be seen as an indication of a return to tradit ional views; rather, it is likely to reflect changing perceptions of what constitutes female independence. Changes have also taken place among adults, though in a slightly different way. While the young have become increasingly supportive of working mothers since 1994, adult views have either been stable or become less liberal. And, while young people have become more conservative in their views about gender roles, adults have become more liberal. Despite this, young people remain more liberal in their outlook than adults. Table 3.2 Attitudes towards working women and gender roles, young people and adults, 1994 and 2002/3

12–19 18+

1994 2003 Change 1994 2002 Change

% agree

Working mother can have as good a relationship with child as a non-working mother

69

78

+9

63

64

+1

Job is best way for woman to be independent

61

50

-11

59

53

-6

% disagree

Family life suffers if woman has a full-time job

47

52

+5

50

43

-7


78

73

-5

58

63

+5

Base 580 663 984 1960

Older teenagers, aged between 16 and 19, tend to express more liberal and egalitarian views about these matters than younger groups. As the next table shows, this difference is most marked in relation to the statement “family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job”. Nearly two-thirds of 16–19 year olds disagree with this view, compared to under half of 12–15 year olds. The youngest group in our sample, those aged between 12 and 13 are the most conventional of all; 64 per cent disagree with the view that it’s a man’s job to earn money and a woman’s job to look after home and family, compared to 76 per cent of 14–15 year olds and 81 per cent of 18–19 year olds. Table 3.3 also shows that although young people’s views differ to those of adults overall, they are similar to those held by the youngest adults in our sample, those aged between 18 and 24.


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Table 3.3 Young people’s attitudes towards gender roles, by age

12–15 16–19 18–24 (2002)

% agree


79

75

67

Job is best way for woman to be independent 48 53 51

% disagree

Family life suffers if woman has a full-time job 46 63 60


70

78

84

Base 417 246 148

One interpretation of these findings is that attitudes towards these issues develop during a person’s adolescence and their early adulthood. As our surveys of young people did not involve interviewing the same groups of people in 1994, 1998 and 2003, we cannot use them to track how an individual’s views might change as they get older. However, by combining information from the Young People’s Social Attitudes survey with that from the adult British Social Attitudes surveys carried out in the same years we can track the attitudes of particular cohorts of young people (that is, people born during the same period). For example, we can examine how attitudes to gender roles have developed over time among those young people aged 12–15 in 1994 by looking at 16–19 year olds in 1998 and 21–24 year olds in 2003. This analysis is shown in Table 3.4. Each cohort’s years of birth are described in the first column of the table. Each row then shows the proportion of people who disagree with the view that family life suffers when a woman works in 1994, 1998 and 2003, in order to see whether, as they get older, their views change. Take the cohort born between 1979 and 1982 (who are highlighted in bold in the table). In 1994, when they were 12–15, 43 per cent disagreed with this statement. Four years later, in 1998, this proportion had grown to 50 per cent, rising to 57 per cent by the time they had reached their early twenties. An even more dramatic change took place among the next cohort; when they were 12–15, 41 per cent disagreed with the view that family life suffers when a women works, compared with 63 per cent of the same cohort at the age of 17–19.


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Table 3.4 Family life suffers if woman has full-time job, cohort analysis, 1994-20032

% disagree family life suffers

1994 1998 2003 Change (1994-2003)

All 12–19 year olds 47 45 52 +5

Cohort

(age in brackets)

(age in brackets)

(age in brackets)

1975–1978 52 (16–19) 68 (20–23) 58 (25–28)* +6

1979–1982 43 (12–15) 50 (16–19) 57 (21–24)* +14

1983–19863 41 (12–15) 63 (17–19) +22

1988–1991 46 (12–15) n/a

* = data from 2002

A similar pattern emerges when we carry out the same exercise in relation to our statement about tradit ional gender roles, with the movement from one’s late adolescence to early adulthood being associated with increasingly liberal views. However, when it comes to whether a working mother can have as good a relationship with her child as a non-working mother, there is little evidence of a change in view as young people age. On this issue, views appear to remain fairly fixed throughout one’s teenage years and into one’s early twenties. The age of the young person was not the only characteristic associated with different views on these matters. In general, teenage girls emerge as being far more liberal and egalitarian on these matters than boys, particularly when it comes to views about ‘traditional’ gender roles. Around eight in ten (81 per cent) girls disagree with traditional views about the respective roles of men and women, compared with just over six in ten (63 per cent) boys. The same observations have been made elsewhere about men and women in their twenties and thirties (Crompton et al., 2003) and adolescents (Furnham and Gunter, 1989). Those living in the most financially disadvantaged households have the least liberal views about the impact of a mother’s paid employment on family life. To assess this, we divided our sample of young people into four income groups, based upon the information obtained about their household’s income during the British Social Attitudes survey. Only four in ten young people living in the poorest households disagree with the view that family life suffers when a woman works, compared to nearly six in ten of those in other households. An even starker difference is shown in Table 3.5, which examines views about traditional gender roles. Just over half of those in the poorest households disagree with traditional notions of gender roles, compared to eight in ten of


56

those in the richest homes. However, income was not clearly related to young people’s views about the other two statements we considered. A range of other socio-economic characteristics were associated with differences of opinion on these issues, including class and parental education. However, if we examine the relative importance of a range of different factors using multivariate analysis, education and class cease to be significant once income is taken into account (and so we do not report them here).4

Table 3.5 Man’s job to earn money, woman’s job to look after home and family, by household income

Household income quartile

Lowest 2nd lowest 2nd highest Highest

% % % %

Agree 30 14 7 9

Neither agree nor dis agree 15 11 6 10

Disagree 55 72 87 81

Base 141 132 152 118

Note: Based on all young people for whom parental data is available

The clearest relationship between young people’s backgrounds and their views about gender roles and female employment relates to perhaps the most relevant consideration of all; whether the young person’s mother works or not. Young people whose mothers are in paid work are far more supportive and liberal in their views than young people whose mothers do not work. As Table 3.6 shows, there is virtually a 20 percentage point gap between the views of these two groups on the assertions that family life “suffers” if a woman works, and that it is a man’s job to earn money and a woman’s to look after the home and family. In the latter case, for instance, nearly eight in ten of those whose mothers work disagree, compared with six in ten of those whose mothers do not work. The importance of this relationship, while taking into account differences in income, education and class, is confirmed by multivariate analysis.


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Table 3.6 Young people’s attitudes towards gender roles, by whether their mother has a paid job

Mother not in paid work

Mother in paid work

% agree


70

81

Job is best way for woman to be independent 47 53

% disagree

Family life suffers if woman has a full-time job 40 58


60

79

Base 203 388

Note: Based on all young people for whom parental data is available So far, therefore, we have found clear evidence that young people are considerably more liberal than adults in their views about gender roles and female employment. However, this does not reflect a huge generation gap; rather, teenagers’ views are very similar to those held by younger adults (indeed, if we trace the development of young people’s views as they age, we can see that their views about gender roles become increasingly liberal during their late teenage years, and into their early twenties). We have also found that young people’s views overall have changed over the last decade. This is particularly true as regards working mothers, of whom young people are more supportive now than before. By contrast, there has been little change of view among adults or, in the case of whether family life “suffers” if a women works, a hardening of view. And even young people are slightly less rejecting now of traditional gender roles than they were in 1994 (although they remain more liberal on this issue than adults). But it is hard to put this change down to a ‘backlash’ against increasing levels of female employment; young people with working mothers remain substantially more supportive of working women than are teenagers whose mothers do not work. Relationships: cohabitation, marriage and lone parenthood In 2001, marriages in Britain were at their lowest level since the First World War. The divorce rate increased steadily in the 1970s and 1980s, levelling off in the 1990s (Coleman, 2000; Barlow et al., 2001). Cohabitation rates have


58

increased, rising from five to 15 per cent between 1986 and 1999, and there has been a considerable rise in lone parenthood – more than doubling since 1971 (Barlow et al., 2001). Around a quarter of dependent children now live with a lone parent (Dench et al., 2002). To assess young people’s views about family formation and relationships, we asked them whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married It’s a good idea for a couple who intend to get married to live together first One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents When there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they don’t get along

In most cases, we can compare young people’s responses to those of adults. And, as seen in Table 3.7, young people are notably more liberal in their views. Indeed, there is a gulf in attitudes between young and old on whether one parent can bring up a child as well as two; seven in ten young people agree that they can, nearly double the rate found among adults. Cohabitation is supported by the majority of both groups, but while 85 per cent of young people think it acceptable to live together without intending to marry, only 69 per cent of adults agree.

Table 3.7 Attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, young people and adults

12–19 18+ (2002)

% agree

All right for a couple to live together and not marry 85 69

Good idea to live together first if intend to marry 73 61

One parent can bring up a child as well as two 70 39

% disagree

When there are children, parents should stay together 66 n/a

Base 663 1960

n/a = not asked


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Young people’s views on lone parenthood have become more liberal over time. Table 3.8 shows that seven in ten now think that one parent can bring up a child as well as two, compared with just over half in 1994. They are also less likely to think that couples should stay together ‘for the sake of the children’. However, a more mixed picture emerges in relation to cohabitation. Here we find a modest increase in the proportion agreeing that cohabitation is “all right”, but a nine percentage point decline in the percentage who would recommend cohabitation to a couple before marriage. This suggests that, while young people are increasingly likely to tolerate a situation which is now widespread, they are less likely now to actively advocate it. That said, three-quarters of young people do advocate living together before marriage. During the same period adult opinion about these issues has shifted in a consistently liberal direction. However, these changes are far more modest than those found among young people. Unfortunately, adults were not asked in 2002 about their views on relationship breakdown where children are involved, meaning that we cannot see how their views have changed alongside those of young people.

Table 3.8 Attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, young people and adults, 1994 and 2002/3

12–19 18+

1994 2003 Change 1994 2002 Change

% agree

All right for a couple to live together and not marry

80

85

+5

64

69

+5

Good idea to live together first if intend to marry

82

73

-9

58

61

+3

One parent can bring up a child as well as two

55

70

+15

35

39

+4

% disagree

When there are children, parents should stay together

59

66

+7

56

n/a

Base 580 663 984 1960

n/a = not asked

As we found with attitudes to gender roles, older teenagers generally have more liberal views than younger ones on cohabitation, marriage and relationships. The differences are generally fairly modest, though there is a large difference in


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relation to whether “when there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they don’t get along”. On this issue, younger groups are more likely than older ones to think that parents should put their children first; seven in ten (72 per cent) 16–19 year olds disagree with this notion, compared to six in ten (62 per cent) 12–15 year olds (and, within this group, 56 per cent of 12–13 year olds). To what extent do the views of teenagers tally with those of young adults (those aged 18 to 24)? The two groups do, in fact, have fairly similar views on cohabitation and marriage, but there is a large difference between their attitudes to lone parents. Only 55 per cent of 18–24 year olds think that one parent can bring up a child as well as two, compared to 70 per cent of 12–19 year olds. On this measure, then, teenagers’ views are distinctive even when compared to those of young adults. Earlier we found that girls were more likely than boys to have more liberal views about gender roles. The same applies to their views on marriage and cohabitation. Both our research, and that of others, finds young men to be more conventional and pro-marriage than young women (Sharpe, 2001). Table 3.9 shows that, as was the case with age, the difference is most marked in responses to the view that parents should stay together for their children’s sake. Three-quarters of girls disagree with this, compared to 55 per cent of boys – a substantial difference. The only exception to this tendency for girls to be more liberal is that boys are more likely to advocate cohabitation for a couple intending to marry. Table 3.9 Young people’s attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, by sex

Boys Girls

% agree




% disagree

When there are children, parents should stay together 55 75

Base 303 360

Not surprisingly, perhaps, religion is strongly related to views about cohabitation. As shown in Table 3.10, nine in ten young people who do not belong to a religion think that this is “all right”, compared to just seven in ten of their more religious counterparts.


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Table 3.10 Young people’s attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, and family type, by whether belongs to a religion

Does not belong to a religion

Belongs to a religion

% agree




% disagree

When there are children, parents should stay together 67 63

Base 430 231

Perhaps the most relevant comparison is to examine the views of those young people who are themselves growing up within a lone-parent family. Table 3.11 shows that teenagers in this group are markedly more likely to think that one parent can bring up a child as well as two, nearly nine in ten doing so, compared to two-thirds of young people living in couple families. The former are also more likely to advocate cohabitation before marriage. Regression analysis shows that family type is significantly associated with views on these matters once other characteristics are taken into account. Table 3.11 One parent can bring up a child as well as two, by family type

Couple Lone parent

% %

Agree 65 87

Neither agree nor disagree 14 7

Disagree 21 6

Base 448 143

Note: Based on all young people for whom parental data is available Earlier we found that young people in more socio-economically ‘advantaged’ homes (whether measured by income, class or parental education) tended to have more liberal views about gender roles and female employment than young people in less advantaged ones. The same is not true in relation to views about single parenthood; here, young people with parents who are graduates or hold


62

another higher education qualification are notably less approving. As seen in Table 3.12, eight in ten of those whose parent has no qualifications think that one parent can bring up a child just as well as two parents, compared to only six in ten of those whose parent has a higher education qualification. However, the latter are more likely than the former to disagree with the view that a couple with children should stay together if they don’t get on. Half of those whose parent has no qualifications oppose this idea, compared to seven in ten young people whose parent has a higher education qualification. Similar differences apply when we consider young people’s views in relation to their household income or their parent’s class, with those in less advantaged homes being notably more likely to see single parenthood as acceptable, but more likely to think that parents should stay together for their children’s sake. However, once parental education is taken into account, class and income do not emerge as significantly related to young people’s views. This relationship between young people’s views about lone parenthood and their parent’s education cannot solely be accounted for by the fact that lone parenthood is less common among those with more academic qualifications. Both parental education and family type are significantly associated with young people’s views, even when their interrelationship is taken into account. A similar relationship between education and less ‘liberal’ attitudes towards relationships has been found among adults (Barlow et al., 2001), suggesting that ‘middle-class’ values on marriage and parenthood are notably less liberal than they are in other areas. Table 3.12 Young people’s attitudes towards family type, by parental education

Parent’s highest educational qualification

Higher education

A Level or equiv.

GCSE or equiv.

None

% agree

One parent can bring up a child as well as two

59

68

77

78

% disagree

When there are children, parents should stay together

69

71

64

52

Base 185 85 210 99

Note: Based on all young people for whom parental data is available As was the case with gender roles and female employment, young people are notably more liberal than adults in their views about families and relationships. Indeed, there is a considerable gulf in attitudes between young and old on


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whether one parent can bring up a child as well as two. On this issue, young people’s views have become much more liberal over time. However, it appears that young people are less likely now to actively advocate cohabitation before marriage than they were in 1994 (even though they are increasingly likely to tolerate it). The issue of single-parent families is one which divides teenagers even from young adults. Here, then, is a subject on which there truly does seem to be a generation gap; whereas 55 per cent of 18–24 year olds think one parent can bring up a child as well as two, 70 per cent of 12–19 year olds do so, 15 percentage points more than in 1994. To some extent, this is likely to reflect the different experiences of these groups and the increasing prevalence of lone- parent families. After all, as we have seen, teenagers who themselves grow up in a lone-parent family are much more accepting of lone parenthood than those who are living in a couple family. Sexual behaviour Unlike the previous two topics, there is less direct evidence as to how sexual behaviour has changed over the last few decades. Under-age sex, one of the issues we consider here, is notoriously hard to measure due to the lack of survey evidence for under 16s. However, that evidence which does exist suggests that teenagers are becoming sexually active at younger ages than in the past (Coleman, 2000). A recent report based on the National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles found that, among 16–19 year olds, 30 per cent of men and 26 per cent of women first had sex before they were 16 – a substantially higher proportion than that found among adults aged 35 and over (Wellings et al., 2001). This suggests that younger groups are becoming sexually active at an earlier age than their predecessors. However, clear evidence exists of changing attitudes towards sexual behaviour. In particular, there has been a marked increase in permissiveness about pre-marital sex. For instance, the proportion of people who think there is “nothing wrong” with sex before marriage increased from 42 in 1984 to 62 per cent in 2000 (Barlow et al., 2001). We asked young people for their view on the rights and wrongs of two forms of sexual relationship, with the range of answer options distinguishing between extreme and more moderate views: “always wrong”, “mostly wrong”, “sometimes wrong”, “rarely wrong” and “not wrong at all”:

Now some questions about sexual relationships. Firstly, if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage, what would your general opinion be?

What if it was a boy and a girl who were both still under 16?

As Table 3.13 suggests, both young people and adults are far more permissive when it comes to pre-marital sex than they are about under-age sex. However,


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young people are notably more permissive about under-age sex than adults, with just a third thinking this is “always wrong”, around half the rate found among adults. However, only small proportions of both groups think that it is “not wrong at all”, though this view is held by more than twice as many young people as adults. Attitudes towards pre-marital sex do not vary to the same extent; in fact, more adults than young people say it is “not wrong at all” (63 compared to 54 per cent). This is, in fact, the only one of the measures considered in this chapter in which adults express more liberal views than young people! The differences in attitudes towards the two contrasting situations is striking, and no doubt partly reflects the fact that under-age sex is illegal; while pre-marital sex might be considered immoral by those with conservative or traditional views, it is not against the law. However, the fact that young people are notably more liberal in their views about under-age sex suggests that this is an area about which they have formed views based less upon legality and more upon their own experiences and those of their peer-group. It has also been suggested that, on topics where communication within families is poor (which may be the case when it comes to under-age sex) attitudes between generations are most likely to diverge (Coleman and Hendry, 1999). Table 3.13 Attitudes towards sexual relationships, young people and adults

12–19 18+

Under-age sex % %

Always wrong 34 61

Mostly, sometimes or rarely wrong 56 34

Not wrong at all 5 2

Pre-marital sex % %

Always wrong 5 8



Base 663 2139

Young people’s views on these issues have changed little since 1998, when these questions were first asked. Over the same period, adults have become slightly more censorious about under-age sex (with a five point increase in the proportion saying this is “always wrong”) and less censorious about pre-marital sex (with a five percentage point increase in the proportion saying that this is “not wrong at all”).


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Younger teenagers are notably less permissive in their views than older ones. As the next table shows, 16–19 year olds are both more likely to condone and less likely to condemn under-age and pre-marital sex. Indeed, the youngest teenagers in our sample, those aged 12–13, were the most condemning of both, with nearly half thinking that under-age sex is always wrong. When we compare older teenagers with young adults, aged 18–24, their views are notably similar in relation to pre-marital sex (with around a third seeing it as not wrong at all) but remarkably different in relation to under-age sex. Here, young adults were twice as likely to condemn it as older teenagers (50 and 27 per cent respectively). On this issue, therefore, it does seem that teenagers have notably distinctive views. Table 3.14 Young people’s attitudes towards sexual relationships, by age

12–15 16–19 18–24

Under-age sex % % %

Always wrong 39 27 50

Mostly, sometimes or rarely wrong 53 62 45

Not wrong at all 4 8 2

Pre-marital sex % % %

Always wrong 6 4 8

Mostly, sometimes or rarely wrong 41 27 21

Not wrong at all 46 68 67

Base 417 246 160

Gender is not strongly related to views about sexual behaviour, with boys and girls having broadly similar views on the subject. That said, there is a small but consistent tendency for boys to take the most permissive view of all, that pre-marital or under-age sex is “not wrong at all”. This difference is statistically significant in relation to under-age sex (eight compared to three per cent), but not for pre-marital sex (57 compared to 52 per cent). This tallies with other research which has found that teenage boys tend to be more liberal on these issues than girls (Sharpe, 2002) and that men are more liberal than women. It is notable, however, that this is the one area we have considered in which boys are more liberal in their views than girls (with the exception of the desirability of cohabitation). Earlier we found that religious affiliation is linked to views about relationships. So it is not surprising that teenagers who are religious are more likely than those who are not to condemn under-age and pre-marital sex. As Table 3.15 shows, whereas six in ten teenagers with no religious affiliation say


66

that pre-marital sex is “not wrong at all”, just four in ten of their religious counterparts agree. A similar pattern exists in relation to under-age sex, with nearly half of religious young people saying this is “always wrong”, compared to under a third of those with no religion. The importance of religion in explaining young people’s views is confirmed by multivariate analysis. Table 3.15 Young people’s attitudes towards sexual relationships, by whether religious

Does not belong to a religion

Belongs to a religion

Under-age sex % %

Always wrong 29 45



Pre-marital sex % %

Always wrong 1 13



Base 430 231

As levels of religiosity are higher among adults than young people, we also need to consider whether parental religious attachment plays any part in shaping attitudes among those young people who are not themselves religious. While young people with religious parents are more likely to have conservative views about sex, the relationship is less clear if the young person is not religious themselves. However, the relationship between young people’s own religiosity (as opposed to their parents’) and their views about sexual behaviour is far stronger. A range of other characteristics are associated with differences of view about sexual behaviour. On the whole, young people in less socio-economically advantaged homes are less liberal in their views than those in more advantaged ones. Yet those living in a lone-parent household are more permissive about pre-marital sex than those living with a couple. Six in ten (61 per cent) think this is “not wrong at all”, compared to half (51 per cent) of those living with a couple. However, parental education, income, class, and household type did not emerge as significantly rela ted to views about sex once other factors such as religion and age were taken into account. Many writers have discussed the likely influence of parents (and other family members) on young people’s behaviour and attitudes towards sex (Coleman and


67

Hendry, 1999). To what extent, then, is there a correspondence between parental and teenage views on this issue? Table 3.16 groups young people according to their parent’s view about pre-marital sex, and then examines the extent to which these groups of young people differ. It shows that there is a strong relationship between parental and teenage views, with six in ten young people whose parent thinks pre-marital sex is “not wrong at all” taking this view themselves, compared to just over three in ten of young people with parents who hold the alternative view. Parental views about sex are also linked to young people’s attitudes towards under-age sex, but the relationship is weaker than that shown in Table 3.16. This lower level of congruence between parental and teenage views on under-age sex might reflect the fact that young people’s views on these matters are shaped more by personal experience and discussions with their peers than by family. Table 3.16 Young people’s attitudes towards pre-marital sex, by parent’s view

Parent’s view

Always, mostly, sometimes, rarely

wrong

Not at all wrong

Young person’s view % %

Always wrong 16 2



Base 91 228

Note: based on all young people for whom parental data is available So, in contrast to our findings in relation to gender roles and family relationships, young people are slightly less liberal than adults about pre-marital sex. They are, however, notably more liberal when it comes to under-age sex, something which six in ten adults see as “always” wrong. This gulf between teenage and adult opinion holds true even when we compare teenagers with young adults, a half of whom take this view. As we found earlier, older teenagers have more liberal views than younger ones, and those who describe themselves as religious are less liberal. And, as a sure sign that teenagers are not so rebellious as many would have us believe, it is clear that parental influences loom large. Teenagers with parents who hold liberal views about pre-marital sex are notably more liberal than those whose parents are more disapproving.


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Conclusions We began this chapter by asking whether young people’s attitudes towards families and relationships are distinctive from those held by adults and, if so, why this might be. A number of patterns have emerged. Most importantly, it is clear that young people’s views on gender roles, working women, family relationships and sex do differ from those held by adults. In some cases, these differences are very marked indeed. Teenagers are far more accepting of lone parents than are adults; a clear majority (seven in ten) of 12–19 year olds agree that one parent can bring up a child as well as two, compared to just four in ten adults. Under-age sex is another issue that clearly distinguishes between teenage and adult views, with a majority of adults thinking it to be “always” wrong, compared to just a third of young people. However, these marked differences of opinion are the exception rather than the rule. On most of the other measures we consider, the picture is more one of broad consensus, with differences in the magnitude of opinion rather than its direction. Moreover, differences of view between young people and adults tend to be reduced when the comparison is made with 18–24 year olds rather than with adults as a whole. There is also evidence of that young people’s views about some issues, most notably sex, are closely related to those of their parents. In this sense, then, we have found little to suggest that young people’s views are best explained by teenage rebellion and the rejection of adult views. Rather, they are likely to reflect the reality of their lives – lives which have been shaped by wide-ranging societal changes in relation to women’s employment, marriage, cohabitation and lone parenthood. Meanwhile, although there is some evidence of a hardening of attitudes towards cohabitation and women working, the main picture painted by our findings is that young people have become more supportive of lone parents and working mothers over the last decade. Differences among teenagers are considerable, complicating any notion of ‘youth’ as a homogenous group. Age, sex and religion are persistent factors affecting views. Older teenagers are generally more liberal or tolerant than younger groups. They are more permissive about pre-marital sex, with over two-thirds of 16–19 year olds saying this is “not wrong at all” compared to less than half of 12–15 year olds. There are similarly dramatic age differences in relation to views about whether family life “suffers” if a woman has a full-time job. Girls tend to be more liberal than boys. In particular, they are more opposed to the traditional view of gender roles; around eight in ten girls disagree that it’s a man’s job to be breadwinner and a woman’s job to look after home and family, compared to just over six in ten boys. When it comes to relationships, too, boys are more likely to hold traditional views. Just over half (55 per cent) disagree with the view that parents should stay together for the sake of their children, even if they don’t get along, compared to three-quarters of girls. And young people who are religious tend to be more traditional and conventional in their views than those who are not. This is particularly true in relation to attitudes to sex and cohabitation. Personal experience appears to play an all-important role; teenagers who themselves live in a lone parent household are far more likely than those in


69

couple families to think that one parent can bring up a child as well as two (nearly nine in ten agree, compared to two-thirds of young people living in couple families). There is also a clear relationship between personal experience and attitudes towards women and employment, with those who have working mothers being notably more supportive than those who do not. Indeed, six in ten young people whose mother works disagree that family life “suffers” if the woman works full-time, compared with just four in ten of those whose mother does not work. Other parental and household characteristics, including education, income and social class, play a minor role in shaping young people’s views, although their relationship is not always consistent. Most notably, the highest level of liberalism towards lone-parents is found among those whose parents have few, or no, qualifications, despite the fact that this group are likely to have the most traditional attitudes towards gender roles. What do our findings suggest might happen to societal attitudes over the next few decades? The fact that teenagers, like young adults, are so much more liberal than older groups suggests that British opinion overall will continue to become more liberal still, as younger generations, with their less traditional attitudes and values, gradually replace older generations, with their more traditional ones. This partly reflects the strong relationship we have found between religiosity and a person’s attitudes; put simply, far more young people than adults do not define themselves as belonging to a particular religion (65 and 43 per cent respectively). Furthermore, the fact that personal experience is so closely related to attitudes, particularly towards lone parenthood and female employment, also points towards an increasingly liberal and tolerant view about these issues, as increasing numbers of young people grow up in homes in which mothers work, or which are headed by one parent. The last few decades have been marked by considerable changes in family relationships, gender roles and sexuality. In most cases, young people appear to have responded to these changes by becoming more liberal still. There is certainly no sign that, in response to the increasing ‘freedom’ available to adults, young people wish to return to a more traditional view of the family and individuals’ roles within it. Notes 1. When comparing responses to questions in the Young Person’s Social Attitudes

survey (those of 12–19 year olds) with the same questions in the British Social Attitudes survey (18+) we need to be aware that there may be context effects. This may mean that apparent differences in opinion are, in fact, due to the impact of preceding questions. However, every effort has been made to ensure comparability in other ways – the same question wording, mode and answer options were used in the two surveys.


70


1994 1998 2003

All 12-19 year olds 580 474 663

Cohort

1975–1978 227 31 117 1979–1982 346 216 80 1983–1986 – 258 169 1988–1991 – – 417

Note: respondents who failed to give their age are excluded from the cohort breakdown.

3. This cohort was aged 17–20 in 2003. However, the Young People’s Social Attitudes

survey only interviews the 12–19 age group (meaning we can only consider the views of those aged 17–19 that year).

4. The findings reported in this chapter are informed by the results of a series of multivariate analyses carried out in order to identify the characteristics most strongly associated with views about families, gender roles and sex. The results of these analyses are not shown here; details are available from the author on request.

References Barlow, A., Duncan, S., James, G. and Park, A. (2001), ‘Just a piece of paper? Marriage

and cohabitation’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.) British Social Attitudes: the 18th Report – Public policy, Social ties, London: Sage

Coleman, J. (2000), ‘Young People in Britain at the Beginning of a New Century’, Children & Society, 14:230–224

Coleman, J. and Hendry, L. (1999), The Nature of Adolescence, London: Routledge Crompton, R., Brockmann, M. and Wiggins, R.D. (2003), ‘A woman’s place …

Employment and family life for men and women’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 20th Report – Continuity and change over two decades, London: Sage

Davis, J. (1990), Youth and the Condition of Britain: Images of adolescent conflict, London: The Athlone Press

Dench, S., Aston, J., Evans, C., Meager, N., Williams, M. and Willison, R. (2002), Key Indicators of Women’s Position in Britain, Women and Equality Unit, London: Department of Trade and Industry

Duffield, M. (2002), ‘Trends in female employment 2002’, in Labour Market Trends, November

Furnham, A. and Gunter, B. (1989), The Anatomy of Adolescence: Young People’s Social Attitudes in Britain, London: Routledge


71

McGrellis, S., Henderson, S., Holland, J., Sharpe, S. and Thomson, R. (2000), Through the Moral Maze: a quantitative study of young people’s values, London: Tufnell Press

Park, A., (2000), ‘The generation game’, in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L., Bromley, C. and Stratford, N. (eds.) British Social Attitudes: the 17th Report – Focussing on diversity , London: Sage

Sharpe, S. (2001), More than just a piece of paper? Young people’s views on marriage and relationships, London: National Children’s Bureau

Sharpe, S. (2002), ‘”It’s Just Really Hard to Come to Terms With”: young people’s views on homosexuality’, Sex Education , 2(3)

Wellings, K., Nanchahal, K., Macdowall, W., McManus, S., Erens, B., Mercer, C.H., Johnson, A. M., Copas, A.J., Korovessis, C., Fenton, K.A. and Field, J. (2001), ‘Sexual behaviour in Britain: early heterosexual experience’, The Lancet, 358(9296): 1843

Acknowledgements We are grateful to the Children, Young People’s and Families Directorate in the Department for Education and Skills (formerly the Children and Young People’s Unit) for funding the module of questions on which this chapter is based. Responsibility for analysis of this data lies solely with the author.

Can Britain close the digitaldivide?
4 Catherine Bromley ∗
The last few years have seen a marked increase in personal use of the internet.Now, 50 per cent of people use the internet (other than purely for their work),up from 33 per cent in 2000. Then, there was a significant ‘digital divide’between those who did and did not use the internet, most notably in terms oftheir socio-economic backgrounds and their age (Gardner and Oswald, 2001), apattern which has been identified in many other studies (Wilheim, 2000). A keyaim of this chapter will be to examine whether the recent expansion of personalinternet use has reduced these social differences. We begin, however, by considering why a report on public attitudes should beinterested in internet use in the first place. After all, it could be argued that theinternet is just another technological innovation, on a par with the introductionof personal computers or mobile phones. If the internet was simply an extensionof computer technology, then the case for analysing its reach and impact viapublic attitudes research would be weak. But the internet is not just a piece ofsoftware; it is a portal which has the potential to liberalise access to a wholehost of resources and opportunities, and to increase social connections.Moreover, it is an important communication tool, much like newspapers, radioor television, all of which have been subjected to intense scrutiny by socialscientists. It has the capacity to impart knowledge to groups which have tendedto be excluded from traditional information sources, to provide new channels ofcommunication, and to open up access to goods and services previously deniedor impeded by older technologies or methods of exchange. Email has, forinstance, vastly enhanced communication between people living on oppositesides of the globe, and has expanded access to all kinds of information, fromtravel times and weather forecasts to health advice. Indeed, the prolific extent towhich the media makes reference to website and e-mail addresses could almostlead a newcomer to Britain to conclude that the internet is the primary means of ∗ Catherine Bromley is a Senior Researcher at the Scottish Centre for Social Research,

part of NatCen, and is Co-Director of the British Social Attitudes survey series.

BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES74

communication, rather than something to which just half the population hasaccess. From a global perspective, China provides an interesting case in point.Although its government is keen to exploit the economic gains that could accruefrom internet access, the potential for it to have any wider socio-political impactis being carefully controlled through the use of surveillance, censorship andselective blocking of some services (The Economist, 2003). To the Chineseauthorities, therefore, the internet is seen as having the potential both to createwealth and to foster critical thinking and dissent. It is true that some of the more wildly optimistic hopes as to what the internetmight deliver in terms of its potential to connect people politically and socially,most notably via the expansion of ‘digital democracy’ (Budge, 1996; Barber,1999) have yet to be realised, and quite probably never will be. However, futurehistorians will undoubtedly pinpoint the advent of widespread internet use as akey social development (see the chapter by Curtice and Norris in this volumefor a detailed examination of the impact of the internet on political trust andengagement). Unless access to the internet is broadened – both within countriesand cross-nationally – many millions will miss out on what the internet has tooffer and, crucially, we could see the emergence of a digital underclass,excluded from all the possibilities which the majority will come to take forgranted (Golding, 1998). In much the same way that literacy and numeracyempowered previous generations in the developed world (and has still toperform the same function in most of the developing world), internet access andthe skills that accompany it could perform a similar function in the future. The chapter begins by examining who uses the internet, focusing particularlyon whether the recent expansion of internet use has reduced the social divisionsthat were so apparent in 2000. We then explore the different ways in whichpeople use the internet, and their attitudes towards its functions and potentialapplications. Finally, we examine the attitudes and aspirations of non-users inorder to better understand the reasons why large sections of the Britishpopulation are not on-line. This allows us to assess the future prospects ofreducing these stark social divisions in internet use.

Who is on-line?

The costs involved in internet use (such as buying the computer hardware andpaying subscription fees to an internet provider) can be seen as a major barrierto internet use. Consequently, some have argued that one way of closing thedigital divide is to expand public access through libraries, community centresand internet cafés. The last few years has indeed seen a vast expansion in thenumber of these kinds of public internet access points; in 2003 it was estimatedthat 89 per cent of the population lived within three kilometres of a publicaccess point, while 99 per cent live within ten kilometres of one (CabinetOffice, 2004). However, as Table 4.1 shows, the growth in internet use between2000 and 2003 has largely been fuelled by the growth of home access, rather

Can Britain close the digital divide? 75

than by increased take-up of more remote facilities. Between 2000 and 2003,the proportion of users with home internet access grew from 26 to 41 per cent,whereas the proportion who use the internet but who do not have access to it athome grew only two points, from seven to nine per cent.

Table 4.1 Home internet access and personal use, 2000 and 2003

2000 2003 Change2000–2003

Users % %

Have internet access at home and use internet 26 41 +15Do not have internet access at home but use

internet elsewhere 7 9 +2Non-users

Have internet access at home but do not useinternet 9 10 +1

Do not have internet access at home and donot use internet elsewhere 57 40 -17

Base 2293 4432

It is also apparent that the growth of home internet access has partly beenfuelled by parents. Between 2000 and 2003, home access and use amongsthouseholds with children grew from one in three (32 per cent) to over half (54per cent), an increase of 22 percentage points. By contrast, the rate of growthamongst households without children was almost half this rate (from 23 to 35per cent, 12 points). So, despite a mass expansion of public access sites, thestory of Britain’s escalating internet use largely goes hand in hand withincreasing ownership of home computers – often, it would seem, at the behestof demanding children – rather than a stampede across the thresholds oflibraries, internet cafés and other communal internet providers. Rogers’ theory of technological diffusion (1995) suggests that the first peopleto use new innovations such as telephones or radios are usually atypical in theirsocial background, technical skills, and interests. However, as the costs ofhardware fall and the skills required to operate the technology become morewidespread, over time the user population gradually ‘normalises’. Evidencefrom America suggests that these developments are already occurring in theUnited States, where more than two-thirds of the population are now on-line.1So, as internet access continues to spread across Britain, we might expect adiminishing of the ‘digital divide’ between different social use of the internet.We start by looking at whether this is in fact the case. The reasons why the internet might be more attractive and less daunting toyounger generations need little detailed exploration. But it is worth reflecting


briefly on quite how rapid the pace of technological change has been over thepast century. After all, 20 per cent of our respondents were born before theballpoint pen was invented in 1938, over a half (55 per cent) before the firstmicrochip was patented in 1959, and 71 per cent before the first handheldcalculator was introduced in 1967. Just six per cent were born after IBMlaunched its first personal computer in 1981. The marked age differences that exist in personal internet use are shown inTable 4.2, which examines how particular age groups differed in their use of theinternet in 2000 and 2003. The ‘digital divide’ row shows the differencebetween the age groups most and least likely to use the internet (18–24 yearolds and those aged 65 or over), and the third column shows the change ininternet use between 2000 and 2003. This demonstrates that now, as in 2000,18–24 year olds were markedly more likely than older groups to make personaluse of the internet, and that the increase in internet use between 2000 and 2003has actually increased the digital divide between these two groups, from 53 to59 percentage points.

Table 4.2 Personal internet use, by age, 2000 and 2003

% who use theinternet

2000 2003 Change2000–2003

Base(2000)

Base(2003)

All 33 50 +17 2293 4432

Age18–24 58 74 +16 176 348

25–34 51 69 +18 410 749

35–44 40 65 +25 465 879

45–54 36 51 +15 339 759

55–59 23 41 +18 161 369

60–64 19 29 +10 198 300

65+ 5 15 +10 538 1027

‘Digital divide’ 53 59 +6

In 2000, we found that men were more likely to use the internet than women(Gardner and Oswald, 2001). Although this continues to be true, the rate ofinternet use by women has increased more than it has among men, meaning thatthe gap between these two groups is starting to close. So, while in 2000 therewas a difference of 12 points between men’s and women’s use, by 2003 this hadmore than halved to just five points.2


Table 4.3 Personal internet use, by sex, 2000 and 2003


2000 2003 Change2000–2003

Base(2000)

Base(2003)

All 33 50 +17 2293 4432

SexMen 40 53 +13 981 1959

Women 28 48 +20 1312 2473

‘Digital divide’ 12 5 -7

Given the considerable financial costs involved of accessing the internet fromhome (as we have seen, by far the most popular form of access), and the degreeof computer literacy required of users, it is unsurprising that socio-economicfactors such as education, income and social class are all significant predictorsof whether or not someone uses the internet. The next table illustrates this withreference to education. It shows that the growth in internet use has been greatestamongst the most qualified, with the proportion of graduates using the internetincreasing by 12 percentage points between 2000 and 2003, from 72 to 84 percent. Among those with no qualifications at all, however, internet use increasedby only three points, from nine to 12 per cent. As a result, the digital divideassociated with educational qualifications is now greater than ever before.

Table 4.4 Personal internet use, by highest educational qualification, 2000 and2003


2000 2003 Change2000–2003

Base2000

Base2003

All 33 50 +17 2293 4432

Highest educationalqualification

Degree 72 84 +12 300 674

Higher education 47 68 +21 328 600

A level 49 69 +20 234 563

O level 30 53 +23 439 818

CSE or equivalent 21 38 +18 203 466

No qualifications 9 12 +3 740 1208

‘Digital divide’ 63 72 +9


A similar pattern is evident in relation to household income and social class.Nearly eight in ten of those with a household income in the highest quartile (in2003, those with incomes of £38,000 or above) use the internet, an increase of18 points since 2000. Among those in the lowest income quartile (incomes of£11,999 or less), only 22 per cent use the internet, up 11 points since 2000.Consequently, the divide between these two groups now stands at 57 points, upseven points in three years. And, while 71 per cent of professionals andmanagers make personal use of the internet, up 18 points since 2000, the sameapplies to only 27 per cent of those in working-class occupations, up nine pointssince 2000. The digital divide between these two groups has grown from 35 to44 points. So, significant differences remain between the extent to which different groupsuse the internet. And, with the exception of gender, the recent expansion ofinternet use has not only failed to narrow Britain’s digital divide – if anything ithas exacerbated it. These findings support other analyses of the digital dividecarried out cross-nationally (Norris, 2001), and also mirror the kinds of patternsevident in the US at the point when their internet use also stood at around halfthe population (US Department of Commerce, 2000). Of course, some of thefive factors we have examined (age, sex, education, income and class) arethemselves interrelated. Older people are, for instance, the most likely to haveno formal education, meaning that the relationship we find between educationand internet use might simply reflect the fact that older groups are the leastlikely to use the internet. To investigate this, we ran a multivariate logisticregression model (see Appendix I to this Report for more details of this method)which looked at the relationship between each of these five characteristics andinternet use. This allows us to examine the contribution of each characteristiconce the others are taken into account (see Model 1 in the appendix to thischapter for full results). This analysis reveals that all five factors are significantpredictors of internet use. Even when we take account of a person’s age, theirlevel of education remains independently related to their internet use, as doestheir sex, social class and household income. In fact, the relationship betweeneach factor and internet use is so significant that it is impossible to rank thefactors in order of their relative contributions. The fact that these socio-demographic factors are so important in accounting for internet use underlinesthe extent to which the ‘digital divide’ is very much a social divide, and a dividewhich, as yet, shows no signs of diminishing.

How do people use the internet?

We now turn to examine the characteristics of those who do use the internet.We begin by considering where internet use most commonly takes place, andthen examine the different ways in which the internet is used.


Location, location, location

As we have already discussed, the majority of internet users go on-line athome.3 As the next table shows, the next most popular location for personalinternet use is at work mentioned by 45 per cent of all users, and 59 per cent ofall those actually in work (we do not include in this table people who only goon-line at work for work purposes). The least commonly mentioned places arethe public access locations such as libraries and cafés, frequented by only one infourteen users.

Table 4.5 Where do people use the internet?

%

At home 83At work 45At a friend’s or relative’s house 15At school / college / university 11At an internet café 8In a library or community centre 7

Base 1527

Note: Column does not sum to 100 as respondents could mention more than onelocation

The potential for public-access locations to increase internet use amongst thosewho cannot afford home access is self-evident. However, as demonstrated byTable 4.1, the impact of the dramatic expansion in the numbers of these remotelocations has so far been limited, with the bulk of the recent increase in internetuse reflecting an increase in access from home. But we might expect to findthat, among internet users, public-access locations are important in enablingcertain groups to go on-line. This is explored in the next table, which looks atthe relationship between a range of socio-economic factors and reported use ofthe internet at home, work, and in libraries or community centres. It shows thatthe groups most likely to make use of internet facilities in a library orcommunity centre (as well as being the least likely to have access at home), arethe young (aged 18–24), those with the lowest household incomes and people insemi-routine and routine occupations. Indeed, these are the only groups amongwhom the use of public access facilities for internet use attains double figures.However, although public-access locations are an important source of access forthese groups (two of whom, those on low incomes and in semi-routine androutine occupations, are amongst the least likely overall to be on-line), theyremain less important than access at home or work.


Table 4.6 Location of personal internet use, by age, household income and socialclass

Location of internet use

Use of the internet at … … home … work1 … library orcommunity

centre

Base (All /all in work)

All % 83 59 7 1527 / 1089

Age18–24 % 68 46 17 185 / 114

25–39 % 80 61 7 597 / 457

40–64 % 90 61 4 646 / 510

65+ % 92 (25) 2 98 / 7

Household incomeHighest quartile % 91 79 7 428 / 327

Third quartile % 83 57 7 570 / 420

Second quartile % 80 44 7 439 / 298

Lowest quartile % 66 (28) 3 87 /41

Social classManagerial/professional % 88 70 4 476 /414

Intermediate % 78 55 7 399 / 324

Self-employed % 87 51 9 307 / 212

Lower supervisory/Technical % 80 (24) 15 194 / 46

Semi-routine and routine % 75 20 11 259 / 155

Notes: 1.This column is based only on those in workRows do not sum to 100 as respondents could mention more than one locationCells with a base of fewer than 50 are in brackets

Table 4.6 also shows that, when it comes to personal use of the internet in theworkplace, very clear social divisions exist. If we focus on social class (thefactor which is, after all, most closely related to people’s working environment)we find that three-quarters (76 per cent) of professionals and managers have theopportunity to use the internet at work for personal reasons, compared with justa fifth (20 per cent) of those in semi-routine and routine occupations.

What do people use the internet for?

So far we have seen that internet users have very different characteristics whenit comes to where they access the internet. We now consider what peopleactually use the internet for. There are, of course, a vast number of different


things people can do on-line, and the possibilities no doubt grow exponentiallyby the day. To examine this, we presented respondents with a list of fifteenways in which the internet might be used and asked them to say which, if any,applied to them. As Table 4.7 shows, the most common use of the internet wasfor e-mail, accounting for seven in ten internet users. Nearly half used theinternet to access general information (the question did not spell out preciselywhat this might include), and around four in ten used it for travel and weatherinformation, for shopping, and for banking.

Table 4.7 What people use the internet for

%

E-mail 71General information 48Travel and weather information 44Shopping 43Banking and bill paying 37Training, education and learning 31News and current affairs 27Job search 22Sports information 17Downloading music 16Keeping in touch with groups I belong to 14Games 11Accessing local/central government information/services 11Chat rooms 5Something else 5

Median number of uses 4

Base (all who use the internet other than for work) 1528

Note: Table does not sum to 100 as respondents could mention more than one use

Of the fifteen different ways of using the internet presented in Table 4.7, theaverage number reported by respondents was four. A fifth (22 per cent)mentioned five or six and just over one in seven (14 per cent) picked seven ormore. Younger people are the most likely to be fairly expansive users (with 44per cent reporting five or more different uses of the internet), whereas olderpeople are more likely to make quite limited use. In a similar vein, those withno qualifications, low household incomes, in routine occupations, and womenare the least likely groups to be expansive users.Some people regard the internet’s capacity to expand people’s access andexposure to information and resources from which they might otherwise be


excluded from as one of its greatest advantages. Others question the extent towhich its full potential will ever be properly realised, given the vast socialdivisions that exist not only between users and non-users but also amongst thedifferent groups who use the internet. Indeed, the government is starting to shiftits focus away from access targets towards encouraging existing users to makegreater and more ‘sophisticated’ use of the internet (Cabinet Office, 2004). To see whether particular reasons for using the internet are more commonamongst some groups than others, we now focus upon four of the aboveexamples of internet use: e-mail, shopping, news and current affairs, anddownloading music. These items were selected to reflect some of the most andleast common uses of the internet (ranging from the 71 per cent who use it tosend e-mail to the 16 per cent who download music over the internet) andbecause they reflect four quite distinct uses of the internet: communication,commerce, information and exchange. To simplify the analysis, the tablefocuses upon the groups who were most and least likely to use the internet to dothese things.

Table 4.8 Reasons for using the internet, by age, education, household income,social class and sex

Reasons for using the internet

Use of the internet for … … e-mail … shop-ping

… news,currentaffairs

… down-loadingmusic

Base

All % 71 43 27 16 1528

Age18–24 % 71 41 28 42 185

65+ % 78 27 15 1 98

Highest educational qualification Degree % 85 51 39 12 428No qualifications % 57 24 8 8 87

Household incomeHighest quartile % 75 56 32 20 476

Lowest quartile % 65 23 21 11 194

Social class (NS-SEC)Managerial/professional % 79 49 33 14 771

Semi-routine and routine % 60 35 19 21 256

SexWomen % 72 41 22 13 778

Men % 71 44 32 19 750

Notes: Rows do not sum to 100 as respondents could mention more than one reason


Some clear patterns emerge. With the exception of e-mail, older and youngerpeople’s use of the internet differs quite markedly. The over 65s are less likelyto use the internet for shopping, are half as likely as 18–24 year olds to use it fornews and current affairs, and just one per cent say they download music.Income, education and class are also related to the nature of people’s internetuse. Those on the lowest incomes, with no qualifications and who are in routineoccupations are all less likely to make use of the internet for each of our fourexamples. The latter are, however, more likely to use the internet to downloadmusic (although this is likely to reflect the fact that the age profile of people inthese jobs is younger to that found among professionals). Men’s and women’suse of e-mail and internet shopping is very similar, but men are more likely touse the internet for downloading music and for news and current affairs. Ofcourse, men are also more likely than women to read a daily newspaper (59 and48 per cent respectively), suggesting that patterns of internet use are likely toreflect both supply and demand, given that people’s prior interests will greatlyinfluence which activities they choose to pursue on-line. This suggests that,rather than being a mechanism for smoothing out social divisions and exposingmarginalised groups to information and resources traditionally denied them,internet use can often mirror – and in some circumstances exacerbate – pre-existing differences and inequalities.

Why aren’t more people on-line?

As we saw in Table 4.2, internet use is clearly associated with a range of socialcharacteristics. Consequently, there is little need to present an exhaustivepicture of the non-user population, a half of our respondents. Put simply, thehighest proportions of non-users are found among those aged over 65 (85 percent), with no formal qualifications (89 per cent), with household incomes inthe lowest quartile (78 per cent), or in semi-routine or routine occupations (70per cent). Among these groups, therefore, those who do not use the internet arevery much the majority.

Likely internet use in the future

To what extent do non-users actually want to use the internet? To assess this,we asked those who did not currently make personal use of the internet whetherthey expected, or wanted, to use the internet in this way:

How likely do you think it is, if at all, that you will start using theinternet one day (other than for work) ...... very likely,fairly likely,not very likely,or, not at all likely?


Regardless of whether you think you ever will, would you like to usethe internet (other than for work) one day, or not?

The majority said it was “not very” (20 per cent) or “not at all likely” (43 percent) that they would start to use the internet one day. Just over a third (37 percent) thought it likely they would use the internet in future. However, opinionwas more evenly split when it came to the question of whether they would liketo use it, with 46 per cent saying they would and 53 per cent saying they wouldnot. This suggests that there is sizeable pool of potential future internet users.We shall return to this group towards the end of this chapter to examine whatimpact their joining the ranks of current internet users would have on the digitaldivide. Certain groups of non-users are much more likely than others to say theywould like to use the internet one day. The most striking relationship is,unsurprisingly, with age. Three-quarters (75 per cent) of 18–24 year olds whodon’t currently use the internet would like to, compared with just one in four(24 per cent) of those aged 65 and over. Education is also an important factor;seven in ten (71 per cent) of non-users with a degree want to use the internet,compared with just three in ten (31 per cent) of people with no qualifications.Perhaps surprisingly, the relationship between people’s future aspirations andsocial class is not so stark; among those who are not currently on-line, 53 percent of professionals and 40 per cent of working-class people want to use theinternet one day. Logistic regression confirms that age, education, householdincome, class and gender are all independently linked to the likelihood ofcurrent non-users saying they would like to use the internet in the future (Model2 in the appendix to this chapter). So, just as the digital divide between usersand non-users reflects broader social inequalities, so too does the dividebetween those who would, and would not, like to use the internet in future.

Why don’t people use the internet?

Of course, knowing who does not use the internet is not the same as knowingwhy this might be so. A number of possible reasons present themselves. As wemight imagine, the barriers associated with social and economic resourcescannot be underestimated. The internet might be physically accessible inlibraries and community centres to all but a handful of the population, butsignificant problems still remain for those who don’t have the skills orconfidence to use or seek assistance in using a computer. Other barriers mightbe related more to people’s initial motivation – if you feel you have no need forwhat the internet has to offer, you will, quite understandably, be less likely totry it out. Finally it could be that people are mistrustful or fearful of what theinternet has to offer; after all, a lot of the coverage the internet gets in the presscentres on the more nefarious uses to which it can be put, such as fraud or childsexual abuse. These distinctions are important. After all, if internet accessamong hitherto excluded groups is to increase, any attempt to promote access


must be based on a proper understanding of the factors that currently inhibitinternet use. To explore this, we presented respondents with a list of nine possible reasonswhich might explain why they do not use the internet and asked which, if any,applied to them. As the next table shows, the most commonly cited reason wasa lack of interest, chosen by just over a half of internet non-users, followed by alack of need. Of course, that someone has no interest in, or feels no need for, theinternet is arguably more a matter of personal taste than of any specific socio-economic barrier to access. However, more explicit barriers to access were alsofrequently mentioned, most notably lack of knowledge (mentioned by 28 percent) or lack of hardware (25 per cent). In this sense, therefore, thegovernment’s success in establishing a comprehensive network of publicinternet access points is diminished by the fact that one in four non-users stillfeel that they need their own computer in order to make use of the internet.Furthermore, the range of reasons people give for not using the internet suggestthat any attempt to increase internet use amongst people for whom home accessis not a reality will be no easy feat. That so many non-users see very little pointin using the internet means that access to resources such as training, as well asthe physical hardware to go on-line, needs to be complemented by concertedefforts to ignite people’s interest as well. To be fair, government and otherorganisations have directed resources towards increasing skills, as well astargeting groups for whom the benefits of the internet might not be immediatelyobvious (for example, Age Concern has been involved with initiatives tointroduce older people to the internet, promoting benefits such as makingcontact with distant relatives or friends as an incentive). So it seems that asinternet use becomes more and more widespread, the kind of action required tohelp increase its uptake even further will need constant re-evaluation as thenature of the barriers to access shift over time.

Table 4.9 Reasons for not using the internet

%

No interest 51Don’t need to 28Don’t know how to 28Don’t have or can’t afford a computer 25Don’t like using the internet / computers 11Other reason 5Takes too long 4Has computer – but can’t afford internet connection 4Has computer – but too old to connect to internet 2

Base (all who do not use the internet) 1519

Of course, we should not assume that these reasons for not using the internetapply equally to all social groups. This again has implications when it comes toattempting to promote internet use among different groups. We consider this by


examining how a range of social groups differ in the extent to which they citethree of the most commonly mentioned reasons for not using the internet: lackof interest, lack of knowledge and lack of hardware. As Table 4.10 shows, lackof interest has a very clear and predictable social pattern. The older you are, thefewer qualifications you hold, and the lower your household income, the lesslikely you are to be interested in the internet. Men are also more likely thanwomen to give this response. However, when it comes to lack of knowledge ortechnical skills the pattern is far less predictable. Whereas there are clear agedifferences in the extent to which lack of knowledge is mentioned as a barrier,there are few differences between the extent to which this is mentioned bydifferent income or education groups, or by men and women. Not surprisingly,those in the lowest income households are the most likely to say that a lack ofresources is an important factor in explaining their non-use of the internet. Inaddition, men significantly are more likely to give this response than women.

Table 4.10 Reasons for not using the internet by age, education, income, gender,and desire to use the internet in future

Reason for not using the internet

% of non-users who say … … notinterested

… don’t knowhow to useinternet /

computers

… don’t have /can’t afford a

computer

Base

All 51 28 25 1519

Age18–24 41 8 38 7125–39 34 22 31 30040–64 50 29 19 74865+ 64 31 28 653

Highest educational qualificationDegree 38 26 19 88Higher education / A level 42 21 21 309GCSE / O level or below 45 28 29 557No qualifications 61 32 24 804

Household incomeHighest quartile 39 26 10 120Third quartile 43 25 16 230Second quartile 55 32 26 381Lowest quartile 54 30 34 753

SexWomen 48 26 22 1044Men 55 29 27 728

Future internet useWould like to use it one day 29 32 30 769Would not like to 71 25 20 984


This table also looks at the very important distinction between those whoactually want to use the internet one day and those who do not. Understandably,this shows that lack of interest is a very significant factor among the lattergroup, seven in ten of whom say the internet does not interest them, comparedwith just one in three of those keen to go on-line. Those who would like to goon-line are more likely to say they lack skills or resources than are those whodon’t want to use it in the first place. Earlier we wondered whether the kinds of initiatives used to increase internetaccess might need to change over time as the reasons people give for not goingon-line shift. The findings in Table 4.10 suggest that such strategies will alsohave to use a multi-layered rather than ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Not only dodifferent subsections of the non-user population give different reasons for notusing the internet, but also we cannot take for granted that when someone aged18–24 says they have no interest in using the internet, this has the same meaningas it does for someone over 65.

Attitudes towards the internet

In order to understand the concerns of non-users, it is important to look not onlyat their social characteristics, but also at their attitudes towards the internet. Thiswould seem particularly important given the fact that a lack of interest in theinternet is so commonly cited by non-users, as it might allow us to gain a betterunderstanding of what lies behind such thinking. To examine attitudes towards the internet, we presented respondents with thestatements shown in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. These were designed to tap a rangeof views about the internet, including its potential to foster social isolation, itspotential dangers, and whether it contains information not available elsewhere.Both tables contrast the responses of current users with two groups of non-users: those who would like to use the internet (who we shall refer to as‘potential future users’) and those who would not like to use it (‘non-users’). The statements shown in Table 4.11 attracted very different responses fromour three groups of interest. Thus, just over a third of potential users and a halfof non-users agree that “the internet is too complicated for me to use fully”,compared with just one in ten of current users. A belief that those who do notuse the internet “miss out” was most prevalent among current users, and wasleast common among non-users. Meanwhile, potential users and non-users werethe most likely to be concerned about the safety of payment over the internet.Only a minority in each of the three groups felt that the dangers posed tochildren by the internet were exaggerated. These patterns are hardly surprising,but it is instructive that the attitudes of potential users and non-users differ on anumber of items, as it suggests that people’s attitudes might help account forsome of their resistance to the internet.4


Table 4.11 Attitudes towards the internet by current and future usage (i)

% who agree Currentuser

Potentialfuture user

Non-user

The internet is too complicated forsomeone like me to use fully 9 36 49

People miss out on important things bynot using the internet or e-mail 37 26 13

It’s much safer to use a credit card in ashop than on the internet 38 55 50

Many people exaggerate the dangerschildren can come across using theinternet

16 18 21

Base 1290 642 803

A slightly different pattern emerges in Table 4.12. For example, when it comesto the issue of whether the internet is the only source of certain kinds ofinformation, the views of current and potential users are very similar (witharound a half agreeing), while non-users stand out as being far less likely toagree. The group of potential users thus clearly sense that they are missing outon something by not using the internet, a feeling that does not appear to beshared by non-users. In contrast, when it comes to the potential for the internetto promote social isolation, it is current users whose views stand out, withpotential users and non-users being more likely to hold the view that using theinternet reduces people’s likelihood of going out and talking to people. Finally,as the last row in the table demonstrates, the same proportion (three in ten) in allthree groups agree that using the internet is too expensive, which suggests thatfinancial concerns about internet use might not be as pressing a reason for non-internet use as perhaps thought.

