BriefingPerspectives on transatlantic cooperationSeptember 2016

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research ServiceAuthor: Marta LatekMembers' Research Service

ENPE 586.646

DevelopmentAddressing global poverty and insecuritythrough better transatlantic cooperation

SUMMARY

Aid coordination, part of the Paris Agenda on aid effectiveness, has shown itself to beextremely challenging, with only modest and erratic progress made so far. Despiteforeseeable difficulties in its implementation, however, closer transatlanticcooperation on aid coordination would boost the global aid-effectiveness agenda, andmake more plausible the achievement of the ambitious set of SustainableDevelopment Goals (SDG). Based on common fundamental values and sharedstrategic interests, the EU and US are together responsible for over three quarters ofglobal aid, and have the potential to increase their cooperation in areas such as thesecurity-development nexus, the integration of emerging donors, finding a betterbalance between short-term crisis response and a longer-term developmentperspective, and creating a common framework for public-private cooperation fordevelopment. Building on the existing EU-US development dialogue, partners couldintensify mutual learning and improved information-sharing in those areas, andengage in high level dialogue on the division of labour in order to enhance politicalsupport for field-based cooperation. A US-EU inter-agency steering mechanism couldhelp to harmonise reporting requirements and the conditions placed on partnergovernments and programmes, and facilitate more shared analysis, missions andpractical cooperation on the ground.

This briefing forms part of a broader research project on the perspectives ontransatlantic cooperation in the US election year, requested by the Chair of theEuropean Parliament's delegation for relations with the United States.

In this briefing: Context and state of play Potential for convergence Looking ahead: Potential projects Challenges to be addressed Further reading

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Context and state of playAchieving the ambitious Agenda 2030 set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), willgreatly depend on the ability of the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA),together responsible for almost three quarters of official development aid (ODA) in 2015,to implement the agenda domestically and to boost the coordination of their aid policiesat different levels. Moreover, the dramatic escalation of events in the EU neighbourhood,leading to the current refugee crisis and increasing demographic pressure in Africa, makesit more urgent than ever to address the root causes of migration coherently, includingthe environmental, climate and governance challenges and the security-developmentnexus. Transatlantic teamwork based on increased coordination of activities and use ofunexploited synergies could help to bring about the decisive change needed to addressthe serious and intricate problems the world is facing.

The EU and the USA have alreadylaid the foundations for closertransatlantic cooperation in thearea of development cooperation.After years of ad hoc meetings,the EU-US development dialoguegained new momentum followingthe 2009 EU-US summit1 whichagreed to increase informationsharing, coordination and policyalignment in the area ofdevelopment cooperation.Dialogue takes place at severallevels, with in principle annualministerial meetings, although inpractice these are less regular,and biannual discussions between high-level officials, as well as technical exchangesbetween staff, both at headquarters and in the field.2 Initially concentrating on theMillennium Development Goals, food security and climate change, dialogue has sinceturned towards a broader spectrum of issues and to the current topics on thedevelopment agenda. In 2013, discussions covered issues such as the Syria crisis, the roleof the private sector in development, sustainable energy for Africa, civil society, andinstitutional and aid management questions. Topics dealt with in the latest round of thedevelopment dialogue (June 2016)included the implementation of Agenda 2030 and theAddis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development, countering violent extremism,increasing resilience, and the migration/development nexus. In parallel, the EU-USsecurity/development dialogue was initiated in spring 2015, with the second sessionhaving taken place in July 2016 in Washington DC.

In the field, many EU delegations cooperate with offices of the US Agency forInternational Development (USAID), sharing country assessments, comparing strategiesand exploring synergies at sector level. Concerted efforts have, for instance, beendeveloped in food security/resilience, sectors where both sides are increasingly active inthe Sahel and the Horn of Africa3. The joint EU-US response in this region has broughttogether different donors and country-level stakeholders under a single umbrella – AGIR(the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative) – to address the root causes of recurrentfood-related crises.

Total ODA to developing countries (2015)

Data source: OECD, 2015.

