boundary disputes and state failure a case study of somalia
TRANSCRIPT
BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND STATE FAILURE IN THE
HORN OF AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA STATE
FAILURE
A Research work presented to the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
By
KASSIM ABDULBASIT
U07IS1043
AUGUST, 2011
APPROVAL PAGE
Name of Candidate: Kassim Abdulbasit
Research Topic: Boundary Disputes and State Failure in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Somalia State Failure
Approved by:
--------------------------------- Project Supervisor
Mallam A.T. Umar
--------------------------------- Project Coordinator
Mallam Bappah
--------------------------------- Head of Department
Dr. Hudu Ayuba
ABSTRACT
While in the past two decades, the Horn of Africa region has experienced
various armed conflicts, a new security threat that has emerged is the growing
threat of State Failure particularly in Somalia. This phenomenon has assumed
prominence in international discourse in the aftermath of the 11 September
2001 attacks on the United States of America. Against the background of a
politically unstable state, impoverished by poverty, disease, conflicts, and a high
rate of political spoilers, a foothold of state failure in Somalia could further
destabilize the state as well as the whole region.
The research on the causes of the escalation of violence in Somalia has revealed
that within the context of the region, regional security and rivalry are the
determinant factors for the comprehension of the regional politics. This explains
why Ethiopia represents the most important external actor for a vivid
understanding of the pertinent state failure in Somalia. The historical rivalry
between the two nations has often defined their role in the sustainability of
peace and state-building in the two states. This historical rivalry which bore
down to the era of colonialism is premised upon the ill-defined border of the
Ogaden region. The various efforts and motives put forward by the two nations
in restoring the Ogaden region has been a contributing factor to the emergence
of armed contestation, insurgency, coup and the eventual collapse of the central
government as witnessed in Somalia after their defeat by Ethiopia in the era of
Siad Barre. Some measures that the international community, in concert with
other stakeholders can take towards the Somali conflict should therefore include
a practical re-conceptualisation of the imminent factors that propel the
escalation of the conflict foremost of which is the external actors whose role in
the conflict cannot be undermined.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My sincere appreciation and gratitude is first and foremost to Allah (swt)
for unleashing upon me the true light of knowledge and reasoning and for
granting me the opportunity, good health and courage to write this research
work given the overwhelming academic challenges . My sincere appreciation
after Allah (swt) is directed to my beloved parents who never relented in their
struggle to see that my dream and vision becomes a reality.
I wish to acknowledge the invaluable contributions of those who assisted
me to accomplish my studies to this particular stage. I wish to particularly
mention Dr. Siraj Abdulkarim and his beloved wife Hajia Mardiyya Mashi for
the valuable role they play in moulding me and guarding me all through my
studies. I also acknowledge my project supervisor Mallam A.T. Umar, for his
patience, understanding, and tireless effort without which this work would not
have been completed.
I want to commend the efforts of my lecturers who were always ready to
assist me in all dimensions throughout my academic career, Mallam Tafida, Mr
Sunday Suleiman, Mallam Abdul, Mallam Gwarzo and others who have
contributed to my academic success. My commendations also go to Dr. Ibrahim
Muhammad for his encouragement, guidance, and pieces of advice.
I acknowledge with deep appreciation the role played by my beloved
brothers for the unwavering support they gave me during this period. I am
particularly enthused by their advices and sermons which have today sharpen
my orientation.
I also commend the efforts of my colleagues who made my academic
period a fruitful journey Mallam Abdullateef, Mallam Sanusi, Mallam Shefiu,
Mallam Muhammad, Mallam Ismail and others whose contribution cannot be
undermined.
Finally, to all those who in diverse ways assisted in making this work a
reality I am grateful to you all.
ACRONYMS
AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia
ARS Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
CIC Council of Islamic Courts
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
EPLF Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front
TFG Transitional Federal Government
TNG Transitional National Government
SCIC Supreme Council of Islamic Courts
SNA Somali National allince
SNM Somali National Movement
SNRC Somalia National Reconciliation Conference
SRRC Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SRC Supreme Revolutionary Council
SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement
SYL Somali Youth League
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
USC United Somali Congress
WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The substance and veracity of boundaries has sparked up intellectual debate
especially during the Cold War. Boundary brings states together whether they want
it or not. States with a common boundary share at least a minimum degree of
"relation" and cannot claim to be able to totally ignore each other. In fact,
boundaries create a prima facie hostile situation, since "my neighbour is my
enemy".
Boundaries are by definition shared. They define a state territorially and
provide in this way a condition for state sovereignty, yet their very nature as
relational is an infringement upon the same sovereignty. Thus, a boundary can be a
potential mirror of internal disputes as well as a root of an interstate dispute in
itself. Another aspect, adding to the intricacy of boundary relations, is that they are
based both on internal and international legislation: a boundary agreement is an
international legal document, even if it’s making and ratification is exclusively
based on an internal political processes (Nordquist, 1992).
Boundary disputes which frequently correlate with militarized actions have
taken a centre stage as one of the most explosive international flashpoints. Border
incursions between one African country and another are not new even though they
are infrequent; considering the misunderstanding that exists among several
countries about the exact location of their border. A clash when it occurs, not
surprisingly, has usually been about one country seeking to gain an unequivocal
edge in its claim to territory which it believes had been lost through encroachment.
A handful of such clashes that have occurred in recent history such as the
nondescript conflict in North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC), have
been motivated by irredentism when Tutsi and Hutu militias on the other side of
the border in Rwanda and Burundi have meddled in DRC’s affairs. In the 1970s
and 1980s, Libyan troops often clashed with Chadian troops over the “Aouzou
strip,” a land that straddles their common border and is reputedly rich in uranium.
From the early 1990s security forces from Nigeria and Cameroon clashed regularly
over Bakassi, a triangular-shaped land wedged between the two countries, until the
International Court of Justice ruled in 2002 to award ownership to Cameroon. The
most brazen invasion by one African country of another was the case of King
Hassan of Morocco ordering the take-over of the Western Sahara in the “Green
March” of 1975, in which 350,000 civilians crossed the border shortly after Spain
had announced plans to leave the colony (Pazzani, 1994).
Border disputes have contributed to the explosion of state failure in the
aftermath of the Cold War within the international system. The term Failed State
does not denote a precisely defined and classifiable situation but serves rather as a
broad label for a phenomenon which can be interpreted in various ways. A State is
usually considered to have failed when the power structures providing political
support for law and order have collapsed. This process is generally triggered and
accompanied by anarchic forms of internal violence. The former Secretary-General
of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, described this situation in the
following way:
A feature of such state is the collapse of state institutions,
especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of
governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry
and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended,
but its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are
killed or flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars
(Thürer, 1999).
Hence, three elements can be said to characterize a Failed State from the
political point of view. Firstly, there is the geographical and territorial aspect,
namely the fact that Failed States are essentially associated with internal and
endogenous problems, even though these may incidentally have cross-border
impacts. The situation is one of an implosion rather than an explosion of the
structures of power and authority, of disintegration and de-structuring of states
rather than dismemberment. Secondly, there is the internal aspect, namely the
collapse of the political and legal systems. The emphasis here is on the total or near
total breakdown of structures guaranteeing law and order rather than the kind of
fragmentation of state authority seen in civil wars, where clearly identified military
or paramilitary rebels fight either to strengthen their own position within the State
or to break away from it. Thirdly, there is the external aspect, namely the absence
of bodies capable, on one hand, of representing the state at the international level
and, on the other, of being influenced by the outside world. Either no institution
exists which has the authority to negotiate, represent, and enforce or, if one does, it
is wholly unreliable, typically acting as “statesman by day and bandit by night”.
In the foregoing analysis, we can discern the fact that boundary disputes
tend to have a considerable impact on the consequences that accompanies the trend
of state failure and this has been illustrated by the manifestation of conflicts and
the resulting state collapse in the Horn of Africa with Somalia being a
quintessential representation of this circuit.
The Horn of Africa is a region that has experienced severe border disputes
mostly resulting into inter-state wars and capabilities of generating state failure.
The Horn of Africa conventionally comprises of the key states of Ethiopia,
Somalia and Djibouti, though it embraces geopolitically the adjoining states of
Sudan and Kenya (Farer, 1979:1; Danfulani, 1999:37). All these states share social
and cultural values emanating from centuries-old tradition of interrelationships,
common religious practices and economic linkages. Furthermore, the political fate
of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of
neighbouring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from
the problems of the other states no matter how distant and how strong or weak.
The Horn of Africa has long been a focal point of strategic interest to
outsiders. In fact, for many centuries, the Horn attracted international attention for
three main reasons: strategic location; religious and ethnic diversity; and
agricultural potential (Doombos, 1992).
Although border crisis in the Horn of Africa predates colonialism but the
embers of these conflicts could be argued, to a large extent, to have been formed
by colonial politics. This process led to the partitioning and indiscriminate
amalgamation of hitherto independent and diverse elements thereby disregarding
the impending manifestation of rivalries which bore its head after independence.
This indiscriminate amalgamation of diverse elements exploded border
disputes and intense rivalries in the Horn of Africa and the resulting conflict
became obvious after independence as states orchestrate and support insurgencies
as well as instability in their neighbouring states thus ushering the syndrome of
state collapse and its imminent danger within the region. This situation is fully
exemplified by the diplomatic glitches between Sudan and Ethiopia, when Sudan
supported and further instigated rebel movements in Ethiopia. Another case in
view involves the proxy war fought between Mengistu and Barre in which they
both supported insurgencies in one another’s country. These are among many other
cases such as Eritrea’s support for Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the
National Democratic Alliance (Cliffe, 1999:90; Healy, 2008a:39). Many describe
Eritrea’s support to Somali Islamist Movement as a proxy war which is
opportunistic as its cuts across ideological lines (Markakis, 1998).
The external environment also plays an important role in the politics in the
Horn of Africa. This was informed by the strategic position of the region due to its
proximity to the Red Sea which is an important route for international trade and
communication for a number of powerful states. The interest of powerful countries
such as the U.S and the Soviet Union brought it into closer contact with region
establishing spheres of influence and going as far as sponsoring rebel groups in
other states to prove their loyalties. This region due to this became a battle field for
the world powers (Cliffe, 1999:97-99; Lefebvre, 1996:401; Woodward, 2006:49).
The impact of external actors in the Horn of Africa became vividly declared
in the ‘War on Terror’, a declaration that witness the collusion of US and
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006. Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia
in late 2006 may go down in history as one of the most daring if not imprudent
strategic decision any African government has made on its neighbour. Even if
Ethiopia's goal of going into Somalia had been purely humanitarian, the nearly two
decades of instability there and the history of irredentism, distrust and border
disputes between the two countries should have given Ethiopia pause to be
prudent.
Somalia a prominent country within the Horn of Africa region has been
recognized within the international system as an archetype of a failed state. Several
factors have been postulated as the causes of state failure in Somalia ranging from
political fragmentation, clan-based politics, and high level of piracy, the growth of
radical Islamism, regional hostilities, and boundary disputes etc. Since the ouster
of President Siad Barre and the collapse of his institutions in 1991 by the combined
northern and southern clan-based forces, rival countries in the Horn of Africa have
played prominent role towards sustaining state failure in Somalia as a result of the
regional hostility arising from border disputes and intense rivalry within the region.
The most prominent of these rival countries is Ethiopia widely regarded as the
most important benefactor of the rebel movements in Somalia and its outright
support for subversive activities against the legitimate government in Somalia
(Marchal, 2007).
The conflict between Somalia and two of its neighbours, Ethiopia and
Kenya, started with Somali independence in 1960. It can be traced to problems
created by the lack of congruence between, on one hand, the colonial and inherited
new state boundaries, and on the other hand, ethnically homogenous areas. The
Somali idea of a Greater Somalia encompassing all Somali-speaking peoples was
aimed at rectifying this situation created by the colonial powers on the Horn of
Africa.
Ethiopia and Somalia share a history defined simultaneously by shared and
contrasting ethnic, economic and political circumstances. The two countries also
share a conflictual political history, which has remained virile by each side’s claim
to the Ogaden, which is the territory that straddles their border. According to
Schraeder (2005), the future basis for some degree of pan-Somali nationalism
emerging was provided by the temporary unification of significant portions of
Somali-inhabited territory by Italians, adding Ethiopia’s Ogaden region to Italian
Somaliland after occupying Ethiopia in 1935. In the 1940s, Italy again added the
conquered British Somaliland territory to Ethiopia.
When Britain reoccupied the territory in 1941, it placed all the Somali
occupied territory in the Horn, except Djibouti, under one unified administration.
In 1945, Haile Sellassie, fearing the possibility of British support for a separate
Somali state that would include the Ogaden, claimed Italian Somaliland as a “lost
state”. When the British evacuated the Ogaden in 1948, Ethiopia officially took
over running the largest city in the Ogaden. Great Britain which governed British
Somaliland tried to resolve the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the
Ogaden and the Haud, a region that extends southeast from Ethiopia’s Southern
highlands. Somalia, on her part, refused to recognize any pre 1960 treaties defining
the Somali-Ethiopia border, resulting in military incidents only a few months into
Somalia’s independence.
Aside this regional factor that influenced statelessness in Somalia the
prevalent internal congruence also influenced the emergence of state collapse in
Somalia. The history of Somalia’s current stalemate started in 1969—nine years
after independence—when the commander in chief of the armed forces
Mohammed Siad Barre, staged a military coup. Barre suspended the constitution,
dissolved the parliament, banned all political parties in the country and arrested
their leaders. He announced radical plans aimed at transforming the conservative
Muslim country into what he regarded as a modern socialist state by adopting what
he used to refer to as “Scientific Socialism”. This plan for the radical
transformation of the political framework of Somalia ushered into Somalia’s
history the evolution of anarchy, warlordism as well as tribalism.
The rapid disintegration of the Somali central government in the late 1980s
was however, the result of a combination of factors which simultaneously
weakened the capacity of the state while emboldening liberation movements
seeking to dislodge it. Two elements were especially important: one international
and the other domestic.
Popular discourse on the trajectory of Somalia have received considerable
literature but one powerful flashpoints that provides a broader explanation to the
incidence of state collapse in Somalia and the intense security challenges of the
Horn of Africa is the prevalent border disputes that has plagued the political
history of the countries within the Horn of Africa a situation that had its historical
origin in the colonial legacy in the Horn. It could however be argued that the failed
state syndrome and statelessness in Somalia could be traced to the series of border
disputes its experienced with its rival countries in the region most especially
Ethiopia as well as the regional security that defines the political fate of countries
within the Horn of Africa.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
This research seeks to pore over the phenomenon of border disputes and its
resulting consequence on state collapse in the Horn of Africa with particular
reference to Somalia. The extent to which border disputes contributed to the
development of Somalia throughout its history into a major regional and global
battlefield will be carefully examined in the research.
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The aims and objectives of this research is primarily geared towards;
A. Examining the consequences of border disputes on the eventual collapse of
Somalia.
B. Understanding the consequences of regional hostilities in the Horn of Africa
and its effects on survival of Somalia as a state within the region.
C. Attempting a postulation towards the restoration of legitimate authority in
Somalia.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
This research will provide a multi-dimensional approach as against the
existing one-dimensional and reductionist approach of western narratives on
Somalia crisis based on a spectrum oscillating between cultural essentialism, social
anomaly and perplexity. This reductionist interpretation gave birth to a discourse
that portrayed Somalia in stereotypical terms of anarchy, warlordism and tribalism.
This research aims to examine the internal and external forces which have
helped to prolong Somalia’s extraordinary period of state collapse. This research
will also provide a comprehensive and mutually cohesive explanation and analysis
of border disputes as a pertinent factor that facilitate state failure in Somalia.
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research work shall seek to answer the following questions;
A. What is the source and impact of border disputes in the Horn of Africa to state
collapse in Somalia?
B. How has regional hostility within the Horn of Africa contributed to the failure
of Somalia?
C. What is the impact of state failure in Somalia to the regional security of the
Horn of Africa?
D. How has border disputes contributed to the development of Somalia again and
again throughout its history into a major regional and global battlefield?
1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This research work intends to focus on the examination and assessment of
border disputes and its impacts on state failure in Somalia. However, due to the
time frame given for this research the most prominent border dispute in the Horn
of Africa region (Ogaden Crisis) between Ethiopia and Somalia will be addressed
as it present a cogent argument and insight to the present situation of state collapse
in Somalia. Attempts will also be made to explain the border dispute in the
Somalia region between the Somaliland and Puntland and how it has affected the
efforts towards sustaining peace and state-building in Somalia.
The possible limitation for this research shall be the difficulty of accessing
all the relevant literature that provides discourse on state collapse in Somalia as a
result of the language incubus. The researcher intends to establish friendly
relations with Somalis through social networks such as Facebook, Twitter etc for
the purpose of averting the language incubus but this measure could also be
possibly undermined due to the security measures on Somalians based upon the
universal acclaimed terrorism stigma. This is why the researcher is considering the
usage of language translator software in order to ease the language incubus.
There is also the expectation of difficulty in accessing viable literature that
extensively explain the failed state discourse in Somalia as a result of the physical
insecurity and problem of accessibility that have deterred researchers from
conducting longer periods of field research in the country. The researcher intends
to solicit for literature from governmental and non-governmental organizations
such as Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Heinrich Böll Foundation etc via
the internet as a means of averting this limitation.
Financial constraints to gather all the relevant literature that will aid this
research is also pre-empted as a possible limitation. The researcher intends to
solicit for funds and assistance from private individuals as well as public
institutions such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that will aid
the research.
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In the field of political science research, there are various means through
which data are collected, interpreted and analyzed in order to establish the
empirical validity of any scientific research. The two forms of data are primary and
secondary data. However, due to the nature of this research and the constraints to
accessing primary data, the data to be used shall not go beyond the secondary data
which shall be judiciously utilized. The rationale behind the adoption of secondary
data is premised upon the security implications of the variable concerned. The use
of secondary sources shall involve relevant books, internet materials, newspaper
articles, journals, pamphlets and so on.
Subsequently, the research work will employ the use of systematic
qualitative content analysis. The rationale behind the adoption of this method of
data analysis is as a result of the geographical proximity between the researcher
and the area of study.Content analysis is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of
messages that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity,
inter-subjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalisability, replicability,
and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be
measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented.
As an evaluation approach, content analysis is considered by some to be
quasi-evaluation because content analysis judgments need not be based on value
statements if the research objective is aimed at presenting subjective experiences.
According to Dr. Klaus Krippendorff (1980 and 2004), six questions must be
addressed in every content analysis:
1. Which data are analyzed?
2. How are they defined?
3. What is the population from which they are drawn?
4. What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed?
5. What are the boundaries of the analysis?
6. What is the target of the inferences?
1.8 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
A. BOUNDARY CONFLICT
A boundary conflict is over a boundary line that, as a minimum, is defined,
or in the process of being defined, by the parties, by implicit consent or explicit
agreement. This implies that all stakes and issues leading to disputes and armed
conflicts are related to once and somehow agreed-upon boundaries.
B. HORN OF AFRICA
The Horn of Africa conventionally comprises of the key states of Ethiopia,
Somalia and Djibouti, though it embraces geopolitically the adjoining states of
Sudan and Kenya.
C. FAILED STATE
A condition of state collapse implies that a state can no longer perform its
basic security and development functions and that it has no control over its
territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the
conditions for its own existence.
1.9 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS
This research work shall be structured into five major chapters using
different sub-headings:
A. CHAPTER ONE
The first chapter will encapsulate the background to the study, statement of
the research problem, aims and objectives, significance of the research, scope and
limitation, research methodology, conceptual clarification and organization of
chapters.
B. CHAPTER TWO
The second chapter will include the review of relevant literature and the
theoretical framework adopted for explaining the phenomenon.
C. CHAPTER THREE
The third chapter will detail the geographical location, historical background
and government, root causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa as well as the history
of state failure in Somalia.
D. CHAPTER FOUR
The fourth chapter will entail a systematic analysis of the major border
disputes that has affected state-building in Somalia. It will also cover the selection
criteria explanation of variables derived to give answers to the research questions.
E. CHAPTER FIVE
The fifth chapter will encompass the summary of research findings,
conclusion and recommendations. This chapter will also encapsulate the
bibliography of all the cited works within the research.
REFERENCES
Chege, M. (1987), “Conflict in the Horn of Africa”, in Africa: Perspectives on
Peace and Development, edited by Emmanuel Hansen, London: Zed
Books.
Cliffe, L. (1999), “Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa”, in
Third World Quarterly, vol.29 no.1.
Danfulani, S. (1999), “Regional Security and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of
Africa: Somalian Reconstruction after the Cold War.”International Studies,
vol.36 no.1.
Daniel, T. (1999), The “Failed State” and International Law, 81 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 731, 733–34.
Doombos, M et al. (1992), Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace,
Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan, The Hague:
Institute for Social Studies.
Farer, T. (1979), War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm, New
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Healy, S. (2008a), “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts
Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel” In Chatham House Horn of
Africa Group Report.
Healy, S. (2008b), “Ethiopia-Eritrea Dispute and the Somali Conflict” Paper
presented at the Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and
Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa.
Lefebvre, J. (1992), “The geopolitics of the Horn of Africa”, in Middle East
Policy 11, p 7-22.
Lefebvre, J. (1996), “Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power
Intervention in the Horn of Africa”, in Middle East Journal, vol.50 no3.
Marchal, R. (2007), “Warlordism and Terrorism: how to obscure an already
confusing crisis? The case of Somalia”, in International Affairs.
Markakis, J. (1998), Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa, London: SAGE
Publications.
Pazzani, A. (1994), "Morocco VersusPolisario", in Modern Africa Studies
32(2), p 265-278.
Schraeder, P. J. (2005), “From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of the
Pan-Somali Nationalism,” in Nationalism in Post-Colonial andPre-
Communism States, Lowell W. Barrington (Ed.), pp.107-141.
Woodward, P. (1996), The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations,
London:Tauris Academic Studies.
Woodward, P. (2003), The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations,
New York: I.B. Tauris.
CHAPTER TWO
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Several international conventions formulated during this century, from the
UN Charter to regional international documents, stipulate directly or indirectly that
changes of inter-state boundaries are acceptable only through peaceful means. But
crisis situations where boundaries or boundary-related issues are at stake are
frequent in the international system. Some boundary problems are settled before
they escalate into serious crises. Others seem irreconcilable and involve frequent
military exchanges. Regulated or not, boundary and border relations will remain a
potential source of conflict in the international system of states for the foreseeable
future. New states are established, the Cold War kept many unsatisfactory
solutions alive, and the penetration of states into neighbouring border areas, not the
least for economic purposes, has increased. Such developments put boundaries and
its resultant consequence on state collapse on the agenda in international relations
(Nordquist, 1992).
Many national security statements, doctrines, documents and strategies point
to ‘state failure’ as a serious security problem, particularly in the developing world
(USA 2006:15, 44; EU 2003:6, 7). ‘Failed states’ are seen as problematic in
themselves but also as drivers of other security threats, such as regional instability
and terrorism. In this discourse, the state is seen as a necessary prerequisite for
security, stability and peace. This kind of thinking is a strong strain in Western
political philosophy, harking back to Hobbes whose normative philosophy of the
state explicitly argued that the sovereign state was a solution to the ‘perpetuall
warre’ otherwise facing men (Hobbes 1996: 144-145). To an increasing extent the
prevention or rectification of state failure has assume a legitimate and pressing
security concern. Whether by military or civilian means (or an admixture of both)
‘state-building’ has become a political field in itself (Chandler, 2006).
No place seems to accentuate these worries and validate the solution of a
failed state more than Somalia, the epitome of the failed state and the insecurity
that state failure brings. This seemingly intractable security issue has in the autumn
of 2008 entered into the most intense combat and worst humanitarian situation
since the early 1990s. Since the collapse of the Siad Barré and of the Republic of
Somalia in 1991, a great number of analyses, scholarly and otherwise, have been
made in order to understand the reasons for ‘state failure’ in Somalia.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of failed states has attracted the attention of many analysts. The
state failure debate, which spans more than a decade now, has been carried among
others by Bilgin and Morton (2004), Debiel (2002), Dorff (1996, 1999, 2000,
2005), Gurr (1998), Helman and Ratner (1992-3), Herbst (1997), High-level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), Fukuyama (2004), Mazrui (1998),
Milliken (2003), Rotberg (2003, 2004), Schneckener (2004), State Failure Task
Force (2003), Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (2005).
However, any postulation of state failure needs to begin with an
understanding of the different definitions of the state (Nyugen, 2005: 3-4). How
the state is defined is central to an understanding of state failure. In International
law, a given ‘state’ exists when a political entity is recognised by other states as
the highest political authority in a given territory and is treated as an ‘equal’ entity
among the international ‘community’ of states. Statehood does not require
diplomatic recognition by other states, but rather a recognition that it exists.
Another common definition in international customary law states that statehood
exists only when a given political entity possesses a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other
states. A broader definition of the state involves the idea of ‘social contract’,
which focuses on the relationship between the state and citizen. This idea was
developed by the English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes in the 17th
century. Hobbes argued that individuals living without a state and a rule of law
find themselves in a situation of war, of all against all in which life is 'solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. His idea was that individuals would voluntarily
make a social contract with an absolute sovereign government - the state – by
giving up some of their freedom in exchange for guaranteed peace and security
(Przeworski, 1991).
Helman and Ratner (1993) were among the first analysts to use the term
‘failed state’ in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article. They were concerned about 'a
disturbing new phenomenon' whereby a state was becoming 'utterly incapable of
sustaining itself as a member of the international community'. They argued that a
failed state would '[imperil] their own citizens and [threaten] their neighbours
through refugee flow, political instability and random warfare'. Michael Ignatieff
(2002) adopts a Machiavellian/Weberian understanding of state failure when he
argues that state failure occurs when 'the central government loses the monopoly of
the means of violence'.
In the wider sense of state failure, Zartman (1995) develops the idea of state
failure along the lines of Hobbesian social contract theory. For Zartman, state
failure occurs when 'the basic functions of the state are no longer performed….It
refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and
political order have fallen apart'. According to Rotberg,
Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive
political goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy,
and in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the
nation-state itself becomes illegitimate (Rotberg, 2002: 85).
The failed states literature stresses that there are certain indicators that are
necessary (if not sufficient) to categorise a state as ‘failed’. The persistence of
political violence is salient in most definitions of ‘failed states’. For Rotberg,
Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly
contested by warring factions. In most failed states, government
troop’s battle armed revolts led by one or more warring factions
(Rotberg, 2003).
A closely related indicator of state failure is the growth of criminal violence.
Here the presence of gangs, criminal syndicates, arms and drug-trafficking are the
most cited. As a result of the failure of a state to provide security from violent non-
state actors, people often seek protection from warlords or other armed rivals of the
state. A second indicator of failed states concerns their inability to control their
borders. They lose authority over chunks of their territory. Often the expression of
official power is limited to the capital city and one or more ethnically specific
zones. Indeed one measure of the extent of state failure is how much of the state’s
geographical expanse a government genuinely controls.
Rotberg also introduces the idea that it is possible to rank failures according
to in how many dimensions a state fails to deliver positive political goods. Nation-
states exist to deliver political goods - security, education, health, economic
opportunity, environmental surveillance, making and enforcing an institutional
framework, providing and maintaining infrastructure. In order to rank the severity
of state failure, Rotberg suggests that there is a hierarchy of positive state
functions. These are: a) security; b) institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts;
rule of law, secure property rights, contract enforcement; c) political participation;
and d) social service delivery, infrastructure, and regulation of the economy.
Using three criteria to measure state performance (security, welfare and
legitimacy), Schneckener (2004) distinguishes consolidated/consolidating states
from weak, failing and failed/collapsed ones, using security as the key indicator.
He then elaborates on three sets of factors facilitating state failure: structural
factors/root causes, aggravating/accelerating factors and triggers. These can be
found at three levels: international/regional (i.e., external to the state concerned),
state and sub-state. Central for the analysis of state failure, according to
Schneckener (2004: 20), are aggravating factors at the state level, hypothesising
that elite behaviour is a key factor in the erosion or consolidation of state capacity.
Incidents of state failure in the first half of the 1990s were predominantly
analysed through the prism of the security dilemma as applied to the domestic
arena. Thus while there was a policy and academic debate about state failure long
before the issue was catapulted to the centre stage of these debates following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, the issue as a whole was primarily not seen in
terms of posing a risk to international security, but merely as an ‘unfortunate’
regional phenomenon of either temporary significance (Central and Eastern Europe
and former Soviet Union) or of a more endemic yet not particularly threatening
nature (especially Africa). This is not to say that some scholars did not recognise
the implicit long-term dangers to international security posed by state failure
(Manwaring 1993, Zartman 1995, Dorff 1996), but they remained at the margins of
the debate. A dramatic change in the state failure debate occurred only after
September 11. State failure was now seen as a major enabler of international
terrorist networks and therefore became a key focus of both scholarly analysis
(Milliken 2003, Rotberg 2003, 2004) and policy development (US National
Security Doctrine, EU Security Doctrine, Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2005,
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004). No longer were state
failure and its consequences simply viewed through the prism of humanitarian
emergencies and occasionally of threats to regional security and stability, but state
failure had become an issue of utmost importance for international security.
The prevalent scholarly hypotheses about failed state in the new millennium
were focused upon Somalia aimed about verifying the proposed hypothesis thus
providing more framework of analysis for the newly co-opted international legal
jargon. Six big ideas pervade the Somalia state failure literature. The first is the
pre-requisite view of development. This view, which dominates the governance
literature, argues that liberal markets and transparent, accountable states with
bureaucracies with classic Weberian structures are a necessary input for successful
economic development to proceed. The persistence of clientelist, corrupt and
patrimonial states as exemplified in Somalia under the Siad Barre regime is seen in
this view at best as anti-developmental and at worst a trigger for predatory state
action and violent reaction among both state and non-state factions.
The second is the pre-requisite view of security. This view uncritically
accept the concept of failed state in Somalia as a paradigm change in international
politics with fundamental implications for how we should think about and address
insecurity. This view became more popularised after the events of 9/11 and the
increase threats of terrorist networks as well as piracy from Somalia. According to
this view, ‘the incidence of state collapse in Somalia and other states have
arguably become the single most important problem for international order’.
A third view develops the idea that clientelist and patrimonial states as in
Somalia under the Siad Barre regime, while perhaps not developmental, are
purposefully constructed by elites to promote their interests in capital accumulation
and maintaining power. This view contrasts with the first two big ideas in that it
sees identifying and measuring state failure as a misleading exercise since it fails to
incorporate how leaders adapt to the historical constraints of the post-colonial
environment by constructing informal mechanisms of social control and capital
accumulation. This view attempts to incorporate the role of political agency in
concrete historical contexts.
The fourth view is encapsulated in the ‘new war’ thesis. It is based on the
idea that the unravelling of states is closely related to the nature of so-called ‘new
wars’. The proponents of the ‘new war’ thesis argue that contemporary wars are
distinct from old wars in their method of warfare, their causes and their financing.
In this view, new wars can be understood only in the context of globalisation
where the distinction between war and organised crimes is blurred and where war
financing is dependent more on webs of legal and illegal global networks.
Moreover these wars have generated an economy that is built on plunder, which is
sustained through continued violence. The proponents of this view claim that wars
are nowadays a political resources used to be thought of as a means of struggle,
now they are conceived of as the object of struggle.
The fifth view presents a sceptical analysis of the analytical value of the
concept of state collapse in Somalia on epistemological grounds, arguing that it is
difficult to objectively define, identify and analyse failed states with
methodological rigour.
Finally, a further argument in the literature rejects the idea of failed state in
Somalia as a politicized, ethnocentric, hegemonic concept with interventionist
connotations.
“Diagnosis first, prescription second” is an admonition often voiced by
analysts explaining the high failure rates of external peace-building efforts in
Africa’s prolonged civil wars. The axiom is equally relevant for domestic and
international efforts to promote state-building in zones of protracted state failure.
Far too often, well-intentioned agendas to revive functional, democratic
governance are doomed from the start because they are founded on misplaced
assumptions and weak diagnoses of the crisis. This claim certainly holds true in the
case of Somalia, which has endured more than seventeen years of complete state
collapse and which has proven impervious to a series of often robust external
efforts to revive the central state. The most dramatic and costly of these efforts was
the 1993–95 UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which not only failed to
revive a central Somali government but which constituted a major setback for
broader UN ambitions to play a peace enforcement role in the post–Cold War era.
The 2003/04 initiative by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) helped to produce a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia.
But the TFG has faced major problems of legitimacy and capacity from the outset
and has never been able to establish itself as an effective government. As of 2007,
the TFG appears likely to join the long list of stillborn governments declared in
Somalia since 1991.
After exploring these views of failed states as it’s relates to Somalia as well
as verification of the postulations of the proponents of these views, this research
presents a different argument. The argument of this research is premised upon
buttressing the impacts of border disputes on state collapse in Somalia.
The Literature on “Boundary Disputes” has received considerable attention
across the range of social science enquiry. There is little disagreement that the
boundaries of contemporary African states are unusually arbitrary as a result of
their largely colonial origins (Ajala, 1983; Asiwaju, 1985; Barbour, 1961; Bello,
1995; Brownlie, 1979; Davidson, 1992; Kum, 1993; Nugent &Asiwaju, 1996;
Sautter, 1982; Touval, 1966). There is no consensus however, as to whether this
has been a liability for African states. Some argue that borders everywhere are
artificial and that the case for African exceptionalism is weak (Clapham, 1996a;
Odugbemi, 1995).
Others do not dismiss the relatively erratic nature of African boundaries but
suggest either that it has had few deleterious consequences (Ottaway, 1999;
Touval, 1969), that the boundary lines also represent a source of opportunities for
African populations (Bach, 1999; Nugent, 1996), or that they are an asset for state
consolidation (Herbst, 2000). Still others agree that Africa has suffered from its
partitioned nature but see the costs of reshuffling states as greater than the
hypothetical benefits (“Africa’s bizarre borders,” 1997; Barbour, 1961; Bayart,
1996; “Consensus and stability,” 1995; Griffiths, 1996; Young, 1996). Finally, a
few authors believe that at least some African states would gain from territorial
reconfiguration (Bello, 1995; Herbst, 1990, 2000; Nkiwane, 1993; Southall, 1985).
The Horn of Africa provides a firm grasp towards understanding the impacts of
border disputes and its consequences on state failure.
The Horn of Africa is known for being riddled with conflict. The great
northeastern shield of Africa is comprised of Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and
Djibouti, and conflict persists in all four nations. The disagreements between these
nations are longstanding and complex, described as first a clash of tribes, then
imperial consolidation and foreign colonialism.
In a bid to understand the progression of border disputes in the Horn of
Africa and how it has contributed to the collapse of the Somali state, six mutually
complementary scholarly paradigm will be examined. They include:
1. Colonialism and State Collapse in Somalia.
2. The Cold War/East-West National Interests in the Horn of Africa and its
consequences on State Failure on Somalia.
3. Regional Conflicts in the on Horn of Africa and its consequences on State
Failure.
4. The Events of Ogaden War and its Consequences on State Failure on Somalia.
5. The Somaliland and Puntland Border Disputes and its Consequences on State
Failure on Somalia.
6. The Spread of Radical Islam in the Horn of Africa and its Consequences on
State Failure on Somalia.
2.2.1 COLONIALISM AND STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA
This paradigm focuses on the legacy of colonialism in the Horn of Africa
and how it has impacted on the current statelessness of Somalia. The Scholars of
this paradigm (Ayoob, 1980; Chege, 1987; Lewis, 1980; Markakis, 1991;
Woodward, 1996; Zartman, 1985) espouse that the seeds of the current conflicts in
the Horn of Africa and state collapse in Somalia to a large extent date back to the
European colonial experience in the Horn of Africa even though most of the
conflicts’ root causes predate this experience.
They explained that the Horn of Africa, not including Ethiopia, was
colonized at the end of the nineteenth century between the French, British, and
Italians. Djibouti was designated French Somaliland in 1885; British Somaliland
included the region of the Gulf of Aden, and Italian Somaliland included control of
the region nearest the Indian Ocean, as well as the Red Sea colony of Eritrea.
Zartman (1985) suggests that Ethiopia’s expansion eastward into colonial
Somaliland necessitated the boundaries that were established through European
agreement in 1897. The British eventually demarcated their frontier in 1932-34 by
joint agreement, but the Italian boundary was never demarcated. In an effort to
claim more territory, the Italians launched an invasion against Ethiopia under the
pretext that the Ethiopians were within Italian Somaliland. In fact, the Ethiopians
were within their own border, but the Italian invasion effectively moved the Somali
boundary westward to include the grazing area of the Ogaden, an Ethiopian portion
of the Horn of Africa.
