bridging the capability-expectations gap: a case study of the cfsp joint action on south africa

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Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 33, No. 4 December 1995 Bridging the Capability-Expectations Gap: A Case Study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa MARTIN HOLLAND* Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand Abstract This article applies and responds to Hill’s 1993 JCMS article on the expecta- tions-capability gap that exists in the conduct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The case study of one of the first CFSP joint actions (South Africa) provides empirical data that suggest that any such gap can be minimized. While accepting Hill’s general arguments, the case suggests that the CFSP can be effective and proactive. I. Introduction The 1981 London Report set the then European Community (EC) the objective of developing into a fully-fledged international actor. Europe, it was suggested, should ‘seek increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them’ (London Report, 1981, p.14). Despite this ambition, the intervening years have not provided sufficiently unambiguous evidence to end debate. Whether the European Union (EU) can accurately be described as an international actor remains contentious. Undoubtedly, the Union’s international character has progressed in tandem with the treaty reforms of 1986 and 1993, as well as *Thedescriptive elementsof the case study are drawn from M. Holland ‘Relations with the European Union Africa’. In Muller, M. and Carlsnaes, W. (eds) ChangeandSocrrhA~icanExrerncrlReluriom(forthcoming). 0 Blackwell Publishers Lid 1995. I08 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 I JF, UK and 238 Main Set, cuabridge. MA 02142, USA

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Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 33, No. 4 December 1995

Bridging the Capability-Expectations Gap: A Case Study of the CFSP Joint Action on

South Africa

MARTIN HOLLAND* Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury,

Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand

Abstract

This article applies and responds to Hill’s 1993 JCMS article on the expecta- tions-capability gap that exists in the conduct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The case study of one of the first CFSP joint actions (South Africa) provides empirical data that suggest that any such gap can be minimized. While accepting Hill’s general arguments, the case suggests that the CFSP can be effective and proactive.

I. Introduction

The 1981 London Report set the then European Community (EC) the objective of developing into a fully-fledged international actor. Europe, it was suggested, should ‘seek increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them’ (London Report, 1981, p.14). Despite this ambition, the intervening years have not provided sufficiently unambiguous evidence to end debate. Whether the European Union (EU) can accurately be described as an international actor remains contentious. Undoubtedly, the Union’s international character has progressed in tandem with the treaty reforms of 1986 and 1993, as well as

*The descriptive elementsof the case study are drawn from M. Holland ‘Relations with the European Union Africa’. In Muller, M. and Carlsnaes, W. (eds) ChangeandSocrrhA~icanExrerncrlReluriom(forthcoming). 0 Blackwell Publishers Lid 1995. I 0 8 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 I JF, UK and 238 Main S e t , cuabridge. MA 02142, USA

556 MARTIN HOLLAND

through the experiences of collective action. Nonetheless, in general the limita- tions rather than the abilities of European foreign policy remain the focus of attention. In the words of one leading European foreign policy commentator, the question is, ‘if the EC [sic] is less than a state, but more than a conventional intergovernmental organization (IGO), in what ways can it be termed a genuine- ly independent actor in international relations?’ (Hill, 1993, p. 309). This analysis addresses such critiques and tests the requirements of ‘actorness’ against a case study: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) joint action on South Mica. While imperfections do remain, the evidence drawn from this empirical study suggests that the EU has made significant progress towards successfully performing the role of an international actor. How best can European Union foreign policy be conceptualized? Past work

has been either eclectic in its theoretical contribution and devoid of consensus, or explicitly atheoretical relying on case study empiricism and the claim of uniqueness as a rationale (Holland, 1991; Rummel, 1992). Three factors are vital: the relationship between foreign policy and the integration process per se; the distinct character of the CFSP; and the capacity to implement foreign policy decisions (Holland, 1994a, p.117).

First, the relationship between foreign policy and the EU’s internal dynamic is fundamental and conditional on the wider federal-intergovernmental debate. Thus, at the one extreme the creation of a CFSP is equated with a federal union; at the other, the Union remains tantamount to intergovernmentalism while the conduct of external political relations is dominated by national actors. The CFSP, just like the single internal market or Economic and Monetary Union, is intelligible only within the context of the general and pervasive process of European integration: foreign policy does not stand in splendid isolation.

Second, it is not sufficient to conclude that EU foreign policy is simply the aggregation of individual Member State foreign policies: rather it is a distinct process that combines certain national foreign policy attributes with features and capabilities unique to the EU. Such a differentiation between nation-state and European level foreign policy is crucial to the understanding of EU behaviour. There are limitations placed upon the EU’s sphere of action that are not, generally, imposed upon the nation-state. If this characteristic is appreciated, the nature of European Union foreign policy-making becomes less opaque. It is a foreign policy actor, but one that operates within specific and sui generis constraints.