Table 4.12 Attitudes towards the internet by current and future usage (ii)

% who agree Currentuser

Potentialfuture user

Non-user

Most information on the internet cannotbe found elsewhere 50 47 30

Using the internet makes people lesslikely to go out and talk to other people 42 53 52

Using the internet is too expensive 30 31 31

Base 1290 642 803


Earlier we saw that lack of interest is a major reason cited by people as to whythey do not use the internet. Of course, it is always possible that people use thisrationale to mask other concerns, perhaps related to a perceived lack of skills orgeneral confidence. There is some evidence that this might be the case. As thenext table shows, half (48 per cent) of those who say they have no interest inusing the internet also say it is “too complicated” for them to use fully. Theywere less likely than those who cited lack of knowledge or resources as a barrierto think that people who don’t use the internet “miss out on importantinformation”, and to think that most information on the internet “cannot befound elsewhere”. Of course it could simply be that those who say they are notinterested are offering a realistic assessment of their likely aptitude when itcomes to internet technology. But it does suggest that, among some people atleast, more could be done both to promote the advantages of internet use and toallay fears about how difficult the internet is. For some, this might help alleviatetheir apparent lack of interest.

Table 4.13 Attitudes towards the internet by reasons for not using it

Reason for not using the internet

% who agree Notinterested

Don’t knowhow to use

internet/computers

Don’t have/can’t afforda computer

All non-users

The internet is too complicated forsomeone like me to use fully 48 59 41 43

People miss out on importantthings by not using the internetor e-mail

13 20 22 19

Most information on the internetcannot be found elsewhere 32 39 38 38

Using the internet is too expensive 30 29 37 31

Base 758 415 412 1458

Another concern voiced about the internet is the extent to which – given theunregulated nature of much of its content – the information it contains can betrusted. The following table looks at our three groups of users’ responses toquestions about how trustworthy the internet is as a source of information about,firstly, news and current affairs, and secondly, health (see also the chapter byCurtice and Norris in this volume). By way of contrast, we also asked people tojudge newspapers on the same criteria. Two key findings emerge. Firstly,current users are equally trusting of the internet and newspapers when it comesto news and current affairs (65 per cent doing so), whereas they are moretrusting of the internet on health matters than they are of newspapers (47 and 39


per cent respectively). It is also notable that both sources of information areseen as less reliable about health than they are about news and current affairs.So, even amongst the internet savvy, levels of trust are not blind to the contextor nature of the information. Secondly, potential users are more likely to trustthe internet (on either matter) than non-users, which confirms our earlier findingthat potential users and non-users have quite distinct views about the internet.True, potential users are not as trusting as current users, but they are, onbalance, closer in their attitudes to current users than non-users. We can counterthe suggestion that those who do not use the internet are possibly less trusting ofinformation sources in general by pointing to the fact that, for both news andcurrent affairs and health issues, the attitudes of the three groups towards thetrustworthiness of newspapers is identical.

Table 4.14 Trust in the internet as a source of information by current and futureusage

% who say Current users Potentialfuture user

Non-user

Newspapers are a reliable source ofinformation about news and currentaffairs

65 62 59

The internet is a reliable source ofinformation about news and currentaffairs

65 43 19

Newspapers are a reliable source ofinformation about what is best for yourhealth

39 41 39

The internet is a reliable source ofinformation about what is best for yourhealth

47 34 14

Base 1527 769 984

These findings suggest that general attitudes towards, and trust in, the internetare associated with the likelihood of a person wanting to use the internet infuture. This is confirmed by a logistic regression model which, in addition toincluding the ‘traditional’ factors driving the digital divide (age, education,social class, income and sex) also included people’s attitudes towards theinternet (see Model 3 in the appendix to this chapter for full results). Thisanalysis confirms that, even when socio-demographic factors are taken intoaccount, a person’s attitudes towards the internet, and their trust in it as a sourceof information, are significantly related to their desire to use the internet infuture.5 So while the digital divide is very much related to broad socio-economic inequalities, the gulf between those who do and do not use the


internet, and between those who would and would not like to use it one day alsohas subtle attitudinal dimensions.

Can the digital divide ever be closed?

As we have seen, the recent increase in internet usage has done very little toreduce the stark divide between those who are and are not on-line. We turn nowto examining the future prospects for reducing these social divisions. Of course,given the age profile of the internet’s current users, we can expect to seeinternet use increase gradually over time, as older generations (who are lesslikely to use the internet) die and new generations are born. However, if suchgenerational change is to be the internet’s sole source of new recruits, it willtake decades for the existing social divisions in internet use to decline (and willnot necessarily eradicate socio-economic differences associated with education,income and class). Consequently, if internet use is to increase in the near future,it will have to do so by drawing in groups who have hitherto proved unwillingor unable to access the internet. So we turn now to examine what would happenif all those who would like to use the internet were to start doing so. Wouldexisting divisions in internet access narrow, widen or stay the same? The firstcolumn in the next table presents the current prevalence of internet use amongdifferent social groups 6, while the second column shows, for the same groups,the proportion who would use the internet if potential users (defined as thosewho would like to use the internet) are included alongside those who currentlydo use it. This gives us a picture of what the social distribution of internet usemight look like in the future, assuming that all those who desire it were to gainaccess to the internet. When we take account of potential internet users as well as current users,internet use overall grows from half to almost three-quarters of the population(73 per cent). Indeed, among some groups – in particular, the young (18–24year olds), graduates, and those in professional occupations – internet use wouldbecome almost universal. As before, the table shows the size of the ‘digital divide’ between the groupswho are most and least likely to access, or want to access, the internet.Comparing these figures allows us to see whether, if all potential users were togain access to the internet, the digital divide would increase or shrink. We beginwith age. Among 18–24 year olds, three-quarters currently use the internet, anda further 19 per cent do not but would like to do so. If all of these people wereto gain access to the internet, 94 per cent of young people would be on-line.Among those aged 65 and over, however, only 15 per cent currently access theinternet, while a further 20 per cent do not but would like to do so. If all thesepeople were to gain access, just over a third (35 per cent) of those aged 65 andover would be on-line. This makes little difference to the gulf between differentgenerations, with just a small decrease in the digital divide of one percentagepoint. In order for this divide to narrow, a far larger proportion of older peoplethan younger people would need to want to gain access to the internet in thefuture.


However, taking account of potential users as well as actual ones does narrowthe digital divide between different education, social class and income groups.Table 4.15 illustrates this with regard to education. It shows that, while only 11per cent of those with no qualifications use the internet, 28 per cent would liketo do so, resulting in a combined total of actual and potential internet users of39 per cent. This potential increase results in the digital divide between the mostand least educated shrinking by 16 points. Despite this, however, the differencesthat remain are still quite large. For instance, 95 per cent of those with a degreeare either current or potential users, compared with the 39 per cent found amongthose with no qualifications. Similar findings apply in relation to householdincome and social class, with the inclusion of potential as well as actual usersresulting in a smaller, but still substantial, digital divide. Earlier we noted that the social composition of those who would like to use theinternet in future was very similar to its existing user profile (for example, bothgroups are mainly young, well educated and middle class). The fact that theiraddition to our existing group of users in Table 4.15 results, in some instances,in the digital divide narrowing might thus seem slightly odd. This reflects thefact that the absolute numbers of non-users within the more socially advantagedgroups are now quite small, because so many of them are already internet users.

Table 4.15 Current and potential internet users, by age, education and sex

Currentusers

Allpotential

users

Base Change

All 50 73 3299 +23Age18–24 75 94 256 1925–39 67 90 897 2340–64 47 74 1394 2765+ 15 35 751 20‘Digital divide’ 60 59 -1

Highest educational qualificationDegree 83 95 516 12Higher education / A level 67 87 879 20O level or below 47 76 996 29No qualifications 11 39 891 28‘Digital divide’ 72 56 -16

SexMen 54 74 1477 20Women 46 72 1822 26

‘Digital divide’ 8 2 -6


Taking account of potential users as well as actual ones almost eradicates thecurrent digital divide between men and women (though admittedly the gapbetween men and women’s current internet use is smaller than for any of theother factors). These findings suggest that, in the short term at least, the potential to close thedigital divide is greatest where the divide is at its smallest, and that the mostsignificant challenge is the generational digital divide.

Conclusions

This chapter began by asking if the recent increase in internet use has doneanything to reduce the sharp social divisions in internet use identified in The18th Report. So far, we find, it has not. Broadly speaking, if you are young, welleducated, well paid, male or a manager / professional then the chances are youare also an internet user. Furthermore, most of this growth in internet use hasbeen fuelled by an increase in home access, rather than through greater use ofpublic-access locations. We also found that, as well as there being a digital divide between users andnon-users, there is also a divide amongst users in terms of where they use theinternet, what they use it for and the degree of sophistication of their use.Certain patterns start to become familiar: younger people, those with degrees,and high household incomes are more likely to make extensive use of theinternet than are older internet users or those with fewer educational oreconomic resources (whose use tends to be restricted to just one or two differentapplications). It is therefore perhaps more apposite to talk of digital dividesrather than simply referring to it as a singular phenomenon. Nearly a half of non-users would like to use the internet one day, and familiardivides once again appear – these potential internet users tend to be young, welleducated or middle class. The most common reasons given for not using theinternet are lack of interest (51 per cent), lack of need (28 per cent), lack ofsuitable skills (28 per cent) and lack of a computer (25 per cent). This latterfinding is significant given the government’s recent drive to extend publicinternet access locations to the extent that most of the population now liveswithin a few miles of somewhere to log on. For a significant minority, however,it seems that home access will be the key to their joining the digital age, ratherthan trips to libraries, community centres or internet cafés. For others, it wouldappear that the most significant barrier to use is their own lack of interest.Whether this is compounded by their lack of knowledge as to what the internetcould offer is unclear, but is certainly worthy of future investigation. In addition to more traditional socio-demographic factors, we also exploredgeneral attitudes towards, and trust in, the internet. This reveals some noticeabledifferences between potential users (that is, non-users who would like to use theinternet) and non-users who have no desire to go on-line. The former are morelikely to feel they are missing out on something by not surfing the web, and areless concerned about their ability to master the requisite skills for using the


internet than non-users who profess no interest in ever going on-line. Potentialusers are also more trusting of the web as an information source. We found that by combining current users and potential users the social profileof the digital divide becomes less stark, though it far from disappears altogether.Most notably, it seems that the digital divide between men and women lookslikely to evaporate within a short period. The internet has the potential to offer a great deal in terms of access toinformation that was hitherto the reserve of a small elite, as well as innumerableopportunities for communication between and across communities. As moreand more services in both the public and the private sectors, from filling in taxreturns to booking cinema tickets, become commonplace, one significantchallenge that remains is to ensure that those who for various reasons cannot orwill not ever use the internet in future are not disadvantaged by their lack ofengagement with this new technology. A further challenge will be to ensure thatthose who register some interest in using the internet in the future are supportedin that aim, be it through boosting their skills or confidence or by continuing toensure that the costs of internet access are not overly prohibitive. The greatestchallenge, of course, will be in persuading those who claim no interest in everusing the internet that they may have something to gain from adjusting theirview.

Notes

1. Pew Internet and American Life monthly tracking survey (www.pewinternet.org).2. This increase is almost entirely accounted for by an increase in women having

internet access at home rather than through any greater use of the internetelsewhere; the proportion of women who use the internet but do not have homeaccess was eight per cent in 2000 and nine per cent in 2003.

3. The use of items such as televisions and mobiles phones has been mooted as apotential way of expanding access amongst those without the means to buy a homecomputer, so we also asked people how they accessed the internet. Theoverwhelming majority used a PC or laptop (97 per cent), just three per centmentioned accessing it via their television, and seven per cent use a mobile phone.

4. It should be noted, however, that a large proportion of the non-users (and, to alesser extent, potential users) said ‘don’t know’ in response to the statements.

5. The inclusion in Model 3 of responses to the statement “using the internet is tooexpensive” results in household income no longer being a significant predictor ofpotential internet use (though age, sex, education and social class remainsignificant).

6. The figures for current users in Table 4.15 differ slightly to those in Tables 4.2 and4.3. The earlier tables are based on all respondents to the survey whereas Table4.15 is based only on those respondents who were asked the module of questionsabout the internet (two-thirds of the sample).


References

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Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes –the 18th Report: Public policy, Social ties, London: Sage

Golding, P. (1998), ‘Global Village or Global Pillage? The Unequal Inheritance of theCommunication Revolution’, in McChesney, R.W., Meiksins Wood, E. and Foster,J.B. (ed.), Capitalism and the Information Age: The Political Economy of the GlobalInformation Revolution, New York: Monthly Review Press

Norris, P. (2001), Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and theInternet Worldwide, New York: Cambridge University Press

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http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/Wilheim, A.G. (2000), Democracy in the Digital Age: Challenges to Political Life in

Cyberspace, New York: Routledge

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) E-Society Programme for funding the module of questions on which this chapteris based (grant number 335250010). We are also grateful to the Department forEducation and Skills for supporting the question about what people use theinternet for. Responsibility for analysis of this data lies solely with the author.


Appendix

The three models referred to in the text are presented below. All the variables entered inthe first model were significant and are shown in the first table. All the items shown inthe table below were entered into Model 3, as well as the two statements about trust inthe internet as a source of information which proved significant and are therefore shownin the second table.

Logistic regression: Internet use

Model 1 Demographics

B Exp(B)Age18–24 1.10 3.001**25–39 0.50 1.652**40–64 -0.20 0.820**65+ -1.40 0.246**EducationDegree 1.04 2.825**HE / A level 0.45 1.568**O level -0.16 0.853**None -1.33 0.265**Household incomeLowest quartile -0.58 0.559**2nd quartile -0.13 0.8803rd quartile 0.36 1.437**Highest quartile 0.74 2.093**Ref / DK -0.39 0.676**Social classProf / manager 0.56 1.747**Intermediate 0.29 1.331**Small employers -0.46 0.630**Lower

supervisory -0.19 0.831Semi & routine -0.32 0.725**Unable to classify 0.13 1.134SexMen 0.17 1.181**Women -0.17 0.847**Constant 0.02 1.023

Number of cases in model: 4395* Significant at the 5% level**Significant at the 1% level


Logistic regression: Would like to use internet one day

Model 2 Model 3

DemographicsDemographics and

attitudes

B Exp(B) B Exp(B)Age18–24 0.868 2.383** 0.43 1.53625–39 0.571 1.770** 0.60 1.815**40–64 -0.227 0.797* -0.25 0.777*65+ -1.211 0.298** -0.77 0.462**EducationDegree 0.720 2.054** 0.71 2.030**HE / A level 0.021 1.021 0.02 1.022O level -0.066 0.936 -0.16 0.856None -0.675 0.509** -0.57 0.563**Household incomeLowest quartile -0.099 0.906 ns ns2nd quartile 0.295 1.343** ns ns3rd quartile 0.161 1.175 ns nsHighest quartile 0.120 1.127 ns nsRef / DK -0.477 0.621** ns nsSocial classProf / manager -0.045 0.956 -0.14 0.865Intermediate 0.271 1.311 0.32 1.375Small employers 0.463 1.590** 0.47 1.608*Lower supervisory -0.309 0.735* -0.48 0.618**Semi & routine -0.237 0.789* -0.40 0.672**Unable to classify -0.143 0.867 0.23 1.259SexMen -0.132 0.877* -0.18 0.832**Women 0.132 1.141* 0.18 1.202**

continued on next page


Model 2 (cont..) Model 3 (cont..)

DemographicsDemographics and

attitudes

How reliable is internet news & current affairs? Reliable 0.40 1.488**Neither -0.08 0.924Unreliable -0.59 0.554*DK 0.27 1.312How reliable is internet health information? Reliable 0.28 1.317Neither 0.17 1.191Unreliable -0.13 0.878DK -0.32 0.727“Using the internet is too expensive”Agree 0.00 0.996Neither 0.15 1.159Disagree 0.50 1.656**DK -0.65 0.523**“Most info on internet can’t be found elsewhere”Agree 0.31 1.358**Neither -0.05 0.949Disagree -0.15 0.857DK -0.10 0.905“Internet is too complicated for me to use fully”Agree -0.18 0.836Neither -0.29 0.749*Disagree 0.51 1.666**DK -0.04 0.959“People who don’t use the internet miss out on important information”Agree 0.51 1.663**Neither 0.03 1.029Disagree -0.32 0.727**DK -0.22 0.805Constant 0.531 1.700 0.44 1.554

Number of cases in Model 2: 1755 Number of cases in Model 3: 1345* Significant at the 5% level**Significant at the 1% levelns = not significant

The interalready rasend an einformatiorder goointo town But whnot necesnot just oit easier differencemail migrelatives, energy reseem to mon peoplethe poteninvolved between becomes crossing ttheir MP.and valu(Negroporesources * John Cur

NatCen, and ProfUniversiF. Kenne

e-politics? The impact of theinternet on political trust andparticipation

5
John Curtice and Pippa Norris ∗
net has only been widely available for a few short years. Yet it hasdically changed the way that we undertake everyday tasks. Many now-mail rather than make a phone call or send a letter. They look for

on on the web rather than in a reference book or a library. And theyds or organise their financial affairs over the web rather than trotting to shop or bank.ile the internet has undoubtedly changed how we do things, this doessarily mean that it has changed what we do. For what we do dependsn technological availability but also on motivation. The web may makefor us to organise our financial affairs, but this will make little to our behaviour if we lack the motivation to keep them in order. E-ht make it easier for us to keep in touch with distant friends andbut this may matter little if we are unwilling to invest in the emotionalquired to maintain such relationships. Nowhere would motivationatter more than when we consider the possible impact of the internet

’s involvement in politics. The internet would certainly appear to havetial to make a difference, making it easier both for citizens to becomein political activity and for governments to strengthen the bondsthemselves and those they seek to serve. Getting involved simplyeasier (Budge, 1996; Bimber, 1998). People can get involved withoutheir front door, by signing up to an e-petition or sending an e-mail to They can use the internet to find others with similar political instinctses to themselves, without being constrained by where they livente, 1995; Dertouzous, 1997). Political organisations with limited can mobilise their members in a manner that would otherwise have tice is Research Consultant at the Scottish Centre for Social Research, part ofDeputy Director of the Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends,essor of Politics and Director of the Social Statistics Laboratory at Strathclydety. Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the Johndy School of Government, Harvard University.


been beyond them (Bimber, 2002). Meanwhile, by placing information about itsactivities on the internet and making it possible to access government servicesand personnel electronically, governments can make themselves appear moretransparent and accessible, qualities that they might hope would be translatedinto greater trust and confidence in what they do (Grossman, 1995; Rainie,2002). But while the internet may make it easier for people to get involved in politicsor find out what government is doing, it does not necessarily follow they willchoose to do so. If they do not care about any particular political cause orsubject, they are unlikely to use the internet to seek out those of like mind. Andif they have little interest in the details of governmental policy, ministerialspeeches or party political statements, they can happily give these a miss as theysurf through the wide range of resources available on the net. Rather thanmaking more citizens active, the internet may simply make it easier for thosewho are already politically active to pursue their interests with greater ease andmore vigour (Margolis and Resnick, 2000). Instead of producing a more activecitizenry, the internet might even simply enable the minority of already activecitizens to become even more active while allowing everybody else to bypasspolitics entirely. Meanwhile, as the chapter by Catherine Bromley in this volume discusses,only half the adult population currently has access to the internet. Moreover, thehalf with access disproportionately includes those sections of the populationthat are already relatively likely to be politically active (see also Davis, 1999;Norris, 2001). So far, then, the internet largely misses those parts of thepopulation that will have to be reached if it is to have much impact on overalllevels of political participation in Britain or on the degree of trust andconfidence in government. However, if the internet has facilitated politicalengagement amongst those who do have access to it, there would appear to bepotential for it to have a yet greater impact if and when it spreads to the rest ofthe population. This chapter attempts to discern which of these perspectives appears to be themore correct. Is there any evidence that the new opportunities for involvementcreated by the internet make it more likely that people will participatepolitically? Does the availability of government information on the internetinstil greater confidence amongst the public in how they are governed? Or is theinternet simply a tool that is used by those who are already interested andengaged in the political process and confident in the manner in which it works,at most increasing their already relatively high levels of trust and participationyet further?

Uses of the web

Clearly, the internet is unlikely to stimulate political activity or enhance trustand confidence in government if people do not actually use it to find out orcommunicate about politics. So we begin by looking at how much use is madeof the web for political purposes. Table 4.7 in Bromley’s chapter shows the uses

e-politics? The impact of the internet on political trust and participation 101

to which the web is put by those who do have access (other than the smallminority who only have access to it for work purposes). Finding out about newsand current affairs appears to be in the middle rank of uses, engaged in byaround one in four; this makes it decidedly less common than, for example,shopping or paying bills but more common than finding out about sport ordownloading music. However, using the web to access local or centralgovernment information or services is undertaken by only just over one in ten.Indeed, of all the uses we asked about, only chat rooms appear to be lesspopular. Of course, not all web users are the same. Not surprisingly, some activities aremore popular with certain kinds of users than others (see also Table 4.8 inBromley’s chapter). Most importantly, the groups most likely to use the web tofind out about the news or to access government services are precisely thatsection of the population, the better educated, that has long been the most likelyto be involved in politics (Parry et al., 1992; Curtice and Seyd, 2003). Forexample, among those with internet access, nearly two in five of graduates useit to find out about news and current affairs, compared with just one in five ofthose with no qualifications. When it comes to accessing governmentinformation, the educational divide is even more stark. While 17 per cent ofgraduates use the internet for this purpose, only two per cent of those withoutany educational qualifications do so. However, the pattern of uses of the web for political purposes does not simplyreplicate traditional patterns of political participation. In general, politicalparticipation is relatively low amongst the young, highest amongst the middleaged, and then starts to fall off again amongst older groups. Despite this, 18–24year olds with internet access are just as likely to use it to find out about newsand current affairs as are adults in general, and are far more likely to do so thanthose aged 55 or over. Such use is actually highest of all amongst those aged25–34, over a third of whom (35 per cent) use the internet in this way.However, we have to bear in mind that young people with internet access tendto make greater use of the web in general. When we examine the different waysin which this group uses the web, we find that accessing information aboutnews and current affairs comes no higher on its list of activities than it does foradults in general. Moreover, 18–24 year olds actually rarely use the web toaccess government information and services – just six per cent do so, makingthis the least popular use of the web amongst this age group. So while the webmay be a particularly effective means of reaching young people, politics faces acrowded market for their attention as they exploit the resources of cyberspace.

Political trust

So the internet does indeed appear to be used, to some degree, to acquirepolitical information (albeit more so to find out about the news than to accessgovernment information and services). So we cannot simply dismiss out of handthe possibility that it might stimulate political activity or help engender greatertrust in the political process. In this section we examine whether those with


internet access have greater trust and confidence in government, while in thenext section we consider whether they are more likely to become involved inpolitical activity. In order to measure trust and confidence, we asked:

How much do you trust British governments of any party to place theneeds of the nation above the interests of their own political party?And how much do you trust politicians of any party in Britain to tellthe truth when they are in a tight corner?

For each question, the answer options ranged from “just about always” to“almost never”. In both cases, Table 5.1 shows the proportion answering either“just about always” or “most of the time” among those with no internet access,and then among relatively new and more long-standing internet users. We makethis latter distinction as there is no reason to believe that any impact internetaccess might have on people’s political outlooks occurs the moment they getconnected; rather it would only be expected to emerge over a period of time aspeople ascertain, use, and respond to the political resources that the internetoffers. In any event, the table shows that those with internet access appear to bea little more trusting of governments, albeit only marginally. It also appears thatthose who have had access to the internet the longest are also the most likely totrust politicians. So the pattern in Table 5.1 is precisely what we should expectto find if the internet is helping to restore trust and confidence in government.

Table 5.1 Political trust by length of internet use

Length of internet use

% trust just about always/mostly Non-user Less than3 years

3–5 years Over 5years

Governments to put national needsabove party interest 16 18 18 22

Politicians to tell truth in a tight corner 6 4 5 11

Base 1656 756 478 407

However, we have to be careful in our interpretation of these findings. Perhapsthe higher level of trust exhibited by those who have had internet access thelongest is a reflection, not of their use of the internet, but of their highlydistinctive social profile? As we might anticipate from Tables 4.2 to 4.4 ofBromley’s chapter, long-term internet users are distinctly young, well educatedand affluent. Nearly half (45 per cent) of long-standing internet users (thosewho have used it for more than five years) are aged under 35, compared withjust 14 per cent of non-users. A similar proportion (46 per cent) are graduates


(compared with just four per cent of non-users) and over half (55 per cent) livein a household with an income in the top income quartile (compared with justeight per cent of non-users). Perhaps this relatively well-educated and affluentgroup of people has always had a relatively high level of trust? Certainly,previous research has indicated that those with higher levels of educationalattainment are more likely to have trust in governments (Bromley and Curtice,2002). Clearly we need to dispose of this possibility before we can concludethat access to the internet encourages trust and confidence in the politicalprocess. Dealing with this possibility is, however, not entirely straightforward. We havetwo strategies open to us. The first is the more conventional one. This is toconstruct a multivariate model of trust in which we include not only a measureof how long someone has had access to the internet but one or more ‘control’variables that measure the distinctive social and attitudinal profile of long-terminternet users. The key limitation of this strategy, however, is that we cannotalways be sure that our controls have adequately identified what was distinctiveabout long-term internet users prior to their becoming long-term users.1 This problem arises of course because we are trying to use a single survey toexamine a process that we would expect to take place over a period of time.Ideally, we should examine this process by looking at how attitudes havechanged over time. Fortunately we have the means to do this, as we askedsimilar questions on the 2000 British Social Attitudes survey. This provides oursecond strategy. If we assume, as would seem reasonable, that most of thosewho had internet access in 2000 still did so in 2003, then those who have nowbeen using the internet for three or more years should be the same people as allthose who were internet users in 2000. So, if long-term access to the internetincreases trust in government, we should find that levels of trust should haveincreased more (or fallen less) among this group than it has among those withless experience of the internet. Of course, there are some limitations to this strategy too. Perhaps, for someinternet users, the beneficial impact of the internet on political trust was alreadyapparent by 2000, while some of its benefit might already be being enjoyed nowby those who have had access to the internet for less than three years.Consequently, this strategy may underestimate somewhat the overall impact ofthe internet on levels of trust over the past three years. But even so, if theinternet has had any impact, there should be a discernible difference betweenlong-term users and the rest of the population. We begin by pursuing our first strategy, using multivariate analysis techniquesto examine the relationship between political trust and internet use after takinginto account the impact of just one ‘control’, education (which, as we havediscussed, is linked to both internet use and trust). The results are shown inModel 1 in the appendix to this chapter. They confirm that graduates aresignificantly more likely to trust governments to put “the needs of the nation”above those of their party than are those without any qualifications at all.Moreover, once we take account of this relationship, there is no link betweenpolitical trust and the length of time that a person has used the internet. So theapparent relationship in Table 5.1 between the length of time that someone has


been on-line and their trust in government is simply a reflection of the fact thatlong-term internet users are more highly educated than those who have comeon-line more recently or do not use the internet at all. There is also a relationship between educational attainment and the level oftrust a person has in politicians to “tell the truth in a tight corner”. But here wefind too that non-users of the internet are significantly less likely to trustpoliticians than are those who have used the internet for five years or more,even after differences in their levels of educational attainment are taken intoaccount. However, the relationship is a relatively weak one and accounts forvery little of the overall variance in levels of trust. What happens when we pursue our second strategy, and examine whetherlevels of trust among longer-term users have changed differently from thoseamong other groups? As Table 5.2 shows, neither measure of trust shows aclearly divergent pattern between 2000 and 2003. True, there has been a threepercentage point increase since 2000 amongst longer-term users in theproportion trusting governments to put national above party interest “just aboutalways” or “most of the time”, up from 17 to 20 per cent. But there has alsobeen a three percentage point increase amongst the remainder of the populationas well. And there is little difference between the two groups when it comes towhether their views about politicians’ ability to tell the truth in a tight cornerhave changed.

Table 5.2 Trends in political trust by internet use, 2000–2003

Non-user,2000

Non-useror recent

user, 2003

User,2000

Longer-term user,

2003

% trust just aboutalways / most oftime

2000 2003 Change 2000 2003 Change

Governments to putnational needsabove party interest

15 18 +3 17 20 +3

Politicians to tell truthin a tight corner 11 10 -1 6 7 +1

Base 1595 2412 684 885

‘Recent users’ are defined as those who, in 2003, had used the internet for under threeyears. Longer-term users are defined as those who had used the internet for three yearsor more in 2003.

So far it seems that access to the internet and the information it can provide haslittle or no impact on levels of trust in the political process. But there is a secondset of attitudes towards the political process that we can also examine; political


efficacy. By this we mean both the degree to which someone feels able topursue their political interests effectively (sometimes known as ‘personalefficacy’) and the degree to which they feel the political system is willing andable to respond to the demands they might make of it (‘system efficacy’). Afterall, we might well expect that access to political information on the webenhances people’s belief in their ability to express their political viewseffectively, as well as enabling them to understand better the way in which thepolitical system attempts to respond to the demands that are made of it. Table 5.3 shows how each of six measures of political efficacy (three systemand three personal) vary according to length of internet use. In each case, thetable shows the proportion strongly agreeing with our propositions and thus theproportion who feel the least confident, either in the ability of the system torespond to public demands or in their own ability to influence the politicalprocess. For the most part, those with internet access, even if it has been for arelatively short time, are less likely to feel unconfident about these matters (andthus have higher levels of political efficacy). Moreover, the differences betweenthe columns of the table are rather bigger than those we saw when we examinedpolitical trust. Here, at first glance at least, there seems more reason to believethat access to the internet might make a difference.

Table 5.3 Political efficacy by length of internet use

% strongly agree Length of internet use

System efficacyNon-user

Less than3 years

3–5years

Over 5years

Parties are only interested in people’svotes, not in their opinions 30 19 17 18

Generally speaking, those we elect as MPslose touch with people pretty quickly 29 18 16 16

It doesn’t really matter which party is inpower, in the end things go on much thesame

23 15 13 13

Personal efficacyPeople like me have no say in what the

government does 27 19 17 17Sometimes politics and government seem

so complicated that a person like mecannot really understand what is going on

20 11 11 7

Voting is the only way people like me haveany say about how the government doesthings

18 15 12 12

Base 1656 756 478 407


Multivariate analysis in which we take into account the effect of age andeducation leads to a similar conclusion. Model 2 in the appendix shows theresults of two examples of such analyses, one focusing on system efficacy(whether MPs are thought to lose touch “pretty quickly”) and one on personalefficacy (whether politics and government seem too complicated for “a personlike me” to understand). The results reveal that, in both cases, someone’s levelof educational attainment clearly makes a difference to their degree of politicalefficacy. The better qualified someone is, the more efficacious they feel. Agealso matters. Those aged 18–24 are significantly less likely to feel personallyefficacious than are those aged 65 or over, though so far as our measure ofsystem efficacy is concerned, it is those aged 45 to 64 who prove to be leastefficacious. But of most concern to us here is the fact that, even once these tworelationships are taken into account, those who currently have no access to theinternet are significantly less likely to feel efficacious than are those who havehad access for five years or more. In addition, when it comes to our measure ofpersonal efficacy, levels of efficacy are also significantly lower amongst thosewho have been using the web for three years or less. These results are largely typical of all of the measures included in Table 5.3. Ineach case, those without internet access are significantly less likely to feelconfident about the responsiveness of the political system, or their own abilityto influence it, than those who have been using the web for five years or more –even after we take account for differences in the educational and age profile ofthese groups. Moreover, this relationship between length of internet use andpolitical efficacy appears to be robust even if we add further controls to ouranalysis.2 But what of our second analytic strategy? If access to the internet reallyenhances political efficacy we should find that trends in political efficacyamongst those who have had access to the internet throughout the last threeyears have been more favourable than they have amongst those who have not.Table 5.4 presents the evidence, some of which at least provides some supportto the notion. In at least three cases (whether MPs lose touch, whether people“like me” have any say, and whether voting is the only way to influencegovernment actions), the proportion strongly agreeing with the proposition hasfallen by three points or more amongst those who have had long-term internetaccess while changing little amongst the rest of our sample. For instance, theproportion of longer-term users agreeing with the view that MPs quickly losetouch with the electorate has fallen three points, from 19 to 16 per cent, while ithas remained constant, at 25 per cent, among those who either do not use theinternet at all, or have been using it for under three years.


Table 5.4 Trends in political efficacy by internet use, 2000–2003

Non-user,2000

Non-user orrecent user,

2003

User,2000

Longer-termuser, 2003

% strongly agree 2000 2003 Change 2000 2003 Change

Parties onlyinterested in votes,not people’sopinions

28 26 -2 21 17 -4

MPs lose touchpretty quickly 25 25 0 19 16 -3

Doesn’t matterwho’s in power,things go on thesame

21 20 -1 14 13 -1

People like me haveno say in what thegovernment does

26 24 -2 22 17 -5

Politics andgovernment seemso complicated

20 17 -3 11 9 -2

Voting is the onlyway people like mehave any say

18 17 -1 17 12 -5

Base 1595 2412 684 885


So both of our tests provide some evidence to support the argument that theinternet may help to increase levels of political efficacy, through the access itoffers to political information. But if this process is at work, we should be ableto demonstrate one further pattern – that it is those who actually use the internetto access government information who are largely responsible for the higherlevel of political efficacy found amongst internet users. To test this, we repeatedthe analysis described in our second multivariate model but added a measure ofwhether or not respondents use the web to access government information. Ifthe increase in efficacy that we have seen reflects access to this sort ofinformation, we would expect to find that introducing this measure makes littledifference to the impact of either education or age on political efficacy, but thatit substantially reduces the impact of not having access to the internet.


This is indeed precisely what we find (see appendix for details of Model 3).Whether or not someone uses the web to access government information issignificantly associated with their political efficacy. Once this is taken intoaccount, the length of time for which they have used the internet becomes lessimportant (and, in the case of the question of whether MPs lose touch tooquickly, actually becomes insignificant) while the importance of age andeducation is largely unchanged. Of course, there are other ways of interpreting these results. It could be, forinstance, that those who have been using the web the longest have always beenan unusually politically efficacious group, happy to find their way around amyriad of government websites, a quality that our model has not been able totake into account. So our results do not prove that it is access to governmentinformation provided by the web that makes long-term internet users moreconfident in the responsiveness of government or in their own ability to getinvolved. But the results are consistent with this argument and, together withthe results of our earlier analyses, it appears reasonable to conclude that somesuch process has been at work, at least among some longer-term internet users.

Political participation

We now turn to our second question; whether or not access to the internetmakes it more likely that someone will participate in politics. Certainly, asTable 5.5 shows, those who have had access to the internet the longest tend tobe the most likely to have undertaken some form of political action in theirlives, or to be members of a political party, trade union or pressure group. Thereis but one exception to this picture; those who have used the internet the longestare somewhat less likely to claim to have voted in the last general election. Moreover, many long-term users also report reasonably high use of e-mail orthe web to undertake one or more of the activities described in the first part ofTable 5.5. A quarter of those who have used the internet for five years or morehave used it for at least one of these activities, twice the proportion foundamongst those who have used the internet between three and five years, and thejust four per cent of those who have used it for less than three years (see alsoWard et al., 2003). Equally, no less than one in three (33 per cent) long-terminternet users say they have received an e-mail at some point asking them tojoin in a protest or a campaign, as have one in five (19 per cent) of those whohave used the internet for between three and five years (though only seven percent of those whose internet career has been shorter than this, report receivingthis sort of e-mail). In short, the internet does appear to be being used both as ameans of mobilising people and as a way of taking part in political activity,especially among longer-term users.


Table 5.5 Political action by length of internet use


% ever done Non-user

Less than3 years

3–5years

Over 5years

Signed a petition 36 44 50 51Contacted MP 14 15 21 21Gone on a protest or demonstration 8 11 12 19Spoken to an influential person 4 4 7 8Contacted the media 3 4 9 11Contacted a government dept. 3 4 6 9Raised issue in an organisation 2 4 4 6Formed a group of like-minded people 2 2 2 3% who

Voted in 2001 election* 74 70 69 65Belong to political party/trade union 6 10 14 15Belong to a pressure group 1 2 4 8

Base* Base

16561564

756703

478451

407380

* Based on respondents aged 21 or over

But of course none of this proves that access to the internet makes it more likelythat someone will get involved in politics. Perhaps those who have had accessto the internet the longest have always been relatively politically active? Whilethey might well use the internet in the course of their political activity, thismight simply be an alternative way of doing something they would be doinganyway. After all, long-term internet users have far higher levels of interest inpolitics than do the remainder of the population – no less than half (51 per cent)of those who have used the internet for five years or more have “a great deal” or“quite a lot” of interest in politics compared with a quarter (24 per cent) of non-users. So, once again, we need to deploy our two analytic strategies to assesswhether the levels of political participation we have found amongst long-terminternet users are, in fact, an indication that access to the internet really doeshave an impact. Certainly, the results of logistic regressions that simply take into account theimpact of age, educational attainment and internet use on levels of politicalparticipation give some pause for thought. True, they indicate that length of useof the internet is clearly related to the chances that someone is a member of apolitical party or trade union, or of a pressure group. But, when we focus onreported political activities, at least some of the associations we saw in Table5.5 start to disappear. Multivariate analysis of the six most commonlyundertaken forms of political activity reveal that in three cases there is nosignificant relationship between long-term internet use and participation once


differences in educational attainment and age are taken into account.3 Only inthe case of signing a petition, contacting the media, or speaking to an influentialperson do long-term internet users remain distinctive. Meanwhile, in all but onecase (contacting the media), even this distinctiveness vanishes once the highlevel of political interest expressed by internet users is taken into account. There is also no consistent evidence of a marked increase in politicalparticipation amongst longer-term internet users over the last three years. Theonly form of activity where the trend since 2000 has differed between longer-and shorter-term users is contacting the media. As Table 5.6 shows, while thishas actually declined among non-users and those who have used the internet forless than three years, it has slightly increased among long-term users. As ourmodelling also suggested that this form of political participation might bestimulated by access to the internet (even when we take account of politicalinterest), it does appear that here the internet may indeed make a difference,perhaps reflecting the now widespread practice in the media of inviting viewers,listeners and readers to make their views known via the internet. But otherwisethere are more instances of political participation having increased more overthe last three years amongst those who are not long-term users of the internetthan there are amongst long-term users. So, in general, it appears that we cannotsafely conclude that use of the internet encourages or stimulates politicalactivity.

Table 5.6 Trends in political participation by length of internet use, 2000–2003

Non-user,2000

Non-useror recent

user, 2003

User,2000

Longer-term user,

2003

% ever done 2000 2003 Change 2000 2003 Change

Signed petition 37 39 +2 52 51 -1Contacted MP 13 14 +1 23 21 -2Gone on a protest 7 9 +2 14 16 +2Spoken toinfluential person 3 4 +1 6 7 +1

Contacted media 5 3 -2 6 8 +10Contactedgovernment dept. 3 4 +1 6 8 +2

Raised issue in anorganisation 3 2 -1 8 5 -3

Formed a group 1 2 +1 3 2 -1

Base 1595 2412 684 885



However, perhaps there is a more subtle argument that we need to investigate.We have already suggested that the internet might increase political efficacyamongst the minority who have the motivation to use the internet to acquiregovernment information. Maybe, in a similar way, the internet increases therange and intensity of political activity of those who are already interested inpolitics. If so, then we might expect to find that being both a longer-term user ofthe internet and being interested in politics makes more difference to thenumber of political actions in which someone has engaged than does eithercharacteristic on its own. Table 5.7 suggests that this is indeed the case. Longer-term users of theinternet who do not have a lot of interest in politics are only slightly more likelyto report having undertaken one of the activities detailed in Table 5.6 than areshorter-term or non-users with similarly low levels of interest. However, theaverage number of political actions reported by longer-term users of the internetwho do have a substantial interest in politics is significantly higher than theaverage number reported by non-users or shorter-term users with the same levelof interest. Moreover, more formal modelling of this result (which also takesinto account the impact of educational attainment and age) confirms that bothbeing a longer-term internet user and being interested in politics results insignificantly higher levels of political activity than does either characteristicalone.

Table 5.7 Number of political actions undertaken, by length of internet use andpolitical interest, 2003

Mean number of political actions

Interest in politics

Non-user or user forless than 3 years

User for more than 3 years

Base Base

A great deal/quite a lot 1.3 593 1.7 389Some 0.8 799 0.9 302Not very much/none at all 0.5 1018 0.6 193

However, if this result means that internet access enables those who are alreadyinterested in politics to become more active (rather than indicating that earlyadopters of the internet have always been unusually politically active) weshould find that this result is not replicated when we undertake a similaranalysis on data from our 2000 survey. But, as Table 5.8 shows, a similarpattern was also evident that year too, a conclusion that is supported by moreformal modelling of the data. Moreover, the table also shows that the totalnumber of political activities reported by politically interested longer-terminternet users was just as high three years ago as it is now. In short, we cannot


in fact be sure that long-term access to the internet does encourage those with aprior interest in politics to become yet more politically active.

Table 5.8 Number of political actions undertaken, by length of internet use andpolitical interest, 2000

Mean number of political actions

Interest in politics Non-user User

Base BaseA great deal/quite a lot 1.2 438 1.8 293Some 0.7 503 0.9 232Not very much/none at all 0.4 653 0.8 159

We can also investigate a rather different claim. As we noted earlier, youngerpeople are particularly likely to use the internet to find out about news andcurrent affairs, as well as being more intensive users of the web in general.Perhaps, as sometimes has been argued (see, for example, Ward et al., 2003),the internet is particularly effective at getting younger people involved inpolitics. If this were the case, we should find that access to the internet is morestrongly associated with the reported level of political participation amongst18–24 year olds than it is amongst the population in general. Although thesample sizes available to examine this are small, there is nothing to suggest thatthis is the case. For example, in Table 5.9, which looks at the reported incidenceof the three most common forms of political participation (other than voting),the differences across the rows are much the same as those in the equivalentrows of Table 5.5. Equally, if we undertake more formal modelling of thenumber of political actions a person reports, we find no evidence that beingboth young and a longer-term internet user makes a significant difference to therange of political activities in which someone has been engaged.

Table 5.9 Political action, by length of internet use amongst 18–24 year olds


% ever done Non-user

Less than3 years

3–5years

Over 5years

Signed a petition 26 31 35 40Contacted MP 3 3 4 3Gone on a protest or demonstration 0 6 3 10

Base 64 89 56 47


Conclusions

In recent years, politicians have been concerned about the alleged apathy andcynicism of the electorate. So the possibility that the internet might helpreconnect the public with their political system has been eagerly grasped bythose in power. Indeed, current government policy requires all governmentservices to be accessible via the web by 2005, and for it to be possible to use theinternet as a way of voting in national elections some time after 2006. Our analysis suggests that this policy might have some success. In particular, itappears that the easy availability of government information on the web doesappear to help increase people’s sense that they can have some influence onwhat government does. However, relatively few people actually use the internetin this way. So, although the internet may help increase the level of politicalefficacy amongst a minority, it is unlikely to transform levels of politicalefficacy amongst the public as a whole. Certainly, as Table 5.10 shows, there isno evidence that the spread of the internet in recent years has been accompaniedby an increased sense of political efficacy amongst the public as a whole.Meanwhile, there appears to be no evidence that having access to a wide rangeof government information on the web encourages people to be more trusting ofthose in power.

Table 5.10 Trends in political efficacy, 1998–2003

% strongly agree 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003

Parties are only interested in people’s votes,not in their opinions 21 26 27 29 25

Generally speaking, those we elect as MPslose touch with the people pretty quickly 20 23 25 28 23

It doesn’t really matter who’s in power, in theend things go on much the same 17 19 18 22 20

People like me have no say in what thegovernment does 17 25 22 26 23

Sometimes politics and government seem socomplicated that a person like me cannotreally understand what is going on*

15 18 n/a 17 15

Voting is the only way people like me canhave any say about how the governmentdoes things*

14 17 n/a 17 16

Base* Base

2071 2293 1099 2287 44323299


At the same time, although those with access to the internet might use it tofacilitate their political activity, for the most part it does not yet appear that theinternet encourages people to become more politically active. Those who havehad access to the internet for some time are undoubtedly particularly activepolitically. But it seems that they were just as active before they secured accessto the internet (see also Hill and Hughes, 1998; Selnow, 1998; Toulouse andLuke, 1998). Meanwhile, we have not uncovered any evidence at all that accessto the internet makes the young more likely to become politically active. Theone exception to these generalisations appears to be that access to the internetdoes encourage people to contact television, radio or a newspaper when they areupset about what government is doing. Still, perhaps we should not overload the internet with exaggeratedexpectations. Even if it has simply been added to the litany of ways in whichpeople can get politically involved, there is no sign that the spread of theinternet has in anyway discouraged people from getting involved in politics.And, if it does not make the already active yet more active, then at least thismeans the internet is not helping to make those who do get involved in politicsany more unrepresentative of their fellow-citizens than they are already. Weshould also bear in mind that, even if the internet does not result in more peoplebecoming more politically active, it could still have important consequences if itmakes the political activity that does take place more effective, something wehave not been able to consider here. In short, the internet may not ensure webecome any better connected with our politicians, but it does at least provideanother means through which we can attempt to make our voice heard when wefeel the need.

Notes

1. At the same time, we also have to try and avoid being overzealous in our controls,that is, to include as a control something on which internet use might also have aninfluence and so factor out the very impact that we are trying to measure.

2. These include controls, such as political interest and the extent to which someoneidentifies with a particular political party that might in themselves be thought to beaffected positively by an ability to access political information via the internet.

3. These models are available from the author on request.

References

Bimber, B. (1998), ‘The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Communityand Accelerated Pluralism’, Polity, 21: 133–160

Bimber, B. (2002), Information and American Democracy. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press


Bromley, C. and Curtice, J. (2002), ‘Where have all the voters gone?’, in Park, A.,Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes:the 19th Report. London: Sage

Budge, I. (1996), The New Challenge of Direct Democracy. Oxford: Polity PressCurtice, J. and Seyd, B. (2003), ‘Is there a crisis of political participation?’, in Park, A.,

Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes:the 20th Report – Continuity and Change over Two Decades, London: Sage

Davis, R. (1999), The Web of Politics, New York: Oxford University PressDertouzous, M. (1997), What Will Be: How the New Information Marketplace will

Change our Lives, San Francisco: HarperGrossman, L. (1995), The Electronic Commonwealth, New York: PenguinHill, K. and Hughes, J. (1998), Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the

Internet, Lanham, Md: Rown & LittlefieldMargolis, M. and Resnick, D. (2000), Politics as Usual: The Cyberspace Revolution,

Thousand Oaks: SageNegroponte, N. (1995), Being Digital, New York: KnopfNorris, P. (2001), Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the

Internet Worldwide, New York: Cambridge University PressParry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. (1992), Political Participation and Democracy in

Britain, Cambridge: Cambridge University PressRainie, L. (2002), The Rise of the E-Citizen: How People Use Government Agencies’

Web Sites, Washington, DC: Pew Internet and American Life Project (available atwww. pewinternet.org)

Selnow, G. (1998), Electronic Whistle-Stops: The Impact of the Internet on AmericanPolitics, Westport, Conn.: Praeger

Toulouse, C. and Luke, T. (eds.) (1998), The Politics of Cyberspace. London:Routledge

Ward, S., Gibson, R. and Lusoli, W. (2003), ‘Online Participation and Mobilisation inBritain: Hype, Hope and Reality’, Parliamentary Affairs, 56: 652–668

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) E-Society Programme for funding the module of questions on which this chapteris based (grant number 335250010). We are also grateful to the Department forEducation and Skills for supporting the question about the purposes for whichpeople use the internet. Responsibility for analysis of this data lies solely withthe authors.


Appendix

The multivariate analyses referred to in the text are presented below. All are ordinallogistic models. The reference category for each variable in the model is shown inbrackets (for example, the reference category in Model 1 for internet use comprisesthose with five or more years of internet access and the model shows the impact ofbeing in each category of internet user as compared with being in this group). Theentries in each cell are the parameter coefficients, and the entries in brackets theirassociated standard errors.

Model 1 Political trust

Dependent variables

Trust governments Trust politicians

Educational levelDegree .40 (.12) * .31 (.13) *HE below degree .14 (.12) .06 (.12)A level .12 (.12) .02 (.13)O level/GCSE .13 (.11) .03 (.11)CSE .10 (.13) .04 (.13)(None / foreign)

Length of internet useNon-user -.16 (.12) -.26 (.12) *0–3 years -.06 (.12) -.01 (.12)3–5 years -.07 (.12) -.13 (.13)(Over 5 years)

Cox and Snell R2 0.8% 0.7%

* Significant at the 5% level


Model 2 Political efficacy

Dependent variables

MPs lose touch prettyquickly

Politics seems complicatedfor me to understand

Educational levelDegree 1.13 (.13)* 1.50 (.12) *HE below degree .48 (.12) * .94 (.12) *A level .47 (.13) * .71 (.12) *O level/GCSE .47 (.11) * .43 (.11) *CSE .21 (.13) .32 (.13) *(None / Foreign)Age18–24 -.01 (.14) -.82 (.12) *25–34 -.22 (.12) -.36 (.12)35–44 -.16 (.12) -.13 (.12)45–54 -.28 (.11) * -.07 (.11)55–64 .35 (.12) * -.03 (.11)(65+)Length of internet useNon-user -.44 (.12) * -.82 (.14) *0–3 years -.01 (.12) -.39 (.11) *3–5 years -.01 (.12) -.15 (.12)(Over 5 years)Cox and Snell R2 7.0% 12.9%

Base 3241 3260



Model 3 The impact of accessing government information on political efficacy

Dependent variables

MPs lose touch prettyquickly

Politics seemscomplicated for me to

understand

Educational levelDegree 1.07 (.13) * 1.42 (.12) *HE below degree .45 (.12) * .92 (.12) *A level .45 (.12) * .68 (.12) *O level/GCSE .48 (.11) * .44 (.11) *CSE .22 (.13) .33 (.13) *(None / Foreign)Age18–24 -.01 (,14) -.80 (.12) *25–34 -.24 (.12) -.39 (.12)35–44 -.19 (.12) -.17 (.12)45–54 -.28 (.11) * -.07 (.11)55–64 .35 (.12) * -.03 (.11)(65+)Length of internet useNon-user -.22 (.13) -.55 (.13) *0–3 years .12 (.12) -.24 (.12) *3–5 years .05 (.13) -.10 (.12)(Over 5 years)Ever access government

information on-lineYes .43 (.10) * .55 (.10) *(No)Cox and Snell R2 7.5% 13.8%

Base 3241 3260


Patrick Sturgis, Helen Cooper, Chris Fife-Schaw and Richard Shepherd ∗

It is five decades since the landmark discovery of DNA, the so-called ‘blueprint for life’. Scientists have now completed decoding the entire human genome, our unique hereditary code. Our increasing understanding of genes and their function in humans, plants and animals has already begun to revolutionise progress in biomedical and agricultural sciences, with the rapid development of genetic technologies ranging from genetically modified (GM) food to genetic testing and cloning. Grand claims have been made about the future potential of genetic technologies to transform key aspects of our lives. Advocates of genetically modified food predict improved food safety and nutritional quality. Crops genetically modified to tolerate harsh environmental conditions are proposed as a remedy for hunger, poverty and disease in developing countries. Future cures for life-threatening illnesses are predicted to lie in developing medical applications of genetic technology, such as stem-cell and gene therapy. Together with genetic testing, these developments promise to improve our understanding of how genes influence susceptibility to illnesses, so allowing early medical diagnosis and treatment. Viewed from this perspective, it would appear that the dawn of a ‘genomic society’, where the information in genes is readily obtained and utilised, has much to offer in terms of human longevity, opportunity and choice. Indeed, our future stake in a genomic society is already underpinned by substantial government investment in the delivery of genetic technologies within key public services including, most notably, policing and health (Department of Health, 2003). However, while the transformative potential of genetic science has acquired increasing prominence in both the media and academia, it has been accompanied by high levels of public controversy and resistance. Perhaps more than any other area of scientific and technological research, it is framed by the * Patrick Sturgis is Lecturer in Sociology; Helen Cooper is a Research Fellow in

Psychology; Chris Fife -Schaw is Senior Lecturer in Psychology; and Richard Shepherd is Professor of Psychology – all at the University of Surrey.

Genomic science: emerging public opinion 6


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complex moral, political and ethical questions it raises. For example, whilst genetic testing can be used to inform an individual about their risk of developing an inherited disorder, the same information is of predictive value for biological blood relations (who may carry the same gene), for insurers who wish to calculate premiums based on future health risks, and for employers making decisions about recruitment and retention of staff. Social and ethical concerns about privacy and protection against unfair treatment on the basis of genetic characteristics are inextricably linked to the development of gene-based technology (Human Genetics Commission, 2000, 2002). In the British media, the past few years have seen extensive and, at times, sensational reporting about a number of new genetic technologies. This includes speculation about whether or not scientists have succeeded in cloning a human, the potentially deleterious effects of genetically modified crops on wild-life, and the birth of a baby genetically selected to have body tissues that match those of a seriously ill sibling.1 Such coverage has prompted sustained discussion and debate about ‘designer babies’, reproductive choice and the ways in which genetic science is conducted and regulated (Human Genetics Commission, 2004).2 So, concerns that society will abandon traditional morality and ethics at the altar of ‘scientific advancement’, widely articulated through the popular media, counterbalance the utopian optimism which underlies the development of much genetic science. In light of these conflicting discourses concerning the future direction of genetic science, calls have come from politicians and scientists for a more ‘balanced’ debate about the role of science in society. In a recent speech to the Royal Society (2002), the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, emphasised the need to:

… ensure government, scientists and the public are fully engaged together in establishing the central role of science in the world we want.

To meet this need requires that scientists and policy makers engage in more and better-quality dialogue with the public, fostering an informed debate about the merits of scientific research programmes (House of Lords, 2000). A number of large-scale opinion canvassing exercises, most notably on GM crops and food, have taken place under the general banner of consultation and debate (Food Standards Agency, 1999; Department of Trade and Industry, 2003).3 The impetus for such exercises can be traced to a move in science communication towards engaging with public anxieties, rather than denigrating them as irrational and based on scientific ignorance (Bodmer, 1985; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; House of Lords, 2000). However, despite the proliferation of such attempts to engage ‘the public’ in some kind of ‘genetic dialogue’, their success in creating any real impact on public consciousness is far from clear-cut. The government-sponsored ‘GM Nation?’ debate is undoubtedly the most prominent example in this regard. Charged with fostering a nationwide public dialogue on the merits of GM crops and food, it ultimately attracted a small and unrepresentative sample of mainly anti-GM campaigners (Campbell and Townsend, 2003), while the broader population largely ignored it (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004). Despite the

Genomic science: emerging public opinion

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organising committees’ attempts to define the exercise as a debate rather than an opinion poll, their use of a standardised questionnaire as a centre-piece of the exercise inevitably (and unsurprisingly) led to media reports focusing on percentages for and against GM. While we make no claims to having fostered a public dialogue by administering the questions in this survey, we believe that our findings are a good deal more robust and representative of public preferences on these issues than can ever be produced by such exercises in public ‘consultation’. We begin the chapter by describing public opinion toward a broad range of genetic technologies. As questions about some of these issues have been asked in previous British Social Attitudes surveys, we can also examine how public opinion toward such technologies has changed over the last few years. We then consider to what extent the proliferation of information and news stories about genes and genetics has influenced people’s attitudes and belie fs. Does, for instance, growing familiarity with genetic technologies result in more or less opposition toward their development and application in society? Or does this depend, as previous research suggests, on the precise nature of the technology in question? Alternatively, are new genetic technologies still perceived as a rather distant and abstract concept, of which the average person is only dimly aware? Is there evidence to suggest that – as this area of scientific inquiry gains more prominence in the public sphere – we are becoming increasingly ‘geneticised’ in our thinking about the role that genes might play in the development of particular character traits and dispositions? Next, we move on to examine the antecedents and consequences of interest in, and engagement with, genetic science and technology. Being more attentive to genetic issues has been shown to be linked to more positive general appraisals of genetic science (Pardo et al., 2002; Gaskell et al., 2003a). Others, however, argue that being attentive and knowledgeable can have the opposite effect by cultivating more critical expectations (Midden et al., 2002). At a time when facilitating public dialogue and debate about this area of science is high in the minds of scientists and policy makers alike, we identify the socio-demographic characteristics associated with being ‘attentive’ to debates surrounding genetic science and technology. Finally, we move on to use multivariate models to explore the extent to which attentiveness underpins attit udes to genomics.

The shape of public opinion toward genomics GM foods Of all genomic technologies, the genetic modification of crops and food has been the most widely discussed and investigated. During the 1990s, the general trajectory of public opinion about GM food was one of strong and increasing opposition (Gaskell et al., 2003a). Table 6.1 compares public attitudes towards GM in 1999 – a time when anti-GM sentiment and negative media coverage was at something of a high water mark (Gaskell et al., 2003b) – with public attitudes in 2003. That year saw a great deal of coverage of GM crop trials in


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the UK, speculation about a government decision on the commercialisation of GM crops and, of course, the ‘GM Nation?’ public debate on the pros and cons of this technology. A key finding of ‘GM Nation?’ was that a huge majority of participants in the debate rejected any benefits of GM technology (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003), prompting headlines in the media such as “Five to one against GM crops in biggest ever public survey”.4 However, our findings suggest that to characterise current public opinion in this way presents a highly misleading picture. At the end of the 1990s, only one in ten people supported the view that Britain should grow GM foods “in order to compete with the rest of the world”, with a majority (around two-thirds) opposing. At the same time, over half agreed with an outright ban on GM foods and rejected the view that “the advantages of GM food outweigh any dangers”. By 2003, however, the same statements elicit significantly less opposition. The prospect of Britain growing GM foods is no longer rejected by a majority, whilst the proportion in favour of a GM food ban fell from 52 per cent to 29 per cent over the same period. Similarly , only one-third of the British public now disagree that the benefits of GM foods outweigh any dangers. Table 6.1 Attitudes towards GM foods, 1999 and 2003

Agree Neither Disagree Base

In order to compete with the rest of the world, Britain should grow GM foods

1999 2003

% %

10 15

18 30

65 45

833 2649

GM foods should be banned, even if food prices suffer as a result

1999 2003

% %

52 29

22 33

20 26

833 2649

On balance, the advantages of GM foods outweigh any dangers

1999 2003

% %

12 14

22 38

57 33

833 2649

It is important to note that this shift away from outright opposition is underpinned not so much by increased public support for GM food, as by a considerable rise in the proportion of people who neither agree nor disagree with these propositions. In line with other recent survey research (Horlick-Jones et al., 2004), the attitudes of the general public towards GM foods appear increasingly ambivalent in nature, with people simultaneously perceiving benefits and risks associated with the technology rather than opting for a clear ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ position. As Table 6.1 shows, for each of our questions approximately a third of Britons can now be characterised as neither for nor against GM foods, a sizeable increase over a four-year period.


