Bridging the Leadership Gap

A Strategy for ImprovingPolitical Leadership in the EU

Thinking Enlarged Group

Bertelsmann Foundation and

Center for Applied Policy Research (eds.)

Bridging the Leadership Gap

A Strategy for Improving Political Leadership in the EUby the Thinking Enlarged Group

The Thinking Enlarged Group

The Thinking Enlarged Group – named after the title of a strategy paper on thefuture of the EU published in November 2001 – is a group of 18 experts fromboth the accession countries and the EU-15 brought together by the Bertels-mann Foundation in Guetersloh and the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Re-search at the Center for Applied Policy Research (C•A•P), University of Mu-nich, to produce a joint memorandum containing proposals on how to improvepolitical leadership in an enlarged European Union (EU). The Group’s consid-erations aspire to enrich the debate in both the future and current member stateson how to provide the enlarged EU with a reformed institutional structure ableto respond to future challenges. In preparation of the paper the Group mettwice in September (Brussels) and October 2002 (Warsaw).

The Group represents a broad range of institutional, executive and academicexpertise, although the views expressed herein do not reflect any official policyposition, and the members participated purely in a personal capacity. MartinBrusis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Claus Giering of the C•A•P were responsi-ble for writing the report and endeavoured to reflect faithfully consensus withinthe Group. However, given the complex range of subjects under discussion,this was not always possible, with the result that members of the Group do notnecessarily share all the views expressed in this memorandum.

December 2002

I

Summary of Main Proposals

The European Union is characterized by a lack of political leadership with respect toprospective thinking, steering capacity, consistent action and accountability. Aimingto improve political leadership, the first Thinking Enlarged report argued in favour ofelecting the President of the Commission by the European Parliament (EP). Thiswould strengthen the overall legitimacy and political clout of the Commission, and atthe same time reinforce the EU’s parliamentary character. However, the current re-form debate indicates that the election of the Commission President will have to bebalanced by a reform of the Union’s intergovernmental structures, the most contro-versial proposal being the appointment of a President of the European Council. Thepresent strategy paper links this idea with the necessity to restructure the Council andto reinforce the role of both the Commission and the European Parliament, therebyproviding for a holistic reform approach.

European Councilü The Heads of State and Government should elect a senior political figure as “full-

time” President of the European Council for a period of 5 years. The Presidentshould be a manager and promoter of political initiatives, a package-broker in theEuropean Council, and a spokesperson for the Union as an international actor.

ü Notwithstanding the necessity to further communitarise the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy (CFSP), the President of the European Council should (a) speakfor the EU on the international political scene on the highest level and (b) assistthe European Council in defining the principles of and general guidelines for theCFSP, including its Security and Defence Policy dimension (ESDP).

ü Internally, the President should prepare, chair, and organize the follow-up activi-ties of the meetings of the European Council and together with the CommissionPresident chair the meetings of the Coordinative Steering Council (see below).

Councilü The legislative functions of the Council should be separated from other policy-

making functions and brought under the umbrella of a Chamber of States. Thework of the Chamber should be subject to qualified majority voting, the co-decision procedure, the judicial control by the European Court of Justice and theCommission’s monopoly of initiative. The Chamber could remain subject to asystem of rotating Presidency.

ü As to those operative fields not (yet) subject to law-making, the member statesshould come together in the framework of Steering Councils. Given the presentlevel of integration, it would require four Steering Council formations: three re-lated to the policy fields of CFSP, Justice and Home Affairs, and economic,monetary and social matters and one Coordinative Steering Council responsiblefor linking the overall work of the individual Council formations.

ü The Steering Councils could be co-chaired by representatives of the memberstates and the Commission. The (co-)chairmen should fulfil the functions cur-rently carried out by the rotating Presidency.

II

Commissionü Aiming to improve the Commission’s political power base, the President of the

Commission should be elected by the European Parliament. European politicalparties should nominate their top candidate before EP elections. The electedCommission President should be subject to a final approval by the Heads of Stateand Government. The election of the Commission President would enhance theCommission’s political legitimacy and re-establish the Commission as a politicaldriving force of integration.

ü The Commission President should have the right to autonomously select themembers of the college. However, the Commission should not be dominated byone political party or a specific group of parties, but rather reflect the overallcomposition of the EP. The entire Commission should be subject to confirmationby the EP and subsequently by the European Council.

ü The Commission should (a) continue to enjoy the exclusive right of initiative inthe sphere of Community competencies, (b) propose the multi-year work andlegislative programme concerning the sphere of Community competencies, (c)play a leading part in attempts to improve the EU’s efforts to coordinate themember states’ economic policies via the Open Method of Coordination and (d)have more competencies on the expenditure side of the budget.

European Parliamentü The election of the Commission President, the restructuring of the Council and

the appointment of a President of the European Council, will have positive reper-cussions on the position of the European Parliament.

ü The election of the Commission President by the EP will reinforce the parlia-mentary character of the EU’s political system.

