brennan, jason - scepticism about philosophy (ratio)

8/12/2019 Brennan, Jason - SCepticism About Philosophy (Ratio)

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SCEPTICISM ABOUT PHILOSOPHY

Jason Brennan

Abstract

Suppose a person who is agnostic about most phiosophica issues wishes to ha!e

true phiosophica beie"s but e#ua$ wishes to a!oi% "ase phiosophica beie"s&

I argue that this truth'see(ing) error'a!oi%ing agnostic wou% not ha!e goo%

groun%s "or pursuing phiosoph$& *i%esprea% %isagreement shows that pursuing

phiosoph$ is not a reiabe metho% o" %isco!ering true answers to phiosophica

#uestions& More i(e$ than not) pursuing phiosoph$ ea%s to "ase beie"& Man$

attempts to rebut this sceptica argument "ai&

1. Insider and Outsider Scepticism about Philosophy

Phiosophers %isagree immense$ in signi"icant wa$s& Our best phiosophers %isagree

o!er the %octrines) metho%s) an% e!en the aims o" phiosoph$& E+perts in a "ie%s

%isagree) but %isagreement is more per!asi!e in phiosoph$ than in most other "ie%s& As

Thomas ,e$ sa$s) -Phiosoph$ is notabe "or the e+tent to which %isagreements with

respect to e!en those most basic #uestions persist among its most abe practitioners)%espite the "act that the arguments thought ree!ant to the %ispute% #uestions are t$pica$

we'(nown to a parties to the %ispute&./

A sceptic might caim that ra%ica %issensus shows that pursuing phiosoph$ is not

a goo% means "or %isco!ering true answers "or phiosophica #uestions& 0issensus shows

that phiosophica metho%s are unreiabe instruments o" truth& Suppose an uncommitte%

person comes to phiosoph$ hoping to get true answers to her phiosophica #uestions&

She wants to (now what that nature o" causation is) what 1usti"ication is) what rightness

consists in) what 1ustice is) an% so on& She notices that phiosophers ha!e e+tensi!e

%isagreement about the answers to these #uestions an% thus concu%es that the probabiit$

o" her getting the true answer b$ pursuing phiosoph$ is ow& So) she becomes a sceptic

/Thomas ,e$) -The Epistemic Signi"icance o" 0isagreement.) in 2ohn Hawthorne an% Tamar 3en%er)

e%s&) Oxford Studies in Epistemology4O+"or%5 O+"or% Uni!ersit$ Press) 67789) p& /:;&

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about the "ie% o" phiosoph$ an% wa(s awa$ with her #uestions unanswere%& Is she

ma(ing a mista(etrue answers to phiosophica #uestions& It is not necessar$ to go into

much %epth with these %e"ences) because it can be shown rather #uic($ that the$ are not

the right t$pe o" %e"ence&

FGuestions that were once thought to be phiosophica ha!e a ten%enc$ to become #uestions "or the socia

or natura sciences& The bor%er between phiosophica an% nonphiosophica #uestions is "u$& Howe!er)

without sa$ing how to ma(e the %istinction) I wi assume there is something i(e a core o" #uestions that

we reasonab$ can e+pect to remain part o" phiosoph$&

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?eca that the agnostic about phiosophica issues is consi%ering pursuing

phiosoph$ with the goa o" getting true answers to phiosophica #uestions& This outsi%er

sees the %egree o" %issensus an% thin(s to herse") -At most one o" these theories "or an$

gi!en issues is correct& It.s possibe that i" I stu%$ phiosoph$) I wi pro%uce a new

theor$ that competes with these others& Each o" these phiosophers thin(s her own theor$

is more i(e$ to be true than her competitors. theories& I reaie that i" I stu%$

phiosoph$) I wi come to thin( that wa$ about whate!er theories I come to accept as

we& Howe!er) "rom m$ stan%point now) I ha!e to regar% each o" the competing theories

as something i(e e#ua$ i(e$ to be true) or perhaps i(e$ to be true in proportion to

how man$ goo% phiosophers accept the theor$& It.s possibe none o" them are true& I"

so) then much more i(e$ than not) I wi en% up accepting a "ase theor$& So) I shou%

remain an outsi%er an% an agnostic&. The genera probem with the %e"ences iste% beow

is that e!en i" the$ gi!e this outsi%er goo% reasons to stu%$ phiosoph$ an% to accept

%octrines rather than be agnostic) these %e"ences %o not gi!e the right (in% o" reason& I&e&)

the$ %o not gi!eproper epistemic defences o" phiosoph$& Some o" the other %e"ences

"ai because the$ rest on ba% arguments) e!en i" are attempts at proper epistemic

%e"ences&

A& The Argument Undermines Itself& There is a "acie %e"ence5 The Argument against

