bourbon dolphin (capsizing)

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Official Norwegian Reports 2008: 8

The Loss of the Bourbon

Dolphin on 12 April 2007

NOU


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Norges offentlige utredninger

2008Seriens redaksjon:

Departementenes servicesenter

Informasjonsforvaltning

1. Kvinner og homofile i trossamfunn. Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet.

2. Fordeling av inntekter mellom regionalehelseforetak.

Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet.

3. Sett under ett. Kunnskapsdepartementet.

4. Fra ord til handling.Justis- og politidepartementet.

5. Retten til fiske i havet utenfor Finnmark.Fiskeri- og kystdepartementet.

6. Kjnn og lnn.Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet.

7. Kulturmomsutvalget.Finansdepartementet.

8. Bourbon Dolphins forlis den 12. april 2007.Justis- og politidepartementet.

Cover photo: Tony Hall.


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NOU Official Norwegian Reports 2008: 8The Loss of the Bourbon

Dolphinon 12 April 2007Report from a Commission appointed by Royal Decree of 27 April 2007.Submitted to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police on 28 March 2008.

Translation from Norwegian. For information only.

Government Administration ServicesInformation Management

Oslo 2008


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ISSN 0333-2306ISBN 978-82-583-0965-6

07 Gruppen AS, Oslo


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Abbreviations of the Regulations

BuildingRegulations,theCertificationAct,the

COLREG

ISMCode,the

ISMRegulations(forcargoships),theISPSCode,the

LoadLinesConvention,theLSACode,theManningRegulations,theMaritimeSafetyAct,theMARPOL73/78

NavigationRegulations,theNWEAguidelines

POSMOOR

QualificationRegulations,theRadioRegulations,theRescueRegulations,theSeaworthinessAct,the

SOLASConvention,theSTCWConvention,the

WorkandRestTimeAct,theWorkingEnvironment

Regulations,the

Abbreviations

RegulationsNo.695of15September1992ActNo.42of5June1981onPostsrequiringCertificationonNorwegianShipsTheConventiononInternationalRegulationsforPreventingCollisionsatSea,1972TheInternationalManagementCodefortheSafeOperationofShipsandPollutionPrevention,adoptedbytheIMOin1993

RegulationsNo,822of6August1996InternationalCodefortheSecurityofShipsandofPortFacilities,2002

TheLoadLinesConvention,1966Life-SavingApplianceCode1996RegulationsNo.175of17March1987ActNo.9of16February2007onMaritimeSafetyTheInternationalConventionforthePreventionofPollutionfromShips,1973/78RegulationsNo.701of15September1992GuidelinesforthesafemanagementofoffshoresupplyandanchorhandlingoperationsNWEA(NorthWestEuropeanArea)DNV-OS-301PositionMooring.October2004

RegulationsNo.687of9May2003RegulationsNo.1855of17December2004RegulationsNo.1856of17December2004ActNo.7of9June1903onStateControloftheSeaworthinessofShipsetc.ConventiononSafetyofLifeAtSea,adoptedbytheIMOin1974TheInternationalConventiononStandardsofTraining,CertificationandWatch-keepingforSeafarers,adoptedbytheIMOin1978ActNo.50of3June1977onWorkingHoursandRestTimeonShips

RegulationsNo.8of1January2005


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NOU 2 8: 8The loss of the Bourbon Dolphin on 12 April 2 7

Other abbreviations

ACOPAHTSAHT

AHVBPDNVDPDTIGMGZcurveHAZIDHAZOPH&SE

IMOKGlimitcurve

LRNISNORNWEAMOB-boatMODUOIMOLFPCPPSVQAQCRMPROVSMSSOSREP

SWL

TCG

UKOOAUTCVCG

ApprovedCodeofPracticeAnchorHandling,TugandSupplyAnchorHandlingandTug

AnchorHandlingVesselBollardPullDetnorskeVeritas(Norwegianclassificationsociety)DynamicPositioningDepartmentofTradeandIndustry(nowDBERR)ThedistancefromthevesselscentreofgravitytothemetacentreCurveforcorrectingarmasfunctionofheelingmomentHazardousIdentificationHazardousOperabilityHealthandSafetyExecutive

InternationalMaritimeOrganizationMaximumdistancebetweenkeel(baseline)andcentreofgravitytomeetstabilityrequirementsLloydsRegisterNorwegianInternationalShipRegisterNorwegianOrdinaryShipRegisterNorthWestEuropeanAreaManOverboardBoatMobileOffshoreDrillingUnitOffshoreInstallationManagerNorwegianOilIndustryAssociationPermanentChaserPennantPlatformSupplyVesselQualityAssuranceQualityControlRigMoveProcedureRemoteOperatedVehicleSafetyManagementSystemSecretaryofStateRepresentativeforMarineSalvageandInterventionSafeWorkingLoad

TransverseCentreofGravity(transversedistancefromcentrelinetocentreofgravity)UnitedKingdomOffshoreOperatorsAssociationUniversalTimeCentre(GMT)VerticalCentreofGravity(verticaldistancefromcentrelinetocentreofgravity)


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To the Ministry of Justice and the Police

TheCommissionofInquir yintothelossoftheBourbonDolphinon12April2007was appointedat ameetingof theKing-in-Councilon27April2007,ontheauthorityofSection485oftheMaritimeAct.

TheCommissionof Inquiryherebysubmits its report.Thereport isunanimousonallpoints.

Keysupportingdocumentsarepublishedastwoseparateannexes.

Oslo,28March2008

IngerLyngChair

DagAndreassen GisleArnoldHansenFiksdal

GuroHyaasLken YngveSkovly

TerjeHernesPettersen


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6 NOU 2 2: ?Eierbegrensning og eierkontroll i finansinstitusjoner


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Contents

1 Summary..............................................13 3.6.2 Generalrequirementsforsafety1.1 TheAccident.........................................13 andhealth..............................................31

1.2 Thestructureofthereport..................14 3.7 Guidelinesforthesafe1.3 Keyconclusions...................................14 managementofoffshoresupplyandanchor-handlingoperations

2 TheCommissionofInquiry intheNWEA.........................................33anditswork........................................17 3.7.1 General..................................................33

2.1 Introduction..........................................17 3.7.2 Riskassessments .................................332.2 Moreonthemembersofthe 3.8 Operationalstandardsfor

CommissionofInquiry........................17 performanceofmarineoperations......342.3 TheCommissionofInquirys 3.9 Requirementsforthemooring

competenceandtermsofreference ...18 systemoftheTransoceanRather.....342.4 TheworkoftheCommission

ofInquiry...............................................19 4 Thecompany .......................................36

2.5 Collectionoftheevidence...................19 4.1 Organisation..........................................362.6 Methodologyandtheuseofexpert 4.2 Crewsduringtheoperation.................36

witnesses...............................................20 4.3 Thecompanyssafetymanagement2.7 Thestabilitymeetingandstability system ...................................................37

calculations............................................20 4.4 Provisionalcertification2.8 Qualityassuranceandtherighttobe of3October2006..................................39

heard......................................................21 4.5 Internalauditof9March2007.............394.6 DNVsauditof17March2007.............39

3 Regulatoryrequirementsfor 4.7 Evaluation..............................................41anchor-handlingvesselsand 4.7.1 Familiarisation/overlap ........................41anchor-handlingoperations............22 4.7.2 Identificationoftrainingneeds ............41

3.1 Introduction..........................................22 4.7.3 Anchor-handlingprocedure ................. 423.1.1 Theinternationalmaritimesafety 4.7.4 Otheraspectsofthesafetyregulations.............................................22 managementsystem............................42

3.1.2 Norwegianmaritime 4.7.5 Thecrew................................................43safetylegislation...................................23

3.2 Requirementsforthevesselsdesign 5 TheBourbonDolphin...................44

andequipment ......................................23 5.1 Introduction ..........................................443.3 Requirementsforthesafety 5.2 Contractingandconstruction..............45

managementsystem............................24 5.3 Thevesselsarrangement....................463.4 Requirementsformanning 5.4 Stability...................................................49

andqualifications..................................26 5.4.1 Thestabilitybook..................................493.5 Requirementsforcontrol, 5.4.2 Controlofstabilityonboard................50

inspectionandcertification..................27 5.4.3 Theloadcalculator................................513.5.1 TheNorwegianMaritime 5.5 Theengineandpropulsionsystem ....51

Directorateasasupervisorybody......27 5.6 Winchesandother3.5.2 Classificationsocieties anchor-handlingequipment.................52

assupervisorybodies...........................27 5.7 Rescueequipmentandrescue3.5.3 TheNorwegianMaritime arrangement .........................................55

Directoratescontrol............................28 5.8 Navigationandcommunications3.5.4 Theclassificationsocieties equipment .............................................55

ownworkoutsidethepublic 5.9 Manning................................................56regulatorysystem.................................30 5.10 OperatinghistoryfromOctober2006

3.6 BriefsummaryoftheBritish untiltheendofMarch2007 ................ 56

regulatorysystemfor 5.11 Evaluation..............................................57anchor-handlingoperations................31 5.11.1 Contractingandconstruction..............573.6.1 Introduction..........................................31 5.11.2 Thevesselsarrangement....................57


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5.11.3 Stability..................................................57 8 Executionoftherigmove................805.11.4 Winchesandother 8.1 Thebriefingmeeting ............................80

anchor-handlingequipment................58 8.2 Thecrewchange...................................805.11.5 Therescueequipment.........................58 8.3 Briefdescriptionoftheoperation

upto12April..........................................816 Theplanningoftherigmove.........60

8.3.1 Introduction ...........................................816.1 Introduction..........................................60 8.3.2 Theimplementation..............................826.2 BriefdescriptionofChevron, 8.3.3 Writtendivisionoflabourfor

TransoceanandTrident.......................60 deploymentofsecondaryanchors.......826.3 TheTransoceanRather 8.3.4 TheroleoftheBourbonDolphin

-specifications.......................................61 upto12April..........................................846.4 TheTransoceanRather 8.4 Evaluation..............................................84

- personnel............................................62 8.4.1 Thebriefingmeeting ...........................846.5 Themakingofthecontractbetween 8.4.2 Thecrewchange...................................84

ChevronandTransocean.....................646.6 Choiceofmooringsystemand 9 Theaccident ........................................85

installationmethod...............................64 9.1 Introduction ...........................................856.6.1 Provisionalmooringanalyses.............64 9.2 Anchorno.6...........................................856.6.2 Finalmooringanalyses........................64 9.3 Anchorno.2...........................................866.6.3 Choiceofinstallationmethod..............64 9.4 Themorningshift..................................876.7 Therigmoveto213/26-1z 9.5 Weather,windandcurrent