123

Attitude change over the same time period is also evident from people’s appraisals of the risks associated with GM foods. As Table 6.2 shows, in 1999 approximately three-quarters of the British public thought that growing GM foods presented a “definite” or “probable” danger to other plants and wildlife. Four years later, a majority still share this view but the proportion is much lower, at 55 per cent. The public in 2003 are also more willing to accept the safety of GM foods available in the shops than they were in 1999. In sum, these differences show that public opinion about the risks associated with GM food has become more evenly divided over time; although opposition remains the predominant response, it is substantially lower than it was four years earlier. Table 6.2 Appraisals of GM food risks, 1999 and 2003

% saying definitely or probably 1999 2003

Growing GM foods poses a danger to other plants and wildlife 73 55 All GM foods already available in the shops are safe to eat 34 47

Base 833 2649

Genetic databases The use of population databases of genetic information in a wide range of different contexts is predicted by some to be the next big issue of genomic controversy. To date, the use of such databases has largely been limited to the mandatory requirement for individuals investigated for a serious criminal offence to provide a DNA sample to the police. Recent amendments to the law, however, have broadened the criteria which determine who can be asked to provide the police with a genetic sample to be stored indefinitely on a national DNA database. DNA ‘success stories’ in high-profile criminal cases feature regularly in the media, alongside arguments for the criminal genetic database to be compulsory nationwide, and for individual biometric information to be used on a national identity card scheme. In addition, it has long been recognised that databases of genetic information have the potential to transform traditional practices in the insurance industry, in the recruitment and retention of employees, and beyond. As genetic databases proliferate and become more familiar to the public, so might public anxieties about the social ramifications of their wider use evolve. As the final column in Table 6.3 shows, attitudes towards establishing genetic databases vary considerably according to their stated purpose. Nearly nine in ten are in favour of databases to better understand human illness and disease, with a similar proportion endorsing the use of genetic databases to identify serious criminal offenders.5 Genetic databases for purposes other than health improvement or crime reduction are much less well received by the public. Support for their use to trace ancestry is evenly divided, but a majority reject the


124

development of genetic databases used to establish health or life insurance premiums, or a person’s suitability for employment; fewer than two people in ten support the use of databases for these purposes. Levels of support vary between different groups. As we shall explore in more detail later in this chapter, a person’s educational attainment is linked to their views about the acceptability of genetic databases. As Table 6.3 shows, this is particularly evident in relation to their less popular potential uses, with support highest amongst those with lower levels of educational attainment. Just over a quarter of adults without any formal qualifications are in favour of a database used for insurance purposes, more than double the support found among graduates or those with an equivalent qualification.

Table 6.3 Support for the use of databases for human genetic information

% strongly in favour or in favour of a database used to ...

Degree/ higher

A level or equiv

O level or equiv

No qualific-ations

All

... improve our understanding of illness and disease

86

90

88

80

86

... identify people who have committed serious crimes

84

88

91

81

85

... find out more about where people’s ancestors came from

49

50

56

50

51

... judge a person’s suitability for getting health and life insurance

11

19

21

26

19

... judge a person’s suitability for getting a job they’ve applied for

8

12

14

21

14

Base 943 421 940 894 3272

The manner in which public support for genetic databases varies according to their proposed use suggests that public concerns, particularly among the most well-educated groups, might centre on the use of genetic data by third parties for commercial gain, which could adversely affect individuals’ quality of life. Although a clear majority oppose the use of databases for insurance or employment purposes, a majority believe it likely that this will eventually happen, in the longer term at least. Table 6.4 shows that seven in ten believe that genetic information will be used to determine health or life insurance premiums within the next 25 years, a similar proportion as did in 1996. A lower proportion believe that genetic information will be used to judge job applicants, but this view has become more prevalent since 1996.


125

Table 6.4 Perceived likelihood that insurance companies and employers will use genetic data within the next 25 years, 1996, 2000 and 2003

% saying it is very or quite likely that genetic information will be used to judge a person’s suitability for getting …

1996 2000 2003

... health and life insurance 72 76 70

... a job they’ve applied for 43 58 52

Base 2096 1963 2649

Public trust We turn now to examine how far members of the public are trusting of the different stakeholders involved in genetic science. As Table 6.5 suggests, mistrust appears to be more prevalent than trust. Thus, only a quarter trust those in charge of “new developments” in genetic science to act in society’s interests, while a third do not. And, while just under a quarter think that government legislation will protect the public from any risks linked to modern genetic science, nearly double this proportion disagree. Such mistrust extends particularly to genetic scientists, with six in ten agreeing that they only tend to report what their employers want to hear. Only 15 per cent rejected this statement. Of particular concern to those policy makers eager to engage the public in some kind of scientific dialogue may be the fact that only around a quarter of Britons see public involvement in policy decisions as a feasible option, with half thinking that such involvement is unrealistic, owing to the complexity of the underlying science. Table 6.5 Trust in modern genetic science

Agree Neither Disagree Base Those in charge of new developments

in genetic science cannot be trusted to act in society’s interests

%

34

36

25

3272

Rules set by government will keep us safe from any risks linked to modern genetic science

%

23

27

45

3272

Genetic scientists only tend to tell us what the people paying their wages want us to hear

%

60

21

15

3272

Modern genetic science is so complex that public involvement in policy decisions is not realistic

%

50

18

27

3272


126

Human genomics With the completion of the human genome sequence in 2001, much attention has focused on genetic approaches to health improvement and diagnosis. The complex role that genes can have in many human illnesses and diseases is now becoming better understood by scientists and, it would seem, attracting a large measure of public support; nearly half (47 per cent) of the British public in 2003 disagree that “research into human genes will do more harm than good”. However, when research into the genetic basis of human characteristics and disease are communicated to a general audience, media headlines, perhaps inevitably, tend to focus on discoveries of “the gene for” particular health conditions and, more controversially, the origins of complex personality or behavioural traits.6 As a result, some have argued that the public are increasingly likely to take a deterministic view of genetics, that is, to ascribe particular character traits or dispositions to a person’s genetic make-up (Lippman, 1993). To examine whether the increasingly detailed scientific delineation of the genetic basis of human behaviour and morbidity have led to more genetic determinism amongst the public, we asked a series of questions about the ‘causes’ of a range of different traits. The questions were introduced as follows:

Some things about a person are caused by their genes, which they inherit from their parents. Others may be to do with the way they are brought up, or the way they live. Some may happen just by chance. Using this card, please say what you think decides each of the [following] things. If you don’t know, please just say so.

Respondents could choose from six different answer options: “all to do with genes”; “mostly to do with genes”; “mostly to do with upbringing or lifestyle”; “all to do with upbringing or lifestyle”; “an equal mixture of genes and upbringing or lifestyle”; and “just chance”. Table 6.6 shows the proportions of people who thought that the different traits were “all” or “mostly to do with genes”, and how this has changed over time. Just under a third of Britons believe that intelligence is mainly a genetic trait, a proportion that has shown a slight but consistent decrease since 1998. Genes are also perceived by around one-third of the British public as having a major role in determining sexuality, a figure which has remained unchanged over the last five years. Far fewer individuals see genes as mainly responsible for aggressive or violent behaviour; since 1998, a consistent nine-tenths of the public have opposed this view. This stability contrasts with the slight increase over time in the proportion attributing a strong genetic component to medical conditions. This applies most strongly to breast cancer where a majority (55 per cent) now attribute “all” or “most” of the cause to genes, compared to 48 per cent in 1998. Genes are also now likely to be perceived as a dominant cause of heart disease, but to a far lesser extent than breast cancer, with just a third of the public endorsing this view. On the whole, then, there is little evidence to support the notion that the public are becoming increasingly likely to see the underlying causes of human behaviour and disease


127

as mainly genetic, although this is clearly rather a short time frame within which to evaluate the hypothesis. Table 6.6 Extent to which various traits are perceived as genetically determined, 1998, 2000 and 2003

% saying all or mostly to do with genes ... 1998 2000 2003

... intelligence 36 34 30

... being gay or lesbian 34 n/a 35

... chances of being aggressive or violent 9 11 10

... chances of getting heart disease 29 29 33

... chances of getting breast cancer 48 n/a 55

Base 2112 2267 3272

n/a = not asked

In order to examine the acceptability of gene therapy, we also asked whether, for each of these traits, gene therapy should be allowed:

Suppose it was discovered that a person's genes could be changed. Taking your answers from this card, do you think this should be allowed or not allowed to …

Although a majority of the British public reject the view that a person’s genes determine complex behavioural traits such as aggression or violence, Table 6.7 shows that more than half would favour genetic intervention to make someone less aggressive, were this possible, a proportion that has remained la rgely unchanged since 1998. The overall trend during this period, however, is of reduced support for this kind of intervention. What has remained consistently unacceptable over the last five years is changing a person’s genes so that they become heterosexual rather than gay or lesbian, or to determine an unborn child’s sex; around 80 per cent think neither of these should be allowed. However, the use of gene therapy to reduce a person’s chance of developing breast cancer is much more popular and has attracted increasing public support, up from 72 per cent in 1998 and 2000 to 81 per cent in 2003. For the first time, the 2003 survey distinguished between somatic gene therapy, where genetic material is transferred to normal body tissue, and germ-line gene therapy, where genetic material is also transferred to cells that produce eggs or sperm. The key difference is that the results of somatic gene therapy are restricted to the patient treated, while for germ-line gene therapy these modifications are passed from the patient to any children they may subsequently have. In both cases, we asked how acceptable these forms of therapy would be for “someone in their 20s who has a life-threatening medical condition”; around eight in ten thought that these two treatments should be allowed (although support for germ-line therapy was slightly lower than support for somatic gene therapy, at 79 and 85 per cent respectively). Thus, when its purpose is clearly


128

defined as medical treatment, gene therapy receives widespread public support, be it of the somatic or germ-line variety. Table 6.7 Attitudes towards gene therapy, 1998, 2000 and 2003

% saying that changing a person’s genes should definitely or probably be allowed to …

1998 2000 2003

... make a person less aggressive or violent 59 56 56

... make a person straight, rather than gay or lesbian 18 18 18 … determine the sex of an unborn baby 12 16 15 … reduce a person’s chances of getting breast cancer 72 72 81 … treat someone in their 20s with a life-threatening medical condition if the new genes would not be passed on to any children they might have

n/a

n/a

85

… treat someone in their 20s with a life-threatening medical condition if the new genes would be passed on to any children they might have

n/a

n/a

79

Base 2112 2267 3272

n/a = not asked

Much opposition to human genetic intervention is underpinned by its potential to select for ‘desirable’ physical or cognitive characteristics in children. This has prompted fears about a generation of ‘designer babies’, with characteristics such as sex, height, eye colour and even intelligence chosen by parents, as if from a shopping list. More realistically, concerns have focused on prenatal testing for an ever-increasing range of genetic conditions, leading to the termination of pregnancies that, for a variety of social and historical reasons, are not considered ‘normal’ or desirable. To examine attitudes towards these issues, we asked about the acceptability of prenatal testing in the five different circumstances shown in Table 6.8:

Genetic tests can also be carried out on an unborn child. Do you agree or disagree with parents using such tests to help them decide whether or not to have a child that ...

As it is often argued that religious beliefs about the sanctity and protection of human life underpin debate on these issues, the table also shows how public opinion about parental use of prenatal genetic testing varies according to religious affiliation. Overall, around two-thirds agree that it should be permissible for parents to use a genetic test to help decide whether or not to have a child with a mental or physical disability serious enough to mean the child would never be able to live an independent life. A similar proportion are in favour of genetic testing that selects a child whose body tissues are a genetic match for a seriously ill sibling (and could hence be used to provide medical treatment or a cure). Public


129

endorsement of parental use of prenatal testing is markedly lower if its purpose is to decide whether to have a healthy child with a reduced life expectancy. This suggests that perceived quality of life is an important factor in determining the moral acceptability of this type of genetic intervention. Finally, there is very little support for prenatal testing in order to help parents decide a child’s sex, with less than one in ten in favour of genetic testing for this purpose. This is consistent with previous research by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority which found widespread public opposition to the idea that parents should have the right to choose the sex of their child (HFEA, 2003). Views about these matters vary significantly according to a person’s religious affiliation. Those who are not religious, or who belong to the Church of England, are the most supportive of prenatal testing, while those who belong to other religious groups are less in favour. Thus, while seven in ten Anglicans support prenatal tests to help parents decide whether to have a child with a serious mental disability, only just over a half of Catholics agree. It is notable, however, that for the three most serious conditions described in the next table, majorities among all religious groups agree with the use of prenatal tests. Religious affiliation makes no difference to attitudes about genetic testing to have a child on the premise that its body tissues could be used to provide medical treatment for a sibling; nor does it relate to views about the acceptability of prenatal tests to determine a child’s sex. Table 6.8 Attitudes towards prenatal genetic testing, by religious affiliation

% agree with genetic tests to help decide whether to have a child with …

Church of England

Catholic Other Christian

Non-Christian

No religion

All

… a serious mental disability and would never be able to live an independent life

71

54

62

57

69

66

… a serious physical disability and would never be able to live an independent life

68

51

62

57

67

64

… the same types of body tissues needed to treat a brother or sister who is seriously ill

68

62

60

57

64

63

… a condition that means it would live in good health but then die in its 20s or 30s

43

34

35

32

42

40

… one sex rather than another

9

10

7

12

10

9

Base 872 300 494 153 1421 3272


130

The cloning of human embryos is, in many ways, a lightning rod for public resistance and hostility to the moral and ethical problems of human genetic research. With its frightening sci-fi images and associations of ‘playing God’, cloning goes right to the heart of what it is to be human. The few large-scale surveys that have included questions on attitudes to human cloning have found substantial opposition to the idea of creating cloned human embryos, on both moral and religious grounds (Singer et al., 1998; Nisbet, 2004). In-depth qualitative investigations, however, have found the public to be less opposed towards the use of cloned embryos in medical research (Wellcome Trust, 1998). Clearly, therapeutic human cloning is not an easy subject to ask about in a survey questionnaire. So we began by describing it to respondents as follows:

You might have heard of something called human cloning. One type of cloning would be if a person’s genes were copied exactly and used to make an embryo. Cells from the embryo could be used to supply the person with tissues or organs that would be a perfect match for them, meaning their body would not reject them. Do you think this should be allowed or not allowed …?

We then asked about the acceptability of cloning in three specific circumstances: organ transplantation; the treatment of Parkinson’s disease; and to prolong a healthy person’s life. Of these, the two applications with clear medical benefits – organ transplantation and treatment for Parkinson’s disease – are supported by a majority of the public, echoing findings from other studies (Gaskell et al., 2003a). However, public opinion about using the same cloning technology in order to extend the life expectancy of someone in good health is rejected by a sizeable majority; less than one in five adults think that this should be allowed, while nearly three-quarters disagree. We also asked about reproductive human cloning:

Another type of human cloning might be used to treat a young couple who are infertile and cannot have a child. Suppose that the genes from one of them were copied exactly and used to make an embryo with exactly the same genetic make up as that parent. Do you think this should be allowed or not allowed …?

Just under four in ten people think such reproductive cloning should be allowed, while just under half think it should not. This suggests that human reproductive cloning does not meet with quite as strong a level of public opposition as might, perhaps, be expected. However, support for this technology is substantially lower than support for therapeutic cloning for clear medical purposes. Nine per cent of our sample had been advised by a doctor of a serious genetic condition in their family, or knew of another family member who had been told of this. This group were slightly more supportive than average of cloning for organ transplantation or the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, although their small sample size meant that these differences were not statistically significant.


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Table 6.9 Attitudes towards human cloning

Should be allowed

Should not be allowed

... if a person needs an organ transplant % 64 24

... if a person needs treatment for Parkinson’s disease % 64 23

... if a person is generally in good health and wants to live longer

%

15

73

… to treat a young couple who are infertile and cannot have a child

%

38

48

Base: 2649

Our results so far have shown that a majority of the British public approve of human genetic intervention where there is a clear medical benefit. Even reproductive human cloning attracts less outright public opposition than might be expected. It is also clear that attitudes towards the same genetic technology vary substantially according to the context within which that technology is applied. Meanwhile, clear majorities are favourable towards genetic databanks where there is a societal benefit in terms of health or crime control, although the use of individual genetic data in a way that might adversely affect the person concerned attracts little public support. A second key finding to emerge so far is that some attitudes towards genomics have changed substantially over a relatively short time frame. Change is most evident in relation to GM foods; the public in 2003 are far less opposed to these than they were just four years earlier. How attentive are we to modern genetic science? We now turn our attention to an examination of the antecedents and consequences of public attentiveness towards this new and rapidly evolving area of science and technology. Here we pursue a long-standing tradition in models of public opinion which calls into question the notion of a unitary and homogenous ‘public’ with respect to issues of social controversy. Rather, the population as a whole is seen as comprising a number of distinct subgroups, each with differing levels of interest, engagement and familiarity with the issue in question (Le Bon, 1895; Park, 1904; Blumer, 1946). Although the make-up of these groups is conceived as fluid and subject to change as an issue evolves, only a small proportion of the general population are likely to constitute the most attentive group, on most issues, at any one time. By contrast, the majority of the public will be disinterested, uninformed and disconnected from any ongoing public debate. As a consequence, it is argued that only a relatively small proportion of the public will be able to provide an ‘informed’ opinion on any given issue.


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Such a model can be usefully applied to our understanding of public attitudes towards genomics, a fast-moving area of scientific enquiry which is clearly still an ‘emergent’ object of public opinion. We are not the first to adopt this stratified approach to understanding public opinion toward science (Miller, 1998; Pfister et al., 2000). Most prominently in relation to genetic science, Gaskell and colleagues (2003a) combine measures of factual knowledge of biology and genes, with behavioural intentions towards, and awareness of, new genetic technologies into an index of public engagement with biotechnology. According to the Gaskell index, only around a quarter of Britons constituted the ‘engaged public’, with the remaining three-quarters not discussing biotechnology with any regularity, nor anticipating taking part in any public discussion on the subject in the future. Using this approach Gaskell and colleagues find the typical ‘engaged’ European citizen to be male, university educated and below 55 years of age. Who do our results suggest are the most attentive when it comes to genomics? We measured attentiveness by asking whether people were interested in “issues to do with genes and genetics”. Nearly a quarter (24 per cent) had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of interest in the area, a quarter had “some” interest, another quarter (24 per cent) “not very much” interest, and 27 per cent had “none at all”. We also asked about the extent to which they had recently heard or read about these issues, talked about them or simply thought about them. As Table 6.10 shows, just over a third had heard or read “a great deal” or “quite a lot” about genes and genetics, and just under a third had heard or read “a small amount”. One in five had thought about genetics at least quite a lot in the past few months, and one in seven had talked about these issues. Table 6.10 Attentiveness to genes and genetics Over the past few months, how much, if at all, have you …

A great deal,

quite a lot

A small amount

Not very

much, not at all

… heard or read about issues to do with genes or genetics

%

36

30

33

… thought about issues to do with genes or genetics

%

21

26

53

… talked about issues to do with genes or genetics

%

14

27

59

Base: 2649

We combined responses to these four questions to identify those who were particularly more, or less, likely to be attentive to genetic issues. In order to identify the groups who are the most attentive we ran a multivariate analysis, the results of which are summarised in Figure 6.1 (see Model A in the appendix to this chapter for further details). The advantage of this form of analysis is that it takes account of relationships that exist between particular groups of interest


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(for example, the fact that older people tend to have lower educational qualifications than younger ones). Counter to previous research which shows that men tend to be most engaged with new scientific advancements, including biotechnology (Gaskell et al., 2003a), we find that women are more attentive to issues involving genes and genetics. Such issues encompass a variety of genetic technologies relevant to health and family formation which may be of particular salience for women. There is no simple linear relationship between attentiveness and age; older people (in their mid- to late 50s) are the most attentive and younger people (between 18 and 24 years) are the least attuned to issues relevant to modern genetic science. Education and knowledge of genetics are also important predictors of attentiveness. Those without formal qualifications are the least attentive to modern genetic science. More specifically, having a qualification in a biological science is associated with greater attentiveness. In addition, even once education is taken into account, people who score highly on a four item knowledge quiz about genes and genetics are also the most engaged with debates surrounding this area of science (further information about these knowledge questions can be found in the appendix to this chapter). Interest in politics is positively correlated with genomic attentiveness, a finding consistent with previous research (Gaskell et al., 2003a), and likely to result from a general engagement with news and current affairs. Newspaper readership is also related to attentiveness. The most attentive, unsurprisingly, are broadsheet readers, though those who read no paper at all are significantly more attentive than readers of tabloid newspapers. Internet users also score significantly higher on the genomics attentiveness scale than do non-users. As these latter findings apply even when education and a person’s factual knowledge of genetics are taken into account, they suggest that the contexts and channels through which information about genomics is obtained may be important in shaping people’s attentiveness. Equally, however, it is likely that attentiveness itself influences when and how people seek out information. Figure 6.1 Groups more likely to be attentive towards modern genetic science

Attentive public

Age 55 to 59 years Women Politically engaged Broadsheet reader Internet user O level/GCSE qualifications or above Biology qualification Higher genetic knowledge Reported genetic condition in family


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In sum, prior and current levels of formal knowledge appear to play a role in shaping people’s ongoing interest in, and awareness of, genes and genetics. Increased information-seeking may explain why the attentive public is more likely to include people who report having had a serious genetic illness diagnosed in their family – not only may such a diagnosis prompt people to find out more, but it is also likely to increase the salience of information about genes and genetics in the public domain. Attentiveness and enthusiasm about genomics This evidence has helped us identify those most likely to be attentive to modern genetic science. The more important question, however, is whether the attitudes of this group towards genomics are in some senses distinct. After all, it is often anticipated that increasing public awareness and understanding about technological innovation will lead to opinion becoming more informed by “fact and reason” than by “unfounded fear and emotion” (Blair, 2002). There is reason to believe that, as simple familiarity grows with what was initially a novel and alien concept, resistance and hostility will decline as the object becomes anchored and assimilated into existing public discourses and cognitive schemas. Indeed, this could offer an explanation as to why attitudes to GM foods have changed since 1999, with no particula r event or ‘shock’ appearing to underlie the general softening of opinion that has been apparent. In order to investigate whether the attentive public have distinctive views about genomics, we carried out a series of multivariate analyses to assess how a range of factors relate to views about GM crops and foods, trust in the regulation of modern genetic research, therapeutic cloning, and genetic science in general (the construction of these models is described in detail in the appendix to this chapter). Our particular interest is in examining the joint influence of three key ‘cognitive’ factors: education, genetic knowledge and attentiveness. Do these, in and of themselves, make a difference to a person’s views on these matters, even when background characteristics such as age and sex are taken into account? Each model includes a broad range of background variables measuring social and demographic characteristics, most notably age, gender, social class and educational qualifications (including whether the person has any qualification in a biological science). Factual knowledge of biology is measured via our four item knowledge quiz. We also include a self-reported measure of whether a serious genetic condition has been diagnosed within a family as an indicator of the personal salience of issues related to genes and genetics. Measures of internet use and newspaper readership capture differential access or exposure to information relevant to genetic science and the broader context in which this information is conveyed. Additionally, internet use may be indicative of acceptance and adoption of new technologies and, therefore, positively correlated with attitudes to genomics. Self-reported interest in politics is included as a measure of broader political engagement. Finally, religious denomination is included as we earlier found this to be an important predictor of


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views about genetic issues. The full results for these models are presented in the appendix to this chapter. Figure 6.2 summarises, for each issue, the direction and statistical significance of the effects of education, genetic knowledge and attentiveness, taking account of all the demographic characteristics listed earlier. We report in the text cases where these other characteristics emerge as significant once attentiveness, education and knowledge are taken into account. This analysis confirms that an individual’s level of knowledge about, and attentiveness towards, genetic science are important in understanding their attitudes, as is their educational background. The results, however, are far from uniform, with quite different patterns of significance and direction of effect, depending on the particular subject area being considered. We start with attitudes towards GM foods. The negative association between public attentiveness and attitudes to GM food in Figure 6.2 shows that those who are the most attentive to genomics are less likely to be supportive of GM foods. Factual knowledge about genes and genetics, perhaps a better indicator of public familiarity than self-reported interest and engagement, is, however, predictive of more favourable attitudes towards GM foods. The most knowledgeable are, in other words, the most positive about this form of genetic technology. The model also shows that, even once these factors are taken into account, a person’s age, sex, and their interest in politics are significantly related to their views about GM foods. Younger age groups tend to be more favourable than older ones, men more favourable than women, and the politically interested less favourable than those with lower levels of interest. When it comes to trust in the regulation of genetic science, attentiveness is associated with lower levels of trust in the way genomics is managed and regulated. This runs counter to the expectation that attentive individuals should have greater confidence in the competence and trustworthiness of those charged with managing modern genetic science, as they are better able to appreciate the constraints within which they have to operate (Sturgis and Allum, 2004). However, education is positively associated with trust, meaning that the most well educated tend to be the most trusting of current arrangements as regards the management and regulation of genomics. Even when these factors are taken into account, tabloid readers and those who read no newspaper are less trusting than broadsheet readers. Social class also matters, with those in managerial and professional occupations and the self-employed being more trusting than those in skilled manual positions. Attentiveness proves to be unrelated to attitudes towards human cloning for the purposes of medical treatment or organ transplantation, despite this being a genetic technology that has attracted public controversy. When it comes to education and genetic knowledge, we find their impact appears to operate in opposite directions, with knowledge being associated with less favourable attitudes and higher qualifications associated with more favourable attitudes to therapeutic cloning. There were also significant differences of opinion associated with age, sex, newspaper readership, religion and class. Men were more favourable than women, tabloid readers more favourable than broadsheet readers, the non-religious more favourable than the religious, and those in


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intermediate non-manual occupations less favourable than those in skilled manual positions. The final area we examine relates to a person’s general attitude towards human genetic research. This is the only model in which both attentiveness and genetic knowledge prove to be significantly related to people’s attitudes in the same way; those who are more attentive and knowledgeable about genes and genetics express more favourable general attitudes towards human genetic research than those who are not. The only other characteristic to emerge as significantly associated with responses to this question was sex, with men being more favourable than women. Figure 6.2 Relationship between attitudes to genomics and education, knowledge and attentiveness

GM food and crops

Trust Therapeutic cloning

General attitude to

genetic research

Education — Positive Positive — Genetic knowledge Positive — Negative Positive Attentiveness Negative Negative — Positive

— = relationship is not statis tically significant We can conclude from these findings that attentiveness does appear to influence public attitudes towards genomics. However, this must be qualified in two important respects. First, attentiveness is not a uniform predictor of genomic attitudes as it is unrelated to attitudes towards therapeutic cloning. Second, our findings show that it is misleading to assume that a more attentive and knowledgeable public is necessarily more supportive of genetic science and its associated technologies. Indeed, attentive individuals are more critical of GM foods, and are less trusting of those conducting and regulating modern genetic science. At the same time, however, they are significantly less likely to believe that, on balance, human genetic research will do more harm than good. Thus, while these factors are clearly important to our understanding of the shape and trajectory of public opinion in this area, they are not related to attitudes in any simple or straightforward manner. Further analysis also shows that the views that people hold about these four different areas are not strongly related, providing further evidence that public appraisals of specific areas of genetic science are, to a large degree, independent of one another. Although we may see these applications as falling under the general umbrella of ‘genomics’, by dint of their common relation to modern genetic science, it is questionable whether this homogenous classification has any resonance in the public mind. People seem to evaluate technology on the basis of its specific application in society, rather than on the common


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underlying science. Further details of this analysis can be found in the final table in the appendix to this chapter. Conclusions A key finding to emerge from these analyses is that some attitudes towards genomics have changed over a relatively short time frame. Change is most evident in relation to GM crops and foods; the public in 2003 are far less opposed to these than they were just four years ago. It is worth emphasising again the substantially different picture we have obtained of current public opinion towards GM than that which emerged from the ‘GM Nation?’ debate. In our analysis, we find opinion towards GM to be broadly ambivalent. By ambivalence we mean, in this context, that most questions attract a significant amount of both support and opposition, with even larger proportions ‘sitting on the fence’. Opinion in Britain towards genetically modified crops and food cannot, on this evidence, be described as overwhelmingly hostile. Our findings also show that a majority of the British public approve of human genetic intervention where there is a clear medical benefit. This applies when that benefit is intended for another person, such as an ill sibling, and even when it will be passed on to future generations, as in the case of germ-line gene therapy. When considered in the context of treating infertility, even reproductive human cloning garners less outright public opposition than might be expected. A key finding of this research, then, is that attitudes towards the same genetic technology vary substantially according to the context in which that technology is applied. The public are far less accepting of genetic intervention for the purposes of sex selection, increasing healthy life expectancy or determining characteristics such as sexuality. Similarly, a sizeable proportion of the public are favourable towards genetic databanks where there is a clear societal benefit in terms of improved health or crime reduction, but the use of individual genetic data in a way that might adversely affect the person concerned attracts little public support. Our analysis also identifies certain groups as being particularly attentive towards genes and genetics. Amongst the characteristics which are most important in determining level of attentiveness are those that relate to educational qualifications, knowledge of genetics and exposure to information in the public domain (whether through newspapers or the internet). We find some evidence to support the idea that people who are more interested in, and pay more attention to, genomics have distinct attitudinal profiles. Importantly, however, levels of public attentiveness do not have a uniform effect on attitudes across different areas of genetic science. Public attentiveness does not help us discriminate between different views about cloning and, for attitudes towards GM food and trust in modern genetic science, attentive individuals are more opposed and resistant than non-attentive ones. This suggests that it may be overly simplistic to consider public engagement in genetic science as a means to foster greater public confidence and support in new technological developments. Only when it comes to very general attitudes


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to human genetic research do our results show attentiveness to be linked to a more favourable attitude. A similar conclusion can be extended to our measure of genetic knowledge, commonly used with awareness measures to examine public engagement in science. Modern genetic science is still in its infancy. Public opinion towards its technological applications is, perhaps as a consequence, cautious, guarded and sometimes outright oppositional. Are we now though, perhaps, beginning to see some signs of growing familiarity and acceptance, with the earliest and most prominent genomic technology – GM crops and food – showing clear signs of a softening of opinion in Great Britain? In truth, it is too early to tell. Other evidence in this chapter questions the whole idea of the different genomic technologies being considered, in the public mind, as strongly related. Rather, people seem to evaluate these technologies as independent entities, on the basis of the costs and benefits they each bring for individuals and society. Only through continued, high-quality public opinion measurement over a sustained period will such questions really become amenable to empirical enquiry. Notes 1. ‘Contamination in Canada sounds warning to UK’, The Guardian, 18 June 2003;

‘The designer baby created to save his brother’s life…’, Daily Mail, 19 June 2003, headline; ‘GM crops “could carpet Britain with superweed’”, Daily Mail , 10 July 2003, p. 17; ‘Playing God? Ethical storm as first human clone is created’, Daily Mail, 13 February 2004, headline.

2. Also ‘The designer baby myth’, The Guardian, 5 June 2003; ‘Fears over genetic profiles for all’, The Observer , 17 August 2003.

3. Other canvassing exercises have been undertaken in relation to the genetic selection of embryos (HFEA, 2001, 2003; Hu man Genetics Commission, 2004), the use of human genetic information (Human Genetics Commission, 2001; People Science and Policy, 2002) and predictive genetic testing (Royal Society, 2003).

4. The Guardian, 25 September 2003. 5. To check levels of support for the specific use of genetic databases in order to help

solve crime, we also asked:

Some people think everyone in Britain should have to give a sample of their genetic information to a database that would help identify people who have committed serious crimes. Would you be in favour of, or against, this happening?

When put in these terms, public support falls slightly, to just under seven in ten (69

per cent). 6. ‘Prostrate cancer gene identified’, BBC News online, 8 June 2004,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3787033.stm; ‘Genes may be to blame for infidelity’, BBC News online, 7 June 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3783031.stm


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Acknowledgements The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. The work arises from the ESRC Attitudes to Genomics project L145251005 (www.surrey.ac.uk/shs/genomics). The authors wish to acknowledge the co-investigators on this project at the University of Surrey for their contribution to this paper: Julie Barnett, Adrian Coyle, Jo Moran-Ellis, Victoria Senior and Chris Walton. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the members of the project Advisory Board.


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Appendix Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) in MPlus 2.14 was used for all the models detailed below. All figures shown in the table are parameter estimates. Variables obtaining statistical significance at the p<0.05 level are marked with a single asterisk (*). Background characteristics entered as independent variables into all models were: age, gender, interest in politics, newspaper readership, whether or not internet user, highest educational qualification, biology qualification, religion, individual social class (NS-SEC), reported serious genetic illness in the family, attentiveness (models B to E only) and genetic knowledge. The genetic knowledge measure is derived from the following battery of four true/false items: it is possible to transfer animal genes into plants; ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified tomatoes do; it is the father’s genes that determine whether a child is a girl; genetically modified animals are always bigger than ordinary ones. Correct answers were scored +1, and all other answers coded zero, before items were summed to produce a 5-point scale ranging from 0 to 4. This scale is included in the model as a continuous variable. Model A: Predictors of attentiveness to modern genetic science The dependent variable was a single factor of attentiveness based on the aggregation of four items:

How much interest, if any, do you have in issues to do with genes and genetics? [A great deal, Quite a lot, Some, Not very much, None at all]

Over the past few months, how much, if anything, have you heard or read about issues to do with genes and genetics? [A great deal, Quite a lot, A small amount, Not very much, Nothing at all]

*And over the past few months, how much, if at all, have you talked about issues to do with genes and genetics?

*Over the past few months, how much, if at all, have you thought about issues to do with genes and genetics?

*[A great deal, Quite a lot, A small amount, Not very much, Not at all] The table shows how much more or less likely the various groups are to be attentive to modern genetic science. Positive parameter estimates in the table indicate the independent variable is associated with greater attentiveness towards modern genetic science. Model B: Predictors of attitudes towards GM foods The dependent variable was a single factor of attitude towards GM foods based on the aggregation of the following four agree/disagree items:

In order to compete with the rest of the world, Britain should grow genetically modified (GM) foods

Genetically modified (GM) foods should be banned, even if prices suffer as a result


142

On balance, the advantages of genetically modified (GM) foods outweigh any dangers

It is important for me to check whether or not foods contain genetically modified ingredients.

Two other attitude items were included:

In general, do you think growing genetically modified (GM) foods poses a danger to other plants and wildlife?

Do you think that all genetically modified (GM) foods already available in the shops are safe to eat?

[Definitely, Probably, Probably not, Definitely not, Can’t choose] The table shows how much more or less likely the various groups are to be in favour of GM foods. Positive parameter estimates in the table indicate the independent variable is associated with greater opposition about GM food. Model C: Predictors of trust The dependent variable was a single factor of trust towards modern genetic science based on the aggregation of three agree/disagree items:

Those in charge of new developments cannot be trusted to act in society’s interests

Rules set by government will keep us safe from any risks linked to modern genetic science

Genetic scientists only tend to tell us what the people paying their wages want us to hear.

The table shows how much more or less likely the various groups are to display a trusting attitude towards modern genetic science. Positive parameter estimates in the table indicate the independent variable is associated with greater trust. Model D: Predictors of attitudes towards therapeutic cloning The dependent variable was a single factor of attitude towards therapeutic cloning based on the aggregation of two items about whether or not this form of cloning should be allowed or not if “a person needs an organ transplant” and if “a person needs treatment for Parkinson’s disease”. The table shows how much more or less likely the various groups are to be in favour of therapeutic cloning. Positive parameter estimates in the table indicate the independent variable is associated with greater opposition towards therapeutic cloning. Model E: Predictors of general attitude The dependent variable was a single measure of general attitude towards modern genetic science based on agreement with the statement “research into human genes will do more harm than good”. The table shows how much more or less likely the various


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groups are to adopt a favourable stance towards this area of science. Positive parameter estimates in the table indicate the independent variable is associated with more favourable attitudes towards human genetic research. Parameter estimates from Attentiveness Model

Model Predictor

A Attentiveness (higher scores

>attentive)

B Attitude to GM

food (higher scores >favourable)

C Trust

(higher scores >trust)

Age: 18-24 25-34 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ ref=age 35-44

-0.12 0.00 0.06 0.20* 0.12 0.08

0.18* 0.10*

-0.10 -.011

-0.03 0.00

ns ns ns ns ns ns

Gender: Male -0.19* 0.17* ns Interest in politics: yes 0.29* -0.05* ns Newspaper readership: None -0.20* ns -0.12* Tabloid -0.34* ns -0.17* Other newspaper Ref=broadsheet

-0.08 ns -0.07

Internet user: yes 0.25* ns ns Highest qualification: degree No qualifications Ref=O or A Levels

0.08 -0.23*

ns ns

0.11* -0.07

Biology qualification: yes 0.34* ns 0.11* Religion: Church of England Catholic Non-Christian None Ref= Other Christian

ns ns ns ns

ns ns ns ns

ns ns ns ns

Socio-economic Class: MManagerial/professional

Intermediate Self-employed Routine occupations Other social class Ref=supervisory & technical

ns ns ns ns ns

ns ns ns ns ns

0.14* 0.06 0.14* 0.01 0.21*

Genetic knowledge : high score 0.13* 0.06* ns Reported genetic condition in family: yes

0.35*

ns

ns

Attentiveness - -0.11* -0.05*

Base 2299 2299 2299

ns = variable parameters not statistically significant, p>0.05. * = significant at the p<0.05 level


144

Model Predictor

D Therapeutic

Cloning (higher scores >favourable)

E General Attitude

(higher scores >favourable)

Age: 18-24 25-34 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ ref=age 35-44

-0.05 0.00

-0.14* -.006

-0.15 -0.14

-0.01 -0.18* 0.03 0.01 0.03

-0.12

Gender: Male 0.12* 0.13* Interest in politics: yes ns ns Newspaper readership: None -0.01 ns Tabloid 0.16* ns Other newspaper Ref=broadsheet

0.18 ns

Internet user: yes ns ns Highest qualification: degree No qualifications Ref=O or A Levels

-0.07 0.17*

ns ns

Biology qualification: yes ns ns Religion: Church of England Catholic Non-Christian None Ref= Other Christian

0.09 -0.09 0.17 0.13*

ns ns ns ns

Socio-economic Class: Managerial/professional Intermediate Self-employed Routine occupations Other social class Ref=supervisory & technical

-0.01 -0.18* -0.08 -0.05 0.06

ns ns ns ns ns

Genetic knowledge: high score -0.04* 0.07* Reported genetic condition in family: yes

ns

ns

Attentiveness ns -0.15*

Base 2299 2299

ns= variable parameters not statistically significant, p>0.05. * = significant at the p<0.05 level


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Correlations between attitudes to different genetic applications

GM food Trust Therapeutic cloning

General attitude

GM Food 1.00 Trust .37* 1.00 Therapeutic Cloning .26* 0.10* 1.00 General Attitude .18* 0.30* 0.21* 1.00

* Statistically significant p<0.05

James Tilley, Sonia Exley and Anthony Heath ∗

Much of the literature on national identity draws a distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ conceptions. The former is supposed to place importance on aspects such as respect for political institutions, possessing national citizenship and speaking the national language. The latter is associated with a greater emphasis on bloodlines, ancestry and cultural assimilation, leading to a concern with people having been born and brought up in a country, and is therefore thought to be associated with weaker support for multiculturalism and potentially higher levels of worry about immigration. As is described below, French and German conceptions of national identity are generally recognised in literature as fitting neatly into this ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ typology respectively. This chapter seeks to explore the extent to which the typology is adequate in describing dimensions of British national identity. What do the British perceive as the things that make a person ‘truly British’? Using data from the 1995 and 2003 International Social Survey Programme modules which were administered as part of the British Social Attitudes series, the chapter begins by exploring the literature surrounding different dimensions of national identity. In order to assess how appropriate the civic/ethnic distinction is in a British context, we examine the extent to which people in Britain fall into different ‘types’ in terms of the way they conceptualise national identity. After this, we explore the differing social characteristics of those who conceptualise national identity in different ways. In particular, we are interested in the effect of generational changes on the types of national identity that are prevalent in Britain. Lastly, the relationship between people’s differing conceptions of national identity and their degree of patriotism is explored.

* James Tilley is Lecturer in Quantitative Political Science and Fellow of Jesus

College, Oxford; Sonia Exley is Research Assistant in the Department of Sociology and a member of Nuffield College, Oxford; Anthony Heath is Professor of Sociology at the University of Oxford.

Dimensions of British identity

7


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The concept of national identity

The historical background

The origins of national identity as a concept and unifying human force in society can be traced back to the development of states and the centralisation of political power in the post-Reformation, pre-industrial era. Anderson describes the concept of a nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1983: 6). He argues that this “deep horizontal comradeship” felt by citizens within certain territorial confines arose at a time when Enlightenment thought was questioning the notion of divinely ordained authority and a feeling of enlarged community ‘belonging’ was needed in order to gain legitimacy for centralised state power. Indeed, this rejection of the ‘primitive’ theory of nationalism (i.e. that nations have always existed) and the idea that nations are in fact ideological creations has been supported by commentators such as Gellner (1983), Hutchinson and Smith (1994) and Miller (1995). Hutchinson and Smith cite the importance of academic elites in this process: “movements of intelligentsia and opposition groups calling for the vernacular mobilisation of ‘the people’ against a variety of evils” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: 8). Mobilisation of this kind in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took the form of developing national cultures through national literary and cultural traditions and the standardisation of languages and education systems in an attempt to achieve three central goals of ‘autonomy’, ‘unity’ and ‘identity’ within sovereign states. The rise of a mass economy during the Industrial Revolution required mass communication and a reorganisation of humans from their fragmented and local social groupings into nations as the “natural social unit” (Gellner, 1983: 143). However, the extent to which nations and national identity are viewed in this imaginary sense is a matter of some disagreement between theorists. While Gellner has tended to claim that nations are entirely invented entities, Anderson believes this goes too far, arguing that all communities larger than those of immediate localities might be considered ‘imagined’ in that members do not personally know each other, and that to imagine an identity does not necessarily constitute the fabrication of such an identity. Similarly, Miller has raised fundamental questions regarding the way that feelings of national identity are repressed in society and the way in which it is considered “a mark of civilisation not to be affected by the vulgar emotions that nationality evokes” (Miller, 1995: 15). Hutchinson and Smith have drawn attention to the difficulty of defining nationalism as a concept compared with other forms of collective identity. Competing conceptions of national identity are evident in comparative studies of the phenomenon. While some theories focus on nostalgia relating to cultural heritage, others focus on language and geographical boundaries. Miller (1995) has made use here of the arguments of Hans Kohn, who draws a distinction between Western, liberal conceptions of national identity based on civic attachment to the state and Eastern conceptions of nationalism based on more


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mystical, quasi-tribal and ‘backward’ notions of identity. Smith has argued that the Eastern “ethnic genealogical” conception of nationality, with its focus on shared descent and ancestral culture, can tend towards the authoritarian and culturally repressive (Miller, 1995). However, this might be viewed as culturally relativist, particularly given arguments which draw attention to historic repression inherent in certain Western states such as France during the Napoleonic empire. Such arguments are difficult to resolve through comparative studies as there will only ever be a few countries that fall into each type. Each nation’s development tends towards a unique path, and general rules will always be subject to exceptions.

Civic versus ethnic dimensions

Debates about the nature of nationality are often centred on a division of national identity into two overarching types of a civic, or ‘inclusive’, conceptualisation and an ethnic, or ‘exclusive’, conceptualisation. The civic ‘inclusive’ conception is perhaps best characterised by France after the 1789 Revolution. This idea stemmed from the creation of a republic and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, a reduction in the influence of the church and an end to feudal power structures (Safran, 1998). The ethnic ‘exclusive’ form is characterised by the approach taken by Germany after unification in 1870. It has been argued that the ethnic nature of German national identity stems from an issue of national borders. The French national boundaries were clearly defined so that a territorial identity (ius soli) was feasible, but this was not the case in Germany. Here, conceptions of national identity were based more along bloodlines (ius sanguinis), with the focus on the notion of German people as an ethnic group. Fifty years of cultural advancement preceding unification in Germany had led to strong national sentiment, particularly in reaction to French developments, and unification marked the culmination of nationalist ideology whereby the German ‘volk’ were destined to unify and lead from the centre. Much academic literature has been devoted to creating refined typologies of national identity in comparative politics. In addition to the broad conceptions of civic and ethnic identity as typified in France and Germany, factors such as ascriptive ideology (as in the US experience), religion and levels of cultural tolerance can come into play. Bryant (1997) has argued that civic and ethnic definitions of nationality can be subdivided according to their accommodation of difference, and that these definitions can be broadly applied to approaches taken in key societies. While Germany has an ethnic conception of citizenship, it is also exclusive in terms of cultural tolerance. The French civic identity is made more complicated by the expectation of cultural assimilation. This contrasts with the Dutch approach of civic identity and cultural pluralism. Bryant describes British national identity as being civic and also ‘pragmatic’. This notion of pragmatism in British identity is added to by Hjerm (1998), who discusses multicultural approaches to nationality, defined as tolerance without


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the need for cultural assimilation. Hjerm draws a distinction between British ‘laissez-faire’, non-interventionist pluralism and the multicultural policies of ‘new world’ countries such as Australia where active policies for the integration of minority cultures are adopted. The relationship between national identity and tolerance of immigration is discussed in more detail in the chapter by McLaren and Johnson. This discussion suggests that definitions of national identity, and the relative importance of cultural indicators in defining identity, vary strongly between countries. In The 15th Report, McCrone and Surridge (1998) use data from the International Social Survey Programme specifically to examine which aspects of national identity tend to be viewed as important among survey respondents in four countries (Britain, Germany, Sweden and Spain). While they do find clear international differences (Spain, for example, places a higher value on religious identity – undoubtedly a feature of its Catholic and autocratic history), commonality, rather than difference, of experience seems to emerge. There is a focus in all four countries on language and respect for political institutions, which leads the authors to conclude that “overall, considerable national consensus exists with regard to the importance of the basic building blocks that make up national identity” (McCrone and Surridge, 1998: 7). One must be careful, therefore, not to overstate the importance of typologies of identities in comparative work on nationality.

Where does Britain fit in?

Whilst national identities in countries such as Germany and France seem relatively easy to categorise into overarching civic and ethnic definitions, the British experience might be considered more difficult. Cohen (1994) has described the notion of Britishness as “fuzzy” in that British identity has evolved gradually over time (as opposed to being defined through a distinct geo-political event such as a revolution or unification). It is more a result of continuous processes such as rising democracy, industrialisation and welfare state creation, not to mention the complicating factors of sub-state ethno-cultural identities. McCrone and Surridge (1998) suggest that in many ways the British tend to be defined, not in terms of who they are, but in terms of who they are not. High levels of post-colonial immigration and the lack of a clear extreme nationalist presence in Britain might suggest an ideology of civic multicultural tolerance as defining the British experience. However, this might equally suggest an absence of clear British identity. If we think about the two ‘ideal’ types of national identity as intersecting with one another, then we have four possibilities that Figure 7.1 illustrates.


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Figure 7.1 The two dimensions of national identity In general, it might be argued that German national identity could be located in the top left-hand quadrant, whereas French national identity resides in the bottom right-hand quadrant. If Britain fits neither of these, there are still two other possibilities: that British people may have little national feeling of either ethnic or civic origin (bottom left-hand quadrant), or that Britishness is actually a composite of ethnic and civic ideas of national identity (top right-hand quadrant). We turn now to the survey data to try to resolve this issue. Just how ‘fuzzy’ is British national identity? As part of the 1995 and 2003 ISSP surveys, respondents were asked the following question:

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly British. Others say that they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?

To have been born in Britain To have British citizenship

Ethnic national identity

Both ethnic and civic national identity

Neither civic nor ethnic national

identity Civic national identity

High ethnic identity

Low ethnic identity

High civic identity

Low civic identity


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To have lived in Britain for most of one’s life To be able to speak English To be a Christian To respect Britain’s political institutions and laws To feel British To have British ancestry (this was asked in 2003 only)

This series of items was combined with a question that attempts specifically to address issues of ethnicity:

Now a few questions about minority groups in Britain. ... how much do you agree or disagree [that] ...

... It is impossible for people who do not share Britain’s customs and traditions to become fully British

Defining civic and ethnic national identity in the British context Table 7.1 shows proportions rating each of the above items as being “very” or “fairly important” in ‘being British’, broken down by year.1 Table 7.1 Importance of different aspects of ‘being British’, 1995 and 2003

% who say “very” or “fairly important” 1995 2003

% %

Speak English 85 87

British citizenship 83 83

Respect laws/institutions 82 82

Born in Britain 76 70

Feel British 74 74

Lived life in Britain 71 69

Have British ancestry n/a 46

Be a Christian 32 31

Sharing customs/traditions* 50 52

Base 1058 873

n/a = not asked * = % who “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement “it is impossible for people who do not share Britain’s customs and traditions to become fully British” From the table, it is clear that there is general agreement that most of these items are important. This is particularly the case for speaking English, having British citizenship, and respecting British political institutions and laws, all of which were thought important by over four-fifths of respondents. There are only


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two items where there is not a clear majority in favour of their importance: having British ancestry and being a Christian – the latter being chosen by less than a third of respondents. The table also shows that there has been little change over time, with the exception of be ing born in Britain, where the proportion saying this was important fell six percentage points between 1995 and 2003. We used a statistical technique called factor analysis to explore the different dimensions in the responses. The results of this analysis are shown in more detail in the appendix to this chapter. In summary, the items fell into two distinct groups which seem to correspond to ethnic and civic conceptions rather well. The first group, which we term the ethnic dimension, contained the items about birthplace, ancestry, living in Britain, and sharing British customs and traditions. The second, or civic group, contained the items about feeling British, respecting laws and institutions, speaking English, and having British citizenship. The analysis also showed that the item on the necessity of being a Christian in order to be truly British did not fit neatly into either dimension, forming instead a separate factor. Given that we might expect this item to associate strongly with Christian belief, this item has been dropped from our analysis.2 It should be noted that our definition of civic versus ethnic national identity differs from the traditional ius soli and ius sanguinis conceptions. In particular, birthplace would normally be interpreted as a feature of ius soli, but we have it as part of the ethnic conception. Our categorisation relies rather on a distinction between ‘choice’ and ascriptive characteristics of national identity. While individuals can choose to do things such as learn English, respect British laws and institutions, and gain British citizenship, they cannot choose their ancestors and nor can they choose where they were born and raised. The distribution of civic and ethnic national identity in Britain Using the questions associated with each of the civic and ethnic dimensions, we assigned respondents a civic and an ethnic ‘score’ of between one and five depending on how important they had considered each of the items, where one represented low importance and five high importance.3 Table 7.2 shows the distribution of respondents along both scales. We can see an emerging pattern of three key groups. Around two-thirds of respondents score highly on both civic and ethnic conceptions of identity (the bottom right-hand cells of the table). This is the only group to have an ethnic component to their conception of national identity. Around a quarter score highly on the civic identity scale but lowly on the ethnic identity scale (top right quarter). A small number of respondents seem to believe neither dimension of national identity is important for ‘true’ Britishness (top left quarter). (Although they make up only about three per cent of the population, they form a disproportionately large group among the young, as we shall see.) But there is practically no one in the bottom left quarter of the table, i.e. scoring high on the ethnic dimension and low on the civic one.


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Table 7.2 Distribution of scores on the ethnic and civic national identity scales

Civic national identity

2 or less 2.01–3 3.01–4 4.01–5 Ethnic national

identity 2 or less

* 1 1 7

2.01–3 * 2 4 13

3.01–4 * 2 8 27

4.01–5

* * 3 29

Base: 796

Table percentages are shown * = less than 1% These findings can be mapped onto Figure 7.1. Thus, there is evidence in Britain of a stand-alone civic national identity, a civic coupled with ethnic identity, and a conception of identity that appears based on neither. The final cell remains rather empty, however; there appear to be few people who claim a stand-alone ethnic national identity. We can define these groups more rigorously using a statistical technique called cluster analysis which brings together individuals with similar scores on items.4 This technique has been used to create three ‘clusters’ – or groups – with similar meaning as the three groups identified in Table 7.2. As seen in Table 7.3, the ‘civic and ethnic identity’ group is the largest, although it has been slightly in decline between 1995 and 2003. The group who see neither civic nor ethnic dimensions of national identity as important is the smallest. But perhaps the most interesting findings relate to the ‘civic identity only’ group. They see the importance in British citizenship, speaking English and respect for British laws and institutions, but tend to view having been born and lived one’s life in Britain and sharing British customs and traditions as considerably less important. This group has grown from less than a quarter of the population in 1995 to around a third in 2003.

Table 7.3 Distribution of conceptions of national identity, 1995 and 2003

Conception of national identity 1995 2003 Both years pooled

% % %

Civic and ethnic 63 58 61 Civic only 23 32 27 Neither civic nor ethnic 13 10 12

Base 961 772 1733


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Although there have been changes over time in the relative size of the groups shown in Table 7.3, a point to which we shall return, there is no reason for thinking that the factors associated with each group have changed. Therefore – and in order to make our statistical analysis more powerful – we pool the data from 1995 and 2003 in the analysis presented in the rest of this chapter.5

National identity and generational change

Having identified three distinct groups of individuals with quite different conceptions of what Britishness means, we now turn to examining the social characteristics of those falling into each group. One common feature emerging from analysis of national sentiment in many countries is that older generations tend to feel a stronger sense of patriotism and national identity than do the young (Rose, 1985; McCrone and Surridge, 1998). A comparative study of Britain and Germany found that pride in the British welfare state was felt more strongly among older age groups in Britain, just as pride in German economic achievements was felt more strongly among older age groups in Germany (Topf et al., 1989). Clearly, one important question to address, then, is whether or not older cohorts hold different views to younger cohorts on their conceptions of national identity. Drawing some conclusions about this allows us to attempt to predict future trends in the strength and importance of civic/ethnic identities as older generations die out and are gradually replaced by newer generations. Table 7.4 gives evidence of a clear difference in views between generations born before and after 1945. Broadly speaking, there is in the more recent generations a rise in the exclusively civic conception of national identity which is matched by a decline in the combined ethnic and civic conception. While only around one in seven of the pre-1945 generation are members of the ‘civic only’ group, around a third of later generations are members of this group. Conversely, membership of the ‘ethnic and civic’ group is most extensive among the older generation. Although ‘civic and ethnic’ is the most common group among all generations, the figure is just over half for the 1945 to 1964 generation and just under half for the youngest group, compared with four-fifths of those born before 1945. Lastly, there are clear generational differences in the ‘neither civic nor ethnic’ group. While only around one in sixteen of those born before 1945 fall into this category, the comparable figures are over one in ten for those born between 1945 and 1964 and one in five for those born after that. This may reflect a growing apathy amongst younger cohorts towards all types of national sentiment, not just differing conceptions of national identity.


