britain in nato: the first six decades

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Britain in NATO:

The First Six Decades

BRITAIN

IN NATO THE FIRST SIX DECADES

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Historians History Note No. 18

Cover illustration: Ernest Bevin signing the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, 4 April 7949 (reproduced courtesy of NA TO Archives).

NATO's Sixtieth Anniversary

Foreword by Sir Peter Ricketts and Sir Bilileffrey

This volume celebrates what NATO has achieved in the sixty years since the signing of the Washington Treaty. It is a remarkable story. NATO has shown a unique capacity to endure and change. Its success reflects the fact that it was created not simply as an alliance against the immediate threat from the Soviet Union, but an alliance standing for the enduring value of freedom and democracy_ This has ensured that NATO remains attractive to a widening range of European nations, and has been able to adapt to new security challenges.

It is important that we learn from the past as we prepare for ATO' future. As Stewart Eldon, our current Permanent Representative on the orth Atlantic Council sets out in the final chapter of this History Note, the transatlantic alliance embodied in ATO faces as many challenges as ever. NATO is committed to helping Afghanistan achieve a table and ecure future. NATO troops also remain engaged in Kosovo. The drive for transformation of the Alliance needs to be sustained, developing the military capabilitie that will be needed to deal with tomorrow's challenges, working closely with civilian agencies engaged in tabilisation work. NATO's partnership programme remain a important as ever.

All these is ues will be on the agenda for the Summit in StrasbourglKehl on 3-4 April, which will take NATO forward into a new era. The Summit participant of today are building on solid foundations laid sixty years ago. We are grateful to the Historian of the oreign and Commonwealth Office for putting together this publication to commemorate ATO' fir t sixty years.

Sir Peter Ricketts Permanent Under-Secretary Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sir Bill Jeffrey P rman nt Under- cretary Mini try f D fenc

Foreword

List of Documents

List of Illustrations

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

hapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Appendix

Contents

1949: The Origin of the Transatlantic Alliance

1959: uc1ear Weapon and Alliance he ion

1969: Flexible Re pon e and Arm ontrol

1979: From Detente to Confrontation

1989: The nd of Hi tory and of ATO?

1999: NATO' Intervention

2009: ATO in the 21 t entury

United Kingdom Permanent Repr ntativ on the orth Atlantic ouncil1950-2009

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List of Documents

No.1 Secretary of State's Review of Foreign Affairs to the Dominion Prime Ministers (draft by Kirkpatrick), 8 October 1945, with minute by Ernest Bevin: 'There i nothing on atomic energy. Find me the reports.', 8 October 1945, FO 371 /73105.

No.2 Washington telno 498 to FO, 'North Atlantic Pact', 26 January 1949, FO 371 /79248.

No.3 FO telno 129 to all posts, 'Atlantic Pact', 11 March 1949, DEF 11 /20.

No.4 Washington telno 1774 to FO, 'Military Organisation of the orth Atlantic Pact' , 29 March 1949 with reply from Chiefs of Staff, 1 April 1949, FO 371 /79276.

No.5 Moscow telno 570 to FO conveying Soviet critici m of NATO, 1 April 1959 FO 371 /146418.

No.6 UKDEL teIno 366 to FO, 'National Council Meeting', 4 September 1959, 0371 /146301.

No.7 Letter from Pemberton-Pigott to Porter (UKDEL) concerning control of nuclear weapon, 9 March 1959, F03371/146371.

No.8 FO Brief for Prime Minister's visit to Paris, 0.7, 'Organi ation of We tern Defence on a World Plane and the Reform of NATO', March 1959, FO 371 /146306.

No.9 British Record of Conversation at French Emba y after dinner, 13 April 1959 FO 3711146306.

No. 10 Letter from Roberts to Rumbold discussing enior French officer' opposition to de Gaulle, 23 January 1959, FO 371/146305.

No. 11 Washington teIno 206 to FO, 'General de Gaulle's Plan' 23 January 1959 0 371 /146304.

No. 12 Letter from Jebb to Rumbold on the ubject ofEi enhower/de Gaulle exchange 130ctob r 1959, FO 3711146310.

No. 13 Letter from Jebb to Hoyer Millar advising a hard line toward de aulle 29 May 1959 0 371/146307.

No. 14 Letter from Robert to Dean reporting differences of opinion with de Gaulle 17 July 1959 371/146309.

No. 15 Letter from Jebb to Rumbold a e ing de Gaulle' intention 2 December 1959 0 371/146310.

No. 16 Letter from Hoyer Millar to Jebb ugge ting the be t way to handl de aull 27 May 1959 0 371/146307.

No. 17 FO Brief, 'Con ultation in ATO, Mon ieur paak' Pr po al '5 ovemb r 1959 0 371/146345.

No. 18 Letter from Robert to Hoyer Millar reporting sugge tion for the futur f A ° Octob r 1959, 0371/146344.

No. 19 Roberts' Annual Review of ATO for 1959, Summary o 371 /154541.

No. 20 Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy ommitte, OPD( 69) 17 ' ATO 20th Anniver ary Meeting, Wa hington: 10-11 April' Memorandum by the cretary of tat or r ign and Commonwealth Affair and the Secretary of tat for Defence 24 March 1969, 041 /413.

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No. 21 Minute from Waterfi ld to Bendall, '6th Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group, Airlie House: 11-l2 ovember, 17 November 1969 FC041 /434.

No. 22 Minute from Waterfield to Killick, 'NATO and Environmental Questions', 30 May 1969, FCO 41 /414.

No. 23 US aide-memo ire relating to the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 4 June 1969, F 04 11414.

No.24 abinet Official Committee on Science and Technology, ST(0)(A)(69)9, 'NATO and nvironmental Problems' , 10 June 1969, FCO 411414.

No.25 arrington to ATO Capitals, telno 205 'NA Mini terial Meeting 13-14 December: TNF and Ann ontrol 23 ovember 1979 FCO, DPN06011 4/79 , Part A.

o. 26 Ro e telno 329 to 0 , ' Joint Mini terial Meeting: TNF Moderni ation and Arm Control', ommunique, 12 December 1979, FCO, DPN060/14/79 , Part B.

No. 27 Alexander to Hurd, 'The Revolution of 1989: How Should the Alliance Re pond?' , 4 January 1990, FCO DZN014/1190.

o. 28 tatement by the Secretary-General following the ACTW ARN deci ion, Vilamoura, 24 eptember 199 ,NATO.

No. 29 Pre Statement by the Secretary-General following deci ion on ACTORD, NATO HQ, 13 October 1998 ', NATO.

No 30 Statement by the Secretary-General of NATO, Dr Solana, on the outcome of the Rambouillet talk , 23 February 1999 ATO Press Relea e (99) 21.

No. 31 Pre tatement by Dr Solana' concerning the deci ion to initiate air operations in the FRY, 23 March 1999, ATO, Pre Relea e (1999) 040.

No. 32 Statement on Ko ovo is ued by the Heads of State and Government A , 23 April 1999, regarding aim of ATO' military intervention, NATO, Pre Relea e -1 (99) 62.

No. 33 Opening Remark by the Prime Mini ter of the United Kingdom and orthern Ireland Tony Blair, at the ommemorativ er mony of the 50th Anniversary of NATO, 23 April 1999, NATO.

No. 34 Declaration igned and i ued by the Heads of tate and Government participating in the meeting of the orth Atlantic ouncil in Wa hington 23 April 1999 NATO, Pre Relea e

A - (99) 63.

No. 35 Defence apabilities Initiative, 25 April 1999 ATO, Pre Relea e NA -S (99) 69.

No. 36 'The ituation In and Around Ko ovo ' : Chairman' Statement i ued at the xtraordinary Meeting ofF reign and Defence Mini ter of the NA ',18 June 1999, NATO, Pre Relea e (1999) 097.

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o.370p ning Statement by NATO ecretary-General, Lord Robert on reviewing NATO in 1999, ATO HQ, 15 December 1999 ATO.

List of Illustrations

1. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, signing the North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949.

2. Western Foreign Ministers meeting at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, ew York, 12 September 1950. From left to right: Robert Schuman (France), Dean Acheson (USA), me t Bevin (UK).

3. The NATO Military Committee meeting in Washington, 24 October 1950. From left to right: General Omar Bradley, Air Marshal Lord Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Admiral Lord Fraser.

4. First Ministerial meeting at NATO's new headquarters at Porte Dauphine, 15 December 1959.

5. NATO Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak (left) in discussion with the oreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd (centre) and the UK Permanent Representative to ATO Sir Frank Robert (right).

6. A souvenir sheet of US commemorative postages stamp celebrating ATO's tenth anniver ary is handed over to NATO Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak (right).

7. The Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, interviewed in Washington.

8. Selwyn Lloyd (left) greeting Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of the eth rlands (right).

9. Opening address by US President isenhower to the orth Atlantic ouncil, Wa hington, 2 April 1959.

10. NATO Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio (centre-left) in conversation with Briti h Defence Secretary, Denis Healey (centre-right).

11. Denis Healey (left) in discus ion with US Defence Secretary, Robert Mc amara (right).

12. The Icelandic Prime Minister, Bjami Benediktsson, cut the cake marking ATO' twentieth anniver ary flanked by Manlio Bro io (left) and US Secretary of tat William Rodg r right).

13. President Nixon addresses the orth Atlantic Council flank d (from left to right) by th UK Permanent Representative to ATO Sir Bernard Burrow, William Rodger and th U Permanent Representative to NATO arlan Cleveland.

14. Special ession of the orth Atlantic ouncil in celebration of ATO' tw ntieth anniver ary.

15. The NATO General Secretary, Jo eph Lun addre se a pecial e ion of the orth Atlantic Council in celebration of ATO' thirtieth anniver ary.

16. The Briti h Prime Mini ter, Margaret Thatcher (centr ) flanked by th Representative to ATO Sir Michael Alexander (left) and her Private (right).

P rmanent cr tary, had Powell

17. orth Atlantic Council meeting at the lev I of ead of tate and ovemm nt 4 D c mb r 1989.

18. Map of former Yugo lavia and neighbouring tate .

19. UK Puma delivering upplie a part of the ATO-I d Ko ovo orc ( OR).

20. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair (l ft) greeting the U Pre ident Bill linton (right) at th opening of the commemorative fiftieth anniver ary ceremony.

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21. British Green Jacket painting boy's face with camouflage paint in Ko ovo.

22. The Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, David Wright, (far left) in discussion with the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson (far right).

23. Map howing KFOR deployments in Ko ovo.

24. NATO member and partner countries.

We would like to thank the following for permi ion to reproduce illu trations: F 0 , Information Management Group (No .2,3); NATO Media Archive (No .1,4-24).

Introduction

In its leader column, prior to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 , The Times declared that 'time and many deeds' would be needed before the pact's true worth could be weighed - but, if there was sufficient will, work and faith it would give the world the hope of peace. 1 In the ixty years following the signature of the treaty, the transatlantic alliance has undergone a profound transformation. The Warsaw Pact, its major adversary for over forty years, has been consigned to history; its membership ha increased from the original 12 to 26; Allied military forces are now deployed throughout the world - from Afghani tan, as part of the International Security A sistance orce (ISAF), to the Gulf of Aden, where ATO ves els provide naval e cort and protection against acts of piracy in Operation Allied Provider. In undertaking the e new mi ion NATO strives to uphold the vi ion laid out ixty years earlier by mest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary and major architect of the Alliance, 'to act as cu todian of peace and determined opponents of aggression' .2

To mark the sixtieth anniver ary of the igning of the North Atlantic Treaty, FCO Hi torian have produced a documentary history which highlight the debates and policy initiative undertaken by the Alliance during its fir t six decades. Rather than attempting to provide a comprehen ive narrative of events, we have focu ed on the main anniver ary years, all of which proved to be turning point in the development of ATO. The outcome i a series of snapshot which chart the evolution of the

1 The Times, 19 March 1949. 2 H.C. Debs, 12 May 1949.

Alliance, and its main preoccupations as it moved from one decade to the next. Each section compri -e a short narrative followed by a election of documents which reflect and augment the main issue brought out within the chapter (for convenience references to the publi hed documents are marked in bold). A number of the documents contain d in the later chapters have not previou ly been in the public domain and have been released pecifically for inclu ion in this Hi tory ote. The full te t of the ATO communique declaration and pre relea e referred to in the footnote can be acce ed via the ATO website.

The fir t chapter describe the birth pang of the Alliance and highlight the ometime tortuou diplomatic proce of e tabli hing a tran atlantic alliance that linked America to the d fenc of

urope. Prominent throughout i the pre nc of me t Bevin who e ingle-mindedn and n

of purpo e en sur d that the orth tlantic r aty wa ucce sfully ratified in the face of oppo ition from Am rican i olationi t who wi hed to avoid entanglement in permanent allianc . The econd chapter focu e on the control of nucl ar w apon within ov rall allianc trategy th qu tion fBerlin, and the train plac d on alliance cohe i n by

eneral d Gaulle demand for a tripartit dir ctorate comprising the nit d tate rance and Britain, to manag global trat gy. Thi period al 0

witne ed ATO ' fir t attempt to develop a p litical agenda in addition to it military role, an obj ctive pur ued with vigour by it ecretary-G n ral Paul-Henri Spaak.

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ATO' twentieth anniver ary in 1969 took place again t a background of growing international tension, with Soviet tank cru hing the Prague Spring of Alexander Dubcek and American troop mired in the jungles of Vietnam. The Alliance wa al 0

in a tate of hock following France' decision in 1966 to withdraw from ATO's integrated command. The adoption of the Harmel Report in 1967 which provided the Alliance with a greater political role, went orne way to repairing the damage. The anniver ary year witne ed further internal debate on the implementation of flexible re pon e and the guideLine authorising the u e of nuclear force . The i ue of arm control wa al 0 addres ed, eventually leading to the talk on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) between NATO and the War-aw Pact which continued throughout the 1970 . inally, the year 1969 marked the point at which

NATO came to reah e the growing ignificance of environmental ecurity and it implication for regional tabi lity. The outcome wa the' Committee on the hallenge of Modem Society' , which met for the fir t time in December.

The dominant them of the fourth chapter are the debate on theatre nuclear force , the Alliance' deci ion to tation Per hing and crui e mi ile to counter the deployment of the Soviet S -20, and

A 0 ' re pon e to the Sovi t inva ion of Afghani tan in December 1979. hapter five deal with the event of 1989 and focu e on the collap e of the

oviet mpire in a tern urope and it implication for NATO' future role. A central a pect of thi chapter i the adoption of the Alliance' omprehen ive Concept of Arm ControL and Di armament and the en uing debate on the need to modemi e NATO' hort-range nuclear force . NATO' fiftieth anniver ary year i discu sed in hapter ix, which focu e on ATO' intervention in the Balkan and the implementation in 1999 of Operation Allied rce. The chapter end with a review of the Wa hington ummit and the debate on NATO enlarg m nt. inally, t wart ldon, the UK' Perman nt Repre entative to NATO, offer a per pective

n the pre ent and future ta k facing th Alliance in the twenty-fir t century.

We hould like to thank tho e who have a i ted in variou way with the preparation of thi Hi tory ote: ir Peter Rickett , Permanent Under-

ecretary at the 0 , Sir Bill Jeffrey, Permanent

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Under-Secretary at the MOD and Jane Darby, A -si tant Director and Head of the FCO's Information Management Group (IMG), for their support and encouragement; Profe sor Patrick Salmon, Giles Ro e and Laine Alahendra of FCO Hi torians, Jim Daly ofIMG and Kevin Rooke of the FCO' Security Policy Group for their editorial upport; Gill Bennett, former Chief Historian at the FCO, Dr Joanna Han on and Susan Laffey of FCO Research Analyst , and Colin Munro, formerly UK Permanent Repre entative to the OSCE, for their advice and comments. We are grateful to The National Archive , Kew, and Victoria Buck at FCO Archives, Hanslope Park, for their a i tance in obtaining document and photographs; to Cele te PalmerEloot for providing copies of photograph held by the NATO Media Archive in Brussels; and to Craig Mitchell of Cry tal Print Publi hing.

Grant Hibberd Isabelle Tombs Stephen Twigge

March 2009

Chapter 1 - 1949: The Origin of the Tran atlantic Alliance

Chapter 1

1949: The Origins of the Transatlantic Alliance

The signature of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 represented the culmination of a concerted diplomatic process to establish a formal military alliance between Western Europe and North America. The treaty signed by twelve nations - Britain, the United States, Canada, France, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands and Luxembourg - pledged that an armed attack against one or more members would be considered an attack against all. In agreeing to the treaty, the United States committed itself to defend Western Europe in the event of a Soviet attack: it was a visible manifestation of President Truman's determination to confront and contain communist expansion. For the uropeans whose economies had been devastated by years of war, alliance with the United States was considered vital to their future security and economic recon truction. In the absence of a strong transatlantic link there was apprehension within Europe ( and America) that many tates would fall under the control of communist front organisation who would look to Moscow rather than Washington for leadership and protection. However, the transformation of the Alliance from political declaration to effective military force would take many years to achieve and raise fundamental is ues of overeignty and security in an age where both uperpower were armed with nuclear weapon .

Origins: The Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in June 1945, the victorious powers sought to con truct a new security architecture for the postwar world. The We t initially hoped for some form of accommodation with Stalin's Soviet Union but these hopes were oon

dashed. Moscow's determination to con olidate its control over the state of Ea tern urope and apparently, to extend its influence into Greece and Turkey raised concerns that Soviet ambition were a direct threat to We tern interests. The collap e of the London Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1947 exacerbated the e fears. The Briti h Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin believed that the European democracies, till truggling to feed and house their own citizen after the privation of war were not in a po ition to resi t Soviet ubver ion and sought to persuade the United State to provide economic and military a i tance to urope befor the ituation deteriorated further. Bevin confided to his American counterpart George Mar hall that th alvation of the We t depended upon th formation

of some form of union backed by the nited State and Britain. 1

The first step in e tablishing a We tern military alliance had been taken in March 1947 when Britain and ranee igned the Treaty of Dunkirk. Th treaty, which wa intended to prevent a re urgence of German militari m, e tabli h d an Anglo- rench bilateral military alliance with a duration of fifty year. or Bevin th treaty repr ent d only the fir t tage in a proce of involving th nit d tat in

the defence of urope. The ne t tep wa to c n inc the American that urop wa prepar d to do more for it own defence. Th re ult wa the We t m

urop an Union which in additi n to Britain and rance included the Benelu countrie ofB 19ium

the etherland and ux mbourg. Ann uncing the propo al to th Hou of ommon on 22

1 Quoted in Andre D taercke (ed. NATO I anxiou birth: The Prophetic vi ion of the 1940 (Hur t and 19 5 p. 30; ee als Peter Weiler Erne t Bevin Manche ter ity Pre , 1993) pp. 176.

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BRiTAi N iN NA TO - THE FiRST SIX DECADES

January 1948, Bevin gave an impas ioned speech contending that the establi hment of a defence pact between the countrie of Western Europe wa e sential to guard against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. 2 Negotiations between the five nations soon yielded result . The Brussels Treaty, under which the allie promi ed to come to one another ' military assi tance in ca e of attack, was igned on 17 March 1948. The US administration

warmly welcomed the European defence pact which wa viewed a the military equivalent of the Mar hall Plan. In addressing Congress, Pre ident Truman expres ed hi hope that the United States would oon extend to the free nations of Europe ' the upport which the situation require ' .3

Forging the Transatlantic Alliance

The uccessful conclusion of the Brussel Treaty and it po itive reception in Wa hington prepared the ground for a collective defence pact between the United State and Western Europe. The driving force behind the e negotiation was Bevin, who saw the Brussels treaty a a sprat to catch a whale. Even before the treaty had been igned, Bevin pressed both the United States and Canada to initiate military taff talks to explore collective ecurity measures in

the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Although Truman remained cautious, he anctioned preliminary scoping talk which were held in the Pentagon b tween 22 March and 1 April 1948. Initially, the concept of tran atlantic military cooperation was view d in term of a istance between individual member of the Brussels Treaty and the United State . The idea of estab1i hing a new treaty organization had yet to emerge. This po ition wa oon to change. In June, the US ongress pa ed the Vandenberg Re olution which called on the admini tration to pursue 'regional and other coll ctive agreement for individual and collective elf-defence ' in accordance with the UN harter.4

In late June, the member of the Brus els Treaty were informed that the United State wa prepared to di cu joint military planning in the event of a S viet attack on We tern urope. The propo al re ulted in the Wa hington xploratory Talk on

ecurity that began on 6 July and were attended by repre entative of the US, Canada, Britain, France and the Benelux countrie .

2 A: 0 37 1173064, Briti h foreign policy re lated t the We tern nion, draft Five Power Treaty, January 194 . 3 Pre ident ruman' Addre to Congre , 17 March 1948. 4 or detail of the Vandenberg re luti n ee, Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 194 : The Birth of the Tran atlantic Alliance (R man & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 75- O.

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The Wa hington talks revealed significant differences between the Europeans and Americans on the nature and scope of a future military alliance. The overriding objective of the Brussels Treaty powers was the provision of US arms and equipment to build up the armed forces of each individual country. The US insisted that before thi was undertaken the Brussels Treaty states must fir t coordinate and standardise their military planning. Britain's representative at the talks, Sir Oliver Franks, reported back to London that the Americans ' could make no unilateral guarantee of European security nor could they consider anything in the nature of straight unilateral military lend-lease for urope'. The disparity in the two positions was summed up by Franks, who dryly observed that the Americans behaved like 'a kind of fairy godmother handing out favours to the less fortunate Western European countries - provided always the latter can justify their claims for uch favour ' . 5 Sir Nichola Henderson, then a junior official at the British Embassy in Washington, was equally critical of the ambivalent approach adopted by the Americans which he characterised a 'some modem Minerva, ready to lend its shield to the good cause of European democracy, but not prepared to promise to descend into the earthly European arena and become involved itself should trouble occur.' 6

A ignificant a pect of the discussions centred on the ize and geographical coverage of the pro pective alliance. The United States ought to extend membership beyond the Brussels Treaty powers to include all nations bordering the Atlantic. The list of potential countrie put forward by the American for inclu ion in the new pact included Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland and Portugal (No. 1). The Brussels Treaty members were less than enthusiastic, believing that an expanded alliance would diminish its overall effectivene s. Britain ided with its uropean partners and sought to temper American ambition : as Franks reported to London, 'the US Government had to avoid the danger of taking on too much and spreading the butter too thin.' A further i sue centred on the wording of the obligation wbereby member would come to one another 's a si tance in the event of attack. The US in isted that any American response cou ld not be automatic and would require the authority of the US Pre ident andlor Congress. The wording of the Rio Treaty, a mutual defence agreement between

5 TNA: D F 111 19, Report on Fir t Week fS ecurity Talk , 13 July 1948.

6 ir icholas Hender on, The Birth of NATO (Weidenfeld & icol on, 19 2), p. 36.

Chapter 1 - 1949: The Origin o/the Transatlantic Alliance

1. Th Fo~ ign ~ tary, Erne. t Bevin, signing the North At/anti > T~7at , 4 April J 949.

13

BRITAIN IN NATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

the US and a number of South American states and recently ratified by Congre ,was considered a way forward. Article 3 of the treaty stated that an attack against one party was regarded as an attack against all. The re pon e of each state, however, was for ' individual determinations' by each signatory, pending agreement upon collective measures.7 The

uropeans preferred the wording of Article 4 of the Bru el Treaty under which alliance members would 'afford the party attacked all the military and other aid and a istance in their power'. In September, the talks were uspended pending the outcome of the US Presidential election.

Drafting the Treaty

The November 1948 election aw Truman unexpectedly re-elected as American President. Throughout the election campaign, Truman had tre ed the importance of containing Soviet

expansion. A tran atlantic ecurity pact linking North America and Western urope was considered an e ential element in thi trategy. The talks, suspended in September, were immediately resumed. The need to extend the Alliance beyond the original Brus el treaty powers was eventually accepted, with the governments of Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, orway, Portugal, and Sweden being invited to join the treaty negotiations. Only Ireland and Sweden declined to participate. The po ible inclusion of Spain wa considered but rejected. Denis Healey, the Labour Party's International Secretary and future Secretary of State for Defence, argued that 'Spain cannot participate in the work of cooperative recovery until its people i freed from the Franco regime'.8 A further area of contention was the American proposal to include Italy and other nations, uch a Greece and Turkey, not bordering on the Atlantic. The suggestion was primarily political and based on the belief that member hip of the Alliance would trengthen links with the We t and protect these countries from communi t ubver ion. The potential inclusion of Italy di mayed military planners who believed

7 he Inter-American reaty of Reciprocal A i tance (Rio Treaty) was ratified by 19 Amerlcan tates on 2 September 1947 in Ri de Janeiro . The ignatories agreed that 'an attack by any tate against an American tate hall be con ide red an attack again t all the American tate .' ach tate was obliged t ' a i t in meeting the attack' when a two-third majority fthe ignatorie inv ked its provi in , although no tate wa required t re pond militarily unle it wi hed t do .

FO 371171808, uropean Recovery Programme ( RP), Briti h Labour Party view n uropean cooperation, February 194 .

14

it would drain resources which could be better u ed elsewhere. The British Chiefs of Staff were particularly dismissive of the Italian contribution to western defence believing that 'Italy as an ally would be a military liability for many year to come'.9 However, the military reservations were outweighed by the broader political imperative of maintaining Italy within the western camp. Italy became the twelfth and final member of the Alliance. Greece and Turkey would eventually become members in 1951.

The first draft of the treaty, prepared by the ambassadorial committee, was circulated to governments in late December 1948. The main area of contention centred on the mutual assistancepledge. The Europeans wanted the pledge to be as strong as possible. Against this, the Americans insisted that the deployment of US troops was a decision for the President alone. The draft treaty attempted to quare these two positions by employing, in Article

5, the following form of words:

The parties agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them occurring within the area defined below shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exerci e of the right of individual or collective elf-defence recogni ed by Article 51 of the

Charter of the United Nations, will as ist the party or partie 0 attacked by taking forthwith uch military or other action, individually and

in concert with the other parties, as may be necessary to re tore and assure the ecurity of the North Atlantic Area. lo

Dean Ache on, who had replaced Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1949, soon discovered that only general agreement had been reached with Congressional leaders, with several influential enator expressing concern that in signing the

treaty the US would automatically commit itself to war (No.2). The delay infuriated Bevin who informed his Cabinet colleagues that Acheson would need time to 'wrestle with the senator ' before the treaty could be agreed. Following the personal intervention of Truman, the phrase 'as it deems necessary' was included in Article 5, satisfying those senators opposed to the treaty. I I

9 0 F 11119, comment by hiefs of taff ommittee. 10 Cited in John Bayli , The Diplomacy of Pragmati m: Britain and the formation of NATO 1942-49 (Kent State Univer ity Pres , 1993), p. 108 .

11 Dean Ache on, Pre ent at the reation (Hamish Hamilton, 1970), pp. 276-84


Further discussion centred on Canada's desire to the event in which he wa now a principal actor.' 13

include a provision for economic, social and cultural Bevin himself was well aware of the ignificance of cooperation to be included within the treaty in order the treaty. Writing in 1950, hortly before hi death to emphasise the importance of Western values. he remarked that 'it is given to few men to see their Bevin, unwilling to cause further delay, eventually dreams fulfilled. Three time in the la t year I know succumbed to Canadian pressure. The final aspect I have nearly died but I kept my elf alive because I of the treaty to be resolved was its geographical wanted to see the orth Atlantic Alliance properly coverage. It was agreed that the North Atlantic area launched. This has been done today. 14

would stretch from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, which allowed America to maintain a clear distinction between its North Atlantic and Rio Treaty commitments. Final agreement on the treaty was reached on 15 March. Bevin expressed his satisfaction that the 'Pact has teeth in it' (No.3), even though he did not get his own way on where the treaty would be signed. His preference for Bermuda was overruled in favour of Washington. 12

2. We tern Foreign Mini te~ meeting at the Waldorf A toria Hotel, New York, 12 September 1950. From left to right: Robert Schuman (France), Dean Ache on (USA), Erne t Bevin (UK).

Ratification and Consolidation

The treaty provision were debated in the ou e of Commons on 12 May with Bevin receiving prai e from the oppo ition a well a hi own party. The warm respon e, together with a me age of congratulations from King George VI, gave him much satisfaction. Bevin's biographer, Alan Bullock, describes thi period a the greate t ten day of his life. ven the creation of the Tran port and General Worker Union could not compare with

12 Roderick Barclay, Erne t Bevin and the Foreign Office, 1932-69 (Latimer 1975), p. 53.

3. The NATO Military Committee meeting in Washington, 24 October 1950. From left to right: General Omar Bradley, Air Mar hal Lord Tedder, Mar halo/the Royal Air Force Sir John Ie or, Field Ma~ hal Sir William Slim, Admiral Lord Fra er.

The orthAtlantic Treaty wa igned in Wa hington on 4 April 1949 by th r ign Mini ter f the twelve participating nation before an audi nc of 1,500 invited dignitarie . In igning th treaty B vin achieved hi objective of linking m rica to the defence of We tern urope and curing a pecial relation hip with th and anada. B th B in and Attlee were d termined that Britain hould b an equal partner with the and fir t among qual with th uropean nation . 'We and th hould b able to maintain contr I of trategic d ci ion of th orth Pact Organi ation particularly in th event of war.' 15 Th treaty nt r d into forc on 24 Augu t with a trategic concept for th d it nc of the Alliance agr ed in Octob r. h trat gy envi aged the 'prompt delivery' of atomic

13 Alan Bull ck Ern t B vin: Foreign n tary, 1945-51 ( UP, 19 5) p.672. 14 Lord I may, NATO: Thefi~ tfiv yea~ 1949-54 (B ch, 1955) p.37. 15 A: FO 371179276 orth tlantic Pact Military Organi ation draft brief from M D to 0 21 March 1949.

15

BRITAIN IN NA TO - THE FIR T SIX DE ADES

weapon on a potential aggres r, noting that thi wa primarily a US re ponsibility. 16 The practicalitie of e tabli hing a military command tructure, however, proved more problematic with

the American military authoritie 'determined not to allow France to participate in overall world trategy . .. or in any detailed planning organisation with which he wa not directly concerned' (No.4) . The advent of the Korean War in June 1950, followed by a rna ive rearmament programme, gave fre h impetu to NATO war plan. In December, General

isenhower wa appointed Supreme Allied ommander and et about integrating all the force

under his control. The proces of developing an agreed military trategy which ati fled all member of the AlLianc would occupy ATO for year to come. The que tion of how to deal with Germany, which tood at the centre of a divided Europe, wa another i ue till to be re olved.

1949-

16

Chapter 1 - 1949: The Origins a/the Transatlantic Alliance

No.1 Secretary of State's Review of Foreign Affairs (draft), 8 October 1945

17

BRITAIN IN NA TO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

, 2

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BRiTAIN IN NATO - THE FIR T SIX DE 'ADE

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21

BRITAiN iN NATO - THE FiR T IX DECADES

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BRiTAIN IN NA TO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

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24

hapter 1 - 1949: Th Origins ofth Tran atlanti Allian

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25

BRlTAIN IN ATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

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Chapter 1 - 1949: The Origin of th Transatlantic AI/ian

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BRITAiN i N NA TO - THE FiRST SiX DECADE

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- ..., -COl stitutea ~onti in suc ~e S 10. Jovi e t

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29

BRITAIN IN NA TO - THE FIRST 'IX DECADES

30

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Chapter 1 - J 949: The Origin of th Tran atlanti AI/ian

R gistry • o.

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BRITAIN IN NATO - THE FIR T IX DECADES

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32

Chapter I - 1949: Th Orig in of the Tran at/anti Allianc

• .. ' r ·l. t th~ JOV' _ t r V l' n e . v i 1 .

rl. se to of

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BRITAIN IN NATO - THE FIR T 'IX DE 'ADE

te c ical ... ~ vt;.led I I an co. .unicr. t u

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Chapter 1 - 1949: The Origin of the Tran atlantic Allian e

1 a VI:! "1 1 co .0 cd t 1 () It; .; t ..,IJ

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5

BRITAI I NATO - THE FIR T 'IX DECADES

36

III.

Th lr Lift and tho Futu~

Th " key fe t or in doaling wi th th oJ 'r11n C r1a1s

bas boen th An f l o/r mo l'io n Qi~-lift, od

' :1a t ~ aJ sty' ~ C-ov rn I un t hay er reat r eon to be grot \3 ful

to t ho CO , OOW O lth J OV ro m nts 1hich hav 0 eivan

ass ista nc y rov1d1ng mu oh noodod airol' ws.

From its 1n au~uration on Juno 28th until

opt mbor 27th th a1r-lift hoe dolivored a total

of 246 , 431 .5 n t m trio tons to tho Ge rman oconomy.