Rosebank-LocationG......................65 conditionson12April2007..................876.8 Theplanningoftherigmove 9.6 Runningofchainforanchorno.2.......88

toLocationI.......................................65 9.7 TheattemptoftheHighlandValour6.9 RigMoveProcedurefor togetholdofthechain........................89

LocationI............................................65 9.8 Thenear-missbetweentheBourbon6.9.1 Thevessels...........................................65 DolphinandtheHighlandValour...916.9.2 Recoveryofthesecondaryanchors 9.9 Theperioduptothecapsizing.............92

(nos.2,3,6and7)................................66 9.10 Forcesaffectingthevesselduring6.9.3 Recoveryofprimaryanchors theaccident............................................95(nos.1,4,5and8),towingto 9.10.1 Introduction ...........................................95LocationG.........................................67 9.10.2 Loadcondition1,ondeparture

6.9.4 Deploymentofanchors........................67 fromLerwick........................................1016.9.5 Requirementsforbollardpull ............67 9.10.3 Loadcondition2,beforethe6.9.6 Weathercriteria...................................69 towing-pinwasdepressed..................1026.9.7 Riskassessmentsandplansfor 9.10.4 Loadcondition3,afterthe

alternativesituations towing-pinwasdepressed..................103(contingencyplanning)........................69 9.10.5 Commentsonthecalculations...........106

6.10 Evaluation..............................................70 9.11 Evaluation............................................1076.10.1 Maritimemanningonthe

TransoceanRather............................70 10 Therescueoperation......................1116.10.2 Choiceofmooringsystem 10.1 Introduction .........................................111

andinstallationmethod........................70 10.2 Raisingthealarmestablishment6.10.3 Therigmoveprocedure ......................71 ofrescueleadership...........................111

10.3 Thesurvivors.......................................1127 Thevessels..........................................74 10.4 Thesearchforthemissing ...............1137.1 Thecharteringofthe 10.5 TheMainRescueCentreat

anchor-handlingvessels......................74 Sola/thelocalpoliceinNorway........1157.2 Overviewtablewithkeydata..............757.3 TheHighlandValour .......................76 11 Thesalvageattempt.........................1177.4 TheOlympicHercules.....................77 11.1 Introduction .........................................117

7.5 TheVidarViking ..............................78 11.2 LoginformationontheBourbon7.6 Evaluationofvesselinspection ........... 79 Dolphinuntilshesank ......................117


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11.3 EventsuntilthesalvagecontractwassignedonFriday13April...........118

11.4 SmitSalvage........................................11911.5 SOSREPSecretaryofState

RepresentativeforMarineSalvage

andIntervention.................................11911.6 Thesalvageplan................................11911.7 SCRSpecialCasualty

Representative....................................12011.8 Thesalvageteam(minusthe

salvagemanager)goestothesceneoftheaccident.........................120

11.9 SOSREPsdecisiontofreetheBourbonDolphinfromanchorchainno.2..............................121

11.10 ThesituationonthefieldonFriday13April...............................121

11.11 Thesalvageteamarrivesonthefield...........................................121

11.12 DevelopmentofthecasualtysconditiononSaturday14April..........122

11.13 TheBourbonDolphinisfreedfromanchorchainno.2.....................122

11.14 ThesituationoftheBourbonDolphindeteriorates.......123

11.15 SalvageManagerJanvanderLaancomesbelatedlytothefield..............124

11.16 TheBourbonDolphinsinks...........124

11.17 Evaluation...........................................12512 Summing-up:causes

andresponsibility............................12712.1 Introduction........................................12712.2 Theproximateand

triggeringcause.................................12712.3 Indirectcausesoftheemergency....12812.3.1 Defectsinthevessel

andthecompany ...............................12812.3.2 Activityonboardon12April.............13012.3.3 Planningoftherigmove,including

vesselrequirements...........................13112.3.4 Theimplementation

oftheoperation...................................13212.4 Whytheemergencywas

notprevented......................................133

12.512.6

13

13.1

13.2

13.3

13.3.113.3.213.3.313.413.4.113.4.2

13.4.313.4.4

13.513.5.113.5.213.5.313.5.413.6

13.6.1

13.6.213.6.313.713.813.913.9.1

13.9.213.9.3

13.10

Deficientsafetymanagement............134Liability.................................................135

Recommendations...........................136Introduction.........................................136

TheNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratesimmediatemeasures.............................................137Stabilityofanchor-handlingvessels .................................................137

Dutyofnotificationofmaritimeaccidentsoutside

Stabilitycalculations...........................137Thestabilitybook................................ 138Training/operations............................ 138Designandcertification......................139Thebollardpullcertificate ................ 139Testingoftheemergencyreleasesystem .................................... 139

Certificationofwinchoperator ..........139Directemergencyexitfromtheengine-room.........................................139Equipment............................................139Rescuefloats........................................139Survivalsuits........................................140Emergencytransponder.....................140Voyagerecorder..................................140Requirementsforthecompanyssafetymanagement ............................140Vessel-specificanchor-handling

procedure.............................................140Overlap/familiarisation/handover....141Identifyneedforqualifications..........141POBlistsondepartureoffshore ........141Planningoftherigmove....................141Executionoftherigmove..................141Start-upmeetingandcommunication...................................142

Tandemoperations.............................142Attentionzonesforrunning-outofanchors............................................142

Norwegianterritory............................142


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Innhold

Table3.1 Significantwaveheightalphavalues .........................................34

Table5.1 Tankcapacities ...................................46Table7.1 Overviewtableofinvolvedvessels ..............................75

Table9.1 Overviewofloadconditions ..............97Table9.2 Excerptsfromdailyreports...............97Table9.3 Listanglesandhorizontalforceas

functionofanglesofattack,Loadcondition2.1 ............................103

Table9.4 Listanglesandhorizontalforceasafunctionofanglesofattack,Loadcondition2.2 ............................104

Table9.5 Listanglesandhorizontalforceasafunctionofanglesofattack,

126tonneschaintension,Loadcondition3.1 ............................104Table9.6 Listanglesandhorizontalforce

asafunctionofanglesofattack,180tonneschaintension,Loadcondition3.1 ............................105

Table9.7 Listanglesandhorizontalforceasafunctionofanglesofattack,180tonneschaintension,Loadcondition3.2 ...........................106


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2


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13NOU2008:8ThelossoftheBourbonDolphinon12April2007 Chapter1

Chapter 1Summary

InthisSummarytheCommissionprovidesabriefaccountof theaccidentitselfandasummary reproductionofkeyconclusionsofthereport.Fortherecord,theCommissionwouldnotethatcertainnuanceswillbemissinginsuchasummary.

1.1 The Accident

TheBourbonDolphinwasdeliveredtothecompany,BourbonOffshoreNorway,atthebeginningofOctober2006bytheshipyardUlsteinGroupinUlsteinvik,MreogRomsdalcounty.ThevesselwasdesignatedDP2AnchorHandlingTugSupplyVessel,builtandequippedtoperformanchorhandling,towingandsupplyoperationsindeepwater.Shehadagrosstonnageof2,974tonnes,was75.2metreslongand17metreswide.Thevesselhada

continuousbollardpullof180tonnesandatensiononthemainwinchof400tonnes.Thevesselwasputintooperationimmediately;uptotheaccident,shehadcompleted16assignments.

From the end of March 2007 the BourbonDolphin was on contract to the oil companyChevron. The contract concerned anchor-handlinginconnectionwiththemoveofthedrillingrigTransoceanRatherontheRosebankoilfield,westofShetland.

The ocean depth in the area concerned is1,100 metres. The rig is moored with eight anchors. The distance between the rig and themooringpositionswasaround3,000metres.Themooringlineswereabout3,500metres,ofwhichabout900metreswasof84mmchainandabout920metresof76mmchain,plus1,725metresof96mmwire.Deploymentofanchorswasdonebymeansofthevesselrunningouttherigschain,connecting it to chain that the vessel had onboard,whereupontherigranoutwire.Theanchorthatwasfastenedtothevesselschainwasthereafterlowereddowntotheseabedwiththe

aidofthevesselswinchandwire.Duringthelastpartofthedeployment,anothervesselparticipatedbygrabbingholdof(grappling)thechainsoas

todistributetheweightofthemooringandrelievethestrainontherig.

Around 09:00 on Friday 12 April 2007 theBourbonDolphinbegantorunoutchainforthelastanchor(no.2).Around14:45allthechainwasout.TheBourbonDolphinthendriftedconsiderablyoffthemooringlineandaskedtherigfor

assistance.TheHighlandValourwassenttoassisttheBourbonDolphin,butdidnotsucceedinsecuringthechain.TheBourbonDolphindriftedeastwardstowardsthemooringofanchorno.3.Theriginstructedthevesselstoproceedwestwards,awayfromanchorno.3.Duringanattempttomanoeuvrethevesseltowardsthewest,atthesametimeasthechainspointofattackoverthesternrollershiftedfromtheinnerstarboardtowing-pintotheouterporttowing-pin,thevesseldevelopedaseriouslisttoport.Theenginesonthe

starboardsidestopped.Thevesselatfirstrightedherself,butsoonlistedagain andat17:08 rolledoveronherportside.

Thecapsizinghappenedsuddenlyandwithoutmuchwarning.Ofthoseonthebridge,onlyoneofthe first officersmanaged to get out. The crewmembers who had been in the deck area managedtogetholdoflife-jackets,climbontothevesselssideandjumpintotheseabeforesherolledright over. Two persons who had been in themessgot themselvesoutontodeckand intothesea.

Full alarm was immediately sounded on therigandthevesselsintheareawereatoncesettosearchingforsurvivors.HelicoptersfromtheBritish coastguard were alerted and arrived on thespotafteraboutanhour.Othervesselsinthevicinityalsoproceededtothecasualty.

TheBourbonDolphinhad acrewof14persons.Alsoonboardwasthemasters14-year-oldson. Seven persons were saved. The bodies ofthreepersonswerefoundinthesea,theremainingfivepersonsarestillmissing.

Thecasualtyremainedsomedaysafloat,bottom-up, until she sank onSunday 15April.TheBourbonDolphinhassubsequentlybeenlocat


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14 NOU2008:8Chapter1 ThelossoftheBourbonDolphinon12April2007

edontheseabed,wheresheislyinginanalmostuprightposition.

1.2 The structure of the report

Most chapters contain partial and main conclusionsrelatedtothemattersunderdiscussion.Thesummaryought thereforetoberead inconjunctionwiththemainpresentation.