ü The establishment of a Chamber of States, as an indispensable prerequisite for anEU legislature representing both a Union of Citizens as well as a Union of States,will strengthen the EP’s role as a law-making and democratic monitoring body.

ü An increased level of accountability on the part of the member states will add toEP’s ability to exercise its democratic control functions and to exert pressure onthose responsible for the EU’s (in)action.

1

1. Political Leadership – Defining the Challenge

Leadership is not a quality one would assign to today’s European Union(EU). The EU has all too often performed far below the potential of its eco-nomic power. Most European citizens consider the EU a bureaucratic ma-chinery incapable of solving urgent European problems and largely unac-countable to the public. To take only the most recent examples: In thelooming U.S.-Iraq confrontation, European policymakers conveyed an im-pression of amateurism, disunity and adhocism. It was not just Europe’snotorious military incapability, but the blatant lack of a common vision,strategy and voice that characterized the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-rity Policy. In reviewing the Common Agricultural Policy, the memberstates failed to repudiate the claims of entrenched interest groups to half ofthe EU budget. Blockade coalitions rendered policy coordination an exer-cise of pork-barrel politics and produced incoherent policies, which to someextent have also impeded the accession process. In effect, the Union contin-ues to support an economic sector of the past. Its spending priorities utterlycontradict its self-declared policy priority of becoming the world’s most dy-namic knowledge-based economy. In reacting to prohibitively high budgetdeficits in Portugal and Germany, member state governments and the Com-mission President joined in an attempt to relax the rules of the Stability andGrowth Pact. The Pact’s clearly specified rules were inconsistently imple-mented, thereby damaging the credibility of economic policymaking in theEuropean Union.

These examples illustrate obvious shortcomings of political leadershipand point to four desirable features of leadership that a reform of the EU’sinstitutional setting should attempt to optimize:(1) Prospective thinking, i.e. to define a common European interest beyond

the lowest common denominator. Prospective thinking denotes strategicaction, i.e. anticipation, empathy and an orientation towards long-termstrategic aims and aggregate welfare. Prospective thinking includes thepower to set strategic priorities among conflicting objectives, to commitoneself to a policy despite increasing costs and resistance and to changea policy if priorities or parameters of the situation alter.

(2) Steering capacity, i.e. to ensure that the member states of an enlargedEU arrive at an agreement by balancing divergent interests, to movepolicy initiatives through the decision-making process, to negotiatepackage deals and in the end to formulate coherent policies. Steering ca-pacity denotes the ability to build the broadest possible coalitions insupport of a policy while aiming at the maximum possible policy im-pact.

(3) Consistency, i.e. to make certain that agreed rules or objectives are im-plemented. Consistency entails taking the indispensable actions to im-plement a policy, even if these generate costs or conflicts, and to exer-cise a hands-on management if implementation is diluted or activitiesbecome fragmented.

Consistency

Steering capacity

Prospective thinking

Four features of po-litical leadership

2

(4) Accountability, i.e. to ensure that the EU has visible leaders as well assimple and transparent rules and institutions. Prospective thinking,steering capacity and consistency require and reinforce accountability. Aprerequisite of public accountability is that decision-making occurs in apolitical culture of shared symbols and narratives. Procedures should le-gitimize decisions and actions in the perception of European citizens,thereby enabling the public to identify who is responsible for a certainpolicy and who can be held accountable for the EU’s (in)action.

The EU needs accountable and effective political leadership more than everbecause advanced economic integration within Europe, global economic andsecurity challenges, and the fast-approaching reality of 27 and more memberstates require effective common policy responses. Political leadership canbe described as the quality of institutions, office-holding persons (“leaders”)and of the EU as such. The following proposals do not elaborate on the per-sonal qualities of leaders, but rather seek to design an optimal institutionalsetting to promote political leadership.

2. Reinforcing Political Leadership

Reinforcing political leadership calls for a holistic reform reflecting thecomplexity of the institutional setting – including the European Council, theCouncil, the Commission and the European Parliament (EP). Isolated re-form proposals that aim at improving only one or a subset of these institu-tions have proliferated in the current debate. Implementing one of theseproposals without considering its collateral effects is likely to damage theinstitutional equilibrium. Instead one should develop a systemic strategy inorder to improve political leadership with regard to prospective thinking,steering capacity, consistent action and accountability. The main challengefor such a strategy is to re-define the division of power and purpose in theEU, thereby providing the system with the ability to deliver. In addition, thelogic of institutional politics in the EU requires that the strategy should at-tempt to strike a balance between those who support a strengthening of theEU’s intergovernmental structures and those who advocate the Communitymethod. No plan for reforming the institutions will be viable, if it seeks totilt the balance strongly in one direction or another. The equilibrium of EUinstitutions needs to be re-calibrated in two major ways:• The EU system needs to facilitate the exercise of power embedded in a

democratic system of checks and balances. All four major EU institu-tions must increase their respective powers. The European Councilshould be enabled to focus its energies, decide on the most fundamentalissues, and thereby give strategic guidance to the EU. The Council, be-sides being co-legislator, must regain its key coordinating role in theEU’s inter-institutional architecture. The Commission as the Europeaninstitution traditionally committed to a common European interest needsto regain its lost political power. The European Parliament should be-come the main body of democratic control on the European level. Con-certed empowerment will retain and reinforce the existing checks andbalances since it reflects the in-built rationality of the system. In additionto inter-institutional power relations, an enlarged EU has to re-balance

Holistic reform

Checks and balances

Accountability

3

the power relations between small and large member states. The veryfact that the EU needs to overcome the small/large-cleavage is a crucialpoint of reference when deciding on how to organise political leader-ship.