Subsequently, the Ogaden was returned to Ethiopian administration.
However, the boundary became a barrier to nomadic migration. This was an
unacceptable proposition for the Somalis, and a border dispute between Italian
Somaliland and Ethiopia followed. Despite negotiation, arbitration, and mediation,
little was resolved. This Italian Somali-Ethiopian border dispute was a direct result
of colonialism in the region. Borders imposed on Somalia and Ethiopia were
something that the “Somali nomads had neither needed nor encountered before”
and were ambiguously assigned, hung on non-existent points, or established
around nomadic tribe and clan territory ( Zartman 1985:75). This resulted in
tensions between two nations that both relied on a common region for nomadic
survival. The Ethiopians were
“Arguing a legal case over where the border was and the Italians
[were] arguing a social-moral case on behalf of the Somalis over
where the border should be” (Zartman 1985:76).
The Ethiopians were justified to claim the territory by law, and the Somalis were
convinced of their claim through colonial power support. Despite Italian support,
colonial Somaliland gained nothing from the dispute as they could not reclaim the
lost region of Ogaden. Somali bitterness toward colonial rule led to independence
movements that resulted in a United Somalia by 1960. This newly emergent state
of Somalia was comprised of tribal leadership and had no continuity for central
governance. Consequently, tumultuous power struggles ensued and the
development of relationships between bordering nations of Eritrea, Djibouti e.t.c
created conflict as the new state struggled to establish its identity in the region.
States that must develop fundamental structures of their relationships
compared with altering established relationships; have difficulty maintaining order
because their diplomatic process has no continuity. In the border dispute between
Somalia and Ethiopia, the nations were forced to develop a new system of
interaction because of the formation of boundaries and creation of the Somali state.
This claim is also observable in Eritrea’s call for independence from
Ethiopia. When Ethiopia’s government changed from a traditional empire to that of
a military junta, a new form of negotiation was forced to occur, and the conflict
grew in complexity. The arguments of these scholars however could be premised
upon the fact that Ethiopia’s role in Somalia conflicts bore down to their bitter
experiences during and after colonialism. The discriminatory amalgamation and
partitioning that took place between the shared border of Somalia and Ethiopia has
generated a bitter rivalry between the two countries a rivalry that has generated
into escalation of instability and conflicts by the stakeholders of each countries
thus strengthening their capabilities to recover the region. This claim could be
strengthened with an assessment of the proxy war fought between Mengistu and
Barre in which they both supported insurgencies in one another’s country
(Markakis, 1991). This factor thus, gives an explanation of one of the dynamics
towards understanding the collapse of Somalia.
2.2.2 THE COLD WAR/EAST-WEST NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE
HORN OF AFRICA AND STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA
This is the paradigm that approaches the consequences of boundary disputes
on state failure in Somalia with a direct focus on the activities of the superpowers
in the Horn of Africa especially in the aftermath of the Cold War. The scholars of
this paradigm (Clapham, 1996; Claude, 1964; David, 1979; Lefebvre, 1992;
Ottaway, 1982; Paul, 1994; Sheehan, 2005) espouse that the causes and dynamics
of conflict in the Somalia is primarily as a result of the growing external influence
in the region.
They contend that the East-West rivalry was at the root of Somalia conflicts.
British and Italian Somalilands gained independence the summer of 1960 and
formed the Somali Republic. Newly united inhabitants shared the general hope that
Somalis living under Ethiopian rule would soon join them once the past fluctuation
of the region’s provisional boundary was resolved. However, Ethiopia was not
willing to offer Somalia control of the region. Unexpectedly rebuffed, irregular
Somali guerillas began harassing residents of the Ogaden. The guerillas’ numbers
steadily rose until Ethiopia sent its army in October 1963, causing the conflict to
evolve into conventional war until a ceasefire was called in April 1964.
The United States became the principal source of external support to
Ethiopia as early as 1950. Still, the United States attempted to provide economic
and military aid to Somalia during the Ogaden conflict in an effort to undermine
Soviet influence. In 1963, the United States, Italy, and Germany offered a
$10million package to Somalia to build its conventional army in order to face large
Ethiopian armed forces. However, Somalia was not persuaded to reject its treaty of
friendship with Russia for so meager an offer, and contracted Soviet military aid
for three times the sum. Bargaining with Cold War superpowers became typical in
the region, and eventually contributed to alliance swapping that directly resulted in
continued regional conflict through endless arms supplies.
The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the
Horn of Africa helped destroy international credibility in conflict mediation;
instead of lending their influence for resolution, they used it to perpetuate conflict
to continue their interests in a geostrategic location as exemplified in the invasion
of Iraq, the Gulf war as well as the on-going Libya crisis. Their presence
stimulated the bitter border rivalry and conflicts between the bitter rivals in the
Horn of Africa, conflicts that would have otherwise been unable to continue. This
stimulation additionally propped up dictatorial regimes that were guilty of horrific
crimes against humanity, and led to the eventual collapse of Somalia and its
armament of dozens of militias.
Both Ethiopia and Somalia have reason to make strong allies of world
superpowers. Ethiopia desired regional hegemony, and its “size, military strength,
and geographic position would make it the dominant state… [But]
underdevelopment and tenuous national unity kept this role out of its reach”.
Somalia desired control of the Ogaden region, but could not do so without
matching Ethiopia’s conventional army. Before the United States and Soviet Union
left the region, they each intervened in both countries and dramatically reversed
alliances and mid-conflict (Paul, 1994).
The United States initially aligned itself with Ethiopia, which retained
control of Eritrea where the U.S. had a base for strategic global military
communications. When conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Washington
pressured Ethiopia’s leadership against using an untrained peasant militia in
Eritrea. In a subsequent slaughter of Eritreans, Ethiopia was rendered ineligible for
military aid when the Carter administration placed Ethiopia on a list of human
rights violators. United States arms shipments to Ethiopia were suspended just as
the nation was running out of ammunition in its struggles against Eritrean and
Somali insurgents.
Therefore, to continue fighting Eritrea and Somalia, Ethiopia needed
military aid. Since arms were no longer provided by the United States or other
western powers, Ethiopia turned to communist nations. The Soviets, recognizing
the benefits of allying with Ethiopia, brokered a $1 billion arms deal and signed a
treaty of friendship with Ethiopia. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union continued
their presence in Somalia. This transition of alliances briefly afforded the Soviet
Union friendly relations with both nations, providing an opportunity for conflict
management. This is evident when, in 1977, both sides were so low on military
supplies that a stalemate would have resulted if arms providers had refused to
continue stocking the region. Instead, Russia exacerbated the conflict when it
signed a treaty with Ethiopia, swapped alliances, and instigated continued arms
build-up. Meanwhile, the United States had lost its influence in the region and was
left to the side-lines as an ineffective bystander (Sheehan, 2005).
In the midst of conflicting East-West interests, tumultuous civil
environments emerged. Newly independent states struggled with their identity and
the result was violent opposition to emerging political ideologies. The East-West
national interests saw its demise in the aftermath of the Cold War. This paved way
for the dominance of U.S interests in the region. However, with the emergence of
radical Islam in Somalia that tends to challenge the interests of U.S, this
superpower supported all invasions in Somalia that are aimed at distorting the
Islamists networks. In a region that survives with rivalry and bitter relations, the
declaration of the supportive invasion of Somalia by U.S evoked another round of
regional hostility and Ethiopia owing to its historical rancour with Somalia under
the Auspice of UNO launched its invasion into Somalia in December 2006 (Ali,
2007).
This paradigm offers probable reasons why Ethiopia invaded Somalia by
analysing three questions concerning the motives that could have prompted the
government to undertake such an audacious action. First, did Ethiopia invade
Somalia to bolster its own security? Second, was the invasion a heartfelt attempt
by Ethiopia to help Somalia to overcome the anarchical and humanitarian crises
that have encumbered Somalia for nearly two decades? Finally, was Ethiopia
simply doing the bidding of the United States, its benefactor, which since the 9-11
terrorist attack, had been apprehensive of Islamic militants gaining a foothold in
the Horn of Africa, one of the most heavily trafficked sea-lanes to the Middle East?
From the foregoing analysis, it could be discerned that the invasion of Somalia by
Ethiopia served two primary and strategic purposes which dwells around U.S and
Ethiopia interests. The interests of U.S is basically geared towards the distortion of
the Islamists networks in Somalia as well as discrediting a base and a playground
for the operations of Al-Qaeda while on the other hand the interests of Ethiopia
though mutually exclusively to the interest of U.S is also aimed at ensuring
instability in the state a situation that present an unchallenged rivalry to Ethiopia’s
regional hegemony.
2.2.3 REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND STATE
COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA
Some of the Scholars (Abbink, 2003; Cottam&Cottam, 2001; Farer, 1979;
Gilkes&Plaut, 1999; Healy, 2008; Langley, 1973; Legum& Bill, 1979; Medhaine,
2004; Metz, 1992; Reisman, 1983) approach the consequences of boundary
disputes on state failure in Somalia with a direct focus and analysis of the internal
conflicts that has plague all of the countries in the Horn. They analyzed the conflict
inherited in each country of the region as a means of explaining its
interrelationship with border disputes and state failure in Somalia.
Internal conflicts that emerged in every nation of the Horn stimulated the
resultant effect of state fragility as well as collapse that best describe the nature of
states in the Horn. In Ethiopia, resistance emerged when the Dergue, a communist
military junta, came to power. Opposition groups eventually dissolved the Dergue,
but the key players remained in power and conflicting political ideologies
instigated the emergence of various rebel groups. In Eritrea, rebels fought for their
independence against Ethiopia after the dissolution of the Eritrean parliament and
revocation of its right to autonomy. However, once control of the region was
wrested, Eritrean guerilla groups and fighters from the Tigre turned on each other.
Conflict in Somalia surfaced when Somali dictator, Siad Barre, attempted to
promote greater Somali nationalism through the dissolution of clan power. Fierce
clan opposition eventually led to his overthrow and to the power vacuum that, to
this day, has yet to be filled. Even Djibouti, which had abstained from much of the
region’s conflict, was not immune to internal power struggles.
In the Horn of Africa, the nature of state power is a key source of conflict,
political victory assuming a winner-takes-all form with respect to wealth and
resources as well as the prestige and prerogatives of office. Irrespective of the
official form of government, regimes in the Horn of Africa are in most cases,
autocracies essentially relying on ethnic loyalties. The military and security
services, in recent times emerging from a liberation front background, ensure the
hold on power of these militarized regimes (Medhanie, 2004:7).
A. ETHIOPIA: THE DERGUE, MENGISTU AND OPPOSITION
GROUPS
Ethiopian civil conflict emerged with the Dergue, a communist military
junta that came to power following the removal and imprisonment of Emperor
Haile Selassie. The monarchy was formally abolished in May 1975, and Marxism
was proclaimed the ideology of the state thus creating a sharp divide between
proponents of the contending political doctrine. The rise of the Dergue, along with
this division, brought civil war. During the years 1975-1977, called the Red Terror,
the Dergue and its opposition engaged in a brutal policy of “execution,
assassination, torture, and imprisonment of tens of thousands without trial.” After
the Dergue destroyed its opposition, it successfully fought off an invasion from
Somalia and then engaged in war against Eritrean rebels (Library of Congress 1993
DT373.E83).
Guerrillas fighting for Eritrean independence took advantage of the
opportunity to further frustrate Ethiopian leadership by aligning themselves with
various opposition groups, such as the Tigrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF),
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Party (EPRP). While countering these rebels, the Dergue leadership fought one
another. The struggle for power resulted in numerous appointments and removals
(or executions) of various heads of the Dergue. Of the many Dergue commanders,
Mengistu Haile Marian was able to retain control after being appointed
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He utilized his post to wrest control of
the country and gained popularity by formally dissolving the Dergue. He replaced
it with the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), but despite the
leadership party change and construction of a new constitution, many government
positions within the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Worker's Party of
Ethiopia (WPE) were filled by Dergue members. Mengistu continued his role as
Commander in Chief of the Armed forces but additionally acted as President of the
PDRE and Secretary General of the WPE (Library of Congress 1993 DT373.E83).
He remained in power until deposed in 1991.
During Mengistu’s reign, discord in Ethiopia was further aggravated by
conflict in Eritrea. Conflict was created during Emperor Selassie’s reign when
Ethiopia dissolved Eritrea’s parliament and negated its right to autonomy. Eritrea’s
subsequent declaration of independence and revolt by various rebel groups
prompted a venerable crisis between the two nations, characterized by human
rights atrocities committed by both sides. During this political crisis, Siad Barre an
emerging power broker in Somalia employed this crisis situation to prolong the
instability in Ethiopia by sponsoring the opposition and rebel groups in Ethiopia
and Eritrea respectively. This situation provoked Mengistu thus gearing him to also
sponsor the infliction of instability through his sponsoring of proxy war that later
contributed to the failure of Somalia. The initial step of Barre was geared towards
curtailing Ethiopia motives to extend the frontiers of her state to include new
peripheries of territorial conquest a situation that was thought by Barre as
`Ethiopia's inherent expansionist dynamic' or in other words` Ethiopia's black
imperialism'.
B. ERITREA AND ITS INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE
Eritrea demanded its independence when Emperor Selassie dissolved its
parliament and created fierce opposition between the two nations. When the
Dergue came to power, they imposed a military settlement on the Eritean
Liberation Front and the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF). However, the
Dergue’s invasion of Eritrea was unsuccessful; by 1978, Eritrean rebel groups
controlled nearly all of the countryside. Despite controlling major cities, the
Dergue were unable to suppress the rebellion. By 1987, rebel groups in Eritrea and
the Tigre controlled at least 90 percent of both region and in 1991, the EPLF set up
a provisional government under Issaias Afwerki (ACED 2000). In 1993, a
referendum resulted in 98 percent of voters favoring Eritrean independence, and
the nation received its independence later that same year. Believing the conflict
resolved after Eritrea won its independence; the international community expressed
its relief. This relief was however short lived. Barely five years passed before war
broke out between the two nations under a different pretense.
The Eritrean struggle for independence received wide support from Somalia
as a result of their bitter rivalry with Ethiopia and the colonial posture Ethiopia
presents in the region. Much of the supports for all the liberation movements that
fought for Eritrea’s independence were from Somalia thus leading to bitter rivalry
between the two nations. Eritrea has also perceived Ethiopia as an imperial state.
The construction of an Eritrean identity was however intertwined with the
liberation struggle against Ethiopia. Eritrea has portrayed itself as colonised and
subjugated by Ethiopia (Abbay 1998).
C. SOMALIA: SIAD BARRE, CLAN OPPOSITION AND THE
EMERGENCE OF WARLORDS
In complete contrast to other conflict management in the Horn of Africa,
Somalia shows little hope for resolution in the near future. Instability and conflict
arose almost immediately following Somalia’s independence in 1960. Somalia’s
second president was assassinated in 1969, and during the power vacuum that
followed, the military staged a coup. Siad Barre was installed as the president of
Somalia’s new government, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which
arrested members of the former government and banned all political parties. The
National Assembly was also abolished, and the constitution suspended (Metz 1992:
2).
Barre attempted to promote a stronger sense of nationalism by minimizing
the importance of clan affiliation within government and civil society. If
successful, he might have negated the ability of clans and sub-clans to undermine
the rule of central government, but he succeeded only in instigating fierce
opposition with various clan-based rebel groups. In an effort to quell opposition,
Barre engaged in oppressive dictatorial rule, characterized by persecution, jailing
and torture of political opponents and dissidents.
The United Nations Development Program described "the 21-year regime of
Siad Barre [as] one of the worst human rights records in Africa," (UNDP
REPORT 2001:42). The Africa Watch Committee agreed, submitting,
"both the urban population and nomads living in the countryside
[were] subjected to summary killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in
squalid conditions, torture, rape, crippling constraints on freedom
of movement and expression and a pattern of psychological
intimidation" (Africa Watch Committee 1990:9).
In an effort to incorporate various territories inhabited by Somalis into a
Greater Somalia, Barre sent the Somali national army into the Ogaden in 1977.
War subsequently broke out in the region, and the Somalis were initially
successful, capturing much of the territory. When the Soviet Union shifted its
support to Ethiopia and halted its supplies to Barre’s regime, the invasion abruptly
ended and the Somali troops were forced out of the Ogaden by 1978. Following
this event, Barre tore up his treaty with the Soviets and welcomed United States
military and economic aid. This action ensured that his offensives would be
adequately armed, and additionally facilitated the alliance swapping that occurred
between Ethiopia, Somalia and the Cold War superpowers.
Barre never gained control of the Ogaden, and in the early 1990s, his brutal
dictatorship was overthrown. Warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid and his rebel group,
the United Somali Congress, invaded the country’s capital and fought government
forces. Aidid ousted Barre in January 1991, and later declared himself President of
Somalia in June 1995. Aidid’s government was not internationally recognized and
his leadership was fiercely contested, particularly by Ali Mahdi Muhammad.
However, Aidid and Mahdi were not the only figures vying for power. With an
absence of established government, a power vacuum emerged and all political and
military leaders from Barre’s fallen regime took up arms, made available through
the millions of dollars’ worth of weaponry provided by the Soviet Union and
United States.
Militias sprouted under the leadership of members of Barre’s fallen regime
as well as that of the various clans. Clans had been a target of Barre’s regime;
when the clans had a common enemy, they worked commonly. With that enemy
fallen, their ideals began to clash, and each clan hungered to establish itself
superior over the others. Warlords emerged from the ranks of the former military
and also through the endorsement of clan elders and sub-clan leaders. The number
of warlords is as numerous as the various freedom movements they lead: Botan Ise
Alin and the Somali Transitional Government, Osman Hassan Ali Atto and the
Somali National Alliance, Mohamed Omar Habeb and the Somali Reconciliation
and Restoration Council, Hussein Mohamed Farrah, former U.S. Marine and
replacement for father Aidid as president, Omar Muhamoud Finnish and Muse
SudiYalahow of the joined United Somali Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance,
Abdi Hasan Awale and the Somali National Alliance, Aaden Saransoor
Rahanweyn and the Resistance Army, just to name a few (Medhaine, 2004).
Internal conflict in Somalia follows a similar pattern to its conflict with
Ethiopia; there is no clear stalemate in the region, no representative that conflicting
parties consider valid. Power-sharing has been unsuccessful and anarchy threatens
to tear the nation apart. The social fabric of Somalia has been so fractured by the
various clan alliances, public support, and secret international interests in different
liberation groups and ideological organizations that no single entity has emerged as
the predominant power in Somalia. Since the fall of Barre, Somalia’s only constant
is general lawlessness, aggravated by famine and disease. A vicious cycle of
resistance continues, and no one is a viable candidate for conciliation.
It could however be argued that the role Somalia played in the series of
conflicts that ensued in other countries within the region as well as the predatory,
repressive, and clannish nature of the government of Siad Barre that survived on a
clan coalition impacted on the political fate of statelessness in Somalia.
D. THE EVENTS OF OGADEN WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
ON STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA
Other scholars (Adam, 1999; Lewis, 1989; Menkhaus, 2007; Metz, 1993;
Ofcansky, 1992; Tareke, 2000; Tirumeh, 1993; Turner, 1993) attempted a direct
focus on the event of the Ogaden War and its significance in the collapse of
Somalia. When Somalia got independence in1960, it directed its internal security
concern to preventing Ethiopia from dominating affairs in the Horn of Africa. The
boldest step Somalia took to challenge Ethiopia’s dominance in the Horn so far
was to support insurgents planning to withdraw from Ethiopia. This insurgency led
to the Ogaden War that lasted from 1977 to 1978. The government of Somalia was
trying to take advantage of the turmoil in Ethiopia caused by the overthrow of
Haile Sellassie and the bloodletting the Derg was perpetrating on opponents of the
revolution.
The Somali government threw its support behind the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF), which was a pro-Somali liberation group in the Ogaden,
planning to withdraw. The initial support the Barre government gave the WSLF
was covert and when Ethiopia accused President Barre of interference, he replied
that only “volunteers” had been given leave from the army to fight.
By September 1977, regular Somali troops’ involvement in the conflict
could no longer be disguised, as they had pushed some 700 kilometers into
Ethiopian territory and captured a provincial capital (Tiruneh, 1993). By the end of
1977, Somali forces had captured 60% of the Ogaden (Ofcansky, 1992). Ethiopia
blames the Ogaden war on Somalia’s irredentism, a wish by Siad Barre to annex
the Ogaden area of Ethiopia (Turner, 1993).
Desperate for help, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of the Derg, turned
to the Soviet Union which obliged by providing military supplies and advisers, as
the Soviets simultaneously cut off supplies for the Somali army. This triggered
what Lewis calls a “seismic shift in superpower alignments in the Horn of Africa”
(Lewis 1989: 575), as Cuba sent troops to help the Ethiopian army. On his part,
Siad Barre turned to the United States and friendly Arab countries for economic
and military help. Nevertheless, the WSLF with its Somali military support was
defeated in1978 and Siad Barre forbade the WSLF from using Somali territory to
attack Ethiopia. In retaliation for Somalia’s misdeeds, Ethiopia in the early 1980s
provided sanctuary and support for the Somali National Movement (SNM), which
was a dissident group formed by Isaaq exiles in London to overthrow the Barre’s
government.
Discontented the President had not represented their interests, the Isaaq
conducted guerrilla raids against Somali government-held territory from
DiraDawa, Ethiopia. President Barre responded by launching a military campaign
to the north against the Issaq. After the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, the United
Somali Congress (USC), one of the rebelling factions competing for control,
became dominant. Competition and alliances between groups such as the Somali
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
eventually resulted in the collapse of the USC leadership.
The political vacuum created led to the resurgence of clan identities which
has always been an integral part of Somali culture. Conflicting ambitions among
clan leaders was largely responsible for the civil war and the social and political
instability that defined the lives of Somalis in the 1990s. According to Adam
(1999), differences between United Somali Council (USC) leaders Ali Mahdi of
the Agbal clan and General Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Habar Gedir clan, were
the most notable. When Ali Mahdi declared himself “interim president” Aidid’s
faction of the USC rejected that claim. The rift among clans widened as they
fought for control of various towns. By 1992 Somalia had collapsed as a state
caused largely by dispute among clans. Hunger, famine and deaths ravaged the
country.
According to Metz (1993), living standards worsening rapidly in Somalia,
was caused not only by civil war but the drought in central and southern Somalia
that left hundreds of thousands starving. By August 1992, Somali refugees that had
settled in neighboring countries were estimated at 500,000 in Ethiopia, 300,000 in
Kenya, 65,000 in Yemen, 15,000 in Djibouti and about 100,000 in Europe.
United Nations peacekeepers sent to Somalia were met by warlords that
resented their presence resulting in deadly assaults on them. Out of humanitarian
concern, however, United States marines were sent to Somalia to bolster the
United Nations peacekeepers. Deadly assaults on United States troops caused their
withdrawal in 1993. Ethiopia has supported and is alleged to have supported a
number of different Somali factions at one time or another. Among these are the
Somali Reconstruction and Restoration Council (SRRC), Muse SudiYalahow,
General Mohammed Said Hirsi Morgan (allied to the Somali Patriotic Movement
or SPM), Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigudud and his Rahanwein Resistance Army
(RRA) and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (former President of Puntland and current
Somali TNG President). A number of Somali warlord factions have also held
meetings and formed loose alliances in Ethiopia.
It could however be argued that the evolution of clan hostility in Somalia as
well as warlordism in Somalia Politics could be traced to the bitter rivalry of
Ethiopia and Somalia at the Ogaden war. The penetration of clannism into Somalia
politics has led to the emergence of conflict as a self-reproducing capacity a
situation that has sustained the re-occurrence of statelessness in Somalia as well as
posing outright challenges to measures geared towards state-building.
E. SOMALILAND/PUNTLAND BORDER DISPUTE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES ON STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA
There have been major tensions between Somaliland and Puntland over their
common border since 2004, with both laying claim to the regions of Sanaag and
Sool. On several occasions there have been military clashes. Relations between the
two over the issue deteriorated again during 2007 and there were further military
clashes.
The Dulbahante and Warsengeli clans of the Harti clan federation live on
either side of the Somaliland-Puntland border in eastern Somaliland and western
Puntland. They have felt politically and economically marginalized in both
Somaliland and Puntland and the degree of effective control exercised in either
Sanaag or Sool by what passes for ‘central authority’ has been limited in practice.
Furthermore, local leaders have often changed their mind over which of the two
polities deserves their allegiance. Shifts in loyalty appear to have played a
significant role in triggering the 2007 crisis. There also remain significant
constituencies within both clans for ultimate reunification with the rest of Somalia,
which confirms that the fate of both Somaliland and Puntland is likely to remain
unavoidably linked to what happens in the rest of the country (Hoehne, 2007).
In July 2007, local leaders in Sanaag, which until then had given its loyalty
to Puntland, seceded from it and formed the new state of Maakhir. Those behind it
came from the Warsengeli clan. They strongly opposed the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) moves to undertake oil exploration in the area. They had also
become resentful of the perceived dominance in Puntland of the Majerteen clan.
Then in September 2007, following unrest in Sool – some of whose
Dulbahante leaders had rejected the authority of the Puntland Government and
talked about establishing another autonomous state, Daraawiish – fighting between
Somaliland and Puntland broke out again. In October 2007 Somaliland troops
occupied the capital of Sool, Las Anod. Somaliland claimed that its forces had
been attacked first. Somaliland troops were reportedly within 35 kilometres of
Puntland’s capital, Garowe, at one point. A conference opened in late November
2007 to try and agree about the future of the area but came to nothing (Hoehne,
2007).
During 2008, outbreaks of violence between Somaliland and Puntland over
Sool and Sanaag continued. Somaliland forces have pushed deeper into Sanaag,
where there have been several instances of foreign aid workers being kidnapped
for ransom. In July 2008 Somaliland forces claimed that they had taken control of
the coastal town of Las Qoray in eastern Sanaag. Puntland swiftly claimed that it
had retaken the town. Local Warsengeli clan elders called on both parties to
withdraw their forces. In practice, neither Somaliland nor Puntland appear to have
much political control over this area (Garowe Online, 2008).
Since October 2008, there have been a series of attacks in parts of
Somaliland-occupied Sool by a new organization called the Somalia Unity Defense
Alliance. Somaliland has accused Puntland of backing the group; Puntland has
denied such allegations (Garowe Online, 2008).
The constant border disputes between the Somaliland and Puntland though a
domestic issue has also raised the failed possibility of establishing a National
Government for Somalia. The series of conflicts between the conflicting regions
has increased the porosity and failure of the emergence of a central government in
Mogadishu the capital-city of Somalia.
F. RADICAL ISLAM IN SOMALIA AND ITS IMPACTS ON STATE
FAILURE IN SOMALIA
A newer approach was devised towards understanding the regional
hostilities in the Horn of Africa and its impact on state failure in Somalia. Some
scholars (Abubakar, 2006; Aynte, 2010; Hassan, 2009; Hussein, 2008; Ibrahim,
2010; Menghaus, 2005; Moller, 2008; Rotberg, 2005; Whitehouse, 2007;
Woodward, 2003) espouse that apart from the border dispute that has strain the
peaceful relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, the widespread of radical Islam
within the Horn of Africa particularly Somalia could provide an insight towards
understanding the motive behind the subversive activities in Somalia by its
neighbors particularly Ethiopia.
The majority of the population of the Horn of Africa with the exception of
Ethiopia, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, are Muslims. This fact is
not meant to mystify the diversity as well as the distinguishing characteristics of
the Islamic social movements of the region and Islamic political doctrines, ranging
from the most extreme to moderate. Likewise, the fact that Islam is the majority
faith in the Horn of Africa should not be seen as denying or obscuring its
coexistence with non-Muslim populations – Christian and Jewish as well as a
mosaic of traditional beliefs (Haggai 2010).
Analysis on “failed state” and its impacts on Somalia have often been
described by parts of the Western media and policy-makers from the security
perspective and it’s capability to provide a breeding ground for terrorist
organizations, including al-Qaida and other radical Islamic groups. The rise of the
Islamic Court Union which included ‘hard-liners’ with alleged links to al-Qaida
increased fears that parts of the Horn of Africa could become a heartland of
militant Islam and that what might initially have been a symptom of conflict could
metamorphose into a ‘root cause’. This proof has been widely disclaimed by the
Combating Terrorism Centre. According to the Harmony Project/Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point, Al-Qaida has not found a promising base in
Somalia and that, if anything, coastal Kenya has been more fertile territory for it.
In a report which drew on declassified internal al-Qaida documents, the Center
stated:
At one point, Al-Qaida operatives were so frustrated that they
listed going after clan leaders as the second priority for jihad after
expelling Western forces (Harmony Project/Combating Terrorism
Center).
Marchal also concluded that:
In Somalia, al-Qaeda members faced the same challenges that
plague western interventions (extortion, betrayal, clan conflicts,
xenophobia, and security vacuum and logistical constraints)
(Marchal, 2007).
Ethiopia’s confrontation with Islamist network in Somalia was however
justified under the claim of ensuring Ethiopia security within the region thus
ushering a legal justification for the armed intervention of Ethiopia into Somalia.
The invasion of Ethiopia coupled with the growing influence of the Islamists
groups exacerbated the conflicts and lawlessness in Somalia thus keeping Somalia
in its perpetual state of failure.
The emergence of the spread of radical Islam in Somalia though predated
Somalia independence emerged as a result of its close links to the Arabian
Peninsula as well as the influence of Wahhabism.
Al-Ittihad al-Islami emerged during the early 1980s out of an alliance
between Wahdat al-Shabab al-Islami (Unity of Islamic Youth) and al-Jama`a al-
Islamiya, thus transforming itself from a peaceful Dawa in political opposition to
the Siad Barre regime into a militant organization engaged in armed conflict after
the collapse of the Somali state. By the 1990s, Al-Ittihad had spread its activities to
Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and established ties with militant Islamist groups,
including al-Qaeda members based in Afghanistan and Sudan. Al-Ittihad’s leaders
could be described as graduates of Saudi Arabian Salafi Islam who combined the
teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood with Wahhabi militancy, and were
determined to establish an Islamic emirate in Somalia and expand it to the rest of
the Horn of Africa (Menghaus, 2005).
Al-Ittihad’s activities in the Ogaden brought it into confrontation with the
Ethiopian government. It was alleged that Al-Ittihad had military camps for
training Islamist guerrillas from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda in a
variety of activities, including the use of small arms, guerrilla warfare, suicide
bombing, mines and explosives, espionage and logistics (Hussein, 2008).The
Ethiopian government’s retaliation in 1997 was swift and unrelenting, dislodging
Al-Ittihad from Ethiopia and destroying its bases in Somalia. Although Al-Ittihad
was dismantled, its leaders returned to Mogadishu, where they created a new more
militant movement with links to global Jihadist organizations (Hassan, 2009).
The emergence of the Islamic Court Union coincided with the collapse of
President Abdullahi Yusuf regime and the dismantling of the Somali state by
competing clan-based movements/militias, which failed to reconcile their
differences and return the country to normalcy (Moller 2008).The Islamic Court
Union at its inception was led by Sharif Shiekh Ahmed and was supported by
Yusuf “Indho Ade” Mohamed Siad, a Somali warlord who controlled Lower
Shabelle.
The ICU offered an alternative court and police system capable of ending the
chaos that characterized Mogadishu for years and bringing order, thereby bridging
the severe governance deficit left by the collapse of the Somali state (Aynte 2010).
It also offered public services previously considered to be under the purview of the
state or NGOs both secular and religious, such as health and education. By 1999,
the ICU became the only recognizable source of security for the residents of the
areas which it controlled. The measures it took included the creation of an Islamic
Union Court police and militia organization, and the expansion of its activities to
include controlling Mogadishu market and the major routes linking the capital with
important trade routes throughout Somalia (Ibrahim 2010).These steps were
followed by the introduction of a strict variant of Islamic Sharia, including the
banning of football (Abubakar 2006).The combined forces of Sharif Shiekh
Ahmed and Yusuf “Indho Ade” Mohamed Siad, with the latter serving as head of
military operations, controlled most of southern Somalia, including the capital and
the all-important port of Kismayo.
In response, the Somali warlords, supported by the Bush administration, were
united for the first time in resisting ICU’s hegemony. This new-found unity was
also an act of self-preservation by the warlords, who formed an umbrella
organization, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism
(ARPCT). However, ARPCT was no match for the ICU, which by 2006 controlled
large expanses of Somali territory after inflicting several major defeats on the US-
backed warlords (Ibrahim, 2010).
Whether acting on its own accord, in order to halt Eritrea’s involvement in its
south-eastern frontier regions, or with the support and approval of the US
administration, Ethiopia mounted an invasion of Somalia in December 2006 and
routed the ICU within weeks.
Aynte posited that Al-Shabab originated around 2004 as an association of
young Mujahideen within the ICU, and served as the latter’s police and militia. Al-
Shabab established itself from the remnants of the ICU following its defeat, and
fought the Ethiopian forces, forcing them to withdraw from Mogadishu in
December 2008(Aynte 2010). Al-Shabab is led by Muktar Ali Robow, also known
as Abu Mansoor, previously the ICU’s deputy defense minister. Another notorious
Al-Shabab military commander, Adam Hashi Ayro, was allegedly trained in
Afghanistan and built up the group along the lines of the Taliban. This also ex-
plains why Al-Shabab is claimed to have links with al-Qaeda and is on the US list
of terrorist organizations.
The connections between the ICU and Al-Shabab can be understood by
examining the origins of its leadership. Al-Shabab’s first leader, Aden Hashi
Frarah, “Ayro”, was appointed by Hassan Dahir Aweys, one of the ICU’s founders
(International Crisis Group 2005). Al-Shabab represents a more militant variant of
the ICU and is a Jihadist group seeking to create a Somali Islamic state and wage
Jihad against Westerners and the enemies of Islam, as well as imposing a puritan
form of Sharia across Somalia. With about 3,000 to 7,000 battle-hardened fighters,
Al-Shabab has gained control of major parts of Mogadishu’s neighborhoods and
has set up military bases in large parts of southern Somalia (Hassan 2009).
Conflict in the Horn follows general patterns: decolonization power struggles,
independent consolidation, and liberation movements. Complicating matters
further are disputes over poorly defined territory and civil rivalries over state
power-structure. The new dimension to these conflicts, however, is Somalia’s
status as a failed state. Somalia’s central government controls little more than a
section of the national capital of Mogadishu. A separatist government controls the
North, and rival warlords and clan leaders control the remainder of the country.
This adds a unique dynamic to conflict resolution in the region because, quite
simply, how do you mediate domestic anarchy? Efforts were undertaken by the
international community to establish peace, but intervention was met with disaster
when the United Nations and United States implemented peace enforcement rather
than peacekeeping.
The Somali civil conflict has led to statewide destabilization and failure,
resulting in an economy with little else to offer than lawless capitalism and piracy.
Conflict management therefore assumes an immediate importance to regional and
international actors because the destabilization is a threat to regional and
international peace. The United Nations’ Unified Task Force intervened in
Somalia, as did the United States, but both were unsuccessful. Those missions
were aimed at restoring order, but failed when mission creep dictated who would
remain in power. Peacekeeping- to- Peace enforcing missions only aggravated
conflicts between Somali factions, splinter groups, and clan leaders. Both the
United States and United Nations left the country without restoring peace or a
central government.
It could however be argued that measureable success in Somalia and other
countries of the Horn, will only occur when there is public accountability of the
region’s leadership. Only when the people stop accepting violence as the only
means to attaining party interests and begin demanding regional support and
interdependence, can we expect long-term resolution. The possibility of achieving
this success will be examined in this research. For now, the Horn of Africa with
special reference to Somalia is a culture of war and death, valuing fighting over
conciliation, noted by the absence of a call to peace despite decades of atrocities.
Until the people demand that accountability, coupled with the space to peacefully
dissent, conflict will be difficult to manage and nearly impossible to resolve.
The turbulent political transitions in all of the region’s states and their
reciprocal fears and disputes were so durable and interlocked that, in retrospect; the
outbreak of all these conflicts seems inevitable. In fact, it should not require much
analysis and imagination to understand that, in the Horn of Africa, conditions for
conflict brew for years, if not decades and centuries. However and paradoxically
enough, it will always be difficult to weave together various contradictory trends as
well as realistically assess precedents and multiple indices of a dynamic nature and
of many dimensions.
And, despite all the dedicated seminars, conferences, presentations, briefings,
articles and voluminous books, it will always be difficult to continuously anticipate
with a reasonably high degree of accuracy the different conflicts’ exact origins,
scale, sustenance and implications.
Furthermore as posited by Joireman, the region’s conflicts are usually
continuations of previous conflicts spanning out of control and they, themselves,
can very easily either set off or further complicate other conflicts (Joireman,
2004:186).