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Despite those achievements, the vast majority of EU and US foreign assistance isprogrammed and implemented in an uncoordinated manner, which reduces the potentialpositive impact of each dollar and euro spent. In cases where host countries do not fullyassume their important role in donor coordination, there is an increased need for betterin-country coordination, as initial policy-level discussions are perceived as makinginsufficient impact on the ground.4 Based on the substantial existing foundation, andtaking the current shortcomings into account, the transatlantic partners should furtherexplore the potential for synergies, both at the level of headquarters, and in the specificpartner countries, in order to increase the overall efficiency of aid through greateralignment and coherence.

Potential for convergenceThe main points of convergence of EU and US development policies are the pursuit ofcommon fundamental values – human rights standards, gender equality, democracypromotion, governance inclusive development – and mutual strategic interests in stabilityand security, economic and social development or mitigation of climate change effects.Of course despite those commonalities that underpin the respective developmentpolicies, the approach to aid differs in several ways.5 United States foreign aid –of whichroughly 41% (2015) is focused exclusively on development and 16% on humanitarianpurposes – has always been strongly driven by security objectives and economic interests,with its main aim being 'to advance US values and interests in the area of security andprosperity'. As for EU development aid, it is strongly focused on eradication of extremepoverty, recognised by the European Consensus on Development as both a moralobligation and a contribution to Europe's long-term security.

However, some observers consider that the current gap between security-focused anddonor-led US aid and poverty-focused and partnership-based EU aid is narrowing slightly.The recent EU push for a comprehensive approach in crisis management to ensure thatpolitical, humanitarian, development and military instruments are used in a coherent wayto address crises and conflicts, shows an acknowledgment of the interdependencebetween security and development. As for EU budget support for developing countries –a key means to increase recipient country ownership of aid – this is now subject to moreconditions than in the past.6 In the case of the USA, although the OECD has recommendedgreater use of country systems (almost a third of US ODA is tied to the delivery of US

Figure 2 - US and EU ODA by sector (2014)

Data source: OECD, 2014.

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goods and services) and better cooperation with other donors, efforts have been madeto implement the Paris Declaration partnership commitments. For instance, between2010 and 2012 the share of US aid provided directly to local institutions rose from 9.7%to 14.3%, despite residual reluctance, except in the case of strategically importantcountries, to provide government-to-government support.7

This slowly narrowing gap between the USA and the EU in the application of the Parispartnership commitments, together with common values and a number of sharedstrategic interests, provide a strong argument in favour of a common approach to someof the most pressing challenges facing international development actors. Greaterpotential for convergence and common action is evident in the following areas:

Improving the effectiveness of international efforts on the security/developmentnexusThere is a clear need for transatlantic cooperation and a convergence in interests in orderto break the vicious cycle of poverty, fragility and conflict affecting a growing number ofstates and regions. Of those people living on less than US$ 1.25 per day, 43% live in the50 countries on the OECD 'fragility list'. By 2030, this proportion could reach 62%,representing half a billion people, if decisive steps are not taken.8 The cost of this fragility,understood broadly as state incapacity to assume basic functions, in 70% of cases becauseof conflict, is estimated at 2.6% a year in terms of lost economic growth.9

At the 2011 Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, both the EU and USAcommitted to the New Deal for engagement in fragile states. Using the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility(INCAF), this common framework establishes mutual commitments, between maindonors and a group of fragile countries, to a country-owned and country-led exit fromfragility. The process, the pilot phase of which concluded in 2015, is focused on fivegroups of goals linking traditional concerns of poverty alleviation and economicdevelopment with security, justice and state legitimacy related objectives. The last OECDStates of Fragility 2015 report notes that aid remains rather unequally distributed among50 fragile states, with 22% of disbursed ODA going to Iraq and Afghanistan alone. Thereport also estimates that development aid allocation is 'still adapting to the newobjectives': in 50 fragile states, 3% of ODA is allocated to the development of access tojustice, 4% for strengthening the legitimacy of political systems and 1.4% for securityreform. The recent reform of the definition of ODA, to include certain military, securityand police costs (insofar as they contribute to aid outcomes), may foster spending inthose crucial peace- and state-building goals.