Phiosoph$ un%ermines itse"& The genera position that phiosoph$ is irrationa "ais to

pass se"'inspection& -Phiosoph$ is irrationa. is a phiosophica position& I" phiosoph$

is irrationa) so is the !iew that phiosoph$ is irrationa& I" phiosophica argumentation

ne!er estabishes an$ position) then the anti'phiosoph$ position cannot be 1usti"ie% b$

phiosophica argumentation& The Argument against Phiosoph$ re"utes the Argument

against Phiosoph$& E!en i" this %e"ence wor(s) it is embarrassing i" this is the best

%e"ence phiosoph$ has& Yet) it is not ob!ious that the %e"ence succee%s& It ma$ 1ust be

that a phiosoph$ is unreiabe e+cept anti'phiosoph$ phiosoph$&

The outsi%er sceptic.s position is that phiosophica metho%oog$ is uni(e$ to

bring her to the truth about phiosophica #uestions& One might argue that the sceptic

use% phiosophica reasoning to arri!e at this concusion) an% so the sceptic cannot

consistent$ be a sceptic& Howe!er) it ma$ 1ust be that a sma set o" phiosophica issues

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is answere% an% that phiosophica metho%oog$ wor(s reiab$ on a sma set o" issues)

i&e&) 1ust in the areas nee%e% to ma(e the sceptic.s argument& =or instance) perhaps the

sceptic nee%s probabiit$) an account o" the notion o" an epistemic peer) some notion o"

reiabiit$) an% not much ese&

B& isunity of Science! One cou% argue that science is ess uni"ie% than common$

thought& Thomas ,uhn caims that the appearance o" unit$ is arge$ a m$th propagate%

b$ ahistorica science te+tboo(s&It ma$ aso be that phiosoph$ on$ appears to ha!e

more %isagreement to us phiosophers because we are most "amiiar with phiosoph$& I"

we were better in"orme%) we wou% reaie that there is 1ust as e+tensi!e %isagreement in

bioog$ an% ph$sics o!er "un%amenta issues as there is in phiosoph$& This approach

ma$ %e"ate science) ma(ing phiosoph$ seem ess in"erior in comparison) but it %oes not

show us that phiosoph$ is truth'trac(ing& Our truth'see(ing outsi%er is not impresse%&

Aso) %e"ating science aso impro!es the comparati!e position o" astroog$) phrenoog$)

an% creationism&

C& "ists of Accomplishments& Another t$pe o" %e"ence is that o""ere% b$ *ibur Urban)

"ormer presi%ent o" the American Phiosophica Association& In /K6) Urban attempte%

to !ai%ate the rationait$ an% progressi!eness o" phiosoph$ b$ isting its recent

accompishments&8 Urban.s ist oo(s strange& Much o" it is har% to un%erstan%) so it is

uncear whether the caims o" progress are worth much& The cearer items are

probematic& =or one) he caims that phiosoph$ has ma%e progress because there is no

mo!ement bac( towar% ,ant& Howe!er) eight$ $ears ater) we see numerous %e"en%ers o"

"orms o" transcen%enta i%eaism) ,antian constructi!ism) an% the i(e& He aso caims

that phiosophers ha!e shown that !aue cannot be re%uce% to something ese an% that

e!oution cannot "u$ e+pain !aues& Howe!er) eight$ $ears o" neo'naturaist metaethics

an% sociobioog$ shows that this caim is not ob!ious$ true& Though I agree with Urban)

I ha!e man$ epistemic peers who %isagree& Thir%) he cites the growth o" ogic as a

T& S& ,uhn) The Structure of Scientific #e$olutions 4Chicago5 Uni!ersit$ o" Chicago Press) /KK89) pp&

/;8'/;J&

8*ibur M& Urban) -Progress in Phiosoph$ in the Last Guarter Centur$.) The Philosophical #e$ie%;56

4/K689) pp& K;'/6;&

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"orma %iscipine& This is one o" phiosoph$.s ma1or accompishments) but it is not cear

that this heps& =orma ogic ma$ ha!e ess %isagreement than other "ie%s) but it is aso

the pace where phiosoph$ comes cosest to being mathematics&

An$ ist wi be contentious& Probab$) i" I were to ma(e a ist o" phiosoph$.s

recent accompishments) it wou% seem esoteric) strange) irree!ant) wrong) an%or si$ to

phiosophers eight$ $ears "rom now&

The outsi%er remains unimpresse%& She can oo( at such ists an% as() %o we $et

(now what right action is) what 1usti"ication is) what (nowe%ge is) what 1ustice is) an% so

on< There remains e+tensi!e %isagreement o!er these "un%amenta issues) an% she

remains worrie% that phiosoph$ is uni(e$ to %ei!er her the truth&

0& Progress as estruction!& Some phiosophers %e"en% phiosoph$ b$ sa$ing that our

wor( at east shows what theories are "ase& =or instance) 3ettier %emoishe% the 1usti"ie%

true beie" ana$sis o" (nowe%ge& Guine) Putnam) an% others era%icate% ogica

positi!ism& 3%e showe% us thatPrincipia 'athematica%i% not a+iomatise arithmetic&