Third, and related, is the capacity to implement actions. Although writing prior to the passing of the Single European Act or the Maastricht Treaty, Allen and Byme offered a general conclusion that remains valid: simply, that success- ful foreign policy implementation is dependent on adequate financial, staffing and political resources, criteria that are as central to the CFSP as to traditional Q Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995

THE CFSP JOINT ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA 557

national foreign policy actors. However, the additional complexity of implemen- tation at the supranational level ‘introduces new complications -the interplay between national and European interests, the lack of a clear central authority, doubts about the competence and commitment of partners and working within a relatively inflexible ideological framework’ (Allen and Byrne, 1985, p.141). Maastricht has exacerbated this complexity, although in essence the conflict was an old one, between the supporters of intergovernmentalism who wished to retain Member State control over foreign policy, and those with a communau- taire approach who argued for greater EU autonomy and a significant role for the Commission. The Maastricht Treaty had for the first time specified the Commis- sion’s shared right of initiative (Article 5.8.3) and confirmed its ‘fully associated’ status (Article J.9) in foreign affairs. The following South African case provided these two opposing trends with an early test of the new foreign policy institution- al implications.

In a recent article, Hill (1993) is sympathetic to such pragmatic criticisms and acknowledges the historic and endemic problem associated with past European foreign policy endeavours. As Hill explains: ‘[Rlecent dramas over the Gulf, the Uruguay Round and Yugoslavia seem to show that the Community [sic] is not an effective international actor, in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events’ @. 306). However, the remedy is not in demanding more recognizable state-like behaviour, but rather a more perceptive understanding of the context of EU action that can address what Hill defines as the ‘capability-expectations gap’. If the dissonance between the EU’s practical capabilities to act and the expectations as to how it should act is to be eliminated, the ‘civilian superpower’ role typically associated with Europe as an internation- al actor has to be solidly grounded in fact and experience, not built on aspirations and presumed potential. Thus Hill is concerned with examining the functions the EU has successfully performed, those it might perform in the international system and how its role is perceived by third countries. In particular, Hill attempts ‘to sketch a more realistic picture of what the Community [sic] does in the world than that presented either by its more enthusiastic supporters or by the dernandeurs beyond its borders’ (p. 306).

As Table 1 describes, Hill lists four functions that Europe has effectively performed in the international system under the procedure of European Political Co-operation (EPC). The EC contributed to the stabilization of western Europe; as the largest global trader, the EC was instrumental in ‘managing’ world trade; it offered an alternative to an American perspective in outlining the west’s role in international diplomacy; and, finally, through the Lome Convention and other preferential agreements, Europe became the principal interlocutor between the developed and the developing world. From this position of increased ‘salience in the international political system’, Hill hypothesizes six new roles that the new

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Table 1: Past and Future Functions of the ECEU

Past functions:

Possible future functions:

1. Stabilizing of western Europe 2. Managing world trade 3. Principal interlocutor in north-south dialogue 4. Alternative western voice in international diplomacy

1. Replacement of USSR in global balance of power 2. Regional pacifier 3. Global intervenor 4. Mediator of conflicts 5. First-third world facilitator 6. Joint supervisor of world economy

-~

Source: Hill (1993). pp. 312-15.

European Union might conceivably perform. First, the EU is regarded as the most likely candidate for replacing the USSR in the global balance of power; second, and consequential, Europe exhibits the potential to act as a regional pacifier; third, this may be extended into an EU global intervention role; fourth, to complement such an intrusive role the EU could assume a greater responsibil- ity as a mediator of conflicts; fifth, building on its existing Lorn6 experience, the EU has the opportunity to lead and restructure first-third world relations; and, lastly, the EU possesses the capacity to become a co-supervisor (with Japan and the USA) of the world economy through increasing dominance in the IMF, World Trade Organization and the current G 7 grouping.

This analysis follows the framework of Table 1 as the context for examining the EU joint action on South Africa. Consideration is given to the extent to which these six conceivable new functions have been achieved, and whether, in at least this one example of the CFSP, the credibility-expectations gap can be bridged. More critically, the example of South Africa offers empirical evidence to evaluate Hill’s untested conceptualization. Extending Hill’s schema, the key questions posed are: the nature of ‘joint actions’ as collective decisions; the expectations of external actors; and, the actual impact of EU action on events. Specifically, the joint action on South Africa focuses on the transition from EPC to the CFSP; the experimental nature of joint actions; the blending of intergov- ernmental authority with communaufaire procedures, and the emergence of the Commission as at least primus inter pares with respect to foreign affairs. ColIectiveIy, each element reinforces the primacy of the intra-European aspects of the external policy towards South Africa and extends Hill’s schematic framework in a number of ways. The case study consists of a truncated

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description of the pre-and post-apartheid European policy providing a context within which both to measure the extent of change in Europe’s bilateral relations withSouth Africa, and to assess whether the joint actionconstitutes recognizable actor behaviour. (For an expanded empirical study, see Holland, 1995.) This historical approach also coincides with Hill’s search for a ‘pattern of activity’ since the launch of EPC in 1970.