• The EU system needs to assign clear and distinct purposes to institu-tions, procedures and policies. To achieve this, roles and responsibilitiesmust be clearly divided between the EU institutions, and between theUnion and the member states. Notwithstanding the necessity to continueto deepen integration, the institutional setting should be more clearly dif-ferentiated into intergovernmental and communitarian tiers. This wouldreflect the fact that in some policy areas, such as foreign, security anddefence policy, the member states are likely to continue to act in an in-tergovernmental manner. In other policy areas, such as the commonmarket, agriculture, competition, monetary policy etc., member stateshave pooled their sovereignties, thus providing a basis for the Commu-nity method to take full effect. Re-balancing purposes will improve thesystemic preconditions for accountability, both in inter-institutional re-lations and in the public perception of the EU.

The subsequent proposals focus on the optimal institutional structure de-signed to facilitate political leadership, and examine in particular the Euro-pean Council, the Council, the European Commission and the EuropeanParliament.

2.1 Continuity and Efficiency in the European CouncilThe European Council should concentrate on providing the EU with thenecessary strategic direction concerning the Union’s overall developmentand policy priorities. In an enlarged European Union with 27 and moremember states the current system of a rotating Presidency will not be able tocope with an overwhelming number of tasks and challenges. Some presi-dencies have been impeded by election campaigns or were unable to fulfiltheir leadership role on account of internal crises. Moreover, a Presidencythat each country in an enlarged Union could only exercise every 14 yearsfor six months would elicit no political motivation within member stategovernments. Even today it is very difficult to maintain the continuity ofadministrative know-how connected with the tenure of the Presidency. Therun-up to, the execution, the handing-over, and the subsequent summing-upof the Presidency represent an enormous operational strain on the adminis-trative capacities of a member state. Against the background of only sixmonths of incumbency it seems increasingly difficult to justify these tre-mendous burdens.

In order to enhance continuity, efficiency and visibility the Heads ofState and Government should elect a prominent senior political figure as“full-time” President of the European Council for a duration of five years.The five-year period should run parallel with the political timetable of boththe EP elections and the Commission’s period of office. Every member stateshould have the right to nominate a candidate. The President should beelected on the basis of a double majority. The rule of double majority, whichcomprises a majority of both citizens and member states, would in effectconstitute a safeguard for both the large and the small/medium-sized mem-

Clear division of re-sponsibilities

Inefficiency of rotat-ing Presidency

Election of a Presi-dent of the EuropeanCouncil

4

European Council

Heads ofState and Government

President

• external functions• internal functions

electchairmanspokesperson

ber states. In an EU-27 neither the six larger nor the 21 smaller memberstates could elect a President of the European Council on their own. Finally,the Heads of State and Government should also have the right to dismiss thePresident after a motion of no confidence.

The President should be a manager and promoter of political initiatives, apackage-broker in the European Council, and a spokesperson for the Union

as an international actor. ThePresident of the European Councilcould play a vital and delicatepolitical role, diplomatically steeringthe way towards the broadestpossible consensus among the Headsof State and Government whilstmaintaining momentum andavoiding stagnation. By heading theEuropean Council for a multi-yearperiod, the President could acquirean extensive knowledge of a widerange of issues and develop thenecessary skills to chair the

meetings of the EU’s most powerful political players – the Heads of Stateand Government.

In more concrete terms, the President of the European Council shouldexercise the following functions:ü Externally, the President, who must be able to call on the general sup-

port of all the Heads of State and Government, should speak for the EUin the international political arena on the highest level (equal to Bush orPutin). In effect, the President of the European Council would be posi-tioned on a higher political level than the current High Representative,who should be subordinate to the President. The President should assistthe European Council in defining the principles, general guidelines, andstrategic priorities for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)– including especially those areas of the EU’s foreign, security and de-fence policy in which the influence of the Union relies on the ability andreadiness of the member states to pool their power resources, i.e. crisismanagement, military security and defence. In the light of the principalneed to develop a common European foreign policy culture, a Presidentof the European Council could help overcome the lack of consensus onboth the EU and member state level when it comes to issues of hard se-curity, which the current and future member states (still) strongly per-ceive as belonging to the realm of national sovereignty.