The commitments made under the New Deal, a key multi-stakeholder and country-focused partnership which aims to leave no-one behind on the SDGs (under the SDG 17pledge on 'partnership for the goals'), will have a greater chance of implementation withthe renewed joint support of the EU and the USA. Furthermore, the EU developmentdialogue could be used to align strategies with regard to selected countries on a country-by-country basis, and to avoid unequal aid distribution due to geopolitical reasons. Thereconfirmed transatlantic support for the New Deal could be accompanied by promotionof the partnership with those fragile countries to rising, private and public, donors, asrecommended in the independent review of the New Deal for engagement in fragilestates (2016).10 With regard to capacity building and supporting good governance andrule of law,11 transatlantic partners are leading donors and should gain more prominence

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when working out a coordinated approach to fragile situations, especially in cases ofcommon strategic interest such as Mali, Afghanistan and Latin America. This couldcontribute to better conflict prevention, which is ultimately much cheaper than dealingwith the long-term consequences, such as protracted crises.

Finding a better balance between short-term crisis response and a longer-termdevelopment perspectiveThe growing rise in long-term humanitarian needs and the increased inter-linkagesbetween humanitarian and development assistance stretch the financial capacities of theinternational humanitarian system beyond its limits, leaving over half of humanitarianneeds unfulfilled.12 As protracted crises become increasingly common, both the EU andthe USA face the difficult challenge of bridging the gap between humanitarian anddevelopment policies and avoiding mutually counterproductive activities. Uncoordinatedshort-term relief, such as, for example, massive donations of food supplies, canundermine long-term development efforts, and perturb local markets.13 The gapbetween humanitarian and development policies is also aggravated by the fact that theprinciples of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, on which humanitarianaid is based, often come under pressure when confronted with a development approachbased on partnerships with local governments and serving the strategic interest ofdonors.

The 2008-2009 Raising the bar transatlantic project in the field of humanitarian policyalready focused, among other topics, on linking relief, rehabilitation and development(LRRD) in order to improve common understanding of this concept. Indeed, both partnersface similar challenges of clarifying boundaries and areas of possible integration betweentheir disaster assistance and development programmes. One of the calls reiterated in thisframework was to move from conceptual discussion towards a focus on operational andpragmatic steps to promote LRRD.14 However, a political and conceptual consensus atheadquarters level, in the broader framework of EU-US development dialogue, is aprerequisite for a concerted approach at the operational level. The EU and the USA have,therefore, a strong interest in ensuring close cooperation – including joint analysis andneeds assessment – to develop a common understanding of each crisis situation in orderto coordinate their intervention. Geographically/crisis-focused multi-donor trust fundsare a promising and flexible way to overcome the divide on the ground, whilst enablingparticipation of different stakeholders.

Integration of emerging donors in a reshaped world development architectureThrough their participation in multilateral organisations and multi-stakeholder initiatives,including the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), the USA and the EUand its Member States have had an important influence on the norms and standardssustaining today's global aid architecture. Transatlantic partners provide much effort andresources to reaching major international agreements on development policy, such asthe Monterrey Consensus, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agendafor Action on Aid Effectiveness, and the Millennium Declaration or Agenda 2030.However, development aid architecture is undergoing deep changes. The rise in volumeof financial flows towards developing countries is accompanied by a diversification ofsources and of development actors, in particular emerging state donors, the privatesector, and multi-donor trust funds. The need to adapt both the UN system and the OECD-DAC to this new configuration and to the new expectations raised by the SDG, whilepreserving and reinforcing common values and interests, is a challenge which the EU and

