bridging the gap between theory and practice: the case of administrative policy

0

RESEARCH NOTE

Bridging the Gap Between Theory The Case of Administrative Policy

and Practice:

MORTEN EGEBERG*

The discipline of public administration could play a more constructive role in the field of administrative policy if the gap between empirical-theoretical research and the professional role of political scientists in governments were bridged. This article outlines an instrumental or "action-oriented" model which provides a theoretical framework through which to focus on formal organizational, demographic and physical structures of institutions as the possible instruments, or "steering factors" in organizational design. The model emphasizes empirical observations of the relationships between the instrumental ~ i n d ~ e n d e n t ) variables and actual decision behavior (dependent variables). The author draws on studies conducted in the central governments of several countries.

The aim of this article is to outline a research program to bridge the gap between theory and practice in the field of administrative policy. * By "administrative policy" I mean those policies or measures which attempt to influence other policies through the design of the organizational structure or through the selection or management of personnel. The basis of knowledge on which administrative policy should be built consists primarily of insights into two basic sets of relationships: those between organizational variables and actual decision-making, and those between demographic characteristics of the personnel and their decision behavior. The extent to which the independent variables (organizational design, patterns of recruitment) are in fact subject to manipulation is also a crucial question, and the contending theories dealing with this problem will be touched upon. However, here I will more or less take for granted that these factors are, to some extent, under the control of political or administrative leaders. Finally, knowledge should include a normative component, dealing in particular with the procedural values underlying political-administrative arrangements. In this article, however, I will focus on empirical aspects.

Applied policy analysis is also concerned with this line of inquiry;

* University of Oslo, Norway

Governance: A n International Journal of Policy and Administration. Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1994 (pp. 83-98). 0 1994 Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 IJF, UK. ISSN 0952-1895

84 MORTEN EGEBERG

policy analysts too are eager to learn about the consequences of different policy choices, and to relate these to stated objectives (Hansen 1983). Policy analysts have not, however, developed a global model which specifies consistent independent (instrumental) and dependent variables (Lasswell 1964; Premfors 1984; Wildavsky 1979). The reason may be that policy areas are so numerous, that common variables are difficult to discover while multi-disciplinary character of policy analysis further complicates the task of coherent model-building.

It is consequently no surprise that "applied policy analysis" is often regarded as research which finds its point of departure in a concrete policy problem (Brox 1990; Lindblom 1990, 281; Majone 1986; McRae 1976; Scott 1987, 11). Each individual case must be explored in detail because no general basis of knowledge seems to exist. This also means that little conceptual room is allowed for a "profession" of government outside the research milieu. The researcher himself/herself assumes the role of problem-solver. Ideally, it is the practitioners of the discipline who should be the concrete problem-solvers, whereas applied research should serve to develop the general basis of knowledge for professional practice. It is symptomatic that when one talks about political scientists as professionals, or as "consultants," such a description only applies to political scientists who are attached to research or educational institutions (Andres and Beecher 1989; Pedersen 1990; Rose 1990; Anckar 1991; Newton and Valles 1991).

In the next section I shall outline a scheme of analysis which might provide a program for future research as well as a tool to systematize studies which have been carried out earlier with a wide range of purposes.

An instrumental model within the area of administrative policy

An instrumental, or "action-oriented," model can be specified as a purely empirical-theoretical model: the relationships between instruments (causal factors) and effect-variables. The actual goals and values one wishes to realize can be regarded as a question outside the subject. One can make the assumption that these would (and should) be supplied by a responsible political-administrative leadership - in the form of specifying values on a dependent variable.

What variables then should be treated as dependent? When in policy analysis one asks about the consequences of different policy choices, one typically focuses on economic, social and environmental consequences, so as to relate these to particular policy goals. After all, most policy choices are assumed to have a direct effect on the environments of the political system. The political scientist's point of view, however, is hardly prepared to analyze such environmental effects, even though

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

attempts have been made to fit such relationships into a political science paradigm (Grumm 1975). Economists, sociologists, and biologists are probably better equipped for the task. In political science and public administration, governmental decision-making processes are the more obvious dependent variables (Almond 1990). The fact that patterns of recruitment or governance structures also seem to constitute dependent variables in many studies (e.g. Peters 1988) does not alter our argument since these are also elements in the decision-making processes.

When organizations and institutions take action, it is fundamentally individuals who act. Thus, it is individual decision behavior which is to be explained, understood and, if desirable, influenced. Policymaking is not just the passing of formal resolutions, but also consists of individuals taking initiatives, elaborating alternatives, implementing, and learning. Decision behavior can therefore be understood as a process where premises are supplied and chosen (Simon 1965). As political scientists we are primarily interested in the discretionary and framework-setting decisions such as formulating rules, budgets, and institutional arrangements.