ü Internally, the President should be responsible for the preparation,chairmanship, and follow-up activities of the meetings of the EuropeanCouncil. The President should function as the European Council’sspokesperson. Furthermore, the President could assist the EuropeanCouncil in its role as constitutional co-architect by representing theHeads of State and Government in a possible future reform Convention.In addition, the President of the European Council should, after eachEuropean Summit, submit to the European Parliament and the public a

External functions

Internal functions

Role definition

5

report which will replace the current Presidency Conclusions. Finally,the President of the European Council should be in charge of issuing anannual written report on the progress achieved by the European Council.In order not to establish yet another exclusive bureaucratic machinery,which in the long run might evolve into an institutional competitor to theCommission, the President of the European Council should be able torely on the support of the General Secretariat of the Council. The mutualcoordination and cooperation between the President of the EuropeanCouncil and the Commission President will require an even closer andmore regular working relationship between the General Secretariat ofthe Council and the Commission services.

Taking into account the growing need to link the tools of internal and exter-nal security policy in a comprehensive manner, the suggested reform of theEuropean Council Presidency should by no means counter efforts aimed atovercoming the outmoded pillar structure. The necessity to increase thelevel of political leadership in the field of CFSP is to a great extent due tothe prevailing intergovernmental approach, which is no longer adequate andwill become even more problematical in a Union comprising 27 or moremember states. Hence, the traditional civilian aspects of the EU’s foreignpolicy, including non-military crisis management, should be brought closerto the Community method, since the resources required to implement themare to be found mainly in the area of today’s Community competencies. Animmediate communitarisation of the entire area of CFSP including its Secu-rity and Defence Policy dimension (ESDP) is clearly impossible. The intro-duction of an elected President of the European Council, who will be heldpolitically accountable for the Union’s external record, will increase thepressure on the Union and its member states to improve the EU’s efficiencyas a foreign policy actor, especially with respect to those areas remaining inthe intergovernmental realm.

The alternative proposal, which seeks to combine the Presidency of theEuropean Council and the Commission in one person, and aims to combineand reconcile supranational and intergovernmental legitimacy, may at a firstsight seem promising. However, providing the Union with a single face orvoice would upset the equilibrium between the institutions and, as a result ofthe resources available to the Heads of State and Government, would curtailthe Commission’s autonomy. Given the current level of integration, a singleperson at the top of both the Commission and the European Council mightorientate her or his loyalty and interests towards the member states’ politicalrepresentatives. This solution would thus, in the long run, degrade theCommission to the level of a subordinate authority. Combining both Presi-dencies in one person might eventually become the best-case-option if EUintegration truly reaches the level of Political Union. Until then, however,the institutional setting should reflect the actual division of power within theEuropean Union.

The mere introduction of an elected President of the European Councilwill lead to a disequilibrium in the inter-institutional balance if it is not sup-plemented by substantial innovations on the part of the Council, the Parlia-ment and, most significantly, the Commission. Whether or not the Conven-tion and the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference will be able to

Overcoming the pillarstructure

“Double-hat” presi-dent: pros and cons

Alternative solution:Team Presidency

6

Chamber of States

(Rotating)Presidency

Chamber of States(legislation and budget)

(Subordinate) SectoralMinisterial Committees

chairs

prepare

adopt such a holistic reform, the present system of rotating presidencies isnot a viable option in an EU of 27 or more member states. If, however, anagreement on an elected Presidency as part of a reform comprising all fourmajor institutions should not be possible, one might also consider the alter-native solution of a Team Presidency consisting of three member states,which will always include one of the larger EU members. The Team Presi-dency would fulfil all those tasks and responsibilities currently carried outby the rotating Presidency for a minimum period of 18 months. In order toprovide the Team Presidency with a single face and voice, the three memberstates exercising the Presidency might select a person of their choice to co-ordinate their triumvirate. If the power of a European Council President isnot counterbalanced by a stronger Council, Commission and European Par-liament, a Team Presidency could replace the current inadequate system ofrotating Presidency.

2.2 Council Reform – A Clear-cut Division of FunctionsA reform of the Union’s intergovernmental structures should not be re-stricted to the European Council. Any reform aspiring to improve politicalleadership will also depend on a major adaptation of the Council. Aiming toincrease the efficiency of the decision-making process, the EU’s ability toconsistently implement agreed policy objectives and the overall account-ability of the actors involved, the Council’s legislative functions should beseparated from operative policymaking functions of the EU.

The Council and the European Parliament should constitute the two mainbranches of the EU’s legislature. The respective functions of the Councilshould be brought together under the umbrella of a Chamber of States co-responsible for approving every single legislative or budgetary act. Theseacts would be adopted by representatives of the member states, e.g. by a

permanent round of European Ministersor by the group of ministers responsiblefor the issues on the agenda. On thepart of the member states, laws shouldbe prepared by subordinate sectoralministerial committees, structuredalong the lines of the Seville SummitConclusions. The Chamber of Statescould retain the system of a rotatingPresidency, thereby enabling memberstates to continue to introduce theirspecific national policy priorities intothe EU’s decision-making machinery.Since the Chamber of States will deal

with issues in the sphere of Community competence, its work must be sub-ject to the relevant procedures, including qualified majority voting, the co-decision procedure, the judicial control by the European Court of Justiceand the Commission’s monopoly of initiative. The meetings of the Chamberof States should be public.