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the USA should face together in order to increase their impact. The integration ofemerging donors such as the Gulf States, China, Brazil or Turkey, with their specificapproaches to aid, into donor cooperation fora is not an easy task, and will need to bepreceded by some reform in order to counter the accusation that donor organisations arepurely 'Western clubs'. In this regard, the United Arab Emirates status as a participant inOECD-DAC, and the imminent addition of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is a step in this directionthat some other emerging donors, such as China or India, are unlikely to take in the nearfuture. On the operational level, the EU and the USA should pool their resources to jointlyexamine existing cases of triangular cooperation to increase its effectiveness; identifyingbest practices, and also possible shortcomings, is necessary to better engage withemerging donors in the field.15 As for reshaping the UN development system, this hasgained new urgency following the adoption of Agenda 2030. The EU and USA shouldjointly ensure implementation and, if necessary, continuation, of the reform proposal tobe presented in the second half of 2016 in the framework of the Economic and SocialCouncil states' dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the UN development system(UNDS).16 Diplomatic efforts should be deployed by the transatlantic partners toinfluence their respective non-OECD allies and to explain the need for comprehensivereform. This should involve a higher degree of harmonisation and strengthening of thesystem-wide coordination of the 31 organisations forming UNDS in order to support themember states in delivering the SDGs.17 The partners should also coordinate theirapproaches while exercising influence on their respective non-OECD allies (especially theGulf States and Turkey), to ensure greater transparency and traceability of aid flows, inorder to avoid the risk of financing terrorist and radicalisation activities which may behidden behind purported charitable assistance.18

Common framework for public-private cooperation for developmentThe USA has a long tradition of private philanthropy. Corporate philanthropic foundations– such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – figure among key development actors.American NGOs, foundations and corporations today provide two thirds of privatedevelopment assistance (PDA) coming from OECD countries (US$ 30 billion of US$ 45billion in 2011). The growth of global PDA is much faster than that of ODA (registering 7%growth in ODA and 51% in PDA between 2006 and 2011), so that they are estimated tobe very close in volume today.19 The challenge in this regard is to ensure PDA'scomplementarity to ODA, and its optimum alignment with its overall objectives.

Private-public partnerships (PPP) are considered as one of the main ways to achieve thiscomplementarity. PPPs are expected to generate a win-win situation in which thecommercial and strategic interest of the private sector works for the achievement ofoverall development goals while catalysing supplementary funds. Since the creation ofthe Global Development Alliance (GDA) in 2001, the USA has become a leader inpromoting public-private partnerships; more than 1 480 USAID PPP have been initiated,representing a total value of US$ 1.5 billion, 47% of them in the health sector.20 AcrossEurope, Member States’ development agencies grant unequal status to PPP: in some

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countries – Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands – there are specificstructures promoting and managing PPP; in others, such as France or Ireland, PPPs areused much less. The EU as such increasinglyrecognises the private sector as an indispensablepartner in development cooperation. Since 2007 ithas developed its own instruments to match private-public funds, known as blending mechanisms.Currently, there are seven geographically-focusedblending facilities, mixing EU grants with loans orequity from public and private financiers. TheEuropean Investment Bank (EIB) and the EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)have contributed to over half the projects approvedby the EU between 2007 and 2013, of which 63%support energy and transport infrastructureinitiatives. At the global level, a myriad of multi-donor trust funds focused on different issues and-/orgeographical areas receive contributions frommultiple public and private financial partners andallocate these resources to numerous implementingentities to support specific national, regional orglobal development priorities.21 The commontransatlantic assessment of the impact of public-private partnership on poverty reduction could be astarting point for developing common standards forengagement with business. Indeed, civil society organisations stress the need fordevelopment policy-makers to establish criteria to ensure the measurable developmentimpact of private sector engagements, as well as transparency and compliance withlabour, social, environmental and fiscal standards, including respect for human rights.22

As transatlantic partners, the EU and USA could make joint efforts to promote:

corporate social responsibility, achieving international binding agreements instead ofa proliferation of voluntary business self-regulation schemes, as a main prerequisiteto the positive development impact of the private sector;

greater transparency around corporate participation in the UN process anddevelopment funds, (including a UN framework to scrutinise for potential conflicts ofinterest), in order to avoid a private interest-driven development agenda;23

a common framework that sets clear guidelines for multi-stakeholder initiatives toalign with countries' own development strategies.

Looking ahead: Potential projectsEuropean and American values in the development policy area overlap to a large degree.Existing differences can be used as an opportunity for mutual learning (through jointidentification and/or exchange of best practice, joint country analysis, regular discussionsabout how best to address the security/development nexus and the link between shortterm assistance and long-term development in each particular case) and better divisionof labour in various areas.