Obviously, independent variables must be chosen from among the factors that are theoretically relevant: that is, factors that have some explanatory power in relation to decision behavior. If they are to be relevant in an instrumental, or “action-oriented,“ model, they should at the same time be subject to manipulation (see also Gormley 1987).

Since politico-administrative systems are organized systems, it is important to identify how behavior is explained within organizational theory. Scott (1987) distinguishes between the rational system and the natural system perspectives, which are both affected by environmental factors. In the rational system perspective, official goals, formal structure and, to some extent, professional affiliation constitute the central explanatory factors. Gulick (1937) and Simon (1965) also add the location and physical arrangement of organizations. In the natural system perspective the importance of the informal normative structure (or organizational culture) for behavior is stressed. This perspective also emphasizes the significance of a broad range of individual attributes brought into the organization by the members themselves. In a newer variant of this perspective, the formal structure is also considered important, but as a legitimating facade for the organization’s environments, rather than as a factor affecting behavior (Meyer and Rowan 1977).

The ”new institutionalism” in organizational theory integrates factors from different perspectives. Institutions can be described as formal, demographic, physical, temporal, cognitive and symbolic arrangements. March and Olsen (1984; 1989) maintain that one should also analyze the individual institution’s historical development and growth

85

86 MORTEN EGEBERG

of personal networks. ”New institutionalism” is thus very inclusive; the only explanations of behavior which seem to be deemphasized are the environments and intentional explanations.

When we are to choose, then, explanations of behavior as instruments, there is a certain theoretical basis for concentrating on formal organizational structure, organizational demography and the physical structure of organizations. The effects of the informal normative structure, or ”organizational culture,” on behavior have been documented (Wilson 1989, 90-110), but studies of these relations face problems of operation- alization since the effects of culture are difficult to distinguish from the effects of professional composition and of formal organizational structure. In addition to the problems of measurement, we have the problem that culture is not an easy variable to manipulate (Wilson 1989, 91), even if culture in formal organizations can be easier to change deliberately than culture in the rest of society (Wilkins and Ouchi 1983).

“Formal organizational structure” can be defined as those impersonal and explicitly given norms which specify rights and duties for different positions and prescribe how the relationships between them should be arranged. In focusing on formal structure, it is important not to adopt uncritically the structure’s own legal categories, but to identify dimensions which offer theoretical utility and which at the same time are sufficiently recognizable to permit classification of concrete cases. The degree of specialization, principles of specialization and the form of coordination are examples of theoretically relevant dimensions of formal structure. For example, central governments can vary with regard to their degrees of institutional horizontal and vertical specialization, and of hierarchical or collegial forms of coordination. The amount of vertical specialization and collegial coordination may affect the possibility of political steering from above, as discussed below.

Theoretical analysis of various principles of specialization and their policy implications may have considerable potential. Hammond (1990) suggests that Herbert Simon’s criticism, and the impression that Simon ”won” the duel in the 1940s, may explain why there is almost a complete lack of empirical studies on the effects of alternative forms of specialization. Hammond (1986) shows theoretically, in line with Gulick‘s 1937 analysis, why it is impossible to design a “neutral” hierarchy: that is, a hierarchy that does not influence policymaking. If, for example, the uppermost principle of specialization is geography (”place” or ”area”), then only geographical conflicts would be presented systematically to the top management. If the uppermost principle of specialization is the administrative ”sector,” only sectoral conflicts would be the object of systematic attention from the leadership. Hammond’s theory may be confirmed by organization charts-assuming such charts accurately de- scribe officials’ actual behavior. As we have already seen, however, the

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 87

role of the formal structure has long been a contested one. Only empirical studies suggest a way out of this dispute.

"Organizational demography" refers to the attributes which people bring with them into or out of organizational positions: e.g. professional background, earlier work experiences, organizational affiliations outside and length of service inside the organization under study, sex, age, and social background, (Pfeffer 1983). The organizational demography can then be seen as an "instrumental" variable in recruitment and career planning. Pfeffer (1983; 1985) has outlined a research program in which demographic factors also include unit group demographies as variables - that is, he seeks to determine how the particular gender, age and tenure distribution and cohort pattern of organizational units affect organizational innovation and change, as well as power and influence.

"Physical structure" has so far been given the least attention in the literature. To the extent that political scientists have taken any interest in architecture and the material structure of organizations, they seem primarily to have focused on the symbolic aspects such as the relationship between the architectonic and interior design on the one hand and political or bureaucratic culture on the other (Goodsell 1977; 1988; Lass- well 1979). Physical arrangements can be considered however, as sup- porting or weakening the effect of formal structure, or constituting a possible alternative to formal reorganization. Physical distances and meeting places between organizational units, which themselves can be planned for specific institutional purposes, may also generate un- planned meetings between decision-makers. It is, then, face-to-face encounters that are assumed to be especially affected by the physical structure.