From the foregoing analysis, we can discern the fact that all the unfolding
political trend that has exacerbated the state failure in Somalia possess a self-
reproducing capacity that had its historical origin in the bitter rivalry between
Somalia and its rival country Ethiopia, a capacity that entrenched to the generation
of other concomitant factors that have prolonged the state failure in Somalia as
well as frustrating all viable efforts towards state-building.
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There are different theories that have been postulated about the issue of state
failure. For the purpose of this research work , the Step to War theory shall be
employed in explaining how border disputes between Somalia and other countries
of the Horn of Africa has largely contributed to the state failure in Somalia.
The Steps to War theory suggests that typical power politics strategies, such
as alliance formation, military buildups, and aggressive crisis bargaining, often
have the unintended consequence of escalating conflict to war, especially when
these strategies are pursued in defense of unresolved territorial issues.The strongest
correlation uncovered thus far in the causes of war literature is not the fact that
democracies do not fight each other. Instead, contiguity remains a better predictor
of whether war will or will not occur (Diehl, 1985a, 1985b; Bremer, 1992).
However, the evidence supporting the link between contiguity and war has
often been dismissed as spurious to such factors as proximity or the number of
interactions between states. Only the territorial explanation of war views the
correlation between contiguity and war as an important relationship.
The territorial explanation of war argues that contiguity is a proxy for the
existence of territorial issues between states, since these issues are most likely to
occur between states that border each other. In this sense, territorial issues
constitute the underlying cause of war (Vasquez, 1993).The territorial explanation
of war argues that how states handle the sensitive issue of territorial control with
their neighbors greatly affects the probability of war between those states. States
that pursue alliances, military build-ups, and other power politics measures in
response to territorial issues tend to increase their chances of going to war.
However, if states are capable of resolving or removing these territorial issues from
their agenda, it is argued that they will be capable of avoiding war for prolonged
periods of time, even if other contentious issues arise (Vasquez, 1993: 146-147,
151-152). Territorial issues are the most dangerous issues because they are the
issues that are most likely to generate a power politics response.
2.4 TERRITORIAL EXPLANATION OF WAR
The territorial explanation of war identifies a general underlying cause and a
set of proximate causes of war. The underlying cause is seen as the rise of a
territorial dispute. Territorial issues influence the processes that lead to war, but
the steps toward war are far from determined. Territorial issues merely provide a
source of conflict that is more likely to end in war than other types of issues. This
does not mean that territorial issues inevitably go to war; in fact, most do not end
in war. The territorial explanation of war contends that these issues have a higher
probability of going to war than other issues or what would be expected to occur
merely by chance (Vasquez and Henehan, 1999; Senese, 2005).
Whether territorial issues will ultimately end in war depends on how they
are handled. If actors contest these issues by resorting to power politics, then the
probability of war increases along with the escalation of these practices. Among
equals, these coercive acts fail to gain compliance because territorial issues are too
salient for the actors involved; nothing short of war can resolve these types of
stakes. In spite of the likely dangers, actors who engage in power politics tend to
resort to higher and higher levels of coercion. Power politics then becomes a set of
proximate causes of war because they follow the rise of territorial disputes and are
more closely tied to the outbreak of war. If territorial issues are not handled
through coercive power politics, then they are less likely to end in war.
Territorial disputes lead political actors to resort to a series of realist
practices intended to force the other side to back down; these practices include
military buildups, the making of alliances, and the use of realpolitik tactics and
demonstrations of resolve in crisis bargaining. In the modern global system, realist
folklore (which is learned from socialization in the system and derived from the
realist social construction of history) tells leaders that, when faced with threats to
their security, they should increase their power by either making alliances and/or
building up their military. Both practices are intended to increase a state's security,
although most recognize that it typically produces a security dilemma (Jervis,
1976).
Each step produces a situation that encourages the adoption of foreign
policy practices that sets the stage for actors to take another step toward war.
The effects of territorial disputes on pairs of states have important implications
both internationally and domestically. First, the logic of the security dilemma
encourages actors to take additional measures to increase their capability; this leads
to an upward spiral of increasing insecurity, threat perception, and hostility. States
then resort more frequently to coercive diplomacy (i.e. the threat or use of force) to
get the other side to come to an agreement on outstanding issues. Second, each of
these external interactions has the domestic effect of increasing the influence and
number of hard-liners within the polity and reducing the number and influence of
accomodationists.
The increase in hard-liners in turn encourages the adoption of realist
practices that fuel hostility and encourage coercive moves that result in the
outbreak of international crises. War usually occurs after a series of crises between
two states, with the crisis that escalates to war having certain characteristics: a)
initiating a crisis with a physical threat to a territorial stake, b) an ongoing arms
race, c) escalatory bargaining across crises, d) a hostile spiral, and e) hard-liners on
at least one side (Vasquez and Gibler, 2001).
Alliances tend to be followed by war because they increase threat perception
and hostility in the other side, leading it to try to make a counter-alliance, if
possible, or building up its military, and often both, as each side overcompensates
(Gibler, 2000). Similarly, when a state with an ongoing territorial dispute witnesses
a military buildup in its rival, this produces a sense of threat and an attitude of
hostility, leading it to respond by building up its military. When following realist
strategies and tactics, the leadership of each state refuses to back down, so disputes
among equals tend to stalemate, fester, and repeat. These recurring crises are the
real engines of war, increasing the influence of hard-liners in each side who make
it more difficult to reach a compromise and manage each new crisis, until
eventually one crisis emerges that cannot be managed, and escalation to war is the
outcome.
2.5 STEPS TO WAR THEORY IN ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA BORDER
DISPUTES
This research will follow the focused and structured method of case study
design. This analysis is structured to ask similar questions regarding the onset of
warfare. Were there territorial elements at dispute during the conflict? Did the
leaders of each state seek to build alliances and build up their militaries prior to the
conflict? Is there a history of repeated disputes that lead the current conflict under
analysis to become intractable? And finally, were hardliners in power that then
drove the conflict towards its ultimate and deadly outcome?
2.6 DESCRIPTIVE NARRATIVE OF ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA WAR
The Ethiopian-Somalian War (or the Ogaden War) was one of the first truly
interstate conflicts in Africa during the modern era. Somalia has always claimed
the Ogaden territory as part of a wider empire, and when Ethiopia was in chaos
during regime consolidation, Somalia invaded to retake what it claimed as their
territory. The typical elements of the Steps to War are in operation in this conflict,
all driven by outstanding territorial claims and the power elements it takes to
firmly establish a change in the territorial situation.
Imposed boundaries seem to be a recurring theme throughout African, as
well as European history. In Europe the problem tends to be territorial claims
based on losses during war or to tribute. In Africa the problem is Western
imposition of boundaries that might function for a few years, but eventually
disintegrate due to ethnic territorial claims or rivalry between the two states that
forces the reassertion of colonial claims. No border is perfect, yet the combination
of ethnic ties, reasserted nationalism that comes along with realignments in
domestic politics, and imposed boundaries centuries old has made the African
region ripe for interstate war.
Ethiopia and Somalia were both colonies of Italy, which were then
relinquished after World War II. Ethiopia was the oldest recognized independent
state in Africa, yet the ambitions of European states frequently imposed constraints
on Ethiopian independence. Great Britain set up a provisional border in 1950. It
was the ethnic territorial claims that were reasserted which led to conflict and
rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia during the realignment after World War II.
Ethiopia spent much effort to regain the Ogaden from the British, and it was finally
restored officially in 1954. This only led to a bitter rivalry between Somalia and
Ethiopia in which both claimed the territory and people included.
There was popular support in Somalia to unite all people of Somali culture
into a single nation (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 131). One such territorial claim was
the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, which Somalia claimed was stolen during the
colonial partition. The future integration and independence of Somalia only raised
cries for reacquisition of the territory. According to Bahru,
“The new republic was committed to the unification of all Somalis,
including those in the Ogaden, the then French territory of
Djibouti, and the North Frontier District of Kenya. But it was the
Ogaden which became the primary focus of Somali
irredentialism.” (Bahru 2001: 182)
Since the 1800’s, Ethiopia had been the dominant armed force in the region.
The region was thrown into turmoil (once again) when Emperor Haile Selassie was
overthrown by the Derg(which means “Committee”) in 1974. The successful Derg
turned to internal fighting and massive social change from 1974 until 1977 (Bahru
2001: 251). Various other rebel groups then reasserted their claims in the region
during this period of domestic instability.
The primary rebel actor in this conflict was the Western Somali Liberation
Front (WSLF), which operated in the Ogaden with the support the Somalia military
(Laitin and Samatar 1987: 135). Mengistu Haile Mariam was named the leader of
Ethiopia in February 1977 after the third internal coup for the Derg (Bahru 2001:
253). Mengistu accused Somalia of helping the WSLP with official armed forces,
which Somalia denied. Cuban officials note that Somalia asked for military
assistance in 1976 based on the claim “that that country (Ethiopia) represented the
greatest danger to socialism in North Africa.”
The attacks by the WSLF were a cleverly planned operation to take
advantage of internal Ethiopian instability. Many of the leaders of the WSLF were
former Somali officers who had resigned their posts (Laitin and Samatar 1987:
141). The war was not an internationalized civil war, but a directly planned
invasion by Somalia.
Somalia invaded the Ogaden region on July 23, 1977. With a force of
35,000 soldiers and 15,000 WSLF fighters, Somalia gained the immediate
initiative (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 141). The Soviet Union was supplying arms
to both sides and attempted to mediate the situation. However, when Somalia
continued its assault, the Soviets cut off all aid to Somalia, increased aid to
Ethiopia, sent nearly 1,000 advisors, and 15,000 Cuban troops (Laitin and Samatar
1987: 142).
Somalia initially controlled as much as 90 percent of Ogaden but their
forces were eventually defeated. Reinforcements from the Soviets and Cubans
allowed the Ethiopians to counterattack. Air superiority allowed the Ethiopians to
also decimate the Somalian tank forces and target supply lines. Somalian leader
SiadBarre ordered a retreat back to Somalia on March 9, 1978. The WSLF
continued operations until at least 1981. On April 4, 1988, the two sides signed a
communiqué to end the hostilities, yet formal peace has not been declared due to
on-going instability in Somalia.
2.7 ISSUES AT STAKE
The issue at stake in this conflict was clearly territorial. The Ogaden region
had no distinguishable wealth or strategic purposes. Somalia claimed the Ogaden
region in Ethiopia. They felt they had a right to this region due to ethnic Somali
people living within the boundaries of Ethiopia and unsettled colonial boundaries
(Laitin and Samatar 1987: 132).
In 1934, the Italians invaded Ethiopia through Somalia. After conquering
Ethiopia quickly and with little objection from European powers, Somalia was
given the Ogaden. According to Lewis,
“With the conquest of Ethiopia, Somalia was enlarged by the
addition of the Ogaden and the regions occupied by Somalis on the
upper parts of the Shelbelle and Juba rivers. This added three new
administrative Provinces to the territory and brought together
Somali clansmen who had hitherto been arbitrarily separated by
the Somalia-Ethiopia boundary.” (Lewis 1988: 110)
Much blame for the 1977 conflict can be placed on the British maneuvers to
establish a territorial state in the region. This fact was given legal embodiment in
the agreements that Ethiopia was forced to sign with Britain in 1942 and 1944. On
the basis of these agreements and under the convenient excuse that the
continuation of World War Two required making adequate provisions for Allied
defence, the British came to assume extensive control over Ethiopia’s finance,
administration and territorial integrity. (Bahru 2001: 179)
Taking Ethiopia and Somalia quickly during World War II, the British
sought to settle the border question in the region unilaterally. Along with control of
Ethiopian territorial boundaries, the British also took control of the Ogaden and
Eritrea in the hopes of integrating the Ogaden with a “Greater Somalia – the seed
for Somali irredentism in subsequent decades.” (Bahru 2001: 180) Eritrea was to
be united with Sudan – the Ogaden with Somalia. Ethiopia quickly asserted
territorial claim on Ogaden because it had been a part of their empire only years
earlier and “her sovereignty over which had been recognized in the 1942 and 1944
Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements.” (Lewis 1988: 124)
At one point, the British offered Eritrea in exchange for the Ogaden but no
agreement was reached since the Ethiopian’s felt they deserved both territories.
“For Ethiopia, failure to regain the area was a bitter disappointment.”
(Bahru2001: 181) The Ogaden was restored to Ethiopia in fulfillment of British
promises (but against British desires), which then only raised the possibility of a
conflict with Somalia over the region. According to Lewis,
“The population of the Ogaden as a whole bowed to the inevitable;
and the transfer from British to Ethiopian control took place
smoothly and without further incident on 23 September, 1948.”
(Lewis 1988: 130)
From the very beginning, most tribes in the Ogaden region supported
Somali integration rather than Ethiopian control, but British bribes made a smooth
transition possible (Lewis 1988: 129).
The transfer of the Ogaden to Ethiopia only served to raise tensions and
rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia argued that the Ogaden was not
truly part of Ethiopia and therefore their claims were dubious. According Lewis,
“She (Ethiopia) had gained the Ogaden which she had never fully
administered and to which her only international title was provided
by the 1897 and 1908 Italy-Ethiopian agreements.” (Lewis 1988:
131)
A simple effort to exact tribute from the region in the late 1800’s had served
to turn an entire region over to Ethiopia, partly out of guilt for complacency during
the invasion by Italy in the 1930’s. There was much instability in the area during
the 1950’s to the late 1970’s, yet war was unlikely for many years due to lack of
supplies and attempts to create institutional accountability in the region. Ethiopia
took a lead role in the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in
1963. One of the primary characteristics of the new organization was the
acceptance of colonial boundaries where they stood, thus reinforcing Ethiopia’s
claims on the Ogaden region. Resolution 16, passed in 1964 by the OAU, states
that the organization, “solemnly declares that all member states pledge themselves
to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national
independence.”The OAU and UN continued to deny Somalian claims to the
Ogaden throughout the 60’s and 70’s (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 138).
Somalia claimed that the Ogaden region was traditionally part of Somalia
and was only under the control of Ethiopia because of British intervention. It is
estimated that at least 500,000 Muslims of Somalian decent lived in the region,
making it a ripe spot for rebel activity against the disintegrating state of Ethiopia.
Early desires of the independent state of Somalia were advanced by nationalistic
calls for a united Somalia and were even included in the constitution. Prime
Minister AbdillahiIse in 1959 exclaimed,
“They (“The Somali”) inhabit a vast territory which, in its turn,
constitutes a well-defined geographic unit. All must know that the
government of Somalia will strive its uttermost, with the legal and
peaceful means which are its democratic prerogative to attain this
end: the union of Somalis unite all Somalis and form a single
Greater Somalia.” (Lewis 1988: 161)
Somalia either hoped to invade and take the territory, or to institute a
plebiscite in the region that would turn the territory formally over to Somalia with
proper international support. Ideology and resources were not key factors in this
crisis. Although ideology led the Soviets to support the Ethiopians, they also
initially supported the Somalis. Both states claimed Marxist origins, yet each was
a simple military dictatorship. The Ogaden region had no important territorial
resources.
2.8 ALLIANCES
Somalia took particular care to become aligned with China and the Soviet
Union rather than the West. It bore particular resentment towards Great Britain
after losing important territories to Ethiopia. In 1963, Somali officially refused
Western military assistance valued at 6.5 million pounds in favour of Soviet aid
valued at 11 million pounds (Lewis 1988: 201). Somalia was also the only non-
Arabic speaking state to join the Arab League. Early alliance patterns clearly
raised tensions in the dyad and resulted in the development of rivalry (Valeriano
2003) and then arms races.
The United States supported Ethiopia through much of its post-World War
II era. Initially this support was sought to balance the imposing control of the
British (Bahru 2001: 184). In 1953, the Ethiopia-US Treaty was signed.
“In return for continued use of the communications base in
Asmara…the United States undertook to launch a military aid
programme…By 1970, Ethiopia had come to absorb some 60% of
US military aid to the whole of Africa.” (Bahru 2001: 187)
In an effort to keep potential enemies on their side of the global fight against
Communism, the United States threw money at the Ethiopian military for years. It
has also been claimed that Israelis were brought in by the Ethiopian military to
service and train pilots of American-made F-5s, although Ethiopia denies this
activity (Cooper 2003). Eventually, the alliance soured with the rise of anti-
American imperialist sentiment and new technology that made the Ethiopian bases
irrelevant. By May of 1977, the Derg had cut off ties with America and the “1953
mutual defense agreement had been terminated.” (Bahru 2001: 254)
After severing ties with America, Castro of Cuba visited Ethiopia in April of
1977 and Mengistu visited Moscow in May of the same year (Bahru 2001: 254).
The Soviet Union became the key actor in the build up to this crisis. In 1974,
Somalia signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union
(Laitin and Samatar 1987: 139). Soviet support of both states emboldened both
sides to continue to assert their claims in the conflict, but fear that Soviet support
of Ethiopia would eventually end possibilities of integration of the Ogaden spurred
the Somalis to action.
The United States had been the primary supporter of Ethiopia prior to the
conflict, but in May 1977, Soviet offers of support were accepted instead. The new
Ethiopian leader and the Soviet Union worked out thirteen mutual agreements.
Lewis notes the disturbing events of 1977 from the Somali point of view,
“The new Cuban-trained and Russian-armed peasant army,
numbering at least 70,000, wars proudly paraded in Addis Ababa.
If the Ogaden Somalis were to recover their independence there
was clearly not much time left.” (Lewis 1988: 233)
Late alliance realignments drove the Somalis to act out of fears of predation.
The Soviet Union came to believe that the Ethiopian government truly expressed
Marxist ideals. Most historians seem to agree with this view, “the Derg has
passed into history – not without reason – as one of the most doctrinaire Marxist
regimes that has appeared in the twentieth century.” (Bahru 2001: 243) On
November 13, 1977 a final rupture was made between the Soviets and Somalia.
Lewis notes,
“all naval, air and ground military facilities – including the
important communications and submarine missile handling station
at Berbera – were withdrawn, the Somali-Soviet treaty of
friendship (whose terms Russia had violated by supplying arms to
Ethiopia) was renounced, and 6,000 military and civilian
personnel and their families given a week to leave the country.”
(Lewis 1988: 235)
Somalia had already lined up support from Saudi Arabia and hoped for a
quick conflict with Ethiopia instead of an armed engagement with Ethiopia, Cuba,
and the Soviet Union at the same time. It is also to be noted that Ethiopia and
Kenya were allied together against Somalia. They had an active mutual defence
pact aimed at Somalian aggression and together issued a joint statement
condemning Somalian aggression on September 7, 1977 (Lewis 1988: 234).
Kenya had its own long standing rivalry with Somalia and allowed Ethiopia to
receive arms shipments through Kenyan territory and denied Somalia access to
airspace.
Formally (Gibler and Sarkees 2002), there are alliances between Somalia
and the Arab League in which Somali officially joined in 1974 (alliance #3120 and
3523). Ethiopia and Kenya had an on-going alliance from 1963 (alliance #3550).
Ethiopia also officially signed an alliance with the Soviet Union on November 11,
1978 (#3583), but it has been noted that defence agreements were officially signed
prior to the war in 1977. The 1977 agreements were signed prior to the war to
support the Ethiopians, but a formal “20 year friendship” was ratified in 1978
(#3583).
Overall, the constellation of alliances and alignments that Mengistu was able
to gather together resulted in his victory and domination of the region for years to
come. Lewis notes this “unholy alliance” as a key to victory,
“Perhaps marriage is too strong a term for the curious melange of
Russian (and other East European), Cuban, South Yemeni, Israeli
and Libyan support which enabled Mengistu to re-impose
Ethiopian rule in the Ogaden.” (Lewis 1988: 241)
2.9 MILITARY BUILDUPS
There was a clear military arms race in the region. Somalia was acquiring
weapons quickly from Egypt, China and the Soviet Union. This led to an increase
in weapons acquisitions from Ethiopia. The New York Times noted the races at
the time, “in East Africa, at least two major arms races appear to be
underway…and the other between Ethiopia and Somalia.” (Kandell, 1977) Under
the context of a rivalry and later instability in Ethiopia, the region was ripe for war
in the late 1970’s. Sample lists arms races as being in effect for the years of 1975
and 1978 (Sample 2002). There were no arms races during the disputes in the
years of 1973 and 1977. Laitin and Samatar and also note, “In 1964 the average
military expenditure as a percentage of GNP in Africa was 2.4; in Somalia it was
3.4.” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 138) Gibler, Rider and Hutchinson find an arms
race between Somalia and Ethiopia from 1972 to 1974 (Gibler, Rider et al. 2005).
Ethiopia also has an arms race with Sudan from 1973 to 1975. Kenya and Somalia
have an arms race from 1977 to 1979 (Gibler, Rider et al. 2005). Correlates of
War National Military Expenditure data (updated to 2000) shows a steady increase
in military expenditures for each state (Singer 1987). Somalia goes from spending
16 million in 1973 to 21.4 million in 74, 23 million in 75, 26.2 million in 76, and
31.7 million in 1977. Ethiopia jumps from spending 48.5 million in 1973 to
spending 74.8 million in 1974 and 125 million in 1975. Ethiopian expenditures
hold steady after that point.
Somalia broke off diplomatic ties with Britain in 1963 and thereafter lost out
on 1.3 million pounds a year in development aid (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 138).
The country briefly supported economic integration of the North African region
but these plans were harmed by Somali irredentialism. In 1974, Somalia joined the
Arab League and was able to illicit resources and military supplies from its new
Arab allies (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 139). The Soviets, based on the 1974 treaty,
provided 250 T-35 and T-54 tanks, 50 MiG fighters, and as many as 3,600 Soviet
advisors (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 140). The region was highly militarized which
then raised tensions within the dyad.
Somalia was outnumbered by Ethiopian military forces, yet they were able
to take an immediate upper hand in the rivalry due to the initial patronage of the
Soviet Union. Somalia had a tank force three times larger than that of Ethiopia and
also had a larger air force. It is reported that the Somalis had about 250 Soviet
tanks and 52 fighter aircraft, about half of which were Soviet advanced MiGs
(Security 2006). The Ethiopians were also acquiring advanced F-5s from Iran.
When the Soviets switched sides to support Ethiopia during the conflict, the
initiative had been lost and Somalia was not able to refit or repair its hardware.
Somalia continued to receive aid from the Soviet’s rival, China. During this time,
North Korea and Yemen supported Ethiopia. An air bridge between Ethiopia and
the Soviet Union resulted in the immediate delivery of equipment and troops
during the early stages of the conflict, which allowed the Ethiopians to
counterattack and eventually regain their territory (Lewis 1988: 234).
“From May 1977 through March 1978, by land and sea, the Soviet
Union supplied about $1.5 billion in military equipment to
Ethiopia. This represented more than seven times the military aid
that the Soviets had supplied to Somalia during the previous three
years.” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 142)
Certainly arguments regarding power transitions come into the equation in
the debate as to the causes of the war (Kugler and Lemke 1996), yet it seems that
all the steps to war were in operation.
It has never been asserted that the causes attributed to the Steps to War
research program are exclusive of the Power Transition program and it seems that
regional issues of a transition of power were in operation during this conflict and
the others under investigation (Lemke 2002). Acceptance of OAU norms on
territorial boundaries is clearly dependent on the power of the revisionist actors
and their dissatisfaction with the status quo, but this process starts with the steps of
territorial claims, rivalry, arms races, alliances, and hardliners coming into the
equation first.
2.10 REPEATED DISPUTES
There was a clear rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia. This rivalry was
“born at independence” when Somalia became independent in 1960 (Goertz and
Diehl 1995). This lead to an immediate conflict posture based on Somalian claims
to the Ogaden territory.Bennett suggests that the rivalry lasted from 1960 until
1992 since no formal settlement had been reached by that time (Bennett 1998).
Diehl and Goertz (Diehl and Goertz 2000) find an enduring rivalry that lasted from
1960 until 1985 with 18 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Nine of these
MIDs occurred before the 1977 war. Thompson codes a strategic rivalry from
1960 until 1988 (Thompson 2001). The general point here is that every major
rivalry dataset codes Ethiopia - Somalia as a serious and deadly rivalry.
The first militarized dispute was recorded in 1960 over movements of
Somali tribesman across the border. There were brief “border wars” in 1961,
1963 and 1964 (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 136). The New York Times reports,
“Somalia and Ethiopia accused each other of aggression in the
border conflict, which has produced hundreds of casualties in
armed clashes between troops of the two countries since last
Friday.”
The Organization for African Unity reaffirmed established borders in
Ethiopia’s favour (Bahru 2001: 182). The on-going rivalry and inability to settle
border claims (at least in Somalia’s favour) made the rivalry persist at least until
the 1980’s.
2.11 HARDLINERS
The main hardliner in this case appears to be Siad Barre. The leader of
Somalia was using internal discord in Ethiopia as an opportunity to attack and
claim a territory he felt was part of Somalia. He rose to power in 1969 after a coup
and maintained a dictatorship for the length of his rule. The rule of Barre was one
of traditional monopoly on violence internally and the use of external threats to
impose consolidation and order at home. Yet, Barre’s support for the Ogaden was
also personal.
“Not only was the Ogaden area more central to the Somali
economy and society, but it also was crucial to the legitimacy of
Siyadd’s regime. Siyadd’s mother was from the Ogaadeen clan,
and the Ogaadeen people played a central role in the president’s
tribal coalition.” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 140)
Mengistu of Ethiopia seems to be an accomodationist during this conflict.
He only came to power in February 1977 and spent much of the time prior to the
invasion cracking down on domestic opposition. This is that not to say that
Mengistu was a pacifist. His rule and time with the Derg was filled with blood and
violence. Mengistu was not ready for war in 1977 and did not seek to press the
issue against the Somalis. In fact, he may have been willing to support Ethiopian
devolution of territories (Lewis 1988: 233). Notes from a diplomatic meeting
between Cuba, Ethiopia, and Somalia in March 1977 illustrate the point that
Mengistu was not seeking to push this conflict into a war. This (settlement) proved
impossible to attain, because Siad Barre unequivocally rejected all of the
suggestions presented at the meeting. While the meeting did not lead to an
agreement, nevertheless Siad Barre promised not to attack Ethiopia.
The impressive diplomacy that the Cubans asserted seems to prove that
Somalia had been the aggressor all along and they never considered negotiating
while their power appeared to be on the assent. It also seemed highly unlikely to
Barre that Ethiopia would gain the military support of Cuba and the Soviet Union
so quickly. Yet, to dismiss the wishes of the Soviet Union and Cuba in this
conflict seems foolhardy. Barre was likely blinded into action by his massive
military build-up and the internal weakness of Ethiopia at the time.
The territorial claim on the Ogaden region was present at Somalian
independence in 1960. This issue sparked the beginnings of the rivalry between
the two states. Ethiopia was allied to the United States from 1953 to 1977.
Ethiopia also seems to have acquired an alliance with Kenya in 1963 as an early
response to the territorial issue and emerging rivalry with Somalia. In 1974
Somalia joins the Arab League to develop its own alliance ties and counter
Ethiopian predation. Arms races are observed in 1972, 1974, and 1975 in response
to these developing alliance ties and the repeated disputes festering between the
two states. There is a clear causal chain of events that show first a territorial claim,
then alliance developments, rivalry then emerges and the response at this point is
to build-up the military power of each state. With these four variables in operation
and being cumulative, the raise of any strong hardliner coupled with insecurity led
to the war in 1977.
Table 1 clearly shows the timing of each important variable in this analysis.
Ethiopian-Somalian War (1977-
1978)
Start date 07/23/77 Somalia invades Ogaden region
Main Issue Territory- Ogaden region
Notes (Secondary Issues) Ethnic Somalis under Ethiopian rule
MID Issue Territory
Alliances 1953-5/1977 Mutual Defense treaty between U.S. and Ethiopia
1977 (May) Agreements between Soviet Union and Ethiopian
1963 Kenya and Ethiopian
1974 Somalia joins the Arab League
Arms Races 1972 1974 1975
Rivalry 1960-1985 (Enduring)
Domestic Actors Ethiopia Mengistu Accomodationist
Somalia SiadBarre Hardliner
REFERENCES
Abbink, J. (2003), “Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects for Peace in the
Horn of Africa”, in Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol.21 no.3.
Abubakar, N. L. (2006), “Somalia: When Will Somalia Have Functional
Government?”Weekly Trust, 30 October.
ACED: Armed Conflict Events Database.(2000). Ethiopian Civil War. M
http://onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr70/fethiopia1974.htm Retrieved
March.
Adam, H. M. (1999), “Somali Civil War” , in Civil Wars in Africa, T. M. Ali and
R.O. Matthews (Eds.), Montreal: McGill University Press: pp169-193.
Africa Watch Committee. (1990), Somalia: A Government at War with its Own
People, New York.
Ajala, A. (1983), “The nature of African boundaries” In Africa Spectrum 18, pp
177-188.
Asiwaju, A. I. (1985), “The conceptual framework”, in A. I. Asiwaju (Ed.),
Partitioned Africans, New York: St. Martin’s: pp. 1-18.
Asiwaju, A. I. (1993), Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in
African peace and security, New York: United Nations: pp. 72-99
Aynte, A. (2010), “The Anatomy of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Jihadists” Paper
presented to 9th Horn of Africa Conference with Focus on Somalia. The
Role of DemocraticGovernance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia, 4-6
June, Lund, Sweden.
Ayoob, M. (1980), “The Horn of Africa”, in Conflict and Intervention in the Third
World, edited by Mohammed Ayoob, London: Croom Helm.
Bach, D. (1995), “Contraintes et ressources de la frontière en
Afriquesubsaharienne[Constraints and resources of the border in sub-
Saharan Africa]”Revue Internationale de PolitiqueComparée, 2(3).
Bahru, Z. (2001), A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991, Addis Ababa: Addis
Ababa University Press.
Barbour, K.M. (1961), “A geographical analysis of boundaries in inter-tropical
Africa”, in K. M. Barbour & R. M. Prothero (Eds.), Essays on African
population,London: RoutledgeKegan Paul, pp. 303-323.
Bayart, J. F. (1996), “L’historicité de l’Etatimporté” In J. Bayart (Ed.), Lagreffe
del’Etat, Paris: Khartala, pp. 11-39
Bello, A. (1995), “The boundaries must change” In West Africa, p. 546.
Bennett, D. S. (1998), "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration", in
American Journal of Political Science 42(4), pp 1200-1232.
Bilgin, P. and Morton, A. D. (2004) ‘From “Rogue” to “Failed” States: The
Fallacyof Short-termism’, Politics, vol. 24, no. 3, 169-180.
Brownlie, I. (1979), African boundaries: A legal and diplomatic encyclopedia,
London: C.Hurst.
Boyd, J. B. (1979), “African boundary conflict: An empirical study”, in African
Studies Review 22, pp 1-14.
Brown, D. H. (1961), “Recent Developments in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier
Dispute” International Comparative Law Q. 10(1), pp 167-176.
Butterworth, R. L. (1980), Managing Interstate Conflict, 1975-79: Data with
Synopses.Final Report. Unpublished mimeograph, 356 pp
Clapham, C. (1996a), Africa and the international system, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Claude, I. (1964), Power and International Relations, New York: Random House.
Combating Terrorism Center (2006), “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al
Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities”. CTC, Department of Social
Sciences,United States Military Academy, West Point.
Cooper, T. (2003), Ogaden War, 1977-1978, ACIG.org.
Cottam, M. and Cottam, R. (2001), Nationalism and Politics: the political
behavior of nation states. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
David, S. (1979), “Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage”, in
International Security, vol.4 no.2.
Davidson, B. (1992), The Black man’s burden: Africa and the curse of the nation
state. NewYork: Times Books.
De Waal, A. (2007), “Sudan: International Dimensions to the State and its Crisis”,
In Crisis States Research Centre Occasional Paper no.3. Debiel, T. (2002)
Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in CrisisRegions.
London: ZED Books.
Diehl, P. and Goertz, G. (2000), War and Peace in International Rivalry, Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Dorff, R. H. (1996), ‘Democratisation and Failed States: The Challenge of
Ungovernability’, Parameters, vol. 26, no. 2, 17-31.
Dorff, R. H. (1999), ‘Responding to the Failed State: The Need for Strategy’,
Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 10 (Winter): 62-81.
Dorff, R. H. (2000), ‘Responding to the Failed State: Strategic Triage’, in Beyond
Declaring Victory and Coming Home, eds. A. J. Joes and M. Manwaring.
Westport,CT: Praeger, 225-243.
Dorff, R. H. (2005), ‘Failed States after 9/11: What Did We know and What Have
We Learned?, International Studies Perspetives, vol. 6, no. 1, 20-34.
European Union (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World http://www.isseu.
org/solana/solanae.pdf access 20070508
Fukuyama, F. (2004) State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-
First Century. London: Profile Books.
Garowe Online 10 November 2008, “New rebel outfit to fights Somaliland security
forces”.
Gibler, D. M. and Sarkees, M. (2002), Coding Manual for v3.0 of the Correlates of
War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816-2000, Typescript.
Gilkes, P. and Plaut, M. (1999), War in the Horn: the conflict between Eritrea and
Ethiopia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Gibler, D. M., Rider, T., et al. (2005), "Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles:
Interdependent Racing and the Likelihood of Conflict in Rival States"
Journal Of Peace Research 42(2),pp 131-147.
Griffiths, I. (1996),”Permeable boundaries in Africa”, in Paul Nugentand A. I.
Asiwaju (Eds.), African boundaries, London: Pinter, pp. 68-83
Gurr, T. R. (1998) ‘The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S.
Foreign Policy Planning’, paper presented at the conference on “Failed
States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences”,
Purdue University, West Lafayette, 25-27 February 1998,
http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/failed%5Fstates/1998/papers/gurr.html
(accessed 17 March 2011).
Haggai, E. (2010), Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Sudan. London: Lynne Rienner.
Hassan, A. A. (2009), “Al Shabab Threat Clouds the Horn of Africa” 3 February.
URL: http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Feb/03_alshabab_ahmed.html
accessed 5 March 2011.
Herbst, J. (1990), “War and the state in Africa”, in International Security, 14, pp
11 – 139.
Herbst, J. (1996-7) ‘Responding to State Failure in Africa’, International Security,
vol. 21, no. 3, 120-144.
Herbst, J. (2000), States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority
And control, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, New York: United Nations.
Hobbes, T. (1996), Leviathan. Rev. student ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press.
Hoehne, M. V. (2007), “Puntland and Somaliland clashing in Northern Somalia:
Who cuts the Gordian knot?” Available at
http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hoehne/printable.html
Holsti, K. J. (1996), The state, war and the state of war, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Ibrahim, M. (2009), “The Geopolitical Implications of the Somali ‘Islamic Courts’
Activities in the Horn of Africa” http://arts.monash.edu.au/politics/terror
research/proceedings/gtrec-proceedings-2009-05-mohamed-ibrahim.pdf
accessed March 11, 2011
Ignatieff, M. 2002. 'Intervention and State Failure', Dissent, Winter.
Imru, Z. (1989), The Horn of Africa: A Strategic Survey, Washington DC:
International Security Council.
International Crisis Group (2005), “Somalia’s Islamists”, Africa Report No. 100
Joireman, S. (2004), “Secession and its Aftermath: Eritrea”, in Managing and
Settling Ethnic Conflicts, edited by Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff.
New York: Palgrave McMillan
Kapil, R. L. (1966), “On the conflict potential of inherited boundaries in Africa”
World Politics18, p 656-673.
Kautilya, J. (1960), Arthasastra, Mysore: Mysore Publishing and Printing House.
Kugler, J. and Lemke, D. Eds. (1996), Parity and War: Evaluations and
Extensions of the War Ledger, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Kum, J.M. (1993), Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in
African peace and security, New York: United Nations. pp. 49-71
Laitin, D.D. and Samatar, S. S (1987), Somalia: nation in search of a state,
London:Westview Press.
Langley, J. (1973), Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa: 1900-1945,
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lemke, D. (2002), Regions of war and peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Legum, C. (1985), “The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa in International
Perspective”, in The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena,
edited by William Dowdy and Russell Trood, Durham: Duke University
Press.
Legum, C. and Bill L. (1979), The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis, New York:
Africana Publishing Company.
Lewis, I. M. (1963), “Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism”, in Modern African
Studies1 (2), p 147-161.
Lewis, I. M. (1988), A Modern History of Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of
Africa. Boulder, Westview Press.
Library of Congress Country Research. (1993), Country Study: Ethiopia. Call
Number DT373 .E83 1993.http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html.
Retrieved March 2010
Mazrui, A. A. (1998),“The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa”, in
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, eds. O. A. Otunnu
and M.W. Doyle. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 233-243.