Of this t t al amount 36.6 has been oonveyed by .>ri tish

and 63 .4~ by Ame r10an airoraft. In addition 22,951

gros s mot ric t one of German industrial f~oi ght

hove uC D baokl o' d d f rom Templehof and Ge tow airfielde

ond 3,123.5 groee mo tric tons of parce l ~o 1l hay boen

een t \I e t from ;oto 1. Tho ..) r1 ti sh cont ri bu tion to th1 s

Whol ch1ev om ot haa moa nt 20 ,720 so rt1es nd 6,851,619

il e 10 10 by )r i ti sh 01 ror rt.

Th o pro l orn of upplyin G p trol to tho rlin

oc nomy h pro on t od partioular dif 1culti s. These

h vo boon mot by th provision of tank r a1 roraft,

orig1 nally fi cd for tho rofuollin of ma ch1nos 1n l

flight, un h 1'0 aro t prosont f ive of th oso spool 1

m ch1n a in uso . To as 1st ln th oconomy of fuol

consump t1on in J rl1n, arran omonts r e boinS mode to

s pply d1 901 oil. xporiments with Tudor nd Halifax

aircraft oquippod with poc1al t onka oro at prosont io

prooe. Th inoroasing us of four- onglnod airoraft,

howov r, acoontua tos th d1 floultioe of monning and

at pe h v bu n t kon t o tro1n orews ~apidly to~ four

englnod work.

Plane ara nOI baing worked out for mainta1ning tbo

la1r-11ft

hapter 1 - 1949: Th Ori in of th Tran atlantic Allian

a i~-11ft ovo r th o -intor. Those lnvolv o cODsider blo

inOr 0QSO i n t onnouc of food a ne supplies to be de11v r od

to , arlin. It i e relut1v ly easy to d live r th o amount

of food no coee~ ry, but i f hea lth a nd moralo ar · to b

mainta i ned i ie.: n CGee r y to s upply r , in1 urn

ro quirement adorn et io ep c o- he tin g fo r th e Vlint er,

whieh inv olves tho tr Depo rt of about 3 owt. of co I

pur houscho ld. ~ noth G r fa ctor in maintaining moral

1e the proviai n of omploy~ nt, and th ir-li f t

cao only pI y ' e nnll pa rt 1n tho VI y of doli v rin g

r 'w m t ri a l s fo r th o f ctori06 to de al ith; ho ove r,

ech Oi s for ru bbl e c lear a nc c 1n '3e rlin or e boing r apidly

Qxpanded , und GO f or mo r a l is exeell nt .

Politiool oluo of Ai r-Lift.

~ u i t o apa rt from th cons idorable oxp anse involvod

(for det lIe e nn ox ) t ho ir-11ft 1 bvi usly not

tb fin el eol ut ion t o th . r11n problem . It ha~ ho '/OVOl'

bo n 0 .r o t dvonto 0 to us fol' foul' r o~sons:

( ) it hoe onabled us to avoid nogot1 a ting on tho

futur o of 0 I'm ny ~ith th Rueei ne undor dur sS ;

(b) it he e a rv d S 0 dv onstrotion w rnin g not

only to t ~ U 61 ns bu t to tho poopl~ of G rmo ny

nd ~os tern Europ of f s t ern pow r and r souro s;

(0) it hes givon us time to t ko our aas to th Uni t ed

J otlone an to mobilise world opinion on our a1de;

(d) it h e on blod us to continuo undi turbed with th

urg nt ark of bul1dln up lost rn ormany.

37


o. 2 Washington to FO, 'North Atlantic Pact', 26 January 1949

3

Chapter 1 - 1949: The Origins of the Transatlantic Alliance

Clair

1r. anka o. 498

.12.67 P • 28th January, 19 9. 6. 2 • a th January , 19 9.

a6th January, 1949.

orth tlant10 at.

t • h son at

/

.-

39

BRlTA! IN NATO - THE FIR T lX DE 'ADE

4

.abingtOD Solegram o. 498 to I ••

-2-

• bell eve 'h S th,a, prinoiplea and this oommOD heri t ge oan be t be fortlf1 eel and preserved and th. gener 1 welf r. ot the people ot the orth Atlant10 area advanaed by an arrang ent tor oo-op.r tioD in aitera tteat1ng their p.aoe and leour1iy and common interests.

I hope t o be able very soon to ape k more apec1f1oally bout 1 t.

hapter 1 - 1949: Th Origin of the Tran at/anti Allian e

No.3 FO to all posts, 'Atlantic Pact', 11 March 1949

, OUTWARD ~;YING TELEG!t. ,}1 /

(This telegram is of purticulor secrecy m s hould be :retai'ned by the Quthorised r ccipien t and n . possed on) .

By Oonfidential Bog Top Seoret

POLITIC.L SECRET DIS'I'RIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS .L·.JI:S~~S ImPRES ·'NT.I~TIVE ~;T:-

ADDIS ,,'.B,,· BA J~MMAN ANGOR!. f.THENB B .... ,GD/.D Bl~NGKOK B/,T~',VI1, BEIRUT BELGRhDE BERLIN BERNE . BOGOTA BRITISH MIDDLE

EAST OFFICE BRUSSELS BUCfUJmST BUDAPEST . BUENOS AIRES C},IRO CARi.CJ.S COPENHi~GEN DfJdASCUS GENEV/, (UNITED

KINGDOM DELEG.·,TION )

No. 130 Intel.

It 11th Maroh, 1949. I

TOP SEORET.

My No.129 Intel .

Atlantio Poot

GU .. , TEl(:.L~~ THE H..~GUE

ILIVl NI, HELSI NGFORS HOLY SEE JEDDJ', . JERUS • .LL1·J K.'~UL

1~·.TM4'INDU KJL.'.RTOU1l ' NEW YORK ~ . 1. S. o • E ~ E • C. P .. ·.R IS

(U . K. DiL .) LIt.ll LISBON

' DRID 1, ".NIL!, MEXICO ~!ONTEVI:!)r.O MOSCO\':' N;.NKING NEW YOH r (UNI .. D

KINGDO t D G. ,'l'I l )

OSLO P:illIS PRi,GUE R,~NGOON HEYK,L~VIK HIO DE J4'~IRO Rur,IE S.IGON 84', frL'~GO SEuUL SfL~GlL',I (Etffi/,SSY) SIN .:.POilE ( SPEC LJ.

CO iISSIONER , 30UTH-EAST ;,SIA)

8 0 ' STOCKHCL TEH:rli. rroKYO TRIESTE VI ' NN ~ \'{. ,RS ., ~.: . HINGTON

The key Artiole of th " 'l'r my (J~rtlclo 5. ~utuol i ss1atonce) hos emergod in 0 form wh1ch cen be r gnrd d Q V ry 8 t1sfoctory. The wording retains the conoeption that on ott ok on one of the parties i6 on attock on all . os well as mruclng cle r thnt the meosures whioh th 61gnntor1es nrc boun to t ko in the f ocO of sllch' on a tt:lok includo "the usc of rma lorc ."

2. On the whol can be ell cont~nted.n1th tho r esults ot the long negotiation ~hich hos t ckun plnc v r this txt; the Paot h s teeth in it and ~1l1 give str n rounds for enoou~ogemen' t o Europe.

,. At the Bame t1md. it 1s strictly n def nslv poet nd 1n harmony wi th the Chorter of' the Ull~ ted Not! n. Its objeot i8 to reinforoe but not to repl 00 the ccur1ty r ov1d d by tho 'Oharter, and Article 7 speo~flcnlly provlues that it d008 not atfect in ony "flY the rights on :>b11t;.nt1ons of the parties under tho Ohorter or at'tect the p i!if lY 1 spons1b1l1ty o~ tbe Security Oouncil tor the mo1ntcn~nc' of intarnnt10n 1 peoco and 8ecur1 ty. The Poc t 1s basod on ],rtlcl 51 of the Ohorter. wh1ch 8ofeguords . "·the inherent r1t:ht of ind1 v1dunl

lor

"

41

BRITAiN iN NATO - THE FIRST SiX DECADES

)

42

TOP SECRET

Foroign ' Orfice Intel No . 130

- , 2 -

or collective s Clf-defence i~ n crrne ntt~ck occurs ogainat . a member ••••••• until the Securi ty Council tU1B, taken the meosuy6 s necessary •••••.•. "

4. We h~ve been successful in avoiding a ny r eferenoe , e i t her in thc actu 1 text of the P ct or in the prcamble , t o Chopter VIII of the United Nations ChQrter , which r efers to 'Regional ilrrongemen~s" . These regional ~rrongcmcnts were to be for the purp06e of calin with diff r ences between parties in a certain region, and not between thc r eg i onal group as a whole and some, potential outside og r ssor . Moreover, under the Chnrte r, no enforcement action con · be taken u~der a liRe 10nal f.rrnngement" without the authorisation of tho Security Counc i l , Which would h ve brought us bock t o where we started , f ced

i th tho ri h of v to. It .. ther ef ore il:1 ortnnt t o str oss, in any publicity r egnr ing th /,tlnnt ic ; ct" :i\a4- it io b !:i ... a. upon Article 51 0 the Ch rter.

5. Now th t It .ly is . ~flnitoly t o be sso i o te with th ~ Poet , it has become impossibl~ to lccve 'Turk y , Greece an Iran ntirely out in the cold, on it is c ~ r lly ogr e that some sort of eclaration omphas i s in our int rest in thes countri s ill be rna e . Th pr ecise r rrn of the prop se ecl~r ti n has not ye t bee n decido~ .

6. hll the bove mf Y be f~ely use as eo In 00 t ext has b~en published. JAy immediately f ollowin Intel . gives publicity'iroctiv for imme~ iAte uso . Subotcnc0 pr it , with the excepti n of p~ra . 2(v1). h~s be n communicated to Governments 0 Brussels Powers and to U. S. on~ Oano~1an Governments , nd they hove boen urge t o nke 0 similar 11ne in their 0 n publ icity.


No.4 Washington to FO, 'Military Organisation', 29 March 1949, and reply of Chiefs of Staff, 1 April 1949

43

BRiTAiN iN NATO - THE FiRST 1X DECADES

• (This t ele 1s ot tlcu r secrecy reta.1ne by the authoris r eel 1ent

Cypher/OTP •

s . • 3. 55 •• th

191..9. R. 10. 33 p. • 29th

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47

BRITAIN IN ATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

... (

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4

Chapter 2

1959: Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Cohesion

In the ten years since its creation in 1949, NATO had rapidly established itself as the cornerstone of western security. Its original membership of twelve had soon expanded to fifteen; Greece and Turkey joining in 1952 with West Germany becoming a member in 1955. In response to NATO's expansion, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Treaty Organisation which consolidated Moscow's domination over Eastern urope. The continuing problem of a divided Berlin still dominated Ea tWest relations. In November 1958 the Soviet leader, ikita Khrushchev, gave the western power an ultimatum to leave the city by June 1959. The Cold War was getting hot. At the strategic level, the Alliance wa committed to a forward defence based on the use of nuclear weapon . The fir t tactical nuclear ystem were deployed on the European mainland in the mid 1950 . Exactly who controlled these weapons in time of war wa an issue that had been left largely unaddressed. With the possibility of conflict over Berlin now a real possibility, the control of nuclear weapon within NATO became a dominant theme of intra-alliance politics. The French, under Pre ident de Gaulle demanded control of all nuclear force stationed on French soil. In May 1959, de Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from ATO command and three month later expelled all nuclear-capable forces from French soil. NATO's unity was facing its first decisive test.

Berlin and the Soviet ultimatum

Less than ten years after the end of the Berlin airlift, the divided city was once again the centre of confrontation between ast and West. The underlying cause of the dispute wa the flow of migrants from East to West, most of whom took

Chapter 2 - 1959: Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Cohesion

4. First Ministerial meeting at NATO' new headquarters at Porte Dauphine, 15 December 1959.

advantage of Berlin's open borders and democratic freedoms to seek a new life in the We t. The number of East German citizen cros ing into West Berlin each year soon exceeded 200,000. 1 Their 10 wa a costly drain upon the Ea t German economy and an embarra sment to Moscow. In ovember 1958 in an attempt to halt the flow Khru hchev declared that the military occupation of Berlin wa 'a cancerou tumour which must be liquidated' and that the Soviet Union intended to ign a peace treaty with ast Germany regardle of we tern reaction.2 He further accu ed the we tern power of using their position in Berlin to pur ue subv r iv activities against the Soviet bloc. To put an end to 'the abnormal and dangerous ituation' Khru hchev is ued an ultimatum demanding that We t Berlin be made a 'demilitari ed fr e city' within ix months.3 Moreover, if the We tern power refu ed to accept the 'free city' propo aI, Mo cow would act unilaterally, giving th a t German regime full control of all acce rout into Berlin.

The i sue threatened to tum into a major a tWest confrontation. In re pon e to Khru hchev' ultimatum the We tern pow r ugge ted holding a Four-Power conference of oreign Mini ter to con ider all que tion relating to Germany including the tatus of B rlin. Khru hchev agr ed and the danger ofwarrec ded. Mo cow continued to in i t that, while it wa prepared to give guarantee regarding Berlin' freedom and acce to it th occupation tatu mu t b nded.

1 Keith Hamilton, Patrick almon and tephen Twigge (ed .), Document on Briti h Policy Ove~ ea (DBPO),

erie III, Volume VI, Berlin in the old War, 194 -1990 (Routledge, 2009) p. 87. 2 The Time 12 ovember 1958. 3 DBPO, erie III Vo1um VI, p. 76.

49

BRITAiN iN NATO - THE FiRST 'lX DE 'ADES

The We tern power maintained that there could be no change in the city' tatu pending German reunification. Meeting in Washington to celebrate it tenth anniver ary, the orth Atlantic Council expre ed it det rmination to maintain the freedom of the people of We t Berlin and called for collective action in the face of Soviet provocation. In re pon e, Mo cow condemned the Alliance as a tool of the Pentagon and the greate t threat to the ecurity, national overeignty and independence of

We tern European tates (No.5).

5. 'ATO e retary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak (left) in di u ion with the Foreign Se retary,

lwyn Lloyd 0 entr ~ and the UK Permanent R 'Pre ntative to NATO, ir Frank Robert (right).

n 11 May the ur-P wer on£ renee to di cu the rman qu tion open d in eneva. Hop f ucce were n thigh. n the qu ti n f B rlin

the W t ught guarantee of free acce to the ity nd in i ted that a united Germany h uld

have th right to j in whatev r military alliance it wi hed. he ovi t continued to cont nd that ccupati n right in Berlin mu t be t rminated and

that a unit d erman mu t remain neutral. Th talk w r d adl k d. In Augu t, Khru hch v accepted n invitati n t vi it the nited tate which

rai ed th pr pect f more progre being made in bi tat ral di u ion b tw en the uperp w r ( o. 6). here w re h pe in the We t that a period

impr ved r tati n with the viet nion would n £ How. Th c mmunique i ued after private

t lk b tw nPre id nt i nhowerandKhru hchev at amp D vid n 27 pt mb r indicated that an und r tanding n B rlin had been reach d.4 At

tat (FRU.:J, 'Ii 1. lX,

5

a press conference in Wa hington the following day, Eisenhower confirmed that both leaders had agreed that discussions on the Berlin hould not be prolonged indefinitely but there would be no fixed limit on them. Reaction in We t Berlin was mixed. Its citizens were relieved that the Soviet ultimatum had been withdrawn, but feared that Khrushchev had not relinquished hi goal of absorbing the whole of Berlin into the East German state.

6. A ouvenir heet of U. ommemorative po ta e tamp celebrating NATO' tenth anniver ary i handed over to NATO e retaryGeneral, Paul-Henri paak (right) .

The control of nuclear weapons in NATO

Th confrontation over Berlin and the pr pect of war rai d que tion the Alliance had ought t av id. r rno t am ng t the e wa th deploym ot of nuclear £ rce in NATO urop and the c mmand authority governing their u e. The deci ion to deploy tactical nucl ar w ap n within NAT had fir t b en agre d by th orth Atlantic unci I in 1954. h d ci ion wa ba ed n tw fundamental criteria. ir t by increa ing th firep wer f the Alliance, they enhanced the credibi li ty f forward defenc. c nd the n ed to increa e military pending, in order to match oviet c nv ntional

5 Paul Buteux, Th P liti n ultati n in A TO, 1965-19 0 P, 1

force levels, was no longer necessary. The strategy became official NATO doctrine in May 1957 when the North Atlantic Council approved MC 14/2, The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area, more usually referred to as 'Massive Retaliation' .6

7. The Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, interviewed in Washington.

In order to implement the trategy, Wa hington fir t required the agreement of uropean government to tation, and possibly launch US tactical nuclear weapons from allied territory. Un urprisingly, allied governments sought safeguards to en ure that the weapons would not be used against their wishes (N o. 7). To allay European fears isenhower ugge ted the creation of a NATO atomic tockpile whereby the US would still retain cu tody of the warhead but with NATO allies given respon ibility for their storage and transportation.7 Thi arrangement did not suit President de Gaulle who demanded full

6 Pedlow, NATO Strategy Documents, p. XX. 7 Ronald Powaski, The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993 (Greenwood, 1994), p. 42.

Chapter 2 -1959: Nuclear Weapon and Alliance Cohesion

control of all NATO nuclear weapon stationed in France. In March he announced the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from ATO command (Nos. 8 & 9). The US Air orce re ponded by redeploying nine of its squadrons stationed in France to bases in Britain and West Germany. In 0

doing the US sought to impress on de Gaulle that although French cooperation wa de irable their real estate was not indi pen ible.

8. Selwyn Lloyd (left) greeting Jo eph Lun , Foreign Minister of the etherland (right).

France and NATO

De Gaulle's unea y r lation hip with TO had been apparent inc hi r turn to power in June 195 . In September he et out hi view in a memorandum addre ed to Pre ident i enhower and Prime Mini ter Macmillan in which h demand d the creation of a tripartite directorat con i ting of America Britain and rance to plan e t m global trategy and authori e the u e of nuclear weapon .

Britain and America were unwilling to accede to de Gaulle' demand a acceptanc would have eriou ly undermined alliance cohe ion. De Gaulle's uncompromi ing tance un ettled many within the rench military and diplomatic e tabli hment. General Valluy ommander in

hief Allied orce ntral ur pe b Ii ved d Gaulle' memorandum 'ill-conceived in ub tance and extremely maladroit in pre ntation' o. 10). Thi view wa hared by erve Alphand th rench amba ador to Wa hington who conced d that d Gaulle' ambition w re unreali tic and ba ed

Ali tair Home, Macmillan 1957-19 6 (Macmillan 19 9) pp. 109-10.

51

BRITAIN IN NATO - THE FIR T SIX DECADE

on the General' mi guided belief ' that United State policy wa worked out in the back room of the Pentagon, to which he wa determined to gain acce (No. 11). In an attempt to placate de Gaulle, Britain and America agreed to informal tripartite talk with the rench but insi ted that NATO would retain the primary role of afeguarding Western ecurity. Thi arrangement did not sati fy de Gaulle

who wanted nothing Ie than the same degree of triparti m a had exi ted between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin (No. 12). Britain's ambassador to rance Gladwyn Jebb argued for a more robust re pon e contending that the General held ATO in contempt and hould be frankly told ' to what extent he i crying for th moon and to what extent he ha legitimate grievance which could be met' (No. 13). A h wdown with de Gaulle was considered inadvi able. The preferred approach wa to work n de Gaulle ' advi er who had more ympathy

with the UK po ition and to leave the running to the American (No. 14). In pur uing thi trategy th Briti h ought to deny de Gaulle the opportunity

f prov king i enhow r to withdraw orne or all of American troop in urope ' ( o. 15). It wa neverthele accepted that ' if we could not get on with the rench w mu t g t n without them' (No. 16).

Expanding NATO's Remit?

h continu d uncertainty ov r the Fr nch r tati n hip with ATO coincid d with a review

f th rgani ati n undertaken by th ecretary eneral Paul-Henri paak.9 The impetu behind

th revi w wa paak' belief that A 0 wa to inward-l king and did n t c ver many of the imp rtant trat gic area f the world. To addre thi h rtcoming, paak ugg ted e tab li hing a numb r f r gi nal gr up within AT covering the Middle a t Africa and outh- a t A ia. The gr up ,compo d f tho member with a pecial int re t w uid examine b th P litical and military pr bl m nd th ir c nelu i n h uid b r ported t ATO a a wh Ie' ( 0.17). paak al 0 contended that A hould expand beyond it military remit and p rat a a c ordinating agency for we tern c n mic aid t the und r devel p d c untri and

play an f£ ctive part in the a t-We t truggle' (No. 18). paak propo at rec ived a mixed re p n . he id a f xpanding the role f

9 Paul -Henri paak wa Prime Min ter f B 19ium n three eparate a i n . Hi eeond tenn, 13 t 31 Mar h 1946,

wa th h rte t g vemment in B Igian hi t ry. In 1956, h wa eh en by the uneil t ueeeed L rd I maya

eeretary n ral. He held thi offie fr m 1 57 un ti l 1 61 when he wa ueeeeded by Dirk tikker.

52

the Alliance beyond purely military objectives was di mi sed by member tate who were determined 'not to u e NATO for economic purposes ' . 10 The concept of regional groupings, however, received a more favourable response and addre ed the growing realisation ' that NATO mu t adapt to meet a changing ituation'. II

9. Opening addre by US Pre ident Ei enhower to the North Atlantic Council, Wa hington, 2 April 1959.

In December, the Alliance marked it tenth anniv r ary with the opening of NATO' new headquarter in Pari. The building, ituated in Porte Dauphine, had taken four year to con truct and wa a ymbol of allied cooperation. ranc provided the ite and the labour Belgium upplied the m tal framed window , America in tall d th air-conditioning D nmark th furniture, Holland the interpreting quipment, Italy the marb le, Turkey a m aic, and Britain for rea n unknown, the kitchen equipment. 12 If the co perative nature of th enterpri e wa intended to convcy a n e of c mm n purpose, the ev nt of 1959 hard ly fulfilled the xpectati n. In hi review f th year ev nt , ir rank Robert , Britain Permanent R pr entative to NATO, concluded that it wa difficult to ay whether on balance NA: 0 ' tenth anniv r ary wa a g od or a bad ne for the All ianc (N o. 19). A for th future there were d ubt a t whether the United tate would continue to h ld it own again t the oviet Uni n in th mlng decade.

10 T 1959. 11 A: 0 37 11146344 mem randum by Pemb rt n-Pig-tt, 1 etober 1959.

12 The Annual Reg; I r a/ World Ev nt , 1959 L ngman , 19 O), pp. l 7-6 .


No.5 Moscow to FO conveying Soviet criticism of NATO, 1 April 1959

I:

53

BRiTAi N iN NA TO - THE FiR T SIX DECA DES

54

o. 570 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. . ••• 0. thus constitute thre t t security, ~~tional so~ ~ independence of I est European t tea. 0 single m er c' c1 1 to be m~re secure today t h it t e ye s a o. Hence it is not ris ' t h t u 0 blic opinion is demand d t o t tlnnt ' .. t policy ' f v ur f .cons truct i v.e , pe cetul coexi ten ~ y t he ovlet Unlon. '

6. Pravda l e in article r at tes substance of Government st te nt of ch 29 and ks t h. t eace Tr e ty w d

t end t o est German ~ lit i s an expansi nl , ' hich e s plement t ion of U ' ted States im ri 115m.

7. V a so quote Unit t o t he effect th t r ecent United St t ea - It i eement (see gr ph 3 bove ) i host1le act ect st t he Soviet Union, ~hic l a s It 11a~s 0 n to t e t of r t 1 to bl oT .

For 1 Offioe I e se p S If

avin t tJKDEL . • Ho e · 0 . 8.

Repe t e I re ested]

bbbbb

• 43 d ~o . 79


No.6 UKDEL to FO, 'National Council Meeting', 4 September 1959

55

BRITAIN iN NATO - THE FiRST SiX DECADES

:0 . 366

- 2 -

5.

Tur ninr.

Please set: 190 y imIne iat 1~1 ollowin telcgr m.

CONFIDENTIAL

56

ev o :; d

b eer.. no 1 seem

3 .

en

Chapter 2 -1959: Nuclear Weapons andAliiance Cohesion

No.7 Pemberton-Pigott to Porter (UKDEL) concerning control of nuclear weapons, 9 March 1959

57


o. 8 FO Brief for Prime Minister, 'Organisation of Western Defence', March 1959

/ ...... _ •• , .... oc

5

hapter 2 - 1959: Nuclear Wi apon and Allian e ohe ion

W , i ton D. d ufl ed ott fuirlJ ',le11j another roun 01

Afr ic rill prob b~' st rt i tho rn1 Je of a rch . But

! t i :; clu&r th t this .c:.nd oJ.. pro~edure sti l l oes n t

a s',/er the h ~oL. mi11 t r y que t 10 5 S t. o e oral nul

· ish .

L ~ . Anct he r s oc t o·" tho Gene al ' s ide l;l. s is thn t he doe a

lot consider the inter r ~iOl oJ.. ~orce6 1n ! TO to be ' f ood

s yste.n. He t ' ink tou i:; Fre nch fo eC "ill 0 l1y fi e ht r operly

VI ~e 1 undor nu ti or 1 co a d . ./ e told tho+ U. Couve de

!uI' villo hura s t. i via'll wI h,h is i eod con i~to t ';/i th

t 'oe 're c 1 n[J.t io[ · 1 ~har cter .

5. . , len hi u i do' S . 9 1'0 irat ut Ol'~ rd in the .. ~utum t e

~ ono ul VI 3 id to be cons1 r 1 r thoro' 'h r e r n 0 . mo

\'h i ch he d i1 not tli nk ver nt . /0 h ve

o moro of thi ... exco t th t tho Frenc ') a re

p ~ u i . pro osals for refor 0 t l' e Nl TO ? v 1 Con and

tructuro '1l1ich \' 111 r: i va them :l' e 4-er Dh re in 1 t . The

Go or l's ~tio 11_t s pirit h. s r " t er b~come

co 1 B 0 Fro C.l rof'u 8uls to co - o rate i joint l:ATO eater risos ,

\ lz :

( u ) t 0 F e C 1 h ve r orus~ t ta e

8 stem r '"ATO lr dofe ce.

rt 1n n 1ntogr ted

(t ) lhey h vo r c_ 1 od to uc co t intarm ~iate r u e b l11stic

mie i1 S OJ,' nuclu r s iles on French t r'itory if

t ho ate o bE: U de 1 TO co tro:' •

(c) J:l 0] h vc 18 r f UBO to s r e t o the c ommon in nci

fro t I !'&struc u e fun a of theso install tio 8 even

out 1cJ ch te rito y ..

/(d )

59

BRiTAIN IN NATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

60

SEC ET

( ) Tho,: h ... ve re fuoed t o t ke p r t in ( , r oBr I ' .. 0

of 1 '1 vi i t8 b:,' 8 sy"utAdl'on f r ot.. C' e fou r Che, n..;l

C in.rTldni countrio : ( ' n::' t d Xi n G'Offi , Fr !c , .l3clg ium J an

t or therl "lds ) to c :. ClJ. t e ho "' onth anniv ~' sa ... ] '" -of' ::"TO G r..~ ally ',hey arc no'" rluy in l' 0p.3r ' 't

i _ th·.;i ~ c e l ebra tions .

(0) Fir lly , 'i, , in .h la s t VlO ';{ CZor.:;!1al de G ~-l

s i ~n 1n~ truc t_o 8 fo r t'~ 1 of . 1e

French "-:'lcut f rom I- ~O i 4 time o1"lIar .

T 1,8 c . n be f er :' •• .3 riO!3 ..... 0 1' : e fu «..Ul'(j of t ' ..

.\111 nc e ~ But Our v i ,'.' ~ t' t () t ~.: io . :0 c;ooll tryi r. to bI' 1 ' bou '~

ho',','.)" by COl corte - L' p':,b1 ic c t :i. on bec' uso t e. 'J iv no h lJe

of ch.Jngi t 0 G( n ral t oj i deot:) sud . r~:' in t llis '/8-... On t he

oth r hond , overy op ortunity ~ hou1 b 6 t r n in .r i '~te t o pint

tb t th1 ,ol ~, '~ wi ] 1 ha!"m Fr' ce s r.ru h e~ ot h6f m"'mbe!'s of

Co 0 ll ,~ nc& or mo ·~ . lnu t hop; tC'l4.'1 he 1' 0 9r C3~Lt:.: t 10 of

the Allies ] the G~ 'r 1 ' 6 wili a1' a ' vis 1'8 (w' 0 n ve lnay b on

v or soun) nd t l (] lOCi. 0' 0 l ent ', '111 g r (1 11y in1 lu _ ~e 1m.

t t t 1.. ntiol '11111.>0 0 t k n UD wit

t prob l .'!, u o· n '0 '. t 10n l itl e Ru Ai no th t t S8

i de '111 t · iCe a sa on plE!e in tno Df uirs 0:' the All i a nce a n

1111 at h V ~ as l~C : d~ sruptlve ect 8 ey loul d 1 otho r

me r ou n t 1\ j 8 \ C n (" t h _. _ J ... -, :J to ·' h , k n h 0 : t •

cr

r ~se t 0 u~ je t 0 - t ~dlter r nean fl ot wi ,,' the French in

Pa r1s s1nce the rne in 0';) j I.! t of tl: v 1s 1 ~ 1s to t 1 k obout GOfrr3 r~

an B " 11n. But 1 t e 'r e!" h brL it up M1l"i t f.;l hould say t t

v b en 1n CO'I r r for t nl · t nd , not :aving h time

t o f 110 ': the 1mpllco tlons of ~ hc 18 t v olo~n~n~s , fO not

anxious to h:: v a prolo ed COl veroat1on 'llit t he 'rench on the

ub j ct.

ECRET


I

8. M1n1et '8 woul ax es e ne ~ al dl s)l oo u~ s a waul au port

any line wh1ch by that ti .0 the at'1c ns thenss lve mi ht va

taken with t he Fr e ch such as sayi

(8) that t he French action i poses of th ir cla 1m to a

grost I' ~ hor e of NATO co ndersi

(b) 1t Quld wee ten tho ir vole in t h Counc i ls of 'he

Alli nee;

(c) tha t it could only have the effec t of imlni~h1 our

inter t in tri r i ta co ult&t ions on o ~h r ubj ects

in Va hi ·ton.

9. Tho ricans have b n inform€. Qccord1 lYe

10. If C:e er 01 de G ullt3 S ks of his b ro del' s trate 1c ideas

Un1 t d Kl~dom inisters \1111 prO ob1 wis h 0 take t

a s t e Secr otory o~ State i th t e Fr eh Ambassador,

...ame line

m ly that

1 ply no praetic(. l po11 ·' ic s to ;~pec t the Arne ie ns to be

PI' 0 pa l' ed to tl'Y to ork out so e kl or world strat nd the rear

that vlley CUI hop to g t 1 ; oJ kin of 1n1'or me l tri Ct rti te

d1sous ,, 10ns hioh have 11' a r start • It 1s sugges t od tha t it

should b left t o the Arne I'1c t1S to 6 y more 1ihan h1 on th1a

spect if the 11ah.

61


o. 9 British record of conversation at French Embassy after dinner, 13 April 1959

62


2 RT

EC

63


o. 10 Roberts to Rumbold discussing French officers and de Gaulle, 23 January 1959

(

64

•


Comment11l6 on (b), Valluy recalled bis own experiences in the Standing Group two years or so ago. Hia impression then was that the U.K. did not really object to giving France eat sfactlon in the Iberlant area and that the objections had oome mainly tram the American side. Perhaps these could now be removed. He added that h fully reoognised that the real laO axis in the editerranean was east/west and therefore extended far beyond Prenoh interests, but it should not, in his view, be impossible to reconcile this with 80.e viaible satisfaction for Prance's concern with control over the north/south axis in the estern edi terranean and in the Iberlant area.

You, and the other reoipient. of thia letter will, I am aure, take special. care that Valluy's oonfidenoe should be respeoted as he was speak1ns very frankly and, at times, pretty disrespectfully about General de Gaulle.

It is perhaps worth adding that Speidel, ho was at the same dinner but ho did not take part in the above oonversation, spoke to me separately in very crt tical. terms about General. de Gaulle's ideas, and even more about the Chancellor's t ndency at the mo.ent to defer to de Gaulle in moat matters. He said that he would hiaself be seeing the Chanoellor in a d", or t 0 and intended to warn him that this German policy was not to tbe good of ATO.

I am sending copies of this letter to Gladwyn Jebb, Kit Steel in BoDD, Harold Caooia in utUngtOD, Il1chael Denny in the St&Dding Grou.p and to Richard Po ell at th niatry ot Defenoe.

-

SECRE!

65


o. 11 Washington to FO, 'General de Gaulle's plan', 23 January 1959

(

)

I

66


67


o. 12 Jebb to Rumbold on the subject of Eisenhower/de Gaulle, 13 October 1959

6


No. 13 Jebb to Hoyer Millar advising a hard line towards de Gaulle, 29 May 1959

69


••

70

co IFm~TIAL

Anyw~ J SO far as I know no responsible foreigner - other than myself to a minor degree and within the limits of my Instructions - has ever even hinted to the Great Mail that there 1s ~hlpg even faintly deplorable in the w~ he barges about the N. A. T. o. china shop. A "trSnk discussion" on these lines J at the least J certainly seems overdue.