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Table 7.4 Conception of national identity by generational group

Conception of national identity

Born pre-1945 Born 1945–1964 Born 1965+

% % % Civic and ethnic 80 55 47 Civic only 14 34 33 Neither civic nor ethnic 6 11 20

Base 611 641 479

Source: British Social Attitudes surveys, 1995 and 2003 It should be noted that whilst we have identified these differences as generational in nature, it is possible that they are actually related to the ageing process. That is, as people become older they may change their conception of national identity. This seems rather implausible, though. Whilst it seems reasonable to argue that differing formative experiences (the decline of Empire and the increased ethnic mix of the population, for example) have led to generations with different conceptions of national identity, it is much more difficult to think of a mechanism that could explain why growing older makes one less likely to adopt an inclusive idea of Britishness.6 Different formative experiences of the cohorts are still not the only possible explanation for the patterns seen in Table 7.4. However, these generational differences could, for example, be due to compositional changes. Ideas of national identity are linked to a number of other important individual characteristics. Levels of education, libertarian versus authoritarian views and religiosity are linked in important ways to aspects of national identities. More highly educated citizens with socially liberal attitudes are thought to have more inclusive ideas of national identity (see Dowds and Young, 1996 for a detailed discussion of this phenomenon). And these other characteristics are also linked to generation. For example, older generations tend to be less well educated – while only seven per cent of those aged between 18 and 24 in 2003 have no formal qualifications, the comparable figure for those aged between 45 and 54 is 25 per cent, and 55 per cent for those aged 65 and over. Older generations are also more religious (Tilley, 2003). It may be therefore that differences between generations are simply due to differences in their education, religiosity and so forth. Equally there have been large shifts in the composition of the British population in terms of parental origins. People born before the Second World War are overwhelmingly likely to be born of Brit ish parents. By contrast, with the mass immigration from former Empire countries in the 1960s and 1970s and more recently from Central and Eastern Europe, newer generations of British-born individuals are much more likely to have non-British born parents. By 2001, 8.3 per cent of the British population was born overseas compared with


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just 4.2 per cent in 1951. Moreover, this proportion rose faster between 1991 and 2001 than in any previous decade (Rendell and Ball, 2004). Clearly we would expect this to have an effect on conceptions of national identity that focus on ancestry, ethnicity and birthplace. Thus, we need to use more sophisticated statistical techniques which allow all these factors to be taken into account at the same time. The detailed results of this analysis are reported in the appendix to this chapter. In summary, it confirms many of our expectations regarding the impact of social factors. There is a clear effect of education: those with degrees are significantly more likely to belong to the civic only group (or to the ‘neither civic nor ethnic’ group), as compared with those who have no formal qualifications. In addition, there is also an effect of religion: those who describe themselves as belonging to the Church of England are less likely to have a civic only or a ‘neither’ conception (i.e. more likely to have an ethnic component to their conception of identity) than those with no religion, or for that matter those with a non-Christian or non-state Christian religion. Also, as might be expected, those whose parents are or were not British citizens are also more likely to belong to the civic only group (or to the ‘neither civic nor ethnic’ group). However, even after all these other factors are taken into account, the clearest pattern is the continued significance of generational differences in determining membership of the three different groups. The pattern shown previously in Table 7.4 still holds: there is a substantial split between those born before the 1940s and those born during and particularly after the 1940s. Younger generations, starting from those born in 1940, are strongly and significantly more likely to support a civic only conception, eschewing any ethnic component. There is a similar pattern for the ‘neither civic nor ethnic’ group, with those born after 1960 being strongly and significantly more likely to fall into this category. The standard accounts of generational change emphasize the role of formative experiences when people are growing up and entering adulthood. It is by no means difficult to link the differences that we have found to events that happened in these cohorts’ youth. The emergence of generations that experienced their adolescence and early adulthood during the 1960s and later on with more inclusive national identities fits with events of the time. The 1960s saw a number of changes to Britain’s place in the world and the composition of citizens in Britain. The decline of British imperial power in the post-war period and the final end of Empire in the early 1960s, coupled with mass immigration from former colonial holdings, are both likely to have affected how individuals experienced Britishness when growing up. A number of theorists have also emphasized the role of international conflict in fostering national consciousness. The historian Linda Colley (1992) has shown how a sense of Britishness was in large part a consequence of the wars with Napoleonic France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the conflicts between Protestant Britain (with its constitutional monarchy) and Catholic and absolutist European countries. More recent conflicts with Germany in the two world wars will have maintained this sense of a shared British endeavour that joined the different nations of Britain in a shared project against


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a common enemy. But the latter decades of the twentieth century have not seen Britain pitted on its own against other nations (with the exception of the Falklands War). Britain now tends to take part in broader international coalitions, whether in military, economic or political conflicts, and these will not have the same implications for national identity as did earlier conflicts. It is not surprising then that for the youngest generations British identity does not have the same resonance as it did for older generations. However, although we have discounted the effect of ageing on attitudes, there is always the possibility that external events will act as a shock to change attitudes across generations, a so-called period effect. Recent years, with the resurgence of the debate about immigration (discussed in more detail in the chapter by McLaren and Johnson), may have had an impact on conceptions of British national identity. There is, in fact, a hint of this in our analysis: even after all the factors discussed above were taken into account, there were significantly fewer people who professed neither a civic nor an ethnic conception of national identity in 2003 than in 1995. If, as we have argued earlier, the views of this group are effectively an expression of apathy on the issue, then recent events may have jolted them to take sides. However, there is no similar reduction in the numbers espousing a ‘civic only’ conception of identity, so even this possible period effect seems to contribute to conceptions of national identity moving in a civic direction. Conceptions of national identity and patriotic views Heath et al. have shown the continued importance of British national sentiment as a notion which should be “conceptualised as an autonomous principle in its own right” for its explanatory power in determining views on issues such as Europe, nuclear defence, devolution and Irish unification (Heath et al., 1999: 158). Similarly, Hutchinson and Smith have stated that “what is often conceded is the power, even primacy, of national loyalties and identities over those of even class, gender and race” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: 4). Therefore, we are also interested in whether conceptions of national identity are related to national sentiment. To examine this, we use a battery of questions from the 1995 and 2003 British Social Attitudes surveys designed to measure how ‘patriotic’ individuals are. They might to some extent be best thought of as a measure of “my country right or wrong” – how much people think that Britain is superior to other countries. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements:

I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world

There are some things about Britain today that make me feel ashamed of Britain

The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the British


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Generally speaking, Britain is a better country than most other countries

People should always support their country, even if the country is in the wrong

When my country does well in international sports, it makes me feel proud to be British

We used the answers to these six items to give respondents a score from one to five on a ‘patriotism scale’, where one represented a low level and five a high level of patriotism.7 Table 7.5 shows scores on the patriotism scale broken down by the different conceptions of national identity. It is clear from the table that those who hold a ‘civic and ethnic’ conception of national identity (i.e. the only group that have an ethnic component to their view of national identity) are substantially more patriotic than those in other groups. Those with a ‘civic only’ conception hold the lowest level of patriotism, while the ‘neither civic nor ethnic’ group fall somewhere in the middle. This pattern has been stable over time. Table 7.5 Patriotism score by conception of national identity

Civic and ethnic Civic only Neither civic nor ethnic

All

1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003

% % % % % % % % 2 or less * * 5 6 15 10 4 3

2.01–3 25 26 60 58 53 63 37 40

3.01–4 61 61 33 34 28 23 50 49

4.01–5 12 11 3 * 3 * 9 7

Base 618 462 222 236 121 74 961 772

* = less than 1% In order to untangle the relationship between conceptions of national identity and patriotism, we carried out a multivariate analysis that allowed us to take other factors such as sex, education, race, religion, class, region and parental citizenship into account. We also included respondents’ underlying libertarian–authoritarian and left–right economic values. For this, we used the British Social Attitudes libertarian–authoritarian and left–right scales which are described in the Appendix to this Report (see Heath et al., 1994; Evans et al., 1996). The reason for including these values is that they are possible alternative sources of patriotic feeling. In particular, given that libertarian–authoritarian


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values are also related to generational group (Tilley, 2005), it is important to see whether the conception of national identity has any use in explaining the level of patriotism over and above that provided by libertarian–authoritarian values. The results of this analysis are presented in detail in the appendix to this chapter. As we might expect, there is a negative relationship between patriotism and education – those with degrees are significantly less likely than their less- educated counterparts to espouse patriotic views. Equally religion, social class and parental citizenship all have some effect on patriotism scale scores. Most notable is the generational differences, however. Less patriotic cohorts born after 1940 appear to be replacing older, more patriotic generations (see Model 1 in the appendix to this chapter). When we add libertarian–authoritarian values to the model, they also show a clear relationship to patriotism: libertarian views are significantly negatively correlated with pro-patriotic sentiments, and their introduction into the model tends to reduce the effect of some of the social characteristics, notably education, suggesting that some of the effect of education was mediated by libertarian values (see Model 2). The explanatory power of the model is increased from 20 per cent of the variation to 27 per cent. (Left–right values had no significant effect.) Finally, when we add in our measure of conception of national identity, we find that people whose conception of national identity does not include an ethnic component are much less patriotic than those in the majority ‘ethnic and civic’ group (see Model 3). Libertarian–authoritarian values retain a (slightly reduced) importance of their own, as does generation and education. The explanatory power of the model increases further to 34 per cent of the variation. Thus we are not simply reducing the effect of values and social characteristics by including conception of national identity, although this is certainly true, but are also adding a substantial new factor to the model. Conclusions The literature on national identity has tended to focus on a general typology of ‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ conceptions, where the former concerns itself with citizenship rights and respect for laws and political institutions, and the latter with issues of ancestry and cultural assimilation. It has been argued that civic and ethnic ideas correspond broadly with French and German approaches to membership of the nation, and in our analysis we sought to examine the extent to which Britain might fit into this (rather simplistic) typology. We find that the British cannot easily be categorised as either ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ nationalists. Instead there are three main groups. First, there is a group which combines both civic and ethnic conceptions of identity. This is the only group for whom ethnic considerations play any part in their conception of national identity. Although they make up the majority of the population, they are more numerous in the older generations, and we can surmise that this view is therefore in decline within the population as whole.


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The second largest group are those who reject ethnic conceptions in favour of a purely civic approach. They make up around a third of people born after the second world war, and there seems every prospect that this group will grow in size as younger generations replace older ones. Lastly, there a group who believe that there is very little at all that matters in making a person ‘truly British’. Although much smaller, this group does make up around a fifth of the generation born since 1965. Might the growth in Britain of a younger generation which rejects both civic and ethnic identities signal a potential decline in British nationalist sentiment? It is possible, and commentators such as Dogan (1994) have long argued the arrival of a ‘post-nationalistic’ era in Western European politics. However, the extent to which national identities will shrink in importance over time is a matter of some speculation. Increasing migration, European enlargement and the broader processes of globalisation must be balanced against the persistence of nationalist conflicts throughout the world. Indeed, Miller has asserted that “the majority of people are too deeply attached to their inherited national identities to make their obliteration an intelligible goal” (Miller, 1995: 184). In fact, there is some evidence that events since 1995 may have caused this last group to shrink, perhaps as people take sides on the national identity issue in the climate of a more polarised debate about immigration. Within Great Britain, continuation of strong national identity might be a good thing. While nationality can be a source of division between countries it can also promote a sense of community and belonging, collective loyalty and shared mutual responsibility. However, distinctions must be drawn between different types of national identity. We find in our analysis that those who include ethnic elements in their conception of national identity tend towards authoritarian values and greater patriotism. We also find evidence showing the replacement of older generations who hold ‘exclusive’ ethnic conceptions of identity with younger, more ‘inclusive’ cohorts. Indeed, the existence of multiple models of national identity seems to capture the prevailing mood. To borrow from Partridge (1999), it is “a thoroughly post-modern, post-national solution, in keeping with our mongrelised and global times”. Notes 1. In order to combine the two types of questions and make them comparable it was

necessary to combine “can’t choose” and “neither agree nor disagree” into a single middle category for all nine items.

2. Religion is included as a controlling variable in the later analysis. 3. The civic identity scale was a simple summation of the responses to items about

citizenship, ability to speak English, respect for political institutions and laws, and feeling British, divided by four. It was coded 1 to 5 so that higher scores mean individuals think civic elements of national identity are more important. Unfortunately ‘to have British ancestry’ was only asked in 2003. Thus, in order to enable us to pool data from both surveys, the ethnic identity scale was created summing only the items on having been born in Britain, having lived in Britain all


162

one’s life, and sharing British customs and traditions, and dividing by three. Again this scale was coded 1 to 5, where 5 indicated that ethnic elements of national identity were deemed most important. Both scales proved to be fairly internally coherent, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.70 for the civic scale and 0.67 for the ethnic scale. The scales also correlated together, with the majority of respondents scoring above four on both scales.

4. Under this procedure (K-means cluster analysis) the number of clusters has to be fixed in advance. A visual inspection of the data in Table 7.2 suggested three groups. The addition of more clusters tends to give very small clusters with few individuals. The three clusters are thus similar to the ones that could be seen by eye from Table 7.2, with one main group with high scores on all items (a civic-cum-ethnic cluster), one smaller group which has high scores on the civic items but not on the ethnic, and the smallest group with comparatively low scores on all items. The next table shows the mean scores for each cluster.

Mean scores of importance for ‘being British’ by cluster membership

Civic and ethnic cluster

Civic only cluster

Neither civic nor ethnic

Born in Britain 4.65 2.67 2.99 British citizenship 4.65 3.79 2.93 Lived life in Britain 4.51 2.84 2.47 Speak English 4.78 4.52 1.97 Respect laws/institutions 4.45 4.19 2.81 Feel British 4.53 3.23 2.64 Sharing customs/traditions 3.69 2.98 2.79

Base 1080 458 195

Source: British Social Attitudes surveys, 1995 and 2003 5. All the analysis in this paper has been replicated using only the 2003 data and

including the item on British ancestry, and the results of this are consistent with those presented here.

6. Indeed, there appears little relationship between conventional social ageing landmarks such as marriage, childbirth and national identity.

7. These items scale extremely well with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78 References Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined Communities, London: Verso Bryant, C.G.A. (1997), ‘Citizenship, national identity and the accommodation of

difference: reflections on the German, French, Dutch and British cases’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 23(2): 157–172


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Cohen, R. (1994), Frontiers of Identity: the British and Others, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Colley, L. (1992), Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837, New Haven: Yale University Press

Dogan, M. (1994), ‘The decline of nationalisms within Western Europe’, Comparative Politics, 26: 281–305

Dowds, L. and, Young, K. (1996), ‘National Identity’, in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A., Brook, L. and Thomson, K. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 13th Report, Aldershot: Dartmouth

Evans, G.A., Heath, A.F. and Lalljee, M.G., (1996), ‘Measuring left–right and libertarian–authoritarian values in the British electorate’, British Journal of Sociology, 47: 93–112

Gellner, E. (1983), Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past, Oxford: Blackwell

Heath, A.F., Evans G.A. and Martin J., (1994), ‘The measurement of core beliefs and values: The development of balanced socialist/laissez faire and libertarian/ authoritarian scales’, British Journal of Political Science, 24: 115–158

Heath, A.F., Taylor, B., Brook, L. and Park, A. (1999), ‘British National Sentiment’, British Journal of Political Science, 29: 155–175

Hjerm, M. (1998), ‘National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries’, Acta Sociologica, 41: 335–347

Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. (eds.) (1994), Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press

McCrone, D. and Surridge, P. (1998), ‘National Identity and National Pride’, in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A., Brook, L., Thomson, K. and Bryson, C. (eds.) British – and European – Social Attitudes: The 15th Report, Aldershot: Ashgate

Miller, D. (1995), On Nationality, Oxford: Clarendon Partridge, S. (1999), The British–Irish Council: the trans-islands symbolic and political

possibilities. Paper presented to the British Council ‘Looking into England’ conference, 16th December 1999,

http://www.britishcouncil.org/studies/england/partridge.htm Rendall, M.S. and Ball, D.J. (2004), ‘Immigration, emigration and the ageing of the

overseas -born population in the United Kingdom’, Population Trends, 116: 18–27 Rose, R. (1985), ‘National pride in cross-national perspective’, International Social

Science Journal, 37: 85–96 Safran, W. (1998), ‘The context of French politics’, in Donald-Hancock, M., Conradt,

D.M., Peters, G., Safran, W. and Zariski, R. (eds.) Politics in Western Europe, London: MacMillan

Tilley, J.R. (2003), ‘Secularisation and ageing in Britain: Does family formation cause greater religiosity?’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42: 269–278

Tilley, J.R. (2005 forthcoming),‘The generational basis of libertarian–authoritarian values in Britain’, Political Studies

Topf, R., Mohler, P. and Heath, A. (1989), ‘Pride in One’s Country: Britain and West Germany’, in Jowell, R., Witherspoon, S. and Brook, L. (eds.) British Social Attitudes: Special International Report, Aldershot: Gower


164

Acknowledgements The National Centre for Social Research is grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number RES-000-22-0326) for their financial support which enabled us to ask the International Social Survey Programme questions reported in this chapter.


165

Appendix Factor analysis of dimensions of British national identity: scores for maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax factor rotation

Civic dimension Ethnic dimension

Born in Britain .81

British citizenship .44

Lived life in Britain .56

Speak English .49

Respect laws/institutions .56

Feel British .68 *

British ancestry .70

Sharing customs/traditions .49

Initial Eigen values 1.29 3.23

Base: 770

* Scores below 0.4 not reported


166

Multinomial logistic model predicting national identity cluster membership for 1995 and 2003 (relative to “civic and ethnic”)

Civic only Neither civic nor ethnic

B SE B SE

2003 .19 .13 -.76*** .19 Women -.24* .13 -.17 .19 Degree 1.26*** .25 .80** .36 Some education .49*** .18 .29 .25 Ref: No qualifications 0.00 0.00 Non-white .18 .41 -.13 .55 Church of England -.32** .16 -.83*** .24 Other Protestant .05 .20 -.30 .28 Catholic -.06 .23 -.06 .29 Non-Christian -.01 .50 .38 .62 Ref: No religion 0.00 0.00 Salariat .30* .18 .26 .25 Routine non-man .01 .18 -.07 .24 Petty bourgeoisie .27 .24 -.07 .37 Ref: Working class 0.00 0.00 Born 1970+ 1.15*** .30 2.27*** .47 Born 1960–69 1.46*** .28 2.02*** .45 Born 1950–59 1.21*** .38 1.26*** .46 Born 1940–49 .78*** .29 .27 .53 Born 1930–39 .22 .31 .99** .48 Ref: Born pre-1930 0.00 0.00 Scotland .37* .22 .50* .29 Wales -.32 .27 .04 .36 Ref: England 0.00 0.00 Parents non-citizens 1.23*** .32 1.54*** .40 Constant -2.34*** .29 -3.17*** .46

Base 409 173

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Relative to “civic and ethnic” (N = 987) R-square (Cox and Snell) = .17


167

Linear (OLS) models predicting patriotism score

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 B SE B SE B SE 2003 .04 .03 .03 .03 .02 .03 Sex -.06** .03 -.05* .03 -.06** .03 Degree -.45*** .06 -.28*** .06 -.23*** .05 Some education -.19*** .04 -.15*** .03 -.13*** .03 Ref: No quals 0.00 0.00 0.00 Non-white -.16* .09 -.16* .09 -.15* .08 Church of England .16*** .03 .09*** .03 .07** .03 Other Protestant .07 .04 .02 .04 .01 .04 Catholic -.08 .05 -.10** .05 -.10** .05 Non-Christian .18 .12 .12 .11 .13 .10 Ref: No religion 0.00 0.00 0.00 Salariat -.15*** .04 -.11*** .04 -.09*** .04 Routine non-man -.11*** .04 -.08** .04 -.08** .04 Petty bourgeoisie -.10* .05 -.10* .05 -.08* .05 Ref: Working class 0.00 0.00 0.00 Born 1970+ -.39*** .06 -.34*** .05 -.23*** .05 Born 1960–69 -.43*** .05 -.37*** .05 -.26*** .05 Born 1950–59 -.35*** .05 -.27*** .05 -.21*** .05 Born 1940–49 -.29*** .05 -.27*** .05 -.23*** .05 Born 1930–39 -.07 .05 -.05 .05 -.02 .05 Ref: Born pre-1930 0.00 0.00 0.00 Scotland -.12** .05 -.10** .05 -.07 .05 Wales -.02 .06 -.03 .06 -.04 .05 Ref: England 0.00 0.00 0.00 Parents non-

citizens -.18*** .07 -.18*** .07 -.09 .07

Authoritarian–libertarian

-.29*** .02 -.23*** .02

Left–right .01 .02 .01 .02 NI – neither -.46*** .04 NI – civic -.34*** .03 NI – civic and ethnic

0.00

Constant 3.74*** .05 4.26*** .07 4.21*** .07 R-square (adjusted) .20 .27 .34

Base: 1502

* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.

Understanding the rising tide ofanti-immigrant sentiment
8 Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson ∗
Britain, like many of her European neighbours, has experienced considerableuneasiness at being a country of immigration. Although policy makers tend toexpress pride in Britain’s comparative success at multiculturalism (‘howeverbad things are in Britain, Europe is surely worse’ goes the thinking – see Favell,2001), Britain’s experiment with multiculturalism was, in fact, an unwantedconsequence of her desire to retain her Empire at the end of the Second WorldWar. Immigration policy prior to 1962 was primarily determined by the concern formaintaining subjecthood linkages with the Old Commonwealth of Canada,Australia and New Zealand. This meant the creation of a citizenship status thattreated all Commonwealth citizens as subjects and thus allowed the freemovement of both Old and New Commonwealth citizens to the UnitedKingdom. Even in the face of increasing numbers of migrants from the WestIndies after the Second World War and pressure from backbench politicianswho were, in turn, under pressure from their constituents to put a halt to blackimmigration, Conservative governments preferred a quasi-open-door policy1 sothat Britain might preserve Commonwealth linkages. What is more, in the faceof ‘race riots’ (arguably mild by comparative standards) in August 1958 andpublic demands to restrict new migration from the West Indies, politicianspreferred to leave the issue alone and continue to uphold the symbolic nature ofa common status across the Commonwealth. It was not until the adoption of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act –when there were already an estimated 400,000+ immigrants from the WestIndies, India and Pakistan in Britain – that the government finally attempted toclose the doors to immigration (see Layton-Henry, 1992). The 1962 Act was ∗ Lauren McLaren is Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Nottingham.

Mark Johnson is a Researcher at the National Centre for Social Research and Co-Director of the British Social Attitudes survey series.


primarily concerned with halting the flow of new immigrants, but by the timeBritain tried to put a stop to immigration, she already had a multiculturalsociety, whether she liked it or not. From the time of the 1962 Act, there was a consensus across both theConservative and the Labour parties that strict controls were desirable andnecessary. Along with strict controls, however, it was thought that conditionsfor migrants already in Britain would need to be improved. Indeed, this hasbeen the mantra of Conservative and Labour governments alike since 1962.Still, while the UK has been far more successful than her European counterpartsat restricting immigration, and is less vulnerable to the immigrant-related effectsof globalisation and to legal restrictions on political action in the realm ofrestricting migration (see Hansen, 2000), further immigrants have indeed come.Some of these are individuals from former colonies who have come to joinfamily members, but many others are from countries that were never Britishcolonies, like those who have come from Central Europe or Iraq2 with the initialpurpose of seeking asylum. While legal scholars make a clear distinctionbetween asylum seekers and immigrants, it is unlikely that ordinary citizens –who are the focus of this chapter – see such a clear distinction. Indeed, Britishpolicy itself – until recently – has tended to conflate the two (see Favell, 2001). Given past restrictive policies, it is reasonable to ask how it is that migrationfigures have recently increased so dramatically, particularly between 1998 and2000. Prior to 2000, the UK was known for having one of the most restrictiveimmigration and asylum regimes in all of Europe, but by the end of 2002, eventhe United Nations – which had previously been critical of Britain’s (non-existent) asylum policy – contended that the country was taking more than itsfair share of refugees.3 How did such a dramatic change come about? It seemsto have started in 1993, with the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, whichfor the first time introduced the right of appeal to those with failed applicationsfor asylum. Subsequent legislation, however, made it increasingly difficult to beaccepted as an asylum claimant in the first place and appeared to keep a cap onthe slowly increasing number of claims. In 1998, however, the Labourgovernment decided for the first time to incorporate the European Conventionon Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) into British law via theHuman Rights Act, and Figure 8.1 shows a jump in both asylum applicationsand new settlements shortly after this. We can only speculate that this newintroduction of human rights legislation into statutory law sent a signal toasylum seekers that they would indeed get fairer treatment (as promised by thenew Labour government when it took power in 1997) than previously. Itdefinitely seems to have spawned more court cases related to immigration andasylum (the number of cases included in the law reports of The Times tripledbetween 1994 and 2002). Moreover, while hostility to new entries is quite highin the UK, it is also known as being a far friendlier place to migrants than manycontinental European countries (see, for instance, Nielsen, 2004). This,combined with improved statutes related to the treatment of asylum seekers, isthus likely to have contributed to the increase in applications. While this pointmay lead some to the conclusion that the legislation in question ought to berepealed, it is highly unlikely that any British government could do so without ahuge outcry from the international community.

Understanding the rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment 171

Figure 8.1 Immigration: the statistics

In this chapter we focus on the period between 1995 and 2003. As Figure 8.1shows, the number of both asylum applications and new settlements clearlyincreased over this period (although there was a large decrease in asylumapplications between 2002 and 2003). The number of asylum applications isnot overwhelmingly large, and the bulk of the increase is reflected in thenumber of new settlements. Again, it is likely that some of this increase was theresult of the passage of the Human Rights Act in 1998, and the subsequentpossibility for UK courts to then interpret the act in a way that would befavourable to the families of established migrants. Previous immigrationlegislation had aimed at severely curbing family reunification, but given thatone of the provisions of the ECHR is the right to family life, it is possible thatcourts in the UK have been able to use this provision to allow extended familymembers of established migrants to move to the UK. At the same time, the NewLabour government is promoting the economic benefits of importing skilledlabour from abroad and some of the increase in settlements very likely resultsfrom this new approach to solving labour shortages in certain sectors of theeconomy and health service. Given the traditional uneasiness with its multicultural status and with the ideaof immigration (particularly non-white immigration), continued exploration ofattitudes to immigration in Britain today is of utmost importance. To do this weuse questions from the International Social Survey Programme asked as part ofthe British Social Attitudes survey in 1995 and 2003.

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

Num

bers

of s

ettle

men

ts/A

sylu

m a

pplic

atio

ns

New settlements Asylum applications


Are anti-immigration sentiments increasing?

We begin by investigating whether ‘anti-immigration’ views have increasedover time. There are two questions that serve as summary measures of generalattitudes towards immigration. The first considers immigrants generally:

Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should be… increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduceda little, or reduced a lot?

As can be seen in Table 8.1, the views of the British public have shifted quiteconsiderably between 1995 and 2003. In 1995, around two-thirds of thepopulation thought the number of immigrants should be reduced, but by 2003this had jumped to three-quarters. Further, all of this increase was among thosewho thought that the number of immigrants should be reduced “a lot”.Meanwhile, the proportion who thought that immigration should stay at thesame level or be increased has fallen from just under a third to a fifth. Wherethere was previously some degree of ambivalence there now seems to be moreconviction, and the conviction is overwhelmingly against immigration. (Thosewho are not citizens and whose parents were not citizens when they were bornare removed from the analyses because it is expected that citizenship statuswould confound the effects of all variables analysed here.) 4

Table 8.1 Views on whether the number of immigrants should be increased orreduced, 1995 and 2003

1995 2003 % change

% %

Increased a lot + a little 3 5 +2Remain as is 26 15 -12Reduced a littleReduced a lot

2441

}}

65 2351

}}

74 -1+10

Base 970 793

Base: Respondents who are British citizens and whose parents were British citizens atthe time of the respondent’s birth

Of course, this change has happened against a backdrop of increasedimmigration, so the status quo has changed. It is not necessarily the case thatpeople want less immigration than they did in 1995 – if they want immigrationto be brought back to 1995 levels, they might logically have moved from the“remain as it is” to the “reduced” camp. Nevertheless, the increase in the


“reduced a lot” category would appear to signify a hardening of attitudesagainst immigration. That this is the case is supported by the weaker but stillsignificant increase in our second measure of attitudes to immigration:

Do you agree or disagree that Britain should take stronger measuresto exclude illegal immigrants?5

Whilst the increase may be less than that found for our first measure, the initiallevel of opposition to illegal immigration is perhaps more important. As shownin Table 8.2, already in 1995 over three-quarters of respondents wanted strongermeasures to exclude illegal immigrants. With such a high level already, furtherlarge changes are hardly likely. The question clearly illustrates the high anti-immigrant sentiment prevalent in Britain.

Table 8.2 Views on whether Britain should take stronger measures to excludeillegal immigrants, 1995 and 2003

1995 2003 %change

% %

Agree strongly 49 } 53 } +5Agree 29 }

7828 }

82-1

Neither agree nor disagree 13 10 -4Disagree/disagree strongly 6 5 -1

Base 970 793


We turn now to a discussion of why the British public has grown more hostile toimmigration over this eight-year period. Apart from the objective increase inimmigration levels, commentators have suggested a number of reasons why thishas happened, and we examine six hypotheses (see, for example, Hjerm, 1998;McCrone and Surridge, 1998):

• that national pride has increased; • that there is increasing conservatism in conceptions of the key components

of Britishness; • that racial prejudice is on the increase; • that there is a new, increased concern about Muslims in particular which

has spilled over into attitudes towards immigration; • that perceptions of the economic and social consequences associated with


immigrants are changing; and • that politicians and the media have flagged up the immigration issue more

often and/or in a different manner to previously.

For each of the hypotheses, two conditions need to hold in order to confirm thelink with increases in anti-immigration sentiment. The first is that the measuremust be related to attitudes towards immigration, and the second is that themeasure must itself show an increase over the relevant time period.

National pride

Our first hypothesis is that the shift in attitudes to immigration is the result ofrising levels of national pride. There are strong grounds for expecting this to bethe case: pride in one’s own country may mean one resents change to a greaterextent, but also it is likely to mean less identification with people fromelsewhere. Immigrants may be seen as posing a threat to the basic functioningof the political system, as well as the social and economic systems. Given thatmost immigrants to the UK come from polities with very different systems ofgovernance (in comparison to that of the UK), it may be perceived that thesenewcomers do not understand the basic functioning of British democracy.Further, specific types of immigrants – namely those from Muslim-basedcountries – may be perceived as having extremely non-democratic goals like thereplacement of secular British democracy with a religiously basedfundamentalist government. In addition, those who are more proud of theBritish system of government may, in turn, feel the threat from immigrantsmore acutely. Even things like extreme pride in the treatment given to variousminority groups may be associated with increased concerns about immigration:people may feel pride in the way current groups are treated but may also worrythat the country will no longer be able to accommodate various groups equallyif more immigrants come into the country. In the realm of economy, immigrantsare often perceived as being a drain on national economic resources, and sothose who feel greater pride in the British economy may have concerns thatimmigrants are a threat to the economic achievements of the country. Respondents were asked to say how proud they were of Britain in each of thefollowing respects:

The way democracy worksIts political influence in the worldBritain’s economic achievementsIts social security systemIts scientific and technological achievementsIts achievements in sportsIts achievement in the arts and literatureBritain’s armed forcesIts historyIts fair and equal treatment of all groups in society


The first stage is to examine whether pride in one’s country is indeed related toattitudes towards immigration. The results are summarised in Table 8.3.6 Thisshows separately for respondents who were either proud or not proud of eachachievement, the proportion who agreed that the level of immigration should bereduced. The final column shows the difference in the level of hostility towardsimmigration between those who were proud and not proud of each achievement.Throughout this chapter, this figure has been calculated so that it is positive ifthe variable in question is related to a wish to reduce immigration and zero ornegative if it is not – in this case, column 1 minus column 2.

Table 8.3 National pride and anti-immigration hostility

% who want to reduce number ofimmigrants

Pride in ... Proud Base Notproud

Base %diffe-rence

... armed forces 77 692 52 61 +25

... history 77 662 57 84 +20

... achievements in sports 77 510 69 229 +8

... scientific and technological achievements 74 612 73 99 +2

... achievement in the arts and literature 73 537 72 136 +1

... economic achievements 73 484 76 221 -3

... fair and equal treatment of all groups in society 73 418 76 290 -3

... social security system 73 374 76 347 -3

... political influence in the world 72 415 76 297 -4

... the way democracy works 72 487 79 224 -7


The table shows a mixed picture. Most aspects of national pride are eitherunrelated to attitudes towards immigration or correlated in the ‘wrong’direction. For example, pride in the way British democracy works, which wehad hypothesised might be related to opposition to further immigration thatcould dilute its effectiveness, is in fact significantly related to not wanting toreduce immigration. However, there are three aspects of national pride whichare related to opposition to immigration: pride in Britain’s armed forces, pridein its history, and – to a lesser extent – pride in its sporting achievements.


The particular importance of pride in the armed forces and in Britain’s history isconfirmed by these being the measures that also show the closest relationship towanting to take stronger measures against illegal immigrants. Pride in sport didnot show a clear relationship to this measure, but there was a significant butweaker relationship with pride in scientific achievements, economicachievements and political influence. However, if a rise in national pride is responsible for the change in views onimmigration, we would also need to establish that levels of national pride havethemselves increased since 1995. As Table 8.4 shows there has been relativelylittle increase in national pride over the period. Indeed, for one of the sources ofpride of interest – in sporting achievements – there has been a significant fall inpride. In fact, only two of the statements show a significant increase, namely inBritain’s economic achievements and in the fair and equal treatment of allgroups in society. Since these were only inconsistently associated with hostilityto immigrants or not at all, this does not look promising for the hypothesis. Thetwo aspects of national pride that were clearly and consistently linked tohostility to immigration – armed forces and history – show no significantchange over time.

Table 8.4 Sources of national pride, 1995 and 2003

% who have pride in ... 1995 2003 %change

... Britain’s economic achievements 38 62 +24

... its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society 49 54 +5

... its political influence in the world 49 53 +4

... Britain’s armed forces 84 86 +3

... its social security system 45 47 +2

... the way democracy works 61 62 +1

... its scientific and technological achievements 80 78 -3

... its achievement in the arts and literature 70 67 -3

... its history 86 83 -3

... its achievements in sports 71 63 -8

Base: 970 793


In a final attempt to rescue the hypothesis, we looked at change over time in theproportion of people who said they were “very proud” of the variousachievements. It could perhaps be argued that this is the real group of interest


for our purposes. This analysis added a few further relatively small butsignificant increases – in Britain’s economic achievement (up from five to 13per cent), in its armed forces (up from 46 to 51 per cent), in its social securitysystem up from seven to ten per cent, and in its political influence in the world(up from six to nine per cent) – all of which are related to attitudes toimmigration on one or other of the measures (except pride in the social securitysystem). The best that can be said is perhaps that changes in national pride could havehad some limited influence on the increase in anti-immigration sentiment, butcould hardly be the main factor. We continue our search for an explanation,turning next to notions of ‘Britishness’.

Conceptions of Britishness

In many ways, traditional elite discourse on British citizenship is likely to haveled to comparatively liberal perceptions of what it means to be British. The keyhistorical precedent here is the British Nationality Act of 1948, which containedan extraordinarily inclusive citizenship norm. This norm was maintained until itwas finally dismantled by the 1981 British Nationality Act. The original notionof citizenship in Britain as outlined in the 1948 Act was one that providedcitizens of the UK and its colonies with a common citizenship. Even in the faceof ever-increasing migration, and even during a Conservative governmentadministration in the 1950s, elite discourse on the issue remained inclusive. However, this conception of British citizenship became increasinglyconservative over time – under both Labour and Conservative governments. Itmoved from exclusion based on the place from which one’s passport was issued(1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act) to quasi-ancestry (CommonwealthImmigrants Bill of 1968)7 to clear ancestry with the new concept of patriality(1971 Immigration Act). Plus, there were increasing restrictions between 1971and 1974 as the rhetoric of Enoch Powell contributed to moving theConservative Party into a more restrictionist mode. Thus, an initially liberalconception of citizenship was converted into one that made clear the importanceof ancestry and heritage (and in particular, the heritage of the stock of peoplewho had initially migrated to the Old Commonwealth). Finally, in keeping with the need to bring citizenship law in line withmigration law and with the acceptance of the near-collapse of directcolonial/Commonwealth ties, the 1981 British Nationality Act completelyrevamped the notion of citizenship and, presumably, the official notion of whatit meant to be British. While all previous legislation held onto the category ofCitizen of the UK and Commonwealth (CUKC) and to the notion ofsubjecthood, the 1981 Act abolished the former and almost completelyabolished the latter as well. A new category, UK citizen, was established andspecified a more standard form of citizenship. Essentially, a child born in theUK would be granted British citizenship if either its mother or its father was aBritish citizen or settled in the UK, and naturalisation for those without kinshiplinkages was made relatively easy (and short).8 As discussed above, however, it


was expected that this liberal citizenship regime would coincide with a verystrict initial entry policy (see Hansen, 2000). Given the history of citizenship and immigration policies in the UK, it isdifficult to know what ordinary citizens’ views might be on what it takes to beBritish. Fortunately, we have survey questions in 1995 and 2003 which doprecisely that. The results of these are discussed in more detail in the chapter byTilley, Exley and Heath. Our interest here is in exploring whether the increasein hostility towards immigration might lie in increasingly conservative notionsof what it means to be British. But we must first determine whetherconservative notions of being British are indeed related to attitudes toimmigration. There are several different components of Britishness investigated in the 1995and 2003 British Social Attitudes surveys, and their relationship to attitudes toimmigration are shown in Table 8.5. We can see from the final column, thatfour of these components of Britishness are strongly related to hostility towardsfurther immigration – being born in Britain, having British ancestry, havinglived most of one’s life in Britain and agreeing that “it is impossible for peoplewho do not share Britain’s customs and traditions to become fully British”.These are in fact the four components that Tilley, Exley and Heath identify intheir chapter as the ethnic, or exclusive, dimension of national identity.

Table 8.5 Components of Britishness and anti-immigration hostility

% who want to reduce number of immigrants

Components of Britishness Important Base Notimportant

Base % diffe-rence

Be born in Britain 80 589 56 183 +24Have British ancestry 85 400 63 348 +22Have lived most of life in Britain 80 560 59 197 +20Be able to speak English 76 687 63 68 +13Be a Christian 82 257 70 483 +12Respect British political institutions

and laws 75 652 69 101 +5Hold British citizenship 75 662 71 92 +4Feel British 75 594 73 152 +2

Agree Base Disagree Base

People who do not share Britishcustoms can never be fully British 88 424 52 138 +36



Other components of Britishness – such as respect for political institutions andlaws, holding British citizenship and feeling British – which Tilley, Exley andHeath include in their civic, or inclusive, dimension of national identity, do nothave a significant relationship to hostility to further immigration.9 A middleposition is held by the items on being able to speak English and being aChristian. These have a significant relationship with wishing to reduceimmigration, but it is weaker than for the items of the ethnic dimension ofnational identity. Having established a relationship between some aspects of Britishness andattitudes to immigration, we turn now to look at whether change in thesevariables could have caused the rise in anti-immigration feeling. As seen inTable 8.6, in stark contrast to the fairly short/easy naturalisation process inBritain, vast majorities in both 1995 and 2003 thought that in order to be trulyBritish a person really must have been born on British soil. However, as alsoshown in the chapter by Tilley, Exley and Heath the ‘ethnic’ components ofBritishness have tended to decrease, not increase, over time. This is especiallytrue of the requirement to have been born in Britain in order to be truly British.(The question on having British ancestry was not asked in 1995.)

Table 8.6 Components of Britishness, 1995 and 2003

% who say important for being truly British 1995 2003 % change

Be born in Britain* 79 73 -6Have lived most of life in Britain* 74 71 -3Hold British citizenship* 85 84 -2Be a Christian* 33 31 -1Respect British political institutions and laws* 83 82 -1Feel British* 75 75 0People who do not share British customs can never

be truly British** 52 53 0Be able to speak English* 86 87 +1Have British ancestry* n/a 48 –

Base 970 793

* Per cent responding ‘very’ or ‘fairly important’** Per cent responding ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’n/a = not askedBase: Respondents who are British citizens and whose parents were British citizens atthe time of the respondent’s birth


We looked also at those who thought each of the components of Britishnesswere “very important” only to find that, on this measure, all the components ofBritishness have declined over time. In summary, then, although certainelements of the conception of Britishness are related to hostility towards furtherimmigration, we have to dismiss the hypothesis that this has caused theobserved increase in anti-immigration sentiments as there has been no increasein these elements. We turn next to another potential explanation: that racialprejudice is on the rise.

Racial prejudice

To what degree has the increase in preference for the exclusion/restriction ofmigrants been a result of increased levels of prejudice? Before considering thishypothesis, however, it is necessary first to determine whether self-reportedlevels of prejudice are related to attitudes towards immigrants.10 As shown inTable 8.7, this is indeed the case. Among the, admittedly very small, group whodescribe themselves as “very prejudiced” against people of other races, anastonishing 100 per cent would like to reduce the number of immigrants.Among the larger (and therefore more reliable) group who describe themselvesas “a little prejudiced”, the figure is still almost nine out of ten. But it falls totwo-thirds among those who say they are “not at all prejudiced”. There is asimilar but weaker relationship with the desire to be tougher on illegalimmigrants (88 per cent of those who are a little prejudiced want strongermeasures, compared with 80 per cent of those who claim not to be prejudiced atall).

Table 8.7 Perceptions of prejudice and anti-immigrant hostility

% who want toreduce numberof immigrants

Base

Self-reported prejudiceVery prejudiced 100 23

A little prejudiced 88 224

Not at all prejudiced 67 539



As with our previous hypotheses, we need to show also that racial prejudice hasincreased over the time period in order to be able to conclude that this may havecaused the increase in hostility to immigration. In The 20th Report, Rothon andHeath (2003) charted the long-term decline in self-reported racial prejudice.Between 1983 and 2001, for instance, the proportion of respondents whoreported that they were either very or a little prejudiced dropped from 35 percent to 25 per cent. However, they also note that this increased to 31 per cent in2002. As seen in Figure 8.2, this has now levelled off at 30 per cent.

Figure 8.2 Self-reported racial prejudice: per cent who see themselves as “veryprejudiced” or “a little prejudiced”, 1983–2003

Although the 2003 figure represents an increase from 2001, it is no higher thanin the mid-1990s. The question was not asked in 1995, but in 1994, reportedracial prejudice was even higher than in 2003, at 36 per cent. By 1996, thisfigure had dropped to 29 per cent, indicating that the 1995 figure would havelikely been somewhere between these two. It is thus impossible to conclude thatthere has been an increase in racism in the 1995–2003 period as a whole. However, before we write off the effect of racism completely, we should lookbeyond self-rated racism at perceptions of racism in society more generally.Perhaps some respondents who will not themselves admit to being racist, willoppose immigration on the grounds that it will cause more racism in others. Wehave two questions to consider here: whether it is perceived there is more orless racial prejudice in Britain now than there was five years ago, and whether itis thought there will be more or less in five years’ time. And these measures doindeed correlate with views on immigration: 79 per cent of people who thinkthere is more prejudice now would like to reduce the number of immigrants,

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003


compared with 71 per cent of those who see less prejudice or the same.Similarly, 81 per cent of those who think there will be more prejudice in fiveyears’ time would like to reduce immigration, compared with 68 per cent ofthose who expect there to be less or the same prejudice. Clearly, interpretationof this latter question is complicated by the fact that we do not know whetherrespondents think that levels of immigration will be reduced or not, but there isnevertheless a relationship there. And in this case we do find a change since the mid-1990s, as seen in Table 8.8.Back in 1994 around a third of respondents thought there had been a rise inprejudice, whereas this figure is now almost half. Similarly, two-fifths predicteda rise in prejudice and this now stands at over half.

Table 8.8 Perceptions of prejudice in society, 1994–2003

1994 1996 2003

Prejudice now compared to five years ago % % %More now 34 29 45About the same 42 48 32Less now 22 20 20Prejudice in five years compared to now % % %More in 5 years’ time 39 32 52About the same 35 43 26Less in 5 years’ time 20 20 18

Base 2302 2399 4432

Thus, while people do not seem to perceive themselves to be any moreprejudiced now than in the mid-1990s, they increasingly think that theircountrymen – and women – are becoming more prejudiced, perhaps as a resultof increased immigration.

Prejudice against Muslims

We have thus found mixed support for our explanation invoking increasingracial prejudice as an explanation for increased hostility towards immigration.We look next at an area likely to be related to racism – increasing hostilitytowards Muslims. There are good grounds to believe that prejudice against thisparticular group will have increased over the eight years of interest. Arguably the most significant event to have occurred between 1995 and 2003was the September 11th terrorist attacks in America. This and the resulting “waron terror” have left much tension and suspicion between Islam and the West.


Such suspicion of ‘others’ from different backgrounds is likely to have beeninfluential in shaping people’s attitudes towards immigration (because bothinvolve the same notion of ‘other’ in many people’s minds). Indeed one of thekey reasons people may be anti-immigration is because of their fears forsecurity, which are likely to be linked to perceived terrorist threats. Here we speculate on the role that anti-Muslim sentiment may have had onimmigration attitudes. Unfortunately this cannot be properly explored becausethe questions were only asked in 2003 and we have no data on change overtime. Nevertheless, we can look at the extent to which anti-Muslim sentimentrelates to anti-immigration views. A sequence of questions were asked in 2003 about various aspects of people’sattitudes to Muslims. As shown in Table 8.9, there is a strong relationshipbetween answers to these questions and anti-immigration views – indeedstronger than any of the relationships we have examined previously. In keepingwith work that emphasises the importance of symbols in explaining attitudes toparticular policies (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears and Funk, 1991), this isparticularly the case for 51 per cent of the population who agree that England(or Scotland or Wales) would start to lose its identity if more Muslims came tolive here. They are 40 percentage points more likely to think that immigrationshould be reduced than the 30 per cent who do not think that their countrywould lose its identity. This close correlation is hardly surprising given that thequestion is specifically about Muslim immigration, and it would be hard toclaim that one sentiment causes the other – rather, we should conclude that theyare closely related views. None of the other questions reported in Table 8.9 areas closely related to views on immigration, but they all still show a very strongrelationship with anti-immigration views. For example, among the 25 per centof respondents who would be unhappy if a close relative married a Muslim,almost nine out of ten would like to see a reduction in immigration, whereas thefigure among the 29 per cent who would be happy to see such a marriage, thefigure is three-fifths. (The figures reported in this section exclude Muslimrespondents.) A slightly less strong, but still significant, relationship is alsofound between all these items and the desire for stronger measures againstillegal immigrants. It is unfortunate that we do not have a reading on these Muslim questionsbefore 2003 and can therefore say nothing with any certainty about their effecton the increase in hostility to immigrants. However, it is widely thought thathostility towards Muslims has increased in the wake of September 11th, and thevery close relationship between these views and hostility towards immigrationcertainly suggest that this has been part of the story why opposition toimmigration has hardened since 1995.


Table 8.9 Anti-Muslim hostility and anti-immigration hostility


‘Pro’-Muslim

view Base

‘Anti’-Muslim

view Base

%differ-ence

England (Scotland/Wales) would begin to lose itsidentity if more Muslims came to live in England(Scotland/Wales)

50 226 90 413 +40

How would you feel if a close relative of yoursmarried or formed a long-term relationship with aMuslim

59 213 88 211 +29

Some people think that Muslims living in Britain arereally committed to Britain ... Other people feelthat Muslims living in Britain could never be reallycommitted to Britain

62 215 89 354 +27

Some people think that Muslims who come to livein Britain take jobs, housing and health care fromother people in Britain ... Other people feel thatMuslims in Britain contribute a lot in terms ofhard work and much needed skills

61 278 88 251 +27

British Muslims are more loyal to other Muslimsaround the world than they are to other people inthis country

57 77 83 463 +26

Muslims living in Britain have done a great deal tocondemn Islamic terrorism 60 183 85 291 +25

Base: Respondents who are British citizens and whose parents were British citizens atthe time of the respondent’s birth. Muslims are also excluded

Economic and social consequences of immigration

So far none of our hypotheses have allowed us to answer satisfactorily ourquestion of why anti-immigration feelings have increased since the mid-1990s.Increases in some aspects of national pride and in certain forms of racism mayhold part of the answer, but we have not found anything that is clearly at theroot of the development. We turn next to look at perceptions of theconsequences of immigration: are people increasingly hostile to immigrationbecause they have come to associate immigrants who are already in the countrywith economic and social problems? As discussed above, British immigration policy since the mid-1960s hasemphasised the combination of tight immigration controls, along withimprovement of social and economic conditions of immigrants already living


here. Thus, via the Race Relations Act of 1965 and later government policies, astrategy of improving housing, education, and health care for immigrants waspursued indirectly by addressing general issues of poverty and development(Joppke, 1999). With such policies, it was presumably hoped that new settlerswould be allowed to adopt a lifestyle similar to more established British citizensand become full participants in society. However, although there is noaffirmative action policy in Britain, some British people may come to feel thatminorities and immigrants draw too heavily on the social and economicresources of the country. One important point to note is that although the nature of immigration haschanged since the end of the British Empire and the near collapse of theCommonwealth, British citizens tend to conflate various types of immigrationinto a single category. While the majority of movement into the UK through theearly to mid-1980s was Commonwealth-related, from the 1990s onward,migration has tended to be less related to former colonial status and isincreasingly asylum-related. However, according to one analysis, ordinaryBritish citizens do not make these distinctions between types of migration(Saggar, 2003), so it is not unreasonable for us to expect that any changes inattitudes to established minorities will help to explain the changes in attitudes tofurther immigration.

Economic consequences of immigration

Turning first to views on the economic implications of immigrants, respondentswere asked to agree or disagree with the following statements:

Immigrants are generally good for Britain’s economy Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain Government spends too much money assisting immigrants

Table 8.10 Perceived economic consequences of immigration and anti-immigration hostility


Agree Base Disagree Base %diffe-rence

Government spends too much on immigrants 91 522 36 95 +55Take jobs from people born in Britain 92 357 46 205 +46Immigrants are good for Britain’s economy 47 151 92 330 +45



As shown in Table 8.10, views on these matters are strongly related to attitudesto immigration. Indeed, among people who see adverse economic consequencesof immigration, there is near unanimity that it should be reduced. They alsohold similarly implacable views on the need for stronger measures againstillegal immigrants. However, among people who do not perceive adverseeconomic consequences, only a minority want to reduce the number ofimmigrants. Have we at last found the key source of the increase in anti-immigrationsentiment? Well, no, as it turns out, because this explanation fails at the secondhurdle – that there should have been change since 1995. As seen in Table 8.11,there has, if anything, been a polarisation of views on whether immigration isgood for the economy, with both the agree camp and the disagree campincreasing by five percentage points at the expense of those who said they heldneither view. In line with our findings for the two summary measures, thereseems less ambivalence on these matters in 2003 than in 1995. On the questionof whether immigrants take jobs from British-born workers, there has been asmall but significant increase in the proportion who disagree with this, perhapsin line with improvements in the economy in general over the period.

Table 8.11 Perceived economic consequences of immigration, 1995 and 2003

1995 2003 % change

Good for British economy % %Agree 14 19 +5Neither agree nor disagree 47 37 -10Disagree 37 42 +5Base 970 793

Take jobs from British % %Agree 49 45 -4Neither agree nor disagree 28 27 -1Disagree 22 27 +5Base 970 793

Govt spends too much assisting immigrants % %Agree n/a 64 –Neither agree nor disagree n/a 23 –Disagree n/a 12 –

Base – 793 –

n/a = not askedBase: Respondents who are British citizens and whose parents were British citizens atthe time of the respondent’s birth

The question about government giving too much assistance to immigrants was,unfortunately, not asked in 1995, so we have no measure of change over time.


However, it should be noted that almost two-thirds of respondents agreed withthis sentiment. This distribution was by far the most negative of any on theperceived economic consequences of immigration, and it was also the mostpolarised of the three, having the lowest proportion in the middle. It is perhapseven more surprising given the probable lack of actual knowledge on theamount of government spending. One reason for this may be the press attentiongiven to spending on asylum seekers, which respondents perhaps had in mindwhen answering. We shall return to this point. Another may be the traditionalemphasis of UK governments on improving the conditions of migrants acceptedto the country (as outlined above). The lack of time-series on this question isunfortunate because it means we are unable to interpret the role of perceptionsof government spending on immigrants in explaining the rise in anti-immigration sentiment. Nonetheless the high level of people agreeing leads usto suspect it is important.

Social consequences of immigration

Since perceptions of the economic consequences of immigration were notfruitful in explaining the increasingly negative views about immigration, weturn now to perceptions of the social consequences. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements:

Immigrants increase crime ratesImmigrants improve British society by bringing in new ideas andcultures

Are perceived negative social consequences of immigration related to feelingsabout reducing or excluding immigrants in the future? The effects shown inTable 8.12 indicate that they are. As with the economic consequences, there isnear unanimity among those who perceive adverse social consequences thatimmigration should be reduced, while only half the respondents who perceiveno such consequences want a reduction. Again, the effect is not quite as strongwhen we consider attitudes to illegal immigrants, but it is still quite powerful.

Table 8.12 Perceived social consequences of immigration and anti-immigrationhostility


Agree Base Dis-agree

Base % diffe-rence

Immigrants make Britain open to ideas 50 240 95 244 +45Immigrants increase crime rates 93 310 50 204 +43



Have perceptions of the social consequences of immigration become morenegative over the 1995–2003 period, however? As seen in Table 8.13, bothmeasures have shown a net shift in the anti-immigrant direction. In the case ofincreased crime rates, the most common answer in 1995 was “neither agree nordisagree”, now it is agreement. Such a dramatic reversal of opinion is apromising candidate in helping us determine why there was an increase inpreference for restrictions on the entry of new immigrants.

Table 8.13 Changes in perceived social consequences of immigration, 1995 and2003

1995 2003 % change

Make Britain open to ideas and culturesAgree 51 31 -20Neither agree nor disagree 31 39 +8Disagree 17 29 +12

Base 970 793

Increase crime ratesAgree 25 39 +14Neither agree nor disagree 38 34 -4Disagree 36 26 -10

Base 970 793


Clearly, the increases in negative perceptions regarding the social consequencesof immigration are prime candidates to explain the overall rise in negativeperceptions about immigration. However, to stop there does not provide acompletely satisfactory understanding of the processes involved. We really needto ask why these perceptions have changed because it seems highly unlikely thatthey are endogenous – that is, other things must be fuelling them. To addressthis we turn to the role of politicians and the media.

The portrayal of immigration by politicians and in the media

We now consider the question of where it is that survey respondents are likelyto find information on immigration that would lead them to be either morepositive or more negative about it. Since many people will have had no personalexperience of immigrants, their sources of information must come from


somewhere else. It is expected that the primary source of information related topolitical affairs is the mass media (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948; Funkhouser,1973; MacKuen, 1981, 1984; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Although the media cannot sway the entirety of a population, they generallycan have considerable influence over people who do not have strongly anchoredopinions – or those who had no/little opinion on an issue in the first place (seeLevin et al., 1998). One of the now seminal works on public opinion formationcontended many years ago that people with unformed ideas tend to reach for‘top-of-the-head’ responses to survey questions while being interviewed (Taylorand Fiske, 1978), and later work elaborated this idea by showing that people arelikely to draw these top-of-the-head responses from things they have heard orseen lately about the issue at hand (Zaller, 1992). In addition, it is well knownthat the media can have an impact on perceptions of particular issues by the wayin which they frame these issues (see Druckman, 2001). What this means is that– at least in the short term – the media can have a tremendous effect onperceptions of topics like immigration. In The 20th Report, Rothon and Heath (2003) compiled information on thenumber of immigration-related articles presented in The Times. As the authorspoint out, information from reports in additional newspapers would have beenhelpful as well since The Times’ circulation is rather low and its emphasis islikely to be somewhat different from other more widely circulated papers likeThe Sun and the Daily Mail. Unfortunately, other newspaper indices are notfreely available. Thus, like these authors, we shall depend on the count ofstories related to immigration from this index, bearing in mind the potentialproblems with doing so. Figure 8.3 presents these counts over the period from1994. What is clear from this figure is that between the mid-to-late 1990s and2000, the number of articles related to immigration more than tripled.Moreover, by the year before our most recent British Social Attitudes survey,this number had quadrupled from the mid-1990s baseline. If we can take this asa general representation of coverage of immigration-related issues in the press,it is clear that the increased reporting on the issue is likely to have had animpact on making people think more about the issue. Naturally, it may be thatThe Times and other newspapers are simply reporting on what they perceive tobe the major concerns of their readers, but as discussed above, many people willnot have encountered immigrants personally and are dependent on news sourcesto inform them as to what is happening on this front – not the other way around. Why did the media suddenly take up the issue of immigration in full force inthe late 1990s and 2000? To some degree, this shift in coverage is likely to berelated to the actual numbers of immigrants entering and settling in the country.We saw earlier in Figure 8.1 the increase in this period in the numbers of peoplesettling in the UK and in the number of new asylum applications received.Clearly, the number of Times articles on immigration is partly a reflection of theincrease in immigration as a whole (i.e. immigration + asylum seekers). Thus, itappears that our causal chain may look something like the following:

Increased immigration Increased news coverage Increased anti-immigration hostility


Figure 8.3 The Times immigration-related articles

On the other hand, it may be useful to consider whether this news coverage is toscale with the increase in migration? That is, does there appear to be a one-to-one correspondence between the increase in numbers and the rise in coverage ofthe issue? In comparing Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.3 we see that, while the numberof articles related to immigration tripled and then quadrupled over this period,the number of new asylum applications and new settlements merely doubled. Itis important to note, of course, that after 2000, the numbers of new settlementsand asylum applications remained at the higher level, and so the overallnumbers of new individuals in the country was compounded over time. One explanation for this disproportionate increase in coverage has to do withwhere the media gets its information. While sources of information arenumerous, a key source is, of course, the British government. Thus, UKgovernment ministers can set the media’s agenda to some degree, and increasesin government ministers’ statements about an issue like immigration can changethe nature of media coverage of the issue, both quantitatively and qualitatively.It seems that by the year before our 2003 survey, government ministers andagencies were indeed setting the media’s agenda to a greater degree thanpreviously. In 1994, there were only four Times articles centred around thereporting of restrictive government policies or negative government statementsregarding immigration. By 2002, however, this number had approached 40.

Adapted from Rothon and Heath (2003), Table 9.5, and The Times Index

2003200220012000199819961994

Num

ber o

f Tim

es a

rticl

es o

n im

mig

ratio

n500

400

300

200

100

0


Moreover, the nature of the messages coming out of government offices,particularly the Home Office, appears to have changed as well. In the mid-1990s, the Home Office clearly favoured restriction, and most of the reports inThe Times stemming from Home Office announcements were related todecisions on deportations11 and refusal to allow certain individuals into thecountry on asylum grounds12, along with a story about Prime Minister JohnMajor supporting the introduction of identity cards13. By 2002, there wereequally restrictive statements, but apparently more of them, plus theintroduction of novel ways of approaching the issue of immigration.Specifically, this was the year in which the new Home Secretary, DavidBlunkett, suggested that immigrants speak English in their own homes14,proposed adding an oath of allegiance to citizenship provisions15, advisedAsians to stop making arranged marriages in their home countries and makethem within the UK instead16, and compared Muslim forced marriages withpractices of medieval England17. That is, the traditional acceptance ofmulticultural practices in Britain seemed to come under sustained direct attackfrom the Labour government, aided and abetted by the Conservative opposition.This, along with the announcements of the creation of new detention centres18,of sending asylum seekers back to their home countries en masse19, and eventipping off television crews as to times and locations of deportations so theycould be filmed20, may have contributed to the overall impression of thecitizenry that immigration needed to be stopped. But can this be supported bythe survey data?