Medhane , T. (2004),“New Security Frontiers in the Horn of Africa”, in Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue on Globalization.
Menkhaus, K. J. (2005), “Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and
State Collapse” In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Battling Terrorism in the Horn of
Africa, Cambridge: World Peace Foundation.
Metz, H. C. (1992), Somalia: A Country Study, Washington, D. C: Library of
Congress.
Milliken, J. ed. (2003) State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. London:
Blackwell.
Möller, B. (2008), “The Horn of Africa and the US ‘War on Terror’ with a Special
Focus on Somalia”, in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), Post-Conflict Peace-
Building in the Horn of Africa, Research Report in Social Anthropology 1,
Lund: Lund University.
New York Times April 3, 1977 Kandell, J. ...Poor Nations Are the Buyers
Nkiwane, S. M. (1993), Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in
African peace and security, New York: United Nations. pp. 29-37
Nugent, P. (1996), “Arbitrary lines and the people’s minds: A dissenting view on
colonial boundaries inWest Africa” In Paul Nugent & A. I. Asiwaju (Eds.),
African boundaries London: Pinter.pp.35-67.
Nugent, P. and Asiwaju, A. I. (1996), “Introduction: The paradox of African
boundaries”, in PaulNugent& A. I. Asiwaju (Eds.), African boundaries,
London: Pinter.pp. 1-17
Nordquist, K.A. (1992), Boundary Conflicts and Preventive Diplomacy, Ph.D.
diss., Dept. for Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
Nyugen, A.(2005),”The Question of ‘Failed States”, View on Asia Briefing Series:
Sydney,Australia.
Odugbemi, S. (1995), “Consensus and stability”, in West Africa, p501-503.
Ofcansky, T. P. (1992), “National Security” In Somalia: Country Study, Helen C.
Metz (Ed.), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office: p 181-189.
Omaar, R. (1991), Somalia: At War with Itself in Current History, pp 230-234.
Ottaway, M. (1982), Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, New
York: Praeger.
Ottaway, M. (1999), “Keep out of Africa”, in Financial Times, Retrieved March 8,
2011, from http://www.ft.com/search9/cgi/vtopic
Ottaway, M., Jeffrey H. and Greg M. (2004), “Africa’s Big States: Toward a New
Realism”, in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook.
Paul, T. (1994), Asymmetric Conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (2005) Investing in Prevention. London.
Przeworski, A. 1991.Democracy and the Market.Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rinehart, R. (1982), “Historical Setting,” in Somalia: A Country Study, Harold D.
Nelson (Ed.), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p 38.
Rotberg, R. 2002. 'The New Nature of Nation-State Failure', Washington
Quarterly,XXV.
Rotberg, R. I. (2003) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror.
Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution.
Rotberg, R. I. (2004) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Rotberg, R. I. ed. (2005), Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge:
World Peace Foundation.
Sample, S. (2002), "The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor States vs. Major
Powers", in Journal of Peace Research 39(6),pp 669-692.
Sautter, G. (1982), “Quelquesréflexionssur les frontièresafricaines [A few
reflectionson African borders]”, in Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch (Ed.),
Problèmesfrontièresdans le tiersmonde[Border problems in the
ThirdWorld],Paris: Université de Paris.
Schneckener, U. (2004) ‘States at Risk: Zur Analyse fragilerStaatlichkeit’, in
States at Risk: Fragile StaatenalsSicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, ed.
U.Schneckener. Berlin: StiftungWissenschaft und Politik, 5-27.
Security, G. (2006), Ogaden War.
Senese, P. D. and Vasquez, J. (2005), "Assessing the Steps to War ", in British
Journal of Political Science 35: 607-633.
Sheehan, M. (2005), International Security: An Analytical Survey, Boulder:
LynneRienner.
Singer, J. D. (1987). "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material
Capabilities of States, 1816-1985." International Interactions 14: pp 115-
132.
State Failure Task Force (2003) State Failure Task Force: Phase III Findings.
Washington, D.C.
Southall, A. (1985), “Partitioned Alur” In A. I. Asiwaju (Ed.), Partitioned
Africans,New York: St. Martin’s. pp 87-103
Thompson, W. (2001), "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics", in
International Studies Quarterly 45, p 557-586.
Tiruneh, A. (1993), The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987, New York: Cambridge
University Press, p 219.
Touval, S. (1969), “The sources of status quo and irredentist policies” Carl
G.Widstrand (Ed.), African Boundary Problems, Sweden: Scandinavian
Instituteof African Studies, pp. 101-118
Turner, J. W. (1993), “Historical Setting” In Ethiopia: A Country Study, Helen C.
Metz (Ed.), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
United Nations Development Program. (2001), Human Development Report 2001
Somalia. New York.
United Nations, Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. (1993),
Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in African peace
and security, New York: United Nations, pp. 3-28
U.S.A. (2006), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
March 16, 2006.
Valeriano, B. (2003), Steps to Rivalry: Power Politics and Rivalry Formation.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.
Vasquez, J. A. (1993), The war puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vasquez, J. (2001), "Mapping the Probability of War and Analyzing the Possibility
of Peace", in Conflict Management and Peace Science 18(2): 145-174.
Weber, A. (2008), “Will the Phoenix Rise again? Commitment or Containment in
The Horn of Africa” Paper presented at the Fourth Expert Meeting on
Regional Security Policy at the Greater Horn of Africa, Cairo.
Whitehouse, D. (2007), “Why did Ethiopia invade Somalia? The US proxy war in
Africa”, in Socialist Worker, 15 January. URL:
http://mostlywater.org/the_u_s_proxy_war_in_africa accessed 3 March
2010.
Young, C. (1996), “The impossible necessity of Nigeria: A struggle for
nationhood”, in Foreign Affairs, 75(6), p 139-143.
Zartman, I.W. (1985), Ripe for Resolution, New York: Oxford University Press.
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA AND THE HORN OF
AFRICA
It was the contours of Somalia’s coastline on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden that gave birth to the geographical term, ‘the Horn of Africa’. However, in
due course the term acquired a distinct political flavour too. According to
Woodward, its legitimacy as a geopolitical term is largely because:
“[…] there seems to be a history of common problems in the
region: disputes over borders both between states and within them;
widespread and prolonged civil war threatening not only
governments but the survival of states themselves; economic
regression that appears to owe something at least to domestic
policy failure, as well as the vagaries of the world economy and
environmental decay; in addition to the famines that seemed to
grow in scale and regularity” (Woodward, 2003).
However, such commonalities should not obscure the fact that the region is
also marked by powerful (but not immutable) cleavages – to name just a few, those
between Islam and Christianity, those between clans, ethnic groups, states and
competing ideologies, those between pastoralists and agriculturalists, not to
mention a cleavage that is too often overlooked by analysts – that of class.
Cleavages such as these have been deployed, sometimes singly, sometimes in
combination, to explain the root causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Each
cleavage has a significant impact on the viability and legitimacy of the ‘failed’,
‘emergent’ or more established states that together make up the region.
The geopolitical term first came to be used widely during the Cold War,
when influence over the region was contested (through local proxies) by the United
States (US) and the Soviet Union. In terms of state formations, at the core of the
region were Somalia and Ethiopia, but as their fates became intertwined, Sudan
also came to be included. Finally, Djibouti was included as part of the region
(when observers remembered that it existed). The end of the Cold War contributed
to a reconfiguration of the region, as Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia
and Somalia collapsed as a state, leading in time to the emergence of two
additional Somali polities, Somaliland and Puntland.
This chapter of this research looks at recent developments in the states and
polities of the Horn of Africa. It also provides some brief background and history
for each as a foundation on which to build a better understanding of the distinct but
overlapping crises that currently affect the region. This chapter will also discuss a
number of overarching themes that have often been deployed by analysts and
policy-makers seeking to identify the ‘root causes’ of conflict in the Horn. In
doing so, the explanatory power and value of these overarching themes is
reviewed.
3.1 SOMALIA
Somalia was one of three separate European colonies to be established in the
Somali lands of the Horn of Africa in the late 19th century in the context of the
‘Scramble for Africa’. Along with Eritrea, the southern Somali lands came under
Italian control. Other Somali lands fell under British and French control. Ethiopia
also incorporated Somalis into its westernmost region as part of the carve-up, while
a substantial number of Somalis to the far south found themselves under British
rule in Kenya. The population of Somalia today is roughly estimated at 7-8
million; it is over 20 years since the last official census (European Regional Survey
for Africa, 2006).
3.2 THE COLONIAL PERIOD: 1880s-1960
In relation to modern statehood the beginnings of Somali history can be
traced to 1839-40 when the British occupied the post of Aden on the Southern tip
of what is now Yemen in order to secure a base for contact with India. The base at
Aden grew and soon demanded more supplies of foodstuffs than could be supplied
by the meagre hinterland of Aden. Therefore British attention soon turned to the
northern Somali coast and established trade links with pastoralists in order to
secure a supply of cattle and sheep. In 1884 the Anglo-Somali relations were
formalized in a series of treaties with the clans of the area, in effect establishing
Somaliland as a British protectorate (ICG, 2003:2).Somaliland was inhabited by
three major clans: the Isaaq 66 %, the Darod 19 per cent% and the Dir 15 per
cent% (ICG, 2003:2).
In the 1890s the Italians established a presence in Southern Somalia and in
1893 a formal colony. In the south, they came into contact with agricultural
communities and highly advanced urban communities as well as pastoralist
communities (Kassim, 1995:29-43).
Earlier the British had been joined by the French who had established a base
to the north of the British protectorate in what is now Djibouti. Somali clans in the
west were brought under Ethiopian rule as emperor Menelik established suzerainty
over the Ogaden region in what is now eastern Ethiopia. The southernmost of the
Somali were over time incorporated into the British colony of Kenya (Lyons
&Samatar, 1995; 11).
No unified Somali political entity existed prior to the colonial period and it
is from the late 19th century that traditions of state structures in the different parts
of what is now the legal entity of Somalia began to deviate from each other. In
Somaliland, the British ruled with as little engagement as possible preferring
‘indirect rule’ to deeper engagement. The Dervish revolt of 1899 required a
substantial military effort to quell led to slightly greater British engagement in
Somaliland. Still the system of ‘indirect rule’ continued. In effect, this meant that
the British preferred to rule through local clan chiefs and their system of authority,
which was left largely intact, rather than to introduce a more developed colonial
administration. It was perhaps of consequence to later developments in Somaliland
that the revolt of 1899 divided rather than united the clans of protectorate. The
Isaaq sided with the British, while the two Darod sub-clans, the Dhulbahante and
the Warsengeli, joined the rebellion (ICG, 2003: 3).
Apart from creating a historical precedent for much later conflict, the
rebellion in 1899 may have contributed to creating greater clan cohesion in the
north-west, particularly among the Isaaq. Italian Somalia and British Somaliland
were both drawn into World War II as Italian forces briefly occupied Somaliland
before being driven back by the British who instead placed Somalia under military
administration.
In 1950, Somalia was returned to Italian trusteeship under a United Nations
resolution that determined that the country would be granted independence in
1960. Originally, the British had no such plans but Somali pressure for
independence (as well as developments elsewhere in Africa) led to a change of
plans and Somaliland was set on the course to independence. In 1957 the Somali
Legislative Council was created and reconstituted in 1959 to include twelve elected
representative. In 1960 an executive branch was formed and elections held.
Independence was formally granted on 25 June 1960 after the Somaliland Council
of Elders had given their approval the previous month. For Somali nationalists this
was an important first step towards creating a single Somali state that would
ultimately encompass all Somalis in Ethiopia, French Somaliland and northern
Kenya. Dreams of a ‘Greater Somalia’ were crucial in sustaining the fragile
civilian-led cross-clan coalitions that governed Somalia for the first decade after
independence. The new government supported insurgencies in each of these areas.
However, tensions between and within different clan families were present from
the birth of the new state and grew in intensity as expansionist dreams ran aground.
3.3 THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA: 1960-1991
3.3.1 INDEPENDENCE 1960
On 1 July 1960, the Somalia, the territory entrusted to Italy, was granted
independence and five days later the two entities merged into the republic of
Somalia through an Act of Union. Relations between the north-west (Somaliland)
and the rest of the country were highly unequal in the Somali republic. Political
institutions, such as the National Assembly, were dominated by Southerners who
also held the posts of Prime Minister and President as well as other senior
ministerial positions. Even more problematic was the South’s dominance of the
officer corps of the national army (Lyons &Samatar, 1995: 12).
The economy of the Republic of Somali also became dominated by the
South, impoverishing the North and further fuelling discontent with the Union.
Inequalities in the top tier of the government were addressed somewhat by the
appointment of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the leader of Somaliland’s
independence movement, to the position of Prime Minister in 1967.
Throughout the era of the Republic, the North and the South remained quite
distinct and popular support of the merger of the two colonies in a single state
quickly waned. Internally, Somalia quickly developed the traits of a ‘predatory
state’ in which membership in the state regime provided a rapid and efficient
means of enrichment, either on a personal or a clan base (Buzan&Waever, 2004:
229).
3.3.2 SOMALIA’S JOURNEY TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION
The aptitude of Somalia’s regime in securing foreign aid might have been a
contributing factor. Despite the corruption, factionalism and clientilism that
dominated politics, Somalia remained a formal democracy until 1969. The largest
party emerging out of the 1964 elections was the Somali Youth League (SYL),
originally with 69 out of 123 seats -later to be expanded to 92 as other deputies
joined the SYL to share the spoils.
In the 1969 election, more than 60 parties appeared. To defend its hold on
power, the SYL used funds from the national treasury and employed the National
Police Force in order to secure its victory (Lyons & Samatar, 1995: 13).
The existence of formal parties should not obscure the fact that the candidates
mainly sought to further clan interests. In most cases, clans had supplied the
financial means necessary to campaign and expected returns of their investments.
Appealing to clan loyalties was initially a means used by the candidates in
parliamentary elections to optimizing their chances of winning. It is significant that
even at the starting-point of Somalia’s existence as a modern state the clan
structure was not only affirmed by modern political structures but actually
reinforced. The SYL won a majority in the election but within a few days almost
all other parliamentarians had joined the party in order to be in a better position to
secure funds.
In 1969 Somalia was thus a one-party state but with little party discipline
since the SYL was a means for individuals to plunder the state. Behind the
parliamentarians, stood the clans, which were becoming increasingly powerful and
increasingly salient as vehicles of identification and collective action. Not for the
last time in its history, Somalia was an entity characterized by many layers of
different organizing principles that it would be difficult for outsiders to choose
between in understanding its politics.
3.3.3 SIAD BARRE ERA AND THE BIRTH OF ETHIOPIAN RIVALRY
The predatory one-party state of the SYL did not even last a year. In
October 1969, a group of military leaders calling itself the Supreme Revolutionary
Council (SRC) led by Major-General Siad Barré had staged a coup d’état
following the assassination of the President. The SRC embarked on a rapid process
of modernization of the country, adopting ‘scientific socialism’ in 1970 as its
guiding principle and aligning Somalia with the Soviet bloc. Modernization in this
sense entails creating a system of education, including a script for the national
language, infrastructure –including sanitation-, organizing a traditional
subsistence/merchant economy into a national economy linked to public finances.
Ostensibly promoting national unity by promoting a pan-Somali ideology, Siad
Barré’s reign was itself heavily clannish in character, resting on the support of the
Marehan, Dhulbahante and Ogaden clans (belonging to the Darod clan-family).
The regime manipulated and strengthened clan rivalries in order to undercut
the possibility of opposition. Thereby, the clan structure was strengthened by the
one-party dictatorship just as it had been by the flawed experiment with liberal
democracy.
The ideology of ‘Pan-Somalism’, whose express goal was to bring all
people of Somali descent into a single national state, naturally had severe
international repercussions. A significant number of Somalis, belonging to the
Darod clan- family, lived in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. Somali
nationalism and irredentist ideology were important tools in holding clan rivalries
in check (Meredith, 2005: 466).
International developments were also to become important for Somalia. In
1974 a coup d’état had taken place in Ethiopia, whereby the ailing emperor Haile
Salassie had been ousted from power by Colonel Mengistu. The country had been
cast in considerable disarray during the last years of the emperor’s reign, with
famine, civil strife and rampant mismanagement. The situation was hardly
improved after the downfall of the old regime. Mengistu soon turned to
revolutionary socialism, nationalizing banks, companies and all rural land
(Meredith, 2005: 244).
This move endeared him the Soviet Union and even more so to Cuba, who
began to support the regime and prefer Ethiopia to its former client, Somalia.
Representatives of the old establishment soon rose in revolt all over the country.
The most serious challenge to the revolution was territorially based, however, as
the Eritreans and the Tigray province intensified their struggles for independence.
Somalia supported the Oromo Liberation Front in the South of Ethiopia and began
to infiltrate the region and supply the insurgents with weapons.
In mid-1977, the Ethiopian army had lost control over the countryside in
Eritrea; a programme of ‘red terror’ had been unleashed by Mengistu all over
Ethiopia which contributed to the chaos and dissolution. Seeing this state of
weakness in its neighbor Siad Barré decided that it was time to act and declared
war. Somali forces were initially successful, capturing most of Ogaden in two
months. In November of 1977, Mengistu’s and Barré’s erstwhile backer, the Soviet
Union intervened on the former’s behalf. A massive air- and sealift brought
hundreds of armour, aircraft and artillery to Ethiopia. Together with a contingent
of 17,000 Cuban soldiers, they provided sufficient support for Ethiopia to
decisively defeat Somalia in 1978 (Meredith, 2005: 247).
The military disaster led to serious political repercussions within Somalia.
Two major rebel groups emerged in 1978. Immediately after the Ogaden war, a
group of army colonels belonging to the Majerteen clan (Darod clan family) staged
a coup attempt that quickly failed. In response the regime launched communal
reprisals against all members of the clan, with killings and the destruction of wells
and livestock –the lifeblood of a pastoralist community–. Out of this campaign of
clan repression the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SSDF) was formed.
Originally it encompassed several clans, but soon developed into an exclusively
Majerteen movement. One of its leaders was Colonel Addullahi Yussuf who had
participated in the failed coup.
In the north-west the Somali National Movement (SNM), based on the Isaaq
clan group in former British Somaliland emerged in 1981 (Meredith, 2005: 467).
The origins of the SNM lay in the conflicts that ensued when members of the
Ogaden clan (Darod clan- family) who were supportive of Siad Barré fled from
Ethiopia and resettled in the north. The Barré regime was openly supportive of the
quarter of a million refugees and discriminatory against the ‘native’ Isaaq. Not
only were the refugees given preferential access to social services and international
aid but also arms that were often put to use against Isaaq civilians (ICG, 2003: 5).
Together with the failing economy and the loss of regime legitimacy after
the defeat in the Ogaden war the renewed discrimination awoke grievances from
the 1960s over regional inequality within Somalia. Both SSDF and SNM were
supported by and operated out of Ethiopia. The major groups the Majerteen clan
and Isaaq clan-family that had been fighting the Barré regime in the 1980s (as
SSDF and SNM) and also suffered heavily at the hands of the regime were
subsequently those that were most successful in forming territorial entities in the
1990s, Puntland and Somaliland, respectively. Furthermore, in the north-western
and north-eastern parts of the country no external interventions took place after
1991.
3.3.4 SIAD BARRE RADICAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE BIRTH
OF CLAN INSURGENCY
In the 1980s, Siad Barré had become a protégé of the West, in particular of
the United States and Italy who made provided large amounts of money in foreign
aid, military and otherwise. By 1988 the country as well as the regime had become
dependent on foreign aid for its survival (Meredith, 2005: 468).
Military aid was a particular necessity as civil war raged against both the
SSDF and the SNM. In 1988, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and the Barré
regime in Somalia realised that they had something in common: the need to combat
insurgencies within their respective countries efficiently. Consequently, they
signed an accord in which they pledged non-aggression and the end of support to
insurgents in the neighbouring country. The accord led to intensified fighting in the
north of Somalia as SNM forces rapidly advanced to take control over most of the
countryside in the area inhabited by members of the Isaaq clan-family. The regime
answered with unrestricted aerial and artillery bombardment of Hargeysa and
employing loyal Ogadeni militias to attach the civilian Isaaq population.
In 1989, Western economic aid ceased as the Cold War was coming to an
end. In the South new armed challenges to the Barré regime arose in the form of
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Congress (USC), which
was based on the Hawiye clan group. The USC had been formed as an answer to
communal punishments of Hawiye civilians by the Barré regime. The tendency of
organizing violent resistance on the basis on clans and clan-groups was rein-
forced by the regime’s increasing tendency to base support and membership of the
army on membership of the Marehan clan (Darod clan-family) (Lyons &Samatar,
1995: 19).
Thus, the practice of viewing politics in a clan-perspective is an interactive
process between different groups analogous to an arm-race. From the view-point of
trying to create a society corresponding to national borders, this was and still is
extremely problematic since it undermines trust in the common polity. The
problem is that while recourse to the clan can be interpreted as a response to the
lack of trust in common institutions and identities, each such recourse undermines
the possibility of building societal trust (Giddens, 1984).
Meanwhile, popular protests erupted in Mogadishu, which met with harsh
reactions from the regime. A central feature of the regime’s response was
collective punishment of communities who were seen as the supporters of
oppositional movements. During 1990, Somalia’s central institutions deteriorated
rapidly. The army split into several factions based on different clans. SiadBarré
finally fled Mogadishu in January 1991 supported only by a small group of loyal
fighters from the Marehan clan (Darod clan-family) (Lyons &Samatar, 1995: 21).
The SSDF gained control over the north-east, the traditional homeland of
the Majarteen clan. From 1991 onwards, the trajectories of the different regions
began to diverge. In the south fighting reigned between the forces of SiadBarré and
the USC, under the leadership of General Muhammed Farah ‘Aideed’. The USC
soon split in two different Hawiye factions, each based on a different clan: The
Habar Gibir under Aideed and the Abgal under Ali Mahdi Mohammed. During
1991 Mogadishu was divided between the two groups who fought each other
ferociously, leaving the city in ruins. To make matters worse, SiyadBarré’s troops
were still active to the south of Mogadishu, were they fought with Aideed’s forces
for control over Somalia’s most fertile lands between the Jubba and Shebelle
rivers. Caught in the middle were neutral clans who had neither armed nor
organized themselves, the Rewein groups.
Attempting to build the polity on the clan system may have been a
contributing factor to the fact that already by the mid-1980s Somalia fitted the
label of a failed state (Menkhaus, 2006: 80). Strategies of divide and rule may be
effective in order to vanquish potential and actual rivals during a limited period,
but it provides self-destructive in the long run since it creates very uncertain
conditions for governance.
3.4 COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CIVIL WAR AND UN
INTERVENTION 1991-1995
A focus on the major actors in the struggle for Somalia runs the risk giving
the impression of a more orderly situation than in fact was the case in Somalia. A
major part of the problem in 1991 and still today is the rampant banditry in many
parts of the country. One little-reported dimension of conflict was the rural-urban
divide which exploded into violence in the early 1990s as militiamen from
marginalized pastoralist backgrounds took revenge on the townspeople that they
perceived as their oppressors (Brons, 2001: 223).
Another is the violence that took place along community lines between
marginalized minority groups (e.g. former slave populations of Bantu descent, but
now assimilated into the clan structure) and more powerful majority clans in the
South (Webersik, 2004).
Plunder and pillage became the principal sources of income, transforming
the country into a war economy. The situation in the country was made more
chaotic and devastating because of the famine, mostly human-induced, that swept
the country in 1992 (Quaranto, 2008: 21).
The grave humanitarian situation in the country brought it into the
international spotlight of the post-Cold War era. Already in 1990 all UN officials
had evacuated Somalia and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
was the only major aid organization still at work in Somalia (Meredith, 2005: 471-
472).
In 1992 a ceasefire between Aideed and Mahdi provided the possibility for
the UN to re-enter the country. In April 1992 the UN Security Council established
the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The first emissary to arrive
was Mohamed Sahnoun who soon won the respect of the Somali actors he met
with. Sahnoun strove to use the clan system and to increase intra-clan cohesion and
inter-clan reconciliation. However, the UN mission was plagued by inefficiency
and Sahnoun’s complaints about the lack of funding, staffing and organization led
to his dismissal by the UN Secretary-General Boutrous-Ghali.
By mid-1992 an Islamic political group had also emerged, the al-Ittihad al-
Islam, which represented the birth of organized radical Islamic politics in the
country. With the humanitarian situation deteriorating rapidly, the UN imposed
an arms embargo on Somalia and sent in a small peace-keeping force in September
1992, but it struggled to win the stable consent of the main factions. The UN’s
humanitarian work was also widely criticized as too slow.
3.4.1 THE BIRTH OF UNISOM AND THE RISE OF SOMALI
NATIONAL ALLIANCE
In June 1993, what was by then known as the UN Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM) was mandated by the Security Council to engage in peace
enforcement, including the disarmament of the factions, without their consent if
necessary. Within a few months, a 30,000 strong force (at full strength), which had
heavy American representation, was engaged in major clashes with Aidid’s forces,
whose capture it now sought. Critics accused UNOSOM, as well as Aidid, of
responsibility for widespread human rights abuses against civilians in the capital.
In late 1993, after suffering a series of reversals, the UN changed policy in
favour of withdrawing most of its troops and encouraging negotiations between the
warring Somali factions, including Aidid. During 1994 these efforts came to
nothing. With violence continuing, UNOSOM withdrew the rest of its troops from
Mogadishu in March 1995 with US support, once again leaving Somalia to its own
devices. Arguments that the withdrawal of foreign troops would concentrate the
minds of the Somali factions proved over-optimistic. When in June 1995 Aidid
was elected ‘President of Somalia’ by a conference of his supporters, now known
as the Somali National Alliance (SNA), other factions immediately rejected his
authority.
Sporadic fighting continued into 1996 and in August Aidid died as a result
of injuries incurred in a skirmish. However, his death had little effect on the
situation. His mantle was taken on by his son, Hussein Mohammed Aidid. With no
progress being made towards resolving the wider differences between the SNA and
its many enemies, attention turned in some parts of the country towards local
efforts to end violence. One such initiative led to the establishment in 1998 of an
autonomous government in Puntland region.
3.4.2 THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF FACTIONALISM
However, unlike the Republic of Somaliland, it did not seek international
recognition as a sovereign state. From 1996 the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), the main intergovernmental organization in the region, with
UN backing, became involved in efforts to mediate between the factions. In 1998
IGAD proposed holding a national peace conference. Similarly named initiatives
had been tried on many occasions before and failed, but this one gathered some
momentum and eventually a conference took place in May 2000 in Djibouti. There
was an effort to ensure that as many parts of Somali society as possible were
present, although it was only partially successful. Neither Somaliland not Puntland
sent representatives. The conference agreed that Somalia would adopt a federal
system and set up a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) with a view to
eventually establishing a Transitional National Government (TNG).
In August 2000, the new TNA elected Abdulkasim Salad Hasan, a Hawiye,
as the President of Somalia. He appointed a TNG in October. However, it quickly
became clear that the TNG lacked legitimacy and support. It had little presence in
Mogadishu. The SNA rejected its claims.
Opponents simply saw the TNG as the ‘UN faction’ and moved to set up an
alternative ‘national government’ by forming the Somali Reconciliation and
Restoration Council (SRRC). By late 2001 what support the TNG had garnered
was beginning to hemorrhage away. IGAD-led attempts to reconcile the TNG and
the SRRC failed. In March 2002 a new ‘State of South-western Somalia’ was
announced by opponents of the TNG. Although this meant little in practice,
Somalia’s fractures appeared to be deepening rather than closing. With the TNG’s
original mandate approaching expiry, IGAD decided that there was no alternative
but to return virtually to the starting-blocks by convening a new peace and
reconciliation conference. It met for the first time in Eldoret, Kenya, in October
2002.
Its first positive outcome was the signing of a ceasefire between the TNG
and five Mogadishu-based factions in December. The TNG remained extremely
suspicious of the process but could not escape the fact that its mandate ended in
August 2003. The effectiveness of IGAD’s mediation was hampered by the rival
agendas of key member states. Nonetheless, after numerous false starts, a relatively
wide range of factions agreed to the establishment of a Transitional Federal
Charter in January 2004 in Nairobi.
It was also agreed that a new Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) would
be created, comprising 275 members, 12 per cent of whom were to be women. The
country’s major clan families would receive 61 seats each, with a coalition of
smaller clans receiving 31 seats. The TFP would then elect a President, who would
appoint a Prime Minister mandated to appoint a Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) and prepare for elections in 2009, after which a new Constitution would be
negotiated. The TFP met for the first time in September 2004. In October it
elected Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a Darod and President of Puntland, as
President of Somalia. In November he appointed Ali Mohammed Ghedi, a Hawiye,
as Prime Minister. Both were known to be close to Ethiopia. The TFG was
appointed in the following month. The key test was whether the new TFG would
have more success than its predecessor in persuading the Somali factions outside it
to co-operate. Unfortunately, despite widespread international support, it proved
nearly as ineffectual and divided on this count as the TNG.
A major split quickly emerged between President Yusuf Ahmed and what
became known as the ‘Mogadishu group’, which was considerably less hostile than
he was to the rising Islamist influence in the capital. As a consequence, the TFG
proved unable to exert much influence over the warlords that had dominated
Mogadishu since the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Siad Barre in 1991.
They carried on largely unimpeded until early 2006 when they were successfully
challenged by an entirely different and, as far as President Yusuf Ahmed was
concerned, antithetical political force, the Council of Somali Islamic Courts
(CSIC).
3.4.3 THE RISE OF RADICAL ISLAM AND ISLAMISTS’ POWER
However, the Islamists militarily defeated the Alliance in June 2006 and
then established the CSIC. It subsequently increased the area under its control and
brought a degree of order to Somalia not seen since 1991. The CSIC did gain
considerable popularity among Somalis in those areas it controlled, although some
of its restrictive social measures were resented. The US was highly suspicious of
the CSIC but was initially prepared to accept that it had an important role to play in
rebuilding Somalia. Neighbors’ such as Ethiopia and Kenya, both strong
supporters of the TFG, took a similar position but also expressed concerns, not
least when CSIC leaders called for a ‘Greater Somalia’.
The border between Ethiopia and Somalia remains a provisional boundary
rather than an agreed international border. The CSIC was also reported to be
supporting Ethiopian rebel groups. It received military support from a number of
Muslim countries and was backed by Ethiopia’s main regional opponent following
their 1998-2000 border war – Eritrea.
Enmity between the TFG and the CSIC also had a clan dimension, with the
TFG viewed as having a strong Darod identity. The CSIC, although not primarily a
clan-based movement, nonetheless brought many clan elders under its umbrella as
it consolidated its power. Its opponents accused it of having a pronounced Hawiye
character (Marchal, 2007).
Matters came to a head between the CSIC and the TFG in December 2006.
CSIC militias advanced to within a short distance of the town of Baidoa, where the
TFG was based. Despite initial denials that it was doing so, Ethiopia moved a
number of combat troops to Baidoa in support of the TFG.
3.4.4 UN RESOLUTION 1725
On 6 December 2006 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1725 on
Somalia. Resolution 1725, whose lead sponsor was the US, is a Chapter VII
resolution under the UN Charter. It authorised IGAD and member states of the
African Union (AU) to establish a “protection and training mission” in Somalia.
Known as the Peacekeeping Mission of IGAD in Somalia (IGASOM), its
protection mandate extended to the “members of the Transitional Federal
Institutions and Government as well as their key infrastructure.” It was expected to
be about 8,000 strong. It was also agreed that states bordering Somalia should not
deploy troops in the country.
IGAD was divided, with Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan reportedly unhappy
about the terms of the Resolution. By contrast, the TFG and its regional allies
warmly welcomed the Resolution. Despite much bellicose talk by the rival
groups, there were also some peace efforts. Representatives of the TFG and CSIC
met twice for peace talks in Khartoum, facilitated by the Arab League, after the
CSIC took Mogadishu. On 22 June 2006 the two sides agreed what is known as the
Khartoum Declaration. Significant as this sounded; in fact it amounted to little
more than an agreement to refrain from violence, recognize each other and to meet
again. At a further meeting in September, the two sides did little more than
reiterate these principles. A few days before Resolution 1725 was approved, the
CSIC agreed a communiqué in Djibouti with IGAD (or, at least a faction within it)
in which it promised to respect the territorial integrity of Somalia’s neighbors and
cease support to insurgent groups. It also condemned terrorism. There were those
who were relatively optimistic that talks could eventually bear fruit.
3.5 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA
The CSIC effectively disbanded itself on 27 December 2006, handing back
political leadership to the clan leaders that it had allied itself with as it consolidated
its power earlier in the year. However, military elements within it, such as the
militants of al Shabaab (the Youth), remained largely intact and threatened a long
guerrilla war. They formed alliances with a number of clan interests, including
Hawiye opponents of the TFG, who took on the mantle of Somali nationalism.
There were credible reports from UN officials of continuing Eritrean support for
these elements. Ethiopian and TFG forces, with US logistical (and, on occasions,
direct military) support, pursued some of these elements south towards the Kenyan
border and had considerable success in eliminating them. In February the UN
Security Council further relaxed the arms embargo against Somalia to allow for
military support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and for the
TFG’S security sector institutions (UN Security Council Resolution 1744, 2007).
3.5.1 THE DECLINE OF TFG AND THE BIRTH OF AMISOM
There was a lull in the violence in Mogadishu after its fall, but from March
2007 onwards the level of attacks against Ethiopian and TFG forces began to rise,
stoked by the TFG’s unpopularity in the capital and considerable anti-Ethiopian
feeling among the population. While the TFG moved to Mogadishu soon after its
victory as a way of showing that it intended to turn itself into a genuinely national
government, it was unable to establish full control. Efforts to promote disarmament
made little progress. It was forced to promote the establishment of vigilante groups
to supplement its efforts to gain control. These became a particular target of attacks
by TFG opponents in Mogadishu.
Ethiopia, conscious of the ill-feeling against it, quickly announced that it
would begin withdrawing some of its troops. Some troops did leave in January
2007, but it proved to be a token gesture. This was accompanied by efforts to get
an AU peacekeeping force into Somalia quickly. The AU adapted the IGASOM
concept, as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1725. It agreed a six-month
mandate for the force, known as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in
January 2007.
The UN Security Council endorsed it under Resolution 1744 of 20 February
2007, which was unanimously adopted. Under Resolution 1772 of 20 August
2007, the Security Council mandated the UN Secretariat to begin the groundwork
for a UN peacekeeping force to take over from AMISOM, probably in early 2008.
At that time, there were hopes that the security situation could be stabilizing.
However, major doubts were expressed in many quarters about the feasibility of
such a force, due to the deteriorating security situation. In a report to the Security
Council later in the year, the UN Secretary-General, Ban ki-Moon, stated that it
was currently too dangerous to send in a UN force, suggesting that a multinational
force composed of a ‘coalition of the willing’ might be a better alternative, at least
in the short-term. However, he was extremely vague about what its mandate should
be.
AU troops on several occasions became targets of the insurgents in
Mogadishu and had to fire back to defend themselves. In November 2007, a rebel
leader called on insurgents to target peacekeepers. There was talk of Arab forces
being sent to Somalia to supplement AMISOM, but this also came to nothing.They
were accused of employing indiscriminate and disproportionate military tactics,
leaving many districts in the capital empty and devastated. The insurgents were
also (and continue to be) accused of serious human rights abuses. Over 500,000
were estimated to have fled the capital, Mogadishu, by the end of 2007, leading aid
agencies to speak of a humanitarian emergency equivalent to, or even greater than,
Darfur. Approximately 1.5 million Somalis were by then dependent upon
humanitarian assistance. The international community viewed the defeat of the
CSIC as a ‘historic opportunity’ for Somalia.
It supported AU efforts to set up AMISOM – the EU initially pledged Euro
15 million – while pushing for moves towards a government of national unity
based on ‘inclusive dialogue’ between all groups that had renounced violence. It
had set up an International Contact Group, involving Italy, Kenya, Norway,
Sweden, Tanzania, UK, US, UN, AU, EU, IGAD and the Arab League, in mid-
2006. It now swung into action. However, relations were not always easy with the
TFG. When a senior ex-CSIC leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – believed by
many to be relatively moderate – surrendered to the Kenyan authorities, the
international community urged the TFG to begin talks with him. However, it was
frustrated by the TFG’s lack of urgency and enthusiasm for doing so.
President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed demonstrated little practical enthusiasm
for such a process. Critics viewed him more as a ‘warlord’ than a genuine
President, sitting at the head of a fractious coalition of other warlords. The human
rights record of the TFG during 2007 was also far from good. For example, there
were incidents of harassment of the independent media, with four radio stations
being closed down. The international community condemned the sacking of the
Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, at the behest of President
Yusuf in January 2007 as contrary to the ‘spirit of reconciliation’. Adan had been
involved in negotiations with the CSIC prior to December 2006.