Chapter2describestheestablishmentandappointment of the Commission, its qualificationsandtermsofreference,theworkoftheCommission of Inquiry, including the implementationofopenhearingsandthecollectionofevidence,theuseofexpertwitnesses,theaddressingoftheadversarialprincipleandrequirementsas topublic

accesstodocuments.Chapter 3 presents regulatory requirements

foranchor-handlingvesselsandanchor-handlingoperations. By way of introduction, the international regulations and Norwegian legislation onmaritimesafetyareexplained.Thereafterfollowsareviewoftherequirementsforthevesselsdesignandequipment,safetymanagementsystem,manningandqualifications.Nextarereviewedtherequirementsforcontrol,inspectionandcertification.AnexplanationisgivenoftheBritishregula

torysystemforanchor-handlingoperationsandoftheguidelinesforthisthattheindustryorganisationshaveadoptedfortheNorth-WestEuropeanArea. Finally, operational standards for the performanceofmarineoperationsandregulatoryrequirementsrelatedtothemooringsystemfortherigarereviewed.

Chapter4providesadescriptionofthecompany,BourbonOffshoreNorway.Thechapteralsodiscusses the crews during the operation, thecompanys safety management system, certificationandaudits.

Chapter 5 gives a factual description of thevessel Bourbon Dolphin. Design, constructionprocessandcommissioning,thevesselstankarrangement, engines, anchor-handling equipmentand winchsystem withemergency release functionarereviewedrelativelythoroughly.Thechapteralsodiscussesthevesselsstabilitybookandloadcalculator.Rescueequipmentandnavigationequipmentareadditionallydealtwith.Inconclusion,thevesselsoperatinghistoryisdescribed.

Chapter6reviewstherigmovethattheBour

bonDolphinwashelpingtoperform.Bywayofintroduction the Commission will describe theplayersonthecommissioningsidetheoilcom

pany,therigcompanyandtheconsultancyfirm,specificationsfortherigandanoverviewofpersonnelontherigduringtheoperation.Arelativelythoroughreviewoftheplanningoftherigmoveisalsomadethechoiceofmooringsystemand

installationmethod,requirementsforthevessels,weather criteria and risk assessments and plansforalternativesituations(contingencyplanning).

Chapter 7 presents key data for the vesselsthat were selected by the operator for the rigmove.

Chapter8providesareviewoftherigmoveuptothecapsizing,includingthecrewchangeontheBourbonDolphin.

Chapter 9 presents the incidents that on 12April2007endedwith thecapsizingofthe Bourbon Dolphin.Firstcomesanexplanation of the

running-outofthediagonalanchor(no.6);thenapresentationoftheattempttoassistmadebyanothervessel.Thenanaccountoftheactualaccident is given, including for the external forcesthataffectedthevesselinthedecisivephase.

Chapter 10provides, byway of introduction,anaccountofthecrewsevacuation.Thisisfollowedbyachronologicalpresentationoftherescueoperationsindividualphasesandimplementation,includingavailableresourcesanduseofvariousrescueaids.Thechapteralsodealswiththe

roles played by Norwegian authorities and thecompanyduringtherescueoperation.Chapter 11describes the measures taken in

anattempttosalvagethecasualty.BywayofintroductiontheCommissionprovidesalistofobservationof thecasualtyspositions.Therefollowsapresentation of occurrences until the signing ofthesalvagecontract,ofthebodiesinvolvedandthedecisionstakenalongtheway.

In Chapter 12 the Commission undertakessummarising analyses and considers the directandindirectcausalrelationshipsandthereportsapproachtoquestionsofresponsibility.

InChapter13theCommissionmakesitsrecommendations.

1.3 Key conclusions

A selection of key conclusions of the report isherepresented.TheorderdoesnotsayanythingabouttheirimportanceinrelationtotheaccidentandtheCommissionstermsofreference.

Keyconclusionsare: Thevesselwasbuiltandequippedasanall-

roundvesselAHSV(AnchorHandlingSupply


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Vessel).Unitingthesefunctionsposesspecialchallenges.Inadditiontobollardpull,anchor-handlingdemandsthrustercapacity,powerfulwinches, big drums and equipment for handling chain. Supply and cargo operations

demandthebiggestpossible,andalsoflexible,cargocapacitiesbothondeckandintanks.TheBourbonDolphinwasarelativelysmallandcompact vessel, in which all these requirementsweretobeunited.

ThecompanyhadnopreviousexperiencewiththeA102designandoughtthereforetohaveundertakenmore critical assessments of thevessels characteristics, equipment and notleastoperational limitations,bothduring herconstructionandduringhersubsequentoperationsundervariousconditions.Thecompany

didnotpickuponthefactthatthevesselhadexperienced an unexpected stability-criticalincidentabouttwomonthsafterdelivery.

Thevesselsstability-relatedchallengeswerenot clearly communicated from shipyard tocompanyandonwardstothosewhoweretooperatethevessel.

Undergivenloadconditionsthevesseldidnothavesufficientstabilitytohandlelateralforces.The winchs pulling-power was over-dimensionedinrelationtowhatthevesselcouldin

realitywithstandasregardsstability. The anchor-handling conditions prepared bythe shipyard were not realistic. Nor did theNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratesregulatorysystem make any requirement that these beapproved.

The ISM Code demands procedures for thekeyoperationsthatthevesselistoperform,Despitethefactthatanchor-handlingwasthevesselsmainfunction,therewasnovessel-specificanchor-handlingprocedurefortheBourbonDolphin.

The company did not follow the ISM codesrequirementthatallriskbeidentified.

Thecompanydidnotmakesufficientrequirementsforthecrewsqualificationsfordemandingoperations.Thecrewslackofexperiencewas not compensated for by the addition ofexperiencedpersonnel.

Themasterwasgiven1hourstofamiliarisehimselfwiththecrewandvesselandtheongoingoperation.Initssafetymanagementsystemthecompanyhasarequirementthatnewcrews

shallbefamiliarisedwith (inducted into)thevesselbeforetheycantakeuptheirdutiesonboard.Inpracticethemasterfamiliariseshim

self byoverlapping withanothermaster whoknowsthevessel,beforehehimselfisgiventhecommand.

Neitherthecompanynortheoperatorensuredthat sufficient time was made available for

hand-overinthecrewchange. Thevesselwasmarketedwithcontinuousbollardpullof180tonnes.Duringananchor-handling operation, in practice thrusters arealways used for manoeuvring and dynamicpositioning.Therealbollardpullisthenmaterially reduced. The company did not itselfinvestigate whether the vessel was suited totheoperation,butleftthistothemaster.

ThecompanydidnotseetotheacquisitionofinformationaboutthecontentandscopeoftheassignmenttheBourbonDolphinwassetto

carryout.ThecompanydidnotitselfdoanyreviewoftheRigMoveProcedure(RMP)withaviewtoriskexposureforcrewandvessel.Thecompanywasthusnotinapositiontoofferguidance.

TheNorwegianclassificationsocietyDetnorskeVeritas(DNV)andtheNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratewereunabletodetectthefailuresinthecompanyssystemsthroughtheiraudits.

Inspecifyingthevessel,theoperatordidnot

takeaccountofthefactthattherealbollardpullwouldbemateriallyreducedthroughuseofthrusters.InpracticetheBourbonDolphinwasunsuitedtodealingwiththegreatforcestowhichshewasexposed.

The mooring system and the deploymentmethodchosenweredemandingtohandleandvulnerableinrelationtoenvironmentalforces.

PlanningoftheRMPwasincomplete.Theprocedurelackedfundamentalandconcreteriskassessments. Weather criteria were notdefinedandtheforceswerecalculatedforbetterweatherconditionsthantheychosetooperatein.Definedsafetybarrierswerelacking.Itwaslefttothediscretionoftherigandthevesselswhetheroperationsshouldstartorbesuspended.

Inadvanceoftheoperationnostart-upmeetingwithallinvolvedpartieswasheld.Thevesselsdid not receive sufficient information aboutwhatcouldbeexpectedofthem,andthemastermisunderstoodthevesselsrole.

Theproceduredemandedtheuseoftwoves

selsthathadtooperateatclosequartersindifferentphasesduringtherecoveryanddeploymentofanchors.Theincreasedriskexposure


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ofthevesselswasnotreflectedintheprocedure.

The procedure lacked provisions for alternative measures (contingency planning), forexample in uncontrollable drifting from the

run-out line. Nor were there guidelines forwhenandinwhatwaysuchalternativemeasuresshouldbeimplementedandwhatifanyriskthesewouldinvolve.

The deployment of anchor no. 2 was commencedwithouttheconsiderabledriftingduringthedeploymentofthediagonalanchorno.6hadbeenevaluated.

Humanerroronthepartoftherigandthevesselsduringtheperformanceoftheoperation.

Communicationandcoordinationbetweentherigandthevesselwasdefectiveduringthelastphaseoftheoperation.

LackofinvolvementonthepartoftherigwhentheBourbonDolphindrifted. Therollreductiontankwasmostprobablyin

useatthetimeoftheaccident. The inner starboard towing pin had been

depressedandthechainwaslyingagainsttheouterstarboardtowingpin.Thechaintherebyacquiredachangedangleofattack.


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Chapter 2The Commission of Inquiry and its work

2.1 Introduction

On27April2007theMinistryofJusticedecided,ontheauthorityofSection485oftheMaritimeAct,toappointaspecialcommissionofinquiryintothelossoftheBourbonDolphinon12April2007.

The Commissions composition was as follows:1. CourtofAppealsJudgeIngerLyng,Chair2. SpecialistengineerGuroHyaasLken3. GeneralManagerGisleFiksdal4. MarineCoordinatorDagAndreassen5. PoliceProsecutorYngveSkovly

The secretary to the Commission was TerjeHernesPettersen,SeniorAdvisorintheMinistryofTradeandIndustry.

2.2 More on the members of theCommission of Inquiry

TheCommissionconsidersitappropriatetogivetheeducationandprofessionalbackgroundofthemembers.

Inger Lyng

Yearofbirth1947Cand. jur.qualifyingexaminationinlaw1976SeniorExecutiveofficerintheMinistryofJusticeAssistantJudgeJuniorPoliceProsecutorLegalAdvisorMunicipalAttorneyofTromsChairmanoftheCountyAppealTribunalJudgeinHlogalandCourtofAppealsfrom1997

Guro Hyaas Lken

Yearofbirth1972GraduateinNavalArchitecturefromtheNorwegianUniversity ofScienceand Technology(NTNU),1996Specialisationinhydrodynamics/marinestructures.

Aker Marine Contractors AS Naval Architect19971998,CSOAkerEngineeringInc./Technip Inc. Houston, Senior Specialist, 1998 2002,AkerMarineContractorsInc.Houston,Principal Naval Architect 2002 2005, AkerMarineContractorsAS2005,SpecialistEngineerPlanningandexecutionofmarineoperations,platformdesign,mooringdesign,movementanalyses,modeltestcorrelationsandrigupgrade studies. Course instructor, MarineWorksManagerandEngineeringManager.

Hasgivenanumberof lectures/papersfocusingonmooringdesignindeepwater.