Newspapers

One obvious way in which we may be able to detect a role of the media is bycomparing attitudes to immigration and their change among those who readdifferent types of newspapers and those who do not read a newspaper. Indeed,of all forms of media, the newspapers are probably the most influential instimulating debate. Clearly, if newspapers are responsible for the rise in anti-immigration sentiment, those who do read ‘anti-immigration’ newspapersshould have a higher level of hostility to immigrants and have experienced agreater increase in hostility, than those who read ‘pro-immigration’ newspapersor do not read newspapers at all. The analysis is not perfect, as people maychoose a newspaper to fit their views rather than the other way round. However,it is hardly likely that immigration looms so large in people’s minds that therehas been wholesale switching of newspapers on this issue alone, but to theextent that this happens, it will tend to inflate any media effect in the data. In order to get to the bottom of this, we classify the newspapers into twogroups which broadly summarises their overall coverage of immigration into‘pro-immigration’ and ‘anti-immigration’.21 Unsurprisingly, the first part of ourprediction is correct, with readers of anti-immigration papers being substantiallymore anti-immigration than readers of pro-immigration papers and non-readers.However, with large majorities of readers of pro-immigration papers and non-


readers also being anti-immigration, the role of the media must be considered tobe rather small. When we consider the change over time we find an even bigger problem withthe media-effect hypothesis. The group which has had the largest increase inopposition to further immigration is actually non-readers, and this holds also forthe desire for stronger measures against illegal immigrants. The increase in anti-immigration sentiments among readers of pro- and anti-immigration papers israther similar, thus failing to display any newspaper effect.

Table 8.14 Anti-immigration hostility by stance of newspaper, 1995 and 2003

% saying number of immigrants should be reduced

1995 Base 2003 Base % change

Pro-immigration 60 157 71 70 +11

Anti-immigration 74 349 84 266 +10

Does not read paper 65 353 79 359 +14


We are forced to conclude that if the media have played a role, it is not in thedirect way that may be expected, and newspapers may not be the mostimportant source of information on this. However, one aspect that we cannotexamine is that newspapers may have an indirect effect. They may influencepeople who do not actually read them – for example, people may see headlinesand form opinions on the basis of them (see Taylor and Fiske, 1978, citedpreviously concerning ‘top-of-the-head’ responses), they may hear summariesof newspaper stories on the television or radio, or friends may tell them aboutwhat they have read.

Interest in politics

Another factor that may be important in understanding the change in attitudes toimmigration is how interested people are in politics. Clearly, this is related toreading a newspaper (more specifically a broadsheet newspaper) – of those whoread a newspaper 39 per cent are interested in politics and 26 per cent are not,compared to 27 per cent and 41 per cent among those who do not read a paper.Among broadsheet readers 72 per cent are interested in politics and six per centare not, compared to 30 per cent and 33 per cent among tabloid readers. Looking at interest in politics rather than newspaper readership has theadvantage that we can take into account, albeit in an indirect way, those who get


more of their information from news and current affairs programmes ontelevision and radio than from a newspaper. Given the role of politicians ininitiating debate, and how they have seemingly become more negative in theirpresentation of immigration issues, one expectation would be that those peopleinterested in politics would be more anti-immigration than those not, as theywill be the ones paying most attention to the discourse. On the other hand, it ispossible that those with a deep interest in politics could take a more consideredapproach to political issues, whereas those who are disinterested will only see orhear the headlines. In Table 8.15, we find that the latter of these two propositions is supported –those people with more interest in politics are indeed less likely to say thenumber of immigrants should be reduced than are those with less interest.However, the percentage change since 1995 is similar among all levels ofinterest in politics, with all groups becoming more hostile to immigration.

Table 8.15 Anti-immigration hostility by interest in politics, 1995 and 2003

% saying number of immigrants should be reduced

Interest in politics 1995 Base 2003 Base % change

Great deal/quite a lot 59 337 67 217 +8

Some 68 331 76 277 +9

Not very much/none 68 302 77 299 +9


These are interesting findings because not only do they suggest that things otherthan the media and politicians influence attitudes to immigration, but they alsoshow that those most concerned about immigration are likely to be those leastwell armed with the facts.

Education

A key factor that is highly likely to be related both to reading a newspaper andto having an interest in politics is education. Education is known to be critical inthe formation of attitudes (Stouffer, 1955; Prothro and Grigg, 1960; Nunn et al.,1978; but see Jackman, 1978; Sullivan et al., 1982; Jackman and Muha, 1984). Our survey is no exception and we see a clear education gradient in hostility toimmigration, as seen in Table 8.16. In 1995, around a third of graduates wanteda reduction in the numbers of immigrants, compared with over four-fifths ofthose with no qualifications. But the changes between 1995 and 2003 are


unexpected and revealing. The group whose attitudes towards immigration haschanged the most is actually the most educated, particularly those with degrees.The proportion believing the number of immigrants should be reduced rose by21 percentage points among graduates, compared to the next highest increase of12 percentage points among those with O level or equivalent. Of course, the lesshighly educated groups already had high levels of anti-immigration feelings inthe first place and so had less ‘room’ to become even more hostile.

Table 8.16 Anti-immigrant hostility by education, 1995 and 2003

% saying number of immigrants should bereduced

1995 Base 2003 Base %change

Degree 35 94 56 112 +21HE below degree 64 140 71 107 +7A level 65 151 68 113 +3O level or equivalent 71 280 83 242 +12No qualification 82 295 81 212 -1


Given that better-educated people are thought to be less easily persuaded andinfluenced by newspapers and politicians, this is further evidence that the roleof politicians and the media on attitudes to immigration is unlikely to be direct.Rather, it seems they may have had an effect pervasive throughout society. Onthe other hand, the results presented here could indicate media and politicianshave accomplished a rather impressive feat of convincing even the welleducated that immigration must be halted, combined, of course, with the actualincrease in immigration over the period.

Party identification

If politicians have stirred up this anti-immigration sentiment then another groupwho we would predict to have had a disproportionate increase in anti-immigration sentiments would be Conservative supporters, because this is theparty that has traditionally been the most hostile toward new immigration. Infact, as already described, part of Labour’s platform in the 1997 electionincluded the desire to create kinder, fairer policies, particularly regardingasylum seekers.


But Table 8.17 shows that, whilst Conservatives are the most likely of any partysupporters to think immigration should be reduced, the extent to which theyincreased in such views over the eight years is the same as Labour supportersand greater than those without a party identification. In fact, in percentageterms, among Labour supporters anti-immigration views increased by 22 percent, whereas among Conservatives it was by only 18 per cent. As witheducation, this may in part be due to a ‘ceiling effect’ – Conservative supporterswere already so opposed to immigration that there was less ‘room’ for furtherincreases.

Table 8.17 Anti-immigration hostility by party identification, 1995 and 2003

% saying number of immigrants should bereduced

1995 Base 2003 Base %change

Conservative 71 257 84 209 +13Labour 58 415 71 292 +13Liberal Democrat 66 144 62 98 -4No party identification 71 85 81 122 +10


Perhaps, though, it is the change among Labour supporters which can actuallybe argued to support the thesis that the pronouncements of politicians have aneffect. Over the eight years there can be no doubt that Labour has become moreright-wing in its views on immigration. Therefore, supporters are increasinglyhearing ministers speaking in negative and restrictionist terms aboutimmigration described above and may have been influenced in that direction.

A more complex picture

Perhaps the reason that we do not find more of a direct effect is that the role ofthe media and politicians is really a mediating one. We have already noted therelationship between views on the social consequences of immigration andhostility to further immigration. Where does newspaper readership fit into this?Among newspaper readers there was a 17 percentage point increase in theproportion who thought immigrants increase crime rates, whereas amongst non-readers there was only a 12 percentage point increase. So perhaps this is theway the media has played a significant role in this change. Further, among


tabloid readers this increase was actually 20 per cent, so that virtually half of alltabloid readers now think that immigrants increase crime, compared to around aquarter of broadsheet readers. It was also the least educated who experiencedthe greatest rise in this view with an 18 percentage point rise among those withno qualifications (but there was a 12 percentage point increase among thosewith degrees as well). On whether immigrants improve society, the increase in proportiondisagreeing was the same among readers and non-readers of newspapers (14percentage points). Tabloid readers, however, increased by 15 percentage pointscompared to the 11 percentage point increase among broadsheet readers. Andthose with little interest in politics experienced a higher rise than those withquite a lot or some interest in politics (16 points compared to 11 and eightrespectively). Among those with no qualifications this view increased by 23 percent, and by 29 per cent among those with O level equivalent qualifications,whereas those with degrees remained roughly stable.

Conclusions

As we have discussed, Britain has seen a large increase in anti-immigrationsentiment since 1995. Back then, two-thirds of respondents wanted the numberof immigrants reduced, whereas by 2003 almost three-quarters held this view.Seventy eight per cent wanted stronger measures to be taken to exclude illegalimmigrants, which increased to 82 per cent in 2003. This is surprising for tworeasons – firstly, these levels were already very high, and secondly, because adominant trend found over the last twenty years of the British Social Attitudessurvey is an increasing liberalism on social issues. We found partial support for the prediction that the change was due to risingnational pride. There was no support for the idea that the increase was causedby notions of Britishness becoming increasingly conservative, however. Norwere we able to establish conclusively that it was due to increasing racialprejudice – the picture is complicated because levels of self-rated prejudice forthe two years in question were very similar, but at the same time respondentsreported that prejudice in society as a whole had increased. We speculated aboutthe possible role of attitudes towards Muslims in particular, but lack of dataprevents us from coming to any firm conclusions. Nor have people becomemore wary of immigration because of perceived economic threats posed bymigrants, perhaps because we are looking at a period of rising economicprosperity. However, there is good evidence that people are increasinglyconcerned about the perceived social consequences of immigration, and this iscertainly related to anti-immigration hostility. The best explanation we could find for this change related to the overallincrease in numbers of immigrants, which appears to have stimulated a rise inmedia coverage of immigration, and perhaps more importantly produced anincrease in government statements and proclamations on the subject, many ofwhich were quite negative in tone and content. This was a far from perfectexplanation, however. Rather than the increased hostility being particularly


associated with people exposed to the anti-immigration newspapers, it seems tohave affected everyone, suggesting either that newspapers have a power beyondtheir own readership or that there are other forces behind the change. It seems asthough there has been a ‘culture shift’ throughout society. Indeed, change hasbeen greatest among groups such as graduates, Labour supporters and thosewith a substantial interest in politics, who were previously relatively pro-immigration. Given the barrage of news reports and government statements and coupledwith actual increases in immigration, it is perhaps no wonder that Britishcitizens became less open to the idea of immigration. In fact, given all of thesecomponents – the increase in immigration, increase in governmentpronouncements, plus the increase in media coverage of the issue – it is perhapssurprising that hostility did not increase even more than it did. Possibly this isdue to the fact that hostility was already so high. This would appear to be a fertile area for future research. In particular, onepoint worthy of further investigation is the changing interpretation of surveyquestions and especially the word ‘immigrant’ by respondents, in the light ofthe current political debate. Another is the specific role played by the mediaand politicians in framing the immigration issue and shaping public opiniontowards immigrants and immigration.

Notes

1. Informal controls were used in the 1950s to discourage immigration. Theseincluded having colonial overseas offices explain to potential migrants that theirlives in the UK would be difficult, as well as indefinitely holding the passports ofthose who attempted to migrate (Hansen, 2000).

2. Although Britain did indeed conquer Iraq at the end of the First World War, theintention did not appear to be the setting up of colonial power there.

3. The Times, 28 December 2002, p.18.4. Ideally, we would investigate the effect of citizenship status on these variables, but

we fear that this would take the chapter rather far afield from its main concern. Theremoval of these observations represents a loss of approximately eight per cent ofthe 1995 sample and nine per cent of the 2003 sample.

5. This is a different format of question compared to our first summary measure – itwas asked in an agree–disagree format, whereas our first measure had answeroptions ranging from increased a lot to reduced a lot. Clearly, then, comparing thetwo should be done with caution.

6. We use the 2003 survey only to ease interpretation; we have no reason to suspectthat the bivariate relationships discussed here differed in 1995.

7. Only individuals who had a ‘qualifying connection’ to the UK could enter, with thismeaning individuals, their children, and grandchildren who were born, naturalised,or adopted in the UK (see Hansen, 2000).

8. The Act also incorporated British Dependent Territories Citizenship and BritishOverseas Citizenship, but neither of these included an automatic right of entry tothe UK.


9. It should be noted, however, that all the various measures of Britishness – with thesole exception of being a Christian – are positively correlated with wishing to takestronger measures against illegal immigrants.

10. We acknowledge the likely problems with political correctness related to thisparticular survey question. Unfortunately, measuring racial prejudice directly isextraordinarily difficult (if not impossible) in the current day, and so we aredependent on this rather direct approach.

11. The Times, 8 June 1995, p.2g.12. e.g. The Times, 27 November 1995, p.1/7f; 28 November 1995, p.2a.13. The Times, 29 April 1995, p.2g.14. The Times, 16 September 2002, p.1g.15. The Times, 8 February 2002, p.1a.16. The Times, 1 June 2002, p.2e.17. The Times, 15 January 2002, p.8f.18. The Times, 28 January 2002, p.4g.19. The Times, 24 May 2002, p.1a.20. This division was done on the basis of the authors’ impressions of coverage and

was not ‘scientific’ in any sense. Newspapers assigned as ‘pro-immigration’ wereDaily Mirror, The Guardian, The Independent and The Financial Times; ‘anti-immigration’ were Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Star, The Sun, DailyTelegraph, and The Times.

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Acknowledgements

The National Centre for Social Research is grateful to the Economic and SocialResearch Council (grant number RES-000-22-0326) for their financial supportwhich enabled us to ask the International Social Survey Programme questionsreported in this chapter. We are also grateful to the Nuffield Foundation (grantnumber OPD-00213-6) for funding the module on ‘Public attitudes towardsminorities in post-devolution Scotland’ which included the questions covered inthe section about attitudes to Muslims.

John Curtice and Mark Sandford ∗

The current Labour government has introduced a substantial programme of devolution since it was first elected in 1997. Scotland has been granted her own parliament with substantial law-making powers, while Wales has an assembly that has administrative and secondary law-making responsibility for a significant range of public services. A further attempt to restore devolved powers to Northern Ireland has been made, while a form of city-wide government has been re-established in London in the form of a mayor and assembly. Although various forms of territorial administration had existed before in the UK, what is significant about these developments is that in each case those responsible for running the new institutions are directly elected by the electorates that they seek to serve, thereby giving them a mandate separate from that of the UK government at Westminster. But this programme of devolution is asymmetric. Each of the four new sets of institutions has a different set of powers and responsibilities. More importantly, England seems largely to have been left out, a situation that has created some apparent anomalies. For example, while the law in Scotland on health and education can be determined within Scotland without any interference from English MPs, the law on such matters for England is still made at Westminster, where Scottish MPs continue to have both a voice and a vote. Moreover, this privilege has been granted while Scotland (and indeed Wales) still enjoys a higher level of public expenditure per head than England. For some commentators the people of England could not be expected to tolerate such apparent inconsistency and unfairness for long. Marquand and Tomaney, for example, have claimed that “it is logically impossible to devolve power to part ∗ John Curtice is Research Consultant at the Scottish Centre for Social Research, part of

NatCen, Deputy Director of the Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends, and Professor of Politics and Director of the Social Statistics Laboratory at Strathclyde University. Mark Sandford is a Research Fellow in the Constitution Unit at University College, London.

Does England want devolution too? 9


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of a hitherto unitary state without impacting on the governance of the remaining parts” (2000: 4; see also McLean, 2000). Yet, so far, little has happened in provincial England. True, a regional development agency has been established in each region of England, an agency which is charged with the task of promoting the region’s economy and whose work is overseen by a regional chamber or assembly. But the agencies are staffed by civil servants while the members of the assemblies are unelected nominees (for further details, see Tomaney, 2002). Neither set of bodies enjoys the independent authority that can come from being directly elected. Only in May 2002 did the government set out proposals for the introduction of elected regional assemblies (DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002). And it was not until November 2004 that it finally gave some people in provincial England a chance to have a say in a referendum on whether they would like their own elected regional institutions. Even then, it scaled down its original ambition of holding a referendum in all three of the northernmost regions of England to doing so in just one, the North East.1 There are two possible explanations why so little has happened. One is that those commentators who were critical of asymmetrical devolution overestimated the impact it would have on the public in England. Perhaps people in England were largely content to be ruled by Westminster before devolution was introduced elsewhere in the UK, and they simply continue to be content to be ruled in that way now. The other interpretation is that the government has been too circumspect. Perhaps there is a strong demand in England to be allowed to enjoy the benefits of devolution, a demand that the current government has simply been too slow to recognise, let alone respond to. In this chapter we consider first of all whether there really is a demand for devolution in England, and then proceed to try to account for the patterns that we find. Levels of support for devolution It might be thought that it would be relatively straightforward to ascertain whether there is a clear demand for devolution. Presumably, if we ask people in a survey a suitably worded question as to whether or not they favour devolution, we would discover whether a majority are in favour or opposed. If a majority say they are in favour, then we can conclude there is indeed a real demand for devolution. If a majority are opposed, then we should draw the opposite conclusion. In practice it is not so simple. A number of surveys designed to tap people’s attitudes towards devolution have been conducted in recent years. For the most part, however, they do not present the clear picture that we might have anticipated. Typically, they fail to find either a majority in support or a majority in opposition to devolution. For example, a survey conducted by ICM for the County Councils Network in January 2003 found that while only 21 per cent of people in provincial England said they would vote in a referendum against creating a “regional government” for their region, just 44 per cent said that they

Does England want devolution too?

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would vote in favour (ICM, 2003). Meanwhile a poll conducted by MORI the following month found only 27 per cent of people in provincial England were against their region having its own assembly, but equally only 44 per cent were in favour (MORI, 2003). In both cases relatively large numbers of people said “don’t know”, that they would not vote, or said that they were “neither in favour nor opposed”, an answer that can sometimes be a surrogate for “don’t know”. In the MORI poll 27 per cent fell into one of these categories, while in ICM’s case as many as 35 per cent did so. In short it appears that for many people in England devolution is a subject on which they simply do not have a clear view one way or the other. Further doubt about the extent of support in England for creating elected regional assemblies is cast by the most recent State of the Nation poll conducted for the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust by ICM in the summer of 2004 (Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, 2004; see also Dunleavy et al., 2001 for details of the results of earlier surveys in this series). This survey asked respondents which they thought was the best way “of deciding how to generate new jobs , develop major road and public transport, and other similar issues”. Just 34 per cent of people in England said they favoured investing responsibility for these matters in the hands of “an elected regional assembly”. As many as 40 per cent backed one of two options that feature in the current status quo: giving the decision either to “appointed business and local government representatives” (24 per cent) or to “government officials meeting at regional level” (16 per cent). Meanwhile a further 14 per cent were quite happy to leave matters in the hands of government ministers in Whitehall. Indeed, of all the independent attempts to measure public opinion on this subject since 1997, only one has ever found a majority in favour of English devolution. This was a poll conducted by Opinion Research Business for the BBC in March 2002. Here, no less than 63 per cent of respondents said they were in favour of creating a regional assembly in their region, while just 22 per cent were opposed. However, this poll failed to offer people explicitly the option of saying that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the idea.2 And, strikingly, no less than 44 per cent said they were “somewhat in favour” rather than “strongly in favour”. Discouraged from expressing indifference, it appears that respondents opted for the next closest option – lukewarm support. We should bear in mind two features of the surveys we have examined so far. First, just because someone is willing to indicate support for the creation of a regional assembly, it does not follow that they necessarily think that this is the best arrangement for England. Only the State of the Nation poll offered respondents a range of possible options for governing England. Second, not even the State of the Nation survey included one of the clear and logically possible solutions to the alleged difficulties of an asymmetric devolution settlement – that England as a whole should have its own parliament in much the same manner as Scotland already has. While regional assemblies may be the form of devolution favoured by the current government, it is not the only possible form of English devolution. Given the apparently lukewarm support for devolution registered by other polls, it should come as no great surprise that we failed to find majority support


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in the 2003 British Social Attitudes survey for any of the devolution options. First, we asked the following question, offering a clear set of alternatives for how England might be governed:

With all the changes going on in the way the different parts of Great Britain are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England ...

... for England to be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament,

for each region of England to have its own elected assembly that makes decisions about the region’s economy, planning and housing,

or, for England as a whole to have its own new parliament with law-making powers?

Only just over a quarter (27 per cent) of respondents in England picked creating regional assemblies, while a little under a fifth (19 per cent) said they preferred an English parliament. The combined level of support for these two options (46 per cent) is actually a little less than the 48 per cent who say they wanted England to continue to be governed as it is now. Even if we focus just on the possibility of creating elected regional assemblies, and remind respondents of the devolution already enjoyed by Scotland and Wales, we still find that support falls well short of a majority. We asked people whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:

Now that Scotland has its own parliament and Wales its own assembly, every region of England should have its own assembly too

Only 30 per cent indicated they agreed with this proposition, with most (24 per cent) saying they simply “agreed” rather than “agreed strongly”. This group was actually slightly outnumbered by the 33 per cent who said that they disagreed (though again only 7 per cent actually disagreed strongly). As we might by now have come to expect, the largest group, 36 per cent, either said they “neither agreed nor disagreed” or were unable to choose an answer at all. It appears, then, that five years after its introduction in Scotland and Wales, devolution fails to ignite much excitement in England. Sometimes surveys find more people saying they are in favour of the creation of elected devolved institutions than say they are opposed, sometimes the opposite. Much depends on just how the question is posed. But it seems that no adequately designed poll secures a majority for either option. For many people in England, devolution is just not a subject on which they have much of a view at all. English devolution is not so much supported or opposed, as greeted with an air of indifference. Nevertheless, there is some sign that public opinion has actually become somewhat more favourable towards regional devolution in recent years. The British Social Attitudes survey has regularly tracked attitudes towards devolution in England since the advent of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh


205

Assembly in 1999, using a slightly different version of the first of the two questions introduced earlier.3 In this version, the wording of the regional devolution option reflects the kind of devolution implemented in Wales, rather than that currently proposed by the government, and reads:

Each region of England to have its own assembly that runs services like health

As Table 9.1 shows, worded in this way, support for regional devolution has increased from just 15 per cent in 1999 to a little under a quarter now. Meanwhile around one in six persistently opt for an English parliament. Even so, despite the increase in support for regional devolution, it remains the case that on this version of the question over half say they are in favour of the status quo. Table 9.1 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, 1999–2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

% % % % %

England be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament

62

54

57

56

55

Each region of England to have its own assembly that runs services like health

15

18

23

20

24

England as a whole to have its own new parliament with law-making powers

18

19

16

17

16

Base 2718 1928 2761 2897 975

We should, of course, bear in mind that public opinion might vary from one part of England to another. Perhaps those living further away from London, where economic growth is less strong and more people have a sense of regional identity, are more likely to want regional devolution (Heath et al., 2002). In particular, most though not all of the polls to which we have referred so far suggest that support for devolution is rather higher in the north of England and especially so in the North East. Our own survey provides some support for this view. For example, as Table 9.2 shows, as many as one in three people in the North East say they favour a regional assembly over either the status quo or an English parliament, more than in any other region, including London which already as an elected assembly.4 Support for regional devolution is also relatively high in Yorkshire and the Humber and (to some extent) the North West. Much the same is true as well of our alternative question that simply invited respondents to say whether they agreed or disagreed with creating assemblies in each region. But even in the North East, neither question elicits anything like a majority expressing positive support for a regional assembly.


206

Table 9.2 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by region

NE NW YH EM WM SW E GL SE

% % % % % % % % %

As now 48 50 48 49 47 49 55 52 50 Regional assemblies 32 27 30 26 29 27 21 24 21 English Parliament 18 18 16 20 20 18 19 15 21

Base 218 444 380 381 420 367 438 489 573

NE: North East. NW: North West. YH: Yorkshire & the Humber. EM: East Midlands. WM: West Midlands. SW: South West. E: East of England. GL: Greater London. SE: South East So, whichever way we look at it, there does not appear to be a strong demand for devolution in England, more a mixture of lukewarm support and indifference. The government’s apparent timidity in introducing regional devolution appears to have been a more accurate reading of public opinion than the expectations of those commentators who anticipated that asymmetric devolution would generate an ‘English backlash’. But why is this so? How can we account for the apparent lack of enthusiasm for devolution in England? Why so little enthusiasm? Knowledge and awareness The first, and perhaps simplest, explanation as to why devolution generates so little excitement in England is that, for whatever reason, people in England have little awareness or knowledge of the subject. Perhaps the existing unelected regional institutions are too remote and have failed to achieve a sufficiently high profile in their region for people to be aware of what regional government might be able to achieve. Perhaps too, people in England simply know too little about the asymmetric devolution settlement that is already in place to want to rebel against it. In short, while students of the British constitution regard the institutional developments of recent years as significant, if not indeed revolutionary, perhaps they have simply failed to register with the wider English public (Sandford, 2002). Table 9.3 certainly suggests that the existing unelected regional chambers or assemblies have for the most part had little impact. Only in the North East do a majority of people say they have heard at least something about the work of their regional assembly. Even here, most say they have not heard very much. The chambers in the other two northern regions, together with the East of England region, also have a relatively high public profile, but elsewhere three-fifths or more say they have heard nothing at all of their work. Meanwhile, awareness of the work of the regional development agencies is only a little


207

higher, with 57 per cent of people outside of London saying they have not heard anything at all about them. Table 9.3 Awareness of work of regional chamber or assembly, by region How much heard about:

NE NW YH EM WM SW E SE All

% % % % % % % % %

A great deal/ quite a lot

4

8

5

6

6

4

3

1

5

Not very much 51 39 39 23 24 34 39 22 32 Nothing at all 45 52 55 69 70 62 58 75 62

Base 217 444 380 381 420 367 438 573 3220

NE: North East. NW: North West. YH: Yorkshire & the Humber. EM: East Midlands. WM: West Midlands. SW: South West. E: East of England. SE: South East Note: Greater London is excluded from this table At the same time, the level of objective knowledge of the current asymmetric devolution settlement also appears to be low, certainly as judged by the answers given when respondents were asked whether each of four statements was true or false. The statements were:

Scottish MPs in the UK House of Commons cannot vote on laws that only apply in England. (FALSE)

It has been decided to cut the number of Scottish MPs in the UK House of Commons. (TRUE)

The Scottish parliament can increase the level of social security benefits in Scotland. (FALSE)

London is the only region in England with its own elected regional assembly. (TRUE)

As seen in Table 9.4, none of these statements attracted correct answers from anywhere near half of the respondents. Knowledge was highest on whether Scottish MPs can continue to vote on laws that only apply in England, but even here only 38 per cent correctly identified this statement as true. Meanwhile, over half of English respondents incorrectly believed that the Scottish Parliament has the power to increase social security benefits north of the border. Many respondents did not even attempt to guess whether a statement was true or false; on none of the items did much less than a third simply say they did not know the answer. Indeed, on the issue of the reduction of the number of Scottish MPs, regarded by some as a key reversal of an unfairness that existed prior to devolution, nearly half said “don’t know”.


208

Table 9.4 Responses to knowledge quiz about devolution Correct Incorrect Don’t

know

Scottish MPs cannot vote on English laws % 38 25 37 London only region with elected assembly % 27 29 44 Cut number of Scottish MPs % 18 34 48 Scottish Parliament can increase social security % 13 56 32

Base: 975

So people in England appear to be largely unaware of the existing institutions in their region and they have little knowledge of the current devolution settlement. However, it is not clear that this is an important explanation of their lack of enthusiasm for devolution. If that were the case, we should find that those who are more aware or more knowledgeable should show a greater level of support for devolution. But of this there is no sign. The small proportion who have heard a great deal or quite a lot about their regional assembly are no more likely to prefer an elected assembly than are those who have heard nothing at all. Equally, they are only two percentage points more likely to agree with our proposition that every region of England should now have its own assembly. Meanwhile, the balance of opinion amongst those able to answer at least two of the knowledge questions correctly is no more favourable towards regional devolution (or indeed an English parliament) than it is amongst those who could not answer any of them correctly. One obvious explanation for this lack of relationship between awareness, knowledge and support is that awareness and knowledge may bring with them an appreciation of the disadvantages of devolution as well as its advantages (see, for example, MORI, 2003). In fact, in our survey those who are most knowledgeable are both more likely to agree with the creation of regional assemblies and more likely to disagree too. For familiarity to lead to support, people may need not only to be aware but also to have formed a favourable impression of the work of the existing regional institutions. And indeed, as Tables 9.5 and 9.6 show, those who think that the existing regional assemblies are giving ordinary people more say or will make their region’s economy better, are far more likely to back the idea of regional assemblies. However, relatively few people fall into these two groups. Less than one in five feel that having a regional assembly gives ordinary people more say in how they are governed, while less than a quarter think it will make their economy better. In both cases the predominant view, shared by around three in five is that the existing regional assemblies simply make no difference. Only in the North East is the picture at all notably different, but even here only around a third think that their assembly is giving people more say or will make their economy better. Evidently, then, one reason for the lack of enthusiasm for


209

devolution is that the existing regional structures are not thought to be making a perceptible difference to people’s lives. Table 9.5 Attitudes towards regional devolution, by whether assemblies give people more say

Perceived impact of regional assembly on giving ordinary people a say

More say No difference Less say % % %

As now 43 52 51 Regional assembly 39 23 23 English parliament 15 20 21

Base 720 2288 162

% agree every region should have its own assembly

44

27

27

Base 591 1903 116

Table 9.6 Attitudes towards regional devolution, by whether assemblies improve region’s economic prospects

Perceived impact of regional assembly on region’s economic prospects

Better No difference Worse % % %


Base 820 2126 159


42

28

18

Base 664 1764 129

Are the arguments in favour of devolution getting through? A second possible explanation for the apparent lack of enthusiasm for devolution in England is that the arguments used by proponents are failing to make an impact. For example, a common argument in favour of regional institutions is that they can provide a focus and a symbol for the pride that people feel in their particular part of England.5 If this argument resonates with


210

the public at large, then we would expect those who feel a strong sense of regional identity to be more supportive of regional assemblies. Another important argument often used in favour of regional government, and the one which the current government has tended to emphasise, is that it can help overcome some of the economic inequalities that are created by differences in the economic performance of different regions (Morgan and Nauwelaers, 1999; Labour Party, 2001; Adams and Tomaney, 2002; DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002). That should mean that those living in less affluent economic circumstances, or those who are ideologically inclined to support greater equality in society, should be more in favour of devolution (Hechter, 1975; Rokkan and Urwin, 1982, 1983). Finally, it is often argued that regional government can improve the way that Britain is governed, not least by increasing the opportunities for people to get involved in decision making and by increasing the accountability of government to the people it seeks to serve (Adams and Tomaney, 2002). If this argument cuts ice with the public, we would expect those who are critical of the way Britain is governed at present to be more supportive of devolution than those who are happy with our current system. The first of these expectations – that those who have a strong sense of regional identity should be more likely to favour devolution – is largely unfulfilled. As Table 9.7 shows, those who say they are very proud of being someone who lives in their particular region are effectively no more likely to prefer a regional assembly to an English parliament or the status quo than are those who say they have little or no pride in their region. Meanwhile, there is only a small difference between these two groups in their response to our second question about every region having its own assembly. Only amongst those who say they do not think of themselves as someone who lives in their particular region does support for regional assemblies fall away somewhat, but even here the relationship cannot be described as anything other than modest.6

Table 9.7 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by regional pride

Regional pride

Very proud Somewhat Not very/ not at all

Don’t think that way

% % % %

As now 52 50 41 50 Regional assembly 27 29 26 24 English parliament 17 16 21 20

Base 836 902 191 1765


36

32

32

27

Base 675 739 147 1451


211

Perhaps, however, this is a dimension where the arguments for an English parliament have an appeal, even if those for regional assemblies do not. But, in fact, there is little sign that support for an English parliament is embedded in a strong sense of Englishness. For example, support for an English parliament is only seven percentage points higher amongst those who describe themselves as “English” than it is amongst those who consider themselves to be “British”. And those who say they are “very proud” of being English are no more likely to support an English parliament than are those who say they are not very proud or not proud at all. On the other hand, there is some limited evidence that devolution has a greater appeal to those who are less well off and those who have an ideological commitment to greater equality. For example, as Table 9.8 shows, less than two in five of those who say they are finding it difficult to cope on their current income support the status quo, compared with over half of those who say they are living comfortably. However, it is not clear that economic dissatisfaction fuels greater support for regional assemblies as opposed to an English parliament. Rather, support for both is a little higher amongst the economically dissatisfied. A not dissimilar result is found if we compare the attitudes of those in routine occupations with the views of those in professional and managerial positions. The former are rather more likely to back some form of devolution and oppose maintenance of the status quo, though the relationship is no more than a moderate one.

Table 9.8 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by subjective income

Feelings about current household income

Comfortable Coping Difficult % % %


Base 1562 1614 527


27

32

34

Base 1307 1309 404

Rather more striking, however, are the differences of view between those who hold different ideological outlooks. Here we have divided our sample into four groups according to where they stand on a set of items that tap the degree to which people favour greater economic equality and government action to secure


212

it. The quarter or so of our sample who are most inclined towards this view can be considered ‘left-wing’ while the quarter or so who are least so inclined can be described as ‘right-wing’, with similarly sized groups on the ‘centre–left’ and the ‘centre–right’ in between. (Further details about this left–right scale can be found in Appendix I to this book.) As Table 9.9 shows, those on the left are notably less likely to support the status quo and to favour the creation of regional assemblies than are those on the right. Moreover, this pattern of higher support for regional assemblies amongst those on the left is found on both of the questions we have been analysing.

Table 9.9 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by position on left–right scale

Position on Left-Right scale

Left Centre-Left Centre-Right Right % % % %

As now 42 50 54 57

Regional assembly 32 26 26 20

English parliament 21 19 16 18


41

30

25

23

Base 907 631 817 596

Left: those with a score of between 1 and 2 on the left–right scale described in the technical appendix. Centre–Left: those with a score of more than 2 but no more than 2.4. Centre–Right: those with a score of more than 2.4 but no more than 3. Right: those with a score of more than 3.

There is also some evidence to support the view that regional assemblies are relatively popular with those who are dissatisfied with the way that Britain is governed at present. As shown in Table 9.10, only two in five of those who think that the system of governing Britain needs a great deal of improvement favour the status quo rather than regional assemblies or an English parliament. This compares with nearly two-thirds of those who reckon that no more than small changes are needed. However, it appears that dissatisfaction with the governance of Britain as a whole is as likely to translate into increased support for an English parliament as it is for regional assemblies. The latter are evidently not regarded as a particularly apposite solution for the alleged inadequacies in the way that Britain is currently governed.


213

Table 9.10 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by perceptions of how well British government works System of governing Britain could be improved

Not at all/ in small ways

Quite a lot A great deal

% % %


Base 1256 1566 836


26

32

34

Base 1033 1292 672

Our investigation of who does and does not support devolution has, then, thrown up an interesting pattern. Few show much awareness of the existing regional institutions in England, while the idea of regional assemblies or even an English parliament has so far failed to tap into the emotional loyalties that people feel towards their region in particular or to England as a whole. Those who are relatively keen on devolution are those who have doubts about the degree of economic inequality in society or about how well the country is governed. At the same time, it is those who think that having a regional assembly would actually improve their region’s economy or how much say ordinary people have in government who particularly back devolution. In short, it appears that support for devolution in England is – at present at least – primarily instrumental. People back it if they think it will bring about some kind of material improvement, but not because they feel it might be a way of symbolising and expressing their sense of regional or even English identity. In this respect it is clearly not anchored in the nationalist sentiment that helped foster the demand for – and opposition to – devolution in Scotland (Curtice, 1999) or indeed explains why any proposed constitutional arrangement for Northern Ireland generates such fierce debate. Lacking this emotional force, and with relatively few convinced as yet of the instrumental benefits that devolution might bring, it is perhaps unsurprising that devolution largely fails to excite the passions of many English hearts. The political debate So far, however, we have left aside one other potentially important shaper of public opinion – the political parties. It is often argued that political parties can


214

mould public opinion by persuading their supporters of the merits of the policy platforms they have adopted (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Evans, 1999; Curtice and Fisher, 2003). Even if a party’s supporters are initially reluctant to back a particular policy, the fact that it is promulgated by the party for which they normally vote and with which they may identify means that they are persuaded to change their minds. If indeed the various political parties have had any influence on public opinion on devolution, we should find a considerable difference between the views of, on the one hand, Conservative supporters and, on the other, those of both Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters. After all, the Conservative Party has signalled its opposition to the creation of elected regional assemblies in England, just as it initially opposed the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, while both Labour and the Liberal Democrats are in favour. Yet, as Table 9.11 shows, the differences between the views of different parties’ supporters are not particularly strong. Asked to choose between the status quo, an English parliament and regional assemblies, Conservative identifiers are the most likely to support the status quo and least likely to support a regional assembly, while Liberal Democrat supporters are at the other end of the spectrum. Even so, the differences between them are no more than a dozen percentage points or so. But even this gap disappears when respondents are simply asked whether they support or oppose regional assemblies and it is now Labour identifiers rather than Liberal Democrats who exhibit a touch more enthusiasm. It appears that the various stances taken by the political parties have had little impact on the electorate. Table 9.11 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by party identification


Conservative Labour Lib Dem None

% % % %

As now 57 52 45 41 Regional assem bly 20 26 33 28 English parliament 21 18 19 18

Base 1010 1372 428 575


28

34

28

25

Base 872 1093 365 440

Interestingly, however, there are rather sharper differences between the parties’ supporters in the three northernmost regions of England. Here, Liberal


215

Democrat identifiers are around twenty percentage points more likely than Conservative identifiers to support regional assemblies, irrespective of how the question is asked. It appears that voters in the north of England have taken rather more notice of the political debate between the parties about devolution than they have elsewhere, not least because the debate has been more intense there. Here perhaps is an indication that the government has been correct in suggesting that this part of England is more ready to hold a referendum on the subject. Table 9.12 Attitudes towards different ways of governing England, by party identification in the north of England


Conservative Labour Lib Dem None % % % %

As now 61 52 36 38 Regional assembly 21 30 42 27 English parliament 17 16 17 23

Base 208 463 111 179


23

36

41

29

Base 184 372 98 146

Note: Table based on respondents in the North East, North West and Yorkshire & the Humber But at the same time, Table 9.12 also contains one other striking feature, as indeed does its predecessor. Labour identifiers do not appear to be particularly keen on regional assemblies, even though it is their government that is promoting them. Asked to choose between the status quo, regional assemblies and an English parliament, Labour identifiers are at best only midway between Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters in their degree of support for regional assemblies. And in the north of England at least, they also emerge as somewhat less keen on regional assemblies than Liberal Democrat identifiers in response to our specific question about regional devolution. This pattern is in sharp contrast to the position in Scotland where, as Table 9.13 shows, not only are there are sharper differences in general between the constitutional preferences of the various parties’ supporters, but Labour identifiers are as much in favour of Scotland having her own parliament, either independent or devolved, as are Liberal Democrat identifiers.


216

Table 9.13 Attitudes towards different ways of governing Scotland, by party identification


Conser-vative

Labour Lib Dem SNP None

% % % % %

Independence 7 20 12 58 27 Devolution 56 66 75 38 67 No parliament 34 9 14 1 13

Base 230 483 163 254 181

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes, 2003 Thus, the relative lack of enthusiasm for devolution amongst Labour supporters in England suggests that while the government’s reading of public opinion on devolution may have been more accurate than the expectations of those who anticipated an ‘English backlash’, its apparently circumspect approach may also have incurred a price. The government’s relatively sotto voce approach may well have resulted in its message not being heard by many of its supporters. And, if indeed that is the case, it will doubtless have contributed to the apparent lack of enthusiasm with which regional devolution is still greeted in England. Whether the decision now to hold the first referendum in the North East means that its message will finally secure more attention, remains to be seen. Conclusions As its critics have long pointed out, asymmetric devolution is full of apparent anomalies and logical flaws. Yet the success of government institutions is not necessarily determined by rational logic. Rather, a crucial ingredient is that the public agree with their very existence in the first place. Institutions that lack such legitimacy will always find it difficult to persuade the public that their decisions and laws should be obeyed, as many years of civil strife in Northern Ireland testify. Creating public institutions that the public does not want is unlikely to be a recipe for good government. Evidently the public in Scotland and in Wales could not now conceive of life without devolution (Curtice, 2004). Any attempt to scrap the existing devolved institutions would be regarded as illegitimate. However, public opinion in England is very different. Here it seems there is still little interest in devolution despite the examples set by Scotland, Wales or even London. Asymmetric devolution may be illogical, but it apparently reflects the varied contours of public opinion across the UK.


217

Our investigation has, of course, found that England is currently indifferent rather than hostile to devolution. So the difficulty that currently faces attempts to introduce elected regional government in England is not that such institutions would be considered illegitimate, but rather that people will simply not think that they are worth bothering with at all. Even so, creating elected regional assemblies in such a climate could still be a recipe for institutions whose elections produce low turnout and whose politicians have little authority or influence. If English regional government is ever to enjoy widespread public support then its advocates will at some point need the courage to argue their case. Notes 1. This chapter was completed before the result of this referendum was known. 2. The eight per cent of people who were recorded by this survey as being “neither for

nor against” comprised respondents who gave this response even though it was not offered by the interviewer.

3. The older question was framed in 1999 in the light of the introduction of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh National Assembly. The new question was introduced in 2003 to reflect what is now government policy for England (DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002). The 2003 survey asked both questions of different random sub-samples of respondents so that the impact of the different wording could be assessed.

4. In this table and in the rest of this chapter we have combined the answers given by those 975 respondents who were asked the older version of our question with the answers of the 2,734 who were asked the newer one. As will be apparent by now, the two questions secured a broadly similar pattern of response.

5. For example, the 2001 Labour manifesto stated that, “For some regions this degree of regional representation [i.e. unelected Regional Chambers] will be sufficient. However, in other parts of the country there may be a stronger sense of regional identity and a desire for a regional political voice.”

6. We might also note that these generalisations are also true within the three northernmost regions of England. Thus the fact that levels of regional pride are notably higher in these three regions than they are in the rest of England does nothing to increase support for regional devolution in those regions (Curtice, forthcoming).

References Adams, J. and Tomaney, J. (2002), Restoring the Balance: Strengthening the

Government’s proposals for elected regional assemblies, London: IPPR Butler, D. and Stokes, D. (1974), Political Change in Britain, 2nd edition, London:

Macmillan


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Curtice, J. (1999), ‘Is Scotland a Nation and Wales Not?’, in Taylor, B. and Thomson, K. (eds.), Scotland and Wales: Nations Again,? Cardiff: University of Wales Press

Curtice, J. (2004), ‘Restoring Confidence and Legitimacy? Devolution and Public Opinion’, in Trench, A. (ed.), Has Devolution Made a Difference? The State of the Nations 2004, Exeter: Imprint Academic

Curtice, J. (forthcoming), ‘What the People Say – If Anything’, in Hazell, R.(ed.), The English Question , Manchester: Manchester University Press

Curtice, J. and Fisher, S. (2003), ‘The power to persuade? A tale of two Prime Ministers’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 20th Report – Continuity and change over two decades, London: Sage

DTLR/Cabinet Office (2002), Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English Regions, London: DTLR

Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Smith, T. and Weir, S. (2001), Voices of the People: Popular attitudes to democratic renewal in Britain , London: Politicos

Evans, G. (1999), ‘Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?’, in Evans, G. and Norris, P. (eds.), Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective, London: Sage

Heath, A., Rothon, C. and Jarvis, L. (2002), ‘English to the core?’, in Park, A., Curtice, J., Thomson, K., Jarvis, L. and Bromley, C. (eds.) British Social Attitudes: the 19 th Report, London: Sage

Hechter, M. (1975), Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul ICM (2003), Regional Assembly Research. Available at:

http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2003/CCN%20report4.pdf Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust (2004), State of the Nation Poll 2004: Summary of Main

Findings. Available at: http://www.jrrt.org.uk/findings.pdf Labour Party (2001), Ambitions for Britain, London: Labour Party McLean, I. (2000), ‘Getting and Spending: can (or should) the Barnett formula

survive?’, New Economy 7: 76–80 Marquand, D. and Tomaney, J. (2000), Democratising England, Oxford: Regional

Policy Forum Morgan, K and Nauwelaers, C. (eds.), (1999), Regional Innovation Strategies: The

challenge for less favoured regions, London: Taylor and Francis MORI (2003), Regional Government in England 2003: A Synthesis of Research,

London: MORI Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. (1982), The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in

European Regionalism, Beverley Hills: Sage Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. (1983), Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of European

peripheries, Beverley Hills: Sage Sandford, M. (2002), ‘What place for England in an asymmetrically devolved UK?’,

Regional Studies, 36: 789–796 Tomaney, J. (2002), ‘New Labour and the evolution of regionalism in England’, in

Tomaney, J. and Mawson, J. (eds.), England: The State of the Regions, Bristol: Policy Press


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Acknowledgements The survey work reported in this chapter was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council as part of its Devolution and Constitutional Change Research Programme (grant number L219 25 2018), by the Leverhulme Trust as part of its Nations and Regions Research Programme, and by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. We are grateful to all three bodies for their generous support. However, responsibility for the interpretations offered and views expressed here lies solely with the authors.

In 2003, the sample for the British Social Attitudes survey was split into three sections: versions A and B made up a random quarter each and version C half of the sample. Depending on which versions it was included in, each ‘module’ of questions was thus asked either of the full sample (4,432 respondents) or of a random three-quarters, half or one-quarter of the sample. (In most years, the British Social Attitudes sample is around 3,300 in size and split into three versions. Thus versions A and B in 2003 are the equivalent of a third of the sample in a normal year; version C is the equivalent of two-thirds of the sample in a normal year; and version C plus either A or B is the equivalent of the full sample in a normal year.) The structure of the questionnaire is shown at the beginning of Appendix III. Sample design The British Social Attitudes survey is designed to yield a representative sample of adults aged 18 or over. Since 1993, the sampling frame for the survey has been the Postcode Address File (PAF), a list of addresses (or postal delivery points) compiled by the Post Office.1 For practical reasons, the sample is confined to those living in private households. People living in institutions (though not in private households at such institutions) are excluded, as are households whose addresses were not on the PAF. The sampling method involved a multi-stage design, with three separate stages of selection. Selection of sectors At the first stage, postcode sectors were selected systematically from a list of all postal sectors in Great Britain. Before selection, any sectors with fewer than 500

Appendix I Technical details of the survey


222

addresses were identified and grouped together with an adjacent sector; in Scotland all sectors north of the Caledonian Canal were excluded (because of the prohibitive costs of interviewing there). Sectors were then stratified on the basis of:

• 37 sub-regions • population density with variable banding used, in order to create three

equal-sized strata per sub-region • ranking by percentage of homes that were owner-occupied in England

and Wales and percentage of homes where the head of household was non-manual in Scotland.

Two hundred and sixty-six postcode sectors were selected, with probability proportional to the number of addresses in each sector. Selection of addresses Thirty-one addresses were selected in each of the 266 sectors. The issued sample was therefore 266 x 31 = 8,246 addresses, selected by starting from a random point on the list of addresses for each sector, and choosing each address at a fixed interval. The fixed interval was calculated for each sector in order to generate the correct number of addresses. The Multiple-Output Indicator (MOI) available through PAF was used when selecting addresses in Scotland. The MOI shows the number of accommodation spaces sharing one address. Thus, if the MOI indicates more than one accommodation space at a given address, the chances of the given address being selected from the list of addresses would increase so that it matched the total number of accommodation spaces. The MOI is largely irrelevant in England and Wales as separate dwelling units generally appear as separate entries on PAF. In Scotland, tenements with many flats tend to appear as one entry on PAF. However, even in Scotland, the vast majority of MOIs had a value of one. The remainder, which ranged between three and 12, were incorporated into the weighting procedures (described below). Selection of individuals Interviewers called at each address selected from PAF and listed all those eligible for inclusion in the British Social Attitudes sample – that is, all persons currently aged 18 or over and resident at the selected address. The interviewer then selected one respondent using a computer-generated random selection procedure. Where there were two or more households or ‘dwelling units’ at the selected address, interviewers first had to select one household or dwelling unit using the same random procedure. They then followed the same procedure to select a person for interview.

Appendix I

223

Weighting Data were weighted to take account of the fact that not all the units covered in the survey had the same probability of selection. The weighting reflected the relative selection probabilities of the individual at the three main stages of selection: address, household and individual. Table A.1 Distribution of unscaled and scaled weights

Unscaled weight Number % Scaled weight

0.08 2 0.0 0.0459 0.10 1 0.0 0.0550 0.11 1 0.0 0.0612 0.13 3 0.1 0.0688 0.17 3 0.1 0.0918 0.22 1 0.0 0.1223 0.25 1 0.0 0.1376 0.40 1 0.0 0.2202 0.50 2 0.0 0.2752 0.83 1 0.0 0.4587 1.00 1587 35.8 0.5504 2.00 2266 51.1 1.1009 3.00 384 8.7 1.6513 4.00 142 3.2 2.2017 5.00 19 0.4 2.7521 6.00 12 0.3 3.3026 7.00 6 0.1 3.8530

Base: 4432

First, because addresses in Scotland were selected using the MOI, weights had to be applied to compensate for the greater probability of an address with an MOI of more than one being selected, compared to an address with an MOI of one. (This stage was omitted for the English and Welsh data.) Secondly, data were weighted to compensate for the fact that dwelling units at an address which contained a large number of dwelling units were less likely to be selected for inclusion in the survey than ones which did not share an address. (We use this procedure because in most cases of MOIs greater than one, the two stages will cancel each other out, resulting in more efficient weights.) Thirdly, data were weighted to compensate for the lower selection probabilities of adults living in large households compared with those living in small households. The weights were capped at 7.0 (causing three cases to have their weights reduced).


224

The resulting weight is called ‘WtFactor’ and the distribution of weights is shown in Table A.1. The mean weight was 1.82. The weights were then scaled down to make the number of weighted productive cases exactly equal to the number of unweighted productive cases (n = 4,432). All the percentages presented in this Report are based on weighted data. Questionnaire versions Each address in each sector (sampling point) was allocated to either the A, B or C portion of the sample. If one serial number was version A, the next was version B and the next two after that version C. Thus each interviewer was allocated seven or eight cases from each of versions A and B and 15 or 16 cases from version C. There were 2,062 issued addresses for versions A and B and 4,122 for version C. Fieldwork Interviewing was mainly carried out between June and September 2003, with a small number of interviews taking place in October and November. Table A.2 Response rate on British Social Attitudes, 2003

Number %

Addresses issued 8,246

Vacant, derelict and other out of scope 753 In scope 7,493 100.0 Interview achieved 4,432 59.1 Interview not achieved 3,061 40.9

Refused1 2,357 31.5 Non-contacted2 309 4.1 Other non-response 395 5.3

1 ‘Refused’ comprises refusals before selection of an individual at the address, refusals to the office, refusal by the selected person, ‘proxy’ refusals (on behalf of the selected respondent) and broken appointments after which the selected person could not be recontacted

2 ‘Non-contacted’ comprises households where no one was contacted and those where the selected person could not be contacted

Fieldwork was conducted by interviewers drawn from the National Centre for Social Research’s regular panel and conducted using face-to-face computer-

Appendix I

225

assisted interviewing.2 Interviewers attended a one-day briefing conference to familiarise them with the selection procedures and questionnaires. The mean interview length was 68 minutes for version A of the questionnaire, 72 minutes for version B and 65 minutes for version C.3 Interviewers achieved an overall response rate of 59 per cent. Details are shown in Table A.2. As in earlier rounds of the series, the respondent was asked to fill in a self-completion questionnaire which, whenever possible, was collected by the interviewer. Otherwise, the respondent was asked to post it to the National Centre for Social Research. If necessary, up to three postal reminders were sent to obtain the self-completion supplement. A total of 811 respondents (18 per cent of those interviewed) did not return their self-completion questionnaire. Version A of the self-completion questionnaire was returned by 84 per cent of respondents to the face-to-face interview, version B by 77 per cent and version C by 83 per cent. As in previous rounds, we judged that it was not necessary to apply additional weights to correct for non-response. Advance letter Interviewers were supplied with letters describing the purpose of the survey and the coverage of the questionnaire, which they posted to sampled addresses before making any calls.4 Analysis variables A number of standard analyses have been used in the tables that appear in this Report. The analysis groups requiring further definition are set out below. For further details see Exley et al. (2003). Region The dataset is classified by the 12 Government Office Regions. Standard Occupational Classification Respondents are classified according to their own occupation, not that of the ‘head of household’. Each respondent was asked about their current or last job, so that all respondents except those who had never worked were coded. Additionally, if the respondent was not working but their spouse or partner was working, their spouse or partner is similarly classified. With the 2001 survey, we began coding occupation to the new Standard Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC 2000) instead of the Standard Occupational Classification 1990 (SOC 90). The main socio-economic grouping


226

based on SOC 2000 is the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC). However, to maintain time-series, some analysis has continued to use the older schemes based on SOC 90 – Registrar General’s Social Class, Socio-Economic Group and the Goldthorpe schema. National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) The combination of SOC 2000 and employment status for current or last job generates the following NS-SEC analytic classes:

• Employers in large organisations, higher managerial and professional • Lower professional and managerial; higher technical and supervisory • Intermediate occupations • Small employers and own account workers • Lower s upervisory and technical occupations • Semi-routine occupations • Routine occupations

The remaining respondents are grouped as “never had a job” or “not classifiable”. For some analyses, it may be more appropriate to classify respondents according to their current socio-economic status, which takes into account only their present economic position. In this case, in addition to the seven classes listed above, the remaining respondents not currently in paid work fall into one of the following categories: “not classifiable”, “retired”, “looking after the home”, “unemployed” or “others not in paid occupations”. Registrar General’s Social Class As with NS-SEC , each respondent’s Social Class is based on his or her current or last occupation. The combination of SOC 90 with employment status for current or last job generates the following six Social Classes: I Professional etc. occupations II Managerial and technical occupations ‘Non-manual’ III (Non-manual) Skilled occupations

III (Manual) Skilled occupations IV Partly skilled occupations ‘Manual’ V Unskilled occupations They are usually collapsed into four groups: I & II, III Non-manual, III Manual, and IV & V.

Appendix I

227

Socio-Economic Group As with NS-SEC, each respondent’s Socio-Economic Group (SEG) is based on his or her current or last occupation. SEG aims to bring together people with jobs of similar social and economic status, and is derived from a combination of employment status and occupation. The full SEG classification identifies 18 categories, but these are usually condensed into six groups:

• Professionals, employers and managers • Intermediate non-manual workers • Junior non-manual workers • Skilled manual workers • Semi-skilled manual workers • Unskilled manual workers

As with NS-SEC, the remaining respondents are grouped as “never had a job” or “not classifiable”. Goldthorpe schema The Goldthorpe schema classifies occupations by their ‘general comparability’, considering such factors as sources and levels of income, economic security, promotion prospects, and level of job autonomy and authority. The Goldthorpe schema was derived from the SOC 90 codes combined with employment status. Two versions of the schema are coded: the full schema has 11 categories; the ‘compressed schema’ combines these into the five classes shown below.

• Salariat (professional and managerial) • Routine non-manual workers (office and sales) • Petty bourgeoisie (the self-employed, including farmers, with and without

employees) • Manual foremen and supervisors • Working class (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, personal

service and agricultural workers) There is a residual category comprising those who have never had a job or who gave insufficient information for classification purposes. Industry All respondents whose occupation could be coded were allocated a Standard Industrial Classification 1992 (SIC 92). Two-digit class codes are used. As with Social Class, SIC may be generated on the basis of the respondent’s current occupation only, or on his or her most recently classifiable occupation.


228

Party identification Respondents can be classified as identifying with a particular political party on one of three counts: if they consider themselves supporters of that party, as closer to it than to others, or as more likely to support it in the event of a general election (responses are derived from Qs.199–201). The three groups are generally described respectively as partisans, sympathisers and residual identifiers. In combination, the three groups are referred to as ‘identifiers’. Attitude scales Since 1986, the British Social Attitudes surveys have included two attitude scales which aim to measure where respondents stand on certain underlying value dimensions – left–right and libertarian–authoritarian.5 Since 1987 (except 1990), a similar scale on ‘welfarism’ has been asked. Some of the items in the Welfare scale were changed in 2000–2001. The current version of the scale is listed below. A useful way of summarising the information from a number of questions of this sort is to construct an additive index (DeVellis, 1991; Spector, 1992). This approach rests on the assumption that there is an underlying – ‘latent’ –attitudinal dimension which characterises the answers to all the questions within each scale. If so, scores on the index are likely to be a more reliable indication of the underlying attitude than the answers to any one question. Each of these scales consists of a number of statements to which the respondent is invited to “agree strongly”, “agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree”, or “disagree strongly”. The items are: Left–right scale

Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off. [Redistrb]

Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers. [BigBusnN]

Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. [Wealth]6

There is one law for the rich and one for the poor. [RichLaw]

Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance. [Indust4]

Libertarian–authoritarian scale

Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values. [TradVals]

Appendix I

229

People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. [StifSent]

For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. [DeathApp]

Schools should teach children to obey authority. [Obey]

The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong. [WrongLaw]

Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. [Censor]

Welfarism scale

The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other. [WelfHelp]

The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes. [MoreWelf]

Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one. [UnempJob]

Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help. [SocHelp]

Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another. [DoleFidl]

If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet. [WelfFeet]

Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people’s lives. [DamLives]

The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain’s proudest achievements. [ProudWlf]

The indices for the three scales are formed by scoring the leftmost, most libertarian or most pro-welfare position, as 1 and the rightmost, most authoritarian or most anti-welfarist position, as 5. The “neither agree nor disagree” option is scored as 3. The scores to all the questions in each scale are added and then divided by the number of items in the scale giving indices ranging from 1 (leftmost, most libertarian, most pro-welfare) to 5 (rightmost, most authoritarian, most anti-welfare). The scores on the three indices have been placed on the dataset.7 The scales have been tested for reliability (as measured by Cronbach’s alpha). The Cronbach’s alpha (unstandardized items) for the scales in 2002 are 0.81 for the left–right scale, 0.82 for the ‘welfarism’ scale and 0.74 for the libertarian–authoritarian scale. This level of reliability can be considered “very good” for the left–right and welfarism scales and “respectable” for the libertarian–authoritarian scale (DeVellis, 1991: 85).