In September many of the TFG’s opponents came together to form the
Alliance for the Liberation and Reconstitution of Somalia (ARS) following a
meeting in Eritrea. It was composed of the former members of the CSIC, a faction
led by Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, representatives of the diaspora and some civil
society groups that were sympathetic to the CSIC. President Yusuf was viewed as
relatively moderate compared with his Prime Minister, Ali Mohammed Gedi. Gedi,
a Hawiye, was a close ally of Ethiopia and tarred as a ‘collaborator’ by many other
Hawiye clan leaders. Among the many issues that Gedi and Yusuf had reportedly
fallen out over were plans to co-operate with China over oil exploration. Yusuf had
taken the lead on the issue; Gedi argued that he and his government should be in
control of exploration negotiations. However, in late-October Gedi resigned. This
increased hopes that the ‘political track’ might now lead somewhere. In November,
a new Prime Minister, Nur Hassan Hussein Adde (henceforth NurAdde), also a
member of the Hawiye clan, but hopefully more attractive to its other leaders, was
appointed. 70 years old, NurAdde, had been head of the Somali Red Crescent since
1991 and was described as coming to the job with “good contacts across the
political spectrum and clan structures but little political baggage” (Marchal,
2007).
In late November 2007 Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi acknowledged
that his forces had become bogged down in Somalia. Attacks by insurgents
prompted major operations by Ethiopian forces against them. Meanwhile the new
Prime Minister named a new Cabinet. However, a significant number of ministers
resigned in protest at its composition. Ethiopia declared itself dissatisfied with it
and there were reports that western countries also regretted that an opportunity had
been missed to bring in individuals currently outside the Transitional Federal
Parliament, as recommended by the NRC. NurAdde agreed to review the Cabinet
again. The main international player in Somalia during 2007 remained the US,
which continued to view the situation there largely in terms of the wider ‘war on
terror’. It is not always clear how much attention it paid to the views of other
members of the International Contact Group. The prospect of a radical Islamic
state in Somalia was viewed with predictable distaste by the administration.
Although there has been no definitive confirmation and Ethiopia itself has denied
it, there were persistent reports during 2007 suggesting that the US had given
Ethiopia the ‘green light’ to intervene on behalf of the TFG in late 2006.
3.5.2 EXTERNAL ACTORS AND THE WAR ON TERROR IN
SOMALIA
The American experience of direct involvement in Somalia in the early
1990s ensured that it was not keen to allow its own forces to become embroiled
there again. However, there were claims of American aircraft supporting military
attacks by the TFG and Ethiopian forces against CSIC and jihadist elements in the
far south of Somalia following the capture of Mogadishu in late 2006.
In June 2007 the US Navy fired missiles at suspected al-Qaeda operatives in
Puntland. US ‘anti-terror’ operations were assisted by the decision of neighboring
Kenya to close its border with Somalia soon after the fall of the CSIC. It remains
closed to this day. In a move that caused much domestic controversy, Kenya
reportedly also transferred a number of Somali militants in its custody to Ethiopian
prisons for interrogation in what critics called another case of ‘extraordinary
rendition’. The US also warned Eritrea that it might declare it a state sponsor of
terrorism unless it ended its support for the insurgency and foreign jihadists, some
of which it claimed were involved in the attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. Towards the end of the year there were reports of divisions within the
US administration over future strategy, with the Pentagon shifting towards building
ties with the Republic of Somaliland, which would require recognition of its
independence, while the State Department remained wedded to trying to rebuild
Somalia as a whole (Washington Post, 4 December 2007).
The TFG called for US$1 billion from the international community to
rebuild Somalia. Its need for donor funds did give donors some leverage over the
TFG. In January 2008 Prime Minister NurAdde bowed to critics and appointed a
new, much smaller but more widely accepted Cabinet. Nine of 18 ministers were to
be non-parliamentarians. NurAdde also pledged to begin extending the
reconciliation process to grassroots communities and opposition groups willing to
engage in dialogue. Also in January 2008, 850 soldiers from Burundi arrived,
bringing AMISOM’s strength to 2,613. The UN continued to develop contingency
plans for a possible UN peace-keeping force during the first quarter of the year, but
there remained little sign that the Security Council had much appetite for it (Report
of the UN Secretary General on the situation in Somalia, S/2008/178, and 14
March 2008).
A gap between militant Islamists and those opposition elements with a more
moderate orientation appeared to be opening up. This did not prevent the TFG and
ARS reaching an agreement in Djibouti on 9 June, which provided inter alia for an
initial cessation of hostilities of 90 days and an eventual ceasefire agreement, a
joint request to the UN Security Council to deploy an international stabilization
force within four months, excluding neighboring states, as a prelude to a UN
peace-keeping force, the concomitant withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the
convening of an international donors’ conference within six months (Report of the
UN Secretary General on the situation in Somalia, S/2008/466, 16 July 2008).
In March the US placed al-Shabaab on its list of terrorist organizations. Its
leader declared this to be a badge of honour (Financial Times, 21 March 2008). Al-
Shabaab did not seem to be set back much by the killing of its commander, Sheikh
Aden HashiAyrow, by a US airstrike at the beginning of May. Ayrow, who had
links with al-Qaida, had been in their sights for some time. There had also been an
unsuccessful airstrike in March against an alleged al- Qaida operative, Saleh Ali
SalehNabhan, in the far south of Somalia. The rebels have periodically been able to
seize control of towns in central and southern Somalia, but have tended to cede
them before they face frontal attack from TFG/Ethiopian forces.
Several attacks have been launched on Ethiopian military bases in Mogadishu
itself. AMISOM has also come under regular attack. There has been a least one
assassination attempt on President Yusuf Ahmed during 2008 (BBC News Online,
18 June 2008). There have been claims that the rebels have been weakened in
Mogadishu, but there is little firm evidence that this is the case. In July 2008, the
Mayor of Mogadishu, former warlord Mohammed Dheere, was sacked by
NurAdde for his failure to improve security in the capital (BBC News Online, 30
July 2008).
September and October 2008 saw heavier fighting in the capital. For their
part, TFG forces are weak, appear to have low morale and have at times not been
paid for prolonged periods. Many of them act in practice as autonomous,
freebooting militias. There have been many instances of them robbing civilians
(New York Times, 29 March 2008).
Without the presence of Ethiopian troops, it is unlikely that the deeply
dysfunctional TFG would have survived. The TFG suffered a major setback in
August 2008, when al-Shabaab took the southern port of Kismayo. However, this
also set in train growing differences between ARS-Asmara and al-Shabaab. The
ARS-Asmara criticised al-Shabaab’s choice to head the new administration. In
September it condemned al-Shabaab’s announcement that it would shell
Mogadishu’s main airport if it was not shut down.
3.5.3 TALKS TOWARDS DJIBOUTI AGREEMENT
The Djibouti agreement initially prompted hopes that, with the humanitarian
situation exacerbated by high food and fuel prices, it would soon become easier for
humanitarian and aid agencies to operate in Somalia. However, their workers were
at growing risk either of abduction or execution. While anti-TFG forces were
responsible for many of these attacks, a significant number appear to have been
conducted by TFG ‘hardliners’, who view humanitarian aid as giving succour to
the enemy (Enough Strategy Paper, September 2008). Since the death in May of
the commander of al-Shabaab, Aden Hashi Ayrow, some of the groups affiliated
with it have increased their targeting of aid workers and their local ‘collaborators’.
There was a small-scale addition to the complement of AMISOM in October
2008, with the arrival of 400 more Burundian troops. This brought the size of
AMISOM on the ground to 3,400 – still fewer than 50 per cent of the planned total
when it was created. The appalling security situation makes it hardly surprising
that other countries continue to hesitate, although Uganda said earlier this year that
it would send more if the funding could be found. In recent weeks, Kenya has also
expressed a willingness to send troops. This follows a marked increase in attacks
across the Kenya-Somalia border by Somali insurgents (New Vision, 8 March
2008).
Given the deepening divisions that exist on both the TFG and ARS sides, the
failure of the Djibouti agreement to quickly bring peace is unsurprising. On the
ARS side, most of the weapons remain in the hands of ‘rejectionists’. It is just
about possible to envisage the ARS-Asmara faction joining a peace process,
provided Ethiopia withdraws without delay. However, bringing an increasingly
fragmented al-Shabaab on board would appear to be an increasingly difficult task.
According to one analyst, some of the clan or criminal militias now using that label
have little real commitment to an Islamist agenda. There have been numerous
recent reports of different militias turning their guns on each other in some areas
(Enough Strategy Paper, September 2008).
There was a flurry of renewed diplomatic activity in late-October. The ARS-
Djibouti and the TFG met again under UN auspices in Djibouti to try and agree a
firm timetable for Ethiopian withdrawal and implementation of the ceasefire. The
talks took place with sides beginning to talk optimistically about a ‘power-sharing’
arrangement. On 26 October 2008 it was agreed to implement the ceasefire from 5
November, with Ethiopia beginning to withdraw its troops from Mogadishu and
other areas from 21 November and completing a full withdrawal within 120 days.
The TFG and ARS-Djibouti were to establish a joint security force and work
closely with AMISOM to bring order to the country. However, this new
agreement, like others before it, has not led to a reduction in levels of violence
around the country. Somaliland and Puntland have also been subjected to insurgent
attacks and there have been attacks on a town on the Kenyan side of the Somalia-
Kenya border, one of which led to the abduction of three Catholic nuns. There are
calls on the Kenyan side for its forces to launch attacks back across the border
against al-Shabaab militias (BBC Monitoring Africa, 6 November 2008).
The ARS-Asmara, al-Shabaab and Eritrea have all condemned the 26 October
agreement. The Hawiye Council is reported to be trying to mediate between the
ARS-Djibouti and those forces that have rejected the agreement (BBC Monitoring
Africa, 4 November 2008). It was also agreed in Djibouti on 26 October that a
new unity government would be the subject of further negotiation under IGAD
auspices (BBC Monitoring Africa, 27 October 2008).
Within days, political leaders from both sides were meeting in Nairobi. While
there was no firm outcome, Prime Minister NurAdde announced that he would
announce the composition of a new, more inclusive, government by 12 November.
However, with the mandate of the TFG having less than a year to run, there were
reports that supporters of President Yusuf would not be included. The future of the
President himself, whose health has been poor for a number of years, now looked
under increasing threat. He swiftly began another rearguard action. Sheikh Sharif
Ahmed, one of the top leaders of the ARS-Djibouti, has returned to Somalia.
However, the TFG’s position grows weaker by the day. It now effectively controls
only parts of Mogadishu and the town of Baidoa (BBC News Online, 15 November
2008).
Given the many divisions that exist within the opposition to the TFG, its
violent overthrow will not necessarily mean a return to the kind of ‘Islamist order’
which the CSIC was able briefly to establish in 2006. Ethiopian pull-out left the
powerless TFG incapable of sustaining itself, setting the stage for a scramble for
power among the fragmented factions, forcing each of them into a posture of pro-
active self-defense.
3.6 OVERVIEW: UNDERSTANDING THE ROOT CAUSES OF
CONFLICT IN THE HORN
In this part of the research, the main causal factors that have been invoked by
commentators and policy-makers to explain the root causes of conflict in the Horn
of Africa are briefly evaluated. A common thread that runs through them all is their
varying impact on the viability and legitimacy of the ‘failed’, ‘emergent’ or more
established states that make up the region.
3.6.1 CLAN
Conflict between and within clans has been the most common point of
reference for much of the Western media and policy-makers as they have sought to
identify the root causes of conflict in Somalia since 1991, conflict which has had
major regional ramifications. In essence, it is argued that clan conflicts have
consumed the Somali state and continue to obstruct efforts at reconstruction,
leaving only chaos and anarchy. However, understanding of Somali clan structures
and how they operate politically has often been lacking. Some have argued that
during the 1980s and since the collapse of Somalia, clan politics has indeed
become even more volatile and fragile. It has also been claimed that clan
affiliations have come to be increasingly deployed by at least some of Somalia’s
‘warlords’ in the context of perpetual struggles over economic and political
resources (Marchal, 2007).
For those who place emphasis on such struggles, the importance of clan
politics in promoting conflict in Somalia can sometimes be exaggerated. Indeed,
there are those who would go so far as to assert that the roots of current conflicts in
Somalia might better be understood through the concept of class – albeit class
refracted through the language and culture of clan. During the 1980s, as the Barre
regime gradually unravelled, there was massive land-grabbing and accumulation
across Somalia, including in the capital Mogadishu, particularly by those factions
of an emerging mercantile class which had access to state power.
Since 1991, as the context shifted to unrestrained plunder and looting, these
assets have continued to be fought over, leaving an unresolved legacy that remains
to this day. According to this view, one of the reasons why it has proven so
difficult to rebuild a state is that competing factions all view the state as a vehicle
for doing the same on a ‘winner take all’ basis. As a result:
The consistent pattern has been that any force or coalition of
forces that came close to assuming state power conjured up an
equal and opposite array of forces that succeeded in preventing
this from happening (De Waal, 2007).
So is the lesson of Somalia that clan and statehood are like oil and water? It
is true that there is not much of a ‘state tradition’ in Somalia. SiadBarre claimed
that his intention was to subordinate clan politics to ‘nation-building’.
However, he eventually became overly reliant upon repression and the
narrow support of particular clans within the Darod clan family – above all, his
own clan, the Marehan. His attempts to ‘hold the ring’ also collapsed because the
resources available to him for patronage diminished as external backers withdrew.
Nonetheless, Somalia did have a state of sorts under Barre during the 22 years he
ruled. Some argue that it might have had a state of sorts again under the CSIC,
strongly backed by business interests in Mogadishu, had its time in power lasted
longer; an argument perhaps with analogies to debates about the Taliban’s rule in
Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. Nor does pervasive clan-based ‘warlordism’
necessarily rule out subsequent state formation. Historically, many states
experienced prolonged periods of warlordism before a more durable basis for the
political institutionalisation of power and authority became possible.
Those who espouse a more class-focused analysis argue that Somaliland
“began as a commercial agreement” backed by a dominant class (livestock
traders) within a dominant clan family, the Isaaq. There was also relatively few
unresolved property disputes in Somaliland on which conflict could feed (De
Waal, 2007).
Not everybody is convinced that a minimalist approach to statehood will
work. In the case of Somaliland, sceptics wonder whether it can ever deliver
anything more than minimal security or minimal development for a finite period
(Woodward, 2003).
The above discussion underscores why a better informed and more nuanced
debate about the meaning and importance of clan politics in promoting conflict in
the Somali lands of the Horn matters so much. It has major implications for those
seeking to achieve peace, stability and security in Somalia. De Waal (2007) goes
so far as to argue that attempts to reconstruct the Somali state should only begin
after outstanding property disputes have been resolved, perhaps through the
establishment of an independent arbitration commission, adding:
“Arguably, the future economic dispensation in Somalia – control
of the monetary authority, mechanisms for contracting, land tenure
system – should be established before any political settlement is
agreed. This will take some of the heat out of the current political
competition.”(De Waal, 2007).
3.6.2 ETHNICITY
Ethnicity is the category which much of the Western media and many
policy-makers instinctively reach for when seeking to understand politics in sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. All too often it appears self-evident that it is the
primary cause of conflict across the sub-continent. There is no doubt that ethnicity
has indeed often played an important role. However, ethnicity must be understood
in a historical and political context. Ethnic identities are not ‘primordial’. Indeed,
many of them emerged and then hardened under colonial rule. Ethnicity – like clan
in the context of Somalia – is rarely a factor by itself. It combines with other
affiliations and interests.
In the post-colonial context, ethnic politics has promoted conflict in sub-
Saharan Africa when it has become the exclusive way by which ordinary people
define themselves, when elites have deliberately deployed it as a vehicle for violent
political mobilization and when the political and economic resources being
competed for have become increasingly scarce and the ‘rules of the game’ have
shifted towards ‘winner takes all’. Ethnicity becomes particularly dangerous when
linked to a political ideology of hatred. Conflict can also be generated at times by
intra-ethnic tensions within the ruling elite. Although not all have materialized in
practice, such variables potentially apply as much to parts of the Horn of Africa as
they do, say, to the African Great Lakes region. In the Horn, ethnicity has played
the strongest role as a driver of conflict in Ethiopia.
Given the importance of Ethiopia in the region, the consequences of such
conflict for the rest of the Horn have always been significant. The experience of
Ethiopia is unusual in that it did not undergo a prolonged period of European rule.
However, since the late-19 century, Ethiopia has been a multi-ethnic ‘empire’ ruled
by regimes dominated to a greater or lesser extent by one ‘indigenous’ ethnic
group.
Under Haile Selasse, the Amhara were the dominant group. Since 1991
members of the Tigrayan ethnic group have been the dominant force within the
Government. However, with a view to ending this tradition, over the last 17 years
the Ethiopian polity has been restructured by the ruling party, the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, along ‘ethnic federal’ lines. The regions
it created were new constructions. The limits of success can clearly be seen in the
Ogaden and elsewhere. But most impartial observers do not consider that the
experiment has simply been a sham. Debate continues to rage fiercely over how far
‘ethnic federalism’ has placed limits on the power of the Tigrayan elite, which still
dominates the EPRDF, and may be creating the conditions for a more genuinely
inclusive political system. Haggman (2007) has asserted that the EPRDF has been
genuinely committed to the success of ethnic federalism. Its track-record is
nonetheless mixed, not least in Somali regional state:
“EPRDF lost Somalis ‘hearts and minds’ by dishonouring the
region’s constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, by meddling in its
internal decision- making, and by the ruthless conduct of its
security forces […] After taking power EPRDF sought to accelerate
development in the country’s marginalised lowland areas belonging
to the Somali, Afar, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regional
states. Despite their limited financial absorption capacity, federal
budget transfers to the so-called ‘backward regions’ steadily
increased over the past decade. The granting of self-government
and investments in human capacity-building for the first time in
modern Ethiopian history enabled the emergence of educated elite
within the periphery. Somali Region forcefully demonstrates that
national identity cannot be decreed or engineered by financial
subsidies, political quotas or the holding of elections” (Haggman,
2007).
Samatar (2004) has asserted, with Somali regional state very much in mind,
that inept and weak local elites are partly responsible for the failure of ‘ethnic
federalism’ to realize its promise. Finally, Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) have
claimed:
“Given the ethnic federal arrangements, minority ethnic groups,
even numerically small ones, are less marginalised at the national
political level than ever previously before in modern Ethiopia’s
history. However, a number of occupational or clan minorities
within ethnic groups continue to be marginalised, despised and
disadvantaged, their political representation subsumed within the
wider ethnic group. Such stigmatised groups (often craftsmen or
hunters) exist among many of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, and a
number have been encouraged by ethnic federalism to petition for
separate representation […] Ethnic federalism has, in some
instances, added a new dimension to pre-existing local conflicts
over land, water, government budgets and other resources,
sometimes adding legitimacy and motivation to an ‘ethnic
rationale’ for the dispute. There are confusing and contradictory
processes at work: some inspired by ‘rightful’ or ‘exaggerated’
claims by local communities, others imposed from above; some
driven by political entrepreneurs for their own purposes, others
perhaps seeking to diffuse opposition” (Vaughan and Tronvoll,
2003)
It is, then, a complex picture. There are no guarantees that, in the medium-
to long-term, ethnic federalism will be a successful mechanism for conflict
resolution within Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state still lacks legitimacy among key
ethnic groups. What is more, some analysts believe that it is a high-risk strategy to
try and combine state-building and democratization in African states with a history
of ethnic division.
3.6.3 ENVIRONMENTAL INSECURITY
There is a growing consensus that there is a correlation between
environmental insecurity and conflict. The Western media and policy-makers have
often had cause to make the link between the two in the context of the Horn of
Africa over the past thirty years, although some analysts assert that there has been
a tendency to do so only relatively late in the day, once a crisis has become
extreme and visible – for example, where there is famine. Over the past year, the
Horn of Africa has been experiencing severe food shortages again.
Whenever there is drought, large numbers can quickly become vulnerable to
food insecurity. However, while there can be conflict between cultivators and the
state, which remains the owner of all land in Ethiopia, it is less pervasive than that
between pastoralists over access rights. The 2004 PAES report adds:
“Conflicts are almost certain to arise where a weak state fails to
deliver law and order, provide transparent and accountable
administration, implement unbiased and fair policy, or effective
mechanisms to address and resolve grievances and disputes”
(Ejigu, 2005).
While it is certainly possible to point to progress and positive achievements
in this regard by those countries of the Horn which have a functioning state, it is
fair to say that, nonetheless, they all continue to fit this definition of ‘weakness’.
Furthermore, the impact of climate change in an area that already suffers from
significant environmental insecurities is likely to exacerbate any weaknesses. The
latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on the expected
impacts of climate change, published in 2007, summarized the impact in Africa as
follows:
• Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate
variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of ‘multiple stresses’,
occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity.
• Climate change will aggravate the water stress currently faced by some countries,
while some countries that currently do not experience water stress will become at
risk of water stress.
• Climate variability and change could result in low-lying lands being inundated,
with resultant impacts on coastal settlements.
• Human health, already compromised by a range of factors, could be further
negatively impacted by climate change and climate variability, e.g., malaria in
southern Africa and the East African highlands (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report,
2007).
A Conflict and Early Warning Response Network (CEWARN) was established in
2003 by IGAD. Since 2005 it has collaborated with IGAD’s Climate Prediction
and Assessment Centre (ICPAC), with the aim of ensuring that conflict prevention
and disaster management experts in both bodies develop a coherent, multi-
dimensional approach to early warning efforts (Meier, 2007).
Finally, there is another type of ‘environment-induced conflict’ to add to the
list offered by the 2004 PAES report. That is conflict between states. One of the
most likely sources of inter-state conflict in the Horn of Africa is water. However,
it is most likely to involve a clash between Egypt and Ethiopia. The headwaters of
the River Nile are to be found in Ethiopia. Egypt, whose economy is heavily
dependent upon the waters of the Nile, has always feared the consequences of
Ethiopian control over the headwaters. At present, Ethiopia does not make heavy
use of the headwaters for its own purposes. Were that to change, relations between
the two countries could come rapidly under strain (Muhammad, 2007).
Both countries, along with Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda Burundi,
Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Eritrea, make up the ten member
states of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), an organization comprising the riparian
states of the River Nile. Its goal is to develop the water resources of the Nile Basin
in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security, and peace for all
its peoples. As part of the NBI, there is also an Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action
Programme. The body is supported by the World Bank and other donors.
Commentators believe that so far the NBI has made a positive contribution to
resolving issues between member states, but it has not yet faced a major crisis.
3.6.4 ISLAMIC MILITANCY AND TERRORISM
The ‘failed state’ of Somalia has often been described by parts of the
Western media and policy-makers as a breeding ground for terrorist organizations,
including al-Qaida. The rise of the CSIC, which included ‘hardliners’ with alleged
links to al-Qaida, increased fears that parts of the Horn of Africa could become a
heartland of militant Islam and that what might initially have been a symptom of
conflict could metamorphose into a ‘root cause’.
As for the CSIC, some analysts claim that, for a moment, it did appear to
offer a potential way out of perpetual clan conflict in Somalia. Menkhaus stated:
“Some detractors […] argued that the movement was simply a
Hawiye front; supporters […] argued vigorously that the Islamists
transcended clannism. The truth lies somewhere in between
(Menkhaus, 2007).
Lewis (2008) claimed that overall Islam is a “veil lightly worn” in Somalia. It
is important to note that the dominant tradition of Islam amongst Somalis has been
the Sufi tradition. This tradition tends to be relatively relaxed on doctrinal matters
and has a mystical orientation. There are three main Sufi brotherhoods in Somalia:
the Qadiriya, Ahmadiya and Salihiya. The Qadiriya is the most numerous and least
inclined towards Puritanism. Nonetheless, there have been moments of ‘home-
grown’ radical reformism in the past. The Salihiya brotherhood, which was an off-
shoot of the Ahmadiya, has a more fundamentalist orientation. It was the main
force behind an armed jihad against Ethiopia and the British and Italian colonial
powers between 1900 and 1920 which spread across what is modern day
Somaliland, Puntland and Ethiopia’s Somali regional state. This means that there is
soil in which more militant, ‘foreign’ traditions can put down roots, as with
Wahhabism and al-Ittihad al-Islam in the 1990s. Even so, radical reformism in
Somalia has more often taken a peaceful form (Lewis, 2008).
Western anxieties that Somalia is a breeding ground for international
terrorism have also fuelled concerns about its place in global criminal networks
that might be helping to sustain al-Qaida and its Somali allies. Following the
attacks of 11 September 2001, the US Government led the way in seeking to block
informal flows of money through the hawala system, on which many Somalis
depended for banking and remittances. Critics have argued that such measures
have usually done more harm than good, cutting off much-needed income flows
and in the process alienating many Somalis. Marchal (2007) noted that, since the
freezing of the assets of the Somali business known as al- Baraakat, which had
been involved in money transfers and telecoms, no criminal action has been
brought against anybody who worked for it.
Fears have been expressed that revenues generated by the export of the leaf
known as Khat, which when chewed has a psychoactive effect, could help to fund
terrorist activities in Somalia. Khat is hugely in demand in all the Somali lands and
in the diaspora, including Britain. For example, some observer has claimed that
Somaliland, where Islamic militancy has had some, albeit so far relatively limited,
purchase, is in danger of turning into a “narco-economy”.
Khat is now one of Somaliland’s chief export crops. Livestock, its
traditional main export, reportedly went into decline after Saudi Arabia, its biggest
customer, imposed an embargo on the grounds that Somaliland’s cattle were
infected with Rift Valley fever. Khat is now a key source of government revenue in
Somaliland, which could stand in the way of effective efforts to reduce production.
However, as yet there appears to be little hard evidence to suggest that funds
gained from the export of Khat are being used to support international terrorism
(Africa Research Bulletin, August 2005).
Puntland is currently the base for most of the pirates operating from
Somalia. The only period in recent history when piracy virtually disappeared
around the country was during the brief rule of the CSIC. Since its downfall, the
phenomenon has reappeared on a rapidly growing scale. Middleton (2002)
discussed a “worst-case scenario” in which pirates develop links with
international terrorism. It states that “there is no firm evidence of this happening.
In a speech in mid-November 2008, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency
argued that al-Qaida is taking advantage of the success of the insurgency to
“revitalize operations” in Somalia (BBC News Online, 14 November 2008).
3.6.5 EXTERNAL ACTORS
Many different external actors have been cited by the Western media and
policy-makers as playing a role in promoting conflict in the Horn of Africa today.
Due to timeframe the research will not discuss every dimension of external
involvement in the region.
The research will focus on two interrelated issues: the recent record of
Western powers and their regional allies in Somalia; and the ways in which
countries of the region continue to seek to achieve their policy objectives through
the sponsorship of proxy forces.
The ineffectiveness and inappropriateness of outside interventions in the
Horn of Africa has long been the subject of criticism by commentators on the
region. Recent actions are no exception. For example, Jonathan Steele has
condemned the “inconsistencies in international policy-making” on Somalia since
2006. Writing in February 2008 he argued that the issue had “dropped off the
radar, abandoned …because it all seems so difficult.”
Some might claim that the same has happened with regard to the Eritrean-
Ethiopian border dispute; having invested in the Algiers agreements and UNMEE,
it has been argued that the international community has failed to put sufficient
pressure on both countries to resolve their differences, so increasing the prospect of
a return to hostilities. This failure has been understood as a failure of both will and
capacity (ICG, 2008).
Steele was particularly critical of the role of the US in Somalia. He claimed
that, obsessed with the ‘war on terror’, the US had colluded in the Ethiopian
invasion of Somalia in December 2006, without being challenged by other western
governments – with disastrous consequences on the ground. Not everybody is
entirely convinced by conspiratorial arguments. Menkhaus has claimed that:
“[…] while the US and Ethiopian militaries and intelligence
agencies unquestionably collaborated closely, Ethiopia’s offensive
would likely have occurred with or without US tacit approval
(Menkhaus, 2007).
Many have also been critical of the effectiveness of US military operations
against al- Qaida operatives in Somalia, which – as elsewhere in the world – do
appear to have had mixed results. One European official, speaking in February
2008 after a further round of US air strikes, claimed: “They haven’t got anybody. It
has been an absolute disaster.” The US disputes such negative views. In March
2008, Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, claimed that al-
Qaida has been denied a foothold in Somalia as a result of the success of
operations since December 2006. The successful attack on the leader of al-
Shabaab, Sheikh Aden HashiAyrow in May 2008 marked a change in fortunes for
US forces in the region.
US counter-terrorism co-operation with the TFG has also been criticised. It
has been claimed that this co-operation is in practice with particular security
officials who exercise a high degree of autonomy from the government, raising
questions in some minds about how far the US approach on counter-terrorism is
really contributing to wider peace- building and state-building agendas (Enough
Strategy Paper, September 2008).
Seeking to achieve their policy objectives through the sponsorship of proxy
forces also has a long history in the Horn of Africa. As Healey has written:
“Pursuing (regional) foreign policy through proxy forces in
neighbouring countries has been the ‘normal’ pattern of relations
for decades […] The states of the region all act as enablers and
multipliers of conflict to the detriment of their neighbours. This
regional dynamic is sufficiently powerful to act as a cause of
conflict in its own right, especially where so many problems of
governance abound […] In this context foreign policy, especially
foreign policy, becomes an intimate part of the government’s
strategy for internal stability (Healy, 2008).
To many observers, conflict appears to be inscribed in the very DNA of the
Horn of Africa. However, there are grounds for resisting fatalism. While Somalia
remains convulsed by violence and misery, Somaliland appears to suggest that the
institutionalization of authority and establishment of accountability is not an
impossible dream, provided that certain Western assumptions about what it should
involve and how it can be constructed are put aside. 17 years into an experiment in
‘ethnic federalism’, Ethiopia faces many problems, but the experiment is certainly
not pre-ordained to fail – it may yet successfully create a new and viable political
and cultural reality. Eritrea’s role in the region as a ‘spoiler’ may be problematic
and its democratization at home indefinitely postponed, but its existence as a state
is not seriously in doubt. Djibouti, although it is preoccupied as ever with avoiding
the destabilization that always threatens in such a tough neighborhood, is
domestically reasonably stable. In the short- to medium-term, the keys to peace
and security in the ‘core’ Horn of Africa lie in: first, resolving the stalemate
between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their common border; and, second, in
constructing a durable domestic political and economic settlement in Somalia that
is acceptable to the majority of Somalis and to external actors.
Somalia poses an incredibly complex challenge. If a durable political and
economic settlement is one where there is a relatively stable balance of power
within society which offers those actors committed to state-building and
development the means and the opportunity to do so, including sufficient security
and minimally effective and legitimate public institutions, Somalia is about as far
from this scenario as it is possible to be. It seems likely that any durable settlement
in Somalia will have to be federal in character, highly decentralized and
constructed largely from below, as has been the case in Somaliland. The
emergence of the CSIC in 2006 held out some promise for the stabilization of
Somalia but its foreign policy fatally de-legitimized it in the eyes of the US and
Ethiopia, prompting an Ethiopian invasion which removed one ‘security problem’
while arguably helping to manufacture new ones.
How, more broadly, can the international community assist in ending
conflict in the region? Some analysts have claimed that it is vital that the
international community ceases to compartmentalize the various conflicts of the
region and acknowledge that they are intertwined. By this reasoning, the Horn
should be viewed by outsiders as a “Regional Security Complex”, as the African
Great Lakes region arguably has come to be, and regional ‘security architecture’
should be constructed. However, it is also accepted that efforts to intervene on this
basis will continue to be hampered by the fact that IGAD, the international
community’s main partner in the region, is heavily compromised by internal
REFERENCES
Besteman, C. (1996), “Violent politics and the politics of violence: the dissolution
of the Somali nation-state” in American Ethnologist 23(3), pp 579-596.
Bradbury, M. (2008), Becoming Somaliland, London.
Brons, M. H. (2001), Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia. From
Statelessness to Statelessness?, Utrecht: International Books.
Buzan, B and Waever, O. (2004), Regions and Powers the Structure of
International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
De Waal, A. (2007), “Class and power in a stateless Somalia”, 20 February 2007
http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/dewaal/.
Ejigu, M. (2005), “Deforestation, environmental insecurity, poverty and conflict in
The Horn of Africa and Great Lakes”, ETFRN News 43-44/05
http://www.etfrn.org/etfrn/newsletter/news4344/articles/2_12_Ejigu.pdf
Europe Regional Survey for Africa South of the Sahara (2006), London, pp. 1054-
64.
Giddens, A. (1984), The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hagmann, T. (2007), “The political roots of the current crisis in Region 5”, 21
September 2007 www.ssrc.org .
Hagmann, T. and Khalif, M.H. (2006), “State and politics in Ethiopia’s Somali
Region since 1991” in Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali
Studies, Vol.6, 2006.
Harmony Project/Combating Terrorism Center, “Al-Qaida’s (mis)adventures in the
Horn of Africa”.
Healy, S. (2008), “Lost opportunities in the Horn of Africa. How conflict connect
and peace agreements unravel” in Chatham House/Centre of African
Studies, University of London/Royal African Society/Rift Valley Institute,
2008
Hoehne, M. V. (2007), “Puntland and Somaliland clashing in Northern Somalia:
Who cuts the Gordian knot?” Available at
http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hoehne/printable.html
Human Rights Watch reports in July 2007
(http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/07/02/ethiop16327.htm ) and June 2008
(http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/ethiopia0608/ )
International Crisis Group (2003), “Somaliland: Democratisation and its
Discontents”ICG Africa Report No 66, 28 July, 2003.
International Crisis Group (2008), “Beyond the fragile peace between Ethiopia and
Eritrea: Averting new war” in Africa Report No. 141, June 2008
Kassim, M. M. (1995), “Aspects of the Benadir Cultural History: The Case of the
Bravan Ulama” in Ahmed, A. J (ed.) The Invention of Somalia
Lawrenceville, N J:The Red Sea Press.
Lewis, I.M. (2004), “Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox” in
Africa 74(4),pp 489-515.
Lewis, I. (2008), Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, London.
Lyons, T and Ahmed I. S (1995), “Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral
Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction” in Brookings
Occasional Papers,Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Marchal, R. (2007), “Warlordism and terrorism: how to obscure an already
Confusing crisis? The case of Somalia” in International Affairs, November
2007
Menkhaus, K. (2003), “State Collapse in Somalia; Second Thoughts” in Review of
African Political Economy no.97, pp 405-422.
Menkhaus, K. (2006), “Governance without Governance in Somalia: Spoilers,
State Building and the Politics of Coping” in International Security Vol.31
No.3, pp.74-106.
Menkhaus, K. (2007),”The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts” in African
Affairs 106/204, pp 357-390.
Meier, P. (2007), “Networking disaster and conflict early warning systems for
environmental security, unpublished paper, 21 February 2007 http://conflict
reduction.org/meier/Networking%20Systems.pdf
Meier, P. and Bond, D. (2005), “Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in
The Horn of Africa”, paper given at an international workshop on human
security and climate change, June 2005
http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Meier_Bond.pdf
Meredith, M. (2005), The Fate of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence,
New York: Public Affairs.
Middleton, R. (2002), “Piracy in Somalia. Threatening global trade, feeding local
wars”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, Africa Programme AFP BP 08/02
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
Mohammed, A. (2007), “Ethiopia’s strategic dilemma in the Horn of Africa”, 20
February 2007 www.ssrc.org
Quaranto, P. J. (2008), “Building States While Fighting Terror. Contradictions in
United States Strategy in Somalia from 2001 to 2007” in ISS Monograph
Series No 143, May 2008
Samatar, A.I. (2004), “Ethiopian federalism: Autonomy versus control in the
Somali region”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2004
Vaughan, S. and Tronvoll, K. (2003), “Structures and relations of power:
Ethiopia”,SIDA, 2003 http://www.addisvoice.com/resources/Structure-of-
power.pdf
Webersik, C. (2004), “Differences that Matter: The Struggle of the Marginalised in
Somalia” Africa 74 (4), pp 516-532.
Woodward, P. (2003), The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations,
New York: I.B. Tauris.