Chamber of States

7

Member StatesRepresentatives

Commission

co-chair

Steering Councils

Lisbon-Process

JHA

CFSP/ESDP

…

CoordinativeSteeringCouncil

Other policy areas in the field of operative tasks or at least parts of them,which the member states still ascribe to the realm of national sovereignty,are not (yet) subject to law-making. In those fields in which the EU does notlegislate, the member states should come together within the framework ofSteering Councils. The policy areas mainly affected are (1) CFSP, in which

executive decisions are not takenon the grounds of Communitylegislation, (2) those elements ofJustice and Home Affairs (JHA)w h i c h r e m a i n i n t h eintergovernmental sphere, and (3)all those matters related toeconomic, monetary and socialaffairs, which the member statesdo not (yet) want to regulatewithin the framework of theChamber of States. Thus, on thebasis of the present level ofintegration, it would require fourSteering Council formations: three

related to the policy fields of CFSP, JHA, and economic, monetary and so-cial matters and one Coordinative Steering Council responsible for linkingthe overall work of the individual Council formations. In general, theSteering Councils would be subject to the procedures applied in the respec-tive policy fields.

In the light of the requirements of coherence and coordination betweenthe member states and the Commission, the Steering Councils could be co-chaired by a representative of the member states and a member of theCommission. The (co-)chairmen should for a multi-year period perform thefunctions currently assigned to the rotating Presidency (agenda-setting,chairmanship and organization of meetings on all levels, representation ofthe respective Council within EP sessions, etc.).

The Coordinative Steering Council, which would be responsible for pre-paring the meetings of the European Council, should be co-chaired by thePresident of the European Council and the President of the Commission. Onthe whole, the Coordinative Council should help to limit the number of is-sues referred to the European Council. Thus, it would provide the latter withthe ability to concentrate on important strategic matters.

The Steering Council dealing with external relations should be co-chairedby the responsible Vice-President of the Commission and the High Repre-sentative. The latter should be appointed by the Heads of State and Gov-ernment after consultation with the President of the European Council for aperiod of five years. The High Representative should be subordinate to thePresident of the European Council, ranking more on the level of foreignministers than on that of Heads of State and Government, and would be re-sponsible for the day-to-day management of the Common Foreign and Se-curity Policy (see the following overview).

Steering Councils

Co-chairmanship ofthe Steering Councils

External RelationsCouncil

Coordinative Council

8

The Steering Council concerned with issues related to Justice and Home Af-fairs and the one dealing with economic, monetary and social matters shouldbe co-headed by the respective Vice-President of the Commission (“JHA-Commissioner”; “Lisbon-Commissioner”) and a representative of the mem-ber states. The latter could either be a person elected from among the re-spective ministers or appointed by the Heads of State and Government (“MrTampere”, “Ms Lisbon”).

The election of both the President of the European Council and the mem-ber states’ co-chairs of the Steering Councils, and the appointment of theHigh Representative should take into account national proportionality.

The clear-cut division of the current Council structures into a legislativeChamber of States and a number of Steering Councils, which are subject tothe procedures dominating the respective policy fields, would relate policy-making structures and procedures to clearly defined purposes. This would,in effect, not merely raise the EU’s ability to formulate a policy above thelowest common denominator and increase the efficiency of coordinationamong member states and institutions, but more importantly, raise the levelof accountability of those institutions or individuals which or who are politi-cally responsible.

2.3 Strengthening the Commission’s Political Power BaseChanges to the intergovernmental structures of the EU have to be paralleledby an improvement of the Commission’s political power base. Hence, fol-lowing elections to the European Parliament, the Commission Presidentshould no longer be nominated by the European Council but elected by theEP. The European political parties should on the basis of a common elec-toral programme nominate their top candidates for the post of President ofthe Commission. The elected Commission President should be subject to afinal approval by the Heads of State and Government.

JHA and economic,monetary and socialmatters

Respect for nationalproportionality

Raising the level ofaccountability

Election of the Com-mission President bythe EP

European Council Commission

Heads ofState and

Government

President

appoint

subordinate to

electchairs

HighRepresentative

Council GeneralSecretariat

approve

co-chairPresident

chooses

RELEXVice-President

close cooperation

Steering Councils

Commissionexternal services

co-chairco-chair

Overview: Cooperation in the field of external relations

9

CommissionEuropeanParliament

EuropeanParties

EuropeanCitizens

President

selects dismisses

Commissioners

Vice-Presidents

approves

approvesEuropeanCouncil

elects /dismisses

• approves• initiates impeachment proceedings

elect

candidates forCommissionPresident

4

7

3

6

2 1

5

One should dismiss the idea of attributing the task of electing the Presi-dent of the Commission to a European Congress consisting of European andnational parliamentarians. As it is the task of the EP to continuously controlthe Commission, the Parliament must of course be the institution which hasthe right to elect or dismiss the Commission President. In general, the es-tablishment of a European Congress as yet another institutional body wouldbe an inappropriate way of integrating national parliaments, and wouldmerely exacerbate the complexity of EU decision-making.