230

Other analysis variables These are taken directly from the questionnaire and to that extent are self-explanatory. The principal ones are: Sex (Q.39) Highest educational qualification Age (Q.40) obtained (Q.1018) Household income (Q.1191) Marital status (Q.133) Economic position (Q.706) Benefits received Religion (Q.866) (Qs.1122-1139) Sampling errors No sample precisely reflects the characteristics of the population it represents, because of both sampling and non-sampling errors. If a sample were designed as a random sample (if every adult had an equal and independent chance of inclusion in the sample) then we could calculate the sampling error of any percentage, p, using the formula: s.e. (p) = p(100-p) √ n

where n is the number of respondents on which the percentage is based. Once the sampling error had been calculated, it would be a straightforward exercise to calculate a confidence interval for the true population percentage. For example, a 95 per cent confidence interval would be given by the formula:

p ± 1.96 x s.e.(p) Clearly, for a simple random sample (srs), the sampling error depends only on the values of p and n. However, simple random sampling is almost never used in practice because of its inefficiency in terms of time and cost. As noted above, the British Social Attitudes sample, like that drawn for most large-scale surveys, was clustered according to a stratified multi-stage design into 266 postcode sectors (or combinations of sectors). With a complex design like this, the sampling error of a percentage giving a particular response is not simply a function of the number of respondents in the sample and the size of the percentage; it also depends on how that percentage response is spread within and between sample points. The complex design may be assessed relative to simple random sampling by calculating a range of design factors (DEFTs) associated with it, where

Appendix I

231

Variance of estimator with complex design, sample size n

DEFT = √ Variance of estimator with srs design, sample size n

and represents the multiplying factor to be applied to the simple random sampling error to produce its complex equivalent. A design factor of one means that the complex sample has achieved the same precision as a simple random sample of the same size. A design factor greater than one means the complex sample is less precise than its simple random sample equivalent. If the DEFT for a particular characteristic is known, a 95 per cent confidence interval for a percentage may be calculated using the formula:

p ± 1.96 x complex sampling error (p) = p ± 1.96 x DEFT x p(100-p) √ n Calculations of sampling errors and design effects were made using the statistical analysis package STATA. Table A.3 gives examples of the confidence intervals and DEFTs calculated for a range of different questions. Most background variables were fielded on the whole sample, whereas attitudinal variables were mainly asked only of three-quarters, half or a quarter of the sample; some asked on the interview questionnaire and some on the self-completion supplement. It shows that most of the questions asked of all sample members have a confidence interval of around plus or minus two to three per cent of the survey proportion. This means that we can be 95 per cent certain that the true population proportion is within two to three per cent (in either direction) of the proportion we report. Variables with much larger variation are, as might be expected, those closely related to the geographic location of the respondent (e.g. whether living in a big city, a small town or a village). Here the variation may be as large as six or seven per cent either way around the percentage found on the survey. It should be noted that the design effects for certain variables (notably those most associated with the area a person lives in) are greater than those for other variables. For example, the question about benefit levels for the unemployed has high design effects, which may reflect differing rates of unemployment across the country. Another case in point is housing tenure, as different kinds of tenures (such as council housing, or owner-occupied properties) tend to be concentrated in certain areas; consequently the design effects calculated for these variables in a clustered sample are greater than the design effects calculated for variables less strongly associated with area, such as attitudinal variables. Also, sampling errors for proportions based only on respondents to just one of the versions of the questionnaire, or on subgroups within the sample, are larger than they would have been had the questions been asked of everyone.


232

Table A.3 Complex standard errors and confidence intervals of selected variables

% (p) Complex standard error of p

95% confidence

interval

DEFT

Base

Classification variables

Q202 Party identification (full sample) 4432

Conservative 25.2 1.1 23.1 – 27.3 1.65 Labour 37.2 1.0 35.2 – 39.3 1.43 Liberal Democrat 10.8 0.6 9.6 – 12.0 1.32

Q848 Housing tenure (full sample) 4432

Owns 71.8 1.2 69.4 – 74.2 1.80 Rents from local authority 12.6 0.9 10.8 – 14.3 1.80 Rents privately/HA 14.0 0.9 12.2 – 15.8 1.75

Q866 Religion (full sample) 4432

No religion 43.0 1.0 41.2 – 44.9 1.29 Church of England 26.6 1.1 24.5 – 28.8 1.63 Roman Catholic 8.9 0.6 7.7 – 10.0 1.39

Q930 Age of completing continuous full-time education (full sample) 4432

16 or under 58.5 1.3 55.8 – 61.1 1.80 17 or 18 18.5 0.7 17.1 – 19.9 1.22 19 or over 22.3 1.1 20.1 – 24.5 1.78

Q264 Home internet access (full sample) 4432

Yes 51.2 1.1 49.2 – 53.3 1.40 No 48.7 1.1 46.6 – 50.8 1.40

Q852 Urban or rural residence (full sample) 4432

A big city 31.0 2.7 25.6 – 36.4 3.95 A small city/town 50.8 2.6 45.7 – 55.9 3.45 Village/countryside 17.2 2.1 13.1 – 21.3 3.65

Attitudinal variables (face-to-face interview)

Q219 Benefits for the unemployed are ... (3/4 of sample) 3272

... too low 24.9 0.9 23.1 – 26.7 1.39 ... too high 29.8 0.9 28.1 – 31.5 1.26

Q510 NHS should be available to those with lower incomes (half sample) 2293

Support a lot 10.6 0.7 9.2 – 11.9 1.07 Support a little 16.5 0.9 14.7 – 18.3 1.19 Oppose a little 14.6 0.9 12.9 – 16.3 1.17 Oppose a lot 56.9 1.3 54.3 – 59.6 1.29

Q778 Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are ... (half sample)

2193

Always wrong 31.4 1.2 29.0 – 33.8 1.21 Mostly wrong 8.7 0.6 7.4 – 9.9 1.03 Sometimes wrong 9.2 0.9 7.8 – 10.5 1.10 Rarely wrong 6.7 0.6 5.5 – 8.0 1.14 Not wrong at all 36.5 1.2 34.2 – 38.9 1.14

Appendix I

233

% (p) Complex standard error of p

95% confidence

interval

DEFT

Base

Attitudinal variables (self-completion)

A22a B56a C45a

Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off (full sample)

3621

Agree strongly 10.3 0.6 9.1 – 11.4 1.13 Agree 31.7 0.9 30.0 – 33.5 1.17 Neither agree nor disagree 23.7 0.7 22.3 – 25.2 1.03 Disagree 26.0 0.8 24.4 – 27.7 1.14 Disagree strongly 5.9 0.5 4.9 – 6.8 1.24

B44b C34b

GM foods should be banned even if food prices suffer as a result (3/4 of sample)

2649


A13a B31b

I would worry if housing were provided near my home for people with mental problems leaving hospital (half of sample)

1845


A18a How important to cut down on the number of cars (1/4 of sample)

972

Very important 26.4 1.6 23.2 – 29.6 1.15 Fairly important 43.9 1.7 40.6 – 47.2 1.05 Not very/not at all important 21.9 1.4 19.1 – 24.7 1.07

Analysis techniques Regression Regression analysis aims to summarise the relationship between a ‘dependent’ variable and one or more ‘independent’ variables. It shows how well we can estimate a respondent’s score on the dependent variable from knowledge of their scores on the independent variables. It is often undertaken to support a claim that the phenomena measured by the independent variables cause the phenomenon measured by the dependent variable. However, the causal ordering, if any, between the variables cannot be verified or falsified by the technique. Causality can only be inferred through special experimental designs or through assumptions made by the analyst.


234

All regression analysis assumes that the relationship between the dependent and each of the independent variables takes a particular form. In linear regression, it is assumed that the relationship can be adequately summarised by a straight line. This means that a one percentage point increase in the value of an independent variable is assumed to have the same impact on the value of the dependent variable on average irrespective of the previous values of those variables. Strictly speaking the technique assumes that both the dependent and the independent variables are measured on an interval level scale, although it may sometimes still be applied even where this is not the case. For example, one can use an ordinal variable (e.g. a Likert scale) as a dependent variable if one is willing to assume that there is an underlying interval level scale and the difference between the observed ordinal scale and the underlying interval scale is due to random measurement error. Often the answers to a number of Likert-type questions are averaged to give a dependent variable that is more like a continuous variable. Categorical or nominal data can be used as independent variables by converting them into dummy or binary variables; these are variables where the only valid scores are 0 and 1, with 1 signifying membership of a particular category and 0 otherwise. The assumptions of linear regression cause particular difficulties where the dependent variable is binary. The assumption that the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables is a straight line means that it can produce estimated values for the dependent variable of less than 0 or greater than 1. In this case it may be more appropriate to assume that the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables takes the form of an S-curve, where the impact on the dependent variable of a one-point increase in an independent variable becomes progressively less the closer the value of the dependent variable approaches 0 or 1. Logistic regression is an alternative form of regression which fits such an S-curve rather than a straight line. The technique can also be adapted to analyse multinomial non-interval level dependent variables, that is, variables which classify respondents into more than two categories. The two statistical scores most commonly reported from the results of regression analyses are: A measure of variance explained: This summarises how well all the independent variables combined can account for the variation in respondent’s scores in the dependent variable. The higher the measure, the more accurately we are able in general to estimate the correct value of each respondent’s score on the dependent variable from knowledge of their scores on the independent variables. A parameter estimate: This shows how much the dependent variable will change on average, given a one unit change in the independent variable (while holding all other independent variables in the model constant). The parameter estimate has a positive sign if an increase in the value of the independent variable results in an increase in the value of the dependent variable. It has a negative sign if an increase in the value of the independent variable results in a decrease in the value of the dependent variable. If the parameter estimates are

Appendix I

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standardised, it is possible to compare the relative impact of different independent variables; those variables with the largest standardised estimates can be said to have the biggest impact on the value of the dependent variable. Regression also tests for the statistical significance of parameter estimates. A parameter estimate is said to be significant at the five per cent level, if the range of the values encompassed by its 95 per cent confidence interval (see also section on sampling errors) are either all positive or all negative. This means that there is less than a five per cent chance that the association we have found between the dependent variable and the independent variable is simply the result of sampling error and does not reflect a relationship that actually exists in the general population. Factor analysis Factor analysis is a statistical technique which aims to identify whether there are one or more apparent sources of commonality to the answers given by respondents to a set of questions. It ascertains the smallest number of factors (or dimensions) which can most economically summarise all of the variation found in the set of questions being analysed. Factors are established where respondents who give a particular answer to one question in the set, tend to give the same answer as each other to one or more of the other questions in the set. The technique is most useful when a relatively small number of factors are able to account for a relatively large proportion of the variance in all of the questions in the set. The technique produces a factor loading for each question (or variable) on each factor. Where questions have a high loading on the same factor then it will be the case that respondents who give a particular answer to one of these questions tend to give a similar answer to the other questions. The technique is most commonly used in attitudinal research to try to identify the underlying ideological dimensions which apparently structure attitudes towards the subject in question. International Social Survey Programme The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is run by a group of research organisations, each of which undertakes to field annually an agreed module of questions on a chosen topic area. Since 1985, an International Social Survey Programme module has been included in one of the British Social Attitudes self-completion questionnaires. Each module is chosen for repetition at intervals to allow comparisons both between countries (membership is currently standing at 40) and over time. In 2003, the chosen subject was National Identity, and the module was carried on the B version of the self-completion questionnaire (Qs.1–15).


236

Young People’s Social Attitudes survey As in 1994 and 1998, we fielded in parallel a survey of young people aged between 12 and 19. In 2003, the Young People’s Social Attitudes survey was funded by the Children and Young People’s Unit. Sample design All young people aged 12–19 living in the same household as an adult British Social Attitudes respondent were eligible for interview on the Young People’s survey, except any 18 or 19 year old who had already been interviewed as part of the main study. The Young People’s data can thus be linked to the British Social Attitudes responses given by an adult within the household – normally a parent of the young person. The questionnaire Unlike the main British Social Attitudes survey, there was only one version of the questionnaire administered to 12-19 year olds, and no self-completion supplement. Some of the questions were also asked on one or more versions of the adult survey, allowing direct comparisons to be made between the adult and the young people’s samples. The rest were unique to the Young People’s survey. The topics covered were:

• Gender differences • Problems at school • Views about education and work • Politics and decision-making • Prejudice and morality • Fulfilment • Friends and social networks • Household tasks

A number of demographic and other classificatory questions were also included (such as age, sex, religion, current economic activity, and educational experience and expectations). Other background variable, (such as tenure) can be derived from the adult British Social Attitudes responses. Weighting As with the adult data, the Young People’s Social Attitudes data were weighted to take account of the relative selection probabilities of the adult respondent at the address and household stage. However, the young people’s data do not need

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to be weighted further to take account of the differential selection probabilities within the household: since all 12–19 year olds in the household were eligible for inclusion in the survey, there is no need for further weighting. Fieldwork The Young People’s Social Attitudes questionnaire was implemented in computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). Interviews were carried out by the same interviewers who worked on the British Social Attitudes survey. During the interview with the adult respondent, the interviewer established the number of eligible young people living in the household. At the end of the BSA interview, they asked permission to approach these young people. The median interview length was 32 minutes. Out of a sample of 4,432 BSA respondents, 997 eligible young persons were identified, which represents a response rate of 66%. The final response achieved is shown in Table A.4. Table A.4 Response rate on the Young People’s Social Attitudes survey

Number %

In scope 997 100.0 Interview achieved 663 66.5 Interview not achieved 334 33.5 Refused 240 24.1 Non-contact 39 3.9 Other 55 5.5

Notes 1. Until 1991 all British Social Attitudes samples were drawn from the Electoral

Register (ER). However, following concern that this sampling frame might be deficient in its coverage of certain population subgroups, a ‘splicing’ experiment was conducted in 1991. We are grateful to the Market Research Development Fund for contributing towards the costs of this experiment. Its purpose was to investigate whether a switch to PAF would disrupt the time-series – for instance, by lowering response rates or affecting the distribution of responses to particular questions. In the event, it was concluded that the change from ER to PAF was unlikely to affect time trends in any noticeable ways, and that no adjustment factors were necessary. Since significant differences in efficiency exist between PAF and ER, and because we considered it untenable to continue to use a frame that is known to be biased, we decided to adopt PAF as the sampling frame for future British Social Attitudes


238

surveys. For details of the PAF/ER ‘splicing’ experiment, see Lynn and Taylor (1995).

2. In 1993 it was decided to mount a split-sample experiment designed to test the applicability of Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) to the British Social Attitudes survey series. CAPI has been used increasingly over the past decade as an alternative to traditional interviewing techniques. As the name implies, CAPI involves the use of lap-top computers during the interview, with interviewers entering responses directly into the comp uter. One of the advantages of CAPI is that it significantly reduces both the amount of time spent on data processing and the number of coding and editing errors. There was, however, concern that a different interviewing technique might alter the distribution of responses and so affect the year-on-year consistency of British Social Attitudes data.

Following the experiment, it was decided to change over to CAPI completely in 1994 (the self-completion questionnaire still being administered in the conventional way). The results of the experiment are discussed in The 11th Report (Lynn and Purdon, 1994).

3. Interview times of less than 20 minutes were excluded as these were likely to be errors.

4. An experiment was conducted on the 1991 British Social Attitudes survey (Jowell et al., 1992), which showed that sending advance letters to sampled addresses before fieldwork begins has very little impact on response rates. However, interviewers do find that an advance letter helps them to introduce the survey on the doorstep, and a majority of respondents have said that they preferred some advance notice. For these reasons, advance letters have been used on the British Social Attitudes surveys since 1991.

5. Because of methodological experiments on scale development, the exact items detailed in this section have not been asked on all versions of the questionnaire each year.

6. In 1994 only, this item was replaced by: Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. [Wealth1]

7. In constructing the scale, a decision had to be taken on how to treat missing values (‘Don’t knows,’ ‘Refused’ and ‘Not answered’). Respondents who had more than two missing values on the left–right scale and more than three missing values on the libertarian–authoritarian and welfare scale were excluded from that scale. For respondents with just a few missing values, ‘Don’t knows’ were recoded to the midpoint of the scale and ‘Refused’ or ‘Not answered’ were recoded to the scale mean for that respondent on their valid items.

References DeVellis, R.F. (1991), ‘Scale development: theory and applications’, Applied Social

Research Methods Series, 26, Newbury Park: Sage Exley, S., Bromley, C., Jarvis, L., Park, A., Stratford, N. and Thomson, K. (2003),

British Social Attitudes 2000 survey: Technical Report , London: National Centre for Social Research

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Jowell, R., Brook, L., Prior, G. and Taylor, B. (1992), British Social Attitudes: the 9th Report, Aldershot: Dartmouth

Lynn, P. and Purdon, S. (1994), ‘Time -series and lap-tops: the change to computer- assisted interviewing’, in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Brook, L. and Ahrendt, D. (eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 11th Report, Aldershot: Dartmouth

Lynn, P. and Taylor, B. (1995), ‘On the bias and variance of samples of individuals: a comparison of the Electoral Registers and Postcode Address File as sampling frames’, The Statistician , 44: 173–194

Spector, P.E. (1992), ‘Summated rating scale construction: an introduction’, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 82, Newbury Park: Sage

1. Figures in the tables are from the 2003 British Social Attitudes survey

unless otherwise indicated. 2. Tables are percentaged as indicated. 3. In tables, ‘*’ indicates less than 0.5 per cent but greater than zero, and ‘–’

indicates zero. 4. When findings based on the responses of fewer than 100 respondents are

reported in the text, reference is made to the small base size. 5. Percentages equal to or greater than 0.5 have been rounded up (e.g. 0.5 per

cent = one per cent; 36.5 per cent = 37 per cent). 6. In many tables the proportions of respondents answering “Don’t know” or

not giving an answer are omitted. This, together with the effects of rounding and weighting, means that percentages will not always add to 100 per cent.

7. The self-completion questionnaire was not completed by all respondents to the main questionnaire (see Appendix I). Percentage responses to the self-completion questionnaire are based on all those who completed it.

8. The bases shown in the tables (the number of respondents who answered the question) are printed in small italics. The bases are unweighted, unless otherwise stated.

Appendix II Notes on the tabulations in chapters

As explained in Appendix I, three different versions of the questionnaire (A, Band C) were administered, each with its own self-completion supplement. Thediagram that follows shows the structure of the questionnaires and the topicscovered (not all of which are reported on in this volume). The three interview questionnaires reproduced on the following pages arederived from the Blaise computer program in which they were written. For easeof reference, each item has been allocated a question number. Gaps in thenumbering system indicate items that are essential components of the Blaiseprogram but which are not themselves questions, and so have been omitted. Inaddition, we have removed the keying codes and inserted instead the percentagedistribution of answers to each question. We have also included the SPSSvariable name, in square brackets, at each question. Above the questions wehave included filter instructions. A filter instruction should be considered asstaying in force until the next filter instruction. Percentages for the corequestions are based on the total weighted sample, while those for questions inversions A, B or C are based on the appropriate weighted sub-samples. Thethree versions of the self-completion questionnaire follow. We reproduce firstversion A of the interview questionnaire in full; then those parts of version Band version C that differ. The percentage distributions do not necessarily add up to 100 because ofweighting and rounding, or for one or more of the following reasons:

(i) Some sub-questions are filtered – that is, they are asked of only aproportion of respondents. In these cases the percentages add up(approximately) to the proportions who were asked them. Where,however, a series of questions is filtered, we have indicated the reducedweighted base (for example, all employees), and have derivedpercentages from that base.

(ii) At a few questions, respondents were invited to give more than oneanswer and so percentages may add to well over 100 per cent. These areclearly marked by interviewer instructions on the questionnaires.

Appendix IIIThe questionnaires


As reported in Appendix I, the 2003 British Social Attitudes self-completionquestionnaire was not completed by 18 per cent of respondents who weresuccessfully interviewed. The answers in the supplement have been percentagedon the base of those respondents who returned it. This means that thedistribution of responses to questions asked in earlier years are comparable withthose given in Appendix III of all earlier reports in this series except in The1984 Report, where the percentages for the self-completion questionnaire needto be recalculated if comparisons are to be made.

Appendix III 245

BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES: 2003 SURVEY

Version A Version B Version C (quarter of sample) (quarter of sample) (half sample)

Face-to-face questionnaires

Household grid, newspaper readership and party identification

— Public spending and social welfare

E-society Giving to charity E-society

Education — Education

Health care —

Politics & national identity(long)

Politics and national identity(medium)

Politics and national identity(short)

Job details

— Employment relations

Prejudice (short) Prejudice (long)

Transport Genomics

— Immigration —

Classification

Self-completion questionnaires

— ISSP —

— Public spending and social welfare

E-society Giving to charity E-society

Education — Education

Health care —

Politics and national identity

— Employment relations

Transport Genomics

Scales

BR

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246Contents

Page

Introduction 247Household grid 247Newspaper readership 249Party identification 250Public spending and social welfare 251Charitable giving 256E-society 257Education 265Health 269Devolution and constitutional change/Nations and Regions 273

Proportional representation 273Retrospective evaluations 274Political issues 275Political trust 276National identity 279Constitutional issues 283English regions 285

Economic Activity 287Respondent’s job 287Employment relations 290Students 295

Prejudice 296Racial prejudice 296Sexual attitudes 297

Genomics 297Immigration 303Transport 306Classification 308

Housing and local area 308Religion, national identity and race 309Education 311Vote 314Spouse/partner’s job details 315Income 317

Administration 321

BRITISH SOCIALATTITUDES

2003

FACE-TO-FACEQUESTIONNAIRE

Appendix III: Face-to-face questionnaire247

Household grid

ASK ALLQ37 [Househld] N=4432

(You have just been telling me about the adults thatlive in this household. Thinking now of everyoneliving in the household, including children:) Including yourself, how many people live hereregularly as members of this household? CHECK INTERVIEWER MANUAL FOR DEFINITION OF HOUSEHOLDIF NECESSARY. IF YOU DISCOVER THAT YOU WERE GIVEN THE WRONGINFORMATION FOR THE RESPONDENT SELECTION ON THE ARF: DO NOT REDO THE ARF SELECTION PRODECURE DO ENTER THE CORRECT INFORMATION HERE DO USE <CTRL + M> TO MAKE A NOTE OF WHAT HAPPENED.

% Median: 2 people- (Don’t know)- (Refusal/Not answered)

FOR EACH PERSON AT [Househld]

[Name] (NOT ON DATAFILE)FOR RESPONDENT: (Can I just check, what is your firstname?)PLEASE TYPE IN THE FIRST NAME (OR INITIALS) OFRESPONDENTFOR OTHER HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS: PLEASE TYPE IN THE FIRSTNAME (OR INITIALS) OF PERSON NUMBER (number)

Q39 [RSex] (Figures refer to respondent) N=4432% PLEASE CODE SEX OF (name)46.7 Male53.3 Female- (Don’t know)- (Refusal/Not answered)

Introduction

ASK ALLQ1 [SerialNo] (NOT ON SCREEN) N=4432

Serial Number

Q17 [GOR2](NOT ON SCREEN) N=4432% Government office region 2003 version 4.5 North East 9.9 North West 8.5 Yorkshire and Humberside 8.7 East Midlands 9.7 West Midlands 8.3 SW10.0 Eastern 5.2 Inner London 6.3 Outer London13.4 South East 6.2 Wales 9.3 Scotland

Q27 [ABCVer] (NOT ON SCREEN) N=4432% A, B or C?26.1 A25.4 B48.5 C

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248ASK ALLQ133 [MarStat2] N=4432

CARD A1Can I just check, which of these applies to you atpresent?

% CODE FIRST TO APPLY54.6 Married 8.9 Living as married 2.4 Separated (after being married) 6.5 Divorced 7.7 Widowed19.9 Single (never married)- (Don’t know)- (Refusal/Not answered)

N=4432 Q148- Can I just check which, if any, of these types of

relatives do youQ150 yourself have alive at the moment. Please include

adoptive relatives. PROBE: Which others? DO NOT INCLUDE STEP RELATIVES UNLESS LISTED ON THECARD. DO NOT INCLUDE FOSTER RELATIVES CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 8 codes)44.7 Father [RelFath]56.6 Mother [RelMoth]52.7 Son [RelSon2] 5.8 Step-son [RelStepS]50.4 Daughter [RelDaug2] 4.7 Step-daughter [RelStepD]21.1 Grandchild (daughter's child) [RelGrChD]18.4 Grandchild (son's child) [RelGrChS] 5.2 None of these [RelNone2]- (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

[RAge] (Figures refer to respondent) N=4432FOR RESPONDENT IF ONLY ONE PERSON IN HOUSEHOLD: Iwould now like to ask you a few details aboutyourself. What was your age last birthday?FOR RESPONDENT IF SEVERAL PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLD: Iwould like to ask you a few details about each personin your household. Starting with yourself, what wasyour age last birthday?FOR OTHER PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLD: What was (name)`s agelast birthday?FOR 97+, CODE 97.

% Median: 46 years0.0 (Don’t know)- (Refusal/Not answered)

FOR PEOPLE IN THE HOUSEHOLD OTHER THAN RESPONDENTN=4432

[P2Rel3] (Figures refer to second person inhousehold)

% PLEASE ENTER RELATIONSHIP OF (name) RESPONDENT62.5 Partner/ spouse/ cohabitee 7.6 Son/ daughter (inc step/adopted) 0.2 Grandson/ daughter (inc step/adopted) 7.5 Parent/ parent-in-law 0.1 Grand-parent 1.7 Brother/ sister (inc. in-law) 0.8 Other relative 2.4 Other non-relative- (Don’t know)- (Refusal/Not answered)


VERSION A AND B ENGLAND: IF READS A NEWSPAPERQ196 [NwspSWRg] N=1929% Do you think (newspaper) contains ... READ OUT ... 0.8 ... too much news about (government office region),18.1 too little,26.7 or about the right amount? 2.1 (Varies too much to say) 1.9 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q197 [NwspBrit] N=1929% And do you think (newspaper) contains ... READ OUT

... 2.4 ... too much news about the rest of Britain, 6.8 too little,38.0 or about the right amount? 1.1 (Varies too much to say) 1.2 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q198 [NwspWrld] N=1929% And do you think (newspaper) contains ... READ OUT

... 2.6 ... too much news about the rest of the world,11.8 too little,33.4 or about the right amount? 0.9 (Varies too much to say) 0.9 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Newspaper readership

ASK ALLQ190 [Readpap] N=4432

Do you normally read any daily morning newspaper atleast 3 times a

% week?53.0 Yes47.0 No 0.0 (Don’t know)- (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [ReadPap]Q191 [WhPaper] N=4432

Which one do you normally read?% IF MORE THAN ONE: Which one do you read most

frequently? 3.6 (Scottish) Daily Express 9.6 (Scottish) Daily Mail 7.1 Daily Mirror (/Scottish Mirror) 1.4 Daily Star14.2 The Sun 2.4 Daily Record 4.5 Daily Telegraph 0.4 Financial Times 2.8 The Guardian 0.7 The Independent 2.7 The Times 0.0 Morning Star 3.2 Other Irish/Northern Irish/Scottish regional or local

daily morning paper (WRITE IN) 0.3 Other (WRITE IN) 0.0 MORE THAN ONE PAPER READ WITH EQUAL FREQUENCY 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

BR

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250IF PARTY GIVEN AT [PartyID]Q209 [Idstrng] N=4432

Would you call yourself very strong (party), fairlystrong, or not very

% strong? 6.2 Very strong (party)23.9 Fairly strong46.9 Not very strong 0.1 (Don’t know) 6.7 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALLQ210 [Politics] N=4432

How much interest do you generally have in what isgoing on in politics

% ...READ OUT ... 8.6 ... a great deal,21.0 quite a lot,33.1 some,24.5 not very much,12.7 or, none at all? 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ211 [DfWnGEE] N=986

CARD A4 Some people say that it makes no difference whichparty wins in elections, things go on much the same.Using this card, please say how much of a differenceyou think it makes who wins in general elections to

% the House of Commons?14.3 A great deal27.1 Quite a lot21.1 Some27.2 Not very much 9.4 None at all 0.9 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)


ASK ALLQ199 [SupParty] N=4432

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as asupporter of any one

% political party?34.5 Yes65.4 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘no’ OR DON’T KNOW AT [SupParty]Q200 [ClosePty] N=4432

Do you think of yourself as a little closer to onepolitical party than

% to the others?25.6 Yes39.7 No 0.2 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [SupParty] OR ‘yes’, ‘no’ OR DON’T KNOWAT [ClosePty]

Q202 [PartyID] N=4432IF ‘yes’ AT [SupParty] OR AT [ClosePty]: Which one?IF ‘no’ OR DON’T KNOW AT [ClosePty]: If there were ageneral election tomorrow, which political party doyou think you would be most likely to support?

% DO NOT PROMPT25.2 Conservative37.2 Labour10.8 Liberal Democrat 1.1 Scottish National Party 0.4 Plaid Cymru 1.0 Other party 1.2 Other answer16.2 None 1.5 Green Party 3.8 (Don’t know) 1.6 (Refusal/Not answered)


IF NOT ‘none’, DON’T KNOW, REFUSAL AT [SocBen1]Q216 [SocBen2] N=3276

CARD B2 AGAIN And which next? ENTER ONE CODE ONLY FOR NEXT HIGHEST

[SocBen1] [SocBen2]% %

Retirement pensions 59.4 19.0Child benefits 14.7 22.7Benefits for the unemployed 3.5 6.9Benefits for disabled people 15.8 38.2Benefits for single parents 5.5 10.4(None of these) 0.6 1.4(Don’t know) 0.5 0.3(Refusal/Not answered) - -

VERSIONS B & C: ASK ALLQ217 [FalseClm] N=3276

I will read two statements. For each one please saywhether you agree or disagree. Firstly... Large numbers of people these days falsely claimbenefits. IF AGREE OR DISAGREE: Strongly or slightly?

Q218 [FailClm] N=3276(And do you agree or disagree that...) Large numbers of people who are eligible for benefitsthese days fail to claim them. IF AGREE OR DISAGREE: Strongly or slightly?

[FalseClm] [FailClm]% %

Agree strongly 51.4 42.1Agree slightly 26.3 37.4Disagree slightly 10.7 10.3Disagree strongly 6.2 3.2(Don’t know) 5.3 7.1(Refusal/Not answered) - -

Public spending and social welfare

ASK ALLQ213 [Spend1] N=4432

CARD B1 Here are some items of government spending. Which of them, if any, would be your highest priorityfor extra spending? Please read through the whole list before deciding. ENTER ONE CODE ONLY FOR HIGHEST PRIORITY

IF NOT ‘none’, DON’T KNOW, REFUSAL AT [Spend1]Q214 [Spend2] N=4432

CARD B1 AGAIN And which next? ENTER ONE CODE ONLY FOR NEXT HIGHEST

[Spend1] [Spend2]% %

Education 27.5 35.9Defence 1.0 2.2Health 52.1 27.3Housing 3.3 6.9Public transport 4.4 8.4Roads 2.3 3.6Police and prisons 4.4 7.5Social security benefits 2.1 3.5Help for industry 1.3 2.8Overseas aid 0.7 0.6(None of these) 0.6 0.4(Don’t know) 0.3 0.1(Refusal/Not answered) - 0.8

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALLQ215 [SocBen1] N=3276

CARD B2 Thinking now only of the government's spending onsocial benefits like those on the card. Which, if any, of these would be your highestpriority for extra spending? ENTER ONE CODE ONLY FOR HIGHEST PRIORITY

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252ASK ALLQ224 [RetResp] N=4432

CARD (Please say from this card/ Still looking at thiscard,) who you think should mainly be responsible forensuring that people have enough money to live on inretirement?

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALLQ225 [SickResp] N=3276

CARD B4 AGAIN And who do you think should mainly be responsible forensuring that people have enough to live on if theybecome sick for a long time or disabled?

Q226 [UnemResp] N=3276CARD B4 AGAIN And who do you think should mainly be responsible forensuring that people have enough to live on if theybecome unemployed?

[HealResp] [RetResp] [SickResp]% % %

Mainly the government 83.3 58.3 82.8Mainly a person's employer 7.1 10.5 8.4Mainly a person themselvesand their family 7.7 29.1 7.2(Don’t know) 1.8 2.1 1.6(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0 0.0 -

[UnemResp]%

Mainly the government 81.1Mainly a person's employer 2.9Mainly a person themselves and their family 13.7(Don’t know) 2.4(Refusal/Not answered)

Q219 [Dole] N=3276Opinions differ about the level of benefits forunemployed people. Which of these two statements comes closest to yourown view

% ...READ OUT...33.7 ...benefits for unemployed people are too low and

cause hardship,40.3 or, benefits for unemployed people are too high and

discourage them from finding jobs?16.9 (Neither) 0.1 EDIT ONLY: Both: Unemployment Benefit causes hardship

but can't be higher or there would be no incentive towork

0.7 EDIT ONLY: Both: Unemployment Benefit causes hardshipto some, while others do well out of it

0.4 EDIT ONLY:About right/in between 2.9 Other answer (WRITE IN) 4.9 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALLQ222 [TaxSpend] N=3276

CARD B3Suppose the government had to choose between thethree options on this

% card. Which do you think it should choose? 6.3 Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and

social benefits38.3 Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same

level as now50.9 Increase taxes and spend more on health, education

and social benefits 3.3 (None) 1.1 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q223 [HealResp] N=3276CARD B4 Please say from this card who you think should mainlybe responsible for paying for the cost of health carewhen someone is ill?


Q234 [CarerWk2] N=3276And suppose a carer on benefits was asked to visitthe job centre every year or so to talk about ways inwhich they might find work. Which of these statementscomes closest to what you think should happen totheir

% benefits if they did not go?48.4 Their benefits should not be affected27.9 Their benefits should be reduced a little 7.2 Their benefits should be reduced a lot12.7 Their benefits should be stopped 2.0 (Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)) 1.8 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/Not answered)

Q237 [PayHols] N=3276Suppose a person wants to go on holiday but hasn'tgot the money to pay for it. In your view ... READOUT ...

Q238 [PaySofa] N=3276Now think about someone else who wants to replacetheir sofa but hasn't got the money to pay for it. Inyour view ... READ OUT ...

Q239 [PayOven] N=3276 And now think about someone who wants to replacetheir broken cooker but hasn't got the money to payfor it. In your view ... READ OUT ...

[PayHols][PaySofa][PayOven]% % %

…should they save up the money beforehand, or, should 88.3 74.6 19.5they borrow the money and pay it back later? 9.1 22.4 78.6(Don’t know) 2.6 3.0 1.8(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0 0.0 0.0

ASK ALLQ227 [CareResp] N=4432

CARD And who do you think should mainly be responsible forpaying for the

% care needs of elderly people living in residentialand nursing homes?

84.3 Mainly the government12.6 Mainly a person themselves and their family 3.1 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALLQ228 [LonPaWk2] N=3276

Suppose a lone parent on benefits was asked to visitthe job centre every year or so to talk about ways inwhich they might find work. Which of the statementson this card comes closest to what you think should

% happen to their benefits if they did not go?16.8 Their benefits should not be affected38.2 Their benefits should be reduced a little14.2 Their benefits should be reduced a lot27.3 Their benefits should be stopped 2.1 (Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)) 1.4 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q231 [SickWk2] N=3276Now think about someone on long-term sickness ordisability benefits. Which of these statements comesclosest to what you think should happen to theirbenefits if they did not go to the job centre everyyear or so to talk about ways in which they might

% find work?40.7 Their benefits should not be affected32.1 Their benefits should be reduced a little 9.4 Their benefits should be reduced a lot13.2 Their benefits should be stopped 3.4 (Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)) 1.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

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254Q245 [MtUnmar5] N=3276Suppose instead the mother does not marry, but thefather has another child with someone else. Should hego on paying maintenance for the first child, shouldhe stop or should it depend on his income?

[MtUnmar4] [MtUnmar5]% %

Continue 52.1 70.7Stop 9.1 1.6Depends 37.2 26.9(Don’t know) 1.6 0.8(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0 0.0

Q246 [MuchPov] N=3276Some people say there is very little real poverty inBritain today. Others say there is quite a lot.

% Which come closest to your view ... READ OUT ...41.3 ... that there is very little real poverty in

Britain,54.8 or, that there is quite a lot? 3.9 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/Not answered)

Q247 [PastPov] N=3276Over the last ten years, do you think that poverty inBritain has been

% increasing, decreasing or staying at about the samelevel?

34.9 Increasing19.3 Decreasing39.1 Staying at same level 6.7 (Don’t know)

- (Refusal/Not answered)

Q240 [WhenSave] N=3276Some people regularly put money aside into pensionsor savings for their retirement. When do you think aperson needs to start doing this in order to be sureof having a decent standard of living when they

% retire...READ OUT...78.5 ...in their 20s or earlier,14.2 their 30s, 3.0 40s, 1.1 50s, 0.1 or 60s? 1.9 (Not necessary to do this/Never) 1.2 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q241 [MtUnmar1] N=3276 Imagine an unmarried couple who split up. They have achild at primary school who remains with the mother.Do you think that the father should always be made tomake maintenance payments to support the child?

Q242 [MtUnmar2] N=3276 If he does make the maintenance payments for thechild, should the amount depend on his income, ornot?

Q243 [MtUnmar3] N=3276Do you think the amount of maintenance should dependon the mother's income, or not?

[MtUnmar1] [MtUnmar2] [MtUnmar3]% % %

Yes 88.4 88.2 73.7No 9.9 10.7 24.8(Don’t know) 1.7 1.1 1.5(Refusal/Not answered) 0.1 0.0 -

Q244 [MtUnmar4] N=3276 Suppose the mother now marries someone else. Shouldthe child's natural father go on paying maintenancefor the child, should he stop or should it depend onthe step-father's income?


Q252 [WhyNeed] N=3276CARD B7 Why do you think there are people who live in need?Of the four views on this card, which one comesclosest to your own?

% CODE ONE ONLY13.1 Because they have been unlucky28.2 Because of laziness or lack of willpower19.3 Because of injustice in our society31.8 It's an inevitable part of modern life 4.5 (None of these) 3.0 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q253 [PovEver] N=3276CARD B8 Looking back over your life, how often have therebeen times in your life when you think you have livedin poverty by the standards of that time?

% Please choose a phrase from this card.55.5 Never17.5 Rarely19.2 Occasionally 5.7 Often 1.9 Most of the time 0.1 (Don’t know)


IF ‘rarely’, ‘occasionally’, ‘often’ OR ‘most of thetime’ AT [PovEver]

Q254 [PovChAd] N=3276% And was this ... READ OUT ...12.6 ... as a child,21.1 or, as an adult?10.7 (Both) - (Don’t know)0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q248 [FuturPov] N=3276And over the next ten years, do you think thatpoverty in Britain will

% ... READ OUT ...45.9 ... increase,13.5 decrease,33.2 or, stay at about the same level? 7.4 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/Not answered)

Q249 [Poverty1] N=3276Would you say that someone in Britain was or was notin poverty if... ... they had enough to buy the things they reallyneeded, but not enough to buy the things most peopletake for granted?

Q250 [Poverty2] N=3276(Would you say someone in Britain was or was not inpoverty ...) ... if they had enough to eat and live, but notenough to buy other things they needed?

Q251 [Poverty3] N=3276(Would you say someone in Britain was or was not inpoverty ...) ... if they had not got enough to eat and livewithout getting into debt?

[Poverty1] [Poverty2] [Poverty3]% % %

Was in poverty 18.8 47.1 90.2Was not 78.7 50.2 8.7(Don’t know) 2.5 2.6 1.1(Refusal/Not answered) - - -

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256Charitable giving

VERSION B: ASK ALLQ260 [CharOft] N=1127

CARD C1 Generally speaking, how often, on average, do yougive money to charity - please do not include moneyspent in charity shops or buying lottery or raffletickets? Please just tell me a letter from this card.

% IF ASKED: DO NOT INCLUDE MONEY TO BEGGARS OR BUYINGTHE BIG ISSUE

10.8 A: Never13.6 B: Occasionally but less often than once a year21.9 C: Once or twice a year21.5 D: Once every few months23.6 E: Once or twice a month 8.6 F: Once a week or more- (Don’t know)- (Refusal/Not answered)

IF NOT ‘never’, DON’T KNOW, REFUSAL AT [CharOft]Q261 [CharAmt] N=1127

CARD C2 And how much, on average, do you give to charity eachyear?

% Again, please just tell me a letter from this card.14.2 A: Less than £520.2 B: £5.00 - £1225.0 C: £12.01 - £5016.6 D: £50.01 - £120 8.4 E: £120.01 - £500 3.3 F: More than £500 1.1 (Don’t know) 0.4 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSION B: ASK ALLQ255 [IncomGap] N=1127

Thinking of income levels generally in Britain today,would you say that the gap between those with highincomes and those with low incomes is

% ...READ OUT...78.1 ... too large,17.5 about right, 1.6 or, too small? 2.8 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/Not answered)

Q256 [SRInc] N=1127% Among which group would you place yourself ...READ

OUT... 4.1 ... high income,53.0 middle income,42.2 or, low income? 0.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALLQ257 [HIncDiff] N=4432

CARD Which of the phrases on this card would you say comesclosest to your

% feelings about your household's income these days?44.3 Living comfortably on present income42.6 Coping on present income10.1 Finding it difficult on present income 3.0 Finding it very difficult on present income 0.0 (Other answer (WRITE IN)) 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)


E-society

ASK ALLQ264 [Internet] N=4432

Does anyone have access to the Internet or World WideWeb from this address?

Q265 [WWWUse] N=4432Do you yourself ever use the Internet or World WideWeb for any reason (other than your work)?

[Internet] [WWWUse]% %

Yes 51.2 49.8No 48.7 50.2(Don’t know) 0.0 0.0(Refusal/Not answered) - -

VERSIONS A AND C: IF YES AT [WWWUse]Q266 [WWWHrsWk] N=3305

How many hours a week on average do you spend usingthe Internet or World Wide Web (other than for yourwork)? INTERVIEWER: ROUND UP TO NEAREST HOUR

% Median= 2.00 hours 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q262 [CharDD] N=1127Adding up all the money you give to charity eachyear, do you give the

% greatest amount in the form of ... READ OUT...17.9 ...regular payments from a bank, such as Direct

Debits,66.4 or, as donations to collections when asked? 4.4 (Half and half) 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

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258VERSIONS A AND C: IF IN WORK OR ON GOVERNMENTTRAINING SCHEME

Q299 [WWWWork] N=3305And do you yourself ever use the Internet or WorldWide Web for your

% work?25.2 Yes31.7 No 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [WWWWork]Q300 [WWWHrWk2] N=3305

How many hours a week on average do you spend usingthe Internet or World Wide Web for your work? INTERVIEWER: ROUND UP TO NEAREST HOUR

% Median: 3.00 hours 0.1 (Don’t know)

0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALL WHO USE INTERNET (WHETHERFOR WORK OR NOT)

Q301 [WWWLong] N=1754CARD C2 Thinking now about all the times you use theInternet, either for work or for your own personaluse. Can you tell me when you first started

% using the Internet? 6.1 Within the last 6 months 7.2 Over 6 months, up to 1 year ago31.9 Over 1 year, up to 3 years ago29.5 Over 3 years, up to 5 years ago25.2 More than 5 years ago- (Don’t know)0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q267- CARD C1 N=3305Q281 For which of the following do you personally use the

Internet or World Wide Web (other than for yourwork)? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY.

% Multicoded (Maximum of 15 codes)21.1 Shopping [WWWShop] 2.4 Chat rooms [WWWChat]35.3 E-mail [WWWEmail]13.6 News and current affairs [WWWNews]15.2 Training, education and learning [WWWEduc]21.5 Travel and weather information [WWWTrav] 6.8 Keeping in touch with groups I belong to [WWWGroup]23.8 General information [WWWInfo]18.3 Banking and bill-paying [WWWBank2] 8.0 Downloading music [WWWMusi2] 8.3 Sports information [WWWSpor2] 5.5 Games [WWWGame2]10.7 Job search [WWWJobs2]5.5 Accessing local/central government

information/services [WWWGovt] 2.4 Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) [WWWOth2] 0.2 (None of these) [WWWNone2]- (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)


VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALL WHO DO NOT USE INTERNET(OTHER THAN FOR WORK)

Q332- CARD C5 N=1672Q340 Here are some reasons why people might not use the

Internet (other than for work).Which of thesereasons, if any, apply to you? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 9 codes)51.2 Have no interest in using the Internet [NWWWNInt]10.5 Don't like using the Internet

or computers [NWWWNLik]28.4 Don't need to use the Internet [NWWWNNee]28.2 Don't know how to use the Internet

or computers [NWWWDKUs] 3.9 Using the Internet takes too long [NWWWTooL]24.7 Don't have or can't afford a computer [NWWWNAfC]2.2 Have a computer - but it is too old to

connect to the Internet [NWWWCOld]3.9 Have a computer - but can't afford

the cost of Internet access [NWWWNAfI] 5.1 Other reason (PLEASE SPECIFY) [NWWWOth] 2.3 (None of these reasons apply) [NWWWNone] 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q352 [Use1day] N=1672How likely do you think it is, if at all, that youwill start using the

% Internet one day (other than for work) ...READ OUT...13.0 ...very likely,23.6 fairly likely,19.5 not very likely,43.2 or, not at all likely? 0.7 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q302- CARD C3 N=1754Q308 On this card are some places where people can use the

Internet or send email. In which of these places doyou personally use the Internet or send email? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 7 codes)79.0 At home [UseWWWHo]47.6 At work [UseWWWWo]10.5 At school / college / university [UseWWWSc]14.4 At a friend's or relative's house [UseWWWFr] 6.7 In a library or community centre [UseWWWLi] 7.3 At an Internet café [UseWWWCa] 1.3 Somewhere else (PLEASE SPECIFY) [UseWWWEl]- (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q318- CARD C4 N=1754Q323 And in which of these ways do you yourself access the

Internet? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 6 codes)97.4 Personal or Laptop Computer [AcWWWPC] 3.4 Television [AcWWWTV] 7.3 Mobile phone [AcWWWPh] 1.1 Personal organiser / digital assistant [AcWWWPO] 0.3 Games console [AcWWWGa] 0.5 Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) [AcWWWOt] 0.1 (Don’t know)


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Q358 [HeaPapR] N=3305 CARD C6 AGAIN From what you know or have heard, how reliable asource of information would you say that newspapersare about what is best for your health?

Q359 [HeaWWWR] N=3305 CARD C6 AGAIN (From what you know or have heard), and how reliablea source of information would you say that theInternet is about what is best for your health?

[NewsPapR][NewsWWWR][HeaPapR]% % %

Very reliable 5.7 9.9 2.5Fairly reliable 56.8 37.3 36.9Neither reliablenor unreliable 20.0 16.3 30.7Fairly unreliable 12.1 3.6 18.9Very unreliable 4.0 1.5 5.7(Don’t know) 1.3 31.3 5.1(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0 0.0 0.0

[HeaWWWR]%

Very reliable 6.5Fairly reliable 28.5Neither reliable nor unreliable 22.6Fairly unreliable 5.4

Very unreliable 2.2(Don’t know) 34.8

(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0

Q353 [WdLkUse] N=1672Regardless of whether you think you ever will, wouldyou like to use the

% Internet (other than for work) one day, or not?46.3 Yes52.7 No 0.9 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ354 [MobPhone] N=3305

Do you personally have or do you ever use a mobilephone?

IF ‘yes’ AT [MobPhone]Q355 [TextMes] N=3305

Do you ever use your mobile phone to send textmessages?

[MobPhone] [TextMes]% %

Yes 81.3 51.0No 18.6 30.4(Don’t know) 0.0 -(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0 0.1

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ356 [NewsPapR] N=3305

CARD C6 From what you know or have heard, how reliable asource of information would you say that newspapersare about news and current affairs?

Q357 [NewsWWWR] N=3305 CARD C6 AGAIN (From what you know or have heard), and how reliablea source of information would you say that theInternet is about news and current affairs?


Q364 [BankBal] N=3305CARD C9And what if you needed to check your bank balance?Which one of the ways

% on this card would be your preferred way of doingthis?

48.9 In person (e.g. at a cash machine or at a bankbranch)

4.5 By post20.6 Over the Internet23.8 Over the telephone 0.3 Another way (PLEASE SPECIFY) 1.5 (Does not apply / don't have a bank account) 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)


Q367 [NetGrpIn] N=1754 CARD C10 Please tell me how much, if at all, the Internet hashelped you to do each of the following things. Firstly, how much has the Internet helped you tobecome more involved with groups and organisationsyou already belong to?

Q368 [NetBelfs] N=1754CARD C10 AGAIN (And how much has the Internet helped you to...) ..find people or groups who share your interests orbeliefs?

Q369 [NetDifAg] N=1754CARD C10 AGAIN (And how much has the Internet helped you to...) ..make contact with people of different ages?

Q370 [NetDifRa] N=1754CARD C10 AGAIN (And how much has the Internet helped you to...) ..make contact with people of different racial orethnic backgrounds?

Q360 [VoteChoi]CARD C7 N=3305There are many different ways of voting in elections.If you had a choice, which one of the ways on thiscard would be your preferred way

% of voting in British elections?12.4 By pressing a button on a computer at a polling

station33.4 By filling in a paper ballot paper at a polling

station16.8 By sending in a ballot paper by post 9.8 By voting over the telephone15.6 By voting over the Internet 8.7 By sending a text message from a mobile phone 0.4 (None of these) 2.7 (Don't vote at elections) 0.2 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q361 [PassPApp] N=3305CARD C8Say you needed to apply for a new passport. Which oneof the ways on

% this card would be your preferred way of doing this?35.6 In person (e.g. at a post office or passport office)30.2 By post18.6 Over the Internet13.5 Over the telephone 0.2 Another way (PLEASE SPECIFY) 1.8 (Does not apply / wouldn't want a passport) 0.2 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

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Q374 [MemWWW] N=1754Are you a member of, or do you ever join in theactivities of, any Internet based discussion groups,interest groups or online gaming

% groups? 9.5 Yes90.4 No- (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ375- CARD C11 N=3305Q389 Are you currently a member of, or do you regularly

join in the activities of, any of the organisationson this card? IF YES: Which ones? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 15 codes)43.5 None of these [MemNoGrp]9.5 Political parties or trade

unions (inc student unions) [MemPtyTU] 4.7 An environmental or conservation group [MemEnvC]2.3 A pressure group or campaigning

organisation [MemPress]6.7 Parent-teachers' / school parents

Association / Board of Governors etc [MemPTA2]4.0 Youth groups (e.g. scouts, guides,

youth clubs etc) [MemYouth]9.1 Education, arts, drama, reading or

music group / evening class [MemArtEd]12.2 Religious group or church organisation [MemRelg]19.7 A sports or recreation club [MemSport]

Tenants' / Residents' group /Neighbourhood watch [MemResd2]

9.3 Social club / working men's club [MemSClub] 2.9 Women's group / Women's Institute [MemWomen] 2.7 Group for older people(e.g. lunch clubs) [MemOlder]4.9 Local groups which raise money for

charity (e.g. The Rotary Club) [MemChari]

Q371 [NetDifEc] N=1754CARD C10 AGAIN (And how much has the Internet helped you to...) ..make contact with people of different economic or

social backgrounds?Q372 [NetGrpLc] N=1754

CARD C10 AGAIN (And how much has the Internet helped you to...) ..make contact with groups and organisations that arebased in your local community?

[NetGrpIn][NetBelfs][NetDifAg]% % %

A great deal 6.0 7.0 4.1Quite a lot 12.7 12.8 7.6Some 13.4 15.3 10.7Not very much 21.5 17.5 16.6Not at all 46.1 47.0 60.5(Don’t know) 0.1 0.1 0.4(Refusal/Not answered) 0.1 0.1 0.1

[NetDifRa][NetDifEc][NetGrpLc]% % %

A great deal 3.3 2.6 1.6Quite a lot 5.2 5.0 5.0Some 9.7 11.3 16.0Not very much 15.3 16.0 16.5Not at all 65.6 64.0 60.5(Don’t know) 0.7 1.0 0.3(Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ373 [NghBrHd] N=3305

Can I just check, how long have you lived in yourpresent neighbourhood? ENTER YEARS. ROUND TO NEAREST YEAR. PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE. IF LESS THAN ONE YEAR, CODE 0.

% Median: 15 years 0.0 (Don’t know)0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)



Q428 [GovInfoW] N=1754CARD C13 How often do you use the Internet to look upinformation about national or local government or theservices they provide, or do you never do this?

Q429 [PolInfoW] N=1754CARD C13 AGAIN And how often do you use the Internet to look upinformation about political parties, campaigns orevents, or do you never do this?

Q430 [NewsWeb] N=1754CARD C13 AGAIN And how often do you use the Internet to visit a newsor current affairs web site, including the web sitesfor any newspapers, radio or television newsprogrammes, or do you never do this?

[GovInfoW][PolInfoW][NewsWeb]% % %

Every day, or nearlyevery day 2.8 0.8 9.42-5 days a week 1.5 0.3 5.8At least once a week 4.8 1.9 10.7At least once a fortnight 3.2 0.8 5.4Less often but at leastonce a month 11.1 4.3 10.7Less often than that 17.7 8.2 13.3Never do this 58.8 83.7 44.6(Don’t know) - - -(Refusal/Not answered) 0.1 0.1 0.1

3.6 Other local community or voluntarygroup (PLEASE SPECIFY) [MemOthL]

2.8 Other national or international groupPLEASE SPECIFY) [MemOthNI]

0.0 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q425 [NeigIll] N=3305CARD C12 Suppose that you were in bed ill and needed someoneto go to the chemist to collect your prescriptionwhile they were doing their shopping. How comfortable would you be asking a neighbour to dothis?

Q426 [NeigSink] N=3305CARD C12 AGAIN Now suppose you found your sink was blocked, but youdid not have a plunger to unblock it. How comfortable would you be asking a neighbour toborrow a plunger?

Q427 [NeigMilk] N=3305CARD C12 AGAIN Now suppose the milkman called for payment. The billwas £5 but you had no cash. How comfortable would you be asking a neighbour ifyou could borrow £5?

[NeigIll] [NeigSink][NeigMilk]% % %

Very comfortable 44.8 53.4 17.5Fairly comfortable 28.4 29.6 14.7Fairly uncomfortable 12.9 7.4 16.6Very uncomfortable 13.2 8.4 50.0(Don’t know) 0.6 1.0 1.1

(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0 0.1 0.1

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264 VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALL N=3305

Q449- CARD C14 AGAIN

Q456 And have you ever done any of the things on this cardabout a government action which you thought wasunjust and harmful? Which ones? Any others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 8 codes)16.2 Contact my MP or MSP [DoneMP] 5.0 Speak to an influential person [DoneSpk] 4.7 Contact a government department [DoneGov] 5.1 Contact radio, TV or a newspaper [DoneTV]41.9 Sign a petition [DoneSign] 3.3 Raise the issue in an organisation

I already belong to [DoneRais]10.7 Go on a protest or demonstration [DoneProt] 1.8 Form a group of like-minded people [DoneGrp]45.0 (None of these) [DoneNone] 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: IF NOT ‘NONE OF THESE’Q466 [EvDonWWW] N=3305

And did you use email or the Internet to help you do(this/any of these

% things)? 6.2 Yes25.6 No 0.1 (Don’t know)0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: IFUSE INTERNET (WHETHER FOR WORK OR NOT)

Q467 [WWWProt] N=3305Has anyone ever contacted you by email or via theInternet asking you to

% join in a protest or campaign about an issue? 9.1 Yes43.8 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ431- CARD C14 N=3305

Q438 Suppose a law was being considered by parliament

which you thought was really unjust and harmful.Which, if any, of the things on this card do youthink you would do? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 8 codes)45.8 Contact my MP or MSP [DoMP]16.3 Speak to an influential person [DoSpk]12.7 Contact a government department [DoGov]16.6 Contact radio, TV or a newspaper [DoTV]74.0 Sign a petition [DoSign]7.7 Raise the issue in an organisation

I already belong to [DoRais]18.4 Go on a protest or demonstration [DoProt] 5.4 Form a group of like-minded people [DoGrp] 6.5 (None of these) [DoNone] 0.4 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSION A AND C: IF NOT ‘NONE OF THESE’Q448 [EvDoWWW] N=3305

And do you think you would use email or the Internetto help you do (this/any of these things)?

% IF WOULD/WOULD NOT: Definitely or probably?14.7 Definitely would20.1 Probably would 4.7 Probably would not 9.6 Definitely would not 2.0 (Depends) 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)


IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [EdSpnd1b] Q472 [EdSpnd2b] N=1637

CARD D2 AGAINAnd which is your next highest priority?

[EdSpnd1b][EdSpnd2b]% %

Nursery or pre-school children 10.1 10.8Primary school children 19.7 22.1Secondary school children 27.2 22.3Children with specialeducational needs 25.3 23.2Students at collegesor universities 15.1 18.0(None of these) 1.5 0.7(Don’t know) 1.0 0.5

(Refusal/Not answered) - 2.6

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ473 [PrimImp1] N=3305

CARD D3Here are a number of things that some people thinkwould improve education in our schools. Which do you think would be the most useful one forimproving the education of children in primaryschools - aged (5-11/5-12) years?

% Please look at the whole list before deciding. 1.6 More information available about individual schools10.2 More links between parents and schools17.0 More resources for buildings, books and equipment14.1 Better quality teachers37.1 Smaller class sizes 0.8 More emphasis on exams and tests14.1 More emphasis on developing the child's skills and

interests 2.3 Better leadership within individual schools 1.2 Other (WRITE IN) 1.6 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

Education

VERSIONS A AND C: FIRST RANDOM HALF OF SAMPLEQ469 [EdSpend1] N=1668

CARD D1 Now some questions about education. Which of the groups on this card, if any, would beyour highest priority for extra government spendingon education?

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [EdSpend1] Q470 [EdSpend2] ` N=1668

CARD D1 AGAINAnd which is your next highest priority?

[EdSpend1][EdSpend2]% %

Nursery or pre-school children 10.1 11.2Primary school children 20.6 22.8Secondary school children 26.9 25.2Less able children withspecial needs 25.1 21.5Students at colleges oruniversities 14.7 15.8(None of these) 1.1 0.5(Don’t know) 1.4 0.5(Refusal/Not answered) 0.1 2.6

VERSIONS A AND C: SECOND RANDOM HALF OF SAMPLEQ471 [EdSpnd1b] N=1637

Card D2 Now some questions about education. Which of the groups on this card, if any, would beyour highest priority for extra government spendingon education?