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 DATA ANALYSIS ON BORDER DISPUTES AND STATE FAILURE
IN SOMALIA: A CASE STUDY OF ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA DISPUTE ON
OGADEN REGION
This Chapter aims to explain how the sources in the preceding chapters are
to be used to develop variables for analyzing the process of border disputes and
state failure in the Horn of Africa region using Somalia as case study. This chapter
outlines the design method used during the conduct of the research. The
methodology used is the qualitative method of research aimed at evaluating the
case study by using secondary sources of data and information to establish the
regional security implications of border disputes and state failure in the Horn of
Africa. The research aims at identifying and analyzing answers to the secondary
questions that will facilitate the answering of the research primary question. One
method of analysis is the qualitative method, which involves analysis of data such
as words, pictures, objects and artifacts. In this method of research, the researcher
is the main data-gathering instrument.
Qualitative research is one of the two major approaches to research
methodology in social sciences. Qualitative research involves an in-depth
understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern human behaviour.
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research relies on reasons behind various
aspects of behaviour. Simply put, it investigates the why and how of decision-
making, as compared to what, where, and when of quantitative research. Hence,
the need is for smaller but focused samples, rather than large random samples by
which qualitative research categorizes data into patterns as the primary basis for
organizing and reporting results. Unlike quantitative research, which relies
exclusively on the analysis of numerical or quantifiable data, data for qualitative
research comes in many media - including text, sound, still and moving images.
(Free Dictionary 2010).
As put forward in a study by Anne-Marie Ambert, qualitative methods trade
comparative objective studies of a broad range of subjects for depth, to facilitate
understanding on a more finite sampling. Qualitative methods focus on how and
why people behave, think, and make meaning, rather than focusing on what people
do or believe on a large scale. Another benefit, according to Ambert, is that
qualitative research enables the researcher to analyze data from the macro to the
micro level without risking analytical integrity by comparing the proverbial apples
to oranges (Ambert et al., 1995: 880).
According to Ellen Taylor-Powell, in analyzing qualitative data, the
researcher must know the material, focus the analysis, and categorize the
information by identifying themes or patterns and organizing them into coherent
categories. The researcher then continues with an interpretation of the data where
he attaches meaning and significance to the analysis (Taylor-Powell, 2003: 2).
The congruence method, a subset of qualitative analysis, allows for such
challenging data to be analyzed and compared within each individual case study to
extract the impact of the various relational characteristics without the necessary
requirement of finding multiple case studies that can be compared on an even plane
to objectively measure the accuracy of the hypothesis. The congruence method
tests a hypothesis’s ability to predict whether the variables vary in the expected
directions, to the expected magnitude, along the expected dimensions, or whether
there is still unexplained variance in one or more dimensions (George and Bennett,
2005: 181-183).
4.1 SELECTION CRITERIA AND EXPLANATION
The first step in the development of the research questions was to examine
available background material on the growing trend of border disputes and state
failure and their effects on Somalia the archetypal of failed state. The
characteristics were identified from instances where different authors, citing
different sources, came to similar conclusions about the influence of a particular
criterion, giving credibility to the characteristics. The variables that will be used
for this analysis are: colonialism, pan-Somali nationalism, superpower national
interests and political interference in the region, regional conflicts in the Horn of
Africa, Ogaden war and the impacts of radical Islam and terrorism. This section
provides a closer look at each characteristic and why it was selected as criteria.
4.1.1 COLONIALISM
Colonialism plays a key role in the growth and spread of statelessness in
Somalia. The seeds of the current conflicts in Somalia to a large extent date back to
the European colonial experience in the Horn of Africa even though most of the
conflicts’ root causes predate this experience (Chege, 1987:88; Ayoob, 1980:137).
Indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century and after the construction of the Suez
Canal (Woodward, 1996:14), the European colonial powers partitioned the
previously free constituent parts of the Horn of Africa, joining unrelated areas and
peoples into territorial units. The establishment of new states (Sudan got its
independence in 1956, British and Italian Somalilands in 1960, Kenya in 1963, and
Djibouti in 1977 while Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and forcefully
gained its independence in 1993, leaving Ethiopia landlocked) was thus based on
misdrawn borders which were agreed upon by the colonial powers and basically
ignored ethnic, cultural, historical and religious groups’ natural lines. And
consequently, it resulted in intra-state conflicts (in particular demands for
autonomy for ethnic groups) as well as in the regimes of the newly independent
states lodging territorial claims in turn leading to conflict with other states.
The Italian Somali-Ethiopian border dispute was a direct result of
colonialism in the region. Borders imposed on Somalia and Ethiopia were
something that the “Somali nomads had neither needed nor encountered before”
and were ambiguously assigned, hung on non-existent points, or established
around nomadic tribe and clan territory ( Zartman 1985:75). This resulted in
tensions between two nations that both relied on a common region for nomadic
survival. The Ethiopians were
“Arguing a legal case over where the border was and the Italians
[were] arguing a social-moral case on behalf of the Somalis over
where the border should be” (Zartman 1985:76).
The Ethiopians were justified to claim the territory by law, and the Somalis were
convinced of their claim through colonial power support. Despite Italian support,
colonial Somaliland gained nothing from the dispute as they could not reclaim the
lost region of Ogaden. Somali bitterness toward colonial rule led to independence
movements that resulted in a United Somalia by 1960. This newly emergent state
of Somalia was comprised of tribal leadership and had no continuity for central
governance. Consequently, tumultuous power struggles ensued and the
development of relationships between bordering nations of Eritrea, Djibouti e.t.c
created conflict as the new state struggled to establish its identity in the region
(Zartman 1985:95).
The challenge was also compounded by the fact that the framework of
colonial laws and institutions had been designed to exploit local divisions rather
than to overcome them. Colonialism also disrupted the political, social and
economic lives of pastoral societies. The emergence of colonial ports as well as the
development of modern transport systems disrupted the ancient trade networks on
which pastoralists depended, coastal markets disappearing in many cases.
Moreover, transportation networks and related physical infrastructure were
designed to satisfy the needs of the colonial power rather than to support the
balanced growth of an indigenous economy.
During the same period, by taking advantage of inter-European rivalries, the
Ethiopian rulers doubled through conquest the geographic size of their independent
state built on the interior highlands. A vast and multi-ethnic state was created there.
The need to maintain intact the unity of this fragile and disparate entity led to the
excessive centralization of political and economic power which in turn stimulated
widespread infringement upon local cultures and led to religious coercion and
political repression (Woodward, 1996).
Conflicts were also triggered by ethno-centrism arising from colonial rule
which favoured certain ethnic groups accorded access to education and economic
privileges. This was done at the expense of other ethnic groups in the context of
divide and rule tactics employed by the colonial powers and inflicted deep societal
wounds in some states. In the post-colonial era, ill-advised policies have
entrenched colonially-designed disparities and chronic injustice, thereby worsening
ethnic animosities and antagonisms in most states of the region. This animosities
and antagonisms serve as the best platform to analyse the origin of state failure in
Somalia.
4.1.2 PAN SOMALI NATIONALISM
Arising from the impact of colonialism is the ideology of greater Somalia
Nationalism, which has always been used by Somali politicians to win political
power within the country as well as against Somalia’s neighbors which could also
provide an insight into the current status quo of Somalia. It should be recalled that
the Somali leaders in the 1960s believed that Somalia, being one nation with one
language and one religion would be more easily governable and better off
compared to other African countries that were more diverse.
The greater Somalia philosophy demanded that British Somalia in the south,
Italian Somaliland in the north and French Somalia (Djibouti), be merged into one
country with a strong central government. This motive to unite Somalis has always
been viewed by Somalia Neighbors’ as a means of expansionism and
encroachment into the misdrawn colonial borders of neighboring states. This has
frequently heightened the inter-state rivalry in the region and every effort to restore
the state-building process in Somalia (Claude, 1964).
When Somalia gained independence, and later when Siad Barre took over,
Somalia quickly made enemies out of their neighbors. With the goal of
incorporating every land that has a majority of Somalis into the greater Somalia,
they clashed with Kenya and Ethiopia. Somalia in the aftermath of independence
wanted to join all the Somali speaking land together to create a Greater Somalia.
The new Somali flag with the five pointed star in the middle represented the
northern and the southern regions of the republic, as well as the unredeemed north
eastern provenance of Kenya, the Ogaden provenance of Ethiopia, and the French
territories of the Afar and Issas (Djibouti).
These three political entities are largely Somali in population. The Ogaden
Provenance is rich in oil deposits and natural gas, which made it a prize possession
for the Ethiopians to keep and the Somalis to take. In 1963 President Osman of
Somalia called the Ethiopians expansionist and called for the Ogaden to be part of
Greater Somalia. The Ethiopians responded by calling the Somalis expansionists;
because they were the ones seeking to take other peoples land and incorporated
into their own. This exchange of words finally reached its boiling point and in
1964 war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia around each other’s border. The
philosophy of Greater Somalia has also not only generated regional hostility by the
neighboring countries of Somalia; it has also generated the capacity to sustain
subversive activities towards the establishment of a central government that pursue
such policy in Somalia, a situation that appears as a mechanism that frustrate every
actions and steps taken towards state-building in Somalia.
4.1.3 SUPERPOWERS NATIONAL INTERESTS AND POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
The Horn of Africa has never acquired a strategic importance for its raw
materials or for any other continental advantage (Imru, 1989:55). Indeed, the
region has always been allotted a relatively important strategic value owing to its
proximity to the Red Sea which is an important and expeditious route of
international trade and communications between Europe, the Middle East and the
Far East as well as the navigation route through which oil is transported from the
Persian Gulf (in which the largest oil deposits of the world are located) to
consumers in North America and Europe (Legum, 1985:193; Lefebvre, 1996:388).
Hence, the states of the Horn of Africa were forced into economic, political
and military dependence on either one of the two superpowers of the Cold War –
the US and the Soviet Union. Competing to establish positions of influence and
military advantage in the strategically significant regions of the Persian Gulf and
Indian Ocean, the two superpowers supported client states in the adjacent Horn of
Africa primarily by injecting military aid and undermined inimical states by
supporting rebel movements and weaving unfriendly alliances and counter-
alliances (Abbink, 2003:407).
The interests of the U.S can be explained in terms of securing access to oil
for the West in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. It was thus in the
interests of the U.S. to fend off any expansion of Soviet power and influence,
whether through proxies or not, in the Middle East, Indian Ocean and the Horn of
Africa. Conversely, the Soviet Union aimed at promoting its credibility as a
superpower by influencing and over-arming the largest number of strategically
placed client states (Imru, 1989:57), at imperilling oil tankers bound to the West
via the Suez Canal and at reducing to nil the influence of the US in the above
mentioned regions. Geopolitical logic also required the Soviet Union which needed
to have maritime staging areas for its rapidly increasing navy to control the arc
running from South Asia to the Horn of Africa (Farer, 1979:114-115).
The struggle to harness the various national interests of the superpowers
created an unstable shift in alliance and supports of states in the region a situation
that later escalated the inter-state rivalry in the region. This rivalry was well
exemplified between Ethiopia and Somalia in which pursuing regional foreign
policy through proxy forces in neighbouring countries has been the normal pattern
of relations for decades. This activity has proved persistent over time and has
survived radical political reconfigurations, including changes of regime (Healy,
2008a:39). Mengistu engaged Barre in a proxy guerrilla war in which they each
supported the other’s insurgent (Lefebvre, 1996:397). Their presence i.e. U.S. and
the Soviet Union stimulated the bitter border rivalry and conflicts between the
bitter rivals in the Horn of Africa, conflicts that would have otherwise been unable
to continue.
Both Ethiopia and Somalia have reason to make strong allies of world
superpowers. Ethiopia desired regional hegemony, and its “size, military strength,
and geographic position would make it the dominant state… [But]
underdevelopment and tenuous national unity kept this role out of its reach”.
Somalia desired control of the Ogaden region, but could not do so without
matching Ethiopia’s conventional army. Before the United States and Soviet Union
left the region, they each intervened in both countries and dramatically reversed
alliances and mid-conflict (Paul, 1994). This swift alliance formation and support
from the superpowers contributed to the military build-ups of the states in the
region and an eventual outbreak of violence and conflicts between the states in the
region. This outbreak of violence and conflicts gives an account of the seemingly
failure of the Somali state.
4.1.4 REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
The Horn of Africa is the most conflict-ridden region in the world (Shinn,
2009:1) with conflicts, exacerbated by external interference and accompanied by
widespread human rights violations, raging sometimes simultaneously within and
between states. In fact, the African continent’s longest-running intra-state conflicts,
the Eritrean conflict and the South-Sudanese conflict with an estimated death toll
of over two million, took place in the Horn of Africa. It is also generally held that,
due to natural and man-made disasters, the Horn of Africa has the highest
percentage of refugees, estimated to have reached 700,000 in 2003 which is
roughly Djibouti’s population, and internally displaced persons in Africa, a trend
reinforcing future cycles of conflict. In 2008, the total number of internally
displaced persons in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda was estimated at 2.74
million out of which an estimated 1.3 million people were displaced in Somalia
which is one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters (OCHA, 2008). In Sudan
alone, in 2003, there were over 4 million internally displaced persons, virtually
Eritrea’s entire population.
Also, given the highly personalized milieu in which politics operates in the
Horn of Africa, it was possible for a ‘strong-man benevolent leader’ (Rupiya,
2008:14) in the likes of Mengistu Haile Mariam, Gaafar Nimeiri or Siad Barre who
were all deeply insecure behind their ruthlessness and vindictive egomania, to
shape the political destiny of a state almost single-handedly and to enter into warm
or conflictual relations with other states, inducing civilian populations to join in
and converting them into military and para-military groups (Wasara, 2002:39). In
fact, despite the devastation they brought, such leaders and their behind-the-scenes
operators used senseless conflicts to divert popular impatience to their inability to
improve conditions. Moreover, there is in these states, a lack of trained personnel
mustering a long-term vision and with long experience in security policy-making
and management who prefer to go abroad in order to better their lives or escape
systematic maltreatment. Leaders exploiting the international community’s laissez-
faire attitude turn deaf ears to the advice of professional policy advisors and
opinion-formers. This automatically leads to what an observer of regional politics
described as ‘short-term thinking’ (Medhanie, 2004:7).
Furthermore, in order to hold on to power, to hold the state together and to
defend it against the claims and attacks of other states and rebel movements,
governing regimes build and maintain military forces of large dimensions (See
Tables 1and 2).
Table 1: Military Balance in the Horn of Africa in 1972
Asset Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan
Personnel
Strength
44,000 6,000 13,000 36,000
Tanks 50 ---------- 150 130
Combat
Aircraft
46 ---------- 21 40
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1972-1973
Table 2: Military Balance in the Horn of Africa in 1989
Asset Djibouti Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan
Personnel
Strength
4,000 315,000 23,000 65,000 72,000
Tanks ---------- 750 76 290 175
Combat
Aircraft
---------- 143 28 63 45
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1989-1990
They spend a large share of national expenditure disproportionate to
available economic resources and existing security threats. This kind of excessive
militarization eventually entails an increased burden especially in the present times
of dwindling resources and economic crises. Excessive military spending is
essentially a wasteful expenditure because of which social projects in education or
health remain stagnant or even non-existent. It also heightens the perception of
mutual threat with a wide range of unintended political consequences.
On the one hand, external threats will be used to distract attention from real
internal problems. On the other hand, a politicized, compromised and restless
military with its proneness to usurp state power and resources will represent a
grave danger to inherently fragile regimes as well as their political and security
structures.
Furthermore, the role Somalia played in the various regional conflicts that
ensued in neighbouring states as well as the nature of her alliance could also define
the motives of state actors such as Ethiopia and Kenya and their role in the
emergence of state failure in Somalia.
Table 3: Selected Intra-State Conflicts in and around the Horn of Africa
State Selected Rebel
Movements
Year of Origin Motivation Active Regional
Backing
Djibouti Front for the
Restoration of Unity
and
Democracy
1991 Change of
Regime
Eritrea
Eritrea Eritrean Islamic Jihad 1989 Change of
Regime
Sudan
Eritrean Democratic
Alliance
--------- Change of
Regime
Ethiopia
Afar Red Sea
Democratic Front
1998 Autonomy Ethiopia
Ethiopia Eritrean Liberation
Front
1961 Secession Sudan, Somalia,
Egypt
Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front
1972 Secession Sudan, Saudi
Arabia
Tigray People’s
Liberation Front
1975 Autonomy and
Change of
Regime
Sudan
Oromo Liberation
Front
1976 Secession Sudan, Somalia,
Eritrea
Western Somali
Liberation Front
1961/1976 Secession Somalia
Ogaden National
Liberation Front
1986 Secession Eritrea
Ethiopian People’s
Patriotic Front
1998 Change of
Regime
Eritrea
Kenya Shifta War 1963 Secession Somalia
Libya National Front for the
Salvation of Libya
1981 Change of
Regime
Sudan
Somalia Somali Salvation
Democratic Front
1979 Change of
Regime
Ethiopia
Somali National 1981 Secession Ethiopia
Movement
Al Itihad Al Islamiya
1983
1983 Islamization Sudan, Eritrea
Somali Patriotic
Movement
1989 Change of
Regime
---------
United Somali
Congress
1989 Change of
Regime
Ethiopia
Al Shabab Al
Mujahedeen
2006 Change of
Regime
Eritrea
Sudan Beja Congress 1958 Autonomy Eritrea
Anyanya 1960 Secession Ethiopia
Sudan People’s
Liberation Army
1983 Secession Ethiopia, Libya,
Uganda,
Eritrea, Kenya
National Democratic
Alliance
1995 Change of
Regime
Eritrea,
Ethiopia
Justice and Equality
Movement
2003 Darfur Eritrea, Chad
Sudan Liberation
Movement
2003 Darfur Eritrea
Uganda National Resistance
Army
1981 Change of
Regime
----------
Lord’s Resistance
Army
1987 Autonomy Sudan
Source: Mesfin, B. (2002), The Horn of Africa as a Security Complex: Towards a
Theoretical Framework
From the table above, we can deduce the fact that Somalia regional backing
for the Eritrean Liberation Front in 1961, Oromo Liberation Front in 1976, and
Western Somali Liberation Front in 1961/1976 against Ethiopia as well as their
support for Shifta war in 1963 against Kenya which represent the active regional
backing Somalia has ever involved in increased the rivalry of the two states against
Somalia as well as their posture towards supporting rebel movements in Somalia a
situation that further aggravated the state failure in Somalia.
4.1.5 OGADEN WAR
The discriminatory amalgamation and partitioning that took place in the
course of colonialism between the shared border of Somalia and Ethiopia has
generated a bitter rivalry between the two countries a rivalry that has generated
into escalation of instability and conflicts by the stakeholders of each countries
thus strengthening their capabilities to recover the region.
The leaders of the two countries, especially since Somalia’s independence,
have kept a topsy-turvy relationship marked by skirmishes and wars. When
Somalia got independence in 1960, it directed its internal security concern to
preventing Ethiopia from dominating affairs in the Horn of Africa. The boldest
step Somalia took to challenge Ethiopia’s dominance in the Horn so far was to
support insurgents planning to withdraw from Ethiopia. This insurgency led to the
Ogaden War that lasted from 1977 to 1978. The government of Somalia was trying
to take advantage of the turmoil in Ethiopia caused by the overthrow of Haile
Selassie and the bloodletting the Derg was perpetrating on opponents of the
revolution. The Somali government threw its support behind the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF), which was a pro-Somali liberation group in the Ogaden,
planning to withdraw. The initial support the Barre government gave the WSLF
was covert and when Ethiopia accused President Barre of interference, he replied
that only “volunteers” had been given leave from the army to fight.
By September 1977, regular Somali troops’ involvement in the conflict
could no longer be disguised, as they had pushed some 700 kilometers into
Ethiopian territory and captured a provincial capital (Tiruneh, 1993). By the end of
1977, Somali forces had captured 60% of the Ogaden (Ofcansky, 1992). Ethiopia
blames the Ogaden war on Somalia’s irredentism, a wish by Siad Barre to annex
the Ogaden area of Ethiopia (Turner, 1993).
Desperate for help, Mengistu Haile Mariam the leader of the Derg, turned to
the Soviet Union which obliged by providing military supplies and advisers, as the
Soviets simultaneously cut off supplies for the Somali army. This triggered what
Lewis calls a “seismic shift in superpower alignments in the Horn of Africa”
(Lewis, 1989: 575), as Cuba sent troops to help the Ethiopian army. On his part,
Siad Barre turned to the United States and friendly Arab countries for economic
and military help.
Nevertheless, the WSLF with its Somali military support was defeated in
1978 and Siad Barre forbade the WSLF from using Somali territory to attack
Ethiopia. In retaliation for Somalia’s misdeeds, Ethiopia in the early 1980s
provided sanctuary and support for the Somali National Movement (SNM), which
was a dissident group formed by Isaaq exiles in London to overthrow the Barre’s
government.
Discontented the President had not represented their interests, the Isaaq
conducted guerrilla raids against Somali government-held territory from Dira
Dawa, Ethiopia. President Barre responded by launching a military campaign to
the north against the Issaq. After the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, the United Somali
Congress (USC), one of the rebelling factions competing for control, became
dominant. Competition and alliances between groups such as the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) eventually
resulted in the collapse of the USC leadership.
The political vacuum created led to the resurgence of clan identities which
has always been an integral part of Somali culture. Conflicting ambitions among
clan leaders was largely responsible for the civil war and the social and political
instability that defined the lives of Somalis in the 1990s. According to Adam
(1999), differences between United Somali Council (USC) leaders Ali Mahdi of
the Agbal clan and General Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Habar Gedir clan, were
the most notable. When Ali Mahdi declared himself “interim president,” Aidid’s
faction of the USC rejected that claim. The rift among clans widened as they
fought for control of various towns. By 1992 Somalia had collapsed as a state
caused largely by dispute among clans. Hunger, famine and deaths ravaged the
country.
According to Metz (1992), living standards worsening rapidly in Somalia,
was caused not only by civil war but the drought in central and southern Somalia
that left hundreds of thousands starving. By August 1992, Somali refugees that had
settled in neighbouring countries were estimated at 500,000 in Ethiopia, 300,000 in
Kenya, 65,000 in Yemen, 15,000 in Djibouti and about 100,000 in Europe. United
Nations peacekeepers sent to Somalia were met by warlords that resented their
presence, resulting in deadly assaults on them. Out of humanitarian concern,
however, United States marines were sent to Somalia to bolster the United Nations
peacekeepers. Deadly assaults on United States troops caused their withdrawal in
1993.
With regard to the Ogaden Province of Eastern Ethiopia which Somalia
claims, Addis Ababa maintains that the province had been an integral part of
Ethiopia since the reigns of Emperors Amde Tsion[1312-1342], Dawit[1382-
1411], Yeshaque[1414-1429], Zere Yacob [1434-1468], and Sertse Dingil 1563-
1597]. Furthermore, Addis Ababa also argues that its dispute with Somalia centres
only on the demarcation of the borders of former Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.
The northern portion -i.e. the Ethiopia-British Somaliland border, it says, has
already been demarcated, and therefore, cannot be a subject for discussion, let
alone negotiation. In point of fact, Ethiopia maintains that its borders with Somalia
are internationally recognized, and have been confirmed on ten different occasions
from 1897 to 1988.
1. On July 28, 1897, when the Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Treaty was affirmed by
the British Parliament and duly ratified by Queen Victoria;
2. On June 16, 1908, when the Italian Parliament ratified the Italo- Ethiopian
Boundary Treaty of 1897 and the Convention of 1908. Duly concluded, signed and
ratified, it legally binds the signatory parties and their successors, either directly or
by right of devolution;
For the Somali Republic, the dispute with Ethiopia has nothing to do with
problems associated with border demarcation. Rather, it is a question of respecting
the rights of the people of the Ogaden to self-determination, and of recovering
land, which Mogadishu claims, that it “lost” because of the 19th century treaties
that Ethiopia signed with the various European colonial powers.
1. Somalia contends that both the U.N and OAU Charters affirm the rights of
peoples to self-determination, and that Article 103 of the U.N. Charter on self-
determination prevails over rights which Ethiopia claims under treaties that it
signed with the various European colonial powers;
2. Somalia accuses Ethiopia of being a colonialist state, and argues that the people
of the Ogaden are under alien domination. They must therefore be beneficiary to
all the relevant resolutions on de-colonization in order to be able to exercise their
rights to self-determination;
3. Somalia contends that it was never a party to these treaties, and as such, it
should not be expected to accept them;
4. That such resolutions adopted by the OAU and the Non-Aligned countries refer
to new disputes, and not to those which already exist; and
5. That it has registered its serious reservations to such resolutions and therefore is
not bound by them.
The Ethiopians have challenged Somalia’s position by contending that, to
begin with, a state has to have defined boundaries. Since there was no state in
history called “Somalia” before 1960, they could not have taken land from a non-
existent entity. Ethiopia has also referred to Article 62 (a) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that
“A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty,
and which are not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, if the Treaty
establishes a boundary.”
Addis Ababa has also referred to the International Law Commission’s Report that
was approved by the U.N. General Assembly, which maintains that,
“The clean state principle does not in any event relieve a newly
independent state of the obligation to respect a boundary
settlement and certain other situations of a territorial character
established by Treaty.”
For Ethiopia, the right of self-determination cannot have preponderance
over the principle of sovereignty, and it emphasizes that Ethiopian Somalis, who
leave in the Ogaden Province, enjoy the right to govern themselves, to establish
their own regional constitution, to elect their own representatives to regional and
federal assemblies, and to use their language as a medium of instruction in schools,
and in that way, they exercise the right to self-determination. One could also add
that if Somalia’s views on self-determination are to be taken seriously, it should be
the first to recognize the Republic of Somaliland because the majority of its
citizens have already voted for independence.
Unfortunate as it is, Ethiopia and Somalia have gone to war five times in the
last forty seven years over the Ogaden. Similarly, Kenya and Somalia have also
fought three times over the Northern Frontier District. In both cases, the result has
been death, destruction of property, and the displacement of millions of people. We
can therefore deduce that the prolonged war Somalia experienced with her most
contending rivals in the region (Ethiopia and Kenya) over border disputes
contribute to the failure of the Somali state.
4.1.6 THE IMPACTS OF RADICAL ISLAM AND TERRORISM
Almost the entire population of Somalia consists of Sunnis, making Somalia
one of the most religiously homogenous countries in Africa. The Islamic influence
came about through trade contacts with the Arab Peninsula, as well as reciprocal
migration, which has been established as beginning in the 9th century. As early as
the 16th century there are incidents of fighting between Christian Amharic
populations in the Ethiopian highlands and Muslim Sultanates in the eastern
lowlands (present-day Somalia). This rivalry date back to the 16th century, when an
Ethiopian born Muslim warrior by the name of Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, or
what the Ethiopians called him Ahmed Gragn (the left handed), declared a jihad on
the Ethiopian Christian Empire. He started his campaign from his home, Harar. He
enlisted Somali soldiers to his army which the Somalis made up the majority.
Through this campaign he was able to destroy a lot of churches and kill many
Christians. Because of this campaign the Ethiopian Christians have a deep
animosity and hatred against the Somalis for helping with the Jihad and the arrival
of the European colonial powers further complicated relations (Metz, 1992).
The wide religious discrepancies between Somalia and Ethiopia have often
geared intense opposition from the two nations. Somalia has often tend to identify
with countries in the Arab World that share the same religious values with it, an
action that is frequently been viewed from security implications to the region by
neighbouring states. For instance, Somalia alongside Sudan are the only countries
that possesses ties to the Arab League so also aid and technical assistance from
neighbouring Islamic nations.
However, since the mid-1990s, the states in the Horn of Africa have
witnessed hundreds of acts of terrorism against foreign as well as local citizens and
interests. The region is accordingly considered both as a breeding ground and a
safe haven for terrorist organizations, especially after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in the US. Hence, this region has come under increased scrutiny in
the war against terrorism. For instance, Kenya in which around 10 % of the
population is Muslim was the site of the 1998 terrorist attack on the US embassy in
Nairobi, the bombing of a Mombasa hotel and the missile attack on an Israeli
commercial jetliner in 2002. These acts have accentuated the fear that Kenya’s
Muslim-dominated coastal areas may fall under fundamentalist influence and
affect the state’s internal structure and foreign relations as well as exacerbate
latently existing social and ethnic conflicts (Usama, 2009:25-26).
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the US, Somalia came under the
watchful eyes of Western intelligence services and military forces. In view of
Somalia’s lengthy and easily penetrable seacoast as well as the prolonged absence
of a functioning administration, the US worried that Al Qaeda might establish
training bases or use it as a conduit of money, personnel and material for future
terrorist operations beyond the Horn of Africa.
The US thus created a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CTJF-
HOA) with an area of responsibility covering the Horn of Africa plus Yemen. The
US is only bent on reducing the ability of terrorist organizations to operate and
move in the region. The actions of the US clearly show a discrepancy between its
own interest of fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa and that of the regional
regimes which have an utter disdain for its concerns. In fact, the diffusion of
modern military technologies and state-of-the-art techniques of organization which
the US approaches entailed went beyond the modernization of the military or the
transfer of weapons. It led to the institutionalized surveillance of entire populations
and the blind wholesale suppression of all political opponents, leading in effect to
the diffusion of ideas such as Islamist fundamentalism with resultant security
problems particularly in Somalia. An observer of the Horn of Africa said that
Outside actors need to respond judiciously to the allegations of
terrorism levelled against various parties to conflict in the Horn.
The underlying conflicts in the region are older than the
contemporary war on terrorism and will probably outlast it.
Outsiders need to recognize the tactical value of their support and
the interests at stake in representing local adversaries as
associates of terrorism. They also need to weigh the possible gains
(in terms of international terrorism) from intervention against the
risks of greater radicalization, alienation and conflict generation
in the region (Healy, 2008a:44-45).
The U.S declaration of ‘War against Terror’ ushered into the Horn of Africa
another dimension of inter-state rivalry. With international support and U.S
backing, Ethiopia the arch-rival of Somalia once again justified their invasion of
Somalia on the basis of checkmating the rise of radical Islam and the terrorism
threat to the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia fearing the growing influence of these courts
tried to meddle in Somalia’s affairs in the 1990s, when government forces
repeatedly clashed with Islamic backed militias. In 1999, factional leaders in
Somalia lodged a complaint with the Security Council over a border incursion by
Ethiopian forces. Heavily armed Ethiopian troops entered towns along the border
and allegedly took over local administration and detained officials in the towns
(“Somalia Protests Ethiopian”, 1999). The two Somali leaders at the time, Ali
Mahdi and Hussein Aideed, issued a joint statement calling on both the Security
Council and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to intervene to end
Ethiopia’s aggression.
The 9-11 attacks in the United States aggravated another fear that Somalia
would soon become a haven for terrorists. The United States, in fact, had linked
one court, the Al Itihad al Islami, with an estimated membership of 50,000 -
60,000, to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. The Ethiopian government also actively
supported the overthrow of Al Itihad, fearing that importing radical Islamists into
restive Somalia would also risk security in Ethiopia (Le Sage, 2001).
In 2004, a regional body called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Trade
and Development (IGAD) comprising Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea,
Djibouti and Somalia set up the Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
to restore peace and order. In August 2004 a transitional government called the
Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) was formed following settlement among
several factions. The TFI included a transitional parliament, the Transitional
Federal Assembly, a transitional president, a prime minister and a cabinet known
as the Council of Ministers. In October 2004, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected
the Transitional Federal President of Somalia. Selecting Abdullahi Ahmed seemed
a vindication for Ethiopia’s covert involvement in Somalia, since the Ethiopian
government considered him an ally.
Backed by the African Union and the United Nations Security Council, the
Transitional Federal Government was given the international recognition the
Islamic Courts lacked. The TFG’s support, however, was confined to Southern
Somalia. Despite the threat of sectarianism, Islamic militants were unified by their
singular goal of undermining the legitimacy of the TFG. Until he was forced to
resign in December 2008, after conceding that Islamist insurgents had overtaken
much of the country and that he had been unable to unify the unendingly
fragmented Somali nation, Yusuf Ahmed’s presidential authority had repeatedly
been undermined by the Islamist groups.
It came as no surprise, therefore, that the Ethiopian parliament passed a
resolution in November 2006 to allow the government “to take all necessary steps
to ward off attacks by the Islamic Council in Somalia.” This was a euphemism for
Ethiopian forces to cross the border into Somalia, which they subsequently did in
December 2006. The United States considers Ethiopia a pro-Christian nation and
by inference, its government being disinclined to show any leaning to sponsor
international terrorism of the kind some Islamic countries would do.
Ethiopia’s neighbours of Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, Egypt and the
autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland being Islamic, also gives added
poignancy to the friendship the United States intends to keep with Ethiopia. United
States and Ethiopia’s security concerns in the Horn have become intertwined by
their common suspicion of Islamist-backed militias gaining ascendancy in war-torn
Somalia. The common security interests the United States and Ethiopia shared in
the Horn, probably short-circuited any thoughtful analysis of the ramifications on
politics and security arising from Ethiopian troops crossing the border. While top
officials of the Bush administration discreetly avoided volunteering information
that would have suggested United States complicity in Ethiopia’s invasion, lower
administration officials, on the other hand were not so careful. A US State
Department spokesperson stated rather paternalistically:
Ethiopia’s attack is a response to aggression by Islamists and an
attempt to stem the flow of outside arms shipments to them.
Washington is also concerned about reports the Islamists were
using soldiers and abusing Ethiopian prisoners of war (“US Backs
Ethiopia”, 2006).
Observers critical to the invasion have not been so complimentary.
Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen (2007) claim recent US policy in the Horn of
Africa including Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda have worsened
security in the region. Stemming the spread of terrorism and extremist ideologies
has become such an overwhelming strategic objective for Washington that it has
overshadowed US efforts to resolve conflicts and promote good governance.
4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE OGADEN BORDER DISPUTES
The purpose of this section is to analyze the Ethiopia-Somalia border
disputes on the Ogaden region and its resultant effect on state failure in Somalia as
case study. In doing so, the variables identified above will be analyzed in relation
to evidence adduced with a view to ascertain the consequences of the case study on
Somalia statelessness.
4.2.1 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
4.2.1.1 SOMALI NATIONALISM IN ETHIOPIA
The partition of the Horn of Africa at the twilight of the colonial period saw
the establishment of new state borders that did not necessarily trace the boundaries
of the Somali nation. In an outcome reminiscent of the process throughout much of
the post-colonial world, ethnic Somalis found themselves living within a number
of different states including Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia (Laitin 1979). Ethiopia
regained sovereignty over the Ogaden (the region that Somali nationalists refer to
as “Western Somalia”) from the British in the autumn of 1948. The region was
predominantly flat, dry, pastoral land that had remained virtually untouched by any
form of economic, infrastructural, or social development. Besides some scattered
areas of rich grazing land, the Ogaden had few forests or natural mineral wealth for
potential colonizers to exploit. Consequently, at first, the Ethiopian state had little
incentive or opportunity to mobilize the poor and thinly populated region, and
largely refrained from introducing tax collection and strong governance (Gorman,
1981: 30).
Source: Chaliand, 1978: 122
No widespread uprising against Ethiopian rule occurred in 1948, which
suggests that any misgivings the Somali population had over the handover from the
British to the Ethiopians did not warrant violent resistance (Markakis, 1987: 174;
Touval, 1963: 134). It appears that while Addis Ababa allowed the traditional
Ogaden Somali social and political structures to remain in place, and did not
collect taxes, the wider population was generally willing to accept the shift in
political regime. However, two political forces in the Horn of Africa were to act
together to stir Somali nationalist sentiment in Ogaden. The first was the creation
of a pan-Somali conscience which was associated with the establishment of the
Somali Republic. As 1960 (and the independence of the Somali Republic)
approached, a strong sense of Somali identity was stirred across the region (Lewis,
1963: 150; Gebru, 1991; Sheik-Abdi, 1977: 657; Mayall, 1990: 60). Second, over
the course of the 1950s and 1960s, Addis Ababa had gradually expanded its
political and economic involvement in Ogaden. The growth of state control over
what had been for all practical purposes an autonomous region was strongly
resented by the local population. These two currents in the relationship between the
government and the Ogaden Somalis culminated in the increasing levels of social
unrest.
4.3. THE ETHIOPIAN-OGADEN CIVIL WAR
The 1974 Ethiopian revolution unleashed centrifugal forces in the multi-
ethnic state. It was not the first time in Ethiopian history that groups within
Ethiopia had attempted to exploit the perceived vulnerability of a weak transitional
government to begin a nationalist revolt (Gerbu, 1985: 77-92; Berhe, 2004: 572).
However, the insurgencies sparked by the 1974 military coup were unrivalled in
Ethiopian history for their intensity, scope and frequency. New insurgencies were
organized and old insurgencies intensified in Eritrea, Tigray, Bale and Ogaden.