II. Policy Vacillation and Development: 1977-93

As the following analysis suggests, Europe’s changing relations with South Africa are as much a reflection of issues pertaining to European integration as they are a response to South Africa’s domestic reforms. Arguably, once the democratization process began to unfold in South Africa, all that was necessary from the European perspective was the gradual abolition of sanctions and a laissez-faire approach to the normalization of political and economic relations. However, the EU did not adopt this minimalist approach, but selected South Africa as one of the first five ‘joint actions’ of the new European Union’s CFSP launched in November 1993. These ‘joint actions’ undertaken by the European Union ‘as a matter of priority’ were: the promotion of peace and stability in Europe; the Middle East; the former Yugoslavia; the Russian parliamentary election; and South Africa (Presidency Report, 1993). Treating European relations within this framework heightened the attention given to external relations with South Africa, but also made those relations subject to the difficulties, novelty and internal pressures of creating common joint actions. Relations with South Africa became a test case for the experimental exercise of the CFSP and Europe’s ambitions to be a global actor. Consequently, any adequate analysis of the changing anatomy of European-South African rela- tions, or of CFSP joint actions per se, can only be understood within the theoretical context of integration and the Maastricht process.

Prior to the 199Os, European policy towards South Africa vacillated between innovation and reluctance, rhetoric and implementation. The adoption of the 1977 Code of Conduct that regulated the employment practices of European firms with subsidiaries in South Africa established the EC as a leading anti- apartheid body. By the mid-1980s this innovative leadership had given way to conservative opposition to the imposition of sanctions, and the EC became one of the most recalcitrant members of the international community. Intra-EC policy disputes delayed agreement on even modest economic sanctions until as late as 1986, and the effect of their application remained a matter of debate (Holland, 1988, 1995). By the end of the 198Os, the EC had in place five categories of sanctions against South Africa: embargoes on specific scientific, military, diplomatic, trade and sporting and cultural contacts (see Table 2). This 0 Bl~~kwel l Publishers Ltd 1995

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Table 2: EPCKFSP Policy Chronology for South Africa, 1977-94

Policy ~~ ~~~ ~~~~~

Date Implemented Date Rescinded

Code of Conduct (original version 1977) 1985 sanctions on:

oil exports paramilitary goods sensitive technology cultural, sporting and scientific contact

nuclear co-operation military co-operation exchange of military attachds

1985 sanctions on:

Code of Conduct (1985 revised version)

1986 Special Programme

ECSC Decision 86/459 prohibiting certain iron and steel imports

EC Decision 86/517 prohibiting new investments

EC Regulation 3302/86 prohibiting the import of Krugerrands

European Community Observer Mission to South Africa (ECOMSA)

Development Council framework

Council statement on post-Transitional Executive Council

Accreditation of Commission delegation

European Electoral Unit Observer Team (EUNELSA)

Commission proposal for a new co-operation framework

Council adopts new co-ordination framework for birateral relations

Generalized System of Preferences regime introduced

Berlin Declaration

Co-operation Agreement signed between

September 1977

September 1985

September 1985 September 1985 September 1985

November 1985 July 1986

September 1986

September 1986

October 1986

October 1992

May 1993 June 1993

December 1993

January 1994

April 1994

April 1944 September 1994

September 1994 October 1994

November 1985

April 1992

November 1993 October 1993 October 1993

November 1993 -

January 1992

December 1990

January 1992

- May 1994

EU aid South Africa

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THE CFSP JOINT ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA 561

expression of European foreign policy remained unaltered until 1990: despite attempts to adapt the policy further, opposition from key Member States saw the modest status quo prevail. However, a striking characteristic of all these European initiatives was that once agreed, the EC acted in concert with no Member State adopting conflicting bilateral policy.

The 1990s have seen two processes at work simultaneously: the progressive removal of existing sanctions and their replacement by co-operative develop- ment and bilateral trade strategies. The requirement for both remained consen- sus; while this was more readily achieved than in the 1980s, such a process necessitated extended policy deliberations. The removal of sanctions was not without difficulty and the process was staggered over a period stretching fiom December 1990 until the establishment of South Africa’sTransitional Executive Council (TEC) three years later. The only example of a unilateral breech in the history of Europe’s collective South African policy occurred in early 1990 when the British government suspended its prohibition on new investments in South Africa, a position that the Twelve only belatedly adopted collectively at the end of that year. The dejure removal of other sanctions was also delayed because of domestic political constraints in one Member State. Despite the Danish govern- ment approving the lifting of sanctions, the Danish Parliament vetoed this decision, delaying implementation for months. While there was a de fact0 suspension of certain sanctions by many Member States, the legal position was of the continuation of European embargoes. The slowness of the process of gaining a consensus to remove sanctions saw the bulk of measures revoked only in 1992 and some as late as November 1993. Filling this policy vacuum was addressed with greater urgency, and while policy development rested on a broad consensus, this process also posed difficulties. Disputes were less concerned with the details of policy than with the framework under which specific actions were undertaken in the post-Maastricht pillared approach to external relations.