I am sending copies of this letter to Frank Roberts J Harold Caccia and Tony wnbold.


No. 14 Roberts to Dean reporting differences of opinion with de Gaulle, 17 July 1959

71


,

72

CONFIDE TIAL

CI1J

Briti.h without bringing them tormally before NATO. !hey doubted very much whether any practioal solution would be found but they were all in favour ot continual talk and oonsultation if that was what General de Gaulle wanted.

Ml U.S. colleague then wound up the prooeedings with a rather foroed note of optimism on the theme that 8omehow or other President Eisenho.er and President de Gaulle must get together and have a thorough, frank talk. This was in his view one ot the stronge.t reasons in favour ot a Summit Keeting.

Couroel ot course spoke to us as a former colleague and a good friend ot NATO, but the main impression I derived trom this oonversation waa that General de Gaulle 121 not so much hostile to JAtO as indifferent towards it and concerned with what be oonsider. wider issues outside NATO. !hese issues are in his vie. so lIIportant that he muat use such means at pressure as are favourable to him, even it they are NATO means ot pressure, to advance his cause.

I am sending oopies of this letter to !0Q1 Rumbold in Geneva, S~ Hood in WashinctoD, and to Gladwyn Jebb.

CO IA


No. 15 Jebb to Rumbold assessing de Gaulle's intentions, 2 December 1959

73


74

TOP SECRE'I' and GUA.cID

of some or all of the American troops i n urope. I f J

therefore, President Eisenhower is aoi to ut the sere on the ~eneral I think he wo 1 be i11- vised to thre ten any .. merie i th raw i f de GuIle sho lId persist in his wicked w , s. or that ~o 11 be 1 i into de Gaulle 's band. esides , it be ,hat t he

eric ns inten to 0 a.ny\7 . Therefore J i f _ resident Eise ho~er 1 o· ~ to use the bi sti in any he W lIdo atter to Sll est th t 'bi1ity of trl t1te isc .ssions on lorl ~ ro I e s 1011 be viti ted I :' the nar 1 lrs 19 hi .' ent at · - T TO 11 a. _ er ps it 1 t 0 Qch to ho e th t he rni oht also d ~, le the c rot of i to the General ' s tomic

e - I S rovided he re forms his ti-l TO

In talon run ner 1 de aull c uld only trwnp such cards as t hese, I think, by act lally f1irti ~i th ,tr • Khrushchev. t the end 0 paragraph 4 of my letter under reference yo' will see so at i that General Ely let sliu, n ely the.t tili l:.st is indeed a bility which we must not axel de; and indeed anyboQy ho reads the thi volume of de Galtlle 's 'amoires cannot dismiss it as an inherent absurdity. But I carmot see ho ~ General de Gaulle c at the moment throw over the Chancellor to the extent that would be necessary if re 1 flirtation with the Russians was in his mind.

evertheless , the astonisb1 moderation of present Soviet policy to ards France , not only re Algeria but as re ds evePythl else, i in itself d1sq let1 • 01 arly, us chev ho as to et samet i out of his vis1 t to the G nar . t this co Id po s1 bly be

as me however - al asaUDlin that the neral 111 not c&It the Chance11 r. Have yo 1 yourself ideas?

I am sending a OOW of th1s letter to Frank


No.16 Hoyer Millar to Jebb suggesting the best way to handle de Gaulle, 27 May 1959

75


76


77


o. 17 FO Brief, 'Consultation in ATO, Monsieur Spaak's Proposals', 5 November 1959

o

o LA.,- ,ll ~ ."1'"

I( )

7


(a) It is designed to satisty French aspirations;

but 11 the indications are that it will not do

80. General de Gaulle wants tri.parti te French,

American, British global planning nd there is

no reason to suppose that he ill regard these

NATO groups as an adequate substitute.

(b) It is also designed to &moth I' the proposed

political consultations b9tween the 8ix. Apart

trom the fact that e do not take the plans of

the Six too tragically, they are quite ditferent both

in origIn and in purpose and II. Bpaalt' s groups would

have no effect on. them.

4. . Moreover the concept ot the strength ot NATO and ot the

Alliance is vogue anel int ngible. Some people believe that

the bost ~ope tor all our ru~ure lies in the develepment ot

loyalty to an Atlantio Alliance ond of a harmonious policy by its

membel's. The compoAition ot ~O 1s not perfect tor thi~

purpose but it haa made a beginning and no other gl'oup!ns

shows prom1se ot doing s mUCh. Others think that NATO is

only important as a regional defence communIty and its political

importance derives tram its usetulness tor detence. In either

case it is doubttul how tar a ne 8lstem ot commIttees would

help NATO.

5. or it bristle. Ith praotical 41aadvantasea:

/(a)

79


80

( a)

S~CRET

!ember countries who were excluded from th~ groups

~culd be extremely auspicious. The Canadians in

p rticular have already made clear their hostile

reactions.

(b) For different reasons we suppose tha t the Americans

would be opposed to the scheme with its implication

f two classes of members in NATO. President

~iscnhower said forcibly 1n September to the North

Atl ntic Council th t the Un1ted States regarded all

me.ber c0untr1es were in p~lnciple equal.

(c) One f our own ims is t make the whole of NATO more

"cutw rd-looklng", that is to give all member countr1es

a ~ nee of responsib1l1ty for problems which may not

affect th~m morely, but a re n vertheless of glob 1

1m rt nce. To divert dlBCU6sions from the full

Counci l ould not help ln this.

(d) l r do ve nt to fruscrot action by RubJe~tine it

to influite processes of con8:.llt tion. If policies

hod to be discussed first in the tripartite Anglo

American Prench up and then in a Speak group and

finally in the full NATO Counoll, we should al!. be

exhausted with discussion and never get anywhere.

(e) Thera i8 dltt'iculty over the areas to be covered.

Any formal ATO group deal1ng with Africa would cause

uite disproportionate difficulties wiun the African

countries. And the logical oonsequenct8 ot Middle

Lastern and South-East Asian groupe would be that

NATO should emb rk en t ormal and effective

co-ordination with CENTO and SEATO which would lead

tG further dttticultlea.

/(t)

SECIlET


(t) Finally 1 t would be very d1tf1cul t to g t agreement

on the oomposit1on ot the groups. To prevent

Germany and Italy from feeling themselves 1n an

inferior poe1 t10n • Spaak has suggested that they

ae well ss the three Standing Group countJ-ies

should torm a n claus ot each group. In that case

all the active member countries ould probably want

to b members of every group and there would be no

real. difference between the groups and th6 :f'ull

Counoil.

6. It ia au Q~ t t the lin t o t kc 1th M. Spn k 1a trot

l' 1 difficulty and tha t

m t lou able and constructive ott mpt to overcome 1 t.

Untortunately there 1s no way j~ hj ch NATO can achieve his

1mm d1 te alme (pal' gr ph 3) an~ tt, creation ot any tormal

maohinery i£ open to the sorious d1 advantages enumerated in

paragraph 5. We tully support hie more general purpose ot

direoting NATO's oollectiveattent1on to strategic areas ot the

world oute1de the NATO area and developing NATO into an effective

political organisation capable t co-ordinattng the r8s1staQoe

ot the Western world to any threat to its seourity trom w~atever

qua~ter. To this end we Ihould preteI' an extension ot ~e

praotloe (tor h10b there 81'8 preoedents) ot oonst1 tut1ng ad hog

oommlttees to oonsider epec1t10 probloma. The prooeed1nga ot

the_ 00l1li1 tteea ould have t be kept aa ral' a posslble 8 aNt;

and the, ould ,Pl'obably have to b open to any member oountl'iee

hlah illhed to take part. Bu t they should provide the

bostnntnge ot moohtn r.v tor a oloser oolleotive atudy at dangers

whlah are eo serious that 1 t 18 un4 niable that the estern

attitude to arda them ought to b co-ord1nated.

81


o. 18 Roberts to Hoyer Millar reporting suggestions for the future of ATO, 8 October 1959

2

•

Chapter 2 -1959: Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Cohesion

On the economic s1d~.f Spaak originally wanted to Slggest that NATO shou.Ld operate as a coordinating agency for estem economic 10. to the under-deV~~ea countr1es and so pl8¥ an effectl ve part in the - est struggle which he considers Will iIicreasingly move over to tfiEj economic field. Fortunately however! Gregh produce what Evelyn described to me as a very brill ant and realistic ~aper pointing out in terms wh1ch I think would have earnea the warm appro at iteha.11, that roo as not the right vehicle fOr this that there were many other agencies in the field, eto., ate. ithout necessarily accept,lIlg Gre s argumEntsl'L~Jl&ik· put wa.ter in his ilie to tIle extent ot proposing UlB.t expanded N TO economic actiVitv' should concentrate upon imoroying the economies ot the under-developed members of N TO - Greece, Turkey, Iceland and Portugal - thus stre~erP.ng the Alliailce as a mole and serving as a pattern tor the outsl a orld. This 1s1 I imagine, a concept, Which will be as much

anathema to Whi'(,aha11 as the broader orld concepti and I am glad to StAY Ulat Gregh bas alreq set out 8.1. the objections to Sbaak, who Is determined however to Illt this proposal forwara. tor consideration by Governments. It is one to which he bas become increas1ngly att ched for some time past.

i.. Turning ~o his own pol1t1cal field, Evelyn told me that Speak Dad instructea him to work out 1n more deta.1l his concept of different groups of TO countries conoentrating upon different areas outside ID, e.g. one on Afr1ca, one on the ddle Bast and one on the F . Bast. '!bis is tl1e oonce~ on hich S s al.re~ said he would

el0aD8 our vie s in due course (please see ~agr M 6 of my tele~ 382 Saving ot SeptEmller 25). Spa8k Qeveloped his Idea fUrther to ~est that t, he c lea the Fi va Cre :t, ers should be-in 1 three grQUP1ngs. He insisted that the avowed object of the politiCal consnl t10n ith1n these tnlfiJ should be to arr1 va at a CCIIIDJ)n TO Wlioy in e or- these areas WhiCh Uld atta ardS be endorsed by the rest of 8 COlD1C11. The consul tion should, in ~1N"" Vi ~ be t the evel ot ut. Represen: t1ves t p 1Y. WJ. th himself in the r in e c e.

,. alYn qUick to po1ilt out to SD88k some of' the obv1ous objections ch uld be r sea in the ditterent

p tal.s to tb co apt, a ther ~~!IK ........ UW\A him to sat out his ole ly 1y 01' to te th up in ch 11K) 1l¥. turn

~lt1on. 8 • ;t, his d t out as cle ble so t the G eut,s oUld :t, tbey e being

8SIC~ea • Th1s m1aht em of ;UUllw-J..iJD ~.~ .. de t.be~1g Pi in tb8 groups.

83


84

SOORET

~ ~

Evelyn's task now is to produce a paper which will f thfUlly reflect Spaak's views! but he is anxious to do it in a form which will be as litt e harmful as possible. One of his ideas is to get aWB¥ trom the Ulree areas pro~sed by Spt!.8k, which clearlY have no particular connection ~th N TO and in one of which, Africa, every kind of difficulty would arise through the mere appearance of N TO intervention. I need op!y mention obvious C.R.O. and C.O. objections. Evelyn thoUght tllat two areas should be substituted - one the Middle East and North Africa and the other the Far East includi.ru! South East Asia. it could reasonably be gued that NA'm bad a direct . interest in the securiW of the

iddle East (the Turkish pOSition, oil :fPlieSt etc.) and also in North Africa since N TO was co tted 0 defend Algeria alrea~. ThIs also happened to be the area in which de Gaulle was directly interested. Similarly, it could be gued that the Chinese Communist menace was a question to which N TO could hardly be indifferent, more especially as it could be argued that there was a greater risk of a world war arising from Chinese action in the Far East than from events in any other area.

. I strongly encouraged Evelyn to get aw~ from the African theatre as such and told him t.h t, at first sight, I thought there was much merit in his two alternative e t

more especial~ as the first could be reg ded linking up with Western defence interests concentrated in C~'ro and the secondwiththe simil defence interests of the free world centred in SE TO. It as cert iIllY open to argwnent whether it was a. good thing for NATO to be directly linked with these other defence pacts. But not even the most neutr l1st critic could SEJ¥ that it was in principle outrageous tor N TO countries to be concerned witfl their 1nterests in these other areas also covered by defence pacts. I added however that ~e~ would not have overlooked the s~ objeotions of canaOa and of Scandinavia to any kind or liiik-up between RAW and CBNTO and SEATO going beyond an axcbqe ot ~ infol'JD8.tion. Indeed, anofher ditf1culW about the whole ide was that whereas Gennany and Italy 1 b.O bad no direct interests outs1de Europe, were to be promolled as members or the Big F1 ve, Oanada, who I1a.d interests outs1de Europe, was not apparently tD figure on any one ot Spaak' s groups.

i On a more general note, I eated to Evelyn that SD&ak might be e~erat1Dg the diilgers to HArm in the months aDead. as Gaulle's attltuC1e had no doubt compelled us and the Americans to consult together rather DX)I'8 Ulan e otherw1se might have done outs1de NATO J and theGermans and the Italians ere sho~ signs of following su1t. But I as etw sure thit there was no desire in e1 tiler lA>ndon or 8sll1hgt,Qn to short-circuit TO or to use it as a rubber stamp tor decisions al ready taken elsewhere.

I t the present moment,


At the present moment! there was a lull in political consultation in ro gely because consultations had not in fact yet begun a.n.;rwhere on a SUDIlli t meeting and because no-one woUld be reB.d¥ to discuss disarmament for two-or-three months. 'lhere were also fortunately no ~or crises ithin NATO such as British force reductions or Cyprus. Hance a certain lull in N TO political consultation was a natural develoP!l8Ilt d by no means necessarily a bad one. It would not do S or N TO any good if Governments ere g1 van tlle impression that HAW was an entity quite distinot from its canponent parts,

ah felt the urge to be active, and spectacularlY active, in the political field quite regardless of the real need tor suCh actiVity.

'0. EvelYn ~ed with all this. rut we both concluded that §paak. 's hUnch tbat something spectacular was needed at the December Ministerial eeting could not be ignored and might well be supported in other quarters. It would therefore be better to make some profitable use of 1t rather Ulan to oPP9se it who e-heartedly. EvelYn felt 1n particular that it would be vew helpful if the Br1 tish Government eme~ fran the Election were able to suggest to Spaak certein :fields of activity with which N TO m1 t usefully concem itself.

II. None of this calls for inmedlate re ot1ons, and clearly these could not be e~cted from lDnoon in we sent clrcumstanc s. But Spaak will certainlY wISh to develop his own ideas d obtain our reactions to them when he visits London earlY in November. By that tim he will MEl) presumablY have got sane ~ with the dr ing. of h1s :report

d 1th the ~~e of t1ine, it 11 become 1nOreas~ d1mcult to modify his ideas. I should be tetul therefore it tlJ.e Department could give sane thougpt to these problems, in the context of mY earlier messages.8bout SDBak's attitude, and 1r you could let me have some fUrther gu1Clance in due course. It woUld, I think, make Spaak's conver :tiona in u,ndon Dm'e businesslike, 8nd perl)8.ps re fruitful, if I could.gQ over the ~und With h1Dl in ~11m1DBJ.7 8¥ c2ur1ng tl11 month. If' you thought it would be usefUl, I could ~s come over for f,aI, 1:.l1Qugh I re ise

1 have IP8DY other ur ant proble in the period lJIIII8mloately attar the Blect on.

I do not know ther the ~ told (altho he

secret.

85

BRITAl IN NATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

o. 19 Robert ' Annual Review for 1959, ummary, 8 February 1960

6

Chapter 3 - 1969: Flexible Response and Arms Control

Chapter 3

1969: Flexible Response and Arms Control

NATO's twentieth anniversary took place against a backdrop of growing international tension. In August 1968, Soviet tanks entered Czechoslovakia, forcibly suppressing the 'Prague Spring', whilst in Vietnam, American troops were involved in an increasingly unpopular and unwinnable war. The North Atlantic Council deplored Moscow's use of force and declared that the people of Czechoslovakia must be free to shape their future without outside interference. In relation to Vietnam, NATO remained silent. For Europeans, the Vietnam War was an issue which threatened to undermine the credibility of the US commitment to Europe. General de Gaulle was determined that France would not be drawn into foreign adventures and, in 1966, withdrew French forces from NATO's integrated command. Other European leaders were less strident but shared de Gaulle's concern that US unilateralism was undermining alliance cohesion. In April 1969, de Gaulle unexpectedly announced his decision to resign the French presidency following his defeat in a nationwide referendum. Any thoughts of a French rapprochement with NATO, however, were short lived with Georges Pompidou, de Gaulle's successor as President, reaffirming that France would not be returning to the NATO fold in the foreseeable future. The election of Willy Brandt as West German Chancellor in October 1969 and his policy of Ostpolitik placed further strain on the transatlantic relationship.

Richard Nixon, who was inaugurated as America's thirty-seventh president in January 1969, was well aware of the strains within NATO but believed that America 'could no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska' .1

1 President Nixon's Report to Congress, The Times, 19 February 1970.

To demonstrate his support for the Alliance, Nixon ensured that his first trip abroad as President was to NATO's headquarters in Brussels where he pledged his determination to achieve a full and genuine partnership. Henry Kissinger, the US National Security Advisor, was more circumspect and voiced his disquiet that NATO was becoming an alliance without a purpose. He further insisted that the US could not continue to shoulder the burden of containing communism worldwide and that the allies must be prepared to do more for their own defence. These two elements of US foreign policy later became enshrined in the so-called

10. NATO Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio, (centre-left) in conversation with British Defence Secretary, Denis Healey (centre-right).

Nixon Doctrine which reaffirmed Washington's commitment to honour its treaty obligations but with the expectation that America's allies would assume greater responsibility for their own

87


defence.2 To achieve this, the US sought increases in conventional forces. The Europeans did not share this view and maintained that NATO's nuclear forces were the main deterrent against Soviet aggression. NATO's attempts to strike the right balance between conventional and nuclear forces and establish a strategy based on the concept of flexible response, adopted by the Alliance in 1968, remained unresolved for the next decade.3 It was even reported that General Lemnitzer, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, banned the use of the phrase flexible response in his Headquarters as he believed it open to so much misinterpretation.4

11. Denis Healey (left) in discussion with US Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, (right).

In addition to its military role, NATO slowly began to develop a political identity. A significant factor behind this move was the Harmel Report of 1967 which advocated a greater role for the Alliance in reducing tension between East and West. 5 Early deliberations focused on arms control eventually leading to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact which continued throughout the 1970s. Other areas of common interest were also

2 The Nixon Doctrine was first articulated at a press conference at Guam on 25 July 1969. For further details, see Walter LaFaber, The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, Volume 2 (Norton, 1994), p. 638. 3 For further details, see Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO 50 Debate Over Strategy in the 1960s (Macmillan, 1988) 4 Francis Gavin, 'The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe during the 1960s', International History Review, December 2ool. 5 For the text of the Harmel Report, see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, 1971).

88

addressed. In April 1969 , the North Atlantic Council endorsed a proposal put forward by President Nixon, that the Alliance should place greater emphasis on environmental concerns. The result was the 'Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society' which met for the first time in December. The issues of resource management, pollution and population growth were high on the agenda.

Flexible Response and Alliance Strategy

NATO's adoption of flexible response in 1968 was designed to provide the Alliance with a range of military options ranging from conventional defence to all-out nuclear war. The strategy replaced the previous concept of Massive Retaliation which had been criticised as offering the Alliance only two alternatives in the face of Soviet attack: capitulation or fire at will. Implementation of the strategy, however, remained problematic. The main issue of contention centred on the duration of the conventional phase and the role of tactical nuclear forces. The continental Europeans, led by West Germany and France, favoured a short conventional phase with the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons taken immediately national territory was threatened. This view was based on the belief that a prolonged conventional battle in central Europe would result in unacceptable destruction and decouple US strategic nuclear forces from the defence of the European continent. The Americans took a different view and favoured a prolonged period of conventional fighting before any decision to employ nuclear forces was taken. This reflected the growing realisation that the US mainland was now vulnerable to a Soviet second strike and that consequently NATO policy should not be based on immediate nuclear response but provide for 'as many options as possible short of a strategic exchange involving the territory of the United States itself'.6

British policy objectives in NATO were contained in a memorandum jointly prepared by the Secretaries of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs and circulated to the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on 24 March, 1969 (No. 20). The primary theme was the need for compromise with Britain taking the leading role in mediating between the extreme views of excessive delay or immediate retaliation. The consequences of failure were stark, for if either view prevailed 'it would be hard to see how the Alliance could maintain its

6 TNA: FCO 41 /413 , OPD (69) 17, 24 March 1969

present character'.7 To avoid a damaging split, the issue was never fully resolved. Meeting in April, NATO defence ministers reaffirmed the validity of the current NATO strategy which required effective conventional forces in addition to supporting tactical nuclear forces deployed in the European area. The statement did little to disguise the reality that while the Alliance possessed sufficient conventional forces to halt a Soviet advance, it lacked the resources (and will-power) to prevail without resort to nuclear weapons. How these weapons would be used and under whose authority they would be launched were questions that needed to be addressed.

The Nuclear Planning Group

The increased emphasis placed on nuclear forces within NATO strategy intensified calls from the European members of the Alliance for greater participation in the planning and deployment of nuclear forces. To satisfy these demands, the US administration advanced plans for a NATO nuclear force. Initial ideas centred on a nuclear-armed, mixed-manned and collectively-owned surface fleet. The Multilateral Force (MLF), as the concept became known, was designed to reconcile two conflicting objectives: deployment would preserve US operational control over nuclear weapons while enabling NATO's European members to participate more fully in the management of nuclear forces assigned to NATO. 8 The MLF proposal was immediately criticised by the Soviets who argued that it would give West Germany access to nuclear weapons. Moscow was adamantthat that deployment of the MLF would prevent the implementation of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In the face of Soviet hostility, and the lukewarm support expressed by the Europeans, the MLF was quietly dropped. In its place came the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) which was composed of four permanent members (America, Britain, Italy and West Germany) and three rotating members.9 Its purpose was to give the non-nuclear members of the Alliance a sense of involvement in the planning of nuclear strategy and deployment and to give reassurance that the US remained strongly committed to the defence of Europe. Denis Healey, the British Defence Secretary, believed that the NPG played a fundamental role in the success of NATO's consultative machinery

7 Ibid. 8 For details, see Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective (Adelphi Papers No. 13), October 1964. 9 For details, see Buteux, pp. 69-109.


during his tenure in office. 10 In 1969, the NPG produced two policy documents on the operational use of nuclear weapons. The first was a Belgian paper dealing with the procedures for consultation within the Alliance prior to any decision to use nuclear weapons in the defence of NATO territory. The second, an Anglo-German paper laying down guidelines for the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in defence of the Alliance, formed the basis for NATO's 'Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons' which was approved by the NPG during its meeting at Airlie House in Virginia in November (No. 21). The British regarded the meeting as 'highly satisfactory' enabling the Alliance to meet the challenges of the new decade with increased confidence and a renewed sense of purpose. 11

12. The Icelandic Prime Minister, Bjarni Benediktsson, cuts the cake marking NATO s twentieth anniversary flanked by Manlio Brosio (left) and US Secretary of State, William Rodgers (right).

Arms Control

From its inception in 1949, NATO had been a purely military alliance. This was soon to change. In December 1967, the North Atlantic Council approved The Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance. The report, written by the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, advocated that, in additional to its military role, NATO should broaden its remit to include political objectives designed

10 For Healey's view of NATO nuclear policy during this period, see Denis Healey, The TIme of My Life (Michael Joseph, 1989), pp. 301-25. 11 TNA: FeO 411434, Washington to FeO, Tel. No. 3095, 12 November 1969.

89


to reduce tension between East and West. The report reinvigorated NATO following the French withdrawal and provided a framework within which the Alliance could adapt itself to the evolving political environment. Not everybody welcomed the report. A prominent critic was Henry Kissinger who believed that NATO was simply not equipped to be an instrument of detente. In June 1968, meeting in Reykjavik, allied ministers declared their readiness to improve East-West relations and signalled their intention to examine measures leading to a mutual and balanced reduction of forces whilst maintaining the security of the Alliance. 12 Any hopes of a positive response from Moscow were soon dashed following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia two months later. Moscow's first tentative reaction to the Alliance's proposal occurred in March 1969, when Warsaw Pact members meeting in Budapest issued a peace declaration calling for a European security conference. 13 The primary aim of the conference was to consolidate Soviet influence in Eastern Europe prior to reductions in military forces.

NATO members rejected the Soviet initiative, believing that progress on MBFR could not be reconciled with Moscow's demand for a European security conference. In May 1970, following their meeting in Rome, the Alliance's formal position on MBFR was spelt out in a note personally delivered to the Soviet leadership by NATO's Secretary General Manlio Brosio. The note detailed four principles which would govern the Alliance's approach to future talks. These were that force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the Alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side; reductions should be on the basis of reciprocity and be phased and balanced as to their scope and timing; the scope should include stationed and indigenous forces and their associated weapons systems; and there must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of any negotiated agreements. 14 Progress remained slow but eventually yielded results. In July 1973, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opened in Helsinki with 35 states sending representatives. Three months later in October the ,

12 For full text of the declaration, see Texts of Final Communiques, 1949-1974 (NATO infonnation Service, Brussels), pp. 209-10. 13 For details, see Detente, Diplomacy and MBFR 1972-1976, FCO Historians, Occasional Papers No. 17 (April 2002).

14 For full text, see Texts of Final Communiques, pp. 237-38.

90

first meeting of the MBFR took place in Vienna. IS

The talks, which lasted almost continuously for the next fifteen years, were the first and only direct negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to take place wholly during the Cold War.

The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society

An early manifestation of NATO's expanded remit occurred in April 1969, when US President Nixon, in his speech to celebrate NATO's twentieth anniversary, called on the Alliance to examine ways in which to improve the quality of life of its citizens. The result was the Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society (CCMS), which met for the first time in December 1969 (Nos. 22-24). The committee, which was established under Article 2 of the treaty, called on member states to tackle common environmental problems that could imperil the welfare and progress of modem societies. Despite initial scepticism shown by a number of member states who believed the initiative was 'ill judged and impractical'16 the CCMS soon established itself and was one of the first bodies to highlight the emerging risks to regional security posed by environmental degradation and its impact on agricultural production and access to water. In 2006, the CCMS was merged with NATO's Science Committee to form the Science for Peace and Security Committee. 17 Its priorities are defence against terrorism, environmental security and the challenges posed by climate change and population migration.

15 For further details see, G. Bennett and K. Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Oversea, Series III, Volume II, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-1975 (The Stationery Office, 1997); G. Bennett and K. Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series Ill, Volume Ill, Detente in Europe, 1972-76 (Frank Cass, 2001).

16 TNA: FeD 411414, Waterfield to K.illick, 30 May 1969. 17 For further details of the Science for Peace and ecurity Committee, see the NATO website.

13. President Nixon addresses the North Atlantic Council flanked (from left to right) by the UK Permanent Representative to NATO, Sir Bernard Burrows, William Rodgers and the US Permanent Representative to NATO, Harlan Cleveland.


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o. 20 Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee,' ATO 20th Anniversary Meeting, 10-11 April', Memorandum by ecretary of State for FCO and Secretary of State for Defence, 24 March 1969

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5 CR

NA~Q 20TH ANNIVERSARY

PART I

ART II

ON~ 10-11 RI1

U.K. Objectives

NATO strategy

PART I

The H rmel Report on the utu e Taske ot the Alliance, attopted at the in1sterial me ting in Dece) ber 96;, stressed that the twin purposes ot the Allianoe are--

a ) defencej

b) d .ten't

This duality has been apparent at both in1sterlal meetings since then, in Reykjavik in June 1968 hen the emphasis was o~ detente, and in russe1a in November when the emphasis, in the aftermath ot Czechoslovak.1a, was on defence. In ashin ton 1~ mu t be our aim to ensure that this QU91ity of pproaoh 1s ublicly maintained and in proIer perspective.

2. Our main objective, and that of our Allies, must be to establish, to ether with -the n ~ erican a min~stration whose o~n policies are still in a formative sta e, a sound basis tor the management ot the Alliance tor the next tew years. It is importar.t that theconfidence ot members of the Alliance in its ability to carry out its dual role for the tores eable future should be confirm d. Despite the salutary shock administered by the Soviet invasion ot Czechoslovakia many prolJlems rems n and the shock itself 18 beginning to be forgotten by some.

3. The background actors which nay to be taken into account include:-

a) the Czech crisis and its aftermath;

b) cQrrent ditferences of emphasis (eXD801al17 bet een the uropeanl and the Americana) ithin

/th The OM I Europeana" in this paper can gene al~ be t en to mean the partioipating European member ot ATO , though th re ar distinot 41 er nc 8 ot emphsai - tor example bet en the C t~al and Southern membere.

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the Alliance about defence strategy and European doubts about the Americ n nuclear commi tment: (this is d~al t Ii th in detail in Part II of this p per);

) the probab16 revival of prcssur. ithin the -',ited st tes for a reduction in U. u . force levels i. Europe;

d) American concern about Nheth · r the ~uropeans are carrying ~ ap ropriete share of the defence burden;

e) th imminence of U.S./Sovi~t negotiatlo~s and th consequent possibil ty of a elaxation in the 11iance's defence effort through euphoria;

f) recent dev lopme;nt s wi thin the Commu t4i s t world , notably th ~ncrep'se in tensi .)n between the Soviet Union and China and the lersew Pact meting of 17 March; snd

g) the posi~ion of France in r~l tion to the Alliance.

4. The net effect 0 these fac~ors is that at a time when the u. efu1n ~S of N TO has just been re-#mphasised, disruptive pressures ere threat ning to reassert themselves. Henc~ the importance ot establishing at Y shin ton a comnon understanding f the f,111ance 's objectives and mutual truet in purJuing them.

5. Defence

The prerequisites for a solution to the problems f acing the .1118nce on the defence side include ackno~ledgment that:-

a) e should work towards an agreed interpr~tatlon of CUI'rent Ni TO strategy;

b} the merican strategic and tactical nuclear commitment should be cr dible and unequivocal;

c) American troop levels and r inforcement capabilities should be related to the requirements of (8) and (b) above;

d) that the European nations should undertake over the coming years to continue to improve the quality and effectiveness or th 1r ccnventional contribution to the Alliance's collective detence. (Implicitly the .~ericana will have to recognise that, unless

/the

2

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c

the threat changes, substantial quantitative increases 1n the level of the contribution are out of the question);

e) that there would be no unilateral reductions in d~tence effort or weakening of peli tical 'Jill a8 a resu) t ot a r sumption of cvntacts ith the aggressor Warsaw act countri B.

6. e cannot hope to resolve all theBe issues at Washi~ ton. Some, notably (c) and (d), require detail d dlscu8sionmore appropriate to the m~eting of the D.P.C. 1n June. inistera wl11 however need in j·prl1 to reafflrm the r~ ( uiremenG for a strong Alliance; their solidarity in the tace of any threat; the continuing determlnat on ot every member to make an appropriate co tribu~ion to the mutual ttort of de .nce and det~rr'nce at all levels; and their eli f tha~ it is only thro~~ a strong and unlted allianne that we can achieve the lasting improvement in Ea8t-Y.e~t ~elatlons whlch is our ultimate aim. In the light of th~ line taken by President Nixon during his tour we ahould try to secure trom the U.S. confirmation of their intention to maintain the present nuclear commitment to Europe, and the forces there hlch make it credible • .Although they will try to avo':d any appearance of a "transatlantic bargain" the Americ swill 1n any cpse X{:e ct the E1lropean members to affirm their intention to maint ain and improve, over the coming y ars , the qualit l and effectivenem of their contribution to conventional d fence. The Americans may ev n try to l1nk this to some ventual European financial commitment.

7. H •• G. will ant in this context to try to scure ackno ledgment that European defance co-op ration ithln the · lllance is of valu to the Aillanc as a hole. Although it i8 th U.K. view that closer .uropean d fence co-operation 1s the most e~tectlve, it ot the only, BY to improve the European input, we can probably hope to achieve no more than 8 rath~r oblique reoognition ot this at the p eaent stage.