EU agreement with Power AfricaIn July 2015, the EU and USA signed amemorandum of understanding (MoU)aimed at enhancing the coordinationbetween the US-led PPP Power Africaand the EU in order to provide cleanpower capacity throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The project will coverfive key areas across Sub-SaharanAfrica: expanding small-scale and off-grid efforts; coordinating technicalassistance mechanisms; aligning policydialogue and reform efforts to improvethe business-enabling environment forenergy investments; exploringopportunities for blended financefacilities and other types of financialsupport; and improving energyefficiency. Cooperation will be furtherconsolidated as a result of the signaturein June 2016 of an MoU on USparticipation in the EU Electrifyinitiative.

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The following functional blocks of cooperation couldprovide the framework for future initiatives andprojects across the various policy fields:

Military/civil involvement in dealing withfragility/crisisThe USA is said to face a significant challenge, forinstance in the Middle East, in transitioning from amilitaristic approach to a role with greater civilianinput, one in which the EU has recognisedexperience.24 For Hamilton and Burwell,25 beyondmutual learning, the partners should target theestablishment of a joint planning centre for civilianoperations, and ultimately a 'Transatlantic fusioncentre', to bring together planning for missionsrequiring both civil and military resources. Based onextensive US experience in military contribution torelief response in crisis situations, the EU and the USAshould develop common guidelines on militaryinvolvement which preserve humanitarian principles,while securing humanitarian and developmentoperations in crisis situations.

Public/private partnership in developmentThe USA has long-standing experience in engaging with public-private partnerships in allareas of foreign assistance, the EU has only recently introduced PPPs in its developmentpolicy.

Institutional fragmentation of the arrangements for development cooperationBoth partners, although for different reasons, suffer a high level of fragmentation in theirdevelopment policies. In the USA, there are 27 entities dealing with different aspects ofaid and different funding allocation models co-exist (presidential initiatives,congressional earmarks, country-specific budgeting). Therefore, the US approach todevelopment often lacks coherence and appears to be based on individual projects.Fragmented budgets and a proliferation of institutional actors make it difficult to build acoherent programme and to adapt it to local priorities.26 On the other hand, EUdevelopment cooperation - a parallel and shared competence of the EU and its Memberstates27- is a patchwork of 29 diverse policies conducted by the European Commissionand the different institutional actors of 28 Member States.28 The experience gatheredsince 2007 in the framework of the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct onComplementarity and Division of Labour, and efforts made by the USA to increaseinstitutional coherence in the area of its development policy, could serve as a startingpoint for knowledge sharing on this crucial issue, which currently hampers aideffectiveness.

Striving for a division of labourThe division of labour among donor countries, at both sector and country level, is part ofthe Paris Declaration engagement on harmonisation, subscribed to by both the EU andthe USA. It aims to reduce transaction costs resulting from multiplication of donor-recipient relationships and avoid the appearance of aid orphans/darlings. The EU and the

Afghanistan as an example?There seems to be considerablecomplementarity between EU and USassistance in this 'aid darling' country,achieved through coordination meetingsin the framework of various donorconferences. US civilian assistance hasfocused on infrastructure projects,economic development, education, andagricultural development, as a counter tonarcotics programmes. Europeanassistance goes mostly to governance,justice/rule of law, and health. HoweverUS counterparts reportedly regret theinsufficient scope of this engagement.Furthermore, on the ground, anexecutive-level mechanism forcoordination of civilian assistance is stilllacking. It seems, however, that there isscope for deepening this engagement, aswell as for better coordination of civilianassistance via such a mechanism.

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USA have expressed their intention to decrease aid fragmentation by concentrating theirassistance in fewer countries and sectors. However, progress has not been significant.