Gisle Arnold Hansen Fiksdal

Yearofbirth1961GraduatedinengineeringfromtheNorwegianInstituteofTechnology(theprecursorofthepresentNorwegianUniversityofScienceandTechnology)Trondheim1984,andinmanagementfromtheNorwegianSchoolofManagement(BI)1990.MARINTEK,researcher,1986-2001,LodicAS,GeneralManager,2001Development/maintenance of software forhydrostaticsandstabilityShipshapePreparationofstabilitybooksforvarioustypesofshipDevelopmentoftheloadcalculatorShipLoadandLodic,foruseonboardvariouskindsofvesselStability studies for The Commission ofInquiryintothelossofWestern

Developmentofdecision-makingsupportsystems for ships in a damaged state (EUprojects)


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Assistance in salvage operation/investigationaftertheRocknesaccident.

Dag Andreassen

Yearofbirth1946Shipsmasterexamination1981DNVIncidentInvestigationTrainingExxonMobilRiskAnalysisTrainingLevelIIMarine specialist ExxonMobil 19872008:Planning,theimplementationofmobileinstallations,vesselinspections19731987:Practicalexperiencefromoffshoreoperations.Shipsmasterfrom1981.

Yngve Skovly

Yearofbirth1962Cand. jurqualifyingexaminationinlaw1988Policeattorney,HardangerAssistantJudgeinSunnmreAssistant Chief of Police/Police ProsecutorSunnmreAdvisor, crisis management aid projectStyrkebrnn(WellofStrength),Georgia

Terje Hernes Pettersen

Yearofbirth1968Cand. jur.qualifyingexaminationinlaw1996MasterofLaw1997Project Manager, The Norwegian MaritimeDirectorateMember,MaritimeSafetyActCommitteeAdvisor/SeniorAdvisor,TheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorateSeniorAdvisor,MinistryofTradeandIndustry

2.3 The Commission of Inquirys

competence and terms of reference

TheCommissionofInquirysmissionisgovernedby the Regulations No. 7 of 28 November 1980pertaining to commissions of inquiry under theMaritimeAct.

The mission is defined in the Commissionstermsofreference,whicharewordedasfollows:

TheCommission ofInquiry shallundertaketheinvestigationsitfindsnecessarytoclarifythecourseofeventsandcausalfactors,andreportonfactorsofsignificance forpreventingsuchaccidentsinfuture.Thisincludesthecoordinationbetweentheshipandtherig,opera

tionoftheshipandfactorsrelatedtotheshipsdesignandcertification.

TheCommissionofInquiryshall alsoprovide an assessment of the attempted salvageoperation during which the ship sank. TheCommissionshallfurtherconsiderfactualcircumstancesthatcanbeenvisagedasjustifyingcriminalliabilityforindividualsorenterprisesorotherliabilityinconnectionwiththeaccident. The deadline for the Commissions reportis1February2008.

Thereportdeadlinewaslaterextendedto1April2008.

TheaccidenthappenedintheUKSectoroftheNorthSeaandinvolved,inadditiontotheNorwegian-registered vessel, a British oil company, adrillrig owned by a company registered in the

Cayman Islands, a British consultancy firm andseveral foreign-registered vessels with theircrews.

The Commission has endeavoured to find areasonable balance between the imperative ofconsidering all the questions that the accidentprovidesoccasiontoevaluate,andtheimperativeofmakingthereportasquicklyasproperandpossible. Regarding the questions the Commissionhasraised,ithasspentthetimeitthoughtnecessaryforathoroughanalysisandaddressingofthe

interestsofaffectedparties.ItispartoftheCommissionstermsofreferencethatitshouldconsiderfactualcircumstancesthatcanbeenvisagedasjustifyingcriminalliabilityforindividualsorenterprisesorotherliabilityinconnectionwiththeaccident.

ItiswidelyknownthattheNorwegianprosecution authorities, under the leadership of thePublic Prosecutor of Mre og Romsdal County,havelaunchedaninvestigationinthecase.InvestigationsareinprogressalsoontheBritishside,undertheaegisoftheHealthandSafetyExecutive(Aberdeen).NeithertheNorwegiannortheBritishinvestigationshavebeenconcluded.

TheCommission isnotacourt.TheCommissionunderstandsitstermsofreferenceasmeaningthatthepresentationofthefactsofthecaseisasufficientpresentationofrelevantcircumstances.Anyassessmentofthefactsinrelationtocriminallawwithaviewtocriminalsanctionsorinrelationtorulesforadministrativemeasuresorreactionsincivillawisamatterfortheprosecutionauthority, otherauthorities, the parties and any

one else affected to decide upon, if necessarythroughcourtproceedings.


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The Commissionhas,however, considered itappropriateinsomecontextstoevaluateandcharacterisethebehaviourofindividualsandinstitutionsonthebasisofprovenfacts.TheCommissionhasnottherebytakenapositiononwhether

criminallaworothersanction-bearingruleshaveactuallybeencontravened.Therescueoperation,whichwas ledbyBrit

ish authorities, was not a part of the Commissionstermsofreferenceandhasnotbeentheobjectoffurtherinvestigation.TheCommissionhas,however,considereditrighttoprovideasummarypresentationoftherescueworkaswell.

2.4 The work of the Commission ofInquiry

The Commission of Inquiry has held regularworkingmeetingsever yotherweeksincetheappointment,alltogether20workingmeetingswithatotalof57meetingdays.TheCommissionhasheldfiveopenhearingsforreceiptoftestimonyfrom involvedparties, confer the discussion belowinSection2.5.

The Commission has collectively, or via individual members, undertaken several site visits.TheBourbonDolphinwasthefirstvessel tobe

builttoanUlsteinA102design.TheCommissionwasthereforeunabletomakeasitevisittoasimilarvessel.Soastoreceiveaquickgeneralintroduction to the methodology of anchor-handling,theCommissionvisitedtheanchor-handlingvesselNormandMasterbelongingtoSolstadRederi,whileshewasberthedatStavanger.

CommissionMemberGisleFiksdalhasvisitedtheshipyard,UlsteinVerft.CommissionMemberDagAndreassenhas,togetherwithCaptainFrankReiersen,undertakenareviewandtestingofrescueequipmentcorrespondingtothatwhichwasonboardtheBourbonDolphin.

TheCommissionchosenottovisitthecompany,BourbonOffshore.TheCommissionheldbriefinginterviewswithrepresentativesofthecompanyimmediatelyaftertheappointment.Thecompanysrepresentativesweresummonedtoanopenhearingonthesamebasisasotherinformants.

TheCommissionhasheldmeetingswith thenextofkinandtheirattorney.TheCommissionsmembers held several telephone conversationsand handled otherapproaches from the next of

kin.TheCommissionhasotherwiseheldmeetings

withtheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate,thePe

troleumSafetyAuthority,DetnorskeVeritas,theinsurers,theprosecutionauthorityandrepresentativesoftheBritishHealthandSafetyExecutivesoastoreceivetheirinput.

TheCommissionhasbeengivenaROV(min

isub)inspectionvideofilmtoreview,takenofthewreckat1,100metresdepthon8December2007.TheCommissionhasreceivedanumberofin

puts from interest organisations, the media andthepublic.

The Commissions secretariat has been inOslo.TheSecretarytotheCommissionhasbeenrelievedofhalfofhispermanentpostintheMinistryofTradeandIndustry.Itwasnecessarytoreinforcethesecretariatwithhiredconsultants.TheChairoftheCommissionwasrelievedofallherother duties. The remaining members have

workedonanhourlybasis.An English version of the Commissions re

portalsoexists.TheCommissionhasnotbeeninvolvedinthetranslation,anddoesnotguaranteethisversion.

2.5 Collection of the evidence

Themaritimeinquiryfollowing theaccidentwasheldinSunnmreDistrictCourton25April2007.

TheCommissionhasheldfiveopenhearingsasasupplementtothismaritimeinquiry.InJune2007theCommissionheardtestimonyfromthecrewsof the BourbonDolphin, the companys representativesand the mastersoftheOlympicHerculesandtheVidarViking.TheCommissionalso held conversions with the next of kin in aclosed forum. In August 2007 the CommissionquestionedthesolesurvivingofficeroftheBourbon Dolphin, the vessels two regular mastersand the first engineering officer from the shiftthatwasnotonboardduringtheaccident.Attheend of August the Commission questioned Detnorske Veritas local representative in Aberdeenand fourofficersfromthe Highland Valour. InSeptember2007theCommissionheardtestimonyfromrepresentativesofChevron,theTransoceanRatherandTrident,inall11persons,whohadbeenresponsiblefortheplanningandtheimplementationoftherigmoveoperationandthesubsequentrescueandsalvageoperation.InOctober2007 the Commission questioned three personsfrom Ulstein Verft and three persons from the

NorwegianMaritimeDirectorate.AlltogethertheCommissionheard testimony

from38persons.Everyonecalledinforquestion


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ingappearedoftheirownfreewillinNorway.Audio recordings were made of all testimony andtheseweremadeavailabletotheparties.Thetestimony was continuously interpreted/translatedtoorfromEnglish.FortheAnglophonewitness

es,itistheEnglishversionthatisvalid.TheCommissionsminutesofthetestimonyhavebeenreviewed and approved by the witnesses, afterwhichtheyweredistributedandmadeavailabletothepublic.Inaddition,theminuteswereincorporatedintoaspecialAnnex2(questioning)tothereport.

The Commission has had access to the policescasedocuments,includingtestimonytakenbythepoliceandbytheHealthandSafetyExecutiveintheUnitedKingdom.

Immediately after its appointment, the Com

mission received all documents and illustrationmaterialthatthemaritimeinspectorinTrondheimhadcollected.TheCommissionhadaskedfor,andcontinuouslyhadsubmitted,anumberofdocumentsfromthoseinvolved.Thisconcernsdocumentationrelatedtotheconstructionandcertification of the vessel, and governing documentsfromthecompany.Keydocumentsrelatedtotherigmove,rawdataforthetrackplot,ROVfilmofthevesselaftershesankandvideoclipstakenonmobilephonesfromtherigastheaccidentwasin

progress,havealsobeenreceived.TheCommissionhasalsoreceivedwrittenaccountsandreportsfromSmit,whohadthesalvagecontract.

KeydocumentsareincludedinaspecialAnnex1(keydocumentation)totheCommissionsreport.

The Commission has subscribed to a mediamonitoringserviceforallNorwegianmediachannels.

2.6 Methodology and the use of expertwitnesses

The Commission has undertaken its own MTO(Man/Technology/Organisation)analysis withareviewofthecourseofevents,fromtheplanningofthevesselsconstructiontoherloss,inordertouncoversafetybarriersandbreachesthereof.Theplanningandtheimplementationoftherigmovewasreviewedinacorrespondingmanner.