These various nationalist movements were unified only in opposition to the
perceived domination of another ethnic group, the Amhara. As one insurgent
leader stated:
The Abyssinian State, or if you like, the Ethiopian State, was and is
the State of the colonizer, the victor or the ruler. As such it has
been, and still is solely serving the interests of its founders – the
Abyssinians or the Amhara to be more exact. The fact that there
was transfer of leadership from Menelik to Haile Selassie, to the
present military rulers does not make any difference (Selassie,
1990: 132).
The fact that 109 of the Derg’s 123 member General Assembly and 14 of
the 16 members of the Central Committee were Amhara was not lost on Ethiopia’s
marginalized ethnic groups (Firebrace, 1982: 88; Schwab, 1985: 55). Although
most nationalist movements shared a general resentment towards the central
government, it is here that most similarities end. The different national fronts had
an array of political objectives ranging from independence, revolution, national
autonomy and irredentism. The Somali irredentists of Ogaden were unique among
the Ethiopian insurgent groups for they alone had a foreign power directly
supporting their military operations by providing troops, weapons, training and
supplies.
The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) owed much of its fighting
capabilities to support it received from Somalia. The inclusion of all lands
occupied by ethnic Somalis was a founding principle of the newly independent
state. This objective, above all, meant the transfer of sovereignty of the Ogaden
region from Ethiopia to Somalia. As such, Mogadishu was forthcoming with
military aid and financial assistance to the Ogaden Somali irredentist movement,
support that in 1977 was expanded to direct military involvement in the civil war.
The Derg, on the other hand, owed much of its continued effectiveness to
Soviet and Cuban support. Until 1976, the United States had been the leading
guarantor of Ethiopian security. Beginning in 1954, Ethiopia had been one of the
United States’ closest allies in Africa. However, the new Ethiopian President,
Mengistu Haile Mariam, believed the United States was not willing to support the
massive expansion of the Ethiopian armed forces that the Derg deemed necessary
for winning the civil war. As such, in one of the greatest reshuffles of Cold War
alignments, Ethiopia dramatically jumped into the Soviet sphere while the Somali
Republic swapped to the United States. Beginning in 1976, the Soviet Union began
to cement its new relationship with Addis Ababa by commencing arms shipments,
officer exchange programs, and financial aid. These efforts peaked after the Somali
forces directly intervened in the Ethiopian-Ogaden civil war in 1977-78.
4.3.1 PHASE ONE: GUERRILLA AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
WARFARE, 1976-1977
The civil war in the Ogaden region grew in scale, ferocity and geographical
location over the initial years of the insurrection. From humble beginnings in 1976,
the WSLF developed into one of the largest and most capable insurgent
movements in Africa. The rapid rise of the WSLF owed a great deal to the
logistical support provided by Somalia. Although, in the first phase the WSLF
expanded in size and capability the insurgent actor never reached a comparable
military balance with the central government. The Derg, armed with sophisticated
American and Soviet weapons, including tanks, artillery and aircraft, completely
outmatched the guerrilla fighters. Any concentrated formations of insurgents were
easy targets for the Ethiopian army and air force. As such, the first phase of the
civil war was characterized by guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare in which
the incumbent came to control all the major towns in the province while the
insurgents increasingly came to have free rein over the vast rural expanses of
eastern Ethiopia.
4.3.2. CHANGING CAMPS: EARLY SOVIET INTERVENTION IN
THE ETHIOPIAN CIVIL WAR
Ethiopian foreign relations underwent a radical realignment following
Mengistu’s seizure of power. The United States had been the major provider of
arms, equipment, and military training to the forces of Emperor Haile Selassie.
Between 1950 and 1973 the United States spent some $161 million in military aid
to Ethiopia that, in 1966, even included the relatively advanced F-5 fighter-
bombers (Lefebvre, 1991: 111-130; Agyeman-Duah, 1986: 289). The United
States military aid to Ethiopia represented 82 percent of its total aid to Africa.
These high levels of assistance from the United States allowed the Emperor to
maintain a regular army of approximately 40,000 soldiers. The final break in
Ethiopian-American relations occurred in April 1977, when Mengistu – having
been seduced by Soviet promises of more military aid than the United States was
willing to provide – dramatically switched camps.
Shortly after the revolution, Ethiopia began receiving military aid from the
Soviet Union. Reportedly the Ethiopians not only received T-34, T-54, and T-55
tanks and armoured personnel carriers but also equipment Moscow reserved for
close allies including SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, Mi-8 helicopters and self-
propelled guns (Ayoob, 1980: 19). Nevertheless, the initial volume of assistance
from the Soviet Union and eastern European states was modest. In 1976, the Derg
received only $18 million – a figure that was eclipsed by the United States residual
arms transfer of $103 million (SIPRI 2006). However, the initial Soviet supplies
were not a true indication of Moscow’s commitment to its relationship with Addis
Ababa. But the USSR could not afford to send additional aid while its superpower
rival was still in the process of supplying the arms that had been agreed to with
Ethiopia in previously signed contracts.
4.3.3 THE BEGINNINGS OF SOMALI INTERVENTION
Besides captured and stolen equipment, the arms pipelines running between
the Somali border towns and the WSLF guerrilla units operating inside Ethiopia
were the Front’s sole source of weapons and equipment. With no other foreign
source of military aid, the WSLF’s war effort was heavily dependent upon
Mogadishu. Initially, Somalia sent significant quantities of rifles (mostly Soviet
supplied Kalashnikovs), rocket-propelled grenades and land-mines. However, from
early in the civil war Somali army officers were also reported to be advising, and
in some cases directly leading, WSLF guerrilla units. The Somali regular soldiers
removed their Somalia National Army (SNA) insignias to disguise themselves as
WSLF members.
Somalia’s support for the WSLF grew in proportion with the insurgency’s
successes. It seems that as reports of WSLF victories increasingly made their way
back to President Siad in Mogadishu, so did his confidence in supporting the
insurgents. Training camps were built on the Somali side of the border specifically
to train new WSLF recruits. Recruits graduating ran from the Somali army ran
programs were then armed by Mogadishu and sent back across the border to fight
in the Ogaden.
4.3.4 MEDIUM INTENSITY GUERRILLA WARFARE
The WSLF political leadership was mostly in self-imposed exile, generally
in Mogadishu, in 1974 when the Ethiopian revolution propelled the Derg into
power. These events apparently caught the WSLF by surprise. Whereas most other
insurgent actors in Ethiopia began, reignited, or intensified their military efforts in
1974-75, the WSLF were not prepared to begin the military dimension of its
campaign until 1976. Nevertheless, the WSLF was eager to exploit the confusion
in Addis Ababa, and in the early months of 1976 the WSLF steadily stepped up its
attacks in the Ogaden, Bale and Sidamo (Korn, 1986: 24). At this early stage, the
best sources available have estimated that the WSLF guerrillas only numbered
3,000 to 5,000 (Gorman, 1981: 62). However, bolstered by support from the
population they were able to move freely around the region further galvanizing
civilians’ collaboration in their cause. Due to Somali assistance the insurgents,
although small in number, was well organized, trained, armed and, above all else,
was coalesced under a single unified political and military command.
The WSLF challenge of expanding its size was helped by the large number
of Ogaden Somali refugees in Somalia. The 1974 drought in eastern Ethiopia, had
forced large numbers of the scattered nomadic population of the Ogaden to migrate
over the border into Somalia and concentrated around food distribution centres.
The Somali famine-relief camps facilitated recruitment into the WSLF. As the
refugees were already inside Somalia, the difficult and dangerous logistical
problem of moving large numbers of new recruits to training camps across the
border in the Republic was moderated (Patman, 1990: 157). Mogadishu played a
central role in training these recruits, many of whom were (before Somalia’s spilt
with the Soviet Union in 1977) also sent abroad to the Soviet Union, Cuba and
North Korea for specialist training (Ottaway, 1982: 83). Refugees and other
Ogaden Somali volunteers, after being armed, trained and organized into guerrilla
units begun to stream back across the border into Ethiopia. By the end of 1976, the
size of the WSLF guerrilla force operating in Ogaden was estimated by the
Ethiopian government to be 30,000, with an additional 6,000 Somali observers
(Ottaway, 1978: 209).
The first months of 1977 marked a turning point for the WSLF. The
frequency, size and effectiveness of the WSLF raids against government
installations increased. Targets of the WSLF guerrilla included key transportation
routes, Ethiopian army convoys, police stations, and even fixed army positions
(Patman, 1990: 209). At this precise time, the first journalistic dispatches from the
Horn began mentioning the presence of up to 1,500 Somali regulars operating in
Ethiopia (Ottaway, 1978: 209). Reports of Somali participation in the conflict
became more frequent as the intensity of the conflict increased. Although the
Somali Republic had been steadily supplying and training the WSLF (a point
Mogadishu had never denied) the reports in February 1977 were the first to cite
Somali units directly involved in supporting the WSLF. From February 1977 until
the full Somali invasion in July 1977, the WSLF guerrillas captured village after
village in the Ogaden. The available information supports the WSLF claim that not
long into 1977 they had effectively wrestled 60 percent of the disputed territory
away from the Ethiopian government’s control (Porter, 1984: 184). The Ethiopian
army had become largely confined to the garrison towns of Jijiga, Gode, Warder,
Degehabour, Kebridehar and further south in Dolo, Ginir, Goba, Neghelli and
Shakisso (Gilkes, 1991: 722).
During 1977, the WSLF increased the tempo of its operations. In early July
1977 the fighting escalated sharply with the WSLF expanding its area of
operations to include targets on the outmost boundary of the territory it claimed.
On 14 July 1977, fighting erupted at the strategically important train junction at
Dire Dawa. The railway linked Addis Ababa with the Djibouti and from there the
outside world. The track was vital to the Ethiopian economy as it carried an
estimated sixty percent of Ethiopia’s exports and imports (Anonymous 1977b, 2),
and a successful attack would interrupt military supplies coming from overseas to
Addis Ababa. Fighting lasted two to three days with heavy causalities being
suffered by both sides (Anonymous 1977b, 2). The WSLF was able to blow up the
two railway bridges on either side of the city however, as is typical of guerrilla
forces, they lacked the offensive capabilities to capture the fortified town.
4.4 PHASE TWO: CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 1977-1978
On the whole, the WSLF during the guerrilla phase of the conflict did not
have the heavy weapons required to breach the defences of the Ethiopian garrisons,
and contented themselves with preventing the Ethiopian soldiers from venturing
out of their strongholds to patrol. However, the invasion by the Somali regular
army in July changed this dynamic and many garrisons, including the airfield at
Gode, quickly fell to the invaders. It seemed likely that the insurgents, with the
addition of direct Somali assistance, would succeed in annexing the Ogaden region
into the Somali Republic. Massive Soviet and Cuban intervention, however, swung
the balance of forces in the Ogaden theatre back in favour of the incumbent. This
phase saw both the incumbent and insurgent receive comparable levels of
assistance from their respective external supporters. The course of the civil war
during this phase underwent revolutionary transformation. The WSLF’s tactics,
unit formations and general conduct evolved into patterns characteristic of
conventional warfare. In response, the incumbent ceased counterinsurgency
operations against the WSLF and engaged them in major conventional
confrontations before eventually defeating the insurgents at Harar and Jijjiga.
Although the Somali National Army’s direct intervention greatly increased
the capabilities of the WSLF its strength was not on parity with Ethiopian
government. Conventional warfare favours the side with the greater military
resources and so, after the initial impetus of the Somali invasion fizzled and the
conflict became one of attrition, the Derg held the military advantage.
4.4.1 DIRECT SOVIET UNION AND CUBAN INTERVENTION
In mid-1977, the Ethiopian Foreign minister visited Moscow and Havana in
a successful attempt to persuade these states to send troops in a repeat of the Soviet
and Cuban intervention in Angola (Ayoob, 1980: 157). On 26 November 1977, an
emergency airlift began originating in the Soviet Union and destined for Addis
Ababa. Several An-22 and Tu-76 transport aircraft logged over 200 return flights
to Ethiopia and still, transport aircraft had to be borrowed from eastern European
states because the superpower’s own air force did not possess the huge number of
aircraft required for such a mammoth operation (Porter, 1984: 201). Reports tell of
flights in early January leaving every 20 minutes from their bases at Tbilisi, north
of the Black Sea. However, it was the sealift that accounted for the majority (an
estimated 75 percent) of the military aid sent by the USSR. Between June 1977 and
July 1978 over 35 freighters made the journey from the Black Sea, via the Turkish
Straits and Suez Canal, to eventually arrive at the Eritrean ports (then part of
Ethiopia) of Assab or Massawa. The unloaded vehicles and weapons then hurriedly
dashed through Eritrea and Tigray (two provinces combating powerful insurgents
themselves) to join the fight in the Ogaden (Porter, 1984: 202).
In total, Moscow sent an estimated 1,000 Soviet military advisors along with
some 300 T-54/T-54 main battle tanks, over 300 artillery pieces, and thousands of
small arms (Porter, 1984: 200; Darnton, 1978: 1). In addition, Cuba supplied
15,000 troops which were heavily involved in fighting against the combined
WSLF and SNA invasion (Darnton, 1978: A3).
4.4.2 THE SOMALI INVASION
The invasion consisted of 35,000 SNA regulars, 250 tanks (most with 250-
mm cannons), 300 armoured personnel carriers, 200 pieces of mobile artillery and
supported by the Somali air force (Marcus, 1994: 196-197). The invasion also
included an additional 15,000 WSLF fighters that had crossed into Somalia to
participate in the assault. The skill and organization Somali advance, under the
leadership of the SNA General Amantar, greatly impressed American military
observers (Laitin, 1979: 166). Although the Somali invasion involved almost twice
as many SNA soldiers than supplied to Addis Ababa, the quantity of equipment
was comparable.
The major flaw in the Somali invasion was not the lack of troops and
equipment, but the fragility of its logistical lines of communication. By the time
the invading forces reached the outskirts of Harar in November, the Somali
logistical lines stretched back over 225km across the border to the northern Somali
city of Hargeisa. Neglected by consecutive Ethiopian governments, the Ogaden
region had few roads linking the major cities that could facilitate the easy
movement of supplies. Besides the obvious quantitative impact the lack of supplies
had on the Somali forces at the front, there were reportedly also important negative
effects on the morale of the Somali forces (Watson, 1986: 167).
4.4.3 WSLF SWITCH TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
On 18 June, the first small numbers of regular SNA units began moving
over the border into the Ogaden. The WSLF quickly joined with the SNA troops
and began the push towards the major government controlled garrison towns
(Gilkes, 1991: 722). From the earliest contact with the SNA forces, the WSLF
style of warfare began to radically change. Falling into formation behind the
advancing SNA columns of armour, the WSLF were largely incorporated into the
Somali order-of-battle, fighting alongside the regular soldiers of the Somali
Republic. As discussed, the WSLF’s raid on Dire Dara on 14 July had been
classically guerrilla in character. The insurgents had attacked key railway bridges
before hurriedly withdrawing before the Ethiopian forces could mount a
counterattack. However, the second assault, which also included a SNA brigade
almost, captured the important garrison city. The most telling change in the WSLF
behaviour was the reaction of the attackers after the assault was repelled. Instead of
dispersing, the WSLF and SNA withdrew to the surrounding hills where they dug-
in and from fixed positions set about shelling the city with artillery and mortars.
The Somali forces found the initial stages of the invasion of Ethiopia
relatively easy going. The guerrilla force had captured most towns in the Ogaden
region as far north as Dire Dawa. Faced by regular Somali units the few thousand
Ethiopian soldiers in scattered garrisons throughout the territory were totally
overwhelmed. It is reported that by 3 August the guerrillas had control over every
town in the region except for three: Dire Dawa, Harar and Jijjiga. However, the
triad of towns represented the most important political, economic and population
centres in the Ogaden. Even more importantly, the towns were along the major
northern road leading from Somali to the Addis Ababa and therefore their capture
was strategically crucial for the Somali war plan. The Derg was equally aware of
the strategic value of these towns’ and consequently extensively fortified them
with Ethiopian regular and militia units.
In early February 1978, under the direction of a Soviet three-star general,
named Vasilii Petrov, and two Soviet brigadier-generals the Ethiopian
counteroffensive built momentum. From this point onwards the war tilted
decisively Ethiopia’s favour. There had been roughly 2,000 Cuban troops fighting
alongside the Ethiopian army, however, in early February the number leapt to over
11,000, many of whom had been flown in from Angola by Ethiopian airlines and
then rushed to the front in order to help maintain the impetus of the
counteroffensive. By early March, Cuban strength in Ethiopia had grown to 15,000
in addition to 1,500 Soviet advisors (Porter, 1984: 204).
The most decisive battle of the war occurred at the strategically important
town of Jijiga. The third largest city in the Ogaden, Jijiga was the gateway from the
eastern highlands to the western plateaus, had changed hands twice before finally
falling to the Somalis on 2 September 1977. To the west of the town Ethiopian
amour, infantry and the Cuban contingent steadily began crossing the Ahmar
Mountains between Jijiga and the Somali border. Western sources reported that
roughly 75,000 Ethiopian and 7,000 Cuban soldiers were involved in the operation
(Kaufman, 1978: A4). Meanwhile, giant Soviet Mi-6 transport helicopters airlifted
Ethiopian and Cuban tanks (two at a time) around the back the Somali defences to
the other side of the mountains. The logistical triumph succeeded in both bypassing
the heavily fortified Somali defences at the Gara Marada Pass while
simultaneously encircling the majority of the WSLF and SNA forces in the
mountains. What ensued was the largest and most decisive conventional
confrontation of the war. The Somali forces – trapped, outnumbered and
outgunned – suffered horrific causalities, which included the annihilation of an
entire armour brigade (Porter, 1984: 186). Jijiga fell to the Ethiopian forces on 5
March 1978.
The routed SNA and WSLF forces that were able to escaped Jijiga fled in
disorder back over the Somali border. Except for two distant and isolated towns in
southeast, every city in Ogaden was back in the hands of Addis Ababa within a
week of Jijiga. On 9 March, hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia ended with
President Siyaad’s public declaration that all SNA forces would be withdrawn
from Ethiopian territory (Porter, 1984: 186).
4.5 PHASE THREE: REVERSION BACK TO GUERRILLA WARFARE,
1979-1980
The civil war, however, did not end with the SNA defeat at Jigija. After a
respite, the WSLF renewed its military campaign against the Ethiopian central
government. The continuation of the war prompted the Soviet Union to continue its
substantial military aid to the incumbent regime. The WSLF did not fair as well
with its international supporter. Mogadishu was still smarting from its
comprehensive defeat in 1978 at the hands of the Ethiopian army. Somalia had
become disenchanted with the pan-Somali ideals that were so strong in the fervour
of independence. Support for the WSLF persisted, but at a much reduced overall
level. In sum, the incumbent found itself in the strongest position it had to that
point in the civil war, while the WSLF found itself in its weakest. The warfare
during this period reflected this new strategic reality with the insurgent reverting to
guerrilla warfare.
4.5.1 CONTINUED SOVIET INVENTION
The Soviet Union, along with the other major foreign supporters of the
Derg, believed the repulsion of the Somali regular army and the regular formations
of the WSLF signalled the end of the Ethiopian civil war in the Ogaden theatre.
The level of foreign assistance to Addis Ababa in 1979 reflects this optimistic
view. The volume of foreign support dived from $917 million in 1978 to a mere
$112 million in 1979 (SIPRI 2006). However, in the face of continued fighting in
Ethiopia, Soviet and Eastern European arms transfers more than tripled in 1980
and continued to rise until the mid-1980s when abruptly Ethiopia became a victim
of Perestroika. Although the volume of external assistance to the Ethiopia dipped
in 1979, the temporary loss of foreign military aid had no real impact upon the
Ethiopian government’s massive expansion of its army. The army, in 1975 and
before Soviet intervention, was roughly 50,000 strong. Yet, with foreign weapons,
money and training the army had rapidly increased to 225,000 in 1977 and by 1979
had numbered 250,000 men (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1982).
The level of external intervention was sufficient to maintain the Ethiopian army’s
military dominance over all the insurgent groups active in the country.
4.5.2 SOMALI DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE ETHIOPIAN-
OGADEN CIVIL WAR
Following the Somali defeat in 1978 Mogadishu continued, if nominally, to
sponsor the WSLF’s military operations in the Ogaden (Lewis, 1989: 576). The
balance of power in the Horn of Africa had decisively shifted towards Ethiopia. As
such, Mogadishu was reluctant to continue direct military support for the
irredentist cause. The Somali assistance to the guerrillas began to be scaled back to
only include indirect military and economic assistance. Economically, Somalia
continued to supply some food to the WSLF, but most of their logistics had to be
obtained from the sympathetic, or intimidated, civilian population or captured from
the Ethiopian forces. Wren reports that following a night raid by the WSLF on an
Ethiopian military convoy, the malnourished guerrillas immediately sat down to
devour the captured rations (Wren, 1980: A2). This suggests that supplies were
becoming more difficult to acquire from Mogadishu than they had been in previous
years.
4.5.3 LOW INTENSITY GUERRILLA WARFARE
Following the defeat of the Somali regular army’s invasion of the Ogaden,
the balance of capabilities between the belligerents dramatically shifted back in
favour of the incumbent. Although the WSLF continued their campaign against
Addis Ababa, they had suffered a traumatic shock at the hands of the Ethiopian,
Russian, and Cuban soldiers. Most of the surviving WSLF members withdrew with
the Somali forces back across the border in order to recuperate (Wiberg, 1979:
191). Others, however, simply returned to the relative safety of their villages in the
Ogaden. In response to the falling levels of guerrilla activity, several Ethiopian
regular and militia units were redeployed north to the Eritrean and Tigrayian
fronts. Government forces in the region probably fell to around 60,000 Ethiopian
and 12,000 Cuban soldiers (Jaynes, 1979: E3).
When in 1980 the WSLF returned in small numbers, the response of the
central government was fast and decisive. The incumbent’s counterinsurgency
campaign had two main thrusts. The first was a classic isolation strategy, while the
second was aimed at the eradication of the guerrilla fighters.
The rural population had “helped the rebels, willingly or under duress, by
providing sustenance, shelter and intelligence information” (Gebru, 2002: 470).
The isolation of the insurgents from the population of the Ogaden became the
incumbent’s most pressing strategic objective. Mengistu took two different
approaches to the isolation of the WSLF. The first method involved coercively
encouraging the Ogaden Somali population to migrate over the border into
Somalia. In 1980, (before the Soviets had begun employing a similar strategy in
Afghanistan) Somalia had the largest population of refugees of any single country.
There were 700,000 Ogaden Somalis living in refugee camps and approximately
another 600,000 living elsewhere in Somalia (Moseley, 1980: A1). The second
strategy aimed to resettle the remaining civilian population in the areas where the
WSLF was still active into fortified villages. The “villagization” program enabled
the government to tightly control the movement of the population and thereby
denying access to the guerrillas.
The second dimension to the government’s counterinsurgency strategy was
designed to military confront and destroy the guerrilla bands. The largest and most
successful eradication operations was coded named “Lash”. Its aim was to, in
conjunction with the isolation strategy, military apply pressure on the WSLF
guerrillas. According to Gebru, six divisions representing roughly 60,000 soldiers
were involved in the massive offensive. Besides the main striking forces, there
were also two divisions already assigned to in the region, air support flying from
Dire Dawa, thousands of militiamen, and the Cuban tank and mechanized brigades
based at Jijiga (Gebru, 2002: 471). The standard tactics in the operation were for
the Ethiopian army after “stationing troops near the border to block suspected
entry and exit points” would mobilize multiple columns of troops and with the
support of armour and helicopters comb the area pushing the guerrillas into
prepared ambushes (Gebru, 2002: 471). The few WSLF members that escaped
across to the border were no longer safe even there. The second element of the
Ethiopian eradication strategy was to sponsor an opposing guerrilla force inside of
Somalia. In 1979, some disgruntled former Somali army officers formed the
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The only fixed installations operated
by the WSLF were inside Somalia, and therefore protected from Addis Ababa by
Somali sovereignty. However, these logistical targets, which had previously been
impervious to attack, now came under assault from the Somali insurgent group.
The SSDF also frequently crossed the border into Ethiopia to help their allies hunt
down the WSLF.
The WSLF military campaign progressively began to taper out during the
early 1980s. Without substantial military aid the guerrilla campaign continued to
be a pest to the central government but hardly a serious threat to the regimes’
existence or the territorial integrity of the state. With the exception of two peaks in
intensity, that roughly corresponded with Ethiopian and Somali border clashes in
1980 and 1982, the WSLF campaign on the whole began to lose momentum (Korn,
1986: 76). The April 1988 peace accord between Presidents Mengistu and Siad
included the provision which put a complete end to the sponsorship of each other’s
insurgent groups (Marcus, 1994: 212; Lewis, 1989: 576).
Due to the military defeat, at the end of the 1970s Somalia was once again
in a weak position with respect to Ethiopia. The remnants of the army were busy
fending off attacks by guerillas and individual Ethiopian units. Against this
background the (sub-) clans openly vented their displeasure, exacerbating rifts in
Somali society that had previously been suppressed by Barre’s authoritarian rule
and pan-Somali visions. However, in the 1980s Barre continued to pursue a policy
of “divide and conquer” in an attempt to prevent the formation of united
opposition, heightening clan antipathies and playing them against each other. For
example, he gave political and military posts as well as money and weapons to
members of marginalized sub-clans.
The April 1988 peace accord between Mengistu and Siad triggered an
outbreak of the Somali civil war. Ethiopia cut off its support to the SNM, which
deprived of its base, pulled together for a military strike in the Isak region in
Northern Somalia, starting an open civil war. Mutinying Ogadeni and Hawiye
engaged the Somali army on further fronts. Ultimately, by 1989 the Somali army
controlled only a few larger cities and the area around the capital, which gained
Barre the nickname “Mayor of Mogadishu” On January 27, 1991 Barre fled to the
area of his Marehan sub-clan in the southwest of the country, later escaping from
there to Kenya. After Barre’s flight, bloody battles for supremacy broke out in
Mogadishu between the militias of the most powerful warlords, Ali Mahdi and
Mohammed Aideed. These Bloody battles ushered into Somalia Political history
the indicators that best categorize Somalia as the world perfect example of a failed
state foremost of which is the collapse of the central government in Mogadishu.
The collapse of the central government in Mogadishu also ushered into the
international political jargon the emergence of a Transitional National Government
and subsequently a Transitional Federal Government established towards
achieving state-building in Somalia both of which run the affairs of Somalia from
exile and largely dependent on external actors for security which posit its low level
of sovereignty. The emergence of the above-mentioned governments ushered a
new conceptualization of the term “Government” owing to the practical absence of
sovereignty and the exiled prognosis that best describe these two forms of
government.
4.6 TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN SOMALIA
In 1996, after multiple failed peace conferences aimed at building a central
government, donors and neighboring states coalesced around the notion of
encouraging formation of regional administrations to serve as “building blocks”
for eventual national reconciliation and state-building in Somalia. This was to
allow a government to be formed eventually by negotiations between functioning
regional authorities not simply armed factions.
From 1996 the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the
main intergovernmental organization in the region, with UN backing became
involved in efforts to mediate between the factions. In 1998 IGAD proposed
holding a national peace conference. Similarly named initiatives had been tried on
many occasions before and failed, but this one gathered some momentum and
eventually took place in May 2000 in Djibouti termed the ‘Arta Conference’. The
conference agreed that Somalia would adopt a federal system and set up a
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) with a view to eventually establishing a
Transitional National Government (TNG). The establishment of the Transitional
National Government in August 2000 had appeared at the time to be a significant
development. The optimism with which it was greeted in many quarters, has
largely evaporated as it has failed to widen its support or deliver public services in
its limited areas of control. In August 2000, the new TNA elected Abdulkasim
Salad Hasan, a Hawiye, as the President of Somalia. He appointed a TNG in
October 2000. However, it quickly became clear that the TNG lacked legitimacy
and support as a result of its little presence in Mogadishu.
The Transitional National Government was plagued by fundamental
problems. It was formed on the basis of a very incomplete peace process as it
excludes some key actors in its reconciliation process. While more broadly
representative than past national reconciliation efforts, it lacked important
constituencies – including Somaliland and Puntland, the Rahanweyn Resistance
Army, and five or six major militia and faction leaders.
Of all Somalia’s major clans, only the Hawiye was virtually united in its
support. Others were divided or hostile. Opposition groups refuse to recognize the
Transitional National Government’s claim to be the sole legitimate national
authority and dismiss it as the “Arta faction”. It was unable to extend its authority
into much of the country.
Indeed, the Transitional National Government controls only half of
Mogadishu and a few areas in the interior. Even in Mogadishu most day-to-day
governance is at the neighborhood level by informal systems of policing and clan-
based Sharia courts. Establishment of the Transitional National Government did
not improve security in the capital. Instead, banditry worsened and armed clashes
increased throughout the South (ICG, 2002).
The Transitional National Government soon became irrelevant and also
failed to ensure credibility and stability in Somalia. It faced a crisis of legitimacy
even among its own supporters because of infighting, corruption, and the scandal
of its business backers’ involvement with counterfeit shillings that have sparked
hyperinflation (Le Sage, 2002). In the words of Andre Le Sage (2002), he argued
that this and other incidents demonstrate that the Transitional National
Government is little more than a thinly-veiled business cartel that supports the
interests of a group of wealthy merchants who use it as a more legitimate form of
protection.
The Transitional National Government was also cast into turmoil after it
reconstituted itself following the dissolution of the cabinet by the parliament in
October 2001. Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah announced a new cabinet in
February 2002, but it represents little change. The only concession was the
reservation of four ministerial posts for opposition leaders. This appears to be in
direct contravention of an agreement reached in the Kenya Conference in January
2002 with a number of factions that was to pave the way for a more broadly
representative government (ICG, 2002). While the TNG took over Somalia’s seat
in the UN, was admitted to the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and IGAD, and gained recognition from Arab states, Ethiopia soon
began to back its rivals.
The Transitional National Government faced the daunting problem of
Ethiopian opposition. Ethiopia views it as a stalking horse for Arab and Islamic
domination of the Horn of Africa, and also accuses it of being a front for al-Qaeda.
Given its military strength and ability to fund militia groups, Ethiopia effectively
exercises veto power over political developments inside Somalia.
In March 2001, Ethiopia engineered the formation of the Somali
Reconciliation and Restoration Council, an alliance of southern faction leaders
which sought, unconvincingly, to portray itself as an alternative government. TNG
received its major support mostly from external actors in the Arab League. In very
general terms, the Arab League has maintained a unified position on Somalia
despite natural differences between its members. The most important actor in this
group is Egypt, which had an active relationship with Somalia in support of the
Transitional National Government (ICG, 2002).
Its interests in the country, stand in contrast to a much more passive set of
Arab actors who have little interest in Somalia as a bloc. Egypt and Djibouti have
worked together to undergird the Transitional National Government and counter
Ethiopian influence in Somalia.
Egypt and Sudan both perceive a strong, unified Somali state as an essential
counterweight to Ethiopian influence in the Horn. Cairo’s concerns are conditioned
primarily by the perennial dispute with Ethiopia over the waters of the Nile, while
Khartoum seeks Ethiopia’s non-interference in its long-running civil war (ICG,
2002).
The Gulf States – notably Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) – have historical commercial ties with Somalia and have remained
politically engaged, albeit at a greater distance. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE
have provided funds to Islamic NGOs for humanitarian and social welfare
programs throughout the Somali crisis. Libya has had sporadic involvement in
Somali affairs, mainly because of Gaddafi’s personal familiarity with numerous
Somali leaders since the 1970s and his apparent desire to recast his country as a
regional power broker.
Arab states had given the Transitional National Government approximately
U.S$25 million in grants through February 2002 (Donald, 2002). The security
forces were initially paid, armed and equipped with a grant from Saudi Arabia,
supplemented by smaller contributions from Qatar, UAE, Yemen and Libya.
The Ethiopian opposition to neither the Transitional National Government
contributed to a perception that it desires neither a unified nor a stable Somalia,
Ethiopia remains central to any lasting peace agreement. It has had a multifaceted
involvement over the past decade. Ethiopia’s most immediate concern in Somalia
is its own national security. Southern Somalia has long served as a base for armed
groups opposed to the Ethiopian government, including the Ogaden National
Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front, and al-Itihaad. The cross-border
activities of these groups provoked an Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in
1996, after al- Itihaad was implicated in terrorist acts in Addis Ababa and Dire
Dawa (ICG, 2002). However in 2001, Ethiopia requested that the Transitional
National Government deny these groups permission to operate and demonstrated
that it will police Somali territory unilaterally, mainly along the southern border
(ICG, 2002).
Ethiopia accuses members of the Transitional National Government of
membership in al-Itihaad, al-Islah and other Islamist organizations and has sought
an American green light to disrupt or destroy what it describes as a terrorist threat.
In the Ethiopian view, external Islamist sources provide Somali
organizations with significant resources for social services and commercial
investment as part of a broader agenda to lay the foundation for an Islamic state.
Ethiopia does not have the financial resources to engage in Somalia in the same
way, but it does have troops and arms with which it is prepared to counter the
Islamists.
Indeed it was this fear of Islamization that propel Ethiopian invasion into
Somalia affairs and a rapid collapse of the Transitional National Government
owing to the corrupt political leadership of the TNG under Abdiqassim Salad
Hassan. In an interview, Ethiopian ambassador to the United Nations, Abdulmejid
Hussein, underscored his authorities’ determination to counter Islamist influence in
the region:
“If you allow these people to infiltrate Somalia, our multicultural,
multi-religious and multiethnic country will pay a price…If the
Somalis don't solve their problems, then we will do it for them...We
won't wait forever” (IRIN, 2002).
A major initiative employed by the regional organization IGAD to address
the problems faced by the TNG was to commence new negotiations that facilitated
the establishment of a transitional parliament and a new transitional government.
This time, following a proportional system that included all relevant clans and
warlords among the delegates, a total of 275 representatives were selected.
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, former leader of the SSDF and later leader of the
Puntland region, former resistance fighter against Siyad Barre and ally of the
Ethiopian regime under Meles Zenawi, was elected as Somalia’s new president in
October 2004 in Kenya.
4.7 ABDULLAHI YUSUF’S REGIME AND THE ERA OF GOVERNMENT-
IN-EXILE
The Government of Abdullahi Yusuf in the aftermath of his victory as the
new elected president of Somalia could not operate directly in Somalia but rather
directs Somalia affairs from the neighboring countries most specifically Kenya.
This attributed the feature of a government-in-exile to his regime. A government in
exile is a political group that claims to be a country's legitimate government, but
for various reasons is unable to exercise its legal power, and instead resides in a
foreign country. Governments in exile usually operate under the assumption that
they will one day return to their native country and regain power. The intense
security situation of Mogadishu prevented the operation of his regime in Somalia.
President Abdullahi Yusuf gave some reasons for why his government operates
from exile on the basis that "The government needs to prepare the grounds for
having some security forces". He also said that "We need to prepare on the
reconciliation side - the government will make sure that when it's moving into
Mogadishu, Mogadishu is ready in terms of accommodating the government”.
Finally he said "We want to solve the problems in Somalia peacefully - including
Somaliland, we would never resolve matters through force. Dialogue and
discussion is much better than resorting to violence" (ICG, 2008).
There was also a practical absence of all the state apparatus that can ensure
the proper functioning of the government in Somalia. There was the absence of
government buildings, army as well as a viable economy. The role played by
Ethiopia in the emergence of the new TNG also created lack of legitimacy and
support for the government as the government was practically viewed as a practical
extension of Ethiopia influence in Somalia. The wide feeling of animosity directed
towards the new TNG influenced its decisions to call for international intervention
a situation that further deteriorate its sovereignty and legitimacy. President
Abdullahi Yusuf said: "We need international help. We don't have proper police,
military or security forces. Without international support our job will be difficult;
everyone knows that" (ICG, 2008). President Yusuf was faced with significant
resistance of over 50,000 well-armed militia members in the country which
provided little chance of success for the new Government without significant
military help from other African nations. President Yusuf originally requested
15,000 troops from the 53-nation African Union to help regain control of his
country but he was provided with only 2000 troops (ICG, 2008). The quest of
sustaining the new TNG has also provided external actors the opportunity to
intervene into Somalia affairs. The new TNG was only capable of functioning in
Somalia a year later with a decision to move to Baidoa, northwest of the capital
near the Ethiopian border. At about the same time as the new TFG was securing
stability for a stable government in Mogadishu, an organization emerged that first
became known as the Supreme Council of Sharia Courts in Somalia. It was
intended to function as an umbrella organization for Somalia’s Islamic courts. The
emergence of the new force drastically altered the power relations and almost
established itself permanently as the new rulers of Somalia.