The USA and the EU (the European Commission and the Member States) could togetherengage in high-level dialogue on the division of labour in order to enhance politicalsupport for field-based cooperation. Using the EU Toolkit methodology for theimplementation of the division of labour and the operational framework of aideffectiveness, the partners could identify comparative advantages (based, among others,on geographical proximity, common cultural or linguistic ties, staff capacity or sector-specific expertise), and consequently reduce the number of sectors and countries inwhich each partner is active. The role of lead donor, or facilitator, could be taken by oneof the partners in each country, together with a Joint Assistance Strategy established bythe host country with the participation of all donors. The EU fast-track initiative ondivision of labour may serve as a model for implementing the division of labour betweenEuropean and American partners. In order to increase effectiveness, an EU-US inter-agency steering mechanism could help to harmonise the reporting requirements,conditions placed on partner governments and programmes, and conduct more sharedanalysis, missions and practical cooperation on the ground. Strengthening operationalcooperation on the ground in the chosen fast-track countries should initially include jointreview of long-term strategies, advanced coordination prior to regional and nationalcoordination meetings, and coordinated outreach to the private sector and civil society.

Improving awareness of global interdependencesUnlike EU development policy, US aid suffers from poor public support. Indeed, althoughdevelopment assistance comprises on average less than 1% of the federal budget, themajority of Americans largely overestimate the amount and consider that the countryspends too much on aid.29 The EU and the USA could organise simultaneous campaigns,on the model of the EU Year of Development, to raise awareness of the crucialimportance of the different SDGs, and to enhance the understanding of the generalpublic. This could contribute to securing political support for US ODA.

Better coordination in international development foraThe EU and USA should coordinate their position on the key convergence areas inadvance of their negotiations in the main international development fora. This isparticularly relevant for joint support of OECD-DAC and UN system reforms, as well asregional bodies.

Challenges to be addressedWhile different in approach, EU and US development policies are based on the same corevalues and several common interests in the pursuit of global public good. Moreover, thespecificities of the transatlantic partners' policy implementation, as well as somecommon problems faced in the process, constitute some limits to practical cooperation,but also provide a possibility for mutual learning and experience sharing. Intensified anddeeper cooperation between headquarters and also in the field, building on the EU-USdevelopment dialogue, is a way for leading development donors to adopt coherentpolicies and work out a better division of labour, avoiding unnecessary duplication as wellas mutually counterproductive activities.

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Although economic savings and positive impacts, in terms of poverty reduction of optimalaid coordination across and within countries, are rather uncontroversial, the progressmade in this direction is limited. Indeed, aid coordination carries some political costs,since the donors reduce their prominence and political influence in the process. Thishampers aid coordination both in the EU and, even more so, at the US level. Indeed, USaid is recognised as an instrument serving US foreign policy goals, and Congressionaldirectives on fund allocations significantly limit the ability of USAID to negotiate division

Top 10 ODA recipients from EU and US (2014)

Data source: OECD, 2014.

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of labour arrangements.30 There are also many practical issues, such as differentprogramming cycles and lead periods, as well as the limited longer-term predictability ofUS funding, that will make greater transatlantic coordination difficult. At EU level, where29 development policies coexist despite common goals, national agencies are oftenrooted in their own legal and institutional cultures and subject to shifting political factors.The coordination challenge is such that, in December 2013, the European Parliamentrequested the Commission to submit a proposal for legislation concerning the regulatoryaspects of EU donor coordination on development aid, in order to boost the existing EUcoordination mechanism. With the arrival on the development scene of large non-DACdonors such as China, political and commercial competition is likely to further underminethe coordination of bilateral aid.31

In this uneasy context, there is a need for an inclusive transatlantic leadership to build aglobal partnership for development, based on mutual interest and global public good,which would engage with emerging economies, the developing world and privatestakeholders, within the revamped UN Development System. The future post-electoralsituation in the USA will have great influence on its position on multilateral governance,and will have a key impact on the future of any such partnership32 necessary to achievethe promises of Agenda 2030.

Further readingDel Biondo, Karen, Stanford University, The EU, the US and partnership in developmentcooperation: Bridging the gap?, CDDRL working papers, December 2014.

Patrick W. Quirk, Transatlantic Academy, (Re)emerging aid donors in the reshaping world order.How to calibrate U.S. and European foreign assistance to secure transatlantic interests, 2013-2014 Paper Series No 5, 2014.