Given its composition, the Commission pos

sesseswithinitsownranksprofessionalexpertise

thatwas considered largely sufficient toanalysethecase.ForthisreasonitwasalsotheCommissions working method that the individual CommissionMember,eitheraloneoringroups,hadaspecialresponsibilityforanalysinganddescribing

apartofthecasecomplex.In certain fields, however, the Commissionfounditexpedient tomakeuseofspecialexpertwitnesses.

ResearchFellowHanneSofieLogsteinhasauthoredalegalopinioninwhichsheundertookareviewoftheBritishregulatorysysteminrelationto the anchor-handling operation in which theBourbon Dolphin was lost. Her opinion hasbeen reviewed by Professor and dr juris KnutKaasenoftheUniversityofOslo.LogsteinsopinionhasbeenincorporatedinitsentiretyasPart7

ofSpecialAnnex1tothisreport.ThecompanyShip&OffshoreSurveyorsAS

hasundertakenatechnicalassessmentofthepropulsive machinery of the Bourbon Dolphin;theirreportisincludedasPart8ofSpecialAnnex1.

TheCommissionhas madeuse ofstatementsfromexpertwitnessesinmeteorology.MeteorologicaldatahavebeenincludedinSpecialAnnex1Part5.

2.7 The stability meeting and stabilitycalculations

The parties have hired their own experts to reporton,calculateandevaluatethevesselsstabilityatthetimeoftheaccident.InaccordancewiththeCommissionsowndesireandattherequestoftheparties,on7December2007CommissionmembersFiksdal,AndreassenandLkenheldameetingwiththestabilityexpertstoreviewrelevant data and establish agreed premises for undertakingstabilitycalculations.MinutesfromthemeetinghavebeenincorporatedintotheSpecialAnnex1,Section1.10.

Commission Member Gisle Fiksdal has performed stability calculations for estimated loadconditionsintheperiodjustbeforetheaccident.ThesehavebeenincorporatedintoSpecialAnnex1,Section1.12.

The stability calculations that CommissionMemberGisleFiksdalundertookandthatunderlietheevaluationinSection9.10havebeenverifiedbyProfessorBjrnSillerudoftheNTNU.


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NOU2008:8 21ThelossoftheBourbonDolphinon12April2007 Chapter2

2.8 Quality assurance and the right to TheCommissionsubmittedadraftof thefacbe heard tualpresentations tothose who weredirectlyaf

fected by the presentation. British authorities

Aftertheendoftheevidencecollection,theaffect- havereceivedrelevantchaptersforreview.These

edpartiesweregiventheopportunitytomakefi- weregiventheopportunity tocomment.Theob

nal comments on the evidence and several of jections received have been considered, but notthemtookthatopportunity. necessarilyfollowed.


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Chapter 3Regulatory requirements for anchor-handling vessels and

anchor-handling operations

3.1 Introduction

Safetyatseaisgovernedbyaveryextensiveregulatory system. This chapter provides a para

mountdescriptionof the rules that apply toanchor-handlingvesselsandanchor-handlingoperations.Moredetailedassessmentsofwhethertheregulatoryrequirementsweremetwillfollowinthe subsequent chapters, whereas Chapter 13containsrecommendationsforchangesintheregulatorysystem.

Bywayofintroductiontothechapter,anoverview is provided of the international regulatorysystem and Norwegian legislation on maritimesafety.Sections3.2to3.4providedescriptionsof

requirementsdirectedatships,whileSection3.5describesthesystemofshipsupervision.Section3.6providesabriefaccountoftheBrit

ishregulatorysysteminrelationtoanchor-handlingoperations.ThistextisbasedonthelegalopinionofResearchFellowHanneSofieLogstein,seeAnnex1Part7.Section3.7discussesguidelinesforthesafemanagementofoffshoresupplyand anchor-handling operations (NWEA); thistext isalsobasedonLogsteins opinion.Section3.8 provides a brief description of operationalstandardsforperformanceofmarineoperations.Theserules aredirectedattheoperatorandrig.Inconclusion,Section3.9providesadescriptionoftherequirementsforthemooringsystemoftherigTransoceanRather.

3.1.1 The international maritime safetyregulations

A numberof international conventions lay downrequirementsforinteraliashipdesignandequipment, for those working on board ship, for the

protectionoftheenvironmentandfortheworkingandlivingconditionsofseafarers.TheLawoftheSea Treaty contains general ruleson the rights

anddutiesoftheflagstateandthecoastalstate,and lays the primary responsibility for supervisionofshipsontheflagstate.MostofthemaritimeconventionshavebeenadoptedbytheUNsInternationalMaritimeOrganisation(IMO).The

organisation was created in1948andiscommitted toenhancing safety atsea, preventingpollution of the marine environment, and anti-terrormeasuresinmaritimeactivity.TheIMOhas167member-states.BelowfollowsalistofimportantIMOconventions: SOLASTheSafetyofLifeatSeaConvention,

1974 MARPOL73/78TheInternationalConven

tionforthePreventionofPollutionfromShips,1973/78

STCW The Convention on Standards ofTraining, CertificationandWatch-keepingforSeafarers,1978

TheLoadLinesConvention,1966 COLREG The Convention on International

Regulations for Preventing Collisions atSea,1972

The IMO conventions contain so-called minimumstandards.Thereistherebynothingtoprevent the flag states from promulgating stricterprovisions, but it is established practice for theflag states to follow the IMO conventions, interaliaforreasonsofcompetition.TheinternationalConventiononSafetyofHumanLifeatSea,SOLAS,isthemostimportantofalltheIMOconventions.ThemainpurposeofSOLASistostipulateminimum requirements for design, equipmentand operation ofships, thereby enhancing maritimesafety.Theflagstateisresponsibleforensuringthatshipssailingunderitsflagsatisfytherequirements of the convention, confer Article II.The convention fixes the number of certificates

theshipsmusthaveasevidenceoftheirhavingsatisfied the requirements. Via the conventions,the IMO has also adopted a number of codes,


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whichusuallycontain technicalamplifyingdetailontheconventions.As examplesmightbementioned the Intact Stability Code, the LSA Code(rescueequipment),theISPSCodeandtheISMCode,conferSection3.3.

ManyoftherequirementsoftheIMOsregulatorysystemaregenerallydraftedandapplyinprincipletoallships.Roughlyspeaking,adistinction is made between requirements directed atcargo ships, passenger ships and fishing-boats.Anchor-handling vessels fall under the categoryofcargoships.Withintheregulatorysystemthatapplies to cargo ships, certain specific requirements are made for certain categories of cargoships, such as oil tankers, contingency vessels,towingvesselsetc.Thestabilityrequirementsforsupplyvesselsarealsoappliedtoanchor-handling

vessels.ThegreatmajorityoftherequirementsintheIMOsregulatorysystemapplyonlytoshipsthatareundertakinganinternationalvoyage,thatis to say, a voyage between ports in differentstates.Fortrafficthatisexclusivelynational,thelegislativejurisdictionistoalargeextentlefttothe flag state. For mobile installations the IMOhasonlytoasmallextentissuedbindingnorms,but the organisation has adopted the so-calledMODU Code (Mobile Offshore Drilling UnitCode)asanadvisorystandard.

3.1.2 Norwegian maritime safety legislation

The conventions are currently implemented byauthorityoftheActNo.9of16February2007onmaritimesafety(theMaritimeSafetyAct).Mostof the statutory regulations are promulgatedbytheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate.Thestatutoryregulationsystemhastoalargeextentimplementedinternationalstandardsbymeansofreferences(incorporation).Atthetimeoftheaccidentof12April2007itwastheActNo.7of9June1903on State Control of the Seaworthiness of Shipsetc.(theSeaworthinessAct)thatwasinforce.

The main duty-holders under the SeaworthinessActweretheshipsmasters,conferSection106firstparagraph.Theprovisionlaiddownthatthe responsibility for conforming to provisionsmadetosecuretheshipsseaworthinessortoaddressthesafetyorwelfareofpersonsonboardrests upon the ships master, unless otherwiseconsequentontherelevantActorprovision.

Section106secondparagraphoftheSeawor

thinessActprescribeddutiesforthecompanyoranyoneactingonbehalfofthecompany.Theprovisionwas incorporatedbyAmendmentNo.70of

2August1991asafollow-upoftheScandinavianStardisaster.Itmandatedthecompanytoestablishroutinesthatensuredthatashipwasinsoundandregulationconditionandthatshewasinspectedinaccordancewiththerules.

Also Section 106 third paragraph made thecompanyaduty-holder.TheprovisionwasaddedbyAmendmentNo.67of10June1977inordertoprovide a clearer formulation of the lines of responsibilitybetweencompanyandshipsmasterregarding safety matters. It lays down that thecompanymustnotunlawfullycauseorbeaccessorytocausinganunseaworthyshiptoputtoseaortotheshipbeingusedincontraventionofpublicpermits. The travaux prparatoires maintainedthattheprovisionwasnotintendedtochangethecurrentstateofthelaw,underwhichtheships

masterhadtheprimeresponsibilityonboardfortheoperationoftheship.Norwasittheintentiontoextendthecompanysresponsibility.TheSeaworthinessActalsocontainedsomespecialprovisionsthatimposeddutiesonpersonsotherthantheshipsmasterandthecompany,seeforexampleSection11secondparagraph,whichforshipsbeingbuiltinNorwayimposedontheshipyardadutytonotifythesupervisoryauthority.

TheSeaworthinessActwasrepealedon1July2007 and replaced by the Maritime Safety Act.

The new law has toned down the duties of theshipsmasterandtoamuchgreaterextentmakesitclearthatitisthecompanythathastheparamount responsibility for the safety of the ship,conferSection6.

3.2 Requirements for the vessels designand equipment

Thekeyprovisionsforshipdesignaretobefoundin SOLAS Chapter II-1, which makes requirementsforthevesselshull,strengthandstability,whereas Chapter II-2 deals with fire safety. Theflag states have issued supplementary requirementstoSOLAS.Moreover,SOLASChapterIII,IV and V contain requirements for respectivelyrescueequipment,radiocommunicationandnavigationequipment.Detailedrequirementsforloadline and freeboard are to be found in the LoadLinesConvention.

Statutory Regulations No. 695 of 15September1992(theBuildingRegulations),laiddownby

theNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate,arethekeyimplementingregulationsforChapterII-1ofSOLASandtheLoadLinesConvention.TheRegula


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tions contain some special requirements for anchor-handlingvessels,forexamplefortowingandanchor-handlingequipmentinSection48,whichlays down rules for winch, wire and chain-stoppers,spoolingapparatus,towing-pinsandcrucifix.

The Regulations contain no specific requirementsforanchor-handlingoperations,asregardsneither stability requirementsnor set-up of loadconditions.Stabilitywise,ananchor-handlingvesselisregardedasanordinarysupplyship,conferSection43firstparagraph.