The election of the Commission President would not only increase thePresident’s own power base but also substantially enhance the Commis-sion’s political legitimacy and weight in the inter-institutional balance. Aparliamentary election similar to national parliaments electing national ex-ecutives on the grounds of a political programme would clarify and increasethe political accountability of the Commission to the electorate of the Euro-pean Parliament (i.e.the citizens of theEU). Politicizing theCommission by in-creasing its politicalstrength, its visibilityand its democraticlegitimacy will trig-ger people’s interestin European affairs.It is sometimes saidthat politicisationwill harm the Commission’s role as an independent and objective agency.However, the danger that the Commission will continue to lose political in-fluence might prove to be even greater. Strengthening its power base via theelection of its President will enable the Commission to counter recent ten-dencies of political marginalisation. In effect, it will provide a major impe-tus for re-establishing the Commission as a driving force of integration.

The Commission President should have the right to autonomously selectthe other members of the Commission. When choosing the members of theCommission, the designated President should take into account nationalproportionality (large/small, new/old, East/West, North/South etc.). On thegrounds of the current level of EU integration, the choice of Commissionersshould by no means lead to a college dominated by one political party or aspecific group of parties, but rather reflect the overall composition of theEuropean Parliament. The Commission President should be granted the soleresponsibility for the assignment of tasks among the members of the Com-mission. On the whole, the structure and distribution of tasks within theCommission should in general reflect the structure of the Chamber of Statesand the Steering Councils. The entire Commission should be confirmed bythe European Parliament and subsequently by the European Council.

With regard to the Commission’s composition as a whole, there are twoprincipal options:(1) If member states are not always represented in the Commission, the

composition of the college should, as was decided in Nice, be based on

Rejecting a EuropeanCongress

Politicizing theCommission

Selection of Com-missioners

Composition

Rotation model

10

the rotation principle. Such a rotation should basically guarantee (i) thatno member state is excluded from the Commission for longer than oneterm, and (ii) that the composition of the Commission always reflects thecomposition of the EU (large/small, new/old, East/West etc.). The lattercan be achieved by grouping the member states accordingly.

(2) In a situation where every member state is always represented in theCommission even after the EU reaches 27 members, the Commissionwill have to reorganize and rationalize its work by, for example, estab-lishing a qualitative ranking of positions like Vice-Presidents and Vice-Commissioners on the level of state secretaries or junior ministers.

The European Parliament should not have the right to table a motion of noconfidence against individual Commissioners. Conversely, the Commissionor its President should not be granted the right to dissolve the EuropeanParliament. The EP (and the Council) should have the right to initiate im-peachment proceedings against individual Commissioners only in cases ofmisconduct, and not solely for political reasons. In addition, the EP shouldbe entitled to dismiss the Commission President, but only by electing a newPresident at the same time (constructive vote of no confidence). A dismissalof the Commission President would automatically be followed by the dis-missal of the complete Commission. The President of the Commissionshould have the power to dismiss any Commissioner.

The Commission’s political leadership scope will not solely be deter-mined by institutional arrangements. A democratically elected CommissionPresident of a weak European Commission will not be able to exert politicalleadership. Hence, the Commission’s powers will have to be increasedalong the lines of the following proposals:ü The Commission should continue to enjoy the exclusive right of initia-

tive in the sphere of Community competencies. The Commission hasshown that it is an honest broker; it has not misused the right of initia-tive, and has demonstrated openness towards proposals coming fromeither the member states or the European Parliament.

ü The Commission, and not the European Council, as was decided at theSeville Summit, should propose the multi-year work and legislative pro-gramme relating to the field of Community competencies. In those areasfor which the Commission is not (yet) responsible, as for example in thespheres of CFSP, ESDP or economic coordination, the strategic pro-gramming should be drafted primarily by the European Council. In gen-eral, when it comes to the elaboration of the EU’s multi-year pro-gramme, laying down clearly who is responsible for what would tend tostrengthen the Commission’s position. More transparency in this respectwill make it easier to single out which institution can or should be heldaccountable.

ü The Commission must take the lead with regard to attempts to improvethe EU’s efforts to coordinate the member states’ economic policies viathe Open Method of Coordination – still a rather new instrument, whichis likely to become more prominent in the years to come. Due to its in-dependence and resources, the Commission should develop and proposebenchmarks and targets for member states to pursue. A comprehensive

Qualitative ranking

Dismissal of theCommission

Powers of the Com-mission

Monopoly of initiative

Multi-year work andlegislative pro-gramme

Open Method of Co-ordination

11

co-legislation

co-decision

elect

EU-Citizens

European ParliamentCommission

elect /reconfirm

Chamber ofStates

EP President

Opp

ositi

on Majority

electsrepresented in

NationalParliaments

nominatecandidates forCommissionPresident

• elects/ dis- misses President• approves Commission• initiates impeachment proceedings

EuropeanParties

elect

NationalGovernments

participate in

involvement of the Commission can ensure that the potential of theOpen Method of Coordination is not misused to undermine the Commu-nity method.