III. Post-Maastricht Policy on South Africa

The Treaty on European Union implemented as of 1 November 1993 instituted the replacement of EPC by the more formalized CFSP. The change was more than semantic. While still lacking in formal legal obligation and enacted outside the existing EC structures, the CFSP marked a significantly deeper commitment to a common European foreign policy. Central to this new plateau in foreign policy co-ordination were the provisions concerning ‘joint actions’ by the Union which constituted the greatest advance towards binding foreign policy actions in the history of Europeanintegration.Tit1e V, Article 5.3.1 provides the legal basis:

The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action.

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Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union’s general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation. (Treaty on European Union, 1992)

Further, the detailed execution of such joint actions may be ‘taken by a qualified majority’, an innovation in stark contrast to the absolute consensus principle at the heart of the former EPC.

Once the consensus decision to adopt South Africaasa joint action was taken, it assumed the status of a binding commitment, albeit it as much for behavioural as for legal reasons. As the 1993 Belgian Presidency guidelines on implementing CFSP state, whereas EPCgoverned by the Single European Act defined common policies as ‘a point of reference’ for the policies of Member States, CFSP joint actions ‘commit Member States in the gositions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’ (Presidency Report 1993, p.20). Greater discipline and collective responsibility are required. As suggested above, the inclusion of South Africa as the first and onIy topic

for joint action outside the immediate geo-political interests of the Union symbolized, amongst other things, the Union’s global aspirations as an interna- tional actor, the creation of a new consensus on a post-apartheid policy, and the emergence of the Commission Directorate Generals for External Political Affairs @G L4) and for External Economic Affairs (DG I) as active participants in the CFSP arena. The designation of South Africa as a ‘joint action’ added an unknown into the policy debate. Just how would the Maastricht procedures work in practice? Past experience was not available to rely on: pragmatism, innovation and a degree of experimentation became policy necessities. Whether such novelty would act in South Africa’s favour or to her disadvantage was unknown.

While the decision-making procedures were untried, continuity character- ized the content of EU policy that bridged the transition from EPC to the CFSP. In June 1993, four months prior to the designation of South Africa as a CFSP ‘joint action’, the then Danish Presidency outlined the elements of what were to become the core components of the 1994 policy. This consisted of a progressive multi-tiered approach that combined involvement in: monitoring the election process; the negotiation of a new bilateral economic framework; and a commit- ment to long-term involvement with the Special Programme of development assistance. Additional components of the policy were support for South Africa’s reincorporation into various international institutions, the resumption of military contacts and the establishment of EU diplomatic accreditation (Holland, 1994b, pp. 8-9). While obviously broad, these parameters established the scope of the eventual joint action. There was no fundamental shift on 1 November, quite the contrary. At the time of its launching, the joint action failed to introduce any new ideas into the policy debate. Its effective policy contribution occurred only as of 8 Blackwell Publishers Lfd 1595

THE CFSP JOINTACMON ON SOUTH AFRICA 563

May 1994 when the details of the general policy objectives began to be specified. However, the resultant implications seriously tested the consensus on which the joint action was based. The UK, for example, sought to impose an intergovern- mental constraint on the scope of EU policy by proposing that the joint action be exclusively limited to election observation. The other policy areas, it was argued, were better dealt with outside the framework of joint action (which by implica- tion would reduce the co-participant role of the Commission). Whileno majority decision on this was ever recorded, the British strategy was unsuccessful and the scope of the joint action remained remarkably expansive. The main policy elements and their detailed development are discussed below.

IV. The 1994 Policy: Election Observation

Prior to Maastricht, Europe’s international role had not involved election monitoring or observation. The joint action on Russia constituted a very modest involvement, making the South African election the first significant test of the EU’s ability to perform a function previously associated with the UN or the Commonwealth. This aspect of the joint action was explicitly detailed in the European Union Council Decision (10503/93) of 7 December 1993 and, except for the question of funding, was not a contentious issue between the Twelve. Whether the financing was to come from the Commission budget or through Member State contribution provoked intergovernmental sensitivities. The EU Electoral Unit (EUNELSA) was established on 24 January 1994, and a total of 307 observers were subsequently deployed (in principle 24 from each Member State and the Commission). Further assistance was provided across a range of sectors: additional European police officers were assigned to assist in security; personnel were provided for mediation tasks, logistics, election administration, and most notably for voter education. Overall, the EU deployed450 people in the Republic and provided some 12m ECU (R40.5m) specifically for the electoral process. The explicit terms of reference established in the European Union Council decision gave responsibility for the co-ordination of EUNELSA to DG Wof the Commission suggestinga communaufuire flavour to the exercise, albeit one primarily of administration rather than policy initiation.