Section43secondparagraphcontainsspecificrequirementsforthestabilityofshipsengagedintowing.Theserequirementsaddressthefactthatthevesselcanbeexposedtoalistmomentinconsequence of the tow operation (which the ordinary requirements for supply ships do not do).

Under the Norwegian Maritime Directoratespractice,anchor-handlingoperationsarenotevaluatedinrelationtotheserequirementsinstabilityapproval.

Section 43 third paragraph makes requirementsforloadconditionsthataretobesubmittedforapproval (rule conditions). No requirementsaremadeforloadconditionsforanchor-handlingoperationsbeingpreparedandconsideredinrelationtostability.Itisuptothecompanyandtheshipyard/designerto include suchconditions in

the stability book (example conditions). Theguidelines for stability in IMO Resolution A.469(XII)arenotdirectlyimplementedintheNorwegian regulatory system foranchor-handling vessels. The resolution recommends, indirectlythroughSection2.4.2asanalternativeifSection2.4.1isnotcompliedwith,thatstabilityoughttobecalculatedfortheworstanticipatedoperatingconditions.ThisisreflectedintheBuildingRegulationsSection12firstparagraph,whereaworstexpected operating condition, confer the resolution,willhavebeincludedasoneofallrelevantloadconditions inwhichthevesselis designedandintendedtooperate.

Theloadconditions,includingtheanchor-handling conditions, must be representative of therelevantoperations.Iftheloadconditionforanchor-handlingdeviatesfromwhatmustbeincludedinthestabilitybook,thecrewmustperformtheirownstabilitycalculationswiththetoolsavailableonboardforthis.

The Norwegian Maritime Directorate doesnot require the stability book to contain special

loadconditionsforanchor-handling.Iftheseareneverthelesscoveredbythebook,itischeckedonlythatthesubmittedconditionsforanchor-han

dlingmeet the stability requirementsofSection43 first paragraph. No evaluation is made of towhat extent the conditions are applicable to theoperationinquestion,providedthattheynotcontainobviouserrors.Theconditionsarethusnot

subjecttotheDirectoratesapproval.Pursuanttothe Building Regulations Section 8, 13th paragraph,stabilityinformationshallbepreparedthatinarapidandsimplemannerenablestheshipsmastertoenjoypreciseguidanceabouttheshipstrim and stability under different sailing conditions.

TheBuildingRegulationsSection15sixthparagraph demand that when vessels are equippedwithrollreductiontank(s),accountshallbetakenofthestabilityreductioncausedbytheiruse.Itisalsodemandedofthecompanythatinstructions

bepreparedfortheuseofthetank(s),plus loadconditionsthatcorrespondwiththeinstructions,ifthetanksforstability-relatedreasonscannotbeusedinallloadconditions.

RequirementsforrescueequipmentforcargoshipsfollowfromStatutoryRegulationsNo.1856of17December2004 (the Rescue Regulations).The Regulations implement the SOLAS ChapterIIIandLSA(LifeSavingAppliance)CodeinNorwegianlawasregardscargoships.Theyincludeprovisions onrescue vessels and hydrostatic re

lease mechanisms for rescue floats, confer Sections8and9.Annex1totheRegulationscontainsfurtherdetailedrequirementsforrescuevessels:amongotherthingsarescuefloatshallfloatfree,and,ifitisinflatable,shallinflateautomaticallyiftheshipsinks.OntheBourbonDolphinsixinflatablerescuefloatshadbeeninstalled.

SOLASChapterIVandVisimplementedbyStatutory Regulations No. 701 of 15 September1992onnavigationalaids(theNavigationRegulations)andStatutoryRegulationsNo.1855of17December2004onradiocommunicationoncargoships (the Radio Regulations). The CommissionhasnotfounditnecessarytogofurtherintomattersconcerningnavigationandtheradiocommunicationsystemoftheBourbonDolphin,andnomoredetaileddescription of this regulatorysystemisthereforegiven.

3.3 Requirements for the safetymanagement system

TheInternationalManagementCodefortheSafeOperationofShipsandPollutionPrevention(theISMCode),wasapprovedbytheIMOon4No


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vember1993viaResolutionA.741(18).TheCodeisanchoredinSOLASChapterIX.TheISMCodemakes requirements for a Safety ManagementSystem(SMS)onshipsandforcompanies.IntroductionoftheISMCodemadethecompanysre

sponsibilityforthesafetyoftheshipclearer.Thebackgroundto theCodewasadesire todevelop a better safety culture in the maritimesector.Itwasdesiredtoenhancesafetyatseabyfocusingonsafetyforthoseinvolvedonboardandonshore,amongotherthingsviaroutinesforqualityassurance.Investigationsfollowingmajorshippingaccidentsinthe1980sandthebeginningofthe 1990s demonstrated serious administrativefailures,bothonboardshipandinthecompaniesshoresideorganisations.TheISMCodehasbeencharacterised as innovative in maritime safety

work,sinceforthefirsttimeitaimedataholisticapproachthatlookedattheshipandherownersandtheinteractionbetweenhumanbeings,technology and organisation. The preamble to theCodeproclaimsinteraliathatitisbasedongeneralprinciplesandobjectives,sincenotwocompaniesarethesameandshipsoperateunderdifferentconditions.

TheobjectoftheISMCodeistopromotesafetyatsea,preventpersonalinjuryorlossofhumanlife,avoiddamagetotheenvironment,particular

lythemarineenvironment,andtoproperty,confertheCodesRule1Section2.1.TheISMCodesRule1Section 2.2.2demands that the company,via the safety management system, introduce aprotectionagainstallidentifiedrisks.Theriskstowhichvessel andpersonnelcanbeexposedshalltherefore be charted and controlled within thecompanys organisation. More detailed requirements for risk assessments, including safe jobanalyses, are contained in Statutory RegulationNo. 8 of 1 January 2005 (the Working Environment Regulations). This has, however, a morespecificfocusonhazardsthatmayarisefortheindividualemployeeonboardduringtheperformanceofworkoperations.

ThecoreoftheISMCodeisRule1Section4,regardingfunctionalrequirementsofsafetymanagementsystems.It islaiddownthatallcompaniesshalldevelop,implementandmaintainasafetymanagementsystemthatincludesthefollowingfunctional requirements: a policy for safety andenvironmentalprotection,instructionsandprocedurestoensuresafeoperationsandprotectionof

theenvironmentinlinewithinternationallawandtheflagstateslegislation,definedauthoritylevelsand communication links between and among

personnelonshoreandonboard,proceduresforreporting of accidents and non-conformanceswiththeISMCode,proceduresforpreparationforandreactionofemergencies,andproceduresforinternalauditingandmanagementreview.

Thesubsequentprovisionsof theCodeamplifyandspecifywhatliesintheindividualfunctionalrequirements.OfthesemaybementionedRule2,that the companyprepareasafetyand environmental policy that is to be implemented andmaintainedonalllevelsoftheorganisation,bothonboardandonshore.Rule4,ontheDesignatedPersonAshore,mayalsobementioned;inordertomaintainsafeoperationoftheshipandtoensurecontactbetweenthecompanyandthoseonboard, every company shall designate one ormore persons onshore, and theseshall have di

rectcontactwiththetoplevelofmanagement.AnotherimportantsectionoftheISMCodeis

Rule6Section5,whichdemandsthatthecompanyidentifytraininglevelsinsupportofthesafetymanagementsystem.Thisentailsarequirementthatthecompanyevaluatewhatqualificationsarenecessaryforthevesselspersonnelinrelationtothe activity/operations to be executed over andabove the minimum requirements in the STCWConvention.Whereasformanyfunctionsitwillbesufficienttopossessqualificationspursuanttothe

requirementsoftheSTCWConvention,executionofcertainmaritimeoperationswilldemandanextendedexpertiseiftheworkistobedoneinasafemanner.

ItfollowsfromtheCodethat thesafetymanagement systems shallbe documentable, conferRule11,andbeverifiedandreviewed,conferRule12.TheshipsshallalsobeoperatedbyacompanythatiscertifiedwithaDocumentofCompliance,i.e.withacertificateofapproval,conferRule13Section 1. The ships shall be equipped with aSafetyManagementCertificate,conferRule13Section7.

The prime responsibility for safety lies withthecompany,conferRule3.Rule1Section1.2definesthecompanyastheshipsowneroranyotherorganisationorperson,forexampleashippingcompany or turnkey charterer who has takenover responsibility for the operation of the shipfromthecompanyandwhohasontakeoveroftheresponsibility consented to take over all dutiesand all responsibility imposed on him by theCode. For cargo ships the ISM Code is imple

mentedinStatutoryRegulationsNo.822of6August1996onsafetymanagementsystemsforcar


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goships.Foroffshorevesselsover500tonnestheCodeenteredintoforceon1July2002.

Requirementsforsafetymanagementsystemsare described only briefly in the SeaworthinessAct,butintheMaritimeSafetyActthishasbeen

given a central significance. The amending billProposition No. 87 to the Odelsting (2005-2006)onMaritimeSafetyemphasisedtheimportanceofsafetymanagementsystems,andtheMinistryofTradeandIndustrystatedinthatconnection:

Thesignificanceofthefactthatthesafetyandenvironmentalworkinthecompaniesisestablished in a structured, systematic and documentablemanner,cannotbeover-emphasised.Itiscrucialthattheindividualcompanyformulatesclearobjectivesforthesafetyandenvironmentalworkandapolicyforhowtheobjectives

aretobeattainedbythecompany.TheMinistry would also emphasise the importance ofthe companys top management prioritisingand ensuring that both the companys safetymanagementsystemandtheindividualshipsofthecompany,functioningasdesignedandbeingcontinuouslyimproved.Withoutaclearprioritisationandfollow-uponthepartofcompanymanagement,itwillbedifficulttoachievethefulleffectofhavingasafetymanagementsystem.

TheISMCodesmainintentionsareenshrinedintheMaritimeSafetyActSection7firstparagraph:

Thecompanyshallseetotheestablishment,implementationandfurtherdevelopmentofadocumentable and verifiable safety management system in the companys organisationandontheindividualships,soastochartandcontrol risksand ensure compliance with requirementslaiddowninorpursuanttotheActorinthesafetymanagementsystemitself.Thesafety management systems content, scopeand documentation shall be adapted to the

needsof thecompanyand theactivityitconducts.

3.4 Requirements for manning andqualifications

SOLAS Chapter V Rule 14 demands that a shiphavesufficientmanning.Amplifyingmanningrequirements are made in IMO Resolution A 890(21),whichisappliedbyNorwayandisemployed

in the Statutory Regulations of 17 March 1987

(theManningRegulations).ItistheNorwegianMaritime Directorate that determines the manningrequirementsfortheindividualvesselviaissueofamanningschedule,whichisakindofcertificate.ItfollowsfromtheRegulationsthatcargo

shipswithagrosstonnageover50shallhavestipulated manning. The requirements made bytheDirectorateareaminimummanning(safetymanning)andthecompanymustitselfdecidewhetheritisnecessarytoincreasethemanningfurther.