8. As regards souring agreem nt on the interpretation ot NATO strategy, Preaid nt Nixon indica ,ad during his visit to N TO that he hoped th 1a auld b discussion on this in Washipgton . It ould probably however be counterproduotiv tor discu sian ot tho pot~ntially divisive iS8UeBaet out in Part II ot this paper to be launched at a inist riel session ot the orth Atlantic Council. On this occasion it ould be beet to stick to 8 neralltioe, takir~ the lin in p &graph 30 ot Part II ot this p~er. e should tak an arl7 opportunity ho ever to have bl1at 1'81 discussions ith the Amor1cana at at "1oW lev 1 on this 1 ue, in th hope ot r ach1na an underetandX8

/w1th

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with them and thus laying the bASis for a ~ore general agreement at a lter stage. Dr. Kissinger invited such bilateral di cusaions while he was here during President ixon t s visi t. 'Ie shall h ve to give thought to ho ~e rela t e t iis dialogu with the other discussions W~ have with our ~rop an partn~ rs •

. Detente

9. President Nixon has s id th t he believes that ~~st and ~st are on the point of entering into an ra of negotiation. He secs thes n gotiatlons as relatin to both erms limitat i s and other political question~ causing tension in th world. (Progress with th ~ former is not conditional on progr 88 in the lattLr.) W knov th t the '.mor'icans are giving the mett.:.r . nt nSe nnd det iled considerati on and are unlikel ! to open n goti ations in th~ immcdia e fu ure~

10. The oth r m mber of the nlliance hav~ all \ .. leo cd President 1" xon t s statements and hav expr'essed the hope that ~hes nogotiations cnn begin 3S S OO I as possibl • The ~l:i ce as whola has been conside'ing the purposes and con i ti ons of resumption of contocts ·,i th the memb~rs of the V. s aw Pact. t ashington Mlni t rs will have b~for t em a peper which proposes gradual and cautious removal of the estr'ct1 ns impos d on contocts as ~ result of t he inv ai n 0 Czecho~lov ~lnia t rs ' ill , w hope, ee thnt:-

a) a consist nt attitud& sha 1 be adopt ed towards co cts with the oth ' r side and nothin aho 1d be

on to mb rr ss other Hlli S;

b) all contpc 6 should be in are 6 or on subjects her~ someth1 g of interest dvant to he

West may be obtained;

c) no contact must appear to condone the action of thos -,ho invaded Czechoslov kia;

d) (a.rP p6r lep s most 1m or t ont) contacts should !J e th 3ubject of the full at exchange ot aims and views within the Allinnce 80 that 11 ore informed of, and h ve chenca to camm nt o~ uach oth r'a intent'ons.

11. ~h most pressing subj ct of consultation is the bilateral ~ovi t-~ riccn dialogu . ~ p evious Lmcrican administration, a t w days b ~tore leaving orric~ , i nformed

ATO ot th possibility that such talks ould b held to deal with th subject ot str tegic arms limitation nd soqjt th ir vie 8. Presid nt Nixon has reit~r8ted the _, m ... l'ic intention to consult tully with tneir N ~TO allies in or er to tak account ot their vl~w8 on matters in which they are concern d. Th re are a numbor ot matt 1'8 which are likely to come up in the Soviet-Am ioan talks and hlch ill be ot direct concern to the other members of NATO e.g. arms

/which

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which ar located in or targeted on W stern F.urope . It will b of p rticular import ce therefore that the principle of ti mely and comprehens i ve con ult~tion on appropriate subjects should bt. l"eaffi r ·d t W'l.shin t on.

12. I~ more g nare1 t rms, N~TO ~lnist rs will probably Iso want at Was ington to express th ·ir desire for a

resumption of the 6 arch f or p ogress on the basic East West uest i ns l a ting to th st~bility of lrope e . g .:-

a ) Europ nn security;

b) the G rman question;

c) ~hG posRibl11ty of mutu~1 and b l anced f orce eductlons in .urope.

Minist~r~ \ill have to consider in particular h -th r or not any s pe"lfic co 1lecti~ respons ' 1s colI d for to the W.rsaw Pact duclaration of 17 rch. onsult t lon is important in this context also , t h", mor 0 since s one · uropean Fore ign ~lni~ tors ".1 a~dy . . o~ 8i s f b . ing Gempt d to r esum bil~tcral 1 s ith tho Soviet Union on ques ions of t is sort.

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PART II - 1',"TO Strategy

i strat e derives from a paper ( !C 14/3) agre .1. is t rs of the fo rtee Ir. mb ers of t .ATO in D c mb r 1967 . However a _though the a ' c strate is a reed, differ e ces ist a6 re arda its precise inter retatio and 1m mentation . These diver encies cotld the medium and Ion term have s rious cons e ue ces for e Jlliance . The para aphs below att m_ t to analyse th m and ~o set out a l~e which can be t l-e by U .K. r e!>resentat~ ves in future discus s ons with our alIi s, it1ally at the ~ashington Minist ~rial meet in . •

~a\,;k f1roUf' d

2 . U ~ e its i c- t10n T TO's ob ' ctive has bee to pres rv peac and to rovi e for the security of the 70rth Atl a Treaty ire. f .TO's has always 1 there-for J et:r'I pI' ari ly a deterr n t strate ; ther e has how vel' - . Jeba e on how uch emphasi.3 snould be placed on t~e o_ans of de~ence t . mselves as oppos ed to t e ca. bili ty for r t aliation .

3. .A priluarily r etaliatory, or det rrent, strate is desi ed to prevent ma' or ho tilitl s r e kin ou by axim1sing he risks 0 the a ' 'r sor and min i min g his

prospects of ain - basically tar u ' the threat of n lclear r S onse . To i mpl m nt it on ust hav

ons systc~s and the ill 0 ~se th m; and thi~ uta par nt to _ ot ntia1 a -. essors. An extr m f orm of d t err nt strate ay is that of maqsive retaliatio ~nere y, ~rudely, th nemy is ~arned in advance that certain a p ess1ve actions will involve an instant res onse "Ii til strat ic nuclear weapons. ;)ince the major nuclear p01er have begun to obtain virtually In'ulnerabl s econd stri capabilitl s it has be come dlr~lcult for a stra t alon th s lines to carry cr dibl11ty.

4. A primar i ly d r n siv atrat is d ai ed to cuntain and r p~l a r ssion 0 any Kind without escalation

.volving rurth r intrins1c r1sks. It pr su oses the political ill, econonic capacity and military resources to match or more than match the pot tial ggr saor's milita~ capability at ev ry lev 1. If an increase in conventi~nal capa il1ty ere to b associated Mith an evident reduction in ~ill1ngne6s to resort to nuclear weapons, this could ~ 11 cress , rather than decrease the risk of hostilities occurring.

5. lh the SOy! t Union had littl~ or no a cond strike aapability N TO's strate was one of 'massive r taliatlon'. Although it aa never so crude or simplistic 88 tho critics of r. Dull s have claim d, this typ of strategy came to be thought of as inflexible, and lacking in cr dibil1ty, particularly 8S the oviet

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Union's s cond st,I"j ca, b ' l Y l..> .gl1n to build up. The debat e as t o \7ha t sh \11 c1 done to rIc it ran on throu the early sixti s •

NATO 's current strategy

6. r ATO' s curl'en t s trat gy is rally, if so what loos ly, r eferred to as a strategy of "flex ible r spo sett e (This is ot the strate of rl xible r s anse as advocat d by r. cl.amara in the eaI·ly sixti a: he had in m d both the flexible use OI str t egic nucl a r weapons, and t ._e ability to counter a large scale conv ntional attack ~ithout r esort to nucl ar weapons). Its basic obj ctiv is aet rrenc but a cons1derabl~ conventional dere siv capaoility is nec ssary to rna it credible . The strat gy colIs for

a . forward de nce to inimise text nt of enemy p n tratio

b. respons 11th force at whet ve l e vel is appropriate to demon "'t rat e th€. det rmil1a t ion of' the Alliance to r sist and to contain the ag r sSion f'or a tim long nough for ne otiation or nuclear d cision;

c. demonstrable willi ess and capability to conduct controlled escalation including the tactical us e of nuclear \\' apo s and as a last resort, th use of str t g c nuclear w ap~ns.

It is r cognis d that a ucleer ~ spons would not b appropria t e or cr~d 1bl as respons to any but ~ej r and d lib r e te ag r ession , Which will have to be positiv ly ident1~ied as such . It is asential that the nucl ar threshold be kep t hi e ou to avoid r TO having t o us nuclear leapons in a situation wh r~ th n my's int n t10ns were ambiguous, or hen h mi t hav miscalculated N TO's willingness to r s1at at all.

7. The implementation of this strategy raises r lati~ ly few conceptual probl ms ither

s . at the highest level ot a ression, wh an Imm diate strat ic r sponse o~ r spons to the 1nitiation of nucloar warfor by the other aide 1s called for,

or

b. at th lowest lev 1 wh n hat is requir d 1s conv ntianal response on a limit d scale.

There are no substantial disagr m nts amon the Allies on action in these areas.

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8. The divergencies in interpretation occur in considering how tc cepe with substanti~l and eliberate ccnventi nal aggressi n by the l .rsaw P ct. The current strategy calls for direct defence by c nventi nul me-ms and the introducti n of tactical nuclear wen one if and when direct defence is in~dequate. Two ma1n prvblemF present themaelvee:-

(a) differing views en hvw long the conventi nnl phase f hostilities wculd 1 st;

(b) NATO 's c pabilities f ·r the conventional ~hase

Beyond these problems there is the parttcular question f the p ll '~iccI and mili tary r Ie f tactical nucle£'.r wenpcns if they hn.ve t be used - whether tc impr ve NATO's prospects f mili tory success or b.i pesing th~ risk of further ebcnlati n to persunde the enemy t cease his ggression. In eitne~ case, NJ~~ must dec~de hew, and n what scale,tac ~ic ~l nuclear weapons sh' uld be used in or er tc rest re the credibility of the deterrent withcut the risk ~t· automatic escalati n t a strategic nucle exch nge .

1 . DifferinG views en the durativn of tne conventi r nol phns~ of hostilities

~he Eur9pes~~ie!; Ge~

9. The m j r 1nterest f the Euroc..ean nations, whos terr1t ry would 04 the bottlegrcund in any ferm ~ f land confl1ct, i8 t prevent W brenk1n cut t nIl . Fr m their point 0f view, it may be argued, th ... censeq11ences would e equally unacceptable whatever the chnr cter cf the h stilitles.

10. The French: Fr nee rejects any concept f convention 1 operati ns other thnn thvsa nee ad to identify aggres8i~n and gain c little time. Her str tegy is entlrely de~endent on the deciSion tc "gO nucle r" s a cn s national territory - possibly includin its l~ediate a nroaches nod thus part of Jest Germany -is directly threatened. She d es not believ that the United States wculd be pre ared to take that decision for the defence r Europe. Hence Gener 1 de Gaulle 18 equi 'Pplng :£1 rance indepanden tly and at great ~ st with range vf strateglc and t ctlcnl nucle r weapons.

11. The Continental Eur enn member of : The L ntlnental ~openn mem era c Nh , 1n-particular the lest Ger~~~s, tend to interpret NATO str tegy in a relat1velY 1ntlexible ny. They are reluctnnt tc accept any interpretation which envlseges prolonged host1l1t1es in depth on their own territories with the consequential destruct1 n and 108S this would entail. They thcrefcre believe that ATO strategy sh uld assume the early tactical use f nuc1e r en~ons it mejor host1lities occur. The c~edibility ct their

derance posture depends entirely upon nuc1enr decision which, f ccuroe, they cannot make by themselves so long as they do not possess their wn nuclear es ns.

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12. The Eur pe ns have cce ted th t if the str tegy f flexible response is t deter effectively, there must be credible and agreed military plans fur esc~l ti n in the event f m j I' hostil1ties. In ther w rds ther must be rcti0n 1 arr gements, in whose existence th enemy believes, r r the t ct1c 1 use f nuclear we ens cn ' r ne r th battlefield. Although these nrrnngem nts w uJ. .. e the bnsia n which N TO w uld, if' necessary, 1ntroauc~ nucle I' we~1 ons tnt hostilities in Europe, their primary Pl' p se is t enhance the cred1bili ty of the deterrent. As further d1scussed in para I' ph 21 bel \v, 0 jomt .Anglo G...rman paper settin out sslb1e litic 1 guideli~es f r the tacti~ 1 use of nucle I' wec ons in Eur po ill e submitted to the nex~ meeting

t the lucle I' Plo~1ng Gr up at the end f aye

13. The Nucleor Planning Gr up, h~wever, alth ugh a use~l forum for associnti nucla nod n n-nucleer states in tne f rm~nti n of nuclear p l1cy, w1~.1 n t cide nuclear r e1e se. It d es u t meet ne t the busic PI' blema - how t decide on the final ~uthorisatl n f the releas of nuclenr wen onB - and it is thie as. ect cf the nuclear ~r b1em that 1s I' bab1Y t the root of ~ enn moas1ness. --'h1l they re reluctt'l,t '"e v ice dc,ubts about ;~erlc~ inten lons, tlmse intenti na must 1 s be a s urce of concern t the Eur e~ s. If they nre e osed tv excessive pressure from the Amer1can s1de t incre se their convent1 nal f rCLe the will ~eaist t r ~ lit1cnl swell ns economic reasons

nd will suspect Americ n m t1ves. The result might be, despite the NPT, pressure fr m the c ntinent 1 Eurcpecos, ~ar icu! rly the Germ~s, f I' nuclear we ns under their wn ccntr 1.

14. Tee c .: N TO str te depends and h s always epended n the Presi~ent f the Unit d St tes ei willing, ~~d being

seen t o be -illing, to teke the nucle r decisi n s so n s necessnry. H ever, 1t 1s I' ble that this decisi n has become more difficult f r him 1n reoent y ra, n th~t as a c nsequence the cred1bI1ity r th Amerioan cnmmltment h a been dioin1ahed. The development f u sec Jn strike c ability by the Soviet Union has tocusse new nttenti n on the dirt rences hich h ve 1 ys ex1sted between the n~tlvn'1l end eo-politic 1 1nterests t the 6~er1cans an of the urope 8. It s inevit· ble th t the American hile recognisin that the defence t ~uro~e is n vital concern,

should consider it os ult1m tely sec ndury ~ the reserv t1 n t the United States. It is equnlly inevlt hle th t they ah uld be less c nesme than the Cont1nental Bur pe 8 t the ossibl11ty t prolonged hostilIties n iest rn Europ ~ soil. r the

bmer10Qna the essential elements in any str teg1e conce t tor J~ re th t it sh~uld offer, in nddit1 n t the deterrence t QI':-

( )

and

the beat o8sibl escal t1 n cf any

chnnce f controlling the l' th t be6l'.n;

(b) 8 many cptiona 8 p aible sh rt t Q atrntogi exchange involving the territory t the United States itselt.

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15. Both the desire to retain control and the desire to keep optionfl open h V~ ~ed t4e ~ericans to seek a~ long e conve tional p •.. ase a ossible 1:1 whic:l to an lyse the need for n nucle r deci i.on and to cf)mrr.unic te with the 0 her side. It iL therefor e not surpri i ne t~ at u..YlI. er the previous dmlnistration s~me ericans wele sayin , at various levels with~n NATO an elsewhere , not only th t tactic ~ l nuclear weapons are no s~bstitute for c ventional torcea but also that prolon ed direct der~nce by conventional for .es would be p~rfectly fe~8ible given suff cient eft rt y the Duropean members of NATO . There are some who appear to believe tho~, given t he increasing American reinforcement cop bil : ty, the Alliance's conventional capm ility can e built up to the oint where nuclear weapons need not be used even in response to all-out non-nuclear aggrensjon i.e. that r urely conventional defence is feasible for NATO . In cony rs tion with the Prime Minister during his recent vi~i t to London, President Nixon '1sked Vlhetl.er the Europea.."'l cOJIltr i es wowd really Vlish the nuclear decision to be ta!ten in vtew of th imL~ nse es ruction in Europe tha t ~ould result. (It i s, of cour e , possible that this pressurp, mervly reflects the unerican wish to pe~suade the Euro~eans ~o l:cep up their convention 1 forces, an that it does net in tself betoken reluctnncv to u e t ... c tic 1 nuclear '/capone i in he event the situa ion eo dem ned .)

16. Th!LY.a..lS-~ . ..£!! At root H. I.G. 'a view on the conventional ph se of Losti l ~ties in the event of m jor 0 re sion is close to that of the Con tinen "al Eu:'opeans. AcceptiJlti the essentially deterrent char cter of N TO's strate y we have ar~~ed that the str te y shoul be b sed on the ssumption th t the decision to use nucle r weepons ~ould, if necessary, b t aken at rather early stage in hostilities. t'e have however 1 id more emphasis than the Continental Europeans on the importance of the convention 1 p se d hav generally supported the United States on the 1m ortance of improving rTu's conventiont l c pability. As a nucl ar po~er we hav~ been conscious of the extreme difficulty of the nucle gr ecision and f the ne d for tim in which to make it. ~ a t ar from self su yortin iolan we cannot so readily i ore any thre t at sea where prolon ~d conventional stru gle ould be more tol r Ie to many of our lies thnn to ourselves.

17. Nevertheless we have tried to discourage the ~er1oans f~om arguing that the convent10hcl phase C~ or should be very prolonged Our reasons for doin so have included:

(0) our sympathy with the v1e s f the Europeans, of whom we are one;

(b) recogn1tion that any reduction in the credibility of the Amerie 4 nuclear commitment ould stimulate pressure in Europe tor an lndependen t nucle capability;

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(d)

EC T

uncertainty whether the Soviet Union on military grounds would be prepared to tolerate a spectacular build up in ATO d conventional c ability without increne1n· her O\Tm pro ortionately and thus :t.r..troduci "': a ne °1 dimension to the arms r ce. 'oreover the politio_l reaction of the Soviet

Government ould in ur view be to take a major !ncrea~e in N4 TO conventional forcee 8S aeli &r te attempt to ex loit th ir difficulties. The result would pro ly ~ ~ qulc r turn to an intense phase in the cold war;

our appreciation of the practical possi ilit1es for increases In NATO's II1tar 0 pa ility.

B. ~'8 Capabilities for the ConventionAl ?hase

18. HeI'e ther3 has been tb:ree cornered argum nt in '101 ving:

(a) the A Q ml1it r~."uthoritiesJ whose ~rotessioD 1 nsseecment is that the conventional f rces ot the ~liance shol eer QUS deficiencies nd ~e inadequate to~ the 1mple~entet1on or the curr nt strate • They do not accept that ~TO '~ mo iliz~ tion and reinforcement en Q ility is any substit te for shortage of ready torceb.

(b) t·he U. S • Government

(e)

e do not know h t line the ne dmin1str t10n will fin lly adopt. Th pOSition t the 1 at inietr tlon

QS somewhat inconSistent, 8 was noted y the Europeans. Some representotiv s c1 imed last ye~r that ovorall there w s little numeric 1 disparity . etween the f rces of N" TO n the .:; B w Pact, and that, al10 1ng tor ~un11tnt1v ditt~r~nces and the 0 ing U.S. reinforcement cap il1ty, the ma jor N°TO commanders fere exaggerat1n th d1sp r1ty et ee~ the C pG 111tles of the 'ars Pact and those of TO: it woe argued th t the land forces 0 Allied Command Ii:urope were "cap ble ot rosistin a lar -scale non-nucle attack tor n reasonable period t time". Or1 inally, this t"itude W 8 pOBsi ly designed t give emph -sls to arguments that the U.S. c uld tford to reduce har own conventi nal r roes 1n Europe. Follo 1na Czechoslovakia, ho ever, the U.S. emphasis as put on Ancouraging the other mem era ot NJTa to strengthen their oonventional capo il1ty. Specifically, in January 1969, the U.8. argued that N TO could not tind n aubati tut tor adequate oonvention 1 t r ea 1n the tnct1c 1 nuclear eft nb111ty, appe ed to enviaage a protracted convention phase, d preased the Euro enn m m ers t are ter ertorta.

IDI-~~~~~~~"'Dl~~~~UJ~~~G~ ho have 18 bet een the

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Pnet and that ot cen, ho ever, 1n

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this view be no questi1ln in the pres nt climate of pu lie opinio of any tt mpt on _~ ' 0' s part to undert (C th~ ex dltur n cess ~ r~ to ma tch th co. v nt io al capc.b il i t~ o ~· the .'arss-,' Pact. This h · s (, st t ed c t~rorlcally by e nurnb - r of Europ en c~ Min i t rs aIr c Oy this y ar. :. t th sao ti"l t .. (.re is , c. r :: l acc t vtance thac.

u lit tive i . rov ~m~nt · r~ ossibl and necessary u d aill th ~ f e ctiv 1 80th strate •

19. .It oU .h no ~lrm jud em nt on the reI tiv fore capnbillti 6 of 4.TO 6. the '. ,erStt\; ct is ossiblc t this ata e ( a basic at d~ 0 roblem is curr ntly in hand Ii thin ;i,TO), on the 'vldenc available 1 t is our b€lie£ that

NhTO cotld not U1 st d full-scale co v tion.l ctt ack by t~e :ars ~ P ct fo r mor ' t hun a short p r _od ot time ~ithout r t:sc to uclc r I ' ons .

The ReI

T cti a1 nuclc. r r nc r th r t _

The Us

th co ec trurn of Their rol~. if they hav

or m111t ry the.. thrc:a t or

e ; d t hus to 'greasio d

destruct ion.

dm much b sic '\ ark on scrim ate first us of

co t xt 0 th cur !'E:m t . r evision or r~viou8 pI s vi 7 , th<.. 1m ortan t as ct

o1it1ccl B ry, of'

dl 11ity The

s be n

22. In the baclc ound to th debe.t bout l ... TO'o co vcntionol cepab ili ty vis-a-vis tha t of th \/arsaw Pact thel' c haa for some YLars been th incr sing olitica l ressur ' lthin the Unit d Stet 8 - r~fl~ct1ng 1nt~r a1io the i ic bnlanc of paym nt probl m - for r ductlons in th lev 1 of .. ricnn fore s sed in Europe. This hoa h d th C_' GC

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(a) ing th voie s of those unerl an ho - mist \ . n ly in thE.. vi 'i of

- or ~ t d to b llev~ th t th ' (3 of co 10 ·1 ~orcf., t~· East , d

st as not too bed and that some withdrawals COQld b tolerat ed;

(b) of incr s the reluct ~ the Europeans to help th msel caus~ 0 the cr - a sin mistaken 1r our - that the ericen Governme t mi t see this as portunity to m k co ce s10 s to their own domestic pressure for \' i thdra: Is.

23. T is situ tion had t corn acute - and 11th llttl r al sign of a m etin of minds - by last summer 1he it was t empcrarily resolv d fa 10 th Czech crisis.. Th pressure 1 the Un~t d tat s 1111 reviv.. hat the Europeans te~r ost is e r etltion of the views of th prev10us .4cministr tion ' .ho s m d to be casting doubts on the uclear str te ; iJ.e at th SEtme tim c nt mpl ting reductlons in U. • fore 6 in E ope. There re signs, durin President 1xo s's visit hat the n o\? dm1n1str tion has t~en this point. If ~e can secul' .m rican acceptance of a e r 11y ~uropean interpr t tio 0 stl' tegy, of the a1ance of fore S in Europe end of th us of tactic 1 ucl.r ons it vill e less 11k ly that Pres1d nt "ixo 'a dmin1stration will rev rt to th 8 of its PI' a c saor 0 Ace de to the pr ssur s for fo c withdr ~ 18. But 1£ the e r11er views p evail or if withdra als t plec ~ly scale, 1t m b com difficult to avold basic ch g ".TO at t gy and ultlm t ly in the ch ~r ct r of ~ ... T •

24. su t · t l nl •• mel'ican wi thdrawals loul~ h£.v t 0 cta :

() in the a 6 C 0 comp sating Euro force incrc a a - ihlen se m unl1k ly pr s nt circumBt ~ ncea - th Y would ravcly e the alre~dy bar ad quatc conve tional c p bility of t .'1111 .e;

(b) a1 ricon tr 0 8 in ~urope are se -ult1m t meat of 1m ric V/111ingn 8S to us po a or the e e of' Euro 0, any si ifieant r duct ion 1 their numb r ·i11 t e d to b ro rded as r ducin th cr d1bil~ty o th ' mer1e comm1tm nt.

25. Th Unit d ta 8 de loyment of th ion eonv nt io a1 forces must blink n to their own lnterpr tion of strategv, hlch ita If reI1 8 to Bome ext t upon th Bcale of convent10 cl contributions or their ~111e8 . ~ further

at ning of the .11iance's conventional capability, h ther 8 a sUlt ot 4J1leric re uctiona or 11 t ral

reductions bJ European m mbcr , coul result in B rtiona in the U.S. that mo.1ntainance of the U.S. ucle r guarant e

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to Europe in 01 d too mcny ria:s; th? t her tect iC'~ 1 .1 lc_~n · VI a90ns v; rc too c s <1; ond th-at NATO str6t ~ &V 7 P $ in effect revertin g to t . ~ t of tho trip !ir . They could , in fact, f'ind thcmsclvc co mi tt ed - in t .. 1r vie'w - to losin atr t e ' ic 0 tu: e i vo1vi too. any r1 ks. : .11 this coule. r el l 1 ad the t o preft, r dlse:-. ~ ment.

26. Doubts in ..:Jurope bout the . mericen fluel -'. r ccmmi tmcnt could h ave ve y si ilar ~onsv Oth r EurOPCE . countries m!.ght begin to e c::r:d ucl e. r ',J l,j pons u."lde r th ir oan control. I this 78S co c eded d the 4ffi ric sa 1'E..sul t, f ced \, i th the clear ossibilit 0 nucl t::or hostilities initlat oth r than by th ir opn decisio , they might once ga in prefer disengagement . This would depend upon cireumst c s. They hey not so f' r t ake t is line i:1 fac 0 t. exi ting Bri tis~ ana Pr nch nucl cr c psbili ties . Furth r, some :.merie ns c1 rly r(;cognisc th t, ult1mete )~, ~ 'ro e should 10'1 ally pOos 5S its Oln

uc1 &r rmoury i f it is to sust in th main burd n of the defc c ~ of lest rn Europ •

';:.7 . Tn th€. Y'orst case it i s h .rd to see hoy th .:1ia.:!e could main in 1 ts res ·nt eh(;4 r n ct r, end orms .- ould have to b ·/olved.

over, any prospect th~t G rmony mi ght obt 1 nu 1 ar "' __ r f!. if:;ht giv

t1v r~- ~rep tivL a ttacK. T us ce its r es tom

erG s in th risk of ~ovi e t

Co el usions --~-

29 . It i lil~ v th&t th div¥r cnt of every m .bcr or" th ~ .:.lllencc c ev r co e11 d . Ho" v r t .... co SE, ;;hich th edvoc t c 1s f 1rly c1 cr . It 1 1 0 not hcpe that t his ill co mun acid r bl mea with1 th :111 c , oth from th I.Meric and from th Europ ana, mor rtlcularly f'rOffi r monS.

30. rhe basic ob e ctivv must to secure at bI d cort1 ui g U.S. i nvolvcm t 0 this side of the ~tl tic and 1. the a f guarding 0 our aca communic tio 6 at th~ h1gh('8t lev 1 poss1ble . *Ie sho d take suitable o ortun1tl s to point out to th ~mericn s t t aub ntis l ~lthdr ~als may h v cons 'quenc s t 1 at un er pres t clrcYmat cea, as d m ing th lon run to their inter ata s to ours .

31. :: must a (; lth the ,;.m ic s on a ratio Ie for k eplng their forct.: , both cony -ntl 1 a1 and nuclear, in Europe. To do this \i C must persundc th m t t th .o.:..uropcen interpr t tion of :.TO stra t gy 1s in f" ct res80nabl nd that while c accept th n~ed for a convtnt1onal ph a ~ r a1ating ma 'or e 'gr aaion this B ould

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not b so prolon ed as to eliminate 0 r~pl~c the thr t of escalation to the tactical uc1e r 1 vel, n d thus reduce the ff ctiven So of' det rr nc. ;/e \,ould support them in urgin the qua1i t &tlv im'"' rovem nts 1i ich would nable the str t egy , thu int r ret d, to b carried out

~ ith gre ter confide ce .

32. If \1e 11, ane the new '-.dm istratl selves that a much mor prolo_ ged convention necessary d that th uropeans could capability if th Y C ose, it is h r to s ~merican com itment can lon continu in its ~res nt form. Fortunat 1y there ia good rc so to au os that influential elements in the ne;w ·.d.ministr .tlon are allv to and sym athct c with the Viffi18 of the Europe 5, a~d e must hope that their ie18 will pr vail.

33. It will b im~ort t that the ~uropcans shoulu b 8 en to be making v ry ff rt to e sur that they are in a position to implement the current str t .gy succ ssfully. This means m lntajnin the pr SSl~ to improve the quality end etfc~tlven ss of N.TO ' s conv nttonel fore' capab i lity. It means, 1n th vi 1 of H •• G. at 1 nst , Bur p der nce co-operation. E ide c th t Europe is t kin its donee seriously ls ltltely to be th most per uasive argument of 81 with th .:rnericans. I., as \'1 b lieve , th .' erieen dministr tion shar a this vie, it should b our aim to

get them to reeI~ir it c l rly to all oth r m mbcr v rnmenta of the .lliance .

107


o. 21 Waterfield to Bendall, '6th Meeting of the uclear Planning Group, 11-12 ovember' ,

17 ovember 1969

10


SECRET

initial consideration at the London meeting in May. The

amendments were intended in particular to meet the American

desire tor a more extensive treatment of the full range ot

options open to NATO . As a result of this preparatory work

relatively few further amendments were presented at Airlie House

and those ot little substance.

4. As regards approval by the .D.A.C., each of the three

tormer members ot the • .G. not present at irlie has made

one substantial comment on the paper which has not 80 far been

reflected in textual amendment:

(a) The Canadians have pOinted to the potential

conflict between NATO's poss1bleneed to use

nuclear weapons early as part ot its strategy

of forward defence and the need tor time to

take a del1berate and considered decision on

any such use.

(b) The Greeks are worried about one aspect of the

treatment of atomic demolition munitions 1n the

paper.

(c) The Dutch believe that A'1'O should retain the

option to deliver an attaOK on Sov1et terr1tory

as part ot 1ts 1nit a1 use ot nuclear eapona.

5. The dilemma to which the Canadians have drawn attent10n

1. real enough but has of course been 1 th the Alliance tor a

long t1llle. It does not arise direotly £rOil the Guideline.

paper and it 1s to be hoped that the Canadians oan be

die.uaded from pursuing it in that context. The reek

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110

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concern 1s not shared by other members and is unlikely to

cause real difficulty. There was some discussion of the

Dutch point at Airlie since the Italians proved to have

Similar v1ews. There was general agreement w1th r. Healey's

argument that there were disproportionate risks 1n placing

Soviet territory in the same category as the rest ot arsaw

Pact territory. No change was made in the text 1n relation

to initial use but amended wording referring to the

desirability ot avo1ding attacks on Soviet territory was

agreed with reference to "follow on" use. It remains to be

seen whether thia w1l1 satiefy the Dutch.

6. Assuming the Dutch, Greeks and Canadians can be satisfied,

the paper will be adopted at the .D.A.C. meeting next month

and sent to the ilitary uthor1ties with an invitation to

them to review their current plana in the light of the

Guidelines. (The Guidelines are, of course, consistent ith

current strategy.) eanwhile studies by the .P.G. of the

"tollow ontl use of nuclear weapons are being put in hand.

Th' BllliaD Paper on Copsultation

7. This paper, like the Anglo-German one, had been the

subject ot extenaive informal d1s cussion before the meeting

assembled. It lay down guidelInes, rather than rules, tor

the procedure to be rollo ed within NATO 1n the event that

there 18 a request trom a member nation o~ a Ma30r ATO

Commander ( .N.C.) tor the use ot nuolear weapons. The

aubjeot 18 ot the highest 8ensitiv1ty, the basic difficulty

being to bridge the gap between the natural desire of the

non-nuolear po er8 ~or 80ae a8surance that their views w1l1 be

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taken into account and the determination of the nuclear powers

to be sure that their freedom ot action and speed of reaction

is not inhibited in any aye

8. e have tended to take a more rlexible view than the

Americans, primarily because we thought that the degree of

compromise necessary to satisty the non-nucleare no would be

most unlikely to impede decision making if it ever came to

war. In the event, after some initial heSitation, the

Americans have come round to this vie and have accepted the

Belgian paper. As the Belgian representative sai in

introducing the paper, it should serve to reassure the non

nuclear members ot the Alliance at a time when, 8S a reeult ot

the N.P.T., they are themselves giving up certain prerogatives

in the nuclear field.

9. e may have some difficulty rrom the Canadians,

supported b the Italians, on this paper at the .D.A.C.

They have been trying to claim that a distinction should be

drawn between consultation on the releaae ot nuclear weapona

trom national custody to •• C.s and oonaultation on their

aotual tiring. Ho ever the Americana hay made it plain they

aee no such distinction and this baa been accepted by the other

non-nuclear members. It seema unlikely the Canadians 111

pre.e thi8 point.