ü The Commission should be given more competencies on the expenditureside of the budget. At present, the basic structure of the budget is ini-tially defined in multi-year proposals by the European Council. Subse-quently, funds cannot be shifted from one budget heading to another. Asa result, for example, savings which accrue from the Common Agricul-tural Policy are always remitted to the member states. For this reason,the Commission to a certain extent is not particularly interested in moreefficient policies. Extending its competencies in line with the rights ofthe EP on the expenditure side of the budget would increase the Com-mission’s political influence and at the same time raise its accountabilityfor how EU taxpayers’ money is being spent.

2.4 Enhancing Democratic LegitimacyThe above-mentioned reform proposals, i.e. the election of the CommissionPresident by the EP, the restructuring of the Council and the appointment ofa President of the European Council, will have repercussions on the positionof the European Parliament in the inter-institutional setting.

The election of the Commission President in the wake of EP electionswill reinforce the parliamentary character of the EU’s political system. Thefact that European political parties will nominate their top candidate for thepost of Commission President on the basis of a specific political programmewill increase the level of politicisation of European affairs in the eyes of theEuropean electorate. The EU will still be a long way away from a level ofpoliticisation comparable to that of member states. However, the voters’ di-rect impact on theelection of one ofthe EU’s mostprominent politicalfigures could trig-ger people’s inter-est in the electionsof the EP and gen-erally stimulatepolitical debates,which in turn willattract media cov-erage and empha-size the significance of the only democratically elected European parlia-mentary body. In addition, providing the Parliament with the right to electand dismiss the Commission President will increase the EP’s political influ-ence on the Commission. As a result, the European Parliament’s weightwithin the institutional equilibrium will increase.

The establishment of a Chamber of States responsible for approving alllegislative or budgetary acts on the part of the member states is an indispen-sable prerequisite for an EU legislature representing both a Union of Citi-zens as well as a Union of States. A clear-cut division of the current legisla-

Increased budgetarycompetencies

Reinforcing the EU’sparliamentary charac-ter

Co-decision

12

Commission

ECJ

Chamberof States EP

co-legislation

co-decision

monopoly of initiative

judicial control

tive and executive functions of the Council will strengthen the EuropeanParliament’s role as a law-making and democratic monitoring body. The

fact that the Chamber ofStates will be subject tolegislative procedureswhich currently dominatethe areas of Communitycompetence will enhancethe rights of the EP. Theintroduction of qualifiedmajority voting in theChamber of States and theuse of the co-decisionprocedure by the two

branches of the EU’s legislature as a general rule governing EU law-makingwill secure the powers of the Parliament and counter the current legitimacydeficit.

The establishment of Steering Councils for those operative policy areaswhich are not (yet) subject to legislative procedures and the introduction ofa President of the European Council will increase the level of accountabil-ity. Increased clarity as to who in the EU is responsible for a certain actionor decision and who in certain cases can be held accountable for the Union’sinertia will increase the European Parliament’s ability to control and exertpressure on those in positions of power. A higher degree of accountabilitywill contribute to the EP’s capacity to efficiently exercise its democraticcontrol functions.

3. Perspectives: Governing a Larger Europe

The proposals outlined in the present paper seek to optimize the enlargedEuropean Union’s institutional structure with respect to the key features ofpolitical leadership – prospective thinking, steering capacity, consistencyand accountability. The Commission President elected by the EuropeanParliament together with a President of the European Council can form theleadership team capable of defining the EU’s long-term interests and pro-viding strategic orientation.

The two presidential positions are embedded in an institutional frame-work that separates legislative from other policymaking functions of the EU,thus relating institutions and procedures to distinct and clear purposes. Inthe field of legislative functions, policies will be coordinated by a stricterand more comprehensive application of the Community method. As far aslegislation is concerned, the EU member states should adopt laws within theframework of the Chamber of States on the basis of qualified majority vot-ing and the rules of co-decision, i.e. together with the European Parliamentin a bicameral system. The application of these procedures will contribute toa smoother decision-making process as the scope of veto options is reduced.

In non-legislative areas, policy will principally be coordinated by inter-governmental structures and decision-making procedures, embodied in asystem of Steering Councils. To ensure consultation with and involvement

Enhancing the EP’sparliamentary controlfunctions

13

of the Commission, the Steering Councils will be co-chaired by Commis-sion representatives. European Council meetings will be prepared by a Co-ordinative Steering Council, under the joint chairmanship of the President ofthe European Council and the President of the Commission. Since the ro-tating Presidency will be replaced by more continuous chairpersons, and theSteering Councils relieved of legislative functions, they will be in a betterposition to negotiate a balance between divergent interests, which is the pre-condition for a coordinated policy. Thus a strengthened Commission Presi-dent and a President of the European Council can build broad supportivecoalitions and steer policy initiatives through the decision-making processwhile aiming at a maximum policy impact.