TheInternationalConventiononStandardsofTraining,CertificatesandWatch-keepingforSeafarers (the STCW Convention of 1978) makesqualificationrequirementsforpersonnelonships.TheconventionisimplementedinStatutoryRegulationsNo.687of9May2003(theQualificationRequirements). At the time of the accident the

regulationswereauthorisedbytheActNo.42of5June 1981 on Certification of Personnel on NorwegianShips(theCertificationAct),whichwasapureenablingact.AmongotherthingstheConventionandtheRegulationsmakequalificationrequirementsforpersonnelonthebridgeandintheengine-room, and various other functions onboard.Therequirementsarebyandlargegeneral,andtoasmalldegreevessel-specific.Forpersonnelonanchor-handlingvessels,nospecialrequirementsaremadeoverandabovethegeneral

minimumrequirements.The Qualification Requirements Section 1-3secondparagraphd)makesrequirementsforfamiliarisation on (induction into) a new vesselwhenthecrewreportsfordutyonaship,andlaysdown that the company and the ships mastershallensure:

thatseafarers,whentheyaresettoserveonboardtheship,aremadeacquaintedwiththeirvariousdutiesandwith alltheshipsarrangementsandinstallations,allequipmentandall

proceduresandspecialaspectsoftheshipthatareofrelevancetotheirduties,whetherroutinelyorinemergencies;and

Amongotherthings,theActNo.50of3June1977onWorkingHoursandRestTimeonShipsmaderequirementsfor77hoursresttimeaweekand11 hours rest time a day for those working onboardship.TheActwasrepealedwhentheMaritimeSafetyActenteredintoforce,andthemostimportantmaterialrequirementshavebeenincorporatedintoSections23and24.


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3.5 Requirements for control,inspection and certification

Ships are subjected to comprehensive supervi

sionbyboththepublicauthoritiesandtheirclassification societies.The supervisioncommencesevenbeforeashipisbuilt,intheformofapprovalofdrawingsandotherdocumentation,andcontinuesthroughtheconstructionprocessandthereafterregularlyintheshipsoperatingphase.Intheoperatingphasetheshipshallmaintainvalidcertificatesshowingthatshehasbeeninspectedbytheauthoritiesandtheclass.Theintroductionofthe ISM Code meant that supervision was nolongerdirectedsolelyattheshipstechnicalcondition,butalsoatthesafetyworkofthecompany.

Seafarersqualifications aremoreoversubject topubliccontrol.

The roles of the public authorities and theclassificationsocietiesinsupervisionofshipsarecomplementary, so as to avoid duplication ofwork.Whereassupervisionofforexamplestabilityandmanningispartofthepublicsupervision,hullandenginesareexamplesoffactorsthathavetraditionally been something supervised by theclassificationsocietiesundertheclassownrules.As described in greater detail below, in Norway

andabroadithaslongbeenstandardpracticethatthe classification societies have been delegatedresponsibility for partsof the public supervisionwork.Thedegreeofdelegationvaries fromstatetostateandinthecaseofNorwaywithwhatkindofshipisconcerned,andwhethertheshipisregisteredinNIS(theNorwegianInternationalShipRegister)orNOR(theNorwegianOrdinaryShipRegister). For example, supervision of safetymanagement system for passenger ships registeredinNORisdonebytheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate,whereasforcargoshipsregisteredinNORthisisdelegatedtotheclassificationsocieties.Inthisroletheclassificationsocietiesactasifitweretheauthoritiesthemselveswhoundertookthesupervision.

3.5.1 The Norwegian Maritime Directorateas a supervisory body

As mentioned, the Law of the Sea Treaty laysdownthatsupervisionofshipsafetyisfirstandforemostanobligationuponthestateinwhichthe

shipisregistered(theflagstate).InNorwaytheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorateisthedesignated supervisory body. The Norwegian Maritime

Directorate is the administrative and executivebodyforworkonsafetyatseaandhasdelegatedauthorityfromtheMinistryofTradeandIndustry.Incasesconcerningpollutionandprotectionof the marine environment, the Directorate has

delegatedauthorityfromtheMinistryoftheEnvironment. The Directorates paramount objectiveistoachieveahighlevelofsafetyforlife,health,vesselandtheenvironment.

TheNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratessupervisionofNorwegianshipsandmobileinstallationsconsistsofvariouselements,suchasapprovalofthedesign,controlofdrawingsandcalculations,inspectionsduringtheconstructionperiod(construction supervision), periodic inspections ofshipsintraffic,surpriseinspections,andauditsofthesafetymanagementsystemsonships,mobile

installationsandthecompaniesoperatingorganisationonshore,plusissueofcertificatesforthesematters.Controlofdocumentationisdonemainlybypersonnelatheadoffice,andinspectionsmainly by the Norwegian Maritime Directorates 19stations, whereas the audits are performed bypersonnelfromboththestations,thevesseldepartmentsand the seafarerdepartment.In addition,thestationsundertakeinspectionsofforeignshipsthatcallatNorwegianportsin theformofportstatecontrolandhoststatecontrol.Supervi

sionofforeignmobileinstallationsontheNorwegianShelfforissueofaLetterofComplianceisperformedincollaborationbetweentheoffshoredepartmentandinspectorsfromthestations.

InadditiontheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate performs audits and spot-checks of the approved classification societies, approved controlenterprises, approved radio enterprises andotherswhoperformsupervisorytasksonbehalfoftheDirectorate.

TheNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratealsoperforms certification of Norwegian maritime personnelandcontrolofthequalificationsofforeignerswhoaretoserveinpostsinNorwegianshipswhere certificates are required. Seafarers medical fitness for service on Norwegian vessels iscontrolled by approved seafarers physicians athomeandabroad.

3.5.2 Classification societiesas supervisory bodies

The Ministry of Trade and Industry has made

agreementsfordelegationofsupervisoryauthority with five classification societies: Det norskeVeritas(DNV),LloydsRegister(LR),BureauVer


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itas (BV),GermanischerLloyd(GL)and AmericanBureauofShipping(ABS).Asregardscontrolofmobileinstallations,theMinistryofTradeandIndustryhasmadeagreementswithDNVandLRfordelegationofsupervisoryauthority.Theback

groundtothedelegationisthatthepurposestobe served by the classification society and thegovernment maritime authorities are to a largeextentidentical.Therulesenforcedbyboth,respectivelytheclassrulesandpublicactsandregulations,builduponandcomplementoneanother.

Whentheclassificationsocietiesarethedelegatedauthority,theyactonbehalfoftheflag-stateauthority.Thecontrolisbasedonthepublicregulatory system of the flag stateand internationalobligations the flag-stateconcerned has ratified.Onthebasisoftheirownclassrules,theclassifi

cationsocietiesperformtheirowninspectionsonboardthesameshipswiththesamepurpose.Delegationcanthuspreventduplicationofwork.Historically,ithasalsobeennaturaltoworkthroughdelegation, as the classification societies begantheirsafetyworklongbeforetheauthoritiesestablishedsupervisioninthearea.

The degree of delegation varies. For NISships, delegation is more comprehensive; itmeansthattheclassificationsocietyisauthorisedtoperformallinspectionsonallkindsofship,in

cludingpassengerships,thatareclassedinthesociety concerned. This also includes assignmentsindesignapproval,inspectionsandissueofcertificatestoshipspursuanttoNorwegianregulationsandinternationalconventions(SOLASandothers)towhichNorwayisasignatory.Manningschedulesare,however,issuedbytheauthorities.FortheNORfleetthedelegationismorelimited,and concerns first and foremost control ofhull,enginesandloadline.Delegationdoesnotapplytomeasurement,stability,outfitting(includingescape routes), the design of the bridge, rescueequipment, radio communication, navigationalaids,pollutionprevention,manningandworkingconditions.Delegationalsocoversonlycertaininspections and the issue of only certain certificates.

Finally, the agreements involve the right ofNorwegianauthoritiestocontroltheworkoftheclassification societies through audits, includingvisits totheirofficesandinspectionsoftheshipssoastodeterminetowhatextenttheworkhasbeen done in conformity with the delegation

agreement. In this connection the NorwegianMaritimeDirectoratehastherightoffullaccesstodocumentationandotherrelevantmatters.The

classificationsocietyhasanextensivedutytoreportonitsongoingwork.

Inconsequenceoftheabove-mentioneddelegation,thefiveclassificationsocietiesperformasubstantialportionofthepublicNorwegiancerti

ficationandsupervisionwork.

3.5.3 The Norwegian Maritime Directoratescontrol

3.5.3.1 Introduction

The Norwegian Maritime Directorate performscontrolandsupervisioninthefollowingareas: Controlofvessels Controlofmobileinstallations Controlofseafarersqualifications Controloftheenvironment

Verificationcontrolofsafetymanagementsystems

Auditsofclassificationsocietiesandapprovedenterprises(smallerfishing-boats)

3.5.3.2 More on the division between direct and

paramount control

The Norwegian Maritime Directorates controlconsistsofbothdirectandparamountcontrol.InrecentyearstheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate

hashadastrategicgoalofturningthesupervisioninthedirectionofamoreparamountcontrol,andthisisalsoenshrinedintheNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratesstrategyplan.DirectcontrolmeansthattheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorateitselfapproves designs, including controlling drawings,undertaking inspections, issuing and renewingcertificates,etc.Paramountcontrol,alsocalledindirectcontrol,coverseverythingelsedonebytheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate.Thetermparamountcontrolinvolvesholisticassessmentsoftheoveralleffectofthemeasuresonwhetherthedesiredlevelisachieved,whetherthemeasuresareexpedient and whether safety conditions havebeen improved as a whole. Paramount controltherefore covers standards work, supervisiontechniquesandmethodology,plusattitudeandbehaviourcorrectionmeasures.Paramountcontrolpresupposes active application of available accidentstatisticsasacorrectivetobothstandardandsupervision changes. The Directorate preparesaccidentstatisticsannually.

The concept of paramount control also in

volvescontrolofdelegatedsupervisor yauthority.Thecontrolisperformedasanauditto makesurethatthosewhohavereceiveddelegatedsu


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pervisoryauthority,forexampleclassificationsocietiesorapprovedenterprises,performtheirdelegateddutiesinasatisfactorymanner.Theclassification societies may have received delegatedassignmentsto,forexample,controldrawingsof

newbuildingsandrebuildings,andsafetymanagementsystems(ISM)onboardandinthecompany.Inprincipletheclassificationsocietiescanperform the same control as the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, provided that they havereceived delegated authority for it. In Norway,portstatecontrolisnotdelegatedtoclassificationsocieties.