4.8 THE RISE OF UNION OF ISLAMIC COURTS AND ETHIOPIAN
INVASION
The capture of political power by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in June
2006 opened a new chapter in this seemingly intractable conflict when they took
control of the capital Mogadishu and most of the south of the country. As the UIC
consolidated its power and expanded its influence across the country, fears were
raised as to how far this expansion could reach. Many fears were expressed as to
its Islamist ideology, links to Al-Qaeda and regional threats to peace and security.
Ethiopia’s military offensive against the UIC in late December 2006, in
support of the TFG, and the subsequent ousting of the UIC, pushed Somalia further
into instability and opened, yet another chapter in the country’s troubled history of
conflict and insecurity.
Ethiopian authorities were from the outset the most suspicious of the UIC
and agreed only reluctantly and at U.S. insistence to give political dialogue a
chance. Once the U.S. position on the courts shifted in late 2006, the Ethiopians
were able to pursue a military solution to what they considered an unacceptable
threat on their country’s borders. The subsequent relationship with the Americans
as they prepared and executed an offensive was more complex and contentious
than has generally been acknowledged. The U.S. did not “sub-contract out” its
war on terror to a regional ally, or “puppet”, as some commentators subsequently
claimed (Mark, 2007). There were sharp differences in Washington over Somalia
policy between the Departments of State and Defence, and the U.S. was initially
reluctant to support the offensive. It did so only once it was clear that Ethiopia was
committed to it, and then in order to ensure it succeeded and also served its own
counterterrorism purposes.
Ethiopia’s primary objective was to crush the UIC and the core interest
groups on which it was based – the Islamists and the wider “Mogadishu Group”
coalition centred on the Habar Gidir clans, which have challenged its interests in
Somalia since the mid-1990s. Its principal fear is the rise of a strong, centralist,
nationalist or Islamist state there that would revive irredentist claims on Ethiopian
territory and like Eritrea, sponsor armed insurgencies inside the country. A
secondary but important policy priority was to ensure the survival of its client, the
TFG.
The U.S. preoccupation was narrower, focused almost entirely on fighting,
with the help of Mogadishu-based militia leaders and the TFG, the few foreign al-
Qaeda operatives believed to be enjoying safe haven in southern Somalia
(Menkhaus, 2007). Both partners however, lacked the required significant support
among the powerful Habar Gidir clans, especially the Habar Gidir/Ayr sub-clan.
Analysts have warned for years that Ethiopia risked getting caught in a quagmire if
it occupied Somalia militarily, recalling the 1993 debacle in Mogadishu, when the
UN mission (UNOSOM) became involved in an unwinnable guerrilla war (Seattle
times, 1998). It was believed that UIC hardliners hoped to trigger exactly that kind
of urban war – one which would bog Ethiopia down in the capital and spark both a
popular uprising and extensive support from the Islamic world. Conventional
wisdom however, held that Ethiopia understood this trap and would therefore seek
to avoid it, either by redeploying after a quick strike or by surrounding rather than
occupying Mogadishu.
The actual trajectory of the war that erupted in late December 2006,
however, took virtually everyone by surprise and produced a “stunning reversal of
fortune” for the Islamists (Jeffrey, 2006). First, the UIC inexplicably deployed
large forces – including many poorly trained recruits and some foreign mujahidin
fighters – in the open countryside, where they were routed by the technologically
superior Ethiopian army. The fighters then fell back to Mogadishu, where it was
expected they would at last conduct an urban guerrilla war. Instead, facing
recriminations from clan elders, moderate Islamists and business supporters, the
UIC dissolved its council and turned over most weapons and armed men to clan
leaders in the capital. UIC leaders and residual members of the Al-Shabaab militia
then fled south toward Kenya, where they took more losses in another engagement.
Some were arrested trying to cross the border; others regrouped in the remote bush
of coastal southern Somalia (ICG, 2008).
The UIC’s sudden retreat toward the Kenyan border led to a third surprise, a
U.S. decision to launch two AC-130 gunship attacks on convoys suspected of
transporting three high-value foreign al-Qaeda suspects near the Kenyan border.
Although these failed to kill their targets, they had a lasting political impact in
Somalia, as they reinforced a widespread conviction that the Ethiopian offensive
was directed and orchestrated by Washington. For regional analysts, the air strikes
– which were aimed at foreign al-Qaeda suspects, not Somali Islamists – confirmed
that the U.S. and Ethiopia were waging two distinct wars in Somalia – one against
Somali Islamists threatening Ethiopian interests, the other against an al-Qaeda cell
threatening U.S. security (ICG, 2008). U.S. and Ethiopian energies had been
devoted almost entirely to the military operation, and whatever little planning had
been done with regard to post-UIC Somalia was quickly overtaken by events. The
result was a scramble to improvise policy in the face of a dramatically new
Mogadishu situation.
4.9 CHALLENGES FACED BY PRESIDENT ABDULLAHI YUSUF
REGIME
The TFG formed in October 2004 after two years of difficult negotiations in
Kenya was led by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD). It has been weakened by continuous infighting between the presidency
and the prime minister that led to the (welcome) ousting of Prime Minister Ali
Mohammed Gedi in late 2007; President Abdillahi Yusuf’s repeated rebuffs of
efforts to make it more inclusive; failure to meet any of its own targets for the
transition; and the military prowess of the insurgency. Some of the challenges of
the government include:
4.9.1 STRUCTURAL FLAWS
The structural problems that plague the TFG hinge on three main issues: the
Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), the composition of parliament (TFP) and
federalism. The Charter’s system of governance is meant to be based on
democratic and pluralist principles consistent with the profound attachment of the
Somali people to their religion and culture (ICG, 2004). But it is an awkward, ill-
defined and overly elaborate document, replete with errors, inconsistencies and
contradictions. Its failure to establish checks and balances, in particular a clear
division of labor between the president and the prime minister facilitated Yusuf’s
efforts to undermine his chief minister (ICG, 2008).
Similarly, the vaguely defined process for replacing members of parliament
turned the TFP into a fractious body marked by a constant struggle between
political and clan blocs. This also led to seat-swapping mainly on grounds of
political expedience, and has enabled the president to fill the institution with his
own supporters. There were allegations that members are regularly bribed or
pressured to vote in a certain way, often in the interest of the president. Salaries are
usually paid on time, and members also get non-statutory “allowances” not
available to other public servants. However, with the worsened security situation,
they come to Baidoa only for a major vote, if at all. The parliamentary calendar is
not known before-hand, and bills are often introduced without having been
scrutinized by a committee as regulations stipulate. Months can elapse before a
quorum is available (ICG, 2008).
Yet, in spite of these shortcomings, the competing power blocs often see
parliament as a crucial institution in their struggles. President Yusuf long felt
politically unassailable, with a loyal speaker and a majority of members on his
side. This began to change rapidly after Ethiopia and the international community
foiled an attempt by his supporters to oust Prime Minister Nur Adde in August
2008. Since then, a majority of members began to side with the prime minister,
who then enjoys extensive support in the body and for that time being, at least,
appears more secure than Yusuf. The division between president and parliament
became more dramatic yet in mid-December 2007, when the legislators again
rebuffed the president’s effort to remove Nur Adde, and Yusuf responded by
insisting he would name a replacement unilaterally (Jeffery, 2008).
Lastly, federalism remains controversial, seen by many as a shift towards
Ethiopia’s agenda and a major concession to Yusuf, who has long advocated a
federal Somalia. Though the concept was written into the Charter, it was
impossible to implement. The federal institutions, with few exceptions, are non-
existent; a constitutional referendum is not imminent because the document has not
been completed, and Somaliland’s demands for self-determination have not been
addressed.
4.9.2 CLAN DYNAMICS
The process that led to creation of the TFG was acrimonious and deeply
divisive with each clan staking claims to key cabinet posts. Although the 4.5 clan-
quota system for allocating cabinet posts was agreed, it was inevitable that some
clans who failed to obtain such posts would feel aggrieved. Beneath the unity and
reconciliation rhetoric, TFG infighting also reflects complex inter-clan rivalry.
Darod-Hawiye mistrust and rivalry have disfigured politics since independence.
These two major clans have cooperated or forged temporary alliances, but even at
the best of times their relationship is one of uneasy détente. With Yusuf
representing Darod interests and the Prime Minister Hawiye interests, a balance
should have been established. But the Hawiye view the president as the archetypal
Darod warlord, bent on perpetuating his clan’s supremacy, an impression that has
been reinforced by policies that have led to the destruction of the capital,
displacement of hundreds of thousands and serious damage to the Bakaaraha
market, the hub of Hawiye economic power (ICG, 2008).
It is thus no surprise that the strongest opposition to Yusuf often came from
the Hawiye, who were also been the backbone of the UIC and the ongoing Islamist
insurgency. The bulk of UIC fighters and supporters were Hawiye, as is a majority
of the Al-Shabaab militia. Despite its Hawiye roots, the UIC was determined to
build itself as an Islamist ideological movement across all the major clans. It used
deeply rooted anti-Ethiopia sentiments to project itself as a nationalist movement
fighting the oppressor.
However, the cliché reduction of everything in the country to the clan
dynamic is inadequate to explain power and societal trends. Power configurations
are not necessarily determined by such factors. The reality was murkier and
sometimes paradoxical. The political landscape witnessed the emergence of cross-
clan power configurations, based sometimes on ideology as the UIC, but at times
on political expediency as the TFG or even the opposition Alliance for Re-
Liberation of Somalia (ARS). The TFG was founded on a clan-quota system; the
ARS was equally representative of all the major clans. This cross-clan alliance
building trend is also contradicted by the re-emergence of clan enclaves, as large
swathes of the country revert back to a style of clan governance that predates
colonialism (ICG, 2008).
The rise of criminal gangs operating largely outside the clan system is
another novel phenomenon. The new organized crime – piracy, people smuggling,
counterfeit banknotes and kidnapping – is run by syndicates that have forged cross-
clan networks. This is particularly discernible in the north-eastern autonomous
region of Puntland, where sophisticated syndicates have emerged. That clan elders
are now targets in the violence sweeping the country is the best indicator that the
classical clan system is fraying. Even during the worst of inter-clan feuds, elders
had always been respected and played a recognized conflict mediation role, with
access to the key players. The apparent erosion of their power does not mean that
they no longer wield influence. Part of the crisis in the south stems from the
inability perhaps the unwillingness to bring them fully into the political decision-
making process. No headway can be made in any peace-making process in the
south if clan elders do not have an effective part (ICG, 2008). The rapid decline of
support for the TFG under President Abdullahi led to the regime change in Somalia
and the formation of a new government under Shaykh Sherif Ahmed an influential
figure in the defunct UIC who was considered a moderate and was believed could
bridge the wide animosity between the TFG and the Islamist militias.
4.10 SOMALIA AND THE CHALLENGES OF PIRACY
There is no law and order of any kind in Somalia due to the lack of a central
government and extreme poverty. As a result, criminal activity is rampant
throughout the country. While some engage in criminal behavior for basic survival,
others have created a professional criminal enterprise, especially in the form of
piracy. Those who participate in criminal activities typically resist any efforts to
establish a safe and stable Somalia, because stability impedes their criminal
activity and long term interests.
Although the international community has not always taken the problem of
piracy seriously, recent events have led to more widespread international concern.
It has become apparent that unless piracy is contested, it will spiral out of control,
threatening the sea lanes that transport almost half of the world’s cargo and
effectively underwriting terrorist movements.
Piracy is defined in international law by Article 101 of the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention) and consists of:
(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,
and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft,
persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b) (Boleslaw, 2005).
Piracy has become particularly lucrative in Somalia because in terms of
maritime traffic, Somalia is one of the most geographically well-positioned
countries in the world. Located between the Horn of Africa and the southernmost
tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia is situated at the crux of all major regional
shipping lanes (Lauren et al, 2009). The strait adjacent to Somalia links the Indian
Ocean, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. The most
noticeable trend observed in the past years has been a shift in the main area of
activity, from southern Somalia and the port of Mogadishu to the Gulf of Aden
(Roger, 2008).
The primary objective of Somali piracy is usually to obtain ransom for both
ships and crew members. Consequently, shipping companies have already suffered
losses in excess of one hundred million dollars. To date, piracy has rarely resulted
in the killing of hostages (Lauren et al, 2009). While the amounts of ransom
demanded are increasing, the average ranges from half a million to two million
dollars. In most cases, pirates and shipping companies negotiate the ransom, which
is paid in cash. Somali piracy has been a major problem since 1991. However, the
incidence of such piracy has grown significantly in recent years both in terms of
scope and scale. Since 2008, it has expanded to cover the entire maritime region. In
addition, pirates have become masterful at identifying vessels that are vulnerable
due to slow sailing speeds, small crews, poor security, and ineffective counter-
piracy procedures (Roger, 2008). The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports
that in May 2009 the number of incidents of Somali piracy, including 114
attempted hijackings and twenty-nine successful hijackings, had already surpassed
all attacks in the previous year.
Pirate operations, while developing into more sophisticated and professional
undertakings, have also become more aggressive and ruthless. Since 1990, the total
number of pirates has increased from the hundreds to the thousands (Roger, 2008).
These increases in the extent of piracy appear to be related to the development of
more effective methods, including the use of more sophisticated equipment by
pirates. For example, pirates now use captured fishing trawlers as base ships that
can operate much farther away from the coastline than their traditional small skiffs.
These ‘mother ships,’ increase the pirates’ range out to sea. In addition,
some pirates now use a system that combines Automatic Identification System
interception and satellite positioning to identify and track an intended target, as
well as “spotters,” who work in ports around the region and provide advanced
knowledge of a potential target’s routes.
These means of more rapid target identification can facilitate an attack in
less than fifteen minutes between identification and contact. Such efficient timing
explains why more ships are captured even when there are international patrols in
the area. More effective methodologies not only allow pirates to attack more
vessels, but they also allow pirates to go after more lucrative targets that can garner
greater ransoms. For example, at the beginning of 2009 Somali pirates released a
number of hostages and hijacked ships for more than $120 million in total ransom.
Those released included the Ukrainian MV Faina, which was loaded with T-72
tanks and a significant amount of ammunition and small arms, as well as the Sirius
Star Saudi oil supertanker, each of which garnered over $3 million dollars in
ransom (Lauren et al, 2009).
Overall, pirates have earned millions of dollars in ransom while disrupting
global trade and causing untold damage to the world’s economy. As a result,
several countries, including the United States, Russia, and India have deployed
warships to tackle piracy in the Horn of Africa region. Due to the various networks
of pirates located in different locations and ports, it is generally accepted that no
central strategic command structure exists. Although not established conclusively,
government officials and clan leaders are likely directly involved in piracy. At a
minimum, they undoubtedly receive some form of compensation for their role in
these activities—or at least for their lack of effort to stop the pirates (Roger, 2008).
Piracy is believed to be Somalia’s biggest industry, and individual pirates are
among the country’s wealthiest persons (David, 2009). Ultimately, piracy has
grown rapidly in Somalia due to several factors, including poverty, lack of
employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, reduction of
pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal fishing, and a volatile
security and political situation.
4.11 THE STATE OF EVENTS IN THE PRESENT
The nature and composition of key domestic actors in Somalia have changed
significantly since the early 1990s, reflecting the contested nature of authority in
stateless Somalia and the fluidity of coalitions. “Factions” for instance, were the
central political actors through the first half of the 1990s. Most were led by a
militia leader and represented a single clan. They monopolized representation in
national reconciliation talks only to fade into irrelevance. Regional and municipal
polities have at times assumed importance, though rarely at the level of national
peace talks.
Since the late 1990s, an array of loose coalitions has served as principal
actors at the national level. From 2000 to 2004 for instance, the Ethiopian-backed
Somali Reconstruction and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), led by Abdullahi
Yusuf served as an effective coalition against the Transitional National
Government (TNG). In 2005, the “Mogadishu Group”, bringing together a
collection of militia leaders, Islamists, civic leaders, and businesspeople mainly
from the Hawiye clan, was a short-lived but powerful coalition opposing the
Ethiopian-backed TFG. The broad Islamist coalition housed in the CIC took
control of Mogadishu and much of South-Central Somalia in 2006 before being
routed in an Ethiopian military offensive in late December of that year.
In a few instances political actors have emerged and have earned a
permanent place on the Somali political game board. These are generally groups
which exert considerable power and influence in Somalia (and hence must be
accounted for in peace talks) but which are poorly organized and divided, hence
not “actors” in the strict sense of the word politically. One such group is the
robust Somali business community, which controls considerable resources and
private militias and is sought after as an ally by governments and coalitions. The
business community enjoys impressive cross-clan partnerships but is invariably
divided over its political fealties, and has generally been reluctant to jump directly
into the political arena. The business community’s typical response is to negotiate
with whoever is in control of seaports and towns to maintain access to markets.
Another emerging group is the large Somali diaspora now numbering over
one million. The diaspora is the most important part of the Somali economy,
sending between $500 million to $1 billion in remittances to Somalia annually. It
provides significant financial and other support to political movements, and is
increasingly a vital pool of leadership for political groups in country.
While specific factions and coalitions have come and gone in Somalia since
1991, two broad groupings have endured in various guises. The purist expression
of these two coalitions was the SRRC (2000–04) and the Mogadishu Group (2005).
The SRRC was backed by Ethiopia, anti-Islamist, dominated by the Darod clan,
based largely in regions outside of Mogadishu, and committed to federalism. The
Mogadishu Group was the exact opposite – it was fiercely anti-Ethiopian, close to
Gulf states and Islamic interests, inclusive of Islamists in its coalition, centred
around powerful sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family (especially the Haber
Gedir/Ayr), based in Mogadishu, and more inclined to support a strong central
state, not a federal system. These two coalitions have assumed different forms.
In between these two coalitions are a host of “floaters” – opportunistic
militia and political figures who move back and forth between the alliances and
who are trusted by neither. The floaters give external observers the false
impression of political movement and significant coalition-building when in fact
the Somali political scene has been locked into a relatively fixed conflict between
the two coalitions.
In December 2010, UN Security Council Resolution 1964 mandated an
increase in the size of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from
8,000, having finally got close to that complement during 2010, to 12,000. The
largest contributor Uganda, which was the target of two bomb attacks in Kampala
in July 2010 by the largest Somali insurgent group, al-Shabaab, has pledged 1,800
additional troops. Also in December 2010, a ‘merger’ was announced between the
two main insurgent groups, Al-Shabaab and Hizb-ul-Islam. The AU had been
calling for an increase to 20,000 troops. Western and Ethiopian support will
continue but unless the performance of the TFG security forces and supporting
militias improves markedly, it is difficult to see anything other than a continuation
of the current military ebb and flow. At present, the main domestic political actors
include the following:
THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: - The TFG has
from the outset been a very weak actor in Somalia despite its formal role. Its
weakness is due in part to its low legitimacy in the eyes of most Somalis, who
argue that TFG leaders were selected in a disputed process and are puppets of
Ethiopia. In the two and half years since its creation, the TFG remains a woefully
underdeveloped administration and has made almost no progress on key transition
tasks. Making matters worse, the TFG has been actively complicit in the very
heavy-handed counter-insurgency campaign led by Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu.
Far from being a source of public order, TFG security forces are the
principal sources of insecurity for the Mogadishu public. The TFG’s low
legitimacy levels have been exacerbated by the fact that the government, which
was intended to be a government of national unity, is instead founded on a narrow
clan coalition excluding important lineages from top positions in the government.
The transitional parliament which in theory is the repository of Somali sovereignty
and the embodiment of proportional clan representation was purged of opposition
figures in 2007; some, if not most of the current members of parliament cast votes
on the basis of payments rendered from the executive branch, making parliament
somewhat less than an ideal embodiment of the democratic process.
What we today call the TFG is in reality a collection of increasingly
autonomous armed factions led by different TFG officials who are seeking to shore
up their own powerbases and control of parts of the capital. That level of internal
division makes it difficult to speak of the TFG as a monolithic actor. Many of the
TFG’s top political figures appear to be driven by very short-term profit-taking,
hoping to seize whatever funds they can before the entire TFG enterprise collapses.
This reflects what William Reno has described as the “shortened political
horizon” of political actors in “shadow states” (Reno 2000: 45).
THE OPPOSITION: - Most Somalis deeply oppose both the TFG which
they view as an illegitimate puppet of Ethiopia and other perceived Christian
dominated states of the region. The Ethiopian occupation encompasses an
enormous range of groups in Somalia with virtually nothing in common except a
shared desire to evict Ethiopia’s influence from Somali territory and block the TFG
from becoming operational. Opposition to the TFG and Ethiopian occupation
consists of two distinct categories of actors. One is a core set of Somali groups
with interests profoundly at odds with those of the TFG and Ethiopia (described
above as the “Mogadishu Group”); the second is a set of opportunistic or
situational opponents whose fealty to the TFG and the opposition has shifted over
time and who have concluded the future lies with the opposition. The “core
opposition” won control of the TNG in 2000, which was successfully opposed and
derailed by the Ethiopian-backed rejectionist group, the SRRC; it was also the
main source of support for the short-lived administration set up by the CIC in
2006.
THE AL-SHABAAB MILITIA: - The Al-Shabaab (“the youth” in Arabic)
militia was originally a special armed unit of the Shari’a court system in
Mogadishu established sometime after 1998 by Islamist hardliner Hassan Dahir
Aweys. Aweys sought to create a well trained, well-equipped, multi-clan militia
which answered to the top leaders of the Islamic Courts. At that time, all other
Shari’a militia in Mogadishu was clan-based, only loosely dedicated to the
Islamists, and limited only to the local jurisdiction of their sub-clans Shari’a court.
By contrast, Al-Shabaab was a sort of Somali mujahideen, composed of young
fighters committed to a radical Islamist agenda. Al-Shabaab is believed to have
numbered more than 400 fighters, and is currently led by a veteran of Afghanistan,
Shaykh Abu Zubair. Al-Shabaab engaged in a war that takes the form of political
assassinations against opponents of the Islamists, including civic leaders but
especially Somali security personnel suspected of linkages to Western intelligence
agencies. Already by 2004, speculation arose that Al-Shabaab was an autonomous
and radically violent force no longer controlled by Aweys (ICG 2005a, 2005b).
The relationship between Al-Shabaab and the Islamist leadership has remained a
topic of speculation. When Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia in December 2006,
Al-Shabaab took heavy losses as Ayro the former leader was killed. But remnants
of the militia regrouped in Mogadishu, and form the core of the increasingly robust
insurgency against the TFG and Ethiopia. In the few public pronouncements it has
made, Al-Shabaab insists that it is leading the insurgency, and that opposition
outside the country supports them. All this points to the fact that Al-Shabaab
cannot be assumed to be spoken for in any peace talks involving the TFG and the
opposition in exile. It is also not clear that anyone can marginalize Al-Shabaab.
The future dispensation of Al-Shabaab is one of the most difficult long-term
challenges in Somalia.
BUSINESS COMMUNITY: - The business community as noted above is a
major player on the Somali political scene mainly as a pivotal source of revenue
for political movements and governments. The business community’s interests are
divided, and the group as a whole tends to be ill-equipped to deal directly with
politics. Business people have little choice but to provide “taxes” to whomever
controls a government or seaport. Efforts to bring the business community more
directly into peace talks to revive a central state are increasingly believed to be
essential.
CIVIL SOCIETY: - Somali civil society has grown in importance over the
past decade, and is an important force for peace and state revival. However, the
political violence, assassinations, and crackdowns by both the TFG and the
Islamists in the past two years have severely weakened civil society. The
independent media has been especially hard hit.
4.12 CONTEMPORARY SOMALIA: EXTERNAL ACTORS AND
INTERESTS
ETHIOPIA: - No other actor is as decisive to the outcome in Somalia as is
the government of Ethiopia. Its military occupation of southern Somalia was the
main catalyst for the armed insurgency; its troops constitute an essential source of
protection for the TFG before its withdrawal, without which the government would
quickly be driven out of the capital; and it enjoys direct backing by the United
States. The prolonged occupation of Mogadishu by the Ethiopian National Defense
Force (ENDF) which was costly to Ethiopia on multiple levels – financially,
diplomatically, and in terms of mounting casualties led to its withdrawal from the
axis of Mogadishu. But the strain of a prolonged and inconclusive
counterinsurgency campaign has to date proven to be a manageable burden on the
government of Ethiopia. The ENDF is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest standing army
and can absorb the strain of simultaneous deployments in Somalia, eastern
Ethiopia, and along the Eritrean border. If the war and casualties in Somalia are
unpopular in Ethiopia, the Meles Zenawi government faces little threat of domestic
unrest after its draconian crackdown on opposition parties in 2005. Its ally the
United States has shielded the Meles government from much of the diplomatic
criticism it could have faced, especially in light of the horrific humanitarian crisis
linked to its counter-insurgency tactics.
In sum, Ethiopia is caught in a quagmire in Somalia, but not a “hurting
quagmire”. Most of the costs of the current insurgency and counter-insurgency are
being shouldered by the Somali people, not Ethiopia. This gives the Meles
government the option of continuing the war either physically or in proxies if
better options do not present themselves. By all accounts, the current crisis in
Mogadishu – the failure of the TFG and the persistent and worsening insurgency –
is costly to Ethiopia, deeply frustrating to Ethiopian officials, and not at all a
scenario they prefer. But the only fear of withdrawal and a subsequent victory by
the insurgents over the embattled TFG tends to decide the fate of Ethiopia and the
Meles government in Mogadishu. This raises the issue of what it is precisely that
the Meles government wants in Somalia, and what outcomes it is willing to live
with. This question is critical to a mediated outcome in Somalia, and is the subject
of considerable debate.
Most diplomats following Somalia – including US officials who enjoy
closer ties to Ethiopian decision-makers – express uncertainty about Ethiopian
policy objectives in Somalia. Resolution of the Somali crisis will, at some point
requires Ethiopia and the Islamist opposition to reach a Modus Vivendi. That a
decade of diplomacy has not focused on bringing these two main protagonists
together for direct talks underscores the weakness of its conflict analysis. The
Somali opposition must address its legitimate security concerns if it wants Ethiopia
to accept a negotiated settlement. If a Somali government or political movement
pursues irredentist policies against Ethiopia, gives support to armed insurgencies
directed against the Ethiopian government, allows itself to be used as a platform
for radical Islamists or pursues close relations with Eritrea, it can expect Addis
Ababa to work against it. Recognition of Ethiopian security imperatives is a
concession Somali political movements of all types must make if Ethiopia is to
support a revived Somali central government.
An additional dimension is Eritrea’s support for the insurgency. Their deep
animosity has led both countries to support opposition groups in the other and look
for additional places to make trouble. Ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region
bordering Somalia are perceived to pose a particular threat to the Ethiopian regime.
It accuses the armed movement there, the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF), of supporting the UIC in Somalia and vice versa and also accuses Eritrea
of supporting the ONLF. The Somalia war has caught Ethiopia in a quagmire that
Eritrea is happy to see perpetuated. However, Eritrea has played its hand badly
with the international community. Due to its acrimonious behavior, the resolution
of the border dispute between the two countries has been largely abandoned by the
international community in favor of Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the consequences of
that unresolved dispute are felt throughout the region. The calculations of both
regimes are tied to political survival and this is nowhere more acute than over the
border issue. Ethiopia has conflicts on three fronts: in Somalia, in its own Ogaden
region, and at the border with Eritrea. The latter holds the key to a long-term
resolution of the Somalia conflict as well as to movement on the Ogaden issue.
ERITREA: - Eritrea sponsors the Committee for the Re-liberation of
Somalia, providing it a base in Asmara and logistical support. It has also provided
arms and training to the CIC when it held Mogadishu, and now is believed to
funnel arms to the insurgency fighting Ethiopia in Mogadishu. Eritrea’s aims are
clear and simple: to use armed groups in Somalia, both Islamist and non-Islamist,
as proxies against its rival Ethiopia.
Eritrea is hoping to keep Ethiopia bogged down in a quagmire in Somalia,
and is willing to support hard-line Islamists to that end despite the fact that the
government of Eritrea is a secular government that has cracked down on both the
Islamist and other opposition based in the Gulf or in Eritrea. Eritrea has little
interest in seeing a negotiated peace which would allow Ethiopia to extricate itself
from Somalia. In terms of state-building, Eritrea was a strong supporter of the CIC
and its short-lived governance efforts in 2006.
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: - The UN plays a lead role in humanitarian relief, state-
building programmes and mediation in Somalia. Like the donors, the UN
specialized agencies and it’s Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) are based in
Nairobi. The UN’s performance has been uneven in Somalia, and it has
periodically come under criticism from Somali groups and others. In recent times,
the UN’s lead role in diplomatic efforts to end the insurgency in Somalia has
gained donor support and confidence.
SOMALI DIASPORA: - As noted earlier, the Somali diaspora is very large
– numbering about one million people and powerful. The Diaspora also sends
funds to political movements; the CIC derived considerable revenue from fund-
raising among the Diaspora. The Diaspora is not united in its political positions,
but in general has been exceptionally vocal in its condemnation of Ethiopian
occupation of Mogadishu. It is very likely that the diaspora will continue to see its
role in Somali political affairs grow in years to come, as it is the repository of
many of the country’s professional class.
FOREIGN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: - A variety of foreign Islamist
movements mainly based out of the Gulf States play an important role in Somalia
mainly as sources of funding. These Islamist groups are usually though not always
Salafist in orientation, embracing a strict interpretation of Islam that is deeply at
odds with traditional Sufi Islam practiced in Somalia. These groups include
Salafist missionaries like Tabliq, which helps fund new mosque construction,
sends clerics, and provides scholarship money to Somali followers. There are also
more progressive Islamic groups providing funding for Somali movements like al-
Islah, which has helped establish schools and hospitals in southern Somalia. A
more dangerous foreign Islamist actor in Somalia consists of al-Qaeda and other
radical groups and individuals believed to be providing funds to the Shabaab
militia. One of the missing elements in talks to promote peace and state revival in
Somalia has been active partnership of the Islamic charities and movements with
Nairobi-based Western diplomacy.
UNITED STATES: - The United States government has pursued a policy
in Somalia informed principally by counter-terrorism concerns. That led the US to
support an alliance of militia leaders in Mogadishu who were eventually defeated
by the CIC in 2006. Since that time, the US has backed the TFG and Ethiopia in
their efforts to build a government and defeat the complex insurgency in
Mogadishu. The US pressed hard for an African Union peacekeeping force to
replace the Ethiopians, on the understanding that the continued presence of the
Ethiopians became the main catalyst for the insurgency. The US also pressed the
TFG leadership to engage in negotiations with the opposition to create a more
inclusive government. But the US has consistently blamed the armed opposition
for the crisis in Mogadishu, supports the Ethiopian occupation, categorized the
Islamist opposition as extremist, and insists that it renounce violence as a
precondition for engagement in political dialogue.
Recent statements suggest the US may be prepared to shift policy on
Somalia to place greater emphasis on fulfilling the political transition rather than
strengthening the governance-capacity of the TFG.
GULF STATES: - Gulf States – principally Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen,
and the UAE – play an intermittent role in Somalia but do not give the country
sustained attention. They periodically provide foreign aid, and are as a result
sought after by Somali factions and transitional governments. They have good
offices with the opposition, and have at times allowed the opposition – both
Islamist and non-Islamist – to operate freely in their countries for residency and
fund-raising. At the same time, they have sought to maintain working relations
with the TFG and Ethiopia, and have been called on by the US for diplomatic
support on Somalia. They all play a critical role in Somalia’s economy, with the
UAE serving as the main commercial and financial hub for Somalia, Saudi Arabia
as the main foreign market, and Yemen as the main source of small arms and a
primary transit stop for Somali migrants seeking work in the Gulf. Some diplomats
have expressed hope that some Gulf States will lead a “coalition of the willing”
peacekeeping force to allow the Ethiopian forces to withdraw.
DONOR COMMUNITY (WESTERN STATES): - Donor states
principally European countries and the European Commission (EC) play an
important role both as sources of foreign aid and in diplomacy in Somalia. All are
based in Nairobi. The European Commission has for years been the largest donor
in Somalia, and at times has exercised considerable clout in Somali political
affairs. Among European countries, Italy has played a lead role on Somalia, with
the United Kingdom and Scandinavian states also more engaged than others on
Somalia. The Western donor states have not always agreed on Somalia policy; the
US in particular has found itself increasingly isolated due to its preoccupation with
counter-terrorism – an agenda shared with less enthusiasm by other donors. In the
past, all Somali political movements and factions sought close relations with the
Nairobi-based donor groups, and Nairobi was the diplomatic hub of Somalia.
Today, with the Islamist and other opposition based in the Gulf or in Eritrea, and
linked more closely to the Islamic world than to the West, the diplomatic centre of
gravity has shifted away from Nairobi. The impact of Western donor states on
Somali state-building efforts has been variable and in some quarters contested.
Some of the most innovative aid projects in local governance and democratization
have been funded by Western donor states, but much of the donor efforts at state
revival tend to be formulaic and accusations have been made that it is exacerbating
the problems of warlordism and corruption.
4.12 CONCLUSION
Somalia’s civil war has been fuelled in large part by distrust and
competition between the country’s byzantine network of clans and sub-clans and
by warlords with a vested interest in instability. A brief flicker of hope
accompanied the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the accession of Shaykh
Sherif Ahmed to the presidency of the country’s Transitional Federal Government.
But that hope was dimmed by fierce fighting and the capture of key towns by
Islamist insurgents. While Somalia’s humanitarian disaster is the region’s most
pressing issue, a longer-term question is whether the war-wracked country as
presently configured can survive. Its northwestern region known as Somaliland has
declared independence, after building a functional administration and maintaining
a comparatively peaceful, democratic existence for the last decade.
Somalia’s prolonged crisis of state failure calls for more imaginative,
unconventional approaches to reconciliation and state building. The challenge is to
restore the institutions of government without plunging the country back into full-
scale war. Past Somali peace initiatives have encouraged the perception of central
government as a “cake” – a source of revenue to enrich those with access to it.
Somali political actors have thus devoted all their energies to the carefully
negotiated dividing up of positions in a government by clan rather than address the
main substantive issues related to actual administration of the country and
reconciliation. Progress is likely to begin only when much of the “cake” is taken
out of the central government, via political decentralization that leaves only core,
minimal functions and budgets for Mogadishu. Too many external mediation
efforts in the past have been based on wishful thinking. Efforts at state building
and reconciliation in Somalia need to be informed by a new realism about what is
and is not possible at this time. As a point of departure, the international
community should work with, rather than against, the flow of Somali political and
economic developments. This will require getting Somali political actors to focus
on substantive issues like the extent of political decentralization appropriate for the
country, or key reconciliation issues like return of stolen or occupied property
(carefully avoided to date) and the sensitive topic of human rights abuses over the
past decade and more of conflict.
Recognition of legitimate political actors must be based on their
demonstrated capacity actually to govern the communities and territories they
claim to represent. An empirical yardstick for legitimacy is essential to rid the
country’s political process of warlords and political opportunists whose sole
interest is appropriating anticipated resources from a central state. Warlords with
no relevance beyond a degree of "name recognition" or an external sponsor should
be marginalized or excluded altogether. On this score, the Transitional National
Government needs to be reassessed for what it is, not what it claims to be. It is a
regional authority controlling pockets of the greater Mogadishu area, not a national
government. Economic realities in the country also make clear that a future
central authority will necessarily have extremely modest revenues. The sooner the
state-building goals reflect this, the better the situation will expect in Somalia.
Efforts to rebuild regional government and, ultimately, a national state must
presume that the end product will be a minimalist central government, performing
only the most essential tasks and leaving all other functions to local authorities or
the private sector. Peace processes that solely focus on cementing reconciliation by
creating bloated and unsustainable parliaments and cabinets are counterproductive,
unrealistic and unsustainable.
The hard questions have not been asked as to what sort of a nation-state
Somalia should look like. The focus has been on creating a national government,
unfortunately, in spite of a lot of investment in the last 15 years, we are nowhere
near a functioning, credible nation-state in Somalia. Western policy in the region
has been influenced largely by the perception that Somalia’s lawlessness provides
a safe haven for al Qaeda. Somalia’s radical Islamist al-Shabaab militia, the most
violent extremist and anti- American adversary are now rife in Somalia due in
large part to the blowback from policies that focused too narrowly on
counterterrorism objectives.
If there is reason for optimism, it is that the Obama administration in
Washington has signaled its willingness to focus more on human rights and
stability and less on waging war against radical Islamists and their allies. Such a
move would involve both pressing Ethiopia to resolve its border dispute with
Eritrea and showing a greater willingness to work with moderate Islamists in
Somalia who many believe are the only force capable of bridging the divide
between the country’s constantly warring clans.
.
CHAPTER 5
5. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
Somalia, officially the Somali Republic and formerly known as the Somali
Democratic Republic, is located on the east coast of Africa between the Gulf of
Aden on the north and the Indian Ocean on the east and