On the whole, prospective thinking and improved coordination within theframework of a reformed institutional setting will lead to a more consistentimplementation of EU policies. Moreover, the effective implementation ofpolicies will be attained by increasing the powers of the Commission in thebudgetary process and in the context of the Open Method of Coordination.

More importantly, the reform programme presented in this paper seeks toestablish a more accountable political leadership. It sets out visible leader-ship roles and clarifies the division of responsibilities between the legisla-tive and the operative policymaking institutions of the EU. Since the EP willelect the President of the Commission, the European political parties and theEuropean citizens will be involved in the selection of one of the mostprominent political leaders on the EU level, who in turn will become moreaccountable to the Parliament and the electorate. The President of the Euro-pean Council, as the person representing the EU in the international politicalarena and presiding over the European Council for a multi-year period, willalso be held more accountable by the European public. This will reduce thepervasive practice of avoiding blame and claiming undue credit, whichcharacterises the current EU system, and has been facilitated by overlappingpowers and ambiguous roles. Creating institutional accountability is theonly feasible way to stop citizens from turning their backs on the EuropeanUnion.

14

Th

inki

ng

En

larg

ed –

Bri

dg

ing

th

e L

ead

ersh

ip G

ap

EU

-Cit

izen

s

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

•H

eads

of S

tate

and

Gov

ernm

ent

•N

atio

nal

Par

liam

ents

Ch

amb

er o

f S

tate

s

Eu

rop

ean

Co

un

cil

Ste

erin

g C

ou

nci

ls

Eu

rop

ean

Par

liam

ent

Co

mm

issi

on

Pre

side

nt

Opposition

Majority

elec

ts

Pre

side

nt

Com

mis

sion

ers

Hea

ds o

f Sta

tean

d G

over

nmen

t

Pre

side

nt

elec

tch

airm

ansp

okes

pers

onse

lect

s d

ism

isse

s

CoR

/ E

SC

–(c

onsu

lting

com

mitt

ees)

Con

cilia

tion

Com

mitt

ee

(Sub

ordi

nate

) S

ecto

ral

Min

iste

rial C

omm

ittee

s

(Rot

atin

g) P

resi

denc

y

Cha

mbe

r of

Sta

tes

chai

rs

prep

are

elec

t

repr

esen

ted in

elec

tre

pres

ente

d by

Eu

rop

ean

Co

urt

of

Just

ice

co-le

gisl

atio

n / c

o-de

cisi

on /

budg

et

mon

opol

y of

initi

ativ

e /

mul

ti-ye

ar p

rogr

amm

ing

elec

ts /

dism

isse

s

appr

oves

co-c

hair

appr

ove

mul

ti-ye

ar p

rogr

amm

ing

Coo

rdin

ativ

eS

teer

ing

C.

judi

cial

con

trol

repr

esen

ted

in

repr

esen

ted

in

15

Members of the Thinking Enlarged Group

Vladimír BilcíkResearch Fellow, Research Center of Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava

Martin BrusisSenior Research Fellow, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Center for Applied PolicyResearch (C•A•P), Munich

Stephen CalleyaDeputy Director and Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Mediterranean Academy ofDiplomatic Studies, University of Malta, Msida

Petr DrulákDeputy Director, Institute of International Relations, Prague

Janis A. EmmanouilidisSenior Research Fellow, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Center for Applied PolicyResearch (C•A•P), Munich

Thomas FischerProject Director, Governance Studies, Bertelsmann Foundation, Guetersloh

Claus GieringSenior Research Fellow, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Center for Applied PolicyResearch (C•A•P), Munich

Heather GrabbeResearch Director, Centre for European Reform (CER), London

Giovanni GreviAssociate Director of Studies, The European Policy Centre (EPC), Brussels

Ulrike GuérotHead of the EU-Unit, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin

Annette HeuserDirector, Bertelsmann Foundation, Brussels

Krassimir NikolovSenior Research Fellow, Institute of European Studies and Information, Sofia; Secretary-General of the Bulgarian European Community Studies Association (BECSA)

Cornelius OchmannProject Director, Central and Eastern Europe, Bertelsmann Foundation, Guetersloh

Sandra PralongFormer Presidential Advisor, University of Bucharest

16

Hans StarkGeneral Secretary of the Study Committee for Franco-German Relations, Institut Français desRelations Internationales (IFRI), Paris

Guoda SteponavicieneVice President, Lithuanian Free Market Institute, Vilnius

Pawel SwiebodaDirector, Department of the European Union and Accession Negotiations, Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw

Christian WeiseSenior Economist, DIW Berlin (German Institute for Economic Research)