I" this is progress towar% truth) it must be progress b$ eimination&

?e"uting ina%e#uate past theories cears the path "or goo% answers) but %oes not

thereb$ gi!e us goo% answers& 4E!en negati!e -progress. ten%s to be re!erse%) as once

%ea% %octrines) such as ?ossD mora theor$) are resurrecte%) abeit in better "orms&J9

O"ten) there are potentia$ in"inite numbers o" possibe theories in an$ sub'"ie%& So)

e!en i" o!er the past 677 $ears o" phiosoph$) we ha!e manage% to show that a "ew

thousan% theories are ina%e#uate) that %oes not show us we are an$ coser to the truth&

On the other han%) suppose there are a "inite number o" theories& I" so) permanent$

re"uting a theor$ increases the probabiit$ one wi accept the correct theor$& In this case)

the agnostic might ha!e reason to pursue phiosoph$) but on$ i" enough theories ha%

been or cou% re"ute% that she were more i(e$ than not going to accept the true one& But

this is not the case&

A%%itiona$) this %e"ence %oes not e+pain phiosophers. actua beha!iour&

:This phrase comes "rom Toni Noge Care$) -Is Phiosoph$ Progressi!e.)Philosophy (o%K 4677:9)

accesse% onine 4;/7:9 at http5www&phiosoph$now&orgissueKKcare$&htm

JE&g&) ?obert Au%i) The )ood in the #ight) 4Princeton5 Princeton Uni!ersit$ Press) 677F9&

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Suppose phiosoph$ is progressi!e because it can show) at east) which theories are "ase)

an% the point is to arri!e at the truth though eimination& This wou% 1usti"$ constructing)

%ebating) e+amining) an% attac(ing theories) but not acceptinga theor$& It wou% not gi!e

the agnostic reason to beie!e an$thing&

E& *onsensus Just Around the *orner! One cou% conce%e that current %issensus shows

that phiosophica metho%s are ine""ecti!e) but then assert that phiosoph$ cou% become

e""ecti!e in the "uture& Phiosophers use the wrong metho%s& *e nee% to continue

wor(ing unti we %isco!er the right metho%s& Then agreement wi "oow& In%ee%) we

cou% e!en ta(e agreement as a sign that we ha!e %isco!ere% the right metho%s&

The natura sciences began ma(ing progress when a change in metho%s was

a%opte%& Scientists %roppe% the Aristoteian para%igm i&e&) the$ began %oing e+tensi!e

-arti"icia. e+periments rather than 1ust ma(ing obser!ations& Aso) the$ accepte%

mathematics as a too "or mo%eing nature& Cou% there be simiar metho%oogica

re!outions "or phiosoph$I certain$ wou% i(e to ha!e that>but it is

a poor substitute "or bona "i%e truth& The truth'see(ing) error'a!oi%ing agnostic is not

intereste% in this substitute&

She might be impresse% to earn 4%epen%ing on what the stan%ar%s are "or rationa

%isagreement9 that man$ or perhaps a phiosophers are 1usti"ie% in their beie"s& *ith

some goo% "ortune) we might %isco!er that allactua phiosophica %isagreements among

members o" the APA are reasonabe ones) an% so no phiosopher must %o an$ beie"

re!ision or become a sceptic& Howe!er) this sti %oes not gi!e the truth'see(ing) error'

a!oi%ing agnostic reason to become a beie!er& She wants a greater than not chance o"

getting true beie"s about most phiosophica issues& E!en a /77 chance o" getting a

1ustified belief that one has the truth about philosophical issues or 4more simp$9 a /77

chance o" getting1ustified beliefsabout philosophical issueswi not moti!ate her)

because there are not the same things as a true beie"s about most phiosophica issues&

The$ are poor surrogates&

?escher.s %e"ence o" phiosoph$ is particuar$ cear in how it "ais to satis"$ this

sort o" agnostic& 4This is not to sa$ his %e"ence is ba%) but 1ust that it is not what I cae%

a proper epistemic %e"ence&9 ?escher ho%s that it can instrumenta$ rationa to accept a

theor$ base% on one.s cogniti!e !aues& There is a purait$ o" reasonabe stances on the

weights o" these cogniti!e !aues& So) "or ?escher) rationa %isagreement rests precise$

on these cogniti!e !aues rather than on truth& But our agnostic is not intereste% in these

cogniti!e uness the$ reiab$ get her to the truth& Apparent$) the$ %o not) because e+

h$pothesi the pursuit o" theories b$ %i""erent peope with %i""erent cogniti!e !aues or

weights "or these !aues resuts in %issensus&

The agnostic as(s us i" we can get her the truth& In ight o" %issensus) apparent$

we ha!e to sa$ no& A we can o""er is 1usti"ie% beie"&

Bro%n Uni$ersity

Box 2334

Pro$idence5 #I 32672

Jason8Brennan9bro%n!edu

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brennan, jason - scepticism about philosophy (ratio)

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