The EU’s contribution to the international observation process was consid- erable, and this aspect of the joint action was a clear success. The procedural and administrative problems that did occur were only to be expected given the inexperience in mounting such a complex undertaking. The observation exercise emphasized a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. The 307 EU observ- ers were, on average, deployed for a considerably longer period (1-3 months) than the more numerous 1800 or so UN observers, the bulk of whom were present for just one week. In terms of observer days spent in South Africa, the EU was 0 Blackwell Publirhea Lrd 1995

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perhaps the major player (Holland, 1994b, p. 33). The presence of the EU provided transparency and generally enhanced confidence in the electoral process, fulfilling an important international role.

V. Bilateral Relations

Codes and sanctions precluded normal EUSouth African economic relations prior to the 1990s. However, this lacuna did not mean that there were no constraints on the type of bilateral regime that could be created. Any new relationship had to be compatible with existing international obligations, includ- ing the new GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) accord. In addition, Europe’s relations with South Africa were becoming increasingly enmeshed within its overall framework for southern Africa which encapsulated the SADC (Southern African Development Community) regime and the Lorn6 Convention. Bilateralism, while a necessary, simple and convenient first step, was likely to be superseded by a region-to-region multilateralism within an EU- SADC framework. In such a context, the bilateral arrangement that was finally concluded in late 1994 was significantly circumscribed and regarded as an interim measure.

The scope of the joint action with respect to the normalization of economic ties was broad and non-specific in its brief. As such, it provided DG I of the Commission with an important opportunity to influence the content and direc- tion of bilateral relations, much to the chagrin of the Union’s intergovernmen- talists. It was only in April 1994 that the possible shape of new bilateral ties began formally to emerge (although DG I had produced policy option papers as early as 1992). The Council adopted the Commission’s proposal to offer South Africa an interim trade framework coupled with the now usual conditionalities and human rights clauses, while the implications and complexities of a longer-term comprehensive agreement were considered further (General Affairs Council, 1994).

The expansive scope of the joint action meant that the April proposal covered topics as diverse as trade and economic co-operation; political dialogue; and development co-operation. Four aspects of trade and economic co-operation were identified. First, South Africa was offered extended market access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) regime (although this was made conditional on regional sensitivities and subject to the revised GSP provisions issued by the EU in June 1994). The regulation giving effect to these GSP benefits came into force on 3 September 1994, and gave duty-free access to Europe for some 2,000 non-sensitive industrial and semi-industrial goods on either a fixed ECU value basis or in accordance with quantitative restrictions. The volume of these concessions has been estimated by the Commission to be Q Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995

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worth 400m ECU (R1.8 billion) per annum. Second, to facilitate regional economic co-operation, it was advocated that the conditions for ‘rules of origin’ cumulation be developed. Third, European support and funding for investment protection and promotion were suggested with backing for small and medium- sized South African companies through instruments similar to the European Community Investment Partners scheme and the European Investment Bank. Fourth, bilateral co-operation across a wide range of areas was encouraged, for example, in education and training, industry, commerce, telecommunications, and science and technology.

The establishment of a political dialogue was both of practical importance and symbolic of the normalization of relations. Parallelling the EU’s global bilateral relationships, emphasis was placed upon support for democracy, the rule of law, social justice and the promotion of human rights. The appropriate content, level and form of the dialogue were left for discussion and mutual agreement, although it was the EU’s view that these should include ministerial and high official level contacts, and incorporate a foreign policy perspective.

In October 1994 the General Ma i r s Council approved the Co-operation Agreement formulated by the Commission based on the April proposals and supplemented the already agreed GSP concessions. The agreement followed a simplified structure and was viewed as a broad basis for subsequent closer relations and more detailed co-operation programmes. Once again, human rights and democratic principles were set as the precondition for future relations; other clauses on global co-operation and provisions to facilitate joint co-operation if necessary, were framed by reference to what was consistent with regional priorities. The September 1994 Berlin Declaration attempted to specify some of these regional issues, especially those raised by the accession of South Africa as SADC’s eleventh member at the end of August 1994. In particular, the EU was keen to establish a dialogue to promote regional integration and to develop mechanisms that facilitated South African participation in regional co-operation projects that were conducted under the auspices of the Lome Convention. The sectors where South African participation was seen as essential were: transport and communications; energy; public administration training; AIDS prevention; agriculture; mining; combatting international crime; and cultural, educational and scientific co-operation.