There is no conception here that change along one or more of the independent variables included in the instrumental model is necessary to promote changes in actual behavior. Behavioral changes may have their origin in other factors such as a cultural change. Neither do we believe that changes in one or more of the instrumental variables always will result in changes in behavior. We do assume, however, that particular values on these variables make some decision behavior more pvob- able than other behavior. The idea is that certain types of institutional arrangement - organizational, demographic and physical - have certain behavioral consequences, and that this is true regardless of the intentions of those who have shaped the institution.

Empirical observations

Empirically, I will focus primarily on central governments in this article. Ideally, empirical observations from local and regional governments and from secretariats of international organizations should be systematized

88 MORTEN EGEBERG

in the same way. The more countries and levels of government that are included, the more reasonable it is to consider the observed relationships as controlled - for both known and unknown factors.

EFFECTS OF FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

To what extent does the design of formal hierarchies affect actual de- cison behavior in those structures? It seems that virtually any opinion on this subject is allowed, both by theorists (see above) and practitioners.* Studies from a wide range of countries, however, reveal clear correlations between the formal structure of hierarchies and actual behavior. Contact patterns and exchange of information to a large degree follow the formal structure of organizations. The flow of information diminishes across organizational boundaries (Scharpf 1977; Olsen 1983; Egeberg 1984; 1987; Larsson 1986, 165; Gerding and Sevenhuijsen 1987; Petterson 1989). At the same time, contact across organizational units has a strong, positive relationship with officials' levels or ranks (Laegreid and Olsen 1978; Egeberg 1984; Jablin 1987). An official's contact with the top level in hidher own institution is also strongly correlated with hidher position level (Aberbach et al. 1981; Egeberg 1984, 1987). Such contact is also related to membership in collegial units, as in task forces (Stigen 1991). A Norwegian study showed much the same patterns (Christensen and Egeberg 1989). Lzegreid (1988) observed equivalent relationships between formal structure and actual behavior even in organizations with little socialization and disciplinary potential. The Norwegian oil administration he studied was characterized by constant and rapid personnel turn-over.

In addition to these synchronous studies, research studies have been designed so that the time succession between variables is clear; that is to say, the behavior is observed after an organizational change has taken place. Kristoffersen (1991) shows that a change to a formal hierarchy in a relatively flat and project-organized structure resulted in actual behavior that followed a hierarchical pattern. Christensen (1987; 1989) shows how the establishment of a new hierarchical level reduced the contact between the levels beneath and the top management level. Egeberg (1984; 1987) found that officials in ministerial departments which had been split tended to experience less conflict in their own field of work, whereas officials in departments which had been merged experienced more conflict in their work. These observations support the hypothesis that formal splits in hierarchies imply that coordination processes and conflicts are moved upward in the organization. Mergers, on the contrary, push such processes downwards, and at the same time increase capacity at the higher levels of management (but as a result less insight will be available at the top). Hult (1987) found equivalent


effects of mergers on decision behavior. She also discovered that mergers can influence the relations with client groups: networks become more differentiated, which can mean that established ”iron triangles” are softened up.

Even if it seems wise for some purposes to merge a large number of organizational units to strengthen coordination between issue areas, there are indications that the positive effects can be considerably reduced if the new units become too big (Painter 1980). For example, there is a negative relationship between the size of a ministry and the ability of officials to anticipate the preferences of the minister (Egeberg 1984).

Hult (1987) also found that changing the specialization principle in new units from a purpose or client principle to a functional or process principle lowered the level of conflicts originating in earlier organizational units. Kristoffersen (1991) found that reorganization from a client principle to a purpose principle reduced the ”overall” or ”holistic” knowledge about different clients which the organization had built up. Likewise, the change from a geographical principle to a purpose principle in one central agency led to the local authorities losing their “natural” points of contact within the central agency, and to geographic area knowledge being replaced by sector knowledge (Helland 1983; Berg 1985).

Central governments can also be specialized vertically into separate institutions at the national level, e.g., the ministerial (cabinet level) department and the central agency. Where such vertical specialization exists, studies indicate that many of the same types of tasks are per- formed at both organizational levels; for example, the subordinate institutions engage in aspects of policymaking by clarifying goals, pre- paring regulations and budgets, and restructuring organizations (Grarnnegard Christensen 1982; Jacobsson 1984; Egeberg et al. 1989).