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IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [SecImp1] Q482 [SecImp2] N=3305

CARD D4 AGAINAnd which do you think would be the next most usefulone for children in

% secondary schools? 1.0 More information available about individual schools 7.1 More links between parents and schools16.0 More resources for buildings, books and equipment12.1 Better quality teachers16.4 Smaller class sizes 3.8 More emphasis on exams and tests16.5 More emphasis on developing the child's skills and

interests19.1 More training and preparation for jobs 4.1 Better leadership within individual schools 1.1 Other (WRITE IN) 0.8 (Don’t know)1.9 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALLQ485 [SchSelec] N=4432

CARD Which of the following statements comes closest toyour views about what

% kind of secondary school children should go to?47.7 Children should go to a different kind of secondary

school, according to how well they do at primaryschool

50.0 All children should go to the same kind of secondaryschool, no matter how well or badly they do atprimary school


VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ486 [PrimBet2] N=3305

From what you know or have heard, do you think thatprimary schools in the area where you live ... READOUT ...

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [PrimImp1] Q476 [PrimImp2] N=3305

CARD D3 AGAINAnd which do you think would be the next most usefulone for children in

% primary schools? 1.9 More information available about individual schools11.6 More links between parents and schools22.6 More resources for buildings, books and equipment13.3 Better quality teachers21.4 Smaller class sizes 1.9 More emphasis on exams and tests20.1 More emphasis on developing the child's skills and

interests 4.2 Better leadership within individual schools 1.0 Other (WRITE IN) 0.3 (Don’t know) 1.7 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ479 [SecImp1] N=3305

CARD D4And which do you think would be the most useful thingfor improving the

% education of children in secondary schools - aged(11-18/12-18) years?

1.2 More information available about individual schools 7.4 More links between parents and schools15.5 More resources for buildings, books and equipment16.1 Better quality teachers24.5 Smaller class sizes 3.6 More emphasis on exams and tests12.8 More emphasis on developing the child's skills and

interests13.0 More training and preparation for jobs 2.3 Better leadership within individual schools 1.7 Other (WRITE IN) 1.8 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)


IF ‘not enough’ AT [WWWenuf]Q490- CARD D7 N=494Q495 What do you think is the main reason your (eldest)

child does not make more use of the Internet at home?

CODE ALL THAT APPLY% Multicoded (Maximum of 6 codes) 4.5 They are not interested [NEnfNInt]3.6 They do not know enough about

computers [NEnfDKCo]2.7 They have to compete for use

of the Internet [NEnfComp]17.7 They have other interests [NEnfOInt] 3.3 The cost of Internet time [NEnfCost] 3.8 Other reason (WRITE IN) [NEnfOth] 3.5 (Don’t know) 0.7 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ504 [HEdOpp] N=3305

CARD D8 Do you feel that opportunities for young people inBritain to go on to higher education - to auniversity or college - should be increased orreduced, or are they at about the right level now?

% IF INCREASED OR REDUCED: a lot or a little?25.2 Increased a lot24.8 Increased a little37.2 About right 7.7 Reduced a little 2.2 Reduced a lot 2.8 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q487 [SecBet2] N=3305And from what you know or have heard, do you thinkthat secondary schools in the area where you live ...READ OUT ...

[PrimBet2] [SecBet2]% %

... have got better over thelast few years, 33.2 25.1got worse 11.6 23.6or, have stayed much the same? 30.2 26.3(Don’t know) 24.9 24.9(Refusal/Not answered) 0.0 0.0

Q488 [WWWLearn] N=3305CARD D6 How important do you think the Internet is forlearning new knowledge or

% skills?42.1 Very important39.4 Fairly important 9.6 Not very important 2.9 Not at all important 6.0 (Don’t know)0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHO HAVE INTERNET ACCESS IN HOME AND CHILD OFTHEIR OWN AGED 5-16 IN HOUSEHOLD

Q489 [WWWenuf] N=494Thinking about your (eldest) child, do you think theymake enough use of

% the Internet at home for school work, too much, ornot enough?

53.4 Enough 8.2 Too much30.5 Not enough 3.7 (Child no longer at school) 3.5 (Don’t know)0.7 (Refusal/Not answered)

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268 VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALL

Q507 [FeesUni] N=3305Which of the following statements comes closest toyour own view ...

% READ OUT...62.2 ...tuition fees for all universities and colleges

should be the same,34.5 or, tuition fees should be different depending on the

university or college students go to? 3.2 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q508 [FeesSub] N=3305And which of these two statements comes closest toyour own view ...

% READ OUT...53.2 ...tuition fees for all subjects studied should be

the same,43.0 or, tuition fees should be different depending on the

subject students study at university or college? 3.8 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL

Q505 [HEFeeNow] N=4432CARD I'm now going to ask you what you think aboutuniversity or college students paying towards thecosts of their tuition - either while they arestudying or after they have finished. Firstly, students and their families paying towardsthe costs of their tuition while they are studying. Which of the views on this card comes closest to whatyou think about

% that? 7.7 All students or their families should pay towards

their tuition costs while they are studying62.0 Some students or their families should pay towards

their tuition costs while they are studying,depending on their circumstances

29.4 No students or their families should pay towardstheir tuition costs while they are studying


Q506 [HEFeeAft] N=4432CARD And what about students paying back some of the costsof their tuition after they have finished studying? Which of the views on this card comes closest to whatyou think about

% that?14.4 All students should pay back some tuition costs after

they have finished studying53.2 Some students should pay back some tuition costs

after they have finished studying, depending on theircircumstances

31.2 No students should pay back tuition costs after theyhave finished studying



VERSION A AND B: ASK ALL IN ENGLAND AND WALESQ516 [NDirSat] N=2072

CARD E1 AGAIN(And how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with theNHS as regards...) ... NHS Direct, the telephone or internet adviceservice?

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ517 [MentSat] N=2284

CARD E1 AGAINNow from your own experience, or from what you haveheard, please say how satisfied or dissatisfied youare with ... ... NHS services for people with mental healthproblems?

[NHSSat] [GPSat] [DentSat]% % %

Very satisfied 6.0 25.3 14.7Quite satisfied 37.7 47.0 37.4Neither satisfiednor dissatisfied 18.4 10.6 15.8Quite dissatisfied 24.4 11.3 13.4Very dissatisfied 12.9 5.5 12.1(Don’t know) 0.5 0.4 6.7(Refusal/not answered) - - -

[InPatSat][OutPaSat] [AESat]% % %

Very satisfied 13.8 12.3 13.7Quite satisfied 38.3 41.7 31.1Neither satisfiednor dissatisfied 17.5 17.0 17.2Quite dissatisfied 13.5 16.7 18.8Very dissatisfied 7.6 6.9 12.6(Don’t know) 9.3 5.4 6.6(Refusal/not answered) - - -

Health

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ510 [NHSSat] N=2284

CARD E1All in all, how satisfied or dissatisfied would yousay you are with the way in which the National HealthService runs nowadays? Choose a phrase from this card.

Q511 [GPSat] N=2284CARD E1 AGAIN From your own experience, or from what you haveheard, please say how satisfied or dissatisfied youare with the way in which each of these parts of theNational Health Service runs nowadays: First, local doctors or GPs?

Q512 [DentSat] N=2284CARD E1 AGAIN(And how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with theNHS as regards...) ... National Health Service dentists?

Q513 [InPatSat] N=2284CARD E1 AGAIN(And how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with theNHS as regards...) ... being in hospital as an in-patient?

Q514 [OutPaSat] N=2284CARD E1 AGAIN(And how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with theNHS as regards...) ... attending hospital as an out-patient?

Q515 [AESat] N=2284CARD E1 AGAIN(And how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with theNHS as regards...)

... Accident and Emergency departments?

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Q523 [InPat6] N=2284CARD E2 AGAIN (And please say whether you think ...) ...the hospital doctors would take seriously anycomplaints you may have

Q524 [InPat7] N=2284CARD E2 AGAIN (And please say whether you think ...) ...there would be a particular nurse responsible fordealing with any problems you may have?

[InPat1] [InPat2] [InPat3] % % %

Definitely would 20.9 13.2 6.0Probably would 53.3 53.9 41.2Probably would not 20.0 25.4 39.7Definitely would not 4.3 4.3 9.7(Don’t know) 1.4 3.2 3.4(Refusal/not answered) - - -

[InPat4] [InPat5] [InPat6] % % %

Definitely would 14.5 20.0 16.7Probably would 41.7 57.0 58.8Probably would not 31.9 16.6 17.6Definitely would not 10.1 3.9 3.9(Don’t know) 1.9 2.5 2.9(Refusal/not answered) - - -

[InPat7] %

Definitely would 14.5Probably would 39.5Probably would not 31.5Definitely would not 6.8(Don’t know) 7.7(Refusal/not answered)

[NDirSat] [MentSat]% %

Very satisfied 8.3 3.4Quite satisfied 18.9 15.2Neither satisfiednor dissatisfied 28.0 27.6Quite dissatisfied 4.8 17.4Very dissatisfied 3.5 9.0(Don’t know) 36.5 27.3(Refusal/not answered) - -

Q518 [InPat1] N=2284CARD E2 Now, suppose you had to go into a local NHS hospitalfor observation and maybe an operation. From what youknow or have heard, please say whether you think thehospital doctors would tell you all you feel you needto know?

Q519 [InPat2] N=2284CARD E2 AGAIN (And please say whether you think ...) ...the hospital doctors would take seriously anyviews you may have on the sorts of treatmentavailable?

Q520 [InPat3] N=2284CARD E2 AGAIN (And please say whether you think ...) ...the operation would take place on the day it wasbooked for?

Q521 [InPat4] N=2284CARD E2 AGAIN (And please say whether you think ...) ...you would be allowed home only when you werereally well enough to leave?

Q522 [InPat5] N=2284CARD E2 AGAIN (And please say whether you think ...) ...the nurses would take seriously any complaints youmay have?


IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [HlthSpnd1]

Q528 [HltSpnd2] N=2284CARD E3 AGAIN And which next? ENTER ONE CODE ONLY FOR SECOND HIGHEST PRIORITY

[HlthSpnd1][HlthSpnd2]% %

Services for babies and young children 26.5 17.9Services for the elderly 33.8 26.6Services for people with mentalhealth problems 12.0 15.6Services for people with physicaldisabilities 9.2 18.1Hospice care for the terminally ill 16.2 18.6(None of these) 0.9 0.4(Don’t know) 1.4 0.4(Refusal/not answered) 0.0 2.4

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ529 [PrDepres] N=2284

Suppose an employee applied for a promotion. He hashad repeated periods off work because of depressionbut this has been under control for a year or sothrough medication. Do you think he would be ... READOUT ...

% 9.1 ... just as likely as anyone else to be promoted,42.4 slightly less likely to be promoted,46.4 or, much less likely to be promoted? 2.0 (Don’t know)

- (Refusal/not answered)

Q525 [NHSLimit] N=2284

It has been suggested that the National HealthService should be available only to those with lowerincomes. This would mean that contributions and taxescould be lower and most people would then take outmedical insurance or pay for health care. Do you support or oppose this idea?

% IF `SUPPORT` OR `OPPOSE`: A lot or little?10.6 Support a lot16.5 Support a little14.6 Oppose a little56.9 Oppose a lot 1.4 (Don’t know)0.0 (Refusal/not answered)

Q526 [SRHealth] N=2284How is your health in general for someone of yourage? Would you say

% that it is ... READ OUT ...41.1 ... very good,39.9 fairly good,13.8 fair, 3.7 bad, 1.4 or, very bad? 0.1 (Don’t know)0.0 (Refusal/not answered)

Q527 [HltSpnd1] N=2284CARD E3 Here are some groups of people for whom healthservices are provided. If the government had someextra money to spend on one of these, which, if any,would be your highest priority for extra spending?

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Q537 [PrDiab] N=2284And now think about someone who has had repeatedperiods off work because of diabetes but this hasbeen under control for a year or so

% through medication.Do you think he would be ... READOUT ...

50.7 ... just as likely as anyone else to be promoted,38.0 slightly less likely to be promoted, 9.3 or, much less likely to be promoted?- (Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)) 2.0 (Don’t Know)


Q538 [ShdDiab]CARD E4 AGAIN N=2284And what do you think should happen? Should hismedical history make a

% difference or not?10.2 Definitely should14.2 Probably should25.6 Probably should not47.6 Definitely should not 0.6 EDIT ONLY: Depends on the job/type of work/depends on

whether it would affect his/her job 0.3 (Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)) 1.5 (Don’t Know)- (Refusal/not answered)

Q541 [MentProb] N=2284Have you, a member of your family or a close friendever sought medical

% help for a mental health problem?30.4 Yes69.4 No 0.2 (Don’t Know)- (Refusal/not answered)

Q530 [ShdDep] N=2284CARD E4And what do you think should happen? Should hismedical history make a


whether it would affect his/her job 0.7 (Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)) 1.4 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/not answered)

Q533 [PrSchiz] N=2284And now think about someone who has had repeatedperiods off work because of schizophrenia but thishas been under control for a year or so throughmedication. Do you think he would be ... READ OUT ...

% 3.6 ... just as likely as anyone else to be promoted,29.8 slightly less likely to be promoted,64.2 or, much less likely to be promoted? 2.4 (Don’t know)


Q534 [ShdSchiz] N=2284CARD E4 AGAIN And what do you think should happen? Should hismedical history make a


whether it would affect his/her job 0.7 (Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)) 2.7 (Don’t Know)



Devolution and constitutional change / Nations and Regions

Proportional representation

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ544 [Monarchy] N=2284

How important or unimportant do you think it is forBritain to continueto have a monarchy

% ... READ OUT ...28.3 ....very important,30.7 quite important,21.6 not very important, 8.4 not at all important, 9.9 or, do you think the monarchy should be abolished? 1.2 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/not answered)

VERSION A: ASK ALLQ545 [Coalitin] N=1157

Which do you think would generally be better forBritain nowadays ...

% READ OUT ... 43.5 ...to have a government at Westminster formed by one

political party on its own,50.0 or, to have a government at Westminster formed by two

political parties together - in coalition? 6.3 (Don’t know) 0.2 (Refusal/not answered)

Q542 [DprHelp]CARD E5 N=2284Suppose you developed serious depression and wantedto seek help. Who

% would you turn to first for help? Please take youranswer from this card

59.4 NHS doctor/ GP 3.9 Private counsellor or psychotherapist32.7 A friend/ someone in my family 1.8 A helpline, such as NHS Direct or the Samaritans 1.3 Someone else 0.1 (This would never happen to me) 0.4 (I would not seek help) 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refusal/not answered)

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274VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ550 [EdStIESW] N=986

CARD F1 AGAIN And what about the quality of education in England?Has it increased or fallen (over the last fouryears)? (Again, please choose an answer from

% the card.) 5.0 Increased a lot28.0 Increased a little24.0 Stayed the same23.6 Fallen a little12.3 Fallen a lot 7.0 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [EdStIESW] Q551 [EdStWhyE] N=986% Do you think this has been ... READ OUT ...63.1 ... mainly the result of the government's policies,26.2 or, for some other reason? 3.7 (Don’t know) 7.1 (Refusal/not answered)

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ552 [SLivIESW] N=986

CARD F1 AGAIN And what about the general standard of living inEngland? Has it increased or fallen (over the lastfour years)? (Again, please choose an

% answer from the card). 9.2 Increased a lot33.2 Increased a little26.7 Stayed the same18.4 Fallen a little10.4 Fallen a lot 2.0 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

Q546 [VoteSyst] N=1157Some people say we should change the voting systemfor general elections to the UK House of Commons toallow smaller political parties to get a fairer shareof MPs. Others say that we should keep the votingsystem for the House of Commons as it is toproduce effective government. Which view comes closerto your own ... READ OUT ...

% IF ASKED: THIS REFERS TO 'PROPORTIONALREPRESENTATION'

35.6 ... that we should change the voting system for theHouse of Commons,

59.8 or, keep it as it is?4.4 (Don’t know)0.2 (Refusal/not answered)

Retrospective evaluations

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ548 [SNHSIESW] N=986

CARD F1 Thinking back over the last four years, would you saythat since then the standard of the health service inEngland has increased or fallen?

% Please choose an answer from this card. 3.8 Increased a lot25.3 Increased a little23.5 Stayed the same25.9 Fallen a little18.9 Fallen a lot 2.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [SNHSIESW] Q549 [StNHSWhE] N=986% Do you think this has been ... READ OUT ...64.5 ... mainly the result of the government's policies,29.0 or, for some other reason? 4.0 (Don’t know) 2.6 (Refusal/not answered)


VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ556 [BrWorld] N=986

CARD F3 How much influence would you say that Britain has inthe world nowadays?

% (Please take your answer from this card) 9.0 A great deal34.3 Quite a lot34.2 Some19.6 Not very much 2.3 None at all 0.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ557 [LevelGen] N=2284

Thinking about things like the health service,schools, the roads, the police and so on, in generaldo you think it is better that the

% standards for such services be ...READ OUT... 65.4 ...the same in every part of Britain,33.8 or, do you think each region should be allowed to set its own standards? 0.7 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/not answered)

Q558 [ECPolicy] N=2284CARD

% Do you think Britain's long-term policy should be...READ OUT ...

15.4 ... to leave the European Union,31.8 to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU's powers,26.9 to leave things as they are,11.1 to stay in the EU and try to increase the EU's

powers, 6.3 or, to work for the formation of a single European government? 8.4 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [SLivIESW] Q553 [SLivWhyE] N=986% Do you think this has been ... READ OUT ...58.9 ... mainly the result of the government's policies,35.4 or, for some other reason? 3.7 (Don’t know) 2.1 (Refusal/not answered)

Political issues

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ554 [BPrioF1E] N=986

CARD F2 Looking at the things on this card, which one do youthink should be Britain's highest priority, the mostimportant thing it should do?

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [BPrioF1E] Q555 [BPrioF2E] N=986

CARD F2 AGAIN And which one do you think should be Britain's nexthighest priority, the second most important thing itshould do?

[BPrioF1E] [BPrioF2E]% %

Maintain order in the nation 40.8 22.2Give people more say ingovernment decisions 32.6 27.6Fight rising prices 12.6 27.0Protect freedom of speech 12.8 21.7(Don’t know) 1.1 0.3

(Refusal/not answered) 0.1 1.2

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VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ563 [GovTrust] N=3305

CARD How much do you trust British governments of anyparty to place the needs of the nation above theinterests of their own political party? Please choose a phrase from this card.

Q564 [MPsTrust] N=3305 CARD And how much do you trust politicians of any party inBritain to tell the truth when they are in a tightcorner?

[GovTrust] [MPsTrust]% %

Just about always 1.4 0.7Most of the time 16.2 5.2Only some of the time 49.4 38.5Almost never 31.0 54.2(Don’t know) 2.0 1.3

(Refusal/not answered) 0.0 0.0

ASK ALLQ565 [GovtWork] N=4432

CARD Which of these statements best describes your opinionon the present

% system of governing Britain? 1.5 Works extremely well and could not be improved32.2 Could be improved in small ways but mainly works well43.3 Could be improved quite a lot21.5 Needs a great deal of improvement 1.3 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

Q559 [EuroRef] N=2284If there were a referendum on whether Britain shouldjoin the single European currency, the Euro, how doyou think you would vote? Would you vote to join theEuro, or not to join the Euro? IF 'would not vote', PROBE: If you did vote, howwould you vote?

% IF RESPONDENT INSISTS THEY WOULD NOT VOTE, CODE DON'TKNOW

29.2 To join the Euro64.9 Not to join the Euro 5.9 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/not answered)

Q560 [EurLike] N=2284 (Can I just check) how likely do you think that youwould be to vote in such a referendum? Would you be

% ...READ OUT......very likely,fairly likely,not very likely,

or, not at all likely?

Q561 [EuroLkly] N=2284 And how likely do you think it is that Britain willjoin the single European currency in the next tenyears ...READ OUT...

[EurLike] [EuroLkly]% %

...very likely, 65.5 43.9fairly likely 19.8 38.5not very likely, 7.3 10.7or, not at all likely? 6.5 3.1(Don’t know) 0.9 3.7(Refusal/not answered) - -


[GovNoSay][LoseTch][VoteIntr]% % %

Agree strongly 22.7 23.2 25.0Agree 41.6 51.8 51.1Neither agree nordisagree 12.1 13.0 10.9Disagree 21.0 10.2 12.0Disagree strongly 1.8 0.6 0.3(Don’t know) 0.7 1.1 0.6(Refusal/not answered) 0.1 0.1 0.1 [VoteOnly][GovComp]

% %Agree strongly 15.6 14.7Agree 48.3 45.3Neither agree nordisagree 12.0 11.1Disagree 20.2 24.1Disagree strongly 2.9 4.0(Don’t know) 0.8 0.6(Refusal/not answered)

ASK ALLQ571 [PtyNMat2] N=4432

CARD (Using this card, please say how much you agree ordisagree with this statement:) It doesn't really matter which party is in power, inthe end things go

% on much the same.19.8 Agree strongly49.5 Agree 7.2 Neither agree nor disagree20.0 Disagree 2.9 Disagree strongly 0.1 (It depends on the level of government) 0.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

Q566 [GovNoSay] N=4432 CARD Please choose a phrase from this card to say how muchyou agree or disagree with the following statements. People like me have no say in what the governmentdoes.

Q567 [LoseTch] N=4432CARD (Using this card, please say how much you agree ordisagree with this statement:) Generally speaking those we elect as MPs lose touchwith people pretty quickly.

Q568 [VoteIntr] N=4432CARD (Using this card, please say how much you agree ordisagree with this statement:) Parties are only interested in people's votes, not intheir opinions.

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ569 [VoteOnly] N=3305

CARD (Please choose a phrase from this card to say howmuch you agree or disagree with this statement:)

Voting is the only way people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.

Q570 [GovComp] N=3305CARD (Please choose a phrase from this card to say howmuch you agree or disagree with this statement:)

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on.

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Q577 [ImpGWAs] N=2284CARD (And has this improved the way Britain as a whole isgoverned, made it worse, or made no difference...) Creating the Welsh Assembly

Q578 [ImpGNAs] N=2284CARD (And has this improved the way Britain as a whole isgoverned, made it worse, or made no difference...) Creating the Northern Ireland Assembly

[ImpGSctP][ImpGWAs][ImpGNAs]% % %

Improved it a lot 1.5 1.1 2.3Improved it a little 11.2 7.8 16.4Made no difference 64.1 64.3 54.1Made it a little worse 4.4 3.8 4.2Made it a lot worse 2.2 2.2 1.9(It is too early to tell) 1.5 1.5 1.4

(Don’t know) 15.0 19.2 19.7 (Refusal/not answered) - - 0.0

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ579 [UKInNatE] N=986

CARD F9 The United Kingdom government at Westminster hasresponsibility for England, Scotland, Wales andNorthern Ireland. How much do you trust the UKgovernment at Westminster to work in the best long-term interest of England? Please take your answerfrom this card.

6.5 Just about always46.1 Most of the time34.6 Only some of the time 9.0 Almost never 3.8 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ572 [QuizSVoE] (This is false) N=986

Here is a quick quiz. For each thing I say, pleasetell me whether you think it is true or false. If youdon't know, just say so and we'll skip to the nextone. Remember - true, false or don't know. Scottish MPs in the UK House of Commons cannot voteon laws that only apply in England.

Q573 [QuizSMPE] (This is true) N=986It has been decided to cut the number of Scottish MPsin the UK House of Commons. (True, false or don't know?)

Q574 [QuizBenE] (This is false) N=986The Scottish parliament can increase the level ofsocial security benefits in Scotland. (True, false or don't know?)

Q575 [QuizLond] (This is true) N=986London is the only region in England with its ownelected regional assembly. (True, false or don't know?)

[QuizSVoE][QuizSMPE][QuizBen[QuizLond]% % % %

True 24.8 18.1 55.5 27.3False 38.0 34.0 12.8 28.7(Don’t know) 37.2 47.8 31.6 43.9(Refusal/not answered) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ576 [ImpGSctP] N=2284

CARD Do you think that so far creating the Scottish

Parliament has improved the way Britain as a whole is

governed, made it worse, or has it made no difference?


National identity

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLVERSIONS C: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDFIGURES REFER TO BRITISH RESPONDENTS ON VERSIONS A&B

Q586 [CloseLoc] N=2284CARD I would like you to think about how close youpersonally feel to different parts of the world, thatis, how much you feel a sense of attachment andbelonging to them. First of all, how closely attached do you feel toyour local area? Please choose a phrase from the card.

ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ587 [CloseReg] N=3742

CARD And how closely attached do you feel to (governmentoffice region) as a whole?

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLVERSIONS C: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDFIGURES REFER TO BRITISH RESPONDENTS ON VERSIONS A&B

Q588 [CloseESW] N=2284CARD And how closely attached do you feel to(England/Scotland/Wales) as a whole?

VERSION A AND B: ASK ALLQ589 [CloseBr] N=2284

CARD And how closely attached do you feel to Britain as a whole?

Q580 [RegBias] N=986% Would you say the government ... READ OUT ...17.0 ... looks after the interests of all parts of England

more or less equally,76.0 or, would you say that it looks after some parts of

England more than others?3.7 (Neither or both)3.2 (Don’t know)0.1 (Refusal/not answered)

IF ‘some parts of England more than others’ Q581 [WhBias] N=986

CARD F10Please look at this card and tell me which parts ofEngland you think

% the government looks after more than others?30.9 London36.3 The South of England as a whole 4.2 The rest of England 0.6 Somewhere else (WRITE IN) 1.3 The North 0.9 Urban areas/cities 0.6 The South East 1.3 (Don’t know) 3.3 (Refusal/not answered)

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ584 [ScotPayE] N=1929

CARD Taking your answers from this card, please say howmuch you agree or disagree with this statement: Now that Scotland has its own parliament, it shouldpay for its services

% out of taxes collected in Scotland.21.8 Agree strongly52.3 Agree11.7 Neither agree nor disagree10.0 Disagree 0.4 Disagree strongly 3.8 (Don’t know) - (Refusal/not answered

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280IF ‘yes, other’, ‘no’ OR DON’T KNOW AT [SRSocC1E]Q594 [SRSocC2E] N=986

Most people say they belong either to the middleclass or the working class. If you had to make achoice, would you call yourself ... READ OUT

% ...18.2 ... middle class33.3 or, working class? 3.6 (Don’t know) 0.3 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ596 [NatID] N=1929

CARD Some people think of themselves first as British.Others may think of themselves first as English.

% Which, if any, of the following best describes howyou see yourself?

16.8 English not British19.1 More English than British31.0 Equally English and British13.3 More British than English10.4 British not English 6.2 Other description (WRITE IN) 2.9 (None of these) 0.3 (Don’t know)

0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ599 [GBPride] N=2284

CARD How proud are you of being British, or do you not seeyourself as

% British at all?40.4 Very proud37.4 Somewhat proud 9.9 Not very proud 2.9 Not at all proud 8.8 (Not British) 0.5 (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

Q590 [CloseEur] N=2284CARD And how closely attached do you feel to Europe as awhole?

[CloseLoc][CloseReg][CloseESW]% % %

Very closely 42.1 27.6 40.6Fairly closely 43.7 47.5 45.6Not very closely 11.4 20.2 11.3Not at all closely 2.4 4.2 2.1(Don’t know) 0.4 0.5 0.4(Refused/Not answered) - - -

[CloseBr] [CloseEur] [CloseBR]% % %

Very closely 29.4 5.3 29.4Fairly closely 50.8 29.6 50.8Not very closely 16.1 45.2 16.1Not at all closely 3.3 19.1 3.3(Don’t know) 0.4 0.8 0.4(Refused/Not answered) - - -

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ591 [SRSocC1E] N=986

Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to anyparticular class?

% IF YES: Which class is that?18.7 Yes, middle class25.9 Yes, working class 1.9 Yes, other (WRITE IN)52.7 No 0.7 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)


[Ident1Eb][Ident2Eb[Ident3Eb]% % %

Working class 12.8 5.3 6.0British 8.0 9.7 9.6Elderly 2.2 2.5 2.2A woman / A man 10.7 8.0 7.6Not religious 0.7 1.6 2.1A wife / A husband 6.0 14.6 9.3A Catholic 1.1 1.0 1.4A country person 2.3 3.3 3.7A city person 1.0 1.2 2.5A Protestant 0.1 0.4 0.7A mother / A father 23.5 14.8 9.4Middle class 2.2 3.2 2.7Black 1.1 0.8 0.5Retired 2.1 3.4 3.3Religious 1.6 1.7 3.4A working person 9.2 10.1 10.2Young 2.9 3.1 5.4White 1.2 2.6 4.3English 6.3 6.9 7.5Asian 1.1 1.0 0.5Unemployed 0.5 0.5 0.7Other (WRITE IN) 1.7 1.4 1.6(None of these/No further answer) 1.3 2.5 4.7(Don’t know) 0.3 0.2 0.2(Refused/Not answered) - 0.3 0.5

VERSION A: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ610 [FlagUJE] N=986

CARD F16 I am going to show you two flags. First of all, hereis the Union Jack. When you see the Union Jack, doesit make you feel proud, hostile or do you not feelmuch either way?

IF PROUD/HOSTILE: Is that very proud/hostile or just a bit proud/hostile?

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ600 [NatPride] N=1929

CARD And how proud are you of being English, or do you notsee yourself as

% English at all?43.3 Very proud32.9 Somewhat proud 7.8 Not very proud 2.2 Not at all proud13.2 (Not English) 0.7 (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

Q601 [Ident1Eb] N=1929CARD People differ in how they think of or describethemselves. If you had to pick just one thing fromthis list to describe yourself - something thatis very important to you when you think of yourself -what would it be?

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [Ident1Eb] Q604 [Ident2Eb] N=1929

CARD And what would the second most important thing be?

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [Ident2Eb] Q607 [Ident3Eb] N=1929

CARD And what would the third most important thing be?

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VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ615 [BEngScMo] N=1929

CARD I'd like you to think of someone who was born inScotland but now lives permanently in England andsaid they were English. Taking your answer from thiscard ... ... do you think most people would consider them tobe English?

Q616 [BEngScU] N=1929CARD (Still thinking of someone who was born in Scotlandbut now lives permanently in England and said theywere English...) And do you think you would consider them to beEnglish?

Q617 [NWhScMo] N=1929CARD And now think of a non-white person living in Englandwho spoke with an English accent and said they wereEnglish. (Still taking your answer from this card...)

... do you think most people would consider them to be English?

Q611 [FlagNatE] N=986CARD F17 And here is the cross of St George. When you seethis, does it make you feel proud, hostile or do younot feel much either way? IF PROUD/HOSTILE: Is that very proud/hostile or justa bit proud/hostile?

[FlagUJE] [FlagNatE]% %

Very proud 34.2 28.0A bit proud 27.2 19.3Does not feelmuch either way 35.7 48.7A bit hostile 1.5 2.0Very hostile 0.8 0.9(It depends) 0.3 0.7(Don’t know) 0.3 0.4(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 0.1

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ612 [Passport] N=2284

CARD Say you were allowed to choose the nationality thatappears on your

% passport. Which one of the descriptions on this cardwould you choose?

51.2 British26.8 English 4.8 European 1.1 Irish 0.2 Northern Irish 8.2 Scottish 0.1 Ulster 3.7 Welsh 2.6 Other answer (WRITE IN) 1.0 (None of these) 0.2 (Don’t know)

- (Refused/Not answered)


Constitutional issues

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ620 [ScotPar2] N=2284

CARD % Which of these statements comes closest to your view? 7.8 Scotland should become independent, separate from the

UK and the European Union 9.8 Scotland should become independent, separate from the

UK but part of the European Union50.5 Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own

elected parliament which has some taxation powers 8.2 Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own

elected parliament which has no taxation powers12.8 Scotland should remain part of the UK without an

elected parliament10.8 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refused/Not answered)

Q621 [WelshAss] N=2284CARD

% Which of these statements comes closest to your view? 7.1 Wales should become independent, separate from the UK

and the European Union 8.9 Wales should become independent, separate from the UK

but part of the European Union35.9 Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own

elected parliament which has law-making and taxationpowers

18.9 Wales should remain part of the UK, with its ownelected assembly which has limited law-making powersonly

15.3 Wales should remain part of the UK without an elected assembly 13.8 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refused/Not answered)

Q618 [NWhScU] N=1929CARD (Still thinking of a non-white person living inEnglish who spoke with an English accent and saidthey were English ...) And do you think you would consider them to beEnglish?

[BEngScMo] [BEngScU] [NWhScMo]% % %

Definitely would 5.9 10.0 8.6Probably would 26.5 24.7 34.2Probably would not 42.3 34.4 38.6Definitely would not 22.3 27.7 15.8(Don’t know) 3.1 3.2 2.8(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 - -

[NWhScU]%

Definitely would 27.6Probably would 39.8Probably would not 19.5Definitely would not 10.9(Don’t know) 2.1(Refused/Not answered) -

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284VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALLQ625 [NIreland] N=2284

Do you think the long-term policy for NorthernIreland should be for it

% ... READ OUT ...27.6 ...to remain part of the United Kingdom54.9 or, to unify with the rest of Ireland? 0.6 Northern Ireland should be an independent state 0.0 Northern Ireland should be split up into two 3.1 It should be up to the Irish to decide 2.2 Other answer (WRITE IN)11.4 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q622 [ESWGoGB] N=2284If in the future England, Scotland and Wales were allto become separate independent countries, rather thanall being part of the United Kingdom

% together, would you be ... READ OUT ...11.1 ... pleased,47.8 sorry,40.1 or, neither pleased nor sorry? 1.0 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS A AND B: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ623 [SEBenGBE] N=1929

On the whole, do you think that England's economybenefits more from having Scotland in the UK, or thatScotland's economy benefits more from

% being part of the UK, or is it about equal? 6.6 England benefits more39.1 Scotland benefits more39.6 Equal 2.9 (Neither/both lose)11.8 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q624 [UKSpnGBE] N=1929CARD Would you say that compared with other parts of theUnited Kingdom, Scotland gets pretty much its fairshare of government spending, more than its fairshare, or less than its fair share of governmentspending?

% Please choose your answer from this card. 8.6 Much more than its fair share of government spending13.2 A little more than its fair share of government

spending44.7 Pretty much its fair share of government spending 7.5 A little less than its fair share of government

spending 0.8 Much less than its fair share of government spending25.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)


VERSION B: ASK ALLVERSION C: ASK ALL IN ENGLANDFIGURES REFER TO BRITISH RESPONDENTS ON VERSION B

Q631 [EngParl2] N=1127CARD With all the changes going on in the way thedifferent parts of Great Britain are run, which ofthe following do you think would be best for

% England ...READ OUT...55.4 ...for England to be governed as it is now, with laws

made by the UK parliament,21.9 for each region of England to have its own elected

assembly that makes decisions about the region'seconomy, planning and housing,

16.5 or, for England as a whole to have its own newparliament with law-making powers?

1.7 (None of these) 4.4 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ632 [HearRAss] N=3742

In recent years, the government has set up chambers

or assemblies in each of the regions of England. How much have you heard about the work of the (government office region chamber or assembly) ... READ OUT

Q633 [HearRDA] N=3742 The government has also set up regional developmentagencies in each of the regions of England. How muchhave you heard about the work of the regionaldevelopment agency in (government office region) ...READ OUT ...

[HearRAss] [HearRDA]% %

...a great deal, 1.9 1.5quite a lot, 6.1 7.1not very much, 34.1 36.0or nothing at all? 56.9 54.3(Don’t know) 0.9 0.9

(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 0.1

English regions

ASK ALL IN ENGLANDQ629 [RegPridE] N=3742

CARD How much pride do you have in being someone who livesin (government

% office region) or do you not think of yourself inthat way at all?

21.5 Very proud24.5 Somewhat proud 4.1 Not very proud 1.4 Not at all proud48.1 Don't think of themselves in that way 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSION A: ASK ALL N=1157Q630 [EngParl]

CARD F24 With all the changes going on in the way thedifferent parts of Great Britain are run, which ofthe following do you think would be best for

% England ...READ OUT...55.0 ...for England to be governed as it is now, with laws

made by the UK parliament,22.3 for each region of England to have its own assembly

that runs services like health,17.0 or, for England as a whole to have its own new

parliament with law-making powers? 1.3 (None of these) 4.4 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refused/Not answered)

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286Q637 [OughInfE] N=3742CARD Taking your answers from this card, which do youthink ought to have

% most influence over the way England is run?10.6 English regional chambers or assemblies14.4 A new English parliament47.6 The UK government at Westminster21.3 Local councils in England 1.4 The European Union 4.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q638 [ElecRAIn] N=3742CARD What if there were elected regional assemblies ineach of the English regions, which made decisionsabout the economy, planning and housing. Which do youthink would have most influence over the way Englandis run

% then?28.4 Elected regional assemblies43.0 The UK government at Westminster18.0 Local councils in England 3.3 The European Union 7.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q634 [SayInRE2] N=3742From what you have seen or heard so far, do you thinkthat having (regional chamber or assembly) for(government office region) is giving

% ordinary people ... READ OUT ...19.4 ...more of a say in how (government office region) is

governed, 4.4 less say,62.0 or, will it make no difference?14.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q635 [ERegEcon] N=3742And as a result of having (regional chamber orassembly) for (government office region) will theregion's economy become better, worse or will itmake no difference?

% IF BETTER/WORSE: Is that a lot better/worse or alittle better/worse?

3.2 A lot better19.4 A little better57.8 No difference 2.9 A little worse 1.1 A lot worse15.5 (Don’t know)0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q636 [DoesInfE] N=3742CARD Taking your answers from this card, which of thefollowing do you think

% currently has most influence over the way England isrun?

1.4 English regional chambers or assemblies76.2 The UK government at Westminster 7.9 Local councils in England10.4 The European Union 4.0 (Don’t know)0.1 (Refused/Not answered)


ASK ALL NOT WORKING OR WAITING TO TAKE UP WORK Q675 [RLastJob] N=1943

How long ago did you last have a paid job of at least10 hours a week?

% GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS/SCHEMES DO NOT COUNT AS `PAIDJOBS'.

17.9 Within past 12 months21.2 Over 1, up to 5 years ago17.3 Over 5, up to 10 years ago22.0 Over 10, up to 20 years ago14.7 Over 20 years ago 4.9 Never had a paid job of 10+ hours a week 0.4 (Don’t know) 1.6 (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHO HAVE EVER WORKED Q676 [Title] [NOT ON DATAFILE] N=4336

Now I want to ask you about your(present/last/future) job.What (is/was/will) your job (be)?PROBE IF NECESSARY: What (is/was) the name or titleof the job?

Q677 [Typewk] [NOT ON DATAFILE] N=4336What kind of work (do/did/will) you do most of thetime?

IF RELEVANT: What materials/machinery (do/did/will) you use?

Q678 [Train] [NOT ON DATAFILE] N=4336What training or qualifications (are/were) needed forthat job?

Q679 [REmplyee] N=4336% In your (main) job (are/were/will) you (be) ... READ

OUT ...88.6 ... an employee,10.5 or self-employed? 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.9 (Refused/Not answered)

Economic activityRespondent’s job

ASK ALLQ674 [REconAct] (percentages refer to highest answer on

the list) N=4432Which of these descriptions applied to what you weredoing last week, that is the seven days ending lastSunday? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 11 codes) 4.1 In full-time education (not paid for by employer,

including on vacation) 0.3 On government training/employment programme55.8 In paid work (or away temporarily) for at least 10

hours in week 0.4 Waiting to take up paid work already accepted 2.0 Unemployed and registered at a benefit office 1.4 Unemployed, not registered, but actively looking for

a job (of at least 10 hrs a week) 0.7 Unemployed, wanting a job (of at least 10 hrs per

week) but not actively looking for a job 4.4 Permanently sick or disabled19.9 Wholly retired from work10.5 Looking after the home 0.6 (Doing something else) (WRITE IN) - (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

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288ASK ALL EMPLOYEES IN CURRENT/LAST JOB Q684 [ROcSect2] N=3881

CARD G1Which of the types of organisation on this card (doyou work/did you

% work/will you be working) for?64.5 PRIVATE SECTOR FIRM OR COMPANY Including, for

example, limited companies and PLCs 2.8 NATIONALISED INDUSTRY OR PUBLIC CORPORATION

Including, for example, the Post Office and the BBC27.8 OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYER /Incl eg: - Central

govt/ Civil Service/ Govt Agency - Local authority/ Local Educ Auth (INCL 'OPTED OUT'SCHOOLS) - Universities - Health Authority / NHS hospitals / NHS Trusts/ GPsurgeries - Police / Armed forces

3.4 CHARITY/ VOLUNTARY SECTOR Including, for example,charitable companies, churches, trade unions

0.3 Other answer (WRITE IN) 0.1 (Don’t know) 1.0 (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHO HAVE EVER WORKED Q687 [EmpMake] N=4336

IF EMPLOYEE:What (does/did) your employer make or doat the place where you (will) usually work(ed) from?IF SELF-EMPLOYED: What (do/did/will) you make or doat the place where you (will) usually work(ed) from?

Open Question (Maximum of 80 characters)

ASK ALL WHO HAVE EVER WORKED Q681 [RSuperv] N=4336

In your job, (do/did/will) you have any formalresponsibility for supervising the work of other(employees/people)? DO NOT INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO ONLY SUPERVISE: - CHILDREN, E.G. TEACHERS, NANNIES, CHILDMINDERS - ANIMALS

% - SECURITY OR BUILDINGS, E.G. CARETAKERS, SECURITYGUARDS

37.0 Yes62.0 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.9 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [Supervise]Q682 [RMany] N=4336

How many?% Median:6(Of those supervising any) 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.9 (Refused/Not answered)


Q698 [WkJbHrsI] N=2472How many hours do you normally work a week in yourmain job - I any paid or unpaid overtime? ROUND TO NEAREST HOUR. IF RESPONDENT CANNOT ANSWER, ASK ABOUT LAST WEEK. IF RESPONDENT DOES NOT KNOW EXACTLY, ACCEPT ANESTIMATE. FOR 95+ HOURS, CODE 95. FOR `VARIES TOO MUCH TO SAY', CODE 96.

% Median: 39 hours 0.8 (Varies too much to say) 0.2 (Don’t know)- (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEESQ699 [EJbHrsX] N=2164

What are your basic or contractual hours each week inyour main job - excluding any paid and unpaidovertime? ROUND TO NEAREST HOUR. IF RESPONDENT CANNOT ANSWER, ASK ABOUT LAST WEEK. IF RESPONDENT DOES NOT KNOW EXACTLY, ACCEPT ANESTIMATE. FOR 95+ HOURS, CODE 95. FOR `VARIES TOO MUCH TO SAY', CODE 96.

% Median: 37 hours 2.1 (Varies too much to say) 1.4 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHO HAVE EVER WORKED BUT ARE NOT CURRENTLYWORKING

Q700 [ExPrtFul] N=1848% (IS/Was/Will) the job (be) ... READ OUT ... 70.8 ... full-time - that is, 30 or more hours per week,27.0 or, part-time? 0.1 (Don’t know) 2.1 (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL SELF-EMPLOYED IN CURRENT/LAST JOB Q689 [SEmpNum] N=469

In your work or business, (do/did/will) you have anyemployees, or not? IF YES: How many? IF `NO EMPLOYEES', CODE 0. FOR 500+ EMPLOYEES, CODE 500. NOTE: FAMILY MEMBERS MAY BE EMPLOYEES ONLY IF THEYRECEIVE A REGULAR WAGE OR SALARY.

% Median :0 employees 0.1 (Don’t know)3.1 (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHO HAVE EVER WORKED (FOR SELF EMPLOYED,DERIVED FROM [SEmpNum])

Q690 [REmpWork] N=4336Including yourself, how many people (are/were)employed at the place

% where you usually (work/worked/will work) (from)? 7.0 None17.9 Under 1013.8 10-2423.3 25-9921.4 100-49914.5 500 or more 1.1 (Don’t know) 0.9 (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL IN PAID WORK Q695 [WkJbTim] N=2472

In your present job, are you working ... READ OUT ...

% RESPONDENT'S OWN DEFINITION77.6 ... full-time,22.3 or, part-time? 0.0 (Don’t know)- (Refused/Not answered)

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290VERSION B: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES Q727 [WpUnions] N=527

At your place of work are there unions, staffassociations, or groups of unions recognised by themanagement for negotiating pay and conditions ofemployment? IF YES, PROBE FOR UNION OR STAFF ASSOCIATION

% IF `BOTH', CODE `1'45.5 Yes : trade union(s) 3.6 Yes : staff association45.9 No, none 5.1 (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘yes, trade unions’ OR ‘yes, staff association’ AT[WpUnions]

Q728 [WpUnsure] N=527Can I just check: does management recognise theseunions or staff associations for the purposes ofnegotiating pay and conditions of

% employment?45.8 Yes 1.4 No 1.9 (Don’t know)


VERSION C: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES Q729 [WpUnion3] N=1030

At your place of work are there any unions or staffassociations? IF ASKED: A union or staff association is anyindependent organisation that represents theinterests of people at work.

% IF YES, PROBE FOR UNION OR STAFF ASSOCIATION. CODEFIRST TO APPLY.

47.6 Yes : trade union(s) 5.3 Yes : staff association43.6 No, none 3.4 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Employment relations

ASK ALL WHO HAVE EVER WORKED Q720 [UnionSA] N=4336

(May I just check) are you now a member of a tradeunion or staff association?

% CODE FIRST TO APPLY19.2 Yes, trade union 2.6 Yes, staff association77.1 No 0.2 (Don’t know) 0.9 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘no’ OR DON’T KNOW AT [UnionSA}Q721 [TUSAEver] N=4336

Have you ever been a member of a trade union or staffassociation?

% CODE FIRST TO APPLY26.7 Yes, trade union 2.2 Yes, staff association48.2 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 1.1 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES Q723 [EmploydT] N=1555

For how long have you been continuously employed byyour present employer?ENTER NUMBER. THEN SPECIFY MONTHS OR YEARS

% Median: 48 months 0.1 (Don’t know)- (Refused/Not answered)

ASK ALL NOT WORKING Q726 [NPWork10] N=1960

In the seven days ending last Sunday, did you haveany paid work of less

% than 10 hours a week? 5.6 Yes92.7 No 0.3 (Don’t know) 1.3 (Refused/Not answered)


VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALLQ733 [TUMstImp]

CARD G2 N=3276 Listed on this card are a number of things that tradeunions or staff associations can do. Which, if any,do you think should be the most

% important thing they should try to do? 4.7 Reduce pay differences in the workplace 7.4 Promote equality for women or for ethnic and other

minority groups26.9 Represent individual employees in dealing with their

employer about problems at work13.2 Protect existing employees' jobs27.4 Improve working conditions across the workplace11.9 Improve pay for all employees 2.8 Have an input into the running the business 2.0 (None of these) 3.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEESQ734 [IndRel] N=1557

In general how would you describe relations betweenmanagement and other

% employees at your workplace ... READ OUT ...35.1 ... very good,46.3 quite good,12.8 not very good, 4.9 or, not at all good? 0.8 (Don’t know) 0.2 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘yes, trade unions’ OR ‘yes, staff association’ AT[WpUnion3]

Q730 [UnionRec] N=1030Does management recognise these unions or staffassociations for the

% purposes of negotiating pay and conditions ofemployment?

46.8 Yes 4.1 No 2.0 (Don’t know) 3.5 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘yes, trade unions’ OR ‘yes, staff association’ AT[WpUnions OR AT [WpUnion3]

Q731 [WPUnioW3] N=1030On the whole, do you think (these unions dotheir/this staff association

% does its) job well or not?32.0 Yes14.6 No 6.2 (Don’t know) 3.5 (Refused/Not answered)

Q732 [TUElig] N=1030Are people doing your job eligible to join a union orstaff association at your workplace? IF ASKED: A union or staff association is anyindependent organisation that represents theinterests of people at work.

% IF YES, PROBE FOR UNION OR STAFF ASSOCIATION. CODEFIRST TO APPLY.

45.5 Yes : trade union(s) 4.4 Yes : staff association 1.8 No 1.2 (Don’t know) 3.5 (Refused/Not answered)

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292VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES Q738 [PrefHr2] N=1557

Thinking about the number of hours you work includingregular overtime,

% would you prefer a job where you worked ... READ OUT...

4.2 ...more hours per week,32.7 fewer hours per week,62.9 or, are you happy with the number of hours you work at present? 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.2 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘fewer hours per week’ AT [PrefHr2]Q739 [EarnHr2] N=1557

Would you still prefer to work fewer hours, if itmeant earning less

% money as a result? 9.1 Yes21.5 No 2.1 It depends- (Don’t know) 0.3 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES Q740 [WkWorkHd] N=1557

CARD G3 % Which of these statements best describes your

feelings about your job? 7.8 I only work as hard as I have to46.5 I work hard, but not so that it interferes with the

rest of my life45.4 I make a point of doing the best I can, even if it

sometimes does interfere with the rest of my life 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.2 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL EXCEPT THOSE WHOLLY RETIREDOR PERMANENTLY SICK OR DISABLED

Q735 [NwEmpErn] N=2470IF IN PAID WORK: Now for some more general questionsabout your work. For some people their job is simplysomething they do in order to earn a living. Forothers it means much more than that. On balance, isyour present job ... READ OUT ...IF NOT IN PAID WORK: For some people work is simplysomething they do in order to earn a living. Forothers it means much more than that. In

% general, do you think of work as ... READ OUT ...36.4 ...just a means of earning a living,61.9 or, does it mean much more to you than that? 0.9 (Don’t know) 0.8 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES Q736 [SayJob] N=1557

Suppose there was going to be some decision made atyour place of work that changed the way you do yourjob. Do you think that you personally would have anysay in the decision about the change, or not?

% IF `DEPENDS': Code as `Don't know'57.8 Yes39.0 No 3.0 (Don’t know) 0.2 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [SayJob]Q737 [MuchSay] N=1557

How much say or chance to influence the decision doyou think you would

% have ... READ OUT ... 14.7 ...a great deal,24.7 quite a lot,18.3 or, just a little? 0.0 (Don’t know) 3.2 (Refused/Not answered)


IF ‘Sundays’ AT [AntiSocH]Q748 [WkSunday] N=1557

CARD G6 AGAIN And about how many times did you work during the dayon Sunday last month?

[WkSatday] [WkSunday]% %

None 3.4 3.3Once or twice 22.5 18.63 or 4 times 19.4 11.5More than this 2.1 1.0(Don’t know) 0.0 0.0(Refused/Not answered) 0.2 0.2

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL CURRENT EMPLOYEES Q749 [WorkTrav] N=1557

CARD G7 On average, how much time do you spend travelling towork each day?

% IF ASKED: GIVE TIME FOR JOURNEY TO WORK ONLY, NOTBOTH WAYS

65.0 Less than 30 minutes23.8 30 minutes - 1 hour 7.1 More than 1 hour - 2 hours 1.3 More than 2 hours 1.1 (I work from home) 1.6 (Varies too much to say) 0.0 (Don’t know)


VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALL IN FIRST RANDOM HALF OFSAMPLE

Q750 [FrstJob1] N=1668CARD

Suppose you were advising a young person who was looking for his or her first job. Which one of these would you say is most important?

Q741- CARD G4 N=1557 Q744 Please tell me which, if any, of the times on this

card you have worked in the last month in your mainjob. CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 4 codes)50.0 Evenings between 6 and 8pm [AntSocEv]32.4 Nights after 8pm [AntSocNi]47.5 Saturdays [AntSocSa]34.4 Sundays [AntSocSu]32.5 None of these [AntSocNo] 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.2 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘evenings’ AT [AntiSocH]Q745 [WkEvning] N=1557

CARD G5 And about how many times did you work eveningsbetween 6 and 8 pm lastmonth, including Saturday or Sunday evenings?

IF ‘nights’ AT [AntiSocH]Q746 [WkNights] N=1557

CARD G5 AGAIN And about how many times did you work after 8pm lastmonth, including Saturday or Sunday nights?

[WkEvning] [WkNights]% %

Once or twice 9.4 6.23 or 4 times 9.3 5.75-10 times 14.5 9.511-20 time 12.5 8.2More than this 4.2 2.6(Don’t know) 0.0 0.1


IF ‘Saturdays’ AT [AntiSocH]Q747 [WkSatday] N=1557

CARD G6 And about how many times did you work during the day

on Saturday last month?

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294VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ754 [JobBsPy1] N=3305

CARD Suppose this young person had the ability to go intoany of these careers. From what you know or haveheard, which one of these careers would offer him orher the best starting pay?

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [JobBsPy1] Q755 [JobBsPy2] N=3305

CARD And which would offer him or her the next beststarting pay?

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALLQ756 [JobMInt1] N=3305

CARD Again, from what you know or have heard, which one ofthese careers would offer him or her the mostinteresting work?

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [JobMInt1] Q757 [JobMInt2] N=3305

CARD And which would offer him or her the next mostinteresting work?

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALL IN SECOND RANDOM HALF OFSAMPLE

Q758 [JobWkLf1] N=1637CARD

Again, from what you know or have heard, which one of

these careers would offer him or her the best work-life balance?

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [FrstJob1] Q751 [FrstJob2] N=1668

CARD (Still supposing you were advising a young personlooking for his or her first job.) And which next?

[FrstJob1][FrstJob2]% %

Good starting pay 6.0 12.5A secure job for the future 34.9 17.6Opportunities for promotion 11.7 23.2Interesting work 38.7 18.6Good working conditions 8.3 27.7(Don’t know) 0.2 0.1(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 0.3

VERSIONS A AND C: ASK ALL IN SECOND RANDOM HALF OFSAMPLE

Q752 [FrstJb1c] N=1637CARD

Suppose you were advising a young person who was

looking for his or her first job. Which one of these would you say is most important? IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [FrstJb1c] Q753 [FrstJb2c] N=1637

CARD (Still supposing you were advising a young personlooking for his or her first job.) And which next?

[FrstJb1c][FrstJb2c]% %

Good starting pay 12.1 12.1A secure job for the future 18.5 18.5Opportunities for promotion 22.0 22.0Interesting work 22.5 22.5A good work-life balance 19.8 19.8A chance to help other people 4.3 4.3(Don’t know) 0.2 0.2



Students

ASK ALL IN FULL-TIME EDUCATION Q760 [Digs] N=180

Do you normally live at the same address during term-time as during the

% holidays?77.4 Same address21.7 Different addresses 0.9 (Varies too much to say) - (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘different addresses’ AT [Digs]Q761 [DigsPare] N=180

Can I just check, is this address your main term-timeaddress or your main out-of-term address or neither?

% INTERVIEWER: 'THIS ADDRESS' = SAMPLE ADDRESS 4.9 Main term-time address16.5 Main out-of-term address 0.3 Neither - (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

Q762 [KeepDigs] N=180Thinking now of the period from mid June to mid Julythis year, (are/were) you keeping on your main term-time home for all or part of this period?

% PROBE FOR CORRECT PRECODE 7.3 All 4.0 Part10.4 No - (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

IF ANSWER GIVEN AT [JobWkLf1] Q759 [JobWkLf2] N=1637

CARD And which would offer him or her the next best work-life balance?

[JobBsPy1][JobBsPy2][JobMInt1]% % %

Nurse 1.3 1.9 6.9Computer engineer 31.8 20.0 6.9School teacher 1.9 5.1 8.3Lawyer 33.9 25.8 12.0Police officer 9.7 10.3 16.8Journalist 1.6 5.9 30.5Doctor 15.5 25.6 13.9(None of these) 0.2 0.1 0.7(Don’t know) 4.1 0.9 3.8(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 4.2 0.1

[JobMInt2][JobWkLf1][JobWkLf2]% % %

Nurse 9.2 3.0 8.4Computer engineer 5.8 26.4 20.6School teacher 11.7 28.6 16.1Lawyer 16.2 15.7 16.6Police officer 16.2 6.0 8.4Journalist 21.0 6.6 12.0Doctor 14.7 6.0 8.7(None of these) 0.4 1.8 1.4(Don’t know) 0.8 5.6 2.1(Refused/Not answered) 3.9 0.1 5.7

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296PrejudiceRacial prejudice

ASK ALLQ766 [PrejNow] N=4432

Do you think there is generally more racial prejudicein Britain now

% than there was 5 years ago, less, or about the sameamount?

44.7 More now19.7 Less now32.3 About the same 0.6 Other (WRITE IN) 2.6 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q769 [PrejFut] N=4432Do you think there will be more, less, or about thesame amount of

% racial prejudice in Britain in 5 years time comparedwith now?

51.7 More in 5 years17.7 Less26.3 About the same 0.7 Other (WRITE IN) 3.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q772 [SRPrej] N=4432% How would you describe yourself ... READ OUT ... 2.8 ... as very prejudiced against people of other races,27.1 a little prejudiced,68.7 or, not prejudiced at all? 0.9 Other (WRITE IN) 0.2 (Don’t know) 0.2 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘all’ OR ‘part’ AT [KeepDigs]

Q763 [DigsWks] N=20How many weeks (do you plan/did you) spend in yourmain term-time home from mid June to mid July thisyear?

% Median: 2 weeks - (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)

Q764 [PareWks] N=20How many weeks (do you plan/did you) spend in yourmain out-of-term home from mid June to mid July thisyear?

% Median: 2 weeks - (Don’t know) - (Refused/Not answered)


Genomics

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALLQ780 [GenInt] N=3276

CARD H1 How much interest, if any, do you have in issues todo with genes and

% genetics? 6.8 A great deal16.9 Quite a lot24.6 Some23.7 Not very much27.4 None at all 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.3 (Refused/Not answered)

Q781 [GenHeard] N=3276CARD H2 Over the past few months, how much, if anything, haveyou heard or read

% about issues to do with genes and genetics? 5.3 A great deal30.6 Quite a lot30.3 A small amount17.6 Not very much15.5 Nothing at all 0.3 (Don’t know) 0.3 (Refused/Not answered) Q782 [GenTalk] N=3276

CARD H3 And over the past few months, how much, if at all,have you talked about issues to do with genes andgenetics?

Sexual attitudes

VERSION C: ASK ALLQ775 [PMS] N=2148

CARD G11 Now I would like to ask you some questions aboutsexual relationships. If a man and woman have sexualrelations before marriage, what would your generalopinion be?

Q776 [YoungSex] N=2148CARD G11 AGAIN What if it was a boy and a girl who were both stillunder 16?