VI. Development

The existing programme (introduced in 1985 as the ‘Special Programme for the Victims of Apartheid’) formed the basis of the Union’s development commit- ment within the parameters of the joint action. The original budget in 1985 was just 10m ECU: by 1994 the Special Programme had grown to 110m ECU per 0 Blrckwell Publishers Ltd 199.5

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annum, making it the EU’s largest single programmable development project in Africa. The first phase of the programme ran between 1985-91 and a total of 402 projects were sponsored, worth 130.7m ECU. After the release of Nelson Mandela, the programme objectives were revised and in the period 1991-93 a further 147m ECU were committed. The current programme - renamed the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) - promotes a sector-based and co-ordinated development strategy that focuses on sustaina- ble long-term development initiatives. Its priority sectors are (with 1991-93 funding levels given in parenthesis): education and training (83m ECU); rural and agricultural development (36m); good governance (13m); health (8m); and community development (7m ECU) (Holland, 1994b, p.16).

The April 1994 Council decision also commented on development co- operation; while adapting to post-election priorities, no innovations were pro- moted and the EU’s policy remained largely consistent with the comprehensive framework outlined above and based on the May 1993 Development Co- operation Council Declaration. Thus a long-term structured development ap- proach and sector-specific policies became priorities. The existing sui generis character of the mechanisms and procedures for development projects in South Africa that were necessitated by the apartheid structure were to be replaced and normal donor-recipient structures introduced. Although no specific level of funding was specified, the Council gave a commitment to maintaining funding at a substantial level during the transitional period. However, despite the probable increase in demand after 1994, a significant increase above the current level of financing appears unlikely in the context of Europe’s own budgetary constraints and other east European and global commitments. Conditionality was again introduced, ‘in particular in relation to the elements of democratiza- tion, rule of law, human rights, good governance and popular participation’ (Development Co-operation Council, 1993). In summary, the joint action’s commitment to development was exclusively channelled through these new objectives of the EPRD and provided a coherent, targetted sectoral-based development initiative for the most needy sections of South African society.

VII. Additional Initiatives

A series of additional European joint action initiatives supported these three major policy components. First, the EU supported South Africa’s case for the normalization of international economic relations with both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Second, with the lifting of both EU and UN sanctions, military contacts resumed and South Africa again became the princi- pal focus for regional security co-operation and dialogue. Third, and most significantly, direct diplomatic contact was established with the EU. While Q Blackwell Publishers Ltd I995

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South Africa has had a delegation attached to the European Commission in Brussels since the early 1970s, formal ties between the Commission and the Republic were prohibited during the apartheid years. The EC’s dialogue was conducted through those Member States with embassies in South Africa and, since the early 199Os, via the non-accredited European Commission Technical Co-ordination Office responsible for the Special Programme and development assistance. Coinciding with the establishment of the TEC in December 1993, a Commission delegation was established in Pretoria. This institutionalization of relations represented more than symbolism. Commission delegations are covet- ed by third countries as they do facilitate closer trade and political dialogues, and provide a regular and formal framework within which to direct communication. They also provide concrete examples of the EU’s role as a global actor. In addition to incorporating the duties of the Co-ordination Office, the delegation will provide a clear focus for bilateral relations and facilitate political dialogues both between the Member States and bilaterally with the Republic. The high level of co-operation between the Member State embassies that has existed historically suggests that the delegation’s task in co-ordinating EU activity will be relatively easy. Perhaps the greatest change provided by the delegation will be the direct input from the Commission into the conduct of the CFSP in third countries, thereby challenging the traditional Member State pre-eminence.

Vm. The EU as a Global Actor: T h e Supporting Evidence

The joint action signified a significant new approach in Europe’s foreign relations with South Africa that saw sanctions and codes replaced by co- operation and development initiatives. The former emphasis on bilateral politics seems destined to give way to a regional focus which, if conceived correctly, can be mutually beneficial for South Africa, southern Africa and the EU. The transition to democracy in South Africa allowed the EU to play a significant role on the international stage and has bolstered its tarnished image as an international actor. EU policy had a recognizable impact on the target state. From both the European and South African perspectives, the joint action has been an almost unqualified success; whether by luck or good judgement, South Africa’s expe- rience as a test case did not result in any major policy omissions or concessions. A normal framework for relations has been established that provides the necessary flexibility for policy development as Europe and the southern African region approach the changing demands of the twenty-first century. From a specifically South African perspective, the joint action caused the Republic and the leading political parties, perhaps for the first time, to focus on the EU level, rather than on traditional bilateral links. While individual bilateral European relations persist, since May 1994 this European focus has increased and become 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995

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the dominant framework for relations with the Government of NationaI Unity. The consequences of the Maastricht debate clearly coloured the development

and anatomy of EU-South African relations. There is clear evidence of direct policy outcomes. Through the joint action a comprehensive approach was adopted rather than segregated incrementalism. Co-ordinating the various policy sectors (development, trade, election monitoring, etc.) together under a single initiative (the joint action), while difficult and possibly time-consuming, had led by the end of 1994 to a compatible and comprehensive policy mix that was regionally sensitive as well as of direct benefit to South Africa. Previous approaches to South Africa under EPC, although paying lip-service to regional scenarios, were essentially bilateral initiatives which occasionally contradicted Europe’s other southern African objectives. The expansive scope of the joint action mediated against this unintended consequence and the resulting policy outcome is more efficient and consistent. To that extent, the experimentation of the CFSP using South Africa as a subject has improved the effectiveness of European policy.