The substantive inputs in policymaking, however, do tend to receive different treatment. Officials in central agencies, in contrast to their colleagues in the ministries, exercise their discretion comparatively in- sulated from ongoing political processes at the cabinet level. They have relatively little contact with the political leadership of the ministry, with other ministerial departments than their ”own,” and with parliament (Grsnnegard Christensen 1982; Egeberg et al. 1989). When they exercise policy discretion, they therefore attach most importance to professional considerations, and next, to user and client interests (Egeberg 1989; Beck Jarrgensen 1991). Only then do they assign weight to signals from the political leadership in the ministry or from the (public) employees’ organizations (Egeberg 1989). However, their relative autonomy from the political leadership suggests that they have fewer opportunities to influence political decision-makers (Egeberg et al. 1989). In the minis-

90 MORTEN EGEBERG

tries, on the other hand, top priority is given to signals from the minister and to professional considerations. Next, they pay attention to signals from user and client groups, and only afterwards are (public) employee interests taken into account (Egeberg 1989a; Christensen 1991a).

In a comparative study of two economic policy analysis units, in the Norwegian Ministry of Finance and in the Central Bureau of Statistics, an equivalent hierarchy of attention was revealed. While the officials’ institutional affiliation varied in these cases too, their professional back- grounds were identical, with economists dominating both units (Strarmnes 1991). A study of the effects of a reorganization introducing vertical specialization in the Norwegian (central) health administration showed that officials who were affiliated with the (new) central agency outside the ministry found that their contacts with the political leadership of the ministry and ministries other than their own were strongly reduced. This happened even though the physical arrangement was a constant in this case; that is to say, the officials were located in the same place after the reorganization (Christensen 1987; 1989). Moreover, the existence of positions in the subordinate agencies formally earmarked for a particular profession seemed to lead the holder of such positions into toning down the importance of political signals in hidher decision behavior (Maynard-Moody et al. 1986; Egeberg 1989a).

As noted above, vertical specialization also tends to reduce political influence over decision-making, amounting to a loss of political control. Studies indicate that this loss of political control can be partially com- pensated for by establishing an organizational unit in the ministry which duplicates the work of the subordinate organization ( Jacobsson 1984; Egeberg 1989a). Vertical despecialization, on the other hand, consis- tently results in increased political control of the decision process (Hult 1987).

Central agencies sometimes have collegial structures attached to the leadership, in the form of executive boards and/or advisory boards. Here we often find representatives of interest groups (clients, users, affected parties, public employees), representatives of political parties, and independent experts (Egeberg 1989a). The existence of an advisory board indeed seems to generate a very modest bias in the agency officials’ behavior in favor of client interests, but executive boards indicate no such bias. Executive boards (on “the line of command”) seem to balance several interests at the same time: they are arenas not only for political steering from above, but also for the articulation of group interests and professional values (Egeberg 1989a). This means, however, that the existence of an executive board increases the likelihood that political signals from the ministry will be blurred on their way down through the administrative apparatus. This may also mean more autonomy for the agency. A study of reorganizations in the statekentral


health administration in Kansas included a vertical despecialization and the removal of the agency’s own executive board and showed that the agency’s encapsulation from political processes - which the board had ensured - was lost (Maynard-Moody et al. 1986).

One practical implication of these observations is that if one wishes to increase the opportunities for political steering from above, one should probably choose a vertically integrated structure. Despite the increased autonomy of subordinate organizations, political steering from above can still be secured to some extent through duplication, absence of an executive board and/or advisory board, and absence of specialist (formally earmarked) positions. If effective influence by affected parties and client groups is considered desirable, the organization should choose vertical specialization, establish an advisory board, and avoid duplication. If professional or institutional autonomy is considered important, one should again choose vertical specialization and avoid duplication, but substitute a board of directors for the advisory board and establish specialist (earmarked) positions. This latter approach is also an organizational solution to the need for policy continuity and predictability across election periods. If one wants to ensure that importance is attached to several procedural values at the same time, a ”hybrid” structure might be the most intelligent choice.

EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHY

Studies show that variables like social and geographical background, age, and gender are inadequate explanations for officials’ preferences and behavior. The institutional affiliation of officials has considerably more explanatory power (Meier and Nigro 1976), and among demographic factors, only professional affiliation seems to generate systematic effects (Laegreid and Olsen 1978; Olsen 1983). However, professional affiliation does not affect the relative weight assigned to competing procedural values of the kind discussed above (Egeberg 1989). Professional background may, however, have an effect on the weight officials assign to different substantive aspects. Pruitt (1979) reveals, for instance, how the policy initiatives taken by a central traffic safety agency showed the influence of one dominating professional group, engineers who were specialists in improving vehicle safety. High priority was therefore assigned to setting vehicle safety standards, whereas safety measures for new road routes, training of drivers, anti- intoxication campaigns, etc. were relatively neglected (see discussion in Wilson 1989, 59-65).