Theatre Nuclear Strike orce8

10. The other in item on the K.P.G. agenda. e a U.8.-

Gel'llllll collation ot views on the role ot "theatre n clear

e roroea", i.e. nuolear eapone 878t .a under BAClUR'8

Tn principal ieau which haa erged here concern

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the appropriate role of these forces at R-hour, i.e. when a

general strategic exchange is ordered. The U.K. submitted a

paper in the summer suggesting that given the strength of

U.S. external forcee available for R-hour, it would be a more

effective use for his forces if SACEUR concentrated his effort

on the pre-R-hour phase of the battle. This view has

occasioned some controversy but seems to be gaining support:

it it does prevail, one effect could be to increase the number jl .. :"J-,t~,..

\

Of aircraft SACEUR has available for the conventional phase of JkAI )~ aM ~ the battle. A further U.S.-German study w111 be submitted at

~h-'" (.-.I (, the Spring meeting of the .P.G.

G' I~ ~ J; embershlp -~ . :h~ 11. There was no tormal discussion of this subject. However

",... ~Ih the Def'ence Secretary raised 1 t inf'ormally wi th several t'V\O \ "'It W" "rr.; ..

~ Ministers and with the Secretary General. The non-nuclears -~ cr

remain firm in their insistence that the group, at Ministerial "...." .~~-

112

level, wi have to be enlarged somewhat. r. Laird seemed

le8e insistent on preservation of the present size of

meabership (seven) than we had been led to expeot. Between

now and the .D.A.C. meeting in December, our beet tactics

(wlth hleh the Defence Secretary agrees) ould seem to be to

give an impression or flexibility but to avoid finally

conceding on the point ot enlargement until the Amerioana have

done 80 or are on the point ot dOing 80. They should not be

lett i80lated on this issue nor should e be eeen to be pressing

them to give way.

lex~ eet1nB

12. The Italians ha ing cOile up to scratch, the embarrassment

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ot an invitation to Athens has been avoided tor the moment,

though it may arise again in conneotion with next Autumn's

meeting.

in Venice.

It 1s hoped that the next meetIng w11l take place

There may be so, ditticult1es in arrang1ng the

respect1ve timlngs ot the R.P.G., D.P.C. and R.A.C. meetings.

The Italians will also be hosts for the X.A.C. meet1ng: the

Americans are talking in terms ot holding ail three meet1ngs

in close succession so that they do not have to make repeated

trans- tlantic crossings. While sympathising with this view,

it ould ln practlcalterll8 be bad to run all three meetings .

together. It 111 be best to work tor the .P.G. meet1ng

to be held 1n the spring some weeks in advance of the N.A.C.

meeting. The ~.P.C. haa hi'therto al ays met in Brussels.

(J.P. ater~leld) estern Organisations Department

111iams 17 loyember. 1969 • r. Tait

)lr. orsan 1Il'. 8~ e. P1ann1ns Staff' r. 199in

113

BRITAi N iN NATO - THE FiRST SIX DECADES

e. o~ h:\~'." -. 'I.'.,. ~ Jh~'''' ..tc,) ~ .. c ~O bj~ I~

If( ~U ~~ . , -

J ~" .. ~.O .,; ~.......:.~~ ... ~ ~ . ..

=-F ~"/~ hM.A.~~ • I h.'c."'''~ A" Ovw ~ "':I f. ,\

k-#t(.k '~c. Who'L..---N~~ e '" '" '-''-' t .

" I"

cL/1.·~ 1>/ ..

0.""6 ~,.I.:U ~- I~"'i

114


No. 22 Waterfield to Killick, 'NATO and Environmental Questions', 30 May 1969

115


• •

116

REST rCTED

vie ed the American proposals With horror but were at a loss to know how to tone them down. The Secretary-General himself also indicated to me that he was not enthusiastic and hoped to have the benefit of our advice when he came here about the end of June on how best to handle the matter. He said he ould let us know through Sir Bernard Burrows when he would like to come. I told him that e hoped to be ready with some ideas, and that

• . ulley had agreed to take the chair at a meeting.

(J. • ./ater:field) e tern Organisations epartment

30 ay, 1969

Co y to: r. J. . homas, S. & T. • r. endall

!ir. Baker Sir Bernar Burro ,U


No. 23 US aide-memoire relating to the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 4 June 1969

117


• •

11

CONFIDENTIAL 2

Accordingly, the United States proposes that experts

of the me.ber governments meet on an ad hoc basis under

the Chairmanship of a member of the International Staff

in Brussels in early September, with the aim of prepar

ing recommendations to the Council on the following

illustrative subjects:

A) The terms of referenoe of the proposed Committee

on the Challenges of Modern Society:

8) Topics of greatest common interest to Alliance

members that might be addressed by the proposed Committee,

including possibly:

1) Environmental Problems

A) Urban and Interurban Transit

B) Air and Water Pollution

C) Housing

2) Civic and Social Problems

A) Urban Crime

B) Control of Drugs

C) Recreation Facilities

D) Private and Public Service Projects to

Aid the Under-Privileged

3) Education 1 Proble ••

A) Modernizing Curricula

B) Equivalenc of University

Require ents

C) Enhancing T chnical Education

~) Mean of Sttaulatinl Work in Existing Intern -

tional Orlanizations. Includinl NATO, on the

For_loin, Probl

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL 3

for this meeting of the group of

States would be ready to

topics in the foregoing

t as supple.ented by suggestions from other allies,

and would hope that other governaants would be prepared

to lNke siailar contributions. For this purpose, the

States suggests that its allies conaider those

on which they are in a position to contribute

di cU.lion papers. Horeover, the United States suggests

of the North Atlantic Council in

aid-June, agreement be reached both to hold a meeting

in early September, and on the general topics

Iht address. It is envisaced that the experts

the report of Secretary General

remand d to thea by the Council,

ccount in the formulation of their

to the Council. At the conclu ion of

the experts might

119


o. 24 Cabinet Official Committee on Science and Technology,' ATO and Environmental Problems', 10 June 1969

120


CO FIDE TI

, N TO AND 'ENVIRO NTAL PROBLE

At t'le special ceremony in "la .1ngton on 10 hpril to commelllorate t e T ent1eth Annlvers y of the signing f the North 6tlantic Tre ty, President ixon 0 led upon the !~liance to c noern itself

1th a "Thir" Dimension" in addition tits efeno and political functions. In particular he proposed the ore tlon within NJ.TO of a Committee on the Challenges of odern Society, "to explore aye in which the experienoe and resources of the .estern nations could most e fecti vely be marshalled towarda improving the qual 1 ty r l1fe of our pe01>188". J.. warning of the President's interest in this concept and ·.TO' a role in fulfilling it, following the favourable impression he h d gained from his visit to NATO Headquarters in February, had been given in the Permanent Counc1l ahortly before the Bshington meeting. Fr m time to time in the past other ideas have been e1tpressed ab ut the ne d tor N.I.TO to "improve its image". But President Nixon's choice f his Commemorat~ve ddres8 to launch his ideas J and his detailed propos Is t special N4~TO machinery for the purpose, 0 me 8S a surprise to other members 0 the l.lli8Oc8 ho susp cted (as it pI' ved rightly) th t he conoept, though it had appealed t the Presi vntts imagination, had not been thought out in its practical app11c tions and relevance t ~O by is advisers. T eir initial reacti n 8 therefor c 6uti us, an indeed critical, an this as retlecte in the Communi ut! paragra h 14 of hich (based n a U.K. amendment t o the original lJllerican draft) eXpresse the

common views the ... lliance in the 1"0110 ing terms:-

"The members f the i.lli 0 e c nsoio s t hat they share common environm nt probl ma which, unl 8S squarely faced, could imperil the lf e nnd progress f their societies. The inietar8 reco i8 that 1 ortant work on thes problems i8 already being carried out 1thin other tnt rnatlonal organisations. The 1n1sters instructed the Council in Permanent Session to examine how to improve, in every practical

flY, the exchange of vi s and eXperIence among • .1li d countries t Whether by action in the ap ropriate 1nternational agencies or othe 188, in the task o~ creating a better environment t r their societies."

2.. The 1.mericBn8 h ve subsequently pursued this 1nitiati 1 th energy, b th in the Counoil and b11at rally 1 th meubers of the ~11ance, 1 ing emph 1s on the P B1dent 's peraonal lJlt rest in

using ~O not only a torWll tor the United statel to drs on · '2u'~T'Aan Xl»erl nee but alao 88 the ap l'oprlate vehicle tor the atudJ solution ot the problems or our society an thus contr1buting to the so11d 1ty o~ the tlantic community.

3. T que tion 8a diacussed in the etiDg ot the North htlantic Council on 14 8¥ re it a cle that hil all delegations were

spar to 0 1 d88 the 1ntr1na1c 1 ortance and value or the ub3ect, none ad7 to accept the 8 citic 1.m8rioan proposals ith r to organ1 ation and proce~ • 0 t dolegations stressed

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122

CO FIDENTIAL

, the importance of n t duplicating ork alre dy b ing undertaken in other intern ti Jnal bo 1es; and many said that ~TO's most effective r ole c uld be thet of a stimulant or c atalyst for action

ther in the appr priete international organisations or by member tries nationally. ~s a result of th meeting, the secretaryr'u has undertaken the exploratory work uf consultati n with

individual governments and preparati n of a report for e reinforced C uncil m et1ng in late September or early October.

4. eanwhile the .,:.rneric 8 have taken account of their 1.11ie8' criticism, albeic with some marks of disappointment at the lack of enthusiasm, and have in principle now acce£)ted that T '~TO:-

(a) should stimulate act10n rathel' t han take acti n it8elt" j

(b) should not t oke on xtra stnffs;

(c) sho~d not duplicate the work of other organisations.

But they remain clearly determined t o carry forward the President's initiati,ve and in particular seem attached to their original idea of somehow arranging in N:.TO for meetings of high level allembracing "experts" (of the type that are peculiar t o the' ash1ngton 4dmin1str t1on) t o talk about environmental problems on a broad front.

port

5. pr par tory r ort from the S cretary-Generol intended t o s rye s the b sis ~ r his c0nsultationa with member Governm nts has b en circulated s parately. The ecr t ry-Gan r al himself will be coming to L Il on on 26 June ~ol' a meting with officials under r. ~ulley's chairmanah1p t o he our vie s on his r port. He will

by then alre dy have h Id consultutions in . ashin on. The FCO suggest that UK vie s might t ke the form f a pap r hich w uld serve as a br1ef ~or our r epres ntatives t o s esk t the Secret y-General and coul ~ be hande t him s an nide-m moire if necess ry. [. first drllf't,

-'Prepared by the FCO, i8 attached t .Annex ;... The ~O emphssi th t this draft is design d only t o set th p litic 1 frame urk for the ST(O)(A~'S further ass~ssment of th subst ce of the ecretary-Gener report. e ate c onsideration ill have tv b given t o t he list in .. ..nn x II of the r rt in the light of the questions th t prece e and refer tit, and to th survey in J.nnex III.

Our viels on the l~erican

6. u.though .TO is h dly the obvious rorum t r discussion f the issues r aised by Pres1d nt Nixon an deta11e in ;.nnex II of the aecretary-Gener 's re ort, and is certainly not well 1 ce for executive action 1tse1t, ~ticle 2 ot the North tlantic Treaty does aay that "The p ties w111 contribute to ard the 1Urther evelopment or peace~ and ri n~ly 1nternation 1 relations •••• by promoting con 1 ti ns or stability and ell-being". .; s Mr. te t h s emphaSised, it 1s clearly right that N~.TO sh uld demonstrate its

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concern to 1nfluence for good the society which it is design d to protect. Moreover, the FaO inisters consider that if the Pres1dent and the hdministr tlon feel so strongly, we must not t 11 to do our

st to hel~ th m ver an initl tive designed to show the continuing dlty and relevance of the liance in present world oircumstanoes.

we, and other members, ere to be unresponsi va to the ~erlcan in1tiative, e uld run a risk of increasing dla11lus1onment ith the J.ll.lance with1ll "JIleric and in the :~rican government itself. Our 1m must therefor be to adopt a constructive attitude and ~o guide NJ~O towards procedures hich are realistic and practicable.

7. To this end we !DUst ensure that the 1 Itlatlve does not founder in a mass of encyclopaedic det all, 1 thout produc ing any contribution ot note on any indlvld~ problem, and does not dup11eate the work t other bodies. We theretore think that NATO should address itself' to selected and specific prob1ems only in this field, nnd should avoid in particular those areas th3t are alreaay covered adequately by other international asencies (our comments to the Americans on these lin s seem to have made some impression, w1thout however lessening the sense ot urgency with hlch the .. &Dlericans 01'8 following up the Idea.) In thoa are s where 1 t does ta e an1nterest, we believe NATO should avoid becolUing 1nvo~v d itselt in detail.ed rese ch programmes, and should coueentrate its energies so 8S to serve rather as a tt ginger group" to preas tor action elee here. ~e believe that this 1s the ay f~O could moat eu1tably and etteetlve~y contribute to the study of environmental problems end be seen by public opinion in member states and elsewhere to have a positive role in the solution of urgent problems outside " the military sph re.

8. On the question or mechanics, e are not convinced of' the need r I' a separate Comm1 t tee in NJ'iTO, h1eh the '4Dleric ans s em to conceive ot 8S high-l.evel Group of '~road-gauge" personalities. Such people 81' hard to tind, and 1 t appears at least questionable

hether continuous discussion on the broad tront app~tly envisaged b~ the J.meric8lls ill be ot much practical use. t the same time, narro -gauge" exp rts, .1n this age of prol1ferat1ng internat10nal con erences, are lett 1th 11tt1e time for their own rese8l'ch. Ther 1s alao the roblem ot the relat10nship ot any committee ot this kind ith the ~orth htlantlc Counc1l t permanent Repr aentative 1e 1. e 0 d therefore prefer to approach the organisational. problem more emp1rica1ly. Thea aub3ects might ell be discussed in meetings ot the Counc1l's existing Committees (e.g. t Deputy permanent Represent tive or Polit1cal Counsellor level) reinforced by the appropr1 te national experts on particular sub3eota as necessar,. Alternat1vely, it the Amerioana »ersist in call1ng tor a n COmmittee, under whatever title, thia too could best be serviced by th Permanent Delegations, again l'einroroec1 as necessary by e erts. It ''broad-gauge'' personalities B1'S s6nt by the mericana to NA'l'O, our aim should be -rOI' them to attend, not as princ1pals ot committees but in the c pacity ot Vi81ting experts. e shall have to deoide, in the 11ght o~ Cil'Cwutance8 at t e time J ho best should represent the UK. It

ould ho ever b our present in~11nation tor ottici a to do 80 bom 8T(O)(), hioh uld ronde the n c ssary guidance.

(O)(~ ) could also obtain, and 1-r neoes8ary send to ~, additional

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CONFIDENTIAL

experts i1 highly specialised matters come to be considered. But in all fores ole circumstonceC) it should be firmly established

the Council itself should have the last word, both on how the is organised and on recommendations.

9. Our other allies, particularly t he Italians, who have express~d considerable scepticism, remain likely to be unenthusiastic about the -mericana' original concept but they will be at a 108S to know huw to reduce it to practicable proportions and hesitant to disillusion the nmericans by a direct refusal to c operate. It seems likely therefore that our own attitude of constructive cooperation, in sympathy with the hmericand ideas but with the aim or a gradual and pragmat1c approach, is likely to be supported genereily.

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CONFIDE TIAL

.t.nnex A

Qomm nts on the Secretary-Qeneral's Paper

Environmental Problems

,. e e1come the Secretary-Qeneral' s action in Wldertaking the exploratory ork of consultation ith indi-v1dual Qovernments, and have studle lth great interest the J'JUlexes to hl~ communication po/69/265 ot 29 ay to the Permanent Representatives • . We agree with the idea that N4~O'S r elevance to our mode~n society should be made clear in such a way s to demonstr te to ali the peop1es 1n the al1iance, and eSllecially the younger generation, that N":'TO not only provides a meane for our defence but also a means of ensuring that our 'estern soc1ety is orth det nding.

2. e fully su port the stat ment in .t~ex I of the secretary-General t s communlcat ion that t is not NI.TO' s funct10n to engage in stuc11es and research, but to proceed by reterenc to the reeul ts ot work done natlonal-ly or 1nternationally. e think lt is desirable, it N ~o is to concern itself lth this field, that its energies should be concentrated on identifying and stimulating action on specific llroblems that are not already covered or covered inadequately by other international agencies or else ilhere. Annex II s 0 s ell just how great the scope of the field is; and !Jmex III provides a useful basis for identitying aress where insufrictent ork 1s being done.

3. In this cOlUlexion e :find helpful the distinction made in ~ex I between problem arising dir ctly from technological development and those due only indirectly to technological changes. In our view, it 1s in the latter field th t the most promising ground is t be found for ~O ork on problema hitherto inadequately studied or insufficiently dis u8sed bet een nat1ons.

e think it important that the areaa ot great st need should be quickly 1dentitied and that i .. TO should avoid dissipating its resources in expensive and time-consuming collation and study or the ork already being done in areas ell covered by international

agencies. ,,\TO oannot hope to beoome, and 1s not suited to be, a orking repository of encyolopaedio kno ledge of the hole problem

or th human env1ronmen t; but 1 t 1s ell placed to act as a II g1llger group" t o stimulate ork by member governments in existing agencies 01' by other means on specific and urgent problema Within the tield.

4. ,e are inclined to ee ith the suggestion in .Annex II that individual nation might pilot au h indiv1dual topios. e think this may be the beat ay to proceed and to produce early resUlts.

5. e have oonsidered in detail the 11 t in Annex II and addre sed 0\11'881 a to the other thre ueat10Ds that pretaee 1 t. Beto mov1ns to a 41 cu sion ot these questions in det 11, ho ver, it ould

r a»8 be a pro r1ate to otter our comments on the question ot ho should Under ake, 1thin the NATO organi tion, the tasks 81'ising :trom

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CONF IOEN I L

these environmental problems . In our view the setting up of a Special Committee of broad- gauge individuals poses some problems. "Broad-gauge" indi vuduals wh could cover t e whole .field are

rhaps more easily f~und in hmerioa than they are in some countries Europe ; whil , in t hese days of many international oonferenoes

and seminars, t 4e oalls on the tim of "narro -gauge" expt:!rts are many, to the inevitable detriment of their essential researoh. The relationship of any ne committee to the Council ot Permanent Representatives would also have to be carefully considered. 7e

ould prefer to see these subjects discussed by a Committee of the Council, servioed by the Permanent Delegations at perhaps Deputy P rmanent Representative level, reinforced by the 8p ropriate national experts ad hoc.

6. In any case we ould certainly endorse the statement at the end of Annex I that if a permanent or temporru:y committee is decided upon, it slould be a body d signed to study and suggest solutions -not to take decisions but to a t as a stimulant for action by member governments .

7. The US Qovernment hav suggest that the Council shou d be invited t o decide in July to promote a meting of experts in early Sep ember to consider these subjects. This idea seems to need further consideration in the light of the Secretary-General's own report and conclusions follo 1n his consult tiona in c pitals . T~e ueation 0 a m e ing ln July ~ uld appe to depend on ~hether tne Secretary-oener al ' s r eport will be re ady by then. e for our art 1ill fall in ith SignOl' Brosio's judgment on this. We do not a'lt the ,,'.meric s t o feel r bu1'tedi but we do think it important

not to commi t ourselves in NJ.TO to remature or b dly thou ht out ·~ner is tiona. ~e should roc eed sta by ate , in practical

manner, to achleve wh t is ossible and avoid outlining grandiose schem~s hlch cannot be fulfilled.

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Chapter 4 - 1979: From Detente to Confrontation

Chapter 4

1979: From Detente to Confrontation

It had been expected that NATO's thirtieth anniversary year would be unexceptional. Events proved otherwise. The Iranian revolution was followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow's aggression marked the end of detente and the beginning of the 'second Cold War' in which the search for common ground gave way to mutual suspicion and military preparedness. 1 The invasion was not the sole reason for the deterioration in East-West relations. From the mid 1970s, NATO members had expressed growing concern over the technological sophistication of the Warsaw Pact's forces, and especially the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missile which could target the whole of Western Europe from mobile launchers based deep inside Soviet territory. To counter the SS-20, the Alliance adopted a 'double-track' strategy: the modernisation of NATO's Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) , represented by the deployment in Europe of the US Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles; and in parallel, arms control negotiations with the Soviets to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance by limiting the numbers of both US and Soviet LRTNF.

The Alliance also sought to match the Soviet's advantage in conventional forces. In May 1978, at the Washington Summit, NATO leaders approved the Long Term Defence Programme which increased annual defence spending between 1979 and 1984 by 3 percent. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister. In her first major foreign policy speech in Luxembourg in October, she condemned the 'massive armies ranged by the Russians' and 'the stream of propaganda which they continue to direct against our institutions and aspirations.' She

1 For details, see Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (Verso, 1983).

further contended that unless NATO deployed more modem weapons the Soviet leadership would soon be able to exercise political pressure on Europe. 'Such a situation cannot be allowed to arise.' 2

Theatre Nuclear Forces

In formulating a response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20, NATO leaders were anxious to maintain a unified position. A particular concern was the growing influence of the anti-nuclear movement which strongly opposed the stationing of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe. Britain was committed to maintaining its own strategic nuclear deterrent and agreed in principle to station cruise missiles in the UK. as long as other members of the alliance followed suit. West Germany also agreed to station Pershing missiles on its soil, but on the condition that deployment was accompanied by meaningful arms control discussions with the Soviets. In October, Moscow began a concerted propaganda campaign against the impending modernisation ofLRTNF, claiming that deployment would upset the balance of forces in Europe and lead to an escalation of the arms race. On 6 October, the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, announced an unconditional withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks from East Germany and an offer to negotiate limits on Soviet medium-range missiles, if NATO halted its plans. On 6 November he called for negotiations 'without delay' and warned that the prospects for arms control would be undermined by a decision on LRTNF modernisation. Following a tripartite meeting with his French and British counterparts, the West German Defence Minister

2 The Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture, Luxembourg, 18 October 1979. Full text available on the Margaret Thatcher Foundation website: www.margaretthatcher.org.

127


acknowledged NATO's need to modernise its nuclear forces and confirmed that West Germany would accept deployment on its territory provided others did the same. Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, contended that a comprehensive approach on arms control was as an integral part of the modernisation programme (No. 25).

14. Special session of the North Atlantic Council in celebration of NATO s thirtieth anniversary.

December 1979: the double-track decision

NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers met on 12 December 1979 and agreed to the deployment, beginning in 1983, of 108 Pershing nand 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with ingle warheads. This constituted the Alliance's mos~ important decision of the 1970s. In parallel, and ~ order not to leave the moral high ground of the dIsarmament debate to the Russians 1 000 US , , nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from Europe a oon a possible. In sanctioning the decision,

ATO minister asserted that the modernisation programme was an appropriate response to uperiority on the part of the Warsaw Pact forces. In

conjunction with the LRTNF deployment, NATO al 0 offered immediate talks with Mo cow on limiting theatre nuclear systems on the condition that any reductions would be based on equal numbers and capabilities and that implementation was adequately verifiable ( o. 26). For Britain, the outcome was ' thoroughly satisfactory ' and more positive than had been expected.3 Other issue were addressed, with

ATO official expressing concern over events in Iran. A major worry was that the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khomeini would be replaced by a Marxi t regime thus providing Moscow with access

3 The TIme • 13 December 1979.

12

to the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf. The US Defence Secretary, Harold Brown cautioned that a Soviet dominated state controlling Iran's oil and threatening the Gulf was against Western interests and that all possible steps should be taken to prevent this outcome. Of more immediate concern was the storming of the US embassy in November by Iranian revolutionary students. The resultant crisis, in which 52 American diplomats were held hostage, came to dominate the US political agenda and was a major test of Alliance cohesion. Meeting on 13 and 14 December in a six-hour marathon, the North Atlantic Council expressed concern over the direct or indirect actions of the Soviet Union and some of its allies and noted the deterioration in human rights and fundamental freedoms in certain countries.4 In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on 18 December, Thatcher expressed her views in unequivocal terms: 'The time has come when the West must begin to substitute action for introspection. ' 5

Afghanistan: NATO's response

On 24-25 December, 75,000 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in support of the Marxist government which had come to power in a bloody coup the previous year. Their action brought the world to 'one of those genuine watersheds, which are so often predicted, which so rarely occur - and which take almost everyone by surprise when they do'.6 NATO's response to the Soviet invasion was far from unanimous. All members were in agreement that Moscow had violated international law and flouted the indivisibility of detente and self-determination. But there were difference of opinion on how best to respond. The Americans favoured a firm respon e with President Carter withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from the Senate. De cribing the invasion as 'the most erious threat to the peace since World War II' , he asked for an increa e in military spending, the strengthening of military presence in the region and enhancement of the Alliance's defence capabilities in general. 7 e also impo ed embargoe on grain and technology shipments to the Soviet Union and announced that America would boycott the 1980 Mo cow Olympic . The US position was welcomed by Britain and We t Germany who argued that the We tern re pon e

4 orth Atlantic ouncil, Final ommunique, 13-14 December 1979. 5 The Times, 19 December 1979. 6 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Yea~ (Harper

oHins, 1993), p. 87. 7 Public Papers of the Pre idents of the United State .' Jimmy Carter, 1980 (U GPO, 1981), p. 40.

should be based on securing two objectives: the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the prevention of similar Soviet interventions. This view was not fully shared by the French who expressed alarm at the possible breakdown in detente between East and West. The French were determined to continue with detente - though not unconditionally - as it offered reciprocal advantages, and they advised against any measures which would further escalate the crisis. Rather than confrontation, Paris sought to re-establish confidence between East and West by focusing on the right to self-determination for the Afghan people and urging that dialogue with Moscow should continue.

15. The NATO General Secretary, Joseph Luns, addresses a special session of the North Atlantic Council in celebration of NATO So thirtieth anniversary.


Subsequent meetings failed to resolve the issue. The Americans argued that events in Afghanistan provided a means of educating public opinion on the need to spend more on defence. This view was supported by Britain who nevertheless regretted Washington's assertive approach, which had produced a hesitant European response. At the beginning of February, Carter thanked Thatcher for her condemnation of the invasion in the Commons and for pledging her support for a firm allied response and for advocating closer links with Pakistan, India and China.8 Differences between America and Europe nevertheless continued, and were reflected in the communique issued at the end of June following the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ankara. On the one hand, NATO ministers expressed deep concern at the continuing occupation of Afghanistan and 'urged the Soviet government to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country' and the right of the Afghan people freely to determine their future. On the other, they restated their willingness 'to work for the improvement of East-West relations and their wish to keep open channels of communication.'9

Facing a dangerous decade

Thus 'the dangerous decade' opened inauspiciously. The divergence of opinion within the Alliance became more pronounced following Ronald Reagan's election victory in November 1980 and his characterisation of the Soviet Union as 'the evil empire'. In November 1983, American cruise missiles were deployed in Britain. Opposition to nuclear weapons grew in strength, especially around the CND movement, with an increasingly strident unilateralist campaign centred on the American base at Greenham Common. Arms control was still on the agenda and in October 1983, just before LRTNF deployment, Defence Ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group decided to reduce the nuclear stockpile in Europe by 1,400 warheads, making a total of 2,400 to be removed since 1979. External and internal challenges left little cause for euphoria as the Alliance ended its third decade. The mood was one of grim determination, and there was nothing to suggest that those in positions of responsibility sensed that this new phase in the Cold War was to be its last.

8 The TImes, 29 January 1980. 9 North Atlantic Council, Communique, Ankara 25-26 June 1980.

129


0.25 Carrington to ATO capitals,' AC Ministerial Meeting, 13-14 December: TNF and Arms Control', 23 ovember 1979

130


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No. 26 Rose to FeD, 'Joint Ministerial Meeting: TNF Modernisation and Arms Control', Communique, 12 December 1979

D

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133


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134

I

• R~NGE, AS WELL AS HAVING MULTIPLE WARHEADS, AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, WH ICH HAS A r·1UCH BETTER PERFORMANCE THAN OTHER SOVI ET

. AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED HITHERTO IN A THEATRE ROLE. DURING THIS PERIOD, ILE THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN REINFORCING ITS SUPERIORITY IN

LONG RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES )LRTNF) BOTH JUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, WES!ERN LRTNF CAPABILITIES HAVE REMAINED STATIC. INDEED THESE FORCES ARE INCREASING IN AGE AND VULNERABILI.TY AND DO NOT INCLUDE LAND-BASED, LONG-R~NGE THEATRE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS.

4. AT THE S~1E TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN A MODERNIZAT fON ;\ 'D EXPANS ION OF THE IR SHORTER-RANGE T'~F AND GREATLY IMPROVED THE OVERALL QUALITY OF THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INCREASING SOVIET INTERCONTINENTA~ CAPABILITIES AND ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY ITH THE UNITED STATES.

5. THESE TRENDS HAVE PROMPTED SERIOUS CONCERN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, ~ECAUSE, IF THEY WERE TO CONTINUE, SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN ~EATRE . NUClEAR SYSTEMS COULD UNDERMINE THE STABILITY ACHIEVED IN INTERCONTINENTAL SYSTEMS AND CAST DOUBT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ' ALLIANCE~S DETERRENT STRATEGY BY HIGHLIGHTING THE GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF NATO'S AVAILABLE NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION.

6. MIN I STERS NOTED THAT THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REQU I RE CONCRETE ·",

CTIONS ON .THE PART OF THE ALLIANCE IF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIB RESPONSE IS TO REMAIN CREDIBLE. AFTER INTENSIVE CONSIDERATION, INCLUDING THE MERITS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, AND AFTER TAKING NOTE OF .THE" POSITIO S OF CERTAIN MEMBERS, Mtr~ISTERS CONCLUDED THAT THE OVERALL INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE WOUlD BEST BE SERVED BY PURSU~G TWO PARALLEL AND COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES OF TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

7. CCORDI'GLY MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED TO MODERNIZE NATO'S LRTNF 1:IY THE DEPLOYMENT I N EUROPE OF US GROUND-LAUNCHED SYSTE~S CO:· PR' I IG ~8 PERSHING II LAUNCHERS, WHICH WOULD REPLACE EXISTING US PERSHING I-A, AND 464 GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLOM), ALL WITH SfNGLE W RHEADS. ALL THE NATIONS CURRENTLY P~RTICIPATING .

- 2 - I IN THE


• THE INTEGRATED DEFENCE STRUCTURE WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAMME, THE MISSILES WILL BE STATIONED IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND CERTAIN SUPPORT COSTS WILL BE MET THROUGH NATO'~ EXISTING COMMON FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS. THE PROGRAMME WILL NOT INCREASE NATO'S RELIANCE UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, MINISTERS AGREED THAT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF TNF MODERNIZATION, 1,~0~ US NUCLEAR WARHEADS WILL BE ~ ITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. FURTHER, MINISTERS DECIDED THAT THE 572 LRTNF WARHEADS SHOULD BE . ACCOMMOD~TED WITHIN THAT REDUCED LEVEL, WHICH NECESSARILY IMPLIES . A NUMERICAL SHIFT OF EMPHASIS AWAY FROM WARHEADS FOR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF OTHER TYPES AND SHORTER RANGES. IN ADDITION THEY NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP IS UNDERTAKING AN EXAM'NATIO~ OF THE PRECISE NATURE, SCOPE AND BASIS OF THE ADJUSTMENTS RESULT I NG FROM THE LRTNF DEPLOYMENT ArlD THE I R POSS IBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF ROLES AND SYSTEMS IN NATO'S NUClEAR ARMOURY AS A WHOLE. THIS EXAMINATION WILL FORM THE BASIS OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPORT TO NPG MINISTERS IN THE AUTUMN OF 199A •

. 8. MINISTERS ATTAC.H GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ROLE OF ARMS CO TROL IN CONTRIBUTING TO A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND IN ADVANCING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. THIS IS REFLECTED IN A BROAD SET OF INITIATIVES BEING EXAMINED WITHIN TH~ ALLIANCE TO FURTHER THE COURSE OF ARMS CO~TROL AND DETENTE IN-THE 198~S. MINISTERS REGARD ARMS CONTROL AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE : ALLIANCE'S EFFORTS TO ASSURE THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY· OF ITS MEMBER STATES AND TO MAKE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ~ORE STABLE, MORE PREDICTABLE, AND MORE MANAGEABLE AT

-

LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS ON BOTH SIDES. IN THIS REGARD THEY WELCOME THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE SALT II TREATY MAKES TOWARDS ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES.

9. MINISTERS CONSIDER THAT, BUILDING ON THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET LRTNF CAPABILITIES OF CONCERN TO NATO, ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE OVERALL NUCLEAR BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPO~S ON BOTH SIDES SHOULD THEREFORE NOW INCLUDE CERTAIN US AND SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THIS WOULD REFLECT PREVIOUS 'ESTERN ·

- 3 - / SUGGESTIONS

135

BRiTAiN IN NATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

.-. .

