brave new nuclear world - princeton universityaglaser/talk2006_chicago.pdf · 2006-11-17 ·...
TRANSCRIPT
Brave New Nuclear World
Alexander GlaserProgram on Science and Global Security
Princeton University
The Future of Nuclear Energy Conference, The Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsNovember 1-2, 2006, Chicago, Illinois, USA
November 2, 2006
The Expansion of Nuclear Power and itsRelevance for the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Revision 7, web
1
“
J. Robert Oppenheimer(on the prospects of a nuclear weapons convention)
in the Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsVol. 1, No. 12, June 1946
We would not make atomic weapons, at least not to start with, but we would start out and build enormous plants, and we would call them power plants—maybe they would produce power; and these plants we would design in such a way that they could be converted with the maximum ease and the minimum time delay to the production of atomic weapons, and we would say, this is just in case somebody two-times us; and we would stock-pile uranium, we would keep as many of our developments [as] secret as possible, we would locate our plants, not where they would do the most good for the production of power, but where they would do the most good for protection against enemy attack.”
2
Capacity Buildup
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
2010-2050-2100
“Expansion begins”
Target 1
Target 2
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
Year
Inst
alle
d nu
clea
r cap
acity
[GW
e]
Slower growth scenario
4
Capacity Buildup
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
2010-2050-2100
“Expansion begins”
Target 1
Target 2
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
Year
Inst
alle
d nu
clea
r cap
acity
[GW
e]
Faster growth scenario
5
Capacity Buildup
0
20
40
60
80
100
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
2010-2050-2100
Annu
al n
ucle
ar c
apac
ity a
dded
[GW
e/yr
]Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
Year
(incl
udes
new
con
stru
ctio
n an
d re
plac
emen
t)
“Expansion begins”
• A nuclear expansion would have to be extremely aggressive (both in scale and speed) in order to make a significant contribution to climate-change-mitigation efforts by 2050
• Hypothetically, 4500 GWe by 2100 would be “easier” to achieve than 1500 GWe by 2050 because the infrastructure (to build reactors) would already be in place
6
Global Nuclear Expansion Scenario(1500 GWe in 58 countries, based on 2003 MIT study)
More than 10 GWe installed
At least 1 GWe installed
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
7
Enrichment Demand and Distribution(for 1500 GWe Global Nuclear Expansion Scenario)
Global enrichment capacity: 1,500 x 150 tSWU/yr (225,000 tSWU/yr)
12,750
4,800
2,250
5,100
27,750
24,450
5,400
2,8503,150
2,850
36,600
20,850
37,200
11,050
10,300
17,650
tSWU/yr Total SWU-production in country
Combined SWU-demand of countries importing alltheir enrichment services: 11,850 tSWU/yr
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
8
Centrifuges for Uranium Enrichment
Depleted uranium
Enriched uranium
rotor
bottom bearing
bottom scoop
baffle
top scoop
electromagnetic motor
casing
tails
feed
product
center post
Source: IPFM 2006 Report
Source: Presentation by Mohammad Saeidi (AEOI)
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
10
Centrifuges in the Past
Centrifuge technology for uranium enrichmenthas been around for more than 50 years
Until recently, export controls were considered “sufficient”by those who held the technology
Proliferation occurred when export controls were violated
Technology considered “too complex” to be a proliferation threat
Focus was on the back-end of the fuel cycle(discouraging reprocessing / separation of plutonium)
R&D classified since 1960 in those countries that were already exploring the technology
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
12
Crude Breakout Scenario(using an early-generation machine)
Stage number
Num
ber o
f mac
hine
s in
sta
ge
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2160
40
20
0
20
40
60
21 40 56 71 84 96 106 91 79 67 57 48 40 34 27 22 17 13 9 6 3
Total number of machines in cascade: 987
Assumed characteristics of P-2-type machine
peripheral velocity =rotor diameter =
rotor height =separative power =
48515
1005
m/scmcmSWU/yr
Source: Urenco
of UF6 w/ natural uraniumof UF6 w/ 4.4%-enriched uranium
Feed =Product =
32.4 kg/d3.3 kg/d
Performance of reference LEU-cascade
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
14
Crude Breakout Scenario(using an early-generation machine)
(compare to equilibrium time for gaseous diffusion process, which is on the order of months)
Time [hours]
Enric
hmen
t [w
t%]
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 120
20
40
60
80
100
Simple batch operation:1 cascade usingpre-enriched feed-stock
Serial batch operation:10 cascades feedinto 1 additional cascade
26%
86%
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
15
Crude Breakout Scenario(using an early-generation machine)
Production of 25 kg HEU in less than 12 days(contained in 37 kg of UF6 and requiring 3900 kg of UF6 LEU feed-stock)
Batch operation in series11 cascades (10 cascades feeding into 1 additional cascade)
about 11 000 machines or 55 000 SWU/yr
Collection of LEU feed-stock over a period of less than 4 months (110 days)
PREPARATION FOR BREAKOUT
Note: up to 2500 kg of enriched UF6 can bestored in one standard product cylinder (Type 30B)
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
16
Clandestine Options