Earlier work experiences may also have an impact on an official’s decision behavior in hidher present job. Experiences from different institutions seem to produce a sort of built-in cross-pressure which makes

92 MORTEN EGEBERG

officials less enthusiastic defenders of their institutions than they might otherwise have been (Peters 1988, 174-175).

As far as collegial structures are concerned, for example the boards of central agencies, two factors seem to emerge as especially important when decision behavior is to be explained: first, the organizational background of the representatives, and, second, characteristics of the collegial unit under study (Rothstein 1988; Stigen 1989).

EFFECTS OF PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

Face-to-face contacts are especially sensitive to an organization’s physical arrangement, and in general appear to be highly appreciated when critical decisions are made in organizations (Jablin 1987, 394). A study of Norwegian ministries shows that 90% of respondents considered written and telephone contact to be important for carrying out their daily tasks, while face-to-face contact in formal meetings was empha- sized by 72%, and other face-to-face contacts were stated as important by 68% (Egeberg 1989b).

Studies carried out in Norwegian ministries reveal clear relationships between the officials’ physical placement and work-related contact with other organizational units. As regards contact with other units in the same department, the officials’ physical location is even more important than their position level or rank. Floor location is significantly related to contact with the political leadership (Egeberg 1989a). A study of physical rearrangements of ministerial departments, in which the formal organizational structure remained unchanged, shows clearly that the frequency of contact between the departments was increased by closer proximity. Departments which moved closer to the rest of the ministry increased their influence, while the degree of actual coordination within the ministry also increased (Jacobsen 1989).

Thus, designing the physical arrangement of departments may achieve some of the same effects (e.g. actual coordination) as does formal organizing. A simultaneous change of both the formal and the physical structure so that they reinforce each other would have a stronger effect. Similarly, one can handle ambiguous goals by designing the formal and physical structure so that they counteract each other.

”To what extent forms of government are a matter of choice” (Mill 1878, 1)

Even if formal organizational structure, physical structure and organizational demography appear to be relatively manipulable compared to, for instance, the degree of urbanization in society (which has also been applied as an independent variable in relation to governmental deci-


sions), much of the literature draws a picture of institutional development which has very little to do with formal design processes. Institu- tional development has often been described as a continuous and incremental adjustment to internal and external needs filtered through established traditions, norms, values, and routines in the organization (March and Olsen 1989; Olsen et al. 1989). Alternatively, reform efforts appear to reflect institutionalized environments: structures and personnel are adopted according to trends and fashion rather than according to the stated goals and defined needs of the single organization (Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Christensen 1991b; Rovik 1992). Reforms may also be seen as taking place through the adoption of administrative doctrines. The arsenal of doctrines is relatively limited over time, and which doctrines are activated, and become ”door-openers” in a given situation, depends on whether they fit into a larger historical lock, or reflect social rules, customs and habits (Hood and Jackson 1991). Institutional development has also, within a population ecology perspective, been interpreted as ”natural selection” processes (Peters and Hogwood 1988). Finally, at least some comprehensive reorganization processes have demonstrated that they have relatively little in common with rational problem-solving, but rather reflect ambiguous goals, unclear technology and fluid participation (March and Olsen 1983; 1989).

Even the organizational demography seems to be a result of not only deliberate design, but of institutional norms and whatever manpower is available at any time (Laegreid 1989; Derlien 1990; Roberg 1991).

Even so, there is no basis for concluding that an institution’s formal organization, personnel composition, and physical structure cannot be deliberately planned to any extent. A number of studies do in fact show that relatively controlled change in central governments is possible (Mayntz and Seharpf 1975, 168; Roness 1992; Pollitt 1984; Christensen 1987; 1989). Organizing the processes of change to include the input of affected parties seems to reduce resistance to change (Mosher 1967; Leemans 1976) and to increase the likelihood of implementation (Lien and Fremstad 1989). Institutional change at the top level - that is to say at the ministerial level, at which the legitimacy for political steering from above can be expected to be strongest - often seems more amen- able to hierarchical steering (Mayntz and Scharpf 1975, 168; Egeberg 1984; 1987).

CONCLUSION

Unlike the effects of most public policies, the effects of administrative policy are familiar to political scientists because they can be concep- tualized neatly within a political science paradigm. Governmental de-

94 MORTEN EGEBERG

cision-making, no doubt, is at the core of our discipline, regardless of our subfield of specialization. Decision behavior is, however, not only a dependent variable in a theoretical model; it is something that people are eager to affect. The question is, therefore, whether we know the factors that make a difference - and how they relate to decision behavior. To the practitioner it is moreover of vital importance whether the independent variables are subject to manipulation or not.