136

• SUGGESTIONS TO INCLUDE SUCH SOVIET AND US SYSTEMS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND MO~E RECENT EXPRESS 10,NS BY SOy, ET PRES IDE·IT

. BREZHNEV OF WILLINGNESS TO DO SO. MINISTERS FULLY SUPPORT THE

DEClsrON TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO NEGOTIATE ARMS LIMITATIONS ON LRTNF AND TO PROPOSE TO THE USSR TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WHICH HAVE BEEN ELABORATED IN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

A. ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATRE MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATSLIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATRE SYSTEMS.

B. LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK IN A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH.

c. THE IMMEDI'ATE OBJECTIVE OF 1ltESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ~STABLISHHENT OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON US AND -SOVIET LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS.

D. ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE CONSISTENT . WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQU4LITY BETWEEN THE SIDES. THEREFORE, THE ~IM1TATIONS SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF DE JURE EQUALITY BOTH IN CEILINGS AND IN RIGHTS.

. £. ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS MUST BE ADE UATELY VERIFIABLE.

10. GIVEN THE SPEICAL I~PORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE OVERA~ SECU~ITY OF THE ALLIANCE, A SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE BODY T A HIGH LEVEL WILL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN THE AlLIANCE ~TO SUPPORT

THE US NEGOTIATLNG EFFORT. THIS BODY WILL FOLLOW THE NEGOTIATIONS o CONTINUOUS BASIS AND REPORT TO THE FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS WHO WILL EXAMINE DEVELOPMENTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS

- S WELL AS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIO S AT THEIR SEMINNUAL HEETI ~GS.

- 4 - I 11. THE

.'


••

....

•

11. THE MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED TO PURSUE THESE TWO PARALLEL AND COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES IN ORDER ,TO AVERT AN ARMS RACE IN EUROPE CAUSED BY THE SOVIET T~F BUILD-UP, YET PRESERVE THE VIABILITY OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE AND THUS MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OFITS MEMBER STATES.

'A. A MODERNIZATION DECISION, INCLUDING A COMMITMENT TO DEPLOYMENTS, IS NECESSARY TO MEET NATO'S DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE NEEDS, TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE RESPONSE TO UNILATERAL SOVIET TNF DEPLOYMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE THE FOUNDATIO t FOR THE PURSUIT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON TNF.

B. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRAINING THE SOVIET BUILD-UP CAN E~HANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY, MODIFY THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF REQUIREMENTS, AND PROMOTE STABILITY AND DETENTE IN EUROPE IN CONSONANCE WITH NATO'S BASIC POLICY OF DETERRENCE, DEFENCE

. -AND DETENTE AS ENUNCIATED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. NATO'S TNF .REQUIREMENTS WILL BE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF CONCRETE RESULTS REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

TEXT ENDS

FCC PSE PASS TO ALL.

ROSE

[COPIES SEBT 1'0 00.10 DOWlIBG S!]

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137

Chapter 5 - 1989: The End of History and of NATO?

Chapter 5

1989: The End of History and of NATO?

The second half of the 1980s witnessed major changes in the international system. The 'velvet' revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, which foreshadowed the end of the Cold War, presented NATO with fresh opportunities and many challenges. The primary catalyst for these events was the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who entered office in 1985 with the aim of reforming and restructuring the stagnating Soviet economy. One of the first sectors to experience reform was the Red Army. In 1988 Gorbachev announced the full withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, allowing the nations of Eastern Europe to determine their own internal affairs. Gorbachev also called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century and in December 1987 at the Washington summit signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) whereby all intermediate range nuclear systems would be withdrawn from Europe. The INF marked the end of EastWest confrontation and military build-up. At the end of 1988, Gorbachev's announcement at the United Nations of a unilateral Soviet reduction in conventional forces was welcomed by the Alliance Foreign Ministers, who outlined proposals for future negotiations. In March 1989, the foreign ministers of the thirty-five CSCE states formally opened the first round of negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

Two events marked the outset of 1989: George H. Bush was sworn in as America's forty-first President and Soviet troops finally withdrew from Afghanistan, further reinforcing scepticism in the West about the danger of the 'Soviet threat'. The year closed dramatically with the fall of the Berlin wall. This momentous year when the Iron Curtain

was lifted also saw the fall ofNicolae Ceausescu in Romania, free elections in Poland resulting in the first non-communist government for forty years; the opening of Hungary's western border leading to an outflow of East German refugees; and the announcement of free Republics in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Would these upheavals mark the end of NATO's raison d'etre, if not 'the end of history'? On both sides of the Atlantic there was a groundswell of opinion that considered NATO a relic of the past, though for different reasons: rightwingers in America (the 'withdrawers'), believed that the European allies should do more for their own defence and did not deserve American support; left-wingers in Europe (the 'removers'), saw in NATO an American obstacle to peace in Europe. l

The battle for public opinion and the consequences for the Alliance gave cause for concern. Sir John Killick, a former British Permanent Representative to NATO, believed that while Gorbachev was widely perceived as imaginative, original, constructive and visionary, NATO was still seen as stuck in the Cold War, hesitant, suspicious and obstructive.

The Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament

Sir Michael Alexander, Killick's successor as Permanent Representative, was equally concerned that NATO had lost its purpose. There was growing speculation that 'the treaty of Washington of 1987

1 Richard 1. Barnet, 'Reflections: the Four Pillars', New Yorker (9 March 1988), pp. 80-83 and Robert A. Levine, NATO: The Subjective Alliance: the Debate Over the Future (Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 1987), pp. 215-220, Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, NATO 50 First Fifty Years (Praeger, Westport, USA, 1999), p. 166.

139


[INF] could lead to the dissolution of the treaty of Washington of 1949'.2 Gorbachev's decision to reduce Soviet forces and seek a zero deployment of short-range nuclear forces placed considerable pressure on West Germany to reciprocate with further nuclear reductions. In February 1989 Chancellor Kohl responded to growing public pressure and announced that the West German government would postpone a decision on Lance modernisation until 1991 at the earliest. 3 He further suggested that ATO should enter into negotiations with the Soviets concerning the deployment of all short-range nuclear forces (SNF) deployed in Europe. In contrast to the West German position, both Britain and America sought to reaffirm

ATO's strategic concept and to ensure that arms control policy including that on SNF, formed an essential component of deterrence. To avoid a damaging split in the Alliance, a compromise was eventually reached. The details were announced at the May summit celebrating the Alliance's fortieth anniversary. The US agreed to hold SNF negotiations with the Soviets, but not before a conventional arms control agreement had been concluded. The que tion of the introduction and deployment of a modernised Lance would be dealt with 'in the light of overall security developments.' 4

ATO reaffirmed the Harmel doctrine (see Chapter 3) e pecially the need for strong defence coupled with dialogue. The trategy toward the a twas to welcome reform, but al 0 to declare that much remained to be done. This a pect was reiterated by Margaret Thatcher who in her ummit addre s detailed ATO' achievement and future goal :

ATO had en ured forty years of peace and economic pro perity; it had overcome pa t difficulties on the tationing of rui e and Per hing the deployment

of which had been vindicated; it had refused to compromise on defence even at such times of Soviet relaxation. She further tre sed the need for ATO to modernize it nuclear deterrent and to maintain a 'flexible re pon e' ba ed on S deployment. She urged upport for Bu hand uggested that urope wa heading towards a period of uncertainty and

2 Lawrence Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO' Fi~ t Fifty Year (Greenwood 1999) p. 166. 3 The Lance mi ile was a mobile field artillery ystem with a maximum range of75 mile. It was fir t deployed in

urope in 1972 and wa capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads. 4 The Alliance' omprehen ive Concept of Arm Control and Di armament adopted by the Head of tate and

overnment at the meeting of the orth Atlantic ouncil, BTU el 29-30 May 1989.

140

vulnerability. Her long and assertive speech at the summit contrasted with the negotiations, which were described by Alexander as cautious and inclined to compromise. Kohl nevertheless acknowledged that the Alliance needed a joint success and had to reach acceptable compromises.

16. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (centre) flanked by the UK Permanent Representative to NATO, Sir Michael Alexander (left) and her Private Secretary, Charles Powell (right) .

A further key announcement wa the US initiative on arm control. De igned in part to regain the initiative from Gorbachev, it sugge ted reduction in tanks, armoured vehicle ,artillery, helicopters, land-ba ed aircraft and ground and air forces stationed out ide national territories.5 It resulted from negotiation in Washington, London and Bonn and Bush' review of ast-We t relation which advi ed a more flexible approach to arm control. The announcement wa welcomed by Kohl: reduction in conventional forces and an accelerated timetable would open the pro pect for early S negotiation and help to defuse the i ue politically.

The 1989 summit declaration

The summit declaration wa a ub tantial political document which acknowledged the current period a 'a juncture of unprecedented change and opportunitie ' and expres ed the hope of moving beyond the po t-war period 'to hape a new political order of peace in Europe'.6 The promotion of

5 Address by Pre ident Bu h, 31 May 1989, Departm nt of tate Bulletin.

6 Declarati n f the Head tate and vernrn nt p rtl 1-

pating in the Meeting of the N rtb Atlantic uncil , ru -el , 29-30 May 1989.


human rights and democratic freedoms was warmly received by most commentators and provided NATO with the opportunity to regain the political initiative by broadening the agenda of the Vienna Conference on Conventional Forces in Europe. The Alliance emerged from the 1989 summit as a revitalised and forward-looking forty-year old.

Britain sought to maintain security through strong defence coupled with the strengthening of human rights and economic freedom in the East. The fact that the British position - supported by the USA and even by France - was by and large adopted marked a considerable achievement as until NATO's May summit there had been deadlock described in the press as the most serious since NATO's foundation. The May summit forced NATO to begin to reevaluate its future role in the post Cold War world. Competition with Gorbachev's charm offensive - he visited London in April - was difficult but would eventually bear fruit. Many remained cautious. The forty-year status quo to which both West and East had become accustomed had gone. If the threat from the East might be diminishing, new dangers were looming. The break up of the Soviet empire revitalised long-suppressed civil and ethnic conflicts, especially in former Yugoslavia, but also in the Baltic and the Caucasus. Gorbachev himself warned against the dangers of 'national-populist' policies.

improvement in East-West relation , 'Margaret was becoming increasingly isolated in ... the view that ... SNF were essential to the flexibility of NATO's defensive response.'8 She held steadfast to the belief that any alternative other than deployment would lead to the' denuclearization' of Europe. Her view was not widely shared. There was growing realisation that given the strength of anti-nuclear sentiment in some Western European countries, especially West Germany, the prospect of Lance modernisation would be postponed indefinitely.

These developments had implications for NATO' future role and gave rise to a lively debate on long-term strategy. On the one hand, there was atisfaction that the Comprehensive Concept had

established a healthy basis for future arms control and helped to stabilise ATO in the short term. On the other, there was considerable apprehension about NATO's long-term prospects: 'In a situation where the two Germanies are moving towards merger and where an essentially cooperative relationship between the tates of Western, Central and a tern urope is in prospect, what would be the role, doctrine and strategy of ATO's armed force ?'( 027) Senior officials thought that sooner or later Gorbachev would run out of 'rabbits' to pull out of hi 'well-stocked hat' , and that NATO should avoid the temptation of a 'competitive triptea e'. But the ituation was exacerbated by the demands of the media, public opinion and academics who pres ed for more 'imaginative' action from NATO.7 The British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey owe, later recalled in his memoirs that due to the steady

7 Michael Alexander, Managing the Cold War: A View from the Front Line (RUS!, 2005), p. 202.

17. North Atlantic Council meeting at the level a/Head a/State and Government, 4 December 1989.

Keeping up with history: the second 1989 summit

In December, ATO leaders met for their second summit of 1989. That two summits had taken place within seven month reflected both the acceleration of the process of change in urope, and the vitality of the Alliance. The summit took place immediately following the 'informal meeting' between Bush and Gorbachev off the coa t of Malta at which both leaders agreed to build a new ast-West relationship. Although the British delegation felt quite confident that there would be no surprises there was apprehen ion concerning the potential upheaval in Eastern urope and the new direction Germany might tak in ATO as it engaged with the a t.9 Despite uch uncertaintie ,

8 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (Macmillan 1994) p. 560. 9 For a discus ion on Briti h policy towards Germany, see Keith Hamilton, Patrick Salmon & tephen Twigge (eds.) Document on Briti h Policy Oversea , Series III, Volume VI, Berlin in the Cold War 1948-1990 (Routledge 2009), pp. 97-119.

141


it was hoped that the compromise agreed in May would remain. Reports from the Bush-Gorbachev meeting indicated that although there had been no euphoria or breakthroughs it had been positive and wide-ranging. The US had agreed to normalise American-Soviet trade by offering Moscow mostfavoured-nation status and both sides agreed to seek further reductions in conventional arms at the CFE summit planned in Vienna. Bush also emphasized the right of the German people to self determination to which Gorbachev responded positively.lo The meeting was not all plain sailing. High winds and heavy seas left the American president stranded aboard his cruiser and the afternoon session of talks had to be abandoned.

At the NATO summit, Thatcher continued to emphasise the Alliance's key security role and was advised to maintain the UK position on the Comprehensive Concept if SNF was raised. She argued that the Soviet Union did not yet grasp what democracy and a market economy entailed. Bush encouraged closer European integration for effective relations with Eastern Europe and welcomed eventual German reunification. The new Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, expressed concern about the potential reduction of US forces in Europe. Apart from seeking American assurances that European security was not at risk, he suggested strengthening relations with France and increasing the role of the CSCE, possibly with a permanent secretariat. The summit concluded by reiterating the continued importance of the Alliance which 'by keeping the peace for the past four decades' provided 'an indispensable foundation of stability, security and co-operation for the Europe of the future.' II

NATO beyond the Cold War

The end of the Cold War was a redefining period for ATO. German unification within the Alliance in October 1990 was followed by the successful conclu ion of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in November 1990 which reduced armed forces tationed in urope to their lowest levels since 1945.

10 For details of the Malta meeting, see Raymond Garthoff, 'The Mediterranean ummit, The Mediterranean Quarterly,

o. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 12-24. 11 orth Atlantic ouncil, Final Communique, Brussels 14-15 December 1989.

142

Reflecting on these tumultuous events and their implications for NATO, Douglas Hurd cautioned:

History has not stopped with the revolutions of 1989 or the progress of 1990 .. . It would be deeply unhistorical to suppose our peoples will from now on live in such total absolute security that there is no need for collective defence ... NATO is more than a product of the Cold War. The very first line of the Treaty expresses our commitment to freedom, democracy and the rule of law - those values which are now blossoming in Eastern Europe. The Alliance has an important role in safeguarding these values through the 1990s.12

The 1990s would vindicate both Hurd's caution and his emphasis on the continuing importance of NATO.

12 Transcript of a peech given by the Foreign cretary, Douglas Hurd, at the NATO meeting at Turnbeny, 7 June 1990.


No. 27 Alexander to Hurd, 'The Revolution of 1989: How Should the Alliance Respond?', 4 January 1990

143


144

•

• (ti) UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

ON THE NORTH ATLANT1C COUNCIL

OTAN NATO

lIIO BRUSSELS

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP Secretary of State for Foreign

and Commonwealth Affairs London SW1

Sir

4 January 199G

THE REVOLUTION OF 1989: HOW SHOULD THE ALLIANCE RESPOND?

Introduction

1. Last summer I submitted to the then Secretary of State, Sir Geoffrey Howe, some thoughts on the challenges facing the North Atlantic Aillance. Those three linked despatches would in normal circumstances have more than exhausted my annual quota. But circumstances have not been normal. History offers few parallels to the speed and scale of the events which have convulsed Central and Eastern urope since June. The drama has had its echoes at Evere. The last weeks of the decade saw not only the normal Ministerial meetings but (for the first time) a second Alliance Summit within a single year and (also for the first time) a visit to NATO by a Warsaw Pact Minister - Edward Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union. Since this Post's Annual Review is written in July, and since there will be many policy discussions and decisions before then, it may be useful to attempt a mid term assessment developing the earlier analysis and recommendations.

Background

2. Last month's Alliance meetings have been reported 1n telegrams of record and comment which need not be summarised here. It is for others to recapitulate and assess Eastern Europe's Revolution. It seems profitless to attempt detailed forecasts of future events - even a few weeks ahead. Many may have foreseen that the colI pse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe was inevitable, would be progressive and might well be rapid. But no-one, so far as I am aware, came close to getting the timing or the character of the upheaval right. There are bound to be more surprises.

3. But in a despatch of this kind some assumptions have to be made. Th ba 1c point has not changed since June viz that "the accelerating crisi of CommunismM, taken together with other trends, means th t the Alliance h 8 to "begin to come to terms

/with - 1 -

Chapter 5 -1989: The End of His tory and of NATO?

with the prospect of an inexorable transformation in the nature of the security relationship between the power blocs ••• n The status quo to which we had become accustomed has gone for good. The reform process will continue in one form or another. The de-ideologisation of inter state relations in Europe is irreversible. So i the progressive withdrawal of the Soviet presence, the weakening of Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and the consequent d~inution of the perceived threat to the Alliance.

4. This is of historic and welcome significance. But the note of caution, even anxiety, apparent at recent NATO meetings needs to be repeated. As the excitement wanes in the former People's Republics, awareness will grow of the political drudgery, social hardship and economic uncertainty that lies ahead. The long term prospects may be good (hopefully the capital markets think so) • But the ~ to which it is now legitimate to aspire will be slow of realisation. Disappointment and disillusion may intervene -including with the West since our aid, however generous, seems bound to fall short of expectations. The ambitions of nascent political movements risk being distorted and scapegoats sought. (President Gorbachev has recently warned against the appeal of "national-populist" policies and pointed out that "nationalism thrives on poor living standards".) Instability ma~ enhance the role of the military. Mr Gorbachev himself has ridden in the whirlwind for five years: the chances grow daily that he will also have to reap it - whether or not at the price of his office.

S. This is the setting in which the complex and potentially destabilizing processes of "unifying W Germany and dismantling Soviet control will take place. A certain scepticism about the chances of progressing smoothly through the early Nineties will do the Alliance no great damage. By contrast a Panglossian approach could cause a lot of harm.

The Response of the Alliance

6. Forecasting the Alliance's future course in detail would at present be little more profitable than doing so for Eastern Europe. No rigid game plan will last for long. Europe is embarked on a period of transition whose duration nd outcome is unknowable. Of the issues to be resolved during this transition those for which the Alliance is responsible are in the last nalysis the most important - since n tional s cur1ty is the objective and precondition of the rest of any gov rnment's policy - but they ar by no means the only ones. Other organisations, most obviously the European Community, are d eply involvedl st bilisinq

nd than improving the economic situation in Eastern Europe 1s e ntial objective. In this confused nd inter~ period the

requir ent will be for tactical fl xibility combined with clar1ty about ba io princ1pl II and a1ms. . We shall need gu14 l1n s again t which the various policy options can be judged.

/7. - ~ -

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146

7. The questions which the Alliance has to answer have not changed all that much in substance since last summer. But they have been considerably sharpened. They can perhaps be grouped under six headings:

(a) Is the requirement for the Alliance in question?

(b) Are changes in the Alliance needed?

(c) The relationship with the Warsaw Pact.

(d) The German question.

(e) The future military role of NATO.

(f) Can consensus be maintained?

To do these issues full justice would require a book rather than a despatch. In what follows I have tried to concentrate on matters likely to be of direct concern to the Alliance in the next 12 months. I have raised longer term and more speculative pOints only in so far as they cast shadows in front of them.

The Requirement

8. With the simultaneous collapse of communism as a state ideology in Europe and of the Warsaw Pact as a war conducting organisation, the thre t which occasioned the creation of the Alliance is declining rapidly. Will the resulting situation warrant the continued effort needed to sustain a multi-national treaty bound security organisation. If so, is a transatlantic dimension necessary?

9. It i8, I hope, xiom tic that we must avoid reverting to a tu t on where the states of Europe, including the UK, seek their ecurity 1n a shifting pattern of balancing coalitions. Th t this seems n impl uslble contingency at present is a measure of th extent to which w t ke the success of the Alliance for gr nt d. But resurgence of tradition 1 patterns would look a good de 1 leaa improbable in a Europe from which stationed fore a h d di8 ppe red7 in which the influence of the Soviet Union and, more particularly, of the United States had greatly diminished while that of a single Germany had greatly increased; and in which E stern Europe had once more been "balkanized It •

The riSKS inh rent in such a senario are obvious. The Romanian events have underlined, aq in, the potential for collective viol nce which exists in all our societies. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria or the Soviet Union next?

10. A Europe "whole nd free" would, I presume, find its security in a form of integr tion similar tc that which Western Europe has been developing under the umbrella of the Alliance.

/Thought - 3 -

Chapter 5 -1989: The End of History and of NATO?

Thought 1s, r1ghtly, being given to outline schemes. But they are, in all probability, years from realisation. In the interim care will be needed if we are to move towards rather than away from such objectives and if, indeed, we are not to jeopardize what has already been achieved. Given the many potential

ources of friction, the infectious nature of instability and the devastating consequences of hostilities for our densely populated continent, there aeema to me to be an absolute requirement to retain throughout the transition (and perhaps beyond) an integrated, multi-n tional security structure, such as the Alliance, based in as well as on Western Europe. Its role may become less clear cut. But even so it will continue to exercise a powerful restraining influence on other European powers (and on its own members). Without it the chances of either the European Community or the CSCE providing a basis for "European architecture" would look poor.

11. There are supporting arguments which do not, perhaps, need to be rehearsed in detail. Dealing with the Soviet Union will always require a collective approach frQm the countries of (Western) Europe. This will be true whether it remains a unitary state or whether - a more alarming prospect in the short term -it disintegrates. The out of area problem, however defined, will increase 1n the Nineties. The growing unit costs and diminishing production runs of defence equipment imply a more coherent European market, role specialisation etc. The further integration of the European Community implies the maintenance of a similar degree of mutual commitment in the defence field. (To keep open the option of future convergence between political and defence cooperation while developing forms of association between the Community and the sates of Central and Eastern Europe will require careful coordination.)

12. The Transatlantic Dimension. Although there must be long term US InVOlvement in Europe (eg through the CSCE), the r t for a major US military pres nce in fully reconc!l Burope ia no self evident. The (welcomed) tationing of hundreds of thousands of US servicemen in Western

Europe, like that of their (unwelcomed) Soviet equivalents in East rn Europe, has always been, in the historical sense, an anomaly. Its progressive tt uation need not be a disaster provided t proce 1s adeq~ t 1 controlled.

b re, 1 !f th ho • In the interim our

objectiv must be to ret in a credible US convention 1 nd nuclear commitment to the a curity of Western Europe. 0 an co 9 t, po t ST ~ lev 1 , to

- 4 -

Un on Nor will Western CPE level , to match the

Iconventional

147


148

conventional capability of the USSR. It would be foolish to sacrifice prematurely a major stabilising factor which once gone will not return. In any case President Bush, who may reasonably expect to remain in office through much of the transitional period,wants to retain a say in the future of Europe and is prepared to make an appropriate contribution to this end.

14. That was one element in the policy statements made by Messrs Bush, Baker and Cheney in Europe before Christmas. Another, less explicit, was that the us is in the process of redefining what it means by an appropriate or "significant" contribution. The numbers of troops and nuclear weapons deployed in Europe will, failing some radical reversal in the international climate, drop dramatically. Willy nilly, the Western Europeans will have to carry a larger share of the responsibility for their own security. It will be for them to ensure that the resulting arrangements meet their needs.

Change in the Alliance

15. Given that there is a continuing requirement for the Alliance, what kind of changes need to be envisaged to ensure its continuing viability in the period of transition? Should another effort be made to enhance European defence cooperation within the Alliance? What are the implications of trying to shift the emphasis of the Alliance's work from the defence aspect to the more obviously political aspects?

16. European Defence Cooperation. The most valuable change to make in the Alliance, if it could be managed, would be a substantial shift in the balance of effort and responsibility from the Americans to the Europeans. Indeed I still have some difficulty in seeing how the future security requirements of Western Europe or the United Kingdom can be met, on a reliable baSiS, other than through a jOint European effort within the Alli nee. It has to be jOint because (in addition to the more general c se summarised in paras 9-11) the medium sized European nation .tate no longer provides credible economic or geo-strategic b a1a or a balanced defence policy: the costs, speed, range and destructive potential of modern weapons systems enforce a larger perspective. It has to be European because the changing relationship between E~rope nd the United States (the New Atlanticism) plainly demands this. It has to be within the Alliance both because of the need to avoid duplication and diversion of effort

nd becauae the neceaa ry US commitment (para 13) will only be forthcoming within the sort of structure (including an American SACEUR) which the Alliance provides. We will need to be sensitive to American concerns on this score in the fluid situation ahead. Hence the undesirability of a premature linkage between defence and the Community.

/17.

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.~ 17. Efforts to develop a European defence identity within the Alliance have hung fire for a generation. But while in the past it might have been a sensible preparation for the future (now upon us), too few were persuaded that it was essential. For the Nineties it looks more like a sine qua non. Either the Western Europeans work together effectively or they place their fundamental security at risk. This argues for a renewed effort to raise the politica~ profile of such cooperation. We should explore with France, at the highest level possible, whether the dissolution of the status quo may not be changing their attitude to cooperation within the Alliance (which is not the same as reintegration). Given, for instance, that M. Rocard has acknowledged the need to harmonise the efforts of the IEPG, of WEU and of the Eurogroup, will France object for ever to co-location in Brussels? It may be time to revisit some other old ideas eg a single European Deputy to SACEUR (with real powers) and to give a more overtly "European" tone to such concepts at the NORTHAG air mobile division and the Franco-German brigade. Governments should associate themselves more publicly with the efforts of the European defence industry to rationalise itself.

18. European defence cooperation bas a tired image. Necessary as it may be, there is no assurance that another attempt to boost it will be successful - particularly if the sentiment that defence is no longer worth the bother gathers force. Others will argue that it has been overtaken by pan-Europeanism. But, as I pointed out in June, in one fundamentalIeSpect the auguries are better: the Americans have recognised that their own policies require a more coherent European effort. The imminence of major US force reductions makes it harder to argue that creation of a European defence caucus might unnecessarily precipitate such withdrawals.

19. The Political D~ension. However for the moment, in the wake of recent us policy statements, the most discussed reform is increased emphasis on the Alliance's political d~ension. It is a proposal which requires def1nition. Many of our Allies, though not n c ar1ly th Americans thamselv s, seek to offset the pro v (n4 by them desired) reduction in the Allianc 's mil toby noreasing its political rol. I am 0 ptlc 1. The Alliance has, of course, alw ys been an organisation with a politic 1 purpo e. But it has been NATO's collective military capability, and the integrated military structure underpinning it, which h s given that purpose substance and credibility and which h s made the Alliance unique. The vastly 1 rger part of NATO'. d ily activity, in Belgium and cro s the Treaty area, 1 devoted to servicing the d fence effort. 1 co ting di8ill tnat one can sust in the Alliance's

ority by 9 i avid nt ~PQrtanc s a for for t 10 9 d 1t 11 ry unction.

/20.

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150

eClj) 20. That said, the Alliance should of course emphasise and develop the political functions it has always had. The structure and the requirement are there. Political consultation is directly relevant to the overall task of the Alliance and enhances its image. But this must be seen in the context of eg the Harmel twin track approach. We stould avoid duplication with other fora. We should look askance at the wish of many Allies to involve the Alliance directly in so-called transnational issues, to build up the Science Programme and the work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (worthy though these undertakings plainly are ) except where the Alliance has something special to offer.

21. The Americans have an evident interest in validating the Alliance's role as a trans-atlantic forum. I have for some time been urging my US colleague (and his predecessor) to bring new topics to the Council. It remains to be seen, for ir.stance, whether the Americans want to consult seriously (as opposed to briefing) on out of area issues. We should focus, obViously, on the arms control process in all its aspects. Mr Baker has rightly drawn attention to verification as a potential subject for Alliance activity (and expenditure) in the politico-military area. The Secretary General has been making the same pOint for many months.

One obvious topic for him will be that of more formal contacts with the Warsaw Pact.

The Relationship with the Warsaw Pact

22. Is it in the interests of the Alliance that the Warsaw Pact continues to exist? What are the implications of the presumed shift frcm a confrontational to a cooperative relationship? How does this fit in with the growing interest in pan-European security structures based eg on the CSCE machinery?

23. The readiness with wh1~h Alliance Foreign Ministers agreed to the unprecedented visit of their Soviet colleague to Evere on 19 December suggests how much Western attitudes towards the Warsaw Pact have changed. The invitation to NATO's Secretary General to qo to Moscow means that the relationship between the two alliances will have to be clarified sooner rather than later. So does the stated intention of the Soviet Union to remodel the Warsaw Pact alonq Alliance lines and the tendency, on both Sides, to equate the organisations as promoters of stability.

24. No-one can know whether the governments emerging from the elections pending throughout Central and Eastern Europe will Wish to remain members of the W rsaw Pact. The Soviet Government evidently hopes that they will. So should the

/Alliance

- 7-


Alliance - though not all my colleagues on the Council would agree. Both orqanisations have a role in the transition. The one is at present the true guarantor of security for the whol,e of Europe. The other provides a measure of reassurance for the Soviet Union and a framework for co-ordinating the security policies of a potentially fissiparous group of countries. The existence of each organisation helps to justify that of the other. As is apparent in Vienna the originally confrontational relationship can co-exist with one that is eSSEntially cooperative - the latter growing in importance at the expense of the former. The CFE negotiation is markedly easier to manage as (in substance) a dialogue than as the discussion among 23 or more individual participants which it may eventually become. Verification regimes, equally, will be s~pler to handle if there are broadly speaking two sides. (In a pan European situation the IAEA model mi.ght become more relevant.)

25. It is too early to determine how a developing cooperative relationship might merge with attempts to intensify the CSCE process and to implement pan European concepts. If the former communist states opt to remain members of the Pact, then doubts about the legitimacy of that organisation as a partner for the Alliance will presumably disappear. The Alliance should try to find acceptable ways of making it clear now that in such circumstances we would be prepared to bulld on the Vienna experience to cooperate with a re,formed Warsaw Pact on general security issues. The CSCE could intensify its activities in Baskets II and III, as has already been proposed. Such cooperation miqht provide the framework within which, given a reasonably extended tranSition, a new European security structure could emerge - whether in the guise of an enlarged NATO, some kind of merger or an altogether new arrangement based on the CSCE.

26. I i equally possible that the W rsaw Paot will lose members in th course of the year and disintegrate. This would mean a marked increase in the lnherent instability of the situation. The CFE process would be placed at risk. The role of th Alli ce would become more rather than le88 vital but, aependiftg on how obvioU8 the instability was, not nece8sarily

to 11 to our publics. We should pr sumably be forced to gr t r d earlier reliance on the full CSCE process -(1e with all 3S states involved and operating individually except for such coordination s the Alliance could sustain). Hence th relev nce of Soviet and French efforts to, in effect, bring forw rd the 1992 Helsinki Summit. Bu on must wonder be th robu tn of the CSCB if too much 1 a ked of it too

800ft. It ght q nde nd h 19h member hip. It enshrines important principles - not bly on the inviolability of frontiers. But th in 1 Ac i8 not t e ty, there ar no

/sanctions

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.~ sanctions and no means of discouraging serious disputes. Given present and prospective divergencies of interest and the absence of any form of team discipline, the consensus rule will make results very difficult to achieve. These are fundamer.tal deficiencies.

The German Question

27. What should be the position of the Germans within the Alliance or alliances during the transitional period? Are there outcomes which the Alliance should be seeking to advance or avoid?

28. Of all the problems to be resolved in Europe's transition, the most immediate and most difficult - not least for the Alliance -is the German question. As seen from Evere the issue has for some time been not whether but when and how: how rapid will the progression be from rapprochement between the two Germanies to interdependence and thence to some form of unity? Recent weeks, highlighting the fragility of the GDR and the risk of chaotic breakdown, have foreshortened the time scales radically. We should probably assume that within twelve months inter-dependence will be a fact and that a formal link of some kind will be in place or in immedia e prospect.