The experience has also illustrated that Maastricht has confirmed and extended the Commission’s role as a significant foreign policy actor. On the one hand, while Maastricht specified the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, on the other it also accommodated a degree of communuuturization by providing the Commission with its first constitutional inroad into foreign policy-making by stipulating a shared right of policy initiative (Article 5.8.3). in the South African case, the Commission fully utilized its power of initiative and was the leading player throughout 1993-94 in structuring the Union’s contemporary policy, fulfilling a role of at least primus inter pares. The new bilateral relations, the EPRD, and the conduct of the election observation all carried a heavy imprint of Commission involvement. This emerging roIe for the Commission is of partic- ular significance to both the South African joint action and to the conduct of the CFSP in general.

However, this apparent bureaucratic influence in foreign policy has to be tempered by the recognition of internal divisions within the Commission itself. An explanation of the South African policy outcome has to acknowledge the role of intra-Commission competition for influence and areas of competence. An innovation introduced in Jacques Delors’ 1993 Commission was the creation of a new Directorate General @G LA-External Political Affairs- under the control of Hans van den Broek) to complement the existing DG I - External Economic Affairs- under the direction of Sir Leon Brittan. The bulk of policy disputes that emerged vis-h-vis South Africa were focused on the demarcation of overlapping competences and exclusive domains of these two branches of the Commission. Again, South Africa was used as the experimental subject, but the policy implications are more pervasive. While the reorganization of the Santer Com- 6 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995

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mission has done much to resolve this intra-Commission competition over South Africa (DG WII having now been assigned principal competence), at a general level it remains too early to say whether DG IA will become the dominant influence in the Commission’s exercise of foreign policy. However, future assessments of the EU’s international actor character need to reflect these internal dynamics.

M. Hill Revisited

To conclude this analysis, the framework suggested by Hill is revisited: the approach enhances the understanding of the joint action on South Africa. Perhaps unusually for the EU and in contrast to the experience of the 1980s, the case offers evidence that expectations and capabilities can coincide, as well as evidence of the immature and precarious level of institutionalization in the EU’s CFSP process. Of the six functions listed in Table 1 that Hill theorizes that the EU can play in the future, four can be applied to some degree in the South African case. As this case study has demonstrated, through its multi-faceted policy the EU acted directly as a global intervenor particularly in relation to the democra- tization process; it assisted in the mediation of internal conflict; provided a bridge and dialogue between the rich first and poor third world: and emerged as a joint supervisor of the world economy and set the parameters for South Africa’s reincorporation into global trading relations (Hill, 1993, pp. 313-14). Hill raises two fundamental objections to the success of a common European foreign policy: first, that ‘a coherent system and full actomess are still far from realization; and second, a refusal to acknowledge this and recognize an inability ‘to take decisions and to hold to them’ (Hill, 1993, p. 318). Again, the joint action on South Africa provides countervailing evidence, though not conclusive refutation, for these reservations.

For Hill capability ‘means cohesiveness, resources and operational capacity’ (p. 321). Despite the policy debates within and between the EU’s institutional structures, cohesiveness was maintained within the designated South African policy, a not inconsiderable feat given the mixed intergovernmental and cornmu- nautuire nature of competences involved in the combined joint action. Sufficient resources in terms of personnel and funding were provided, albeit after a fractious debate concerning the appropriate level and source of joint action funding. The operational capacity of the separate elements of the joint action were all adequate, although the untried innovation of election observation was not without implementational difficulties (Holland, 1994b, pp. 30-3).

While accepting Hill’s concern that there is a real danger in the degree and number of expectations being placed on the EU, the South African experience showed that Europe, when motivated and in common agreement, possessed the 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995

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resources and instruments to match current expectations with capabilities. However, the lack of a clear decision-making focus and limited parliamentary involvement were also highlighted as potential impediments to satisfying expectations. Consequently, Hill’s criteria for a ‘European foreign policy worthy of the name’ - an executive ‘capable of taking clear decisions on high policy matters ... commanding instruments and resources’ that have ‘a sophis- ticated bureaucracy at their disposal’ and enjoys ‘democratic legitimacy’ - remain too demanding @. 316).

Consequently, the EU’s claim to full ‘actorness’ remains tentative even among those loyal to the communuutuire spirit. Reducing expectations to the level of the possible remains as valid for EU-South African relations as it does as a general rubric as suggested by Hill. The dilemma is that success breeds expectations: if it is accepted (as argued here) that the South African joint action was broadly a policy success, as such it may well encourage greater expectations that the EU is either unable, or unwilling, to replicate regionally or globally in the future. The cohesiveness and comprehensive nature of the South African joint action may prove to have been an aberration, an exception that proves the rule.