With this in mind, I have outlined in this article an instrumental, or "action-oriented," model within the area of administrative policy. Rel- evant studies available so far on central governments have been cata- gorized along the proposed lines of research. The variables and the relationships between them, however, need to be developed further, theoretically as well as empirically. Research based on such an instrumental model aims at establishing and systematizing knowledge about general relationships. Thus, an applied purpose in this sense does not stand in opposition to a generalizing and theorizing purpose. Theory- building is, on the contrary, a premise for the development of a more constructive discipline.

Notes

1. This article is in many ways a status report on research subsequent to the project "The central government's organization and mode of operation" (RFSWNORAS (LOS), 1986-89). The purpose of this project was to carry out our own (primary) studies, and in addition, to make the project as general and comparative as possible by trying to categorize observations made in other countries along the same dimensions.

2. An extremely experienced Norwegian senior official in one ministry has, for example, stated that: ". . . The 'old official channels' no longer represent clear lines. The lines instead go in all directions through the whole apparatus. Everybody can go and see everybody - executive officers can discuss real issues with the minister, and heads of division can take decisions with a political advisor without the intermediate levels in the system being oriented. The basic approach today is that everybody's opinions are equally good." (Administrusjonsnytt, vo1.30, no. 3, 1985, p. 5).

In a commentary to the reorganization of the Ministry of Transport from 1 October 1991, the same civil servant wrote: "One then completely disregards the fact that it is the people in these boxes who count, when it is a matter of executive work, the soundness of the decision, productivity, effectiveness, and not least leadership on all levels. A competent leader gets the work done regardless of what boxes are drawn up for his or her area of work. The most perfect "box-work" is useless if the leader is no good. Therefore the "bosses" of the ministries and agencies count more than the boxes of the institutions. This also applies to the Ministry of Transport" (Sumferdsel, no. 7, 1991, p. 7).


References

Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam and Bert A. Rockman. 1981. Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1990. A Discipline Divided. Schools and Sects in Political Science. Newbury Park CA: Sage.

Anckar, Dag. 1991. Nordic Political Science: trends, roles, approaches. European Journal of Political Research 20:239-261.

Andres, Gary J. and Janice A. Beecher. 1989. Applied Political Science: Bridging the Gap or A Bridge Too Far? PS: Political Science and Politics 22:636-639.

Beck Jsrgensen, Torben. 1991. Moderne myndigheder. Generel profil af danske direktorater, styrelser og statslige institutioner. Copenhagen: Paper, Depart- ment of Political Science.

Berg, Henry. 1985. Bransje eller omride? Ein studie au effektar au ei reorganisering i Distriktenes Utbyggingsfond i 1982. Bergen: Thesis, Department of Administra- tion and Organizational Science.

Brox, Ottar. 1990. Praktisk samfunnsuitenskap. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Christensen, Tom. 1987. How to Succeed in Reorganizing: The Case of the

Norwegian Health Administration. Scandinavian Political Studies 10:61-77. . 1989. Forutsetninger og effekter: Restruktureringen av den sentrale

helseadministrasjonen i Norge. In Institusjonspolitikk og forvaltningsutuikling. Bidrag ti1 en anuendt statsvitenskap, ed. Morten Egeberg. Oslo: Tano.

. 1991a. Bureaucratic Roles: Political Loyalty and Professional Autonomy. Scandinavian Political Studies 14:303-20.

. 1991b. Virksomhetsplanlegging. Myteskaping eller instrumentell prob- lemlnsning. Oslo: Tano.

and Morten Egeberg. 1989. Norske departementer 1976-1986: Noen trekk ved formell struktur, personell og beslutningsatferd. In ed. Egeberg.

DerIien, Hans-Ulrich. 1990. Continuity and Change in the West German Federal Executive Elite 1949-1984. European Journal of Political Research 18:349-372.

Egeberg, Morten. 1984. Organisasjonsutforming i offentlig virksomhet. Oslo: As- chehoug/Tanum-Norli.

. 1987. Designing Public Organizations. In Managing Public Organizations. Lessons fiom Contemporary European Experience, eds. Jan Kooiman and Kjell A. Eliassen. London: Sage.