29. Whether or not this in fact turns out to be right, the Alliance must accept that it may be right and that it is the citizens of the GDR, not governments and politicians elsewhere, who will decide. The security implications of such a development for the Alliance are, obviously, vast. Criteria are needed by which to judge and perhaps to a limited extent to steer developments in a process whose direction is clear even if its pace and detail is largely unpredictable. Again from the perspective of Evere, such criteria might include the following:

(a) to avoid creating suspicion or resentment between the Federal Republic and the Allies. The prospect of a single Germany, however configured, worries most non-German Europeans. But if it is inevitable there is little point in bewailing it. The Federal German authorities face an enormously difficult task. An outcome acceptable to the AlIi nce is more likely if the Allies display, at least in public, conf1d nce in the Germans and a desire to help them than if we phaaise our doubts and our desire to constrain. As the Secret ry General has noted, it would not be difficult to stir up popular disaffection for the Alliance in Germany. A reversion to the "us and them" attitudes of the first half of the century can be in no-one's interests. Whatever his inner hes1tations, President Bush seems to have reached this conclusion at an early stage in his Administration and to have acted on that baSis subsequently:

I(b)

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.~ (b) to ensure, if possible, that the neutrality option for a united Germany is eschewed. No-one should be allowed to think that a neutral or non-aligned Germany is a tolerable prospect for the Alliance. It would entail the collapse of NATO in anything like its present form and place a question over the further integration of the European Community (since political cooperation would be emasculated). In acknowledging the stabilizing value of present Alliance structures and of the presence of US troops in Europe (ie in Germany) the Soviet authorities no doubt took into account the risks inherent in German neutrality:

(c) to work together, as far as is compatible with (a) above, with the Soviet Union. It is an Alliance interest to see the German question handled so that it does not create additional pressures on President Gorbachev and the Soviet authorities. Hence the attractions of making haste slowly and the need to avoid statements implying that the GDR might join NATO. If the citizens of the GDR are in a hurry, it will be even more important to carry Moscow with us:

(d) to ensure that the Alliance's basic military requirements are respected. Specifically, given that NATO is to retain a defence role, the ~ito~to be defended must be delimited. It follOWS from (b) above that the boundary in Central Europe should not shift Westwards. It follows from (c) that we should not press for it to move Eastwards, at least in the interim. (One cannot altogether rule ou.t that Mr Gorbachev might accept even this 1n due course.) In other words, the Alliance's front line should stay where it is for the moment. The means of making this possible - one country, two lliances", turning East Germany into a demilitarized zone, etc - all look awkward and implausibl. But no more 80, perhaps, than NATO exercises in one half of an integrated Germany are goinq to appear. Ways will have to be found if the other desiderata in this despatch are to be met.

The Military Role of NATO

30. In a situation where the two Germanies are moving towards merger and where an essentially cooperative relationship between the states of Western, Central and Eastern Europe is in prospect, what would be the role, doctrine nd strategy of NATO's armed forces? What implications does this have for the next steps in rile control?

31. The question mark over NATO's boundary on the Central Front is also a question mark over the future military role of the Alliance. It is easy to assert the importance of the integrated military structure and of the Alliance's collective

Idefence - 10 -

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154

defence capability as a source of stability in a period of uncertainty. It is less easy to define the long term "mission" of NATO's armed forces (and hence their strategy, doctrine and procurement policy) in a period when arms control expectations are accelerating exponentially and when much of the "enemy" is threatening to change sides, In a situation that is evolving daily major weapons systems are nonetheless being evaluated and ordered for entry into service in the next century.

32. It is no doubt craven but in my judgement it is vain and probably self defeating to try to make firm military judgements just now about the long term. We cannot know what the balance of Western European security preoccupations as between Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, North Africa and points further afield will look like in 10-lS years time. We should focus instead on managing the transition effectively ie on maintaining military capabilities and policies which take account of political realities while remaining credible in the eyes of those responsible for implementing them as well as of any potential adversary.

33. The political "realities" are already familiar enough. They include, beyond the German "question", German doubts about the environmental impact of stationed forces aOO the presence of nuclear weapons (few here now see any chance that the Germans will accept a Follow On to Lance); beyond n Americ n intention to draw down their forces, American doubts about flexible r sponse and extended deterrence and, in the case of Canada, about the r ability to retain any forces in Europe for much longer; and beyond the general public euphoria about Eastern Europ , doubts about the ability of most Alliance members to resist anticipating the arms control dividend by engaging in unilateral cuts of one kind or another. (It will b argued that much of the aid required to h lp our form r foes should be funded from defence expenditure no longer needed to deter them.)

34. Against that b ckground, and the more det iled n lysis of the doctrinal issues in my despatch of 22 June, the Allianc 's interim milit ry objectives might include the following:

(a) retention of the politic 1 commitment to forw rd d f nee. But the me ns of implementing the concept (and hence the meaning of the cone pt) will have to ch ng • Current pr ctic on th flanks r ther th n th t on th C ntr 1 Front will becom the mod 1 ie f wer in pl ce fore a, mor emphasis on reserves ( nd rea rviats) on mobility nd "tr ding space for time , on reinforcem nt nd on th pr positioning of equipment cf the ACE Mobil Force. (Non of this would n ces rily dis dv ntage the UK.) W shall be more dependent on timely warning;

/ (b)

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e(fj) (b) retention of the concept of flexible response while recognising, again., that its meaning is going to change. The possession of nuclear weapons and of a credible philosophy for their use remains the only sure means of deterring resort to military force. Trip wire strategies are strategically and morally incoherent (and will undermine the US commitment to Europe). But there will be fewer conventional forces and also fewer and longer range sub-strategic systems. Strategic forces will be modelled on the concept of minimum deterrence. By the end of the transitional period sub strategic systems may well be deployed in the European theatre only at sea and on the homelands of the European nuclear powers. This prospect is relevant to the future balance of influence between the UK, France and Germany. If it is one with which the UK can live, it has implications for the way we approach the SNF negotiation eg our willingness tc accept a much smaller SNF stockpile, and the emphasis we place on the FOTL issue;

(c) retention of an integrated military structure. Without this neither of the previous objectives will be attainable, the Alliance will tend to unravel and any future European system will probably lack the teeth necessary to make it more than a forum for discussion and a source of paper guarantees . It should be based on the deployment of stationed forces in some form (though where th FRG is concerned it will be essential to eliminate any lingering resemblance to occupation forces). It should take on a progressively more European aspect. As alre dy noted (para V), the multi-national character of military formations may become a cri erion of equal importance toth ir operational effectiveness;

(d) cooperation with the Americans to ensure th in their military presence do not undermine th commitment. Th re is a risk that American cut r sult in recrimin tion nd a chain re ctlon vh the Alliance with military deployments interpre d by Congress nd the JCS as inadequate to sustain the strategic commitm nt. Given care this outcome can be void d. The transform tion of the situation in Eastern Europe should make tolerable n the not too dist n future a very subst nti 1 reduction 1n the symbols of the US commitmen , both nucl ar and con v ntional;

(e) n int n ifi d effort to aehiev closer cooperation and further aoctrin 1 rapprochem nt b tw n Fr nee nd he

Alli nee 8 whole and th UK in p rticul r. The r lev nce of this s ems 0 m implicit ln most of the rgumen tion in this despatch. The UK will h ve to ask its lf once more wheth r, despit th perform nc nd cost pen lties we can afford not to coop rate with Franc on 9 th .n xt gen ra ion of tactic 1 air to surface missiles;

/ ( )

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/56

(f) active involvement by NATO, including the military authorities, in the operation of a CFE verification regime. Verification will, if all goes well, be a growth area in the Nineties. Giving NATO a substantial role in coordinating the effort and evaluating the results will make the regime more effective, will help to tie in the smaller countries and will enhance the position of the Organisation as a whole.

35. Arms Control. The arms control process in general will be of critical importance in the management of the period of transition. Acceptance by both sides, for instance, of minimum deterrence as an ultimate objective would throw a long shadow in front on if. But for the moment the CFE negotiations in Vienna are the central issue. Assuming that there is an agreement this year (and that the Warsaw Pact survives), a pause for reflection, consolidation and controlled implementation might well be sensible. The Soviet Union may turn out to share this view. But if not (or if others, including the US, do not) a further negotiation (CFE II) may offer the only practical hope of slowing the pace of structural disarmament within the Alliance and of controlling the twin processes of US and Soviet force reductions.

36. Negotiated reductions are, for many reasons, preferable to unilateral reductions. Without a CFE style framework the draw down in US and Soviet forces could occur in a precipitate, unpredictable and destabilizing manner (SACEUR is preoccupied by the possibility). A purely bilateral approach is unlikely to produce a militarily satisfactory solution or to be acceptable to others facing related political and economic pressures. The UK would have difficulty in exercising effective influence over a process which would affect it profoundly. A CFE II would no doubt be more difficult to manage than the present negotiation e9 because of the uncertain prospects for the Warsaw Pact. But such a negotiation (possibly long drawn out) could make an import nt contribution to the preservation of security in a Europe in transition. The UK should seek to ensure that all stationed forces are included in its ambit and should play an active part in determining its objectives (eg to further constrain Soviet reinforcement and sustainment capabilities) •

Can Consensus be Maintained?

37. Is there likely to be a consensus among Alliance governments on the answers to the questions posed in this despatch? Will there be sufficient public support to sustain the organisation, and in particular its defence role, through the period of transition?

/38.

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. •


-CWJ 38 . It is going to require considerable political effort to develop and sustain a consensus within the Alliance about its role, and about how to maintain its members' security, in the period ahead. Recent reaffirmations , at Summits and Ministerial meetings , of the value of the Alliance are important and genuine. The last couple of years have demonstrated graphically the priority member states give to overcoming disagreements and finding common ground. But collective discussion of the fundamental issues which loom has barely begun.

39 . The Americans have a policy - the New Atlanticism - though it is not clear to me how far they have thought through its implications . President Mitterrand is being extremely active. But the policies his government are pursuing look mutually inconsistent and will certainly have to be modified if consensus is to be possible . The Federal Republic ' s policies within and towards the Alliance will reflect Bonn's electoral and inner German preoccupations. They will presumably be liable to sudden shifts (as with the Ten Points) and are likely to make the Federal Republic a capricious partner for the rest of this year. The prospects thereafter depend greatly on the outcome of the election in December. Partly for that reason perhaps, many of the smaller Allies give the impression that thinking rigorously about the future is simply too difficult at present.

This does, it is true, have the advantage of leaving an opening for those who can make the effort, as Washington and Paris have already demonstrated. It also underlines the importance of close coordination between the major powers on all the issues including , as I argued last June, those of military policy.

40. The need has been identified some time ago for capitals to begin re-educating the public about the rationale for the Alliance's existence. The basic arguments - that the Soviet Union is a long term problem, that the threat may have diminished but the risk of war has not been eliminated, that no dependable alternative to the Alliance and its deterrent strategy is in prospect - are clear enough. But there has been little evidence of a concerted effort to use them. It must be doubted whether in most countries such an effort will occur. External events may make the case for us. But failing such a development the best means of sustaining public support for the Alliance in the short term are prob bly those already in play: emphasizing the political role (properly defined) as the complement of the defence role, arguing the merits of a cooperative relationship with the Warsaw Pact, embracing an on-going arms control process. How effective they will be remains to be seen.

/Conclusion

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157


158

,

eel]) Conclusion

41. The challenges facing the Alliance continue to accumulate. The foundations on which it is built are shifting irrevocably. For good or ill, the question of "whether NATO" has become, de facto, an element in Europe's future security agenda. That said, the question today is "whither NATO". Europe faces its most crucial decade since the 1940s. The opportunities are great, the risks likewise. The process of creating a continent "whole and free" will stretch our adaptability and creativity to the limit. In the complex and uncertain period of transition already under way the Alliance, working alongside the European Community, within the CSCE and, perhaps, in a form of partnership with the Warsaw Pact has a vital role. Despite the longer term questions, there is no alternative to it in sight as a source of stability and security and as a means of preventing war. The Alliance, moreover, enshrines principles - notably the central importance of binding, multi-national security commitments which are embodied in appropriate military structures - that we must preserve. Adherence to those principles did much to make possible the 1989 Revolution and would do much to ensure that its benefits were not lost in future.

42. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for Defence, to the Chief of the Defence Staff, to Sir Percy Cradock, to HM Representatives in NATO and East European capitals and to the European Community as well as to the Head of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Conventional Arms Control in Europe in Vienna and to the Leader of the UK Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

I am, Sir Yours faithfully

----Michael Alexander

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1 . Map 0/ former Yugo 'Iavia and neighbouring 'tate'

160

Chapter 6

1999: NATO'S INTERVENTION

Far from marking the 'end of its history', the end of the Cold War forced NATO to turn in new and unexpected directions. In July 1991 the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, opening NATO's door to new members: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined in 1999. Russia ratified the 'Partnership for Peace' with NATO in May 1995. However the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) into several breakaway entities resulted in bloody conflicts leading to a major NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The last year of the twentieth century, with a high-profile summit in Washington to mark NATO's fiftieth anniversary, was thus dominated by humanitarian peace-keeping operations. The UK, with a new Labour Government and a Prime Minister active on the international scene, was at the forefront in establishing NATO's new priorities. Following his key role in the Kosovo operation as Defence Secretary, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen became Secretary-General in October 1999, succeeding Javier Solana. Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson commanded the Kosovo peace-keeping force, KFOR. Alastair Campbell, the Prime Minister's Press Secretary, joined Jamie Shea, the NATO spokesman, in managing NATO's increasingly sophisticated media operation.

NATO in the Balkans

Following Tito's death in 1980, the SFRY showed increasing signs of division. The state's economic decline continued and the issue of power sharing rose up the agenda. Ethnic Albanians, denied a republic of their own, demonstrated as early as the autumn of 1981 for the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. Slobodan Milosevic exploited a resurgence of nationalist sentiment and came to power in Serbia,

Chapter 6 -1999: NATO'S INTERVENTION

installing his supporters in positions of power and severely restricting the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. 1 National feeling and suspicion of the Serbs mounted, not only in Kosovo, but also in Slovenia, Croatia, and in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH), which declared their independence in 1991. A ten-day conflict followed in Slovenia which ended Yugoslav military interference. Fighting (June-November 1991) in Croatia left the Serbs in control of about one third of its territory.

Remaining within a Serb-dominated rump, Yugoslavia was unacceptable to the Bosniacs and Croats in BiH; equally, an independent BiR was unacceptable to the Bosnian Serbs. In April 1992, the Bosnian Serb leadership refused to accept an independent BiH and proclaimed an independent 'Serbian Republic of BiH' (later renamed 'Republika Srpska'). In the first nine months of the conflict, their army and paramilitary groups aided and abetted by Milosevic, took control of around 70 percent of BiH territory, systematically driving out non-Serbs. The siege and bombardment of the city of Sarajevo started and in summer 1992 journalists began reporting the horrors of Serb-run 'detention camps'. The conflict left some 100,000 people dead, 1.8 million displaced and, for the first time since 1945, Europe witnessed ethnic cleansing and genocide. War crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by all sides during the war.

Between 1992 and 1995 the international community made a series of attempts to secure peace and a negotiated settlement acceptable to all communities in BiR, as well as to Belgrade and Zagreb: all failed. The protection force UNPROFOR, originally

1 For the historical background see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (Macmillan, 1998).

161

BRiTAl IN 'ATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

deployed in Croatia to protect humanitarian relief operation had its mandate extended to BiR. The

had impo ed an arm embargo on all the warring partie and the newly emergent states in 1991) a well a a no-fly zone over BiR. ATO monitored and enforced it: on 28 February 1994 alliance force hot down four warplanes. In 1993 the de ignated rebrenica, Bihac Zepa and Gorazde all predominately Bosniac) afe area . In ay 1995 ATO launched air trike on

erb ammunition dump following Bo nian erb military action around rebrenica. In July 1995 the Bo nian erb eized large number of peacekeeper a ho tage. orne 7, 00 victim 10 t their live in the rebrenica genocide.

19. K Puma d livering upp/i . a. part lh ~ I d Ko ov /~ ~ (Kf'OR).

'I h ub qu nt nd n ting n 21 July 1 r d n int m ti n 1 milit ry ur t b in t publika rp k i it

162

continued to attack UN safe areas. On 28 August a Bosnian Serb shell killed more than 30 people in a Sarajevo market place, and in accordance with the London Meeting decisions ATO and UNPROFOR launched a joint military operation against Bo nian Serb military installation to secure the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. Within three day, Serb leader agreed to withdraw their gun from the arajevo exclusion zone. These events led to a FRY IRS negotiating team entering preliminary negotiation in Geneva and ew York in September. The e in turn paved the way for the ovember 1995 Dayton greement'. The General Framework for

Peace wa igned in Pari on 14 December 1995. It determined the border and con titutional tructure for Bi provided for international upervi ion under a civilian igh Repre entative, and a 60 000-trong peace implementation force (1 OR) which

replaced R OR. hi wa 0 fir t large- cale peace-keeping operation under a

ecurity ouncil Re olution ( R .

Kosovo

where

whi h h t h ,tili i .

in Kosovo, especially from the spring of 1998, and their 'impact on the stability of the whole region', stepped up its reaction in the face of the grave humanitarian situation, especially the mass displacement of people in the countryside ofKosovo and the neighbouring territories. On 24 September - the day after UNSCR 1199 - the North Atlantic Council approved the issuing of an activation warning for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo (No. 28). This was followed by several US declarations that they were ready to use air intervention. At the same time President Clinton's envoy, Richard Holbrooke - who had been instrumental in the Dayton agreement - was sent to attempt to convince Milosevic to comply with the UN resolution. On 13 October NATO issued an activation order for air intervention (No. 29). Although there was no UNSC mandate for military enforcement, for the UK the authority arose from the 'exceptional circumstances in Kosovo'. Baroness Symons, a Foreign Office Minister, had clarified the UK position on 16 November: 'limited use of force is justifiable in support of purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the Council's express authorisation when that was the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.'4 In the meantime Holbrooke had brokered an agreement. The result was to set out FRY's withdrawal of security forces and the deployment of OSCE 'verifiers' in compliance with USCR 1199. NATO declared that it remained ready to use force if necessary. A new Yugoslav military offensive was launched on Christmas Eve, thus violating the agreement and defying NATO. This prompted the Contact Group (the USA, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Russia and representatives of the EU and the OSC ) to try to find a negotiated interim settlement. The massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanians in Rac;ak on 15 January 1999 symbolised the urgency of the situation.

The orth Atlantic Council (NAC) met on 17 January and Solana condemned the massacre as a 'flagrant violation of international humanitarian law', demanding that the FRY should cooperate fully with international organisations and in the prosecution of those responsible. NATO prepared for further action and 'reaffirmed that the ACTORDS (Activation Orders) for air operations remain in effect.' It called on both sides to cease

4 Hou e of Lords Debates, Vol. 594,16 November 1998, Written Answer 140; see also Adam Roberts,' ATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Ko ovo', Survival, Vol. 41, 0.3 (1999), p.103.

Chapter 6 -1999: NATO 'S INTERVENTION

hostilities.s On 22 January the political directors of the Contact Group met in London to discuss the possibility of convening a conference, a move reinforced by a meeting between the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and the Ru sian Foreign Minister, Sergei Ivanov. NATO welcomed the mediation of the Contact Group and on 28 January the UN Secretary-General made a trongly worded statement to the NAC 'linking the efforts of the Alliance, the Contact Group and the UN' and mentioning the horror 'present in the lives of hundreds of thousands of the people of Kosovo whose lives have been disrupted violently'. He also referred to the 'need to use force, when all other means have failed'.6

20. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair (left) greeting the US President, Bill Clinton (right) at the opening of the commemorative fiftieth anniversary ceremony.

On 29 January the Contact Group summoned all partie to negotiate at Rambouillet in France. The following day, the AC reiterated that ATO might intervene to obtain aces ation of ho tilities, the reduction of military forces and an end to excessive and disproportionate use of force and stated that it had agreed that its' Secretary-General may authorize air strikes against target on FRY territory'. At the same time it supported negotiations for averting a humanitarian catastrophe.? The conference was opened on 6 February by the rench President, Jacque Chirac, and the two co-Chairmen of

5 ' tatement by the ecretary General of ATO, Dr Javier Solana on behalf of the A Following its Meeting on unday 17 January 1999', Press release (99) 3. 6 Quoted in Weller, Crisis in Ko ovo, p. 393. 7 ' tatement by the orthAtlantic Council on Kosovo' , 30 January 1999, quoted in Weller, Crisis in Kosovo, pp. 393, 396.

163


the Conference, the British and French Foreign Ministers Robin Cook and Hubert Vedrine. The aim was to work out an interim settlement with power-sharing. Just before the conclusion of the talks at Belgrade's insi tence, a second draft proposed an express recognition of the continued territorial integrity and even sovereignty of the FRY. The FRY refused to accept self-rule for ethnic Albanians. After two weeks of negotiation , and on the basis of the progress made, the co-chairmen decided on a new implementation conference to start on 15 March. Cook encouraged both sides to accept, as the documents discu sed 'provide autonomy for Ko ovo and ensure the protection of the Serb community in Ko OVO.' 9 He reiterated that on 15 March an agreement would have to be reached on an international civilian and military presence in Ko ovo, which would be led by ATO. On 23 February Solana, on behalf of, ATO welcomed the progre made and appealed to all partie to accept the plan o. 30).

On 15 March the Ko ovo delegation confirmed it acceptance of the interim agreement pre ented on 23 ebruary. The FRY / erbia on the other hand, pre ented it own ver ion reopening the whole political di cu ion and in effect propo ing a ubordination of Ko ovo to erbia. The ontact

roup immediately tated that only technical adju tment could be con idered and that th focu wa on implementation. ventually only Ko ovo ign d while the Ru ian delegation remained

ab nt and thu di ociated it If. In the meantime elgrade tr op had ngaged in offen ive peration cau ing a new wave f di placed

per on . Talk adj umed on 19 March. n 22 arch n gotiator trav 11 d to elgrade t g ther

with H Ibr ok , to make a la t att mpt to convince th erb t acc pt the acc rd . 10 Parliam nt in

elgrad rejected th m.

, To End a War Rand m H u ,

164

30 January and insisted that these mea ures were necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. It launched an air campaign in Kosovo and Serbia on 24 March. 11 The Russians, with whom ATO had established formal contacts by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security in 1997, opposed 'humanitarian intervention' which they said did not comply with the UN charter, the Helsinki FinalAct or FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity.

21 . Briti h Green Jacket painting boy' face with camouflage paint in Ko ovo.

11 ' Pre tatement by r Javi r lana, cr tary 1 ncral of J\. " 23 March 19 9. 12 ' Pre nference, !\ II adqu rtcr , ru I ', 12

pril1999.

After initially slow results, air strikes were stepped up with attacks against high-value targets in Belgrade. Efforts were made to minimise civilian casualties. Up to 1,000 aircraft were involved, flying over 38,000 combat missions. Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from aircraft, ships and submarines. Nevertheless, ethnic cleansing continued, forcing some 850,000 Albanians to flee. After the launch of air strikes, relations with Russia became increasingly tense but Moscow was interested in finding a diplomatic solution. The Russian President appointed a special envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, who worked with the ED envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, to negotiate with Milosevic on a peace plan drawn up by the G-S. Following these negotiations, Operation Allied Force ended on 9 June, when the FRYGovernment acceptedtheplan's principles, including a NATO-led international peace-keeping force and the immediate withdrawal of Serb troops. There had not been a single casualty on ATO's side. British and Norwegian Special Forces were the first to enter Kosovo. The KLA was disarmed. Most Kosovo Albanians returned to their homes.

Under UNSCR 1244 Kosovo came under UN administration. It authorised a UN peace- keeping mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a 46,000- trong

ATO-Ied security force (KFOR), commanded by General Jackson. The UK initially contributed 19,000 troops. The Ru sians also contributed, raising hope that cooperation would be resumed.

owever, mutual suspicions remained. On 12 June announced that Russian forces had occupied

the airport at Pristina. The episode resulted in a period of intense negotiation between Russian officer and Jackson regarding the control of the variou zones. The Russians refused to come under

ATO command and demanded their own sector in orth rn Ko ovo. On 18 June an agreement was reached: tasks in the airport would be shared and 3,500 Russian oldiers would operate under joint

ATOlRus ian command. The Chainnan of the xtraordinary Meeting of Foreign and Defence

Mini ter made a statement on the situation (No. 36). TO and UK authorities drew lessons. In 2000 the Hou e of Commons oreign Affairs and Defence ommittee presented reports. 13 The Defence Committee began its inquiry starting on the day of the air strikes with evidence from

13 Hou e of ommons, Foreign Affairs ommittee, Fourth Report, 7 June 2000, http://www.publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm and Defence

ommittee, Fourteenth Report, 24 October 2000, http:// www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uklpalcmI99900/ cm e1ect/cmdfence/34 7 /34 702.htm.

Chapter 6 - 1999: NATO 'S INTER VENTION

George Robertson, the then Defence Secretary, who subsequently published his personal account. 14

As NATO Secretary-General he also presented an assessment: 'Serb forces are out, KFOR is in, and the refugees are home. ' Yet the task ahead of winning the peace through KFOR was formidable, for a country described by Bernard Kouchner, the Head of the UN mission in Kosovo, as emerging from ' forty years of communism, ten year of apartheid, and a year of ethnic cleansing'. An OSCE report, KosovolKosova As Seen, As Told provided evidence of planned aggression against civilians, from which Robertson justified NATO 's intervention as thwarting the spiral of violence. He recognised and regretted civilian casualties, quoting Human Rights Watch who estimated 90 incidents, less than one per cent of the 10,484 ATO sorties. 1s

In April 2000 he reiterated the lessons learnt: 'Kosovo shows why an effective ATO is needed; NATO is taking forward decisions about Kosovo; and other Summit initiatives will equip ATO to do things like Kosovo better as we enter a new century. ' 16

22. The Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, David Wright, (far left) in discussion with the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robert on (far right) .

14 Lord Robertson, Le sons from the CriSiS, October 1999, http://www.mod.uklNRlrdon1yre /31AA374E-C3 B-40 BFC6- 8D6A73330FS/O/ko ovo_1es on .pdf. 15 Lord Robertson, Introduction 'Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and hallenge ', 21 March 2000, p. 5, http:// www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/index.htm. 16 Lord Robertson,' ATO at the beginning of the 21 st century', the etherlands Atlantic A sociation, 13 April 2000, http://www.nato.intldocu/speechl2000/s000413a.htm.

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The Washington Summit: Strategy and capability

Forty-four AIO members and partners - except Russia - met in Washington from 23 to 25 April 1999 in the largest ever NATO gathering of heads of state and government. Apart from Kosovo, the summit concentrated on the new Strategic Concept, the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and enlargement.

Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty defined collective defence of its own members as the original core mission of ATO. There had been some rethinking of its mission with the end of the Cold War. Some wanted to retain the original function with geographical and functional limits and others supported new tasks such as peace keeping. A compromise was struck: collective defence was reaffinned and new potential areas of intervention were envisaged, as demonstrated with Bosnia and Kosovo (No. 34). The Summit communique evoked Article 7 to' tand ready caseby-case and by con ensus to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management' . 17 Acting in the defence of 'common interest ' - rather than purely 'common territory' - provided justification for Alliance involvement in a variety of circumstances such as the Persian Gulf and outh-We t Asia, international terrorism and the threat posed by weapons of rna destruction (WMD). Secretary of State Albright had observed in December 1998 that 'a balli tic mi sile attack u ing WMD from a rogue tate is every bit a much an Article 5 threat to our border as a Warsaw Pact tank two decades ago. 'I There was a shift towards broadening the mandate from collective defence to collective ecurity: 'The Alliance ... not only en ure the defence of it member but contribute to peace and tability in thi region.' 19

The ummit al 0 aw the adoption of the Defence apabilitie Initiative which ought to ensure that

the Alliance' conventional forces were equipped for the mi ion of the twenty-fir t century ( o.

17 Wa hington ummit ommunique i ued by the Heads of tat and vernment Participating in the Meeting of the

rth tlantic ouncil in Washington, 24 Apri11999. 1 Qu ted in Andrew J. Pierre,' ATO at Fifty: ew Challenge , utur ncertaintie', pecial Report, United ate In titute of Peac ,March 1999 http://www.u ip.orglpub 1 p cialreport 1 r9 0322.html, p.7.

19 he Alliance' trategic oncept Approved by the Heads f tate and vernment Participating in the Meeting of the

rth tlantic uncil in Washington D. , 23rd and 24th pril 19

166

35). With a diminished likelihood of a large-scale aggression against one or more members, priorities were shifted towards new threats 'from regional conflicts, ethnic strife and other crises, beyond Alliance territory, as well as the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery'. In this new security environment, NATO needed to prepare for smaller-scale operations and further increase multinational cooperation. The rapid deployment of troops was essential, with forces 'highly mobile, logistically supportable at a distance and geared to an expeditionary role' .20 They also required better protection against chemical, biological, terrorist or cyber attacks.

In 1998, the UK had initiated a review of its own defence capability, issuing its findings in the 1999 Defence White Paper. Britain's contribution to NATO and the future of European defence formed a major aspect of the review. The Amsterdam Treaty of October 1997 had established a Common and Security Defence Policy which increa ed ED responsibility for peace keeping and humanitarian work. At the informal ED summit in Portschach in October 1998, Tony Blair was seen as ' ignalling a significant shift in the UK attitude to uropean defence is ue " declaring that the UK wanted 'Europe to take a tronger foreign policy and security role' whilst ensuring 'that the institutional mechani m in no way undermines ATO but rather is complementary to it' .2 1 The St Malo Declaration in December 1998 marked a ranco-Briti h agreement to work together a the two main pillar of a European defence capability.

The April ATO ummit was pivotal in thi context a it launched the uropean Security Defence Initiative. Blair warmly endorsed the move a for him events in Kosovo had clearly demon trated the need to improve uropean capability. Mo t air strikes had been undertaken by the Am rican and the second large t contribution had been that of the UK. Britain ecured agreement that ATO w uld normally lead in uropean cri i manag ment but would make a set and ervic available to the EU when the latter were given re pOll ibiLity. rd Robert on later ummarized the po ition: More

urope in ATO doe n 't mean Ie orth Am rica. ' 22 The US aim wa to e tabli h fairer burd n- haring. The task proved difficult to implement a uropean

20 Pierre, 'NATO at Fifty', p. 5. 21 Mark Oake " uropean Defence: r m P °rt chach t Hel inki', Hou e of ommon, Re earch Paper 0 120,21 February 2000, pp. 10-11.

22 Lord Robert on, ' Remarks to the Pre up n Hi Arriv 1 at ATO Headquarter " 14 ctober 199 .

defence budgets continued to decline with only three countries prepared to restructure their forces: the UK, France and the Netherlands. The official line was that the ESDI would contribute to a more effective Alliance and stronger transatlantic relations. The defence capability review was especially relevant in the context of NATO enlargement.

Opening NATO's door

In the 1990s, to stabilise Central and Eastern Europe, NATO adopted a strategy of inclusion and collaboration based on Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The criteria demanded of those states wishing to join the Alliance was a democratic system, free market economy, absence of civilian conflict, compliance with human rights laws, civilian control of the military and specified levels of defence and military spending. A consensus among existing members was also required, taking into account strategic and geopolitical considerations. Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia announced their desire to join.23 In 1991 NATO set up the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (replaced in 1997 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPCD, opening a dialogue with the newly independent states of Eastern Europe. In 1994 cooperative military relations were established with the Partnership for Peace (PiP) to prepare potential states for accession. In 1997 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were officially invited to accession talks. They officially joined on 12 March 1999,24 the first enlargement for 17 years.

With the turmoil in the Balkans, the possibility of opening NATO's doors to countries in that region gave rise to a lively debate. Romania had lobbied for some time and had received French support. The UK realised that Front Line States (Albania, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) had carried a heavy burden during the conflict in Kosovo. However, Britain favoured a general statement as it wished to avoid an implicit ranking between groups of countries. The UK did not want to antagonize Moscow further by listing countries that were close to the Russian border. The 1999 summit adopted the Membership Action Plan25 to

23 On enlargement in this period see Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself/or a New Era (Columbia University Press, New York), 2002. Asmus served as a top aide to Secretary of State Albright. 24 'Welcoming Statement by the NAC to the Three Allies', Press Release (1999) 035, 12 March 1999. 25 'Membership Action Plan', Press Release NAC-S (99) 66.


assist the aspirants to develop forces and capabilities. Nine countries were listed in the following order: Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Macedonia and Albania. In 2004 the first seven joined. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia were invited to join, and it was also agreed that Georgia could one day become a member.

Epilogue to an anniversary year

The year 1999 was an important year dominated by NATO's intervention in Kosovo and the completion of a decade of restructuring and reform, summarised by Lord Robertson at the Ministerial meeting of December 1999 as 'one of the most active and productive in the Alliance's entire history', a 'demonstration of NATO's vitality' (No. 37). The fiftieth anniversary itself was a subdued affair. The mood was captured by Blair who, recalling NATO's past achievements, reflected that:

Today we commemorate. But we know that celebration is very hard when, on Europe's doorstep, men are being taken from their homes and shot, women raped in front of their families, children orphaned amid scenes of barbarism and ethnic hatred. We cannot and will not stand by and allow a policy of genocide to succeed. Reversing the hideous policy of ethnic cleansing is the best anniversary memorial NATO could have (No. 33).

Two years after its large-scale military involvement in Kosovo and the subsequent peace-keeping operation, NATO invoked article 5 after 9/11, for the first time in its history and in response to attack not against Europe but against America. The Alliance's Strategic Concept had highlighted the risks of terrorism: 'Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Article 5 and 6 ... Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks ... including acts of terrorism. ' 26 As noted by Lord Robertson, this was 'a vivid reminder how fundamentally our security environment has changed.' Fifty-three years after its creation 'NATO's Article 5 commitment brought the old world to the aid of the new, to reverse the words of Winston Churchill. '27

26 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of Sate and Government participating in the meeting of the NAC, 23 and 24 April 1999. 27 Lord Robertson, Foreword in Asmus, Opening NATO's Door, p. xv. The reference is to Churchill's celebrated speech of 4 June 1940, in turn alluding to a famous speech by George Canning.