Endnotes1 European External Action Service, Statement on Development Dialogue and Cooperation, 2009.2 Alexander Gaus, Wade Hoxtel, EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future, 2013.3 European Commission, Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development, International

development dialogue with the United States, 2016.4 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Alexander Gaus, Wade Hoxtel, Connecting Security and Development:

Towards a Transatlantic Strategy in Fragile States, 2014.5 Stanford University, Del Biondo, Karen, The EU, the US and partnership in development cooperation: Bridging the

gap?, CDDRL working papers, December 2014.6 For more on the use of conditionality in EU aid see: Svea Koch, A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid:

Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union, World Development, Special Issue: PoliticalConditionality and EU Foreign Aid, Volume 75, November 2015.

7 The EU, the US and partnership in development cooperation: Bridging the gap?, Karen Del Biondo, Stanford, CDDRLworking papers, December 2014, p.14.

8 States of Fragility 2015, Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions, OECD, 26 March 2015.9 C. Castellanet, G. Solanet, Y. Ficatier, Adapter les pratiques opérationnelles des bailleurs dans les États fragiles, AFD,

Département de la Recherche, Agence Française de Développement, 2010, p.15.10 Sarah Hearn, Independent review of the New Deal for engagement in fragile states, OECD, April 2016.11 OECD, Development Assistance Flows for Governance and Peace, 2014.12 Alina Dobreva, Marta Latek, Funding gap: A challenge for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), EPRS, 2016.13 Andrea Binder, Kai Koddenbrock and Julia Steets, Improving Humanitarian assistance: transatlantic Agenda for

Action, 2009.14 Julia Steets, Daniel S. Hamilton, (eds), Center for Transatlantic Relations, Humanitarian Assistance. Improving US-

European Cooperation, 2009, p. 120.

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15 Patrick W. Quirk, Transatlantic Academy, (Re)emerging aid donors in the reshaping world order. How to calibrateU.S. and European foreign assistance to secure transatlantic interests, 2013-2014 Paper Series No. 5, 2014.

16 United Nations, Roadmap for ECOSOC Dialogue on longer-term positioning of UN Development system,8 March 2016.

17 More on this subject: Max-Otto, Baumann, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), ECOSOC Dialogue: afederal structure for the UN Development System?, January 2016.

18 Celina B. Realuyo, Combating Terrorist Financing in the Gulf: Significant Progress but Risks Remain, The Arab GulfStates Institute in Washington, January 2015

19 Sarah Hénon, Measuring private development assistance. Emerging trends and challenges, Development initiatives,August 2014, pp. 10-14.

20 USAID's public-private partnerships: A data picture and review of business engagement, George Ingram, Anne EJohnson,and Helen Moser, , 26 February 2016, p.39.

21 Marta Latek, L'engagement du secteur privé dans la coopération au développement: Les formes de coopérationpublic-privé, EPRS, 2014.

22 Jeroen, Kwakkenbos, Eurdad, Private profit for public good? Can investing in private companies deliver the poor,2012.

23 Lou Pingeot, Global Policy Forum, Corporate influence in the Post-2015 process, February 2014.24 Princeton University, Workshop in International Relations, Foreign Policy Cooperation: US and EU, June 2015, p.52.25 Daniel S Hamilton, and Frances G Burwell, Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership, 2009.26 OECD-DAC Peer Review, The United States, 2011, p.16.27 Morten Broberg, Rass Holdgaard, EU external action in the field of development cooperation policy, Sieps, 2014 :6,

p. 61.28 Marta Latek, EPRS, Le défi de la coordination des politiques européennes de développement, (EN), 2015.29 Bianca DiJulio, Jamie Firth, and Mollyann Brodie, Data Note: Americans’ Views On The U.S. Role In Global Health,

23 January 2015.30 ML.Lawson, CRS, Foreign aid: International donor coordination of the development assistance, February 2013, p.16.31 Andreas Fuchs, Peter Nunnenkamp, Hannes Öhler, , Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Why Donors of Foreign

Aid Do Not Coordinate: The Role of Competition for Export Markets and Political Support, No 1825, 2013.32 Alex Evans, Kitty van der Heijden, WRI, A Global Partnership for Sustainable Development: Essential Ingredients,

November 2014.

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