Q777 [ExMS] N=2148CARD G11 AGAIN What about a married person having sexual relationswith someone other than his or her partner?

Q778 [HomoSex] N=2148CARD G11 AGAIN What about sexual relations between two adults of thesame sex?

[PMS][YoungSex][ExMS][HomoSex]% % % %

Always wrong 8.1 61.0 56.6 31.4Mostly wrong 6.1 23.1 26.5 8.7Sometimes wrong 10.5 9.1 10.6 9.2Rarely wrong 8.6 2.2 0.9 6.7Not wrong at all 62.6 2.4 1.7 36.5(Depends/varies) 2.7 1.4 2.3 5.0(Don’t know) 0.9 0.4 0.8 2.0(Refused/Not answered) - - - -

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Q786 [GenDCrim] N=3276CARD H5 AGAIN (and would you be in favour of, or against, settingup such a database if it was...) ...used to identify people who have committed seriouscrimes?

Q787 [GenDOrig] N=3276CARD H5 AGAIN (and would you be in favour of, or against, settingup such a database if it was...) ...used by researchers to find out more about wherepeople's ancestors originally came from?

Q788 [GenDInsu] N=3276CARD H5 AGAIN (and would you be in favour of, or against, settingup such a database if it was...) ...used to judge a person's suitability for gettinghealth and life insurance?

Q789 [GenDJob] N=3276CARD H5 AGAIN (and would you be in favour of, or against, settingup such a database if it was...) ...used to judge a person's suitability for getting a

job they've applied for?

Q783 [GenThink] CARD H3 AGAIN N=3276Over the past few months, how much, if at all, haveyou thought about issues to do with genes andgenetics?

[GenTalk] [GenThink]% %

A great deal 2.1 3.1Quite a lot 11.8 17.3A small amount 26.6 25.6Not very much 24.9 24.1Not at all 34.0 29.3(Don’t know) 0.3 0.2(Refused/Not answered) 0.4 0.4

Q784 [GKnowGov] N=3276CARD H4 How much do you feel you know about the way thegovernment monitors and

% controls developments in modern genetic science? 1.9 A great deal10.7 Quite a lot19.8 A small amount38.6 Not very much25.3 Nothing at all 3.3 (Don’t know) 0.4 (Refused/Not answered)

Q785 [GenDSick] N=3276 CARD H5 Samples of genetic information can be taken frompeople and the results kept in a database. Would you be in favour of, or against, setting upsuch a database if it was... ...used to improve our understanding of illness anddisease?


Q791 [GenTest] N=3276CARD H6 Genetic tests can be used to tell people whether theyare likely to develop a serious genetic condition inthe future. If such a test were easily available,would you want to find out your risk of developing

% such a condition if it could not be treated?16.8 Definitely would21.5 Probably would28.1 Probably would not30.7 Definitely would not 2.5 (Don’t know) 0.4 (Refused/Not answered)

Q792 [GnMental] N=3276CARD H7 Genetic tests can also be carried out on an unbornchild. Do you agree or disagree with parents usingsuch tests to help them decide whether or not to havea child that... ...has a serious mental disability and would never beable to live an independent life?

Q793 [GnPhyscl] N=3276CARD H7 AGAIN (Do you agree or disagree with parents using suchtests to help them decide whether or not to have achild that...) ...has a serious physical disability and would neverbe able to live an independent life?

Q794 [GnDieYng] N=3276CARD H7 AGAIN (Do you agree or disagree with parents using suchtests to help them decide whether or not to have achild that...)

...has a condition that means it would live in good? health but would then die in its 20s or 30s

Q790 [GenDCrm2] N=3276CARD H5 AGAIN Some people think everyone in Britain should have togive a sample of their genetic information to adatabase that would help identify people who havecommitted serious crimes. Would you be in favour of, or against, thishappening?

[GenDSick][GenDCrim][GenDOrig]% % %

Strongly in favour 32.8 43.1 11.7In favour 52.7 41.7 39.0Neither in favouror against 6.8 4.9 30.9Against 3.8 5.4 12.2Strongly against 1.6 2.5 3.6(Don’t know) 1.9 2.0 2.2(Refused/Not answered) 0.4 0.4 0.4

[GenDInsu] [GenDJob] [GenDCrm2]% % %

Strongly in favour 2.7 1.7 21.5In favour 16.3 11.9 47.4Neither in favouror against 15.0 11.3 8.2Against 36.7 39.7 14.7Strongly against 26.8 32.7 6.0(Don’t know) 2.1 2.3 1.7

(Refused/Not answered)

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300

Q798 [GenHeart] N=3276CARD H8 AGAIN And what do you think decides a person's chances ... ... of getting heart disease? (If you don't know, please just say so).

Q799 [GenViol] N=3276CARD H8 AGAIN (And what do you think decides a person's chances ...

... of being aggressive or violent? (If you don't know, please just say so).

Q800 [GenGay] N=3276CARD H8 AGAIN (And what do you think decides a person's chances ...

... of being gay or lesbian? (If you don't know, please just say so).

Q795 [GnTissue] N=3276

CARD H7 AGAIN (Do you agree or disagree with parents using suchtests to help them decide whether or not to have achild that...) ...has the same types of body tissues needed to treata brother or sister who is seriously ill?

Q796 [GnGrlBoy] N=3276CARD H7 AGAIN (Do you agree or disagree with parents using suchtests to help them decide whether or not to have achild that...) ...is one sex rather than another?

[GenMental][GnPhyscl][GnDieYng]% % %

Agree strongly 22.6 19.9 9.1Agree 43.7 44.4 30.4Neither agreenor disagree 12.5 13.6 21.4Disagree 11.6 12.8 26.9Disagree strongly 6.5 6.3 7.7(Don’t know) 2.6 2.6 4.1

(Refused/Not answered) 0.4 0.4 0.4

Q797 [GenCleve] N=3276CARD H8 Some things about a person are caused by their genes,which they inherit from their parents. Others may beto do with the way they are brought up, or the waythey live. Some may happen just by chance. Using this card, please say what you think decideseach of the things that I am going to read out. Ifyou don't know, please just say so. ...Firstly, a person's intelligence?


[GenCanc]%

All to do with genes 12.1Mostly to do with genes 42.7Mostly to do with upbringingor lifestyle 2.7All to do with upbringingor lifestyle 0.7An equal mixture of genes andupbringing/lifestyle 16.5Just chance 11.4(Don’t know) 13.3(Refused/Not answered) 0.4

Q802 [ChgViol] N=3276 CARD H9 Suppose it was discovered that a person's genes couldbe changed.Taking your answers from this card, do you think thisshould be allowed or not allowed to ... ...make a person less aggressive or violent?

Q803 [ChgGay] N=3276CARD H9 AGAIN (Do you think this should be allowed or not allowedto ... ) ... make a person straight, rather than gay orlesbian?

Q804 [ChgCanc] N=3276CARD H9 AGAIN (And should changing a person's genes be allowed ornot allowed to ...)... reduce a person's chances of getting breastcancer?

Q805 [ChgSex] N=3276CARD H9 AGAIN (And should changing a person's genes be allowed ornot allowed to... ) ... determine the sex of an unborn baby?

Q801 [GenCanc] N=3276CARD H8 AGAIN (And what do you think decides a person's chances ...

... of getting breast cancer? (If you don't know, please just say so).

[GenClever] [GenHeart]% %

All to do with genes 8.7 8.9Mostly to do with genes 21.3 24.3Mostly to do with upbringingor lifestyle 17.2 15.1All to do with upbringingor lifestyle 4.9 4.5An equal mixture of genesand upbringing/lifestyle 35.0 34.6Just chance 4.6 5.0(Don’t know) 7.9 7.2(Refused/Not answered) 0.4 0.5

[GenViol] [GenGay]% %

All to do with genes 2.6 12.6Mostly to do with genes 7.8 22.7Mostly to do with upbringingor lifestyle 34.8 7.4All to do with upbringing orlifestyle 15.2 4.2An equal mixture of genes andupbringing/lifestyle 26.0 11.4Just chance 4.8 19.9(Don’t know) 8.9 21.2(Refused/Not answered) 0.4 0.6

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302 Q809 [GenTrst2] N=3276

CARD H10 AGAIN (Please choose a phrase from this card to say howmuch you agree or disagree with this statement.) Rules set by government will keep us safe from anyrisks linked to modern genetic science.

Q810 [GenTrst3] N=3276CARD H10 AGAIN (Please choose a phrase from this card to say howmuch you agree or disagree with this statement.) Modern genetic science is so complex that publicinvolvement in policy decisions is not realistic.

Q811 [GenTrst4] N=3276CARD H10 AGAIN (Please choose a phrase from this card to say howmuch you agree or disagree with this statement.) Genetic scientists only tend to tell us what thepeople paying their wages want us to hear.

[GenTrst1][GenTrst2][GenTrst3][GenTrst4]% % % %

Agree strongly 7.0 1.5 6.6 13.5Agree 26.5 21.1 43.2 46.0Neither agreenor disagree 35.9 26.9 18.0 20.7Disagree 22.7 37.2 22.9 13.7Disagree strongly 2.1 7.3 3.8 0.8(Don’t know) 5.2 5.5 5.0 4.8(Refused/Not answered) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6

Q812 [GenQuiz1] (This is false) N=3276Now for a quick quiz about genetics. For each of thefollowing statements, please tell me whether youthink it is true or false. If you don't know, justsay so and we'll go on to the next one.

By eating a genetically modified fruit, a person's genes could also become modified.

Q806 [ChgSick1] N=3276CARD H9 AGAIN I'd like you to think of someone in their 20s who hasa life-threatening medical condition. Suppose it werediscovered that changing some of their genes bygiving them an injection would help treat them. Thesenew genes would not be passed onto anychildren they might have. Do you think this should beallowed or not allowed?

Q807 [ChgSick2] N=3276CARD H9 AGAIN Now, what if the new genes were passed onto theirfuture children to give them less chance of gettingthe same medical condition in their 20s? Do you thinkthis should be allowed or not allowed?

[ChgViol][ChgGay][ChgCanc][ChgSex]% % % %

Definitely allowed 15.4 4.8 43.9 2.5Probably allowed 40.0 13.5 36.8 12.2Probably not allowed 21.5 25.6 8.2 24.1Definitely not allowed 16.6 48.3 7.0 57.5(Don’t know) 6.1 7.3 3.7 3.3(Refused/Not answered) 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4

[ChgSick1][ChgSick2]% %

Definitely allowed 41.6 36.1Probably allowed 43.3 42.5Probably not allowed 5.8 10.0Definitely not allowed 4.0 5.8(Don’t know) 4.9 5.1(Refused/Not answered) 0.5 0.5

Q808 [GenTrst1] N=3276CARD H10 Please choose a phrase from this card to say how muchyou agree or disagree with this statement.

Those in charge of new developments in genetic science cannot be trusted to act in society's interests.


Immigration

VERSION B: ASK ALLQ818 [MusKnowB] N=1127

People from lots of different backgrounds live inBritain. I would now like to ask you some questionsabout one of these groups - Muslims. By Muslims Imean people who follow the Islamic faith. Generally speaking, how much would you say you knowabout Muslim people

% in Britain ...READ OUT... 2.1 ...a great deal,13.5 quite a lot,60.2 not very much,23.0 or, nothing at all? 0.0 (Don’t know) 1.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q819 [CommitMB] N=1127Please look at CARD H11 Some people think that Muslims living in Britain arereally committed to Britain, these people would putthemselves in box 1 (INTERVIEWER: POINT TO BOX 1 ONTHE SHOW CARD). Other people feel that Muslims in Britain could neverbe really committed to Britain and would putthemselves in box 7 (INTERVIEWER: POINT TO BOX 7). Other people have views somewhere in between in boxes2 to 6 (INTERVIEWER: POINT TO BOXES 2-6). Please can you tell me which number comes closest toyour own views

% about whether Muslims in Britain are really committedto Britain or not?

3.3 1 - are really committed to Britain 8.1 216.6 322.1 416.2 5 9.9 616.9 7 - could never be really committed to Britain 5.6 (Don’t know) 1.4 (Refused/Not answered)

Q813 [GenQuiz2] (This is true) N=3276(Is it true or false that...) It is possible to transfer animal genes into plants.

Q814 [GenQuiz3] (This is false) N=3276(Is it true or false that...) Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, whilegenetically modified tomatoes do.

Q815 [GenQuiz4] (This is true) N=3276(Is it true or false that...) It is the father's genes that determine whether achild is a girl.

[GenQuiz1][GenQuiz2][GenQuiz3][GenQuiz4]% % % %

True 6.8 22.2 11.8 44.2False 58.3 31.6 42.3 25.4Don't know 32.3 43.7 43.2 28.4(Don’t know) 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.4(Refused/Not answered) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6

Q817 [GenFamil] N=3276Has a doctor ever advised you, or any member of yourimmediate family, of a serious genetic condition inyour family?

% FOR 'NOT SURE', CODE DON'T KNOW. 9.3 Yes89.1 No 1.1 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refused/Not answered)

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304Q823 [IDLoseM] N=1127CARD H13 AGAIN (How much do you agree or disagree with the followingstatement:) (England/Scotland/Wales) would begin to lose itsidentity if more Muslims came to live in(England/Scotland/Wales).

[Terror] [LoyalMuB] [IDLoseM]% % %

Agree strongly 3.5 15.5 17.1Agree 21.4 40.5 31.0Neither agree nor disagree 30.4 23.4 17.0Disagree 26.5 10.4 26.1Disagree strongly 8.7 0.8 4.1(Don’t know) 8.2 8.1 3.4(Refused/Not answered) 1.2 1.2 1.2

Q824 [MarrMus] N=1127CARD H14 How would you feel if a close relative of yoursmarried or formed a

% long-term relationship with a Muslim? 9.4 Very happy18.7 Happy41.8 Neither happy nor unhappy14.2 Unhappy10.4 Very unhappy 2.9 (It depends) 1.5 (Don’t know) 1.1 (Refused/Not answered

Q825 [ConMusEn] N=1127CARD H15 Thinking now about Muslims and non-Muslims inEngland. How serious wouldyou say conflict betweenthem is?

Q820 [TakeJbMB] N=1127Please look at CARD H12 (Some people think that Muslims who come to live inBritain take jobs, housing and health care from otherpeople in Britain, these people would put themselvesin box 1. Other people feel that Muslims in Britain contributea lot in terms of hard work and much needed skillsand would put themselves in box 7. Other people have views somewhere in between in boxes2 to 6.) Please can you tell me which number comes closest toyour own views about whether Muslims who come to livein Britain take jobs, housing and health care orwhether they contribute a lot in terms of hard workand

% much needed skills?10.3 1 - take jobs, housing & healthcare 6.8 212.6 325.6 417.3 513.2 6 7.5 7 - contribute a lot in terms of hard work & skills 5.5 (Don’t know) 1.2 (Refused/Not answered)

Q821 [Terror] N=1127CARD H13 How much do you agree or disagree with the followingstatement:Muslims living in Britain have done a great deal tocondemn Islamic terrorism

Q822 [LoyalMuB] N=1127CARD H13 AGAIN (How much do you agree or disagree with the followingstatement):

British Muslims are more loyal to other Muslims around the world than they are to other people in this country


Q830 [WhiNat] N=1127CARD H16 AGAIN And some say that as well as living in(England/Scotland/Wales), to be truly(English/Scottish/Welsh) you have to be white -rather than Black or Asian. (How much do you agree or disagree with this?)

[LivBrit] [WhiBrit][LivNat] [WhiNat]% % % %

Agree strongly 16.9 4.7 14.0 5.3Agree 35.9 9.7 38.6 12.7Neither agreenor disagree 12.6 12.4 10.1 13.0Disagree 26.8 44.4 28.3 42.2Disagree strongly 5.9 26.4 6.6 24.4(Don’t know) 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.3(Refused/Not answered 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1

Q826 [ConMusWd] N=1127CARD H15 AGAIN And what about Muslims and non-Muslims across theworld? (How serious would you say conflict between them is?)

[ConMusEn] [ConMusWd]% %

Very serious conflict 9.7 29.2Fairly serious conflict 45.6 48.3Not very serious conflict 32.5 14.0There is not conflict 3.0 0.7(Don’t know) 7.9 6.7(Refused/Not answered) 1.2 1.1

Q827 [LivBrit] N=1127CARD H16 People have different views about what it takes to betruly British. Some say that as well as living inBritain, to be truly British you have to have beenborn in Britain. How much do you agree or disagree with this?

Q828 [WhiBrit] N=1127 CARD H16 AGAIN And some say that as well as living in Britain, to betruly British you have to be white - rather thanBlack or Asian. How much do you agree or disagree with this?

Q829 [LivNat] N=1127CARD H16 AGAIN And some people have different views about what ittakes to be truly (English/Scottish/Welsh). Some saythat as well as living in (England/Scotland/Wales),to be truly (English/Scottish/Welsh) you have to havebeen born in (England/Scotland/Wales).

(How much do you agree or disagree with this?)

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306Q835 [GetAbB5] N=1157CARD H1 AGAIN (What effect, if any, might this have on how much youyourself use the car) ...charging £1 for every 50 miles motorists travel onmotorways?

Q836 [GetAbB11] N=1157CARD H1 AGAIN (What effect, if any, might this have on how much youyourself use the car) ...increasing parking costs in town and city centres?

Q837 [GetAbB12] N=1157CARD H1 AGAIN (What effect, if any, might this have on how much youyourself use the car) ...charging all motorists around £5 each time theyenter or drive through a city or town centre at peaktimes?

[GetAbB2][GetAbB3][GetAbB4][GetAbB5]% % % %

Might use car even more 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.7Might use car a littleless 18.2 18.8 16.4 14.4Might use car quite abit less 11.7 15.7 14.4 10.9Might give up using car 2.3 4.1 3.6 2.6It would make no difference 31.1 25.6 29.4 35.2(Don’t know) 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.8(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

[GetAbB11][GetAbB12]% %

Might use car even more 0.3 0.5Might use car a little less 17.9 14.4Might use car quite a bit less 10.8 17.6Might give up using car 4.5 8.3It would make no difference 30.7 23.4(Don’t know) 0.4 0.3(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 0.1

Transport

VERSION A: ASK ALLQ831 [TransCar] N=1157

(May I just check...) ... do you, or does anyone inyour household, own or have the regular use of a caror a van?

% IF 'YES' PROBE FOR WHETHER RESPONDENT, OR OTHERPERSON(S) ONLY, OR BOTH

28.1 Yes, respondent only16.7 Yes, other(s) only36.5 Yes, both18.5 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.0 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘yes, respondent’, ‘yes, both’, DON’T KNOW ORREFUSAL AT [TransCar]

Q832 [GetAbB2] N=1157CARD H1 I am going to read out some of the things that mightget people to cut down on the number of car journeysthey take. For each one, please tell me what effect,if any, this might have on how much you yourself usethe car to get about. ...greatly improving long distance rail and coachservices?

Q833 [GetAbB3] N=1157CARD H1 AGAIN (What effect, if any, might this have on how much youyourself use the car) ...greatly improving the reliability of local publictransport?

Q834 [GetAbB4] N=1157CARD H1 AGAIN (What effect, if any, might this have on how much youyourself use the car)

...charging all motorists around £2 each time they enter or drive through a city or town centre at peak times?


Q843 [Travel4] N=1157CARD H2 AGAIN (How often nowadays do you usually) ...travel bytrain?

Q844 [Travel6] N=1157 CARD H2 AGAIN (How often nowadays do you usually) ...travel bybicycle?

Q845 [Travel9] N=1157CARD H2 AGAIN (How often nowadays do you usually) ...go somewhere on foot at least 15 minutes' walkaway?

[Travel1] [Travel2] [Travel3]% % %

Every day or nearly every day 49.2 11.9 7.02-5 days a week 13.5 23.1 10.0Once a week 3.4 21.9 7.1Less often but at least oncea month 1.8 15.6 9.3Less often than that 0.4 12.5 16.2Never nowadays 0.4 14.6 50.0(Don’t know) - 0.2 0.1(Refused/Not answered) 0.2 0.1 0.1

[Travel4] [Travel6] [Travel9]% % %

Every day or nearly every day 2.8 4.8 31.22-5 days a week 2.2 2.9 24.7Once a week 3.8 5.0 15.8Less often but at least oncea month 13.4 3.4 7.8Less often than that 32.8 7.9 5.1Never nowadays 44.8 75.8 15.2(Don’t know) 0.1 0.1 0.1(Refused/Not answered) 0.1 0.1 0.1

Q838 [GetBoth1] N=1157CARD H1b Now suppose that the two things on this card weredone at the same time. What effect, if any, mightthis have on how much you yourself use the car?First, charging motorists £2 for entering towncentres at peak times but at the same time greatly

% improving the reliability of local public transport?0.3 Might use car even more16.8 Might use car a little less22.3 Might use car quite a bit less 7.0 Might give up using car17.6 It would make no difference 0.5 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

VERSION A: ASK ALLQ839 [Drive] N=1157% May I just check, do you yourself drive a car at all

these days?68.7 Yes31.1 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [Drive]Q840 [Travel1] N=1157

CARD H2 How often nowadays do you usually travel ...by car asa driver?

VERSION A: ASK ALLQ841 [Travel2] N=1157

CARD H2 AGAIN (How often nowadays do you usually) ...travel by caras a passenger?

Q842 [Travel3] N=1157CARD H2 AGAIN (How often nowadays do you usually) ...travel bylocal bus?

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308Classification

Housing and local area

ASK ALLQ848 [Tenure1] N=4432

Does your household own or rent this accommodation? PROBE IF NECESSARY

% IF OWNS: Outright or on a mortgage? IF RENTS: Fromwhom?

29.4 Owns outright42.4 Buying on mortgage12.6 Rents: local authority 0.1 Rents: New Town Development Corporation 5.8 Rents: Housing Association 1.2 Rents: property company 0.5 Rents: employer 0.8 Rents: other organisation 0.6 Rents: relative 4.6 Rents: other individual 0.3 Rents: Housing Trust 0.2 Rent free, squatting 0.6 Other (WRITE IN) 0.2 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refused/Not answered)

Q852 [ResPres] N=4432Can I just check, would you describe the place whereyou live as ...

% READ OUT ... 9.2 ...a big city,21.8 the suburbs or outskirts of a big city,50.8 a small city or town,15.1 a country village, 2.1 or, a farm or home in the country? 0.5 (Other answer (WRITE IN)) 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refused/Not answered)

Q846 [TrnNear]CARD H3 N=1157

% About how far do you live from your nearest railwaystation?

23.5 Less than ½ mile (15 mins walk)20.0 ½ up to 1 mile (15-30 mins walk)30.7 Over 1 mile, up to 3 miles19.1 Over 3 miles, up to 10 miles 5.7 Over 10 miles 0.9 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)

Q847 [AirTrvl] N=1157And how many trips did you make by plane during thelast 12 months? Please count the outward and returnflight and any transfers as one trip. INTERVIEWER WRITE IN ANSWER ACCEPT BEST ESTIMATE IF NECESSARY

% Median: 1 trip0.1 (Don’t know) 0.1 (Refused/Not answered)


Q858 [LiveArea] N=2284How long have you lived in the (town/city/village)where you live now? PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE ENTER TOTAL NUMBER OF YEARS IN TOWN/CITY/VILLAGE FOR LESS THAN ONE YEAR, CODE 0

% Median : 200.0 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refused/Not answered)

Religion, national identity and race

ASK ALLQ866 [Religion] N=4432

Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particularreligion? IF YES: Which?

% CODE ONE ONLY - DO NOT PROMPT43.0 No religion 6.6 Christian - no denomination 8.9 Roman Catholic26.6 Church of England/Anglican 1.0 Baptist 1.7 Methodist 3.4 Presbyterian/Church of Scotland 0.2 Other Christian 1.1 Hindu 0.8 Jewish 2.7 Islam/Muslim 0.7 Sikh 0.3 Buddhist 0.4 Other non-Christian 0.0 Free Presbyterian 0.1 Brethren 0.3 United Reform Church (URC)/Congregational 1.3 Other Protestant 0.4 (Refusal) 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.3 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSION A AND B: ASK ALLQ855 [RSpBorn] N=2284

Were (either) you (or your husband/wife/partner) bornoutside (England/Wales/Scotland)?

% IF YES: PROBE FOR CORRECT PRECODE12.3 Yes - respondent (only) born outside

(England/Wales/Scotland) 4.9 (Yes – husband/wife/partner only born outside

(England/Wales/Scotland)) 5.4 (Yes – both respondent and husband/wife/partner born

outside (England/Wales/Scotland))76.7 No 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refused/Not answered)

Q856 [RLivEls2] N=2284Have you ever lived anywhere other than(England/Wales/Scotland) for more than a year? IF YES: Where was that? PROBE TO IDENTIFY CORRECTCODE ELSEWHERE IN UK = (SCOTLAND/WALES/ENGLAND), N.IRELAND, CHANNEL ISLANDS,

% ISLE OF MAN71.5 No - have never lived anywhere outside

(England/Wales/Scotland) for more than a year 7.7 Yes - elsewhere in UK15.9 Yes - outside UK 4.2 Yes - elsewhere in UK and outside UK 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refused/Not answered)

Q857 [ParBorn] N=2284And was either or both of your parents born outside(England/Wales/Scotland)?

% IF YES: One or both?70.0 Neither parent born outside (England/Wales/Scotland)11.5 Yes - one parent born outside

(England/Wales/Scotland)17.6 Yes - both parents born outside (England/Wales/Scotland) 0.2 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refused/Not answered)

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310ASK ALLQ878- CARD X1 N=4432Q885 Please say which, if any, of the words on this card

describes the way you think of yourself. Pleasechoose as many or as few as apply.PROBE: Any other?

% Multicoded (Maximum of 8 codes)67.1 British [NatBrit]50.8 English [NatEng]12.3 European [NatEuro] 2.5 Irish [NatIrish] 0.4 Northern Irish [NatNI]10.4 Scottish [NatScot] 0.3 Ulster [NatUlst] 5.5 Welsh [NatWelsh] 3.4 Other answer (WRITE IN) [NatOth] 1.1 (None of these) [NatNone] 1.5 EDIT ONLY: Other Asian mentioned [NatAsia] 1.3 EDIT ONLY: Other African/Caribbean

mentioned [NatAfric] 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALLQ912 [RaceOri2] N=4432

CARD X2% To which of these groups do you consider you belong? 1.3 BLACK: of African origin 1.2 BLACK: of Caribbean origin 0.1 BLACK: of other origin (WRITE IN) 2.1 ASIAN: of Indian origin 1.3 ASIAN: of Pakistani origin 0.2 ASIAN: of Bangladeshi origin 0.3 ASIAN: of Chinese origin 0.7 ASIAN: of other origin (WRITE IN)89.9 WHITE: of any European origin 0.9 WHITE: of other origin (WRITE IN) 1.1 MIXED ORIGIN (WRITE IN) 0.4 OTHER (WRITE IN) 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF NOT REFUSED AT [Religion]Q869 [FamRelig] N=4432

In what religion, if any, were you brought up? PROBE IF NECESSARY: What was your family's religion?

% CODE ONE ONLY - DO NOT PROMPT14.4 No religion 7.4 Christian - no denomination13.2 Roman Catholic43.8 Church of England/Anglican 1.6 Baptist 4.5 Methodist 6.3 Presbyterian/Church of Scotland 0.3 Other Christian 1.1 Hindu 0.9 Jewish 2.8 Islam/Muslim 0.8 Sikh 0.2 Buddhist 0.1 Other non-Christian 0.1 Free Presbyterian 0.1 Brethren 0.5 United Reform Church (URC)/Congregational 1.1 Other Protestant 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.3 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF RELIGION GIVEN AT [RelRFW] OR AT [RelFFW]Q877 [ChAttend] N=4432

Apart from such special occasions as weddings,funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do youattend services or meetings connected with yourreligion?

% PROBE AS NECESSARY.11.9 Once a week or more 2.1 Less often but at least once in two weeks 5.0 Less often but at least once a month 8.6 Less often but at least twice a year 5.0 Less often but at least once a year 3.7 Less often than once a year48.6 Never or practically never 0.9 Varies too much to say 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)


IF CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLD (AS GIVEN IN HOUSEHOLD GRID)OR ‘yes’ AT [OthChld3]

Q924 [ChPrivEd] N=4432And (have any of your children/ has your child) everattended a fee-paying, private primary or secondaryschool in the United Kingdom? `PRIVATE' PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOLS INCLUDE: *INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS *SCHOLARSHIPS AND ASSISTED PLACES AT FEE-PAYINGSCHOOLS THEY EXCLUDE: *DIRECT GRANT SCHOOLS (UNLESS FEE-PAYING) *VOLUNTARY-AIDED SCHOOLS *GRANT-MAINTAINED (ÒPTED OUT') SCHOOLS

% *NURSERY SCHOOLS 8.0 Yes57.8 No 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q930 [TEA] N=4432How old were you when you completed your continuousfull-time education? PROBE IF NECESSARY `STILL AT SCHOOL' - CODE 95 `STILL AT COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY' - CODE 96

% ÒTHER ANSWER' - CODE 97 AND WRITE IN31.6 15 or under26.9 16 8.9 17 9.5 1820.1 19 or over 0.2 Still at school 1.9 Still at college or university 0.2 Other answer (WRITE IN) 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)

Education

ASK ALLQ923 [RPrivEd] N=4432

Have you ever attended a fee-paying, private primaryor secondary school in the United Kingdom?`PRIVATE' PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOLS INCLUDE: *INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS *SCHOLARSHIPS AND ASSISTED PLACES AT FEE-PAYINGSCHOOLS THEY EXCLUDE: *DIRECT GRANT SCHOOLS (UNLESS FEE-PAYING) *VOLUNTARY-AIDED SCHOOLS *GRANT-MAINTAINED (ÒPTED OUT') SCHOOLS

% *NURSERY SCHOOLS10.8 Yes88.6 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF NO CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLD (AS GIVEN IN THEHOUSEHOLD GRID)

Q925 [OthChld3] N=4432Have you ever been responsible for bringing up anychildren of school

% age, including stepchildren?31.9 Yes33.6 No 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.3 (Refusal/Not answered)

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312 IF ‘yes’ AT [SchQual] N=4432Q932- CARD X3 AGAIN Please tell me which sections of the

card they are in? Q935 PROBE : Any other sections?

CODE ALL THAT APPLY% Multicoded (Maximum of 4 codes)30.8 Section 1: [Edqual1]

GCSE Grades D-G/Short course GCSE CSE Grades 2-5 O-level Grades D-E or 7-9 Scottish (SCE) Ordinary Bands D-E Scottish Standard Grades 4-7 SCOTVEC/SQA National Certificate modules School leaving certificate (no grade)

46.6 Section 2: [Edqual2]GCSE Grades A-C CSE Grade 1 O-level Grades A-C or 1-6 School Certif/Matriculation Scottish SCE Ord. Bands A-C or pass Scottish Standard Grades 1-3 or Pass Scottish School Leaving Certificate Lower Grade SUPE Ordinary N Ireland Junior Certificate

23.7 Section 3: [Edqual3]A-level, S-level, A2-level, AS-level Vocational A-level (AVCE) Scottish Higher/ Higher-Still Grades Scottish SCE/SLC/SUPE at Higher Grade Scot. Higher School Certif Certif Sixth Year Studies/ Advanced Higher Grades N Ireland Senior Certificate

3.3 Section 4: [Edqual4]Overseas school leaving exam or certificate

- (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

Q931 [SchQual]CARD X3

% Have you passed any of the examinations on this card?64.3 Yes35.1 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)


Q937- [PSchQFW] N=4432Q961 CARD X4 AGAIN Which ones? PROBE: Which others?

PROBE FOR CORRECT LEVEL% Multicoded (Maximum of 25 codes) 1.3 Foundation/advanced modern

apprenticeship completed [EdQual26] 3.3 Other recognised trade apprenticeship

completed [EdQual27] 3.3 OCR/RSA - (Vocational) Certificate [EqQual28] 2.6 OCR/RSA - (First) Diploma [EdQual29] 1.3 OCR/RSA - Advanced Diploma [EdQual30] 0.5 OCR/RSA - Higher Diploma [EdQual31] 1.8 Other clerical, commercial

qualification [EdQual32] 6.5 City&Guilds Certif - Level 1/ Part I [EdQual22] 6.0 City&Guilds Certif - Level 2/ Craft/

Intermediate/ Ordinary/ Part II[EdQual23]

3.8 City&Guilds Certif - Level 3/Advanced/ Final/ Part III [EdQual24]

2.0 City&Guilds Certif - Level 4/Full Technological/ Part IV [EdQual25]

1.1 Edexcel/BTEC First Certificate [EdQual33] 1.1 Edexcel/BTEC First/General Diploma [EdQual34] 4.4 Edexcel/BTEC/BEC/TEC (General/Ordinary)

National Certif or Diploma (ONC/OND) [EdQual10] 4.8 Edexcel/BTEC/BEC/TEC Higher National

Certif (HNC) or Diploma (HND)[EdQual11]

3.2 NVQ/SVQ Lev 1/GNVQ/GSVQ Foundation lev [EdQual17] 5.8 NVQ/SVQ Lev 2/GNVQ/GSVQ Intermediate lev [EdQual18] 4.4 NVQ/SVQ Lev 3/GNVQ/GSVQ Advanced lev [EdQual19] 0.6 NVQ/SVQ Lev 4 [EdQual20] 0.2 NVQ/SVQ Lev 5 [EdQual21] 5.5 Teacher training qualification [EdQual12] 3.0 Nursing qualification [EdQual13] 5.3 Other technical or business

qualification/certificate [EdQual14]15.9 Univ/CNAA degree/diploma [EdQual15] 5.7 Other recognised academic or

vocational qual (WRITE IN) [EdQual16] 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALLQ936 [PschQual] N=4432

CARD X4And have you passed any of the exams or got any ofthe qualifications on

% this card?56.5 Yes43.0 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.5 (Refusal/Not answered)

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3140.5 Other (WRITE IN) [BioQOth]0.0 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

Vote

ASK ALLQ1034 [Vote01] N=4432

May I just check, thinking back to the last generalelection - that is the one in 2001 - do you rememberwhich party you voted for then, or perhaps you didn'tvote in that election? IF 'YES': Which party was that? IF NECESSARY, SAY: The one where Tony Blair wonagainst William Hague. IF 'CAN'T REMEMBER', CODE 'DON'T KNOW' (Ctrl + K)

% DO NOT PROMPT30.4 Did not vote/Not eligible / Too young to vote19.7 Yes - Conservative35.9 Yes - Labour 8.2 Yes - Liberal Democrat 0.9 Yes - Scottish National Party 0.3 Yes - Plaid Cymru 0.6 Yes - Green Party 0.7 Other (WRITE IN) 0.1 Yes – (Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party) 2.0 Refused to disclose voting 1.2 (Don’t know) - (Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALLQ1019 [BioQual] N=3276

Can I just check, have you ever studied for aqualification in biology

% or genetics, at school, college or anywhere else?19.3 Yes80.1 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ A [BioQual]Q1020- CARD X5 N=3276Q1025 Which of these qualifications was it? Please tell me

which sections of the card they are in. PROBE: Whichothers? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 6 codes)O-level/CSE/GCSE GNVQ Foundation or Intermediate NVQ/SVQ levels 1 or 2

13.5 Edexcel/BTEC First Certificateor First/General Diploma [BioQOlev]School Certificate or Matriculation Scottish Standard Grades SCE/SLC/SUPE ordinary or standard Northern Ireland Junior CertificateA-level/AS-level/A2-level/ S-level GNVQ Advanced NVQ/SVQ level 3 Edexcel/BTEC/BEC/TEC (General/Ordinary) NationalCertif/Diploma (ONC/OND)

5.5 Scottish Higher/ Higher-Still Grades [BioQAlev]Scot. Higher School Certif SCE/SLC/SUPE at Higher Grade Certif. Sixth Year Studies/ Advanced Higher GradesNorthern Ireland Senior CertificateFirst degree (BA/BSc/BEd)

2.0 Edexcel/BTEC/BEC/TEC HigherCertificate or Diploma (HNC/HND) [BioQDegr]NVQ/SVQ level 4

0.6 Postgraduate degree (MA/MSc/PhD) [BioQPstg]NVQ/SVQ level 5

0.6 Nursing qualification [BioQNurs]


ASK ALL WHO ARE MARRIED OR LIVING AS MARRIED ANDWHOSE SPOUSE/PARTNER IS NOT WORKING OR WAITING TOTAKE UP WORK

Q1073 [SLastJob] N=1051How long ago did (he/she) last have a paid job of atleast 10 hours a week?

% GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS/SCHEMES DO NOT COUNT AS `PAIDJOBS'.

11.3 Within past 12 months20.8 Over 1, up to 5 years ago20.9 Over 5, up to 10 years ago23.9 Over 10, up to 20 years ago14.3 Over 20 years ago 6.9 Never had a paid job of 10+ hours a week 0.3 (Don’t know) 1.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

Spouse/Partner’s job details

ASK ALL WHO ARE MARRIED OR LIVING AS MARRIEd (AT[MarStat2]

Q1072 [SEconAct] N=2814CARD X6Which of these descriptions applied to what your(husband/wife/partner) was doing last week, that isthe seven days ending last Sunday? PROBE: Which others? CODE ALL THAT APPLY

% Multicoded (Maximum of 11 codes) 1.2 In full-time education (not paid for by employer,

including on vacation) 0.2 On government training/ employment programme62.5 In paid work (or away temporarily) for at least 10

hours in week 0.1 Waiting to take up paid work already accepted 0.7 Unemployed and registered at a JobCentre or JobCentre

Plus 0.7 Unemployed, not registered, but actively looking for

a job (of at least 10 hrs a week) 0.4 Unemployed, wanting a job (of at least 10 hrs a week)

but not actively looking for a job 3.4 Permanently sick or disabled17.0 Wholly retired from work12.6 Looking after the home 0.7 (Doing something else) (WRITE IN)- (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

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316Q1079 [PSuperv] N=406In your job, (does/will) (he/she) have any formalresponsibility for supervising the work of other(employees/people)? DO NOT INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO ONLY SUPERVISE: - CHILDREN, E.G. TEACHERS, NANNIES, CHILDMINDERS - ANIMALS

% - SECURITY OR BUILDINGS, E.G. CARETAKERS, SECURITYGUARDS

40.9 Yes55.8 No 0.3 (Don’t know) 3.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [Supervise]Q1080 [PMany] N=406

How many?% Median: 8 (of those supervising any) 4.9 (Don’t know) 3.3 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHERE SPOUSE/PARTNER’S JOB DETAILS ARE BEINGCOLLECTED Spouse/partner’s job details are collectedif respondent is not working or waiting to take upwork, but partner is working or waiting to take upwork.

Q1074 [Title] [NOT ON DATAFILE] N=406Now I want to ask you about your(husband’s/wife’s/partner’s) (present/future) job.What (is his/her job/ will that job be)?PROBE IF NECESSARY: What is the name or title of thatjob?Open Question (Maximum of 80 characters)

Q1075 [Typewk] [NOT ON DATAFILE] N=406What kind of work (do/will) (he/she) do most of thetime? IF RELEVANT: What materials/machinery (do/will)(he/she) use?Open Question (Maximum of 80 characters)

Q1076 [Train] [NOT ON DATAFILE] N=406What training or qualifications are needed for thatjob?Open Question (Maximum of 80 characters)

Q1077 [PEmploye] N=406In your (husband’s/wife’s/partner’s) (main) job(is/will) (he/she) (be)

% ... READ OUT ...79.4 ... an employee,17.6 or self-employed? - (Don’t know) 3.0 (Refusal/Not answered)


Q1090 [PEmpWrk2] N=406IF EMPLOYEE: Including (himself/herself), how manypeople are employed at the place where (he/she)usually works from?IF SELF-EMPLOYED: (Does/Will) (he/she) have anyemployees?

% IF YES: PROBE FOR CORRECT PRECODE.16.1 Under 1010.2 10-2411.2 25-49 8.0 50-99 9.6 100-199 8.5 200-49914.2 500+ 7.3 (Don’t know) 3.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHO ARE MARRIED OR LIVING AS MARRIED ANDWHOSE SPOUSE PARTNER IS WORKING, WAITING TO TAKE UPWORK OR HAS EVER WORKED

Q1120 [SPartFU2] N=1779% (Is/Was) the job ... READ OUT ... 79.1 ... full-time - that is, 30 or more hours per week,19.8 or, part-time?- (Don’t know) 1.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

Income

ASK ALLQ1122 [AnyBN3] N=4432

CARD X8Do you (or your husband/wife/partner) receive any ofthe state benefits

% or tax credits on this card at present?59.5 Yes39.8 No 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHERE SPOUSE/PARTNER’S JOB DETAILS ARE BEINGCOLLECTED AND SPOUSE/PARTNER IS/WILL BE EMPLOYEE

Q1082 [POcSect2] N=335CARD X7Which of the types of organisation on this card(does/will) (he/she)

% (work/be working) for?69.9 PRIVATE SECTOR FIRM OR COMPANY Including, for

example, limited companies and PLCs 2.0 NATIONALISED INDUSTRY OR PUBLIC CORPORATION

Including, for example, the Post Office and the BBC22.4 OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYER

Incl eg: - Central govt/ Civil Service/ Govt Agency - Local authority/ Local Educ Auth (INCL 'OPTED OUT'SCHOOLS) - Universities - Health Authority / NHS hospitals / NHS Trusts/ GPsurgeries - Police / Armed forces

2.1 CHARITY/ VOLUNTARY SECTOR Including, for example,charitable companies, churches, trade unions

- Other answer (WRITE IN)- (Don’t know) 3.6 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL WHERE SPOUSE/PARTNER’S JOB DETAILS ARE BEINGCOLLECTED

Q1085 [EmpMake] [NOT ON DATAFILE] N=406IF EMPLOYEE: What (his/her) employer make or do atthe place where (he/she) (usually works/ will usuallywork (from)?IF SELF-EMPLOYED: What (does/will) (he/she) make ordo at the place where (he/she) (works/ will work)(from)?

Open Question (Maximum of 80 characters)

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318Q1177 [MainInc3] N=4432CARD X9Which of these is the main source of income for youand your

% (husband/wife/partner) at present? 63.8 Earnings from employment (own or spouse / partner's) 8.0 Occupational pension(s) - from previous employer(s) 2.0 Private pension(s)11.2 State retirement or widow's pension(s) 1.7 Jobseeker's Allowance/ Unemployment benefit 4.4 Income Suppport/ Minimum Income Guarantee (for

pensioners) 3.0 Invalidity, sickness or disabled pension or

benefit(s) 0.7 Other state benefit or tax credit (WRITE IN) 1.1 Interest from savings or investments 1.1 Student grant, bursary or loans 1.3 Dependent on parents/other relatives 0.7 Other main source (WRITE IN) 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.8 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL WHO ARE NOT WHOLLY RETIREDAND MALE AGED 65 OR UNDER OR WOMAN AGED 60 OR UNDER

Q1182 [PenXpct1] N=2465CARD X10When you have retired and have stopped doing paidwork, where do you think most of your income willcome from? INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT SAYS 'SPOUSE/ PARTNER'SCOMPANY/OCCUPATIONAL PENSION', CODE AS 'ACOMPANY/OCCUPATIONAL PENSION'.

% SIMILARLY FOR STATE AND PERSONAL/STAKEHOLDERPENSIONS.

27.0 State retirement pension35.8 A company or occupational pension17.1 A personal or stakeholder pension14.5 Other savings or investments 1.1 From somewhere else (WRITE IN) 0.5 EDIT ONLY: Earnings from job/still working 3.5 (Don’t know) 0.4 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [AnyBN3]Q1123- CARD X8 AGAIN N=4432Q1139 Which ones?

PROBE: Which others?% Multicoded (Maximum of 17 codes)22.3 State retirement pension

(National Insurance) [BenefOAP] 0.5 War Pension (War Disablement Pension

or War Widows Pension) [BenefWar] 0.8 Bereavement Allowance/ Widow's Pension/

Widowed Parent's Allowance[BenefWid]

2.2 Jobseeker's Allowance [BenefUB] 6.8 Income Support/ Minimum Income

Guarantee for pensioners [BenefIS]27.0 Child Benefit (formerly Family Allowance) [BenefCB]11.5 Child Tax Credit [BenefCTC] 6.2 Working Tax Credit/ Childcare Tax Credit [BenefFC] 7.1 Housing Benefit (Rent Rebate/

Rent Allowance) [BenefHB] 8.8 Council Tax Benefit (or Rebate) [BenefCT] 4.6 Incapacity Benefit / Sickness Benefit

/ Invalidity Benefit [BenefInc] 5.2 Disability Living Allowance

(for people under 65) [BenefDLA] 2.3 Attendance Allowance

(for people aged 65+) [BenefAtA] 0.9 Severe Disablement Allowance [BenefSev] 1.4 Invalid Care Allowance [BenefICA] 0.6 Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit [BenefInd] 0.4 Other state benefit (WRITE IN) [BenefOth] 0.0 (Don’t know) 0.7 (Refusal/Not answered)


IF ‘company or occupational pension’ OR ‘personal orstakeholder pension’ AT [PenXpct2] AND RESPONDENT ISMARRIED, LIVING AS MARRIED, SEPARATED, WIDOWED ORDIVORCED

Q1189 [PenOwn2] N=2465And would that be your own pension or your(husband’s/wife’s/ex-

% husband’s/ex-wife’s/late husband’s/late wifewifes’s)pension?

11.1 Own pension 5.7 Spouse/partner's pension 3.3 (Both)- (Don’t know) 4.8 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL WHO ARE NOT WHOLLY RETIREDAND (MALE AGED 65 OR UNDER OR WOMAN AGED 60 OR UNDER)

Q1190 [SellHome] N=2465CARD X11 And how likely do you think it is that you will sella home to help fundyour retirement?

% IF ASKED: 'Home' is the building but not the contents10.9 Very likely18.6 Fairly likely33.8 Not very likely30.4 Not at all likely 6.1 (Don’t know) 0.4 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALLQ1191 [HHIncome] N=4432

CARDWhich of the letters on this card represents thetotal income of your household from all sourcesbefore tax? Please just tell me the letter. NOTE: INCLUDES INCOME FROM BENEFITS, SAVINGS, ETC.

IF ‘company or occupational pension’ OR ‘personal orstakeholder pension’ AT [Penxpct1] AND RESPONDENT ISMARRIED, LIVING AS MARRIED, SEPARATED, WIDOWED ORDIVORCED

Q1185 [PenOwn1] N=2465And would that be your own pension or your(husband’s/ wife’s/partner’s/ ex-husband’s/ ex-wife’s/ late husband’s/late wife’s)

% pension?21.3 Own pension 8.2 Spouse/partner's pension11.5 (Both)- (Don’t know) 3.9 (Refusal/Not answered)

VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL WHO ARE NOT WHOLLY RETIREDAND MALE AGED 65 OR UNDER OR WOMAN AGED 60 OR UNDER

Q1186 [PenXpct2] N=2465CARD X10And which do you think will be your second mostimportant source of income? INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT SAYS 'SPOUSE/ PARTNER'SCOMPANY/OCCUPATIONAL PENSION', CODE AS 'ACOMPANY/OCCUPATIONAL PENSION'.

% SIMILARLY FOR STATE AND PERSONAL/STAKEHOLDERPENSIONS.

28.4 State retirement pension16.0 A company or occupational pension10.5 A personal or stakeholder pension28.2 Other savings or investments 1.8 From somewhere else (WRITE IN) 9.3 (None) 1.0 Earnings from job/still working 4.3 (Don’t know) 0.4 (Refusal/Not answered)

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320VERSIONS B AND C: ASK ALL (FOR VERSION A; COMPUTEDFROM [TransCar])

Q1194 [CarOwn] N=4432Do you, or does anyone else in your household, own orhave the regular

% use of a car or van?79.8 Yes19.7 No 0.1 (Don’t know) 0.4 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL IN PAID WORK Q1192 [REarn] N=2472

CARD Which of the letters on this card represents your owngross or totalearnings, before deduction of income tax and nationalinsurance?

[HHIncome] [REarn]

% %Less than £3,999 1.8 3.9£4,000 - £5,999 5.2 5.0£6,000-£7,999 5.8 5.2£8,000-£9,999 4.7 5.6£10,000-£11,999 4.5 7.9£12,000-£14,999 6.0 10.7£15,000-£17,999 5.0 8.3£18,000-£19,999 3.7 6.5£20,000-£22,999 5.0 7.9£23,000-£25,999 5.4 7.6£26,000-£28,999 4.4 4.8£29,000-£31,999 4.6 4.3£32,000-£37,999 6.5 5.0£38,000-£43,999 5.3 3.1£44,000-£49,999 4.3 2.0£50,000-£55,999 3.4 1.2£56,000 or more 8.4 3.9(Don’t know) 8.4 5.8Refusal/Not answered 7.4 1.4

VERSION B: ASK ALLQ1193 [Ownshar2] N=1127

Do you (or your husband/wife/partner) own any sharesquoted on the Stock Exchange, including unit trustsand PEPs and Stocks and Shares ISAs? DO NOT INCLUDE CASH OR INSURANCE ISAs.

% (PEP = PERSONAL EQUITY PLAN)34.9 Yes62.6 No 0.4 (Don’t know) 2.1 (Refusal/Not answered)


IF ‘yes’ AT [ComeBac3]Q1202 [Stable] N=4432

Could you give us the address and phone number ofsomeone who knows you well, just in case havedifficulty in getting in touch with you. IF NECESSARY, PROMPT: Perhaps a relative or friendwho is unlikely to move?

% WRITE DETAILS ON THE BACK PAGE OF THE ARF.31.9 INFORMATION GIVEN49.8 INFORMATION NOT GIVEN 0.0 (Don’t know) 1.9 (Refusal/Not answered)

Administration

ASK ALLQ1199 [PhoneX] N=4432% Is there a telephone in (your part of) this

accommodation?94.8 Yes 4.2 No 0.0 (Don’t know) 1.0 (Refusal/Not answered)

IF ‘yes’ AT [PhoneX]Q1200 [PhoneBck] N=4432

A few interviews on any survey are checked by asupervisor to make sure that people are satisfiedwith the way the interview was carried out. In casemy supervisor needs to contact you, it would behelpful if we could have your telephone number. ADD IF NECESSARY: Your 'phone number will not bepassed to anyone outside the National Centre withoutyour consent.

% IF NUMBER GIVEN, WRITE ON THE ARF88.7 Number given 5.9 Number refused 0.1 (Don’t know) 1.1 (Refusal/Not answered)

ASK ALL N=4432Q1201 [ComeBac3]

From time to time we do follow-up studies and maywish to contact you

% again. Would this be all right?81.8 Yes16.4 No 0.5 (Don’t know) 1.3 (Refusal/Not answered)

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2

A

Advance letters 225 Analysis techniques: see Factor analysis;

Regression Analysis variables 225-230 Asylum seekers 170-171, 191, 194 Attitude scales 228-229 Authoritarian values and national identity 159-161 B

Benefits and left-right scale 16 and region 18 and social class 17 trends in attitudes towards levels of 10

and trends in perceptions of claimants 15-18

see also: Benefit sanctions; Tax credits; Welfare state

Benefit sanctions attitudes to 7-11, 19 and left-right scale 8-9, 11 and region 9 and social class 9

C

Can Britain close the digital divide 73-98

Citizenship and conceptions of 177-178 see also : National identity Cohabitation: see marriage Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing

224, 238 D

DEFT: see Sampling errors Dependent variables 233-234 Devolution arguments in favour 210 asymmetric devolution 201-203, 206-

207, 216 awareness of regional assemblies 206-

207 and left-right scale 211-212 and objective knowledge of 207-208 and party identification 214-216 perceived impact of 208-209 and perceptions of British government

212-213 regional attitudes towards 205-206 and regional pride 209-210

Subject index


344

and subjective income 211 trends in attitudes towards 205 types of 203-204 see 201-219 passim Digital divide 73-78, 84, 90-94 see also : Internet use Dimensions of British identity 147-167 Does England want devolution too? 201-219 E

e-politics? The impact of the internet on political trust and participation 99-118

Efficacy: see Political efficacy Employment and working mothers 51-52 women’s rates of 49, 51 English regional assemblies: see

Devolution F

Factor analysis 235 Face-to-face questionnaires 246-321 Fieldwork 224-225 G

Gender roles and age 53-55, 57

and generational differences 52-53, 57, 68

and household characteristics 55-56 and sex 55 and working mothers 56-57, 69 Genetics: see Genomics Genetically modified crops/foods attitudes towards 121-123, 131, 134-138 Genomic science: emerging public

opinion 119-145 Genomics and public attentiveness 131-137 and genetic databases 123-125, 131 and the media 119-121 and trust in 125, 134-137 public debates about 120-122 see 119-145 passim

Human genomics and behaviour 126-128 changes in attitudes towards 126-128 and genetic determinism 126-127 and genetic testing 120, 128-129 and health 126-128, 137 and human cloning 130-131, 137 and intelligence 126-128 and religious affiliation 129 and sexuality 126-128 Goldthorpe class schema, definition of

227 H

Has modern politics disenchanted the young? 23-47

Human genomics and behaviour 126-128 changes in attitudes towards 126-128 and genetic determinism 126-127 and genetic testing 120, 128-129 and health 126-128, 137 and human cloning 130-131, 137 and intelligence 126-128 and religious affiliation 129 and sexuality 126-128 I

Immigration and asylum 170-171 and anti-Muslim sentiment 182-184 and Britishness 177-180, 196 and education 193-194, 197 and interest in politics 192-193, 197 and levels of 171

and media reporting of 188-197 and national pride 174-177, 196 and newspapers 191-192, 197 and party identification 194-195, 197 and perceived consequences of 184-188,

196 and policy 169-171, 184-184 and politicians 190-191, 193-197 and racial prejudice 180-182, 196 see 169-200 passim

see also : Racial prejudice

Index

345

Independent variables 233-234 International Social Survey Programme

xvii, 147, 150, 171, 235 Internet use access to 74, 75, 100 and age 76, 80-84, 86, 91-92, 101-102,

106, 112 and attitudes to 87-90 and barriers to 84-86 and desire to use 83-84, 86-88, 91 and education 77, 82-84, 86, 92, 101-

103, 106 and gender 76, 77, 82-83, 86, 92-93 and income 78, 80, 82-83, 86 and location used 79-80 and non-users 75, 83, 87-88, 90, 102-

107, 109-112 and political efficacy 104-108, 113 and political participation 100-101, 108-

112, 114 and purpose used 80-83 and social class 78, 80, 82-84, 86, 92

and social divisions 91-93 and trust 89-90, 100-104

and type of user 102-112 see 73-118 passim Interviewing: see Fieldwork L

Labour Party see New Labour Left-right scale 3, 228 Libertarian-authoritarian scale 228-229 Libertarian values and national identity 159-160, 163 M

Marriage and lone parenthood and age 59-60, 63 and family type 61, 63, 69 and generational differences 58, 62-63 and household characteristics 61-62 rates of 57-58 and religion 60-61 and sex 60 Multiple-Output Indicator 222-223

N

National identity and Britishness 150-157, 177-180 and civic conceptions of 148-161 and education 157 and ethnic conceptions of 148, 150-161 and generational change 155-157 and identity scales 153-155 and immigration 156-158 and international conflict 157-158 and libertarian-authoritarian values 159-

160 and patriotism 158-160 and religion 157 and trends in conceptions of 152-155 see also : Immigration National pride 174-177 levels of 176-177 sources of 176 trends in 176 see also : Immigration National Statistics Socio-Economic

Classification (NS-SEC) definition of 226

National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles 63

New Deal 7-8 New Labour 1-5, 9, 11, 13-14, 19 see 1-21 passim P

PAF 221-222 Patriotism scale 159 Pensions 13, 19 Political efficacy and trends in 113 Political interest 36-38 and age 29-35 Political participation

and trust in government 100 and internet use 100-101, 108-114 see also : Internet use Political party attachment 27-28

and age 32-35 Political trust and internet use 100-104


346

Postcode Address File: see PAF Q

Questionnaire plan 243 The questionnaires 246-342 R

Racial prejudice and immigration 180-184 and impact of September 11th 2001 182-183 trends in 181-182 see also : Immigration

Registrar General’s Social Class definition of 226

Regression linear 233-234 logistic 234 measure of variance explained 234 parameter estimates 234-235

Response rates 224-225 S

Sample design 221-222 Sample size 222 Sampling

errors 230-233 frames 222 points 222

Scales: see Attitude scales Scottish devolution: and party identification 215 Scottish Social Attitudes survey xvii Self-completion questionnaire 322-342 September 11th 2001 182-183 Sexual attitudes and age 65 and gender 65 and generational differences 63-64, 67-

68 and household characteristics 66 and religion 65-66, 69 Sexual behaviour changes in 49, 63 Social class

definition of 225-226

Socio-Economic classification, see National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC)

Socio-Economic Group 227 Social security: see Benefits Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)

227 Standard Occupational Classification

(SOC) 225 Stratification 221-222 T

Tabulations, Notes on the 242 Tax credits attitudes to 4-6, 19 and left-right scale 5 and region 6 and social class 6 Taxation

and trends in attitudes towards 11-12 Technical details of the survey 221-239 Teenagers on family values 49-71 Teenagers attitudes towards marriage and

relationships of 58-63 attitudes to sexual behaviour of 63-68 attitudes towards working women of 51-

57, 68 cynicism of 28 and the media 50 party attachment of 25-27, 32-35, 37, 39 political interest of 24-25, 28-31, 34-37 and voting 27-29, 36-38 see 49-71 passim U

Understanding the rising tide of anti -immigrant sentiment 169-200

Unemployment benefits attitudes towards 10-11, 15-18

V

Voting and teenagers 27-29, 36-39

Index

347

W

Weighting 223-224 Welfare state

and left-right scale 13-14 reform of 1-3 and trends in attitudes towards 15-18 Welfarism scale 229 Women

and labour market participation 49, 51 The work-centred welfare state 1-21 Working mothers attitudes towards 51-57, 68 Y

Young people see 23-71 passim see also: Teenagers Young People’s Social Attitudes Survey

xviii, 23, 29, 50, 54, 236-237

british social attitudes: the 21st report (british social attitudes survey series)

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