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23. Map howin KFOR deployment in Ko ovo

16


No. 28 ACTWARN decision, 24 September 1998

169


0.29 CTORD decision, 13 October 1998

170


No 30 Dr Solana on the outcome of the Rambouillet talks, 23 February 1999

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o. 31 Dr Solana on air operations in the FRY, 23 March 1999

172

Chapter 6 - 1999: NATO 'S INTERVENTION

[t remain op n t the Yugoslav ovemment to how t any time that it i ready to n1e t the demand of the int mational omnlunity.

I hope it will h e th wi dom to do o.

At the same time we are appealing to the Kosovar Ibanian to remain firmly committ d t the road to peac whi h they ha e ho en in Pari . We urg in particular Ko ovar armed lem nt to r fr in from provo ative milit ry action.

Let me b clear: TO i not aging war again t Yu 0 la ia.

We ha no quarrel with the people ofYugo lavia wh for to I ng ha been i lated in urope becau e of the policie of th ir government.

Our objective i to pre ent nlore human uffering and more repre ion and violence again t th ci ilian population of Kosovo.

We mu tal 0 act to pre ent in tability pr ading in th r gl n.

TO i united b hind thi ur of acti n.

W mu t halt the iolence and bring an nd to th humanitarian cata troph now unfolding in Ko ovo.

We know th ri k of action but w hav all agreed that inaction bring even greater danger .

We will do what i nee ary to bring tability to th r gion.

W mu t top an uthoritarian r im from repr in it p ople in Europ at th end of the 20th c ntury.

W ha a moral duty t do o.

The re pon ibility i on our houlder and w ill fulfil it.

1 73


o. 32 Heads of tate and Government on TO's military intervention, 23 April 1999

174

Chapter 6 - 1999: NATO'S INTERVENTION

5. We ar int n ifying ATO' military a ti n t in r a the pr ure on 8elgrad . Hi d governm nt rc putting in place

7.

a ditional mea ur t tight n th n traint · n th I grade regim . Th e include inten ifi d implem ntation f n mic anction and an mbargo on p tToleum pr duct on \ hich we

\ lome the lead. We hav dir ct dour Defi n Mini ter t d termine ways that A TO can contribut to halting th d li cry of \ ar material including by launching maritim op rati n , taking into account th po ibl on equ nee on M nten gr .

TO i prepar d to u p nd it air tnk

f

f

c untri .

~ rk ly

Th long-pi ann d unr trained and continuing a ault by u 0 la military polic and paramilitary force on Ko 0 a nd

th r pr ion dir cted again t other minoritie of the FRYar aggravating the already ma iv humanitarian cata troph . Thi threaten t d stabili th urrounding r gion.

9. A TO it m mb rs and its Partn rs hay r pond d to the humanitarian m rg ney and ar int nsifying th ir r fug and humanitarian r li f operation in clo cooperation ith th

H R the I ad agen yin thi fi Id and with oth r r I ant organisation. W will continue our as i tane long n c sary. TO for ar making a major contribution to thi t k.

10. W pay tribut to th rvic men and om n of TO ho c urag and d dication ar f our military nd humanitarian operation .

11. Atrociti ag in t the peopl ofKo ovo by RY military polic and paramilitary fore represent fla rant iolati n 0

international law. Our govemm nt will co-o rat ith th Internation) riminal Tribunal for th Conn r Yugo la ia (I Y)

175


to uppon inve tigation of all tho e including at the highe t I re pon ible for war crim and crim again t humanity. ATO

ill uppon the I TY in it effort t e ur r I ant infonnation. There can be no lasting peace without justice.

12. e acknowl dge and welcome the courageou upport that tal: in th region are providing to our effort in Ko ovo. The fonner Yugo la Republic of Macedonia and Albania have played a particularly important rol not lea t in accepting hundred of thou and f refugee from Ko ovo. The tate in the r gion ar bearing ub tantial economi and ocial burden temming from the current c nflict.

13. will not tolerate threa by the Belgrad regim to the curity of it neighb ur . We ill r pond to uch halleng , by B Igrade t it n ighbou rutting from the pr nc of T ~ r or th ir acti itie on their territory during thi cn i .

14. r affirm our upport for the territorial integrity and ereignty

176

fall ountri in the r gion.

15. W r ffirm our trong upport for the demo raticallyelected o emrn nt of Mont negro. ny mov by B 19rad to und nnin

the govemm nt of Pre id nt Djukanovic will ha e gra con qu n . FRY forc hould I ave the demilitari cd zone f Pr laka immediately.

I . Th obj ti of a fr e pro p rou pen and onomically int rat d outh t ur pe cannot be fully a ur d until the R embark upon th tran ition to d mocraey. Ace rdingly

I pr our upport for th objectiv of a demo ratic R hieh protect th ri ht of all minoriti including tho in V ~vodina and andjak and promi t work ~ r u h change thr ugh and b yon the curr nt conflict.

17. It i

f


No. 33 Tony Blair at the Commemorative Ceremony of the 50th Anniversary of NATO, 23 pril 1999

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o. 34 Wa hington Declaration, 23 pril1999

17


the full rang of the Allianc ' 21 t century mi ion. W will continue to build onfidence and ecurity through ann control, di annament and n n-proliferation m a ure . We r iterat ur

nd mnation of t rrori m and our d terminati n 1 pr te t our elve a ain t thi ourg.

Our lIianc r m in open to all uropean d m ra ie re rdl . of geography willing and abl to meet the re pon ibilitie of m mb r hip and who e inclu ion would enhan e 0 erall urity and tability in Europe. ATO i an e ential pillar of a wid r community of hared value and hared r pon ibility. Working together Allie and Partners including Ru ia and kraine. ar d v loping th ir cooperation and era ing th di i ion imp d by the old War to help to build a ur p whol and fr wh re

curily and pro perity a~ har d and indi i ibl .

. Fifty year after NATO' creation the de tini s of orth Am rica and Europ remain in parable. When we act together, we afeguard our freedom and ecurity and enhance lability mor

etTe ti ly than any of u could alone. ow and for th ntury about to b gin w d lar th fundam ntal obj tiv of thi Allian enduring pea ecurity and liberty for all p opt f

ur pe and rth America.

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o. 35 Defence Capabilities Initiative, 25 April 1999

1 0


ffe tivene of multinational op rati n ~ ill r quire p rti ular tt nti n t the challenge f interoperability. (n thi nt # t,

incr a d att nti n mu t b paid to human f: t r u h a mmon approa he to d trin training and perati nal

pro dure and tandardi ation, a well a to th challeng p ed by the accel rating pace of technological change and the different peed at hi hAllie introduc d nced capabilitie .

Improvement in interoperability and criti al capabilitie hould al 0 trengthen tbe European pillar in A TO.

The Way head

5. Again t thi background the Alliance ha amined rea \! h r impro ement in capabilitie would mak a ignificant contribution toward meeting the challenge of th futur . Th aim h b n to d elop a common ass m nt ofr uir m nt ft r th full rang f IHanc mi ion. In identifying th mo t imp rtant are for improv m nt and with a pe ial ~ u n interoperability the work ha concentrated on th deployability and m bility of Allianc force on their u t inability and I gisti their urvivability and effi ctive ngag m nt apability and n c mmand and control and information y tern . In m a e it ha b en po ibl at thi arty ta e t tout th t p t

b tak n to impro om apabiliti . In ther furth r rk i r quir d t min differ nt opti nand mak firm r comm ndation about impro ment to be m de. Th initiati empha i the importan of th re ouree dim n ion f thi ~ rk a w 11 a th requir m nt for better coordination b t en d fen c planning di iplin . tak into con id rati n th bility f

uropean Allie to und rtak W U-led op rati n ; addr t impro e capabilitie f multinational ~ rm tion . i ue uch a trainin do trine. human fa t on de lopm nt and perim ntati nand tandardi ati

. A part ofthi 0 ~ nc apabilitie Initiati e, ead o emment have e tabti h d a t mporary Hi h L 1 t ring

Group (HL to ov r th impl m nt tion of th 0 I nd t m t th r quir m nt of coordinati nand h nn ni ti n m n r I vant planning di cipline including for lIi cone m d for planning, and with A TO tandardi ation with th aim f a hi ing la ting effect on improv m nt in capabiliti and int ro rability.

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o. 36 tatement at eeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers, 18 June 1999

J 2

Chapter 6 - 1999: NATO 'S INTERVENTION

KFOR will not tolerate any chall nge to it auth rity or intimidation of any f the p ople of K o.

5. The llianc v 1 om th commitm nt m d b it P rtn r and ther inter ted n tion to particip t in KF R.

6. TO look forv ard t th participati n f the Ru in KFOR v ithin a unifi d hain of command. l1ie tbat arran ement v ill be found that ill allo Ru i n nd force to ork together to bring peace and tability to all p pi in

7.

9.

Ko ovo. TO and it member countrie remain ready to r urn c n uhation and full cooperation in th fram ork f th T-Ru ia Founding t.

organi ation

tt hed by H ad f tability f

f

183


184

10. In the Washington Declaration, Allied Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which the Alliance is founded and expressed their vision for the Alliance of the 21 st century. NATO's actions in Kosovo are an expression of this commitment and vision.

Chapter 6 -1999: NATO 'S INTERVENTION

No. 37 Statement by Lord Robertson reviewing NATO in 1999, 15 December 1999

L

185


1 6

o Our e ond topic will be the Balkans. On Ko 0 0 our me ting ill b an opportunity to a the r al and con iderable progres we ha e made in ince the air campaign ended and KFOR wa deployed. Let tho e who ciriticize the international community' accompli hment in Ko v today today remember the ituation w inhereit d just i month ago. For the 0 rwhelming majority of the peopl of Ko ovo life i now b tt r and there i real hop for th future. We will al 0 look at the chall ng we till fa in luding cr ating a cure en ir nm nt for all itizen f Ko vo, e tabli hing the Ko ovo Protection orp funding for th recon tru tion ffort and KFOR' upp rt t other int mational organization . Thi ill h lp u to prepar for ur di u i n \ ith Dr. B rnard Kuhner the h d f th

i ion to Ko 0 0 when h attend the uro- tlanti Partn hip Council m ting t morr w morning.

o We ill examine al 0 the progr we have made in olidifying urity in Bo nia and how to build on that

pr gr . We will di cu th br ader p litical future of outh- t urope and how TO' outh a t urope

lnitiati can pr mote long-tenn p a and tability in the Balkan.

o hi i a i nal nd to be entury a

itality. It ah ad 21 t

Chapter 7 - NATO in the Twenty-First Century

Chapter 7

NATO in the Twenty-First Century. A View from Stewart Eldon, the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to NATO

The twenty-first century began with a stark wakeup call to NATO: 9/11 2001 shocked the Alliance as it shocked everyone else. Within days, Article 5, NATO's central collective security provision, had been invoked, and the Alliance embarked on its first major "out of area" operation, in Afghanistan. 9/11 demonstrated all too clearly that the threat had changed in ways few had imagined.

As other chapters of this book show, the first forty years of NATO's existence (1949-1989) were defined by the threat from the Soviet Union. NATO spent the 1990s focused even closer to home, addressing the numerous potential, and some very real, problems resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Balkans defined the Alliance's operations in the 1990s, and called for a completely new set of peacekeeping, stabilisation and reconstruction skills.

Afghanistan, NATO's defining operation in our current decade, calls for similar peacekeeping, stabilisation and reconstruction skills, but delivered on a far larger scale, at a far greater distance, and in a far more difficult environment.

The threat from terrorism has reshaped our views of what a threat-based organisation such as NATO needs to be able to do. Afghanistan has vindicated the decision in the Comprehensive Political Guidance published at the 2006 Riga Summit to shift towards greater expeditionary capabilities, and highlighted the need to accelerate the development of such capabilities. NATO's forces have been learning and developing new skills fast, in the Western Balkans, then in Iraq (for many NATO Allies), now in Afghanistan. Operations have perhaps become the most important driver for Alliance transformation.

Terrorism is not the only new threat facing the Allies at the start of the twenty-first century. Estonia has suffered cyber-attack. The citizens of many allied countries endured cold this winter because of the use of energy as a political lever. These new threats are not necessarily primarily for NATO to counter, though the Alliance has a clear interest in them. They need addressing through a Comprehensive Approach, engaging all the tools and levers available to allied governments, and the international organisations of which they are members.

At the same time, Russia's invasion of Georgia has caused some Allies to wonder whether the old threat from the Soviet Union has really gone away. While acknowledging the importance of expeditionary operations, they want NATO to focus more on traditional, territorial security, without a return to the Cold War. They ask whether NATO has the right contingency plans for this, and whether they are sufficiently exercised.

How are Allies placed to respond?

NATO's founding document, the Washington Treaty, has stood the test of time, unchanged since 1949. No-one has questioned it, or any of its provisions, including those related to collective defence.

Beneath the Treaty comes the Strategic Concept. The present Strategic Concept was adopted in 1999, in parallel with the first accession of nations from Central Europe.

The current Strategic Concept now looks dated, and

187


there is growing agreement that it needs revisiting. budgets under further strain. Allies will once again The time is ripe for ATO to launch a new cycle be considering how much they need to spend on of renewal when Heads of State or Government defence. meet to celebrate NATO's sixtieth anniversary, in Strasbourg/Kehl in April. There is likely to be a Declaration on Alliance Security, reaffirming our common values and commitments, and an instruction from Heads to NATO to review the Strategic Concept.

The background for this discussion is promising. The optimism and enthusiasm for the new US Administration, on both sides of the Atlantic, create an extraordinary opportunity to renew and revive

ATO. France has made clear its intention to reintegrate into ATO's Command Structure. For the UK in particular this is very welcome. In 1998, the UK and France adopted the St Malo Declaration, recognising their joint interest in security and defence. Since then the two nations have, with some ucces worked to develop the European Security

and Defence Policy and European capabilities. French reintegration should offer scope to make more of the NATOIEU relationship, by replacing any last ve tiges of competition with a complementary approach treamlined structure and eventually the introduction of a single et of Defence Planning tool and a more unified approach to Capability Development.

The debate on the Strategic Concept will need to cover both ATO' political and it military a pect .

l\ 0 i the only tran atlantic international organi ation. One of it great trengths i that orth American and uropean Allie prepare and take deci ion together with tran atlantic Secretariat (the International and International Military taff:) preparing the deci ion of the orth Atlantic

ouncil. It i the mo t developed and the mo t effective forum for tran atlantic cooperation we have. hould ATO' trength be narrowly limited to the ecurity and defence arena, or hould Allie eek to trengthen the tran atlantic relation hip

more broadly?

The commitment of Allie to collective defence remain trong.Allie have however builtacapacity and a re ource greater than now nece ary for their immediate territorial defence. When it come to deployment out ide the orth Atlantic area and accordingly the willingne to inve t further in their capabilitie , their commitment differ. The current financial and economic cri i calling for rna ive public ector timulu package, will put defence

188

Allies will also need to consider NATO's role in the international institutional architecture. Should NATO be a bristling guard-dog others fear to deal with, or does it have capabilities much needed in today's world, which it can and should deploy in concert with other international organisations? Security Sector Reform, with which NATO helped so successfully in Eastern Europe, is one example. The United Kingdom believes the choice between expeditionary capabilities and engagement on the one hand, and a focus on territorial defence on the other, is a false one. It is through working together in real-world situations that the Allies will best ensure that they develop the skills they may need in responding to threats.

ATO's permanent Command structure is an enormous as et. It remains, though, more dispersed than military requirements dictate. Allies will need to examine whether a dispersed Command structure is the most effective - and most cost-effective - way for them to deliver effect and demon trate their solidarity to one another.

Wider i sue will also feature in the di cu Ion. Developing countrie are, rightly, eizing the opportunitie to them that opening market have offered, and becoming richer. NATO Allie' hare of global GDP has probably peaked. Allie are unlikely to get poorer (except in the very hort term of the current rece ion), but other part of the world are getting richer fa ter. Thi i often de cribed a a tran fer of wealth to the a t. It i mor th creation of wealth in the a t. It need t be a factor in ATO' thinking.

The population of mo t of th Allie will age while in other part of the world population growth continue apace. And we are only now fully awar of the impact of climate change a a ecurity threat - fir t highlighted by P\ 0 a long ag a I (ee hapter thre ) - leading to increa ed migrati n competition for re ource and p rhap conflict.

If the fir t decade of the tw nty-fir t century tach u anything it i that anticipating threat i very difficult indeed. It i however, lightly I difficult to anticipate the capabilitie the Alliance will need to re pond flexibly to a wide rang of threat in a changing world. I cannot predict the outc m th debate on which we are embarking. am h w ver confident in the commitment f Allie t c II ctive

defence, and in their common interest in working together. I am confident, too, that NATO will emerge from the coming debate stronger and better prepared to face the challenges of our century.

Chapter 7 - NATO in the Twenty-First Century

189

United Kingdom Permanent Representatives on the North Atlantic Council 1950-2009

Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar (1950/52-53)

1900-89; was educated at Wellington College & New College, Oxford. Early po stings included Brussels, Berlin and Paris. Second Secretary in Cairo 1930-34; HoyerMillar was subsequently appointed Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary and became a First Secretary

in 1935. He served in Washington, 1939-44, latterly with the British Civil Mission. He was appointed Minister at Washington in 1948. He became deputy to the UK Representative on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 1950 and then Permanent Representative of the UK on the NAC with the rank of Ambassador, at Paris, from 1952 to 1953. He became Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) in 1957 and retired in 1961, being made a hereditary peer, Baron Inchyra.

According to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB), 'in appearance Inchyra was very tall and rather portly with a florid complexion and a bald head. He generally moved slowly in a dignified manner. He was a good companion, and had been a popular figure in Oxford and a member of the Bullingdon Club. 'I The diplomat Rosamund Huebener, interviewed for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (BDOHP), recalled that 'he was very astute. The reason that he got the job as PUS was, I think, that he had absolutely no enemies. Everybody liked him. ' 2

I The DONB is available at http://www.oxforddnb.coml index.jsp. 2 BOOHP interviews are available at http://www.chu.cam. ac.uklarchiveslcollections/bdohp/.

Sir Christopher 'Kit' Steel (1953-57)

1903-73; educated Wellington College & Hertford College, Oxford. Early postings included Rio de Janeiro, Paris and The Hague. Other jobs in his varied career included a secondment as Assistant Private

Secretary to HRH the Prince of Wales in 1935-6, attachment to the Representative of Lithuania at the Coronation of King George VI in May 1937 and Political Liaison Officer with General Eisenhower (then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) in December 1944. The following year he became Head of the Political Division of the Allied Control Commission for Germany (British Element). He was subsequently Minister in Washington (replacing Hoyer-Millar) in 1950. He again replaced HoyerMillar when he was appointed UK Representative on the North Atlantic Council in Paris in 1953. He was finally Ambassador at Bonn, 1957-63. He was Chairman of the Anglo-German Association after retirement, from 1966 until 1973.

191


Sir Frank Roberts (1957-60)

1907-98; educated at Rugby and Trinity College Cambridge. Early appointments included Paris and Cairo. He did several stints in Moscow, including as Minister and Charge d'affaires, (1945-48) and then as Ambassador from 1960 to 1962. He was Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary and then Assistant Under-Secretary of

State in 1948-49. He was also Deputy UK High Commissioner in India and UK Representative on the Brussels Treaty Commission from 1952. In 1954 he became Ambassador at Belgrade. He served as UK Representative on the orth Atlantic Council from 1957 to 1960.

In hi Guardian obituary Roberts was described as a , ort of scrum half of diplomacy'. In Moscow after 1945 Robert worked closely with George Kennan and wrote hi own' long telegram' containing a 'powerfully argued analysi of Soviet policy that wa to form the ba i for the allied policy of containment'. According to the ODNB

ewa almo ttheidealcivil ervant- Ioyal, wellinformed indu triou even-tempered ingeniou in finding a way through difficultie and a very intelligent negotiator. He al 0 had omething of a geniu for entering ympathetically into the mind of tho e whom he erved, and it wa thi that earned him th confidence of a variety of Briti h mini ter hurchill Bevin den, Macmillan Butler eath Wilson, Stewart, and even George Brown.

Robert aid in 1996 that' P\. 0 ha in a remarkable way found a new purpo e for it elf which i ba ed upon it econd aim of political con ultation and thi i to omehow find a way of profiting from the pre ent ituation in which we no longer . . . have a ho tile Ru ia but till we have to remember in the back of our mind that thing are till anything but tabl in Ru ia and we don't know quite what i g ing to happen; 0 you don't throwaway your in uranc policy or your fire brigade.'

192

Sir Paul Mason (1960-62)

1904-78; he was educated at Eton and Kings College Cambridge. He served in Prague and from 1936 was AssistantPrivateSecretary to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. He subsequently served in Ottawa and Lisbon. His first Ambassadorship was in Sofia from 1949 and then he served in

The Hague from 1954. Mason was Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council from 1960 to 1962. His final post in the Office was as Alternate Delegate to the Minister of State in the Geneva Delegation on Disarmament and Nuclear Tests, 1962-64.

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh (1962-66)

1909-94; educated at Kings College, Cambridge. He joined the FO in 1933. arly po ting included Cairo, Ottawa Bueno A ire and Prague. He became Private Secretary to the oreign Secretary in 1951 and A i tant Under- ecretary of State from 1954 under Anthony den. huckburgh had a key policymaking

role in the uez n 1 about which h wr te exten ively and controver ially in De cent to Suez: Diarie , 1951-56 (19 6). Two year later he became hief ivilian In tructor at the Imperial Defence ollege and wa econd d to the

ecretariat a A i tant ecr tary- neral in 1 5 . ir velyn ub equently became the Permanent

Repre entative on the orth Atlantic unci 1 fr m 1962 to 1966· later he wa Amba ador at R m . After hi retirement he rved n the bard

ommercial Union A urance and wa inv Ived with the ational Tru t.

Sir Bernard Burrows (1966-70)

1910-2002; educated at Trinity College, Oxford. Burrows served in Cairo in the 1940s and was Counsellor in Washington from 1950 to 1953, before becoming Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, based in Bahrain. He was Ambassador in Ankara from 1958 and Deputy UnderSecretary of State in the

Foreign Office from 1963 to 1966, at which time he was also chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. He was UK Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council from 1966 to his retirement in 1970. He then served as the chairman of the British Institute of Archaeology in Ankara, and as chairman of the Anglo-Turkish Society in London. He was immensely popular in Turkey, and when his wife died in 1997, trees were planted in the central Kugulu (Swans) Park in Ankara to honour the couple. In 1965 he was described in Anthony Sampson's Anatomy of Britain as 'one of the five most powerful people in Whitehall'. Hostile to organised religion, he was fascinated by the paranormal and the humanist approach to conflict resolution.

Sir Edward Peck (1970-75)

Born 1915; educated at Queens College, Oxford. Early postings included Barcelona, Sofia, Ankara and Salonika. He served on the UK Delegation to the UN Special Commission on the Balkans in 1947, was seconded to the UK

High Commissioners Office in Delhi from 1950 to 1952 and was Deputy Commandant of the British Sector in Berlin from 1955-58. He was Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the FO in 1961-66 and Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the FCO from 1968 to 1970. He was UK Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council from 1970 to his retirement in 1975.

Sir John Killick (1975-79)

1919-2004. Educated at University College London and Bonn University, he served in lIM forces from 1939-46 (which included being captured by the Germans at the battle of Amhem). He joined the FO in 1946. Early po stings included Berlin, Frankfurt and Bonn in 1948, a stint as Private Secretary to

the Parliamentary Under-Secretary from 1951 and then First Secretary and Head of Chancery in Addis Ababa in 1954. He rose to become Assistant and then later Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the FO before becoming Ambassador at Moscow in 1971 at a delicate time, following the expulsion of Soviet spies from London in that year. He was Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from 1975 to his retirement in 1979.

In later years Sir John was critical of NATO expansion, saying in his BDOHP interview that NATO's decision-making capability was threatened; he stressed that new members had to accept obligations as well as acquiring rights. After his retirement Sir John was president (1985- 92) then vice-president (1992- 3) of the Great Britain Atlantic Committee, and vice-president of the Atlantic Treaty Association (1992-4). According to his ODNB entry, 'unstuffy and always good company, Killick sang at embassy staff parties and concerts, accompanying his own lyrics on the guitar. Colleagues relished the impact of his Moscow Alphabet Song on KGB listeners. He . . . cut an impressive and original figure. He was a tall, goodlooking man, tanned, with a trimmed moustache. His cheerful and engaging personality made him friends throughout his career. His character was moulded on his military experience and he was an incisive thinker and decision maker. He also had academic and reflective traits, giving him a wider understanding of the varied issues he encountered.' Killick remarked to a Soviet diplomat in 1975 that 'no diplomat should ever tell a lie. I had throughout my career often been evasive or told a great deal less than the truth, but I had never told an untruth. '

193

BRITAiN IN NATO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

Sir Clive Rose (1979-82)

Born 1921; educated at Christ Church, Oxford. Earlypostings included the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Office ofthe Deputy High Commissioner in Madras, where he arranged financial support for British people wishing to have an 'assisted passage'

back to the UK following Indian independence. He subsequently worked in Bonn and then in Montevideo, Paris and Washington. Following a stint as Assistant Under-Secretary of State from 1971 to 1975 he became Head of the British Delegation to the egotiations on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures to central

urope (MBFR) in Vienna in 1973-76. He noted in hi BDOHP interview that these talks were 'the fir t and only negotiations between ATO and the War aw Pact ... We have never negotiated on thi ubject ince.' He recalled that 'In Vienna, in the MBFR negotiation, in the MBFR community of nineteen we literally lived, ate, drank and lept MBFR and people outside u found u totally dull becau e whenever talked about something we talked Mutual and Balanced orce Reduction .'

ollowing a tint a Deputy Secretary to the abinet Offic he became UK Permanent Repre entative on the orth Atlantic ouncil in 1979 and retired in 19 2. After retirement he became Vice-Patron of R I and al 0 wrote about the MB R proce In the 0' Occa ional Paper erie in 2002.

Sir John Graham (1982-86)

Born 1926; educated at Trinity ollege ambridge.

arly po ting included Bahrain, Kuwait and Amman. He wa A i tant Private ecretary to the

oreign ecretary, 1954-57, and then Private Secretary, 1969-72. He wa ead of

hancery in Wa hington 1972-74 and Amba sador

to Iraq 1974-77 and Iran, 1979-80. Graham wa twice Deputy Under-Secretary of State. e wa UK Repre entative on the orth Atlantic ouncil from 19 2 to hi retirement in 19 6.

194

Sir Michael Alexander (1986-92)

1936-2002; educated at Kings College Cambridge, he fenced for the university, and won a silver medal at the Rome Olympics in 1960, as well as a gold medal in the American championship in 1961. Early po stings included Moscow in 1963 and Singapore in 1965. He became Assistant Private

Secretary to the Secretary of State in 1972, Head of Chancery in Geneva in 1975 and was Head of the Personnel Operations Department at the FCO in the late 1970s. He then went on loan to the Civil Service Department and was appointed Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to the Prime Minister. Mrs Thatcher credited him in her memoirs with having been a key influence on her evolving attitude towards the Soviet Union, in terms of recognising that it was 'a flawed colossu " not sustainable in the long-term.

Sir Michael became Ambassador at Vienna in 1982 and wa Permanent Representative on the

orth Atlantic Council from 1986 to 1992. e was therefore in Brn els at a time of profound change, and admitted in hi BDOHP interview that he sub equently felt guilty about rea uring the Ru ians that ATO would never expand when of cour e it did. ollowing retirement he worked in merchant banking and wa a ucce ful chairman of RUSI.

Alexander' contemporary, Rodric Braithwaite wrote of him in th OD

Alexander wa one of th e rare official who can think creatively, formulate an original policy and driv it thr ugh the ffi ial and political machine. rmidable and daunting in argument arr gant even in the ey f m he took few pri n r in debat. ut h wa not only a brilliant public rvant: h wa a fri nd who in pired great affection. i penetrating and original mind wa matched by a wry n f humour, a warmth of manner and a bleak vi w of the ultimate futility of worldly ambition.

e began writing a book on hi experience a a diplomat working on the MB R proce ,Mana in the Cold War: a View from the Fli nt Lin which wa publi bed po thumou ly in 2005.

Sir John Weston (1991-95)

Born 1938; educated at Worcester College, Oxford, Sir John served in the Royal ~arines 1956-58. Early postings included Hong Kong and Peking, as well as a stint at UKREP in Brussels in 1972. He was Assistant Private Secretary to

the Secretary of State 1974, Counsellor and Head of the Presidency Secretariat 1976. He was later Counsellor in Washington and head of the FCO's Defence Department (1981) and Minister in Paris (1985). He became Political Director and Deputy Under-Secretary of State (DUSS) in 1990. Sir John was Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council from 1991 and from 1992 to the Western European Union (WED) as well. From 1995 to 1998 he was Permanent Representative on the UN. After his retirement he served on the board of Rolls Royce and became a published poet.

Commenting on his experience of multilateral diplomacy for his BDOHP interview, Sir John said:

I do, as a matter of fact, think that multilateral diplomacy has, of course, a much greater prominence and importance as a kind of mode through which the British interest, internationally, is pursued. I also think that, in some ways, multilateral diplomacy gives you maximum exposure in terms of job interest and the breadth of subject matter that one is dealing with, with a slightly attenuated exposure to what one might call the social overkill of diplomatic life.

Sir John Goulden (1995-2000)

Born 1941; educated at Queens College Oxford. Early po stings included Ankara, Manila and Dublin. He ran the FCO's Personnel Services Department from 1980 and the News Department from 1982. He was Head of the Chancery of the Office of the UK Permanent

Representative to the EEC in the mid-1980s, from 1988 to 1992 Assistant Under-Secretary of State, and Ambassador to Turkey from 1992. He was UK Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and the WEU from 1995 to 2000.

Sir David Manning (2000-01)

Born 1949; educated at Oriel College, Oxford. Early po stings included Warsaw, New Delhi and Paris. He was made Political Counsellor in Moscow in 1990 and Head of the Eastern Department from 1993. He was the UK~ember of the International Conference on the

Former Yugoslavia (ICFy) Contact Group for Bosnia in 1994 and later that year became Head of Policy Planning. He became Ambassador at Tel Aviv in 1995 and Deputy Under-Secretary in 1998, before becoming Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council from December 2000 to September 2001. He was subsequently Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat 2001-03, and was Ambassador to the United States from 2003 to 2007. In 2009 he was appointed by The Queen to a part-time, advisory role in the newly-formed Household of HRH Prince William of Wales and HRH Prince Henry of Wales.

Sir Emyr Jones Parry (2001-03)

Born 1947; educated at University College Cardiff and St. Catherine's College, Cambridge. Early po stings included Ottawa and Brussels, where he became First Secretary (Energy) and later First Secretary (Institutions) in

UKREP in 1982. Between 1987 and 1989 he was Deputy Director of the Office of the President of the European Parliament. He was Deputy Head of Mission in Madrid in 1993, FCO Deputy Political Director from 1996, Director EU from 1997, and

195

BRITAIN IN NA TO - THE FIRST SIX DECADES

Political Director from 1998. He became Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council in 2001 , and Permanent Representative to the UN in July 2003. He retired in 2007 and is now chairman of the All Wales Convention. In 2008 he became President of Aberystwyth University.

Sir Peter Ricketts (2003-06)

Born 1952; educated at Pembroke College, Oxford. Early po stings included New York and Singapore. Sir Peter's first stint with UKDEL NATO in Brussels was in 1978. He was Assistant Personal Secretary to the Secretary of State in 1983 and later a Counsellor in various posts from 1989 to 1997,

including head of the Hong Kong Department, 1991-94. He became Director of International Security at the FCO in 1999 before going on loan to the Cabinet Office in 2000, where he was Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Intelligence Co-ordinator. Sir Peter became Political Director and Deputy Under-Secretary at the FCO in 2001 before being appointed Permanent Representative on the orth Atlantic Council in July 2003. He became Permanent under Secretary and Head of the Diplomatic Service in 2006.

Stewart Eldon (2006- )

Born 1953; educated at Chri t's College,

ambridge. Hi early po ting included the UK Mission to the UN and Bonn. He wa Private Secretary to the Minister of State 10 1983 and First

ecretary in New York from 1986 to 1990. He took a sabbatical at the

entre for International Affair in Harvard in 1993. He wa oun ellor (Political) in Bru sels in 1994 and Deputy Permanent Representative in ew York in 199 . He became Ambas ador at Dublin in 2003 and wa appointed Permanent Repre entative on the orth Atlantic ouncil in 2006.

196

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britain in nato: the first six decades

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