Reactor
Reprocessing
Yes Yes No
No No (Yes)
Detectability (Selected Criteria)
IdentifiableStructure
ThermalSignature Effluents
Calutron/EMIS
Gaseous diffusion
No Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
PlutoniumProduction
Centrifuge No No No
UraniumEnrichment
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
(Undeclared centrifuge facilities are virtually impossible to detect)
17
• Increase the effectiveness of (and the confidence in) safeguards
• Increase the ability to detect undeclared facilities
• Contain technology to existing or selected producers
• Focus on the demand side (i.e. “devalue” nuclear weapons)
Possible Strategies to Limit the Front-End Proliferation Risks of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Preclude covert misuse
Motivation
Deter clandestine activities
TARGET/OBJECTIVESTRATEGY
Know-how held by “trusted users”
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
19
Containment Strategies
Black Box approaches with or without “Poison Pills” and combined with multinational operation of facilities
Have and have-not approachesBush Proposal (2004) or other “criteria-based” proposals
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
Export ControlsDeter, delay, detect procurement efforts
20
Containment Strategies
To what extent are containment strategies durable anyway?Underlying assumption that indigenous R&D efforts are irrelevant/insufficient
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
(cont’d)
PROBLEMS
Strategies do not effectively address the unique proliferation concerns of centrifuge technology(breakout and clandestine option)
Since the idea of further restrictions on nuclear fuel cycle technologieshas been revitalized in 2004 (e.g. supplier-/client-state arrangements), several countries
have expressed renewed interest in domestic enrichment
In addition to Iran and Brazil, these are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan,South Africa and the Ukraine
Economic incentives to forego domestic enrichment (e.g. assurances of supply) are largely irrelevant
Even if a country is willing to pay five times the market-price for enrichment services in order to havea domestic uranium enrichment capability, this would only raise the overall cost of electricity by about 10%
21
Genealogy of the Gas Centrifuge
Brazil
Japan
India
Australia
Original centrifuge R&D (pre-commercial, “Zippe-connection”)
Technology transfer (confirmed or planned)
Independent development or unconfirmed foreign assistance
Status or achievement unclearLast revision: 09/2006
USA
Russia
Germany
U.K.
The Netherlands
(Libya)
N. Korea
Pakistan
(Iraq)
Iran
Urenco
ChinaFrance
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
22
Timeline of Centrifuge Programs
(arrows indicate uncertain dates of respective events or milestones)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Japan
India
U.K.
Netherlands
Iran
Germany R&D as part of URENCO/ETC
Pakistan
Australia
Brazil
R&D as part of URENCO/ETC
R&D as part of URENCO/ETC
R&D
Machineat least 2-5 SWU/yr
Test cascadeat least 100 machines
Pilot plantand further developments
DRAFT version, August 2006 - by Alexander Glaser, Princeton University
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
23
Timeline of Centrifuge Programs
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
How long does it take to develop centrifuge technology?
Length of required R&D-period has not significantly changed over the past decades(It takes about 15-20 years to go through all phases of the R&D-process)
Even important outside assistance does not shorten the R&D-period excessively(possibly up to 50%, e.g. the case of Pakistan)
Will more countries be able to successfully develop centrifuge technology?
Timeline suggests that countries may begin to pursue a centrifuge program sooner orlater, depending on when they feel sufficiently confident to be able to carry out such an R&D project
Key technologies that were previously used specificallyfor centrifuge-component manufacturing are expanding into additional sectors of modern
industry and/or require less experience or expertise to be operated
(Examples are rotor balancing and flowforming techniques)
(cont’d)
24
• Increase the effectiveness of (and the confidence in) safeguards
• Increase the ability to detect undeclared facilities
• Contain technology to existing or selected producers
• Focus on the demand side (i.e. “devalue” nuclear weapons)
Possible Strategies to Limit the Front-End Proliferation Risks of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Preclude covert misuse
Motivation
Deter clandestine activities
TARGET/OBJECTIVESTRATEGY
Know-how held by “trusted users”
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
25
Viability of a Nuclear ExpansionConclusion and Outlook
If the incentives to acquire national enrichment capabilities,for either peaceful or military purposes, continue to exist, we can indeed expect successful
independent development and deployment of centrifuge technology in more states
Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006
Despite current efforts to set-up a system of assurances of supply, incentives to acquirenational enrichment capabilities remain high
The only effective approach to reduce these incentives is to increase the countries sense of security
Progress in nuclear disarmament has to be a central element of such an agenda
To consider a global expansion of nuclear energy before one reestablishes confidence inthe future of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime is an imprudent proposition
26