, ed. 1989. lnstitutusjonspolitik og forualtningsutvikling. Oslo: Tano. . 1989a. Om 2 organisere konkurrerende beslutningsprinsipper inn i

myndighetsstrukturer. In ed. Egeberg. . 198913. Fysisk struktur som organisasjonsfaktor: Noen mulige kon-

sekvnser for politisk-administrativ atferd. In ed. Egeberg. , Tom Christensen, Roy Nikolaisen and Inger M. Stigen. 1989. Departe-

mentene og andre sentraladministrative organer: En sammenligning av en- kelte trekk ved formell struktur, personell og beslutningsatferd. In ed. Ege- berg.

Gerding, Gerard and Reinoud F.Sevenhuijsen. 1987. Public Managers in the Middle. In eds. Kooiman and Eliassen.

Goodsell, Charles T. 1977. Bureaucratic Manipulation of Physical Symbols: An Empirical Study. American Journal of Political Science 21:79-91.

. 1988. The Social Meaning of Civic Space. Studying Political Authority through Architecture. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

96 MORTEN EGEBERG

Gormley, William T. 1987. Institutional Policy Analysis: A Critical Review. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6:153-169.

Grumm, John G. 1975. The Analysis of Policy Impact. In Handbook of Political Science 6:439-473, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading MA: Addison- Wesley.

GrannegHrd Christensen, Jsrgen. 1982. Den administrative ledelsesfunktion i centraladministrationen. Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift 63:317-47.

Gulick, Luther. 1937. Notes on the Theory of Organization. With Special Ref- erence to Government. In Papers on the Science of Adminisfration, eds. Luther Gulick and L. Urwick. New York: Institute of Public Administration, Colum- bia University.

Hammond, Thomas H. 1986. Agenda Control, Organizational Structure and Bureaucratic Politics. American Journal of Political Science 30:379-420.

. 1990. In Defence of Luther Gulick's Notes on the Theory of Organiza- tion. Public Administration 68:143-173.

Hansen, Susan B. 1983. Public Policy Analysis: Some Recent Developments and Current Problems. In Political Science. The State of the Discipline, ed. A.W. Finifter. Washington DC: The American Political Science Association.

Helland, Toralf. 1983. Organisasjonsutforming- et politisk-administrativt virkemiddel? En studie av en omorganisering i Distriktenes Utbyggingsfond 1978-82. Oslo: The- sis, Department of Political Science.

Hood, Christopher and Michael Jackson. 1991. Administrative Argument. Alder- shot: Dartmouth.

Hult, Karen M. 1987. Agency Merger and Bureaucratic Redesign. Pittsburgh: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press.

Jablin, Fredric M. 1987. Formal Organization Structure. In Handbook of Organi- zational Communication. An lnterdisciplina y Perspective, eds. F.M. Jablin, L. Putnam, K. Roberts and L. Porter. Newbury Park: Sage.

Jacobsen, Dag I. 1989. Effekter av forvaltningens fysiske organisering pH bes- lutningsatferden. In ed. Egeberg.

Jacobsson, Bengt. 1984. Hur styrs forvaltningen? Lund: Studentlitteratur. Kristoffersen, Kari M. 1991. Organisasjonskonsulenfer under egen lupe: En studie av

organisasjonsendringen i R-direktoratet 1985-90. Oslo: Thesis, Department of Political Science.

Larsson, Torbjmn. 1986. Regeringen och dess kansli. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Lasswell, Harold D. 1964. The Future of Political Science. New York: Prentice-

. 1979. The Signature of Power. Buildings, Communication, and Policy. New

Leemans, Arne F. ed. 1976. The Management of Change in Government. Haag:

Lien, Steinar and Jan K. Fremstad. 1989. Organisering av organisasjonsendring.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1990. Inquiry and Change. The Troubled Attempt to Understand

Laegreid, Per. 1988. Oljebyrikratiet. Om statsadministrasjonen i en oljealder.

. 1989. Rekrutteringspolitikk i sentraladministrasjonen. Bergen: LOS-sen-

and Johan P. Olsen. 1978. Byrikrati og beslutninger. Bergen: Universitets-

Hall.

Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books.

Martinus Nijhoff.

In ed. Egeberg.

and Shape Society. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Oslo: Tano.

ter Paper 89/31.

forlaget.


MacRae, Duncan. 1976. The Social Function of Social Science. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Majone, Giandomenico. 1986. Analyzing the Public Sector: Shortcomings of Current Approaches. Part A. Policy Science. In Guidance, Control, and Evalu- ation in the Public Sector, eds. F.X. Kaufmann, G. Majone and V. Ostrom. Berlin: de Gruyter.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1983. Organizing Political Life: What Administrative Reorganization Tells Us about Government. American Political Science Review 77:281-296.

. 1984. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. American Political Science Review 78:734-749.

. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: The Free Press.

Maynard-Moody, S., D.D. Stull and J. Mitchell. 1986. Reorganization as Status Drama: Building, Maintaining, and Displacing Dominant Subcultures. Public Adminis tration Review 46:301-10.