Theoretically, the EU has a choice between expanding its capabilities or lowering external expectations: the latter alternative is not something over which the EU has exclusive control. The post-1989 international vacuum has demanded a growing EU international role and while it may be unhelpful to see the EU as a ‘panacea, a cross between Father Christmas and the Seventh Cavalry’ (Hill, 1993, p. 322), extending capabilities is both possible, andarguably, unavoidable.

Additionally, third country perceptions also impact on the actor capabilities of the EU. From a South African perspective, the post-Maastricht realities have added complexity to an already existing multi-layered process. Direct South African bilateral government-to-government relations with individual Member States have to be pursued; relations with the collective authority of the EU Council of Ministers have to be conducted; a constant dialogue with the Commission (with at least three different Directorates General I, LA and VIII) maintained; and for both political and practical reasons links with the European Parliament require attention - all third country agreements are conditional on Parliament’s approvaI. The shared right of initiative given to the Commission in the CFSP process and the mixed political and economic competences that characterized the joint action on South Africa, produced a complex policy- making style and one where conflict as well as consistency between the various actors is possible. All third countries face the difficult task of determining the most balanced and effective strategy for influencing relations with the EU. To that extent Maastricht failed to identify a single focus for EU foreign policy-

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making and exacerbated the fragmented nature of the EU’s external relations. All third country relations with the EU will certainly need to be sensitive to these multi-faceted considerations if mutually beneficial policy developments are to be achieved.

Hill is categorical in his assessment that pre-Maastricht European foreign policy is best viewed in terms of parallel systems of international relations - that is, the national bilateral policies; EPC (and latterly CFSP) action; and the external relations of the EC. According to Hill,

[I]t cannot be emphasized sufficiently that there is no evidence to suggest an inexorable (let alone imminent) fusion of the three strands into a single European foreign policy along the lines of a nation-state. Statements to the contrary are usually exercises in wish-fulfilment. @. 322)

Has the introduction of CFSP joint action tempered this conclusion? The breadth of the South African joint action suggested a tentative merging of these strands, most clearly between CFSP action and EC external relations (viz., the bilateral trade and development policies), but also with respect to national foreign policies (uiz., the collective approach to election monitoring that replaced all other forms of bilateral involvement from Member States). While trying to avoid ‘wish- fulfilment’, the joint action does provide contestable countervailing empirical evidence. However, the joint action also confirms Hill’s comment that three types of decision-making are involved (with a particular emphasis on the bureaucratic branch of external relations). A comprehensive European global presence has yet to appear during the first two years of the CFSP, but the experience of joint action has established a dialogue between the political and economic branches of Europe’s external affairs and intensified the debate concerning the rationalization of decision-making. As such, the CFSP has already begun to set the agenda for its next reform.

To conclude, this case study presents a less pessimistic (but not wholly contradictory) capabilities-expectations scenario. Hill advocates two minimum measures to bring expectations in line with capability: ‘a clear pulling in of horns’, eschewing short-term involvement for long-term influence; and, recog- nition of the ‘complex interdependence’ and/or variable geometry in foreign policy @. 326). The joint action in South Africa suggests that such short-long- term dichotomies are in essence fallacious and that if policy is realistically constructed, the EU can be a more effective actor on immediate issues than, say, the UN. While the complexity of EU relations is undeniable, the joint action has indicated that because of such cross-cutting pressures a dominant focus may emerge centred around the increasing role and authority delegated to the Commission. Heightened complexity paradoxically anticipates increased deci- sion-making and implementation simplicity. If not comprehensively bridged,

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the South African joint action has at a minimum forded the capabilities- expectations gap and suggested ways in which the dissonance can be minimized and, with creativity, possibly overcome during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

References

Allen, D. and Byme, P. (1985) ‘Multilateral Decisionmaking and Implementation: The Case of the European Community’. In Smith, S. and Clarke, M. Foreign Policy Implementation (London: Allen & Unwin).

Development Co-operation Council (1993) Future Development Co-operation with South Africa - Council Declaration (Brussels: EC), 25 May.

European Union Council (1993) Councii Decision on a joint action adopted by the Council on the bask ofArticle J.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the support for the transition towarcjs a democratic and multiracial South Afiica No. 10503/93 (Brussels: EU), 7 December.

General Affairs Council (1994) Press Communiqud on South Africa (Brussels: EC),19 ApriI.

Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s Inter- national Role’. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 305-28.

Holland, M. (1988) ‘The European Community and South Afiica: In Search for a Policy for the 1990s’. InternationalAffairs, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 415-30.

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Holland, M. (1994a) European Integration: from Community to Union (London: Pinter).

Holland, M. (1994b) ‘Plus sa change ... ? The European Union Joint Action and South Africa’. Centre for European Policy Studies, No. 57 (Brussels: CEPS).

Holland, M. (1995) European Union Foreign Po1icy:fiom EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa pasingstoke: Macmillan).

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