3.5.3.3 More on control of vessels and mobile

installations

ThecontrolresponsibilityassignedtotheNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratecoversallcategoriesofvesseloveracertain size andallmobile installations. The approval and control work is carriedoutaslongastheentityisflying theNorwegianflag.Iftheworkhasbeendelegatedtotheclassificationsociety,thelatterwillperformalltheapprovalandcontrolwork.ThisisthesituationfortheNISfleet.ForNOR,ontheotherhand,mostoftheworkisdonebytheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate itself. The individual phases of the

controlsystemareasfollows:

Building notification

Assoonasacontractforconstructionorrebuildingofavesselhasbeensigned,itshallbenotifiedtotheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate.ThiswasstatedintheSeaworthinessActSection11.

Approval of the design

Drawingsare thensubmitted for approvalof design, control of calculations and approval of arrangement,stabilitybooketc.,confertheBuildingRegulationsSection8.

Construction supervision/initial inspection

Beforeshipsormobileinstallationsubjecttocontrolareputintoservice,itshallbecontrolledthatthe entity was built and equipped in conformitywiththeapproveddrawings.Thisworkisdoneatthe constructing shipyard and with subcontrac

torsthroughouttheconstructionperiod.TheDirectorateshallamongotherthingsbepresentandapprovetheheel(roll)test.

Certification

When,attheendoftheconstructionperiod,ithasbeendeterminedthatthevesselorinstallationsatisfies the requirements laid down in legislation,

regulationsandinternationalconventionsapplicable toNorwegianentities,themandatorycertificatesareissued.TheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate then stipulates the requirements for thecrewsqualificationsforallshipssubjecttocontrol and the minimum manning on passengerships,cargoshipsandmobileinstallations.

Periodic inspection

Theshipisinspectedregularly,andonthisbasisthecertificatesarerenewed.Ingoodtimebefore

theexpiryofthecertificateperiod(nolaterthan14 days before), the company is obliged to requestinspectionforrenewalofthecertificate.

Intermediate inspection and annual inspections

Formostcertificateswithalongperiodofvalidity,intermediateinspectionsoftheshiparemandatory,andusuallyalsoannualinspectionsinordertoascertainwhetherthemandatorytechnicalstandardisbeingmaintainedinthecertificateperiod.

Formostcertificates,itisusualfortheintermediateinspectiontotakeplaceinthecourseofthethirdyear.

ISM audits

Companies that operate cargo ships in internationaltraffic,passengershipsandmobileinstallationsaremandatedtohaveasafetymanagementsystemundertheISMCode.Theauthoritiesconfirm, through issuance of certificates, that thesafetymanagementsystemsatisfiesthemainrequirementsoftheISMCode;andtheyperformsystem audits both of company offices and onboard the individual vessel/installation, soas tomakesurethatthesystemsareactuallyusedandfunctionasintended.

Surprise inspections

Inadditiontotheperiodicinspectionsthatfollowdirectly from the regulatorysystem, surpriseinspectionsonboardmaybeperformed.Thesur

priseinspectionscoverfishing-boatsandpassengerships,plusdelegatedandnon-delegatedcargoshipsinNORandNIS.Inadditiontheclassifica


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tionsocietiesaremandatedtoperform10% surprisesupervisionofthatportionoftheNISfleetthattheyhavebeendelegated.

Port State Control

Pursuant to the Paris Memorandum of Understanding(MOU)andEUdirective95/21assubsequentlyamended,Norwayisobligedtocontrolatleast 25% of individual foreign ships that call inNorwegianports.Inprinciplethecontrolconsistsof ensuring that the ship has valid internationalcertificates,butamoredetailedinspectionmaybeperformedifthereisasuspicionthatashipdoesnotsatisfytheinternationalregulatorysystem.

Other kinds of supervisionThe Norwegian Maritime Directorate also performssupervisioninconnectionwiththeissuanceofsailingpermits,towingpermits,movingcertificates,measurementcertificates,proofofidentityandcertificatesoninsuranceagainstliabilityforoilspilldamage.Vesselsareinadditioninspectedif they have suffered accident or damage. TheNorwegian Maritime Directorate also conductssupervision of equipment suppliers service stationsforinflatablerescueequipment(suchequip

mentshallbecontrolledbyapprovedservicestationsatregularintervals).

3.5.3.4 The Norwegian Maritime Directorates

control of classification societies and

approved enterprises

As mentioned in Section 3.5.3.2, the NorwegianMaritimeDirectorateundertakescontrolofdelegated supervisory authority. This indirect/paramountcontrol aims atreassurancethat systemsand working forms employed function as designedandleadtotheintendedresults.Thisindirectcontrolconsistsmainlyofthreekindsofcontrols: System audits.Auditscheckthattheclassifica

tion societies have a satisfactory system foraddressing the assignments agreed. In addition,spotchecksareperformedatheadofficesand field stations in order to check that theclassificationsocietiesrepresentativesarefollowingthepreconditionsstatedinthedelegationagreement,intheinternationalregulatory

system, in the companies own rules andinstructionsandintheproceduresandinstruc

tionsissuedbytheNorwegianMaritimeDirectorate.

Vertical audits. Here representatives of theNorwegianMaritimeDirectoratewillfollowaninspectionperformedbyaclassificationsoci

etyinconnectionwithcertificaterenewalsoastoreassurethemselvesthattheclassificationsociety has performed its duties as agreed.Representatives of the Norwegian MaritimeDirectorate can also let the class inspectorundertakehiscontrolfirstandmakehiscomments,andthenthemselvesinspectafterwardsandmaketheirowncomments,whichcanbecomparedwithwhattheclassificationsocietyhasfound.

Surprise supervision.Inadditiontotheperiodicinspections,surpriseinspectionsonboardare

alsoundertakeninordertoconfirmthatthevessels technical standard is in conformitywith regulatory requirements. Here the NorwegianMaritimeDirectorateinspectstheshipwithout the classification society beingpresent.AftertheinspectionanexpertpanelintheDirectorateconsiderstheresultsandfindings of the control, and if necessary undertakesfollow-upoftheclassificationsociety.

3.5.3.5 Control of seafarersThe Norwegian Maritime Directorate performscertificationofNorwegianmaritimepersonnelafterapriorcontrolofdocumentationinaccordancewiththeSTCWConvention.

3.5.3.6 Control of the environment

Control that stipulated requirements for designand operation related to prevention of pollutionarebeingcompliedwithareapartoftheordinaryvesselcontrol.

3.5.4 The classification societies own workoutside the public regulatory system

As mentioned above, the classification societiesbegan their work before the public sector. DetnorskeVeritaswasestablishedin1864,andothersocietieswereactiveevenbeforethattime.Atsea,therefore, the private sector was the first to dosafetywork.Thedrivingforcebehindthisdevelopmentwasthemarineinsurancebusiness.The

classificationsocietycaninprincipleperformitsservices on all ships irrespective of nationalityandwaters.Validclasscertificatesareaprecondi


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tionfortheshipbeingabletoobtaininteraliainsuranceandflag-stateregistration.

Theclassificationsocietiesbasetheirworkonself-developed rules for ship design and equipmentasregardsstrength,integrityandsafeoper

ations. The rules of the classification societiestake account, however, of the international conventionsandtoalargeextentmakesupplementaryprovisionstothese.TheNorwegianregulatorysystemhasmadetheclassificationsocietiesregulatory system binding by means of referring tothelatterintheseareas.Thismeansfirstandforemostrulesfortheshipsintegrity,hull,enginesandothertechnicalinstallationsontheship.Theclassificationservicemeansthattheshipsdesignistobeapproved,thattheshipshallbeinspectedthroughouttheconstructionperiod,thatsubcon

tractorsdeliveriesofequipment,asforexamplemainengines,boilers,electricalsystems,pumps,etc.aretobeapprovedbeforedeliverytotheshipyard, and after delivery from the shipyard theship istobeinspectedviaperiodicandother inspections throughout her lifetime.On this basisthe class certificate is issued, to certify compliancewithregulatoryrequirements.

Inprinciple classification isvoluntary forthecompany and neither international nor nationalprovisionsmakedirectrequirementsforclassifi

cationofships.The Bourbon Dolphin was classed in DNVand had consequently tosatisfy theirregulatorysystem.

3.6 Brief summary of the Britishregulatory system for anchor-handling operations

3.6.1 Introduction

Theapplicableregulatorysystemisextensiveandconsists,besidesactsandregulations,ofseveralothersourcesoflawaswell.AsinNorway,thereisadivisionbetweenthemaritimelegislation,thepetroleum legislation and the shoreside legislation.Inbothcountriestheshoresideregulatorysystem has been givenapplication topetroleumactivity, and in addition a number of ruleshavebeenpromulgatedfortheoffshoreactivityinparticular.

Themethodologyof theregulatorysystemisinmanywayssimilartowhatwefindinthesafety

regulationofthepetroleumactivityinNorway,inwhichactsandregulationsareformulatedasfunctionalrequirements(intheUKlabelledagoalset

tingregime).Thismeansthattherulespresentgoalsandprinciplesinwhichitisstatedwhattheauthoritieswishtoachievethroughtheregulatorysystem.Therulesaretherebytoalargeextentvaguelyformulated,whichcreatesdifficulties for

theworkoffindingoutwhatneedstobedonetomeettheregulatorysystemsrequirementsonthebasisofactsandregulationsalone.

Like the Norwegian regulatory system, theBritish regulatory system also makes requirements for health, environment and safety. Theregulatory methodology is broadly speaking amatterofissuinggeneral,formalrulesinwhichthe objective is formulated, whereas the playershavea certaindiscretionasregardshowtheobjectivesare tobeachieved.Forsomeregulatorysystems,aguidanceor approved code of practice

(ACOP)hasbeenprepared.Thesecodesarenotlegallybindinganditisuptotheplayerswhethertheywillmakeuseoftherecommendedsolutions,inthesensethattheymayselectothersolutionsaslongastheselectedsolutionsmeetformalrequirementsinactsorstatutoryregulation.Itisdifficult to determine whether a selected solutionwill meet the requirements of extremely vaguestandards,andthismustbedonethroughaconcrete assessment. As the last link in the chain,work standards or recommendations have been

prepared;thesemayberegardedasconstitutingrelevant good practice, and are usually moreconcretein theircontent. The standardsarenotbinding,butarerelevantaslongastheyprovidean indication of how the vaguely formulated requirementsofthebindingregulatorysystemcanbemet.Theymaybepreparedbytheauthoritiesorbyvariousprivateorganisations.

3.6.2 General requirements for safety andhealth

ThekeypieceoflegislationinBritishsafetyregulationistheHealthandS

bourbon dolphin (capsizing)

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