Mayntz, Renate and Fritz Scharpf. 1975. Policy-Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Meier, Kenneth J. and Lloyd G. Nigro. 1976. Representative Bureaucracy and Policy Preferences: A Study in the Attitudes of Federal Executives. Public Administration Review 36:458-469.

Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83:340-363.

Mill, John S. 1878. Considerations on Representative Government. London: Long- mans, Green, Reader, and Dyer.

Mosher, Fredrick C., ed. 1967. Governmental Reorganizations. Cases and Commen- tay . Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill.

Newton, Kenneth and Josep M. Valles. 1991. Introduction: political science in Western Europe, 1960-1990. European Journal of Political Research 20:227-238.

Olsen, Johan P. 1983. Organized Democracy. Political Insttitutions in a Welfare State- The Case of Norway. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.

, Paul G. Roness and Harald SEtren. 1989. Styring gjennom institusjon- sutforming. In Petroleum og politikk, ed. Johan P. Olsen. Oslo: Tano.

Painter, M.J. 1980. Policy Co-ordination in the Department of the Environment, 1970-76. Public Administrastion 58: 135-54.

Pedersen, Mogens N. 1990. Politologen som konsulent. Tanker om en rolle under udvikling. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 93:317-328.

Peters, B. Guy. 1988. Comparing Public Bureaucracies. Problems of Theory and Method. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.

and Brian W. Hogwood. 1988. Births, Deaths and Metamorpheses in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy, 1933-1983. American Review of Public Adminis- tration 18:119-34.

Petterson, Olaf. 1989. Maktens netverk. Stockholm: Carlssons. Pfeffer, Jeffrey. 1983. Organizational Demography. In Research in Organizational

Behavior 5:299-357, eds. L.L. Cummings and B.M. Staw. Greenwich CT: JAI Press.

. 1985. Organizational Demography: Implications for Management. Cal- ifornia Management Review 28:67-81.

Pollitt, Christopher. 1984. Manipulating the Machine. Changing the Pattern of Min- isterial Departments, 1960-83. London: Allen and Unwin.

98 MORTEN EGEBERG

Premfors, Rune. 1984. Policyanalys i Sverige. Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift

Pruitt, Charles. 1979. People Doing What They Do Best: The Professional En-

Roness, Paul G. 1992. Forvaltningspolitikk gjennom organiseringsprosessar. Bergen:

Rose, Richard. 1990. Institutionalizing Professional Political Science in Europe:

Rothstein, Bo. 1988. State and Capital in Sweden: The Importance of Corporatist

Rerbcberg, Viggo. 1991. Politikkutforming gjennom personellrekruttering? En organisasjonsteoretisk analyse av rekrutteringsprosessene i lndustridepartementet 2982-

2987. Oslo: Thesis, Department of Political Science. Rervik, Kjell A. 1992. Den "syke" stat. Myter og moter i omstillingsarbeidet. Oslo:

Universitetsforlaget. Scharpf, Fritz. 1977. Does Organization Matter? Task Structure and Interaction

in the Ministerial Bureaucracy. In Organization Design, eds. Elmer Burack and Anant Negandhi. Kent OH: Kent State University Press.

Scott, W. Richard. 1987. Organizations: Rational,Natural, and Open Systems. En- glewood NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Simon, Herbert A. 1965. Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administration Organization. New York: The Free Press.

Stigen, Inger M. 1989. Demografisk profil og mulige effekter av denne - En analyse av kollegiale organer knyttet ti1 etatenes sentralledelse. In ed. Ege- berg.

. 1991. Avbyrikratisering og modifisert forhandling? Om bruk av pros- jektorganisasjon i norsk sentraladministrasjon. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidssk- rift 7:173-191.

Strermsnes, Dag. 1991. En analyse av tilknytningsformen metlom Statistisk Sentral- byriog Finansdeparternentet. Oslo: Thesis, Department of Political Science.

Tolbert, Pamela S. and Lynne G. Zucker. 1983. Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Re- form, 1880-1935. Administrative Science Quarterly 28:22-39.

Wildavsky, Aron. 1979. Speaking Truth to Power. The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Boston: Little, Brown.

Wilkins, A.L. and W.G. Ouchi. 1983. Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relation- ship between Culture and Organizational Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 28:468-481.

Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy. What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.

65~208-233.

gineers and NHTSA. Public Administration Review 39:363-71.

Doctoral Thesis, LOS-senteret.

A Dynamic Model. European Journal of Political Research 18:581-603.

Arrangements. Scandinavian Political Studies 11:235-60.

bridging the gap between theory and practice: the case of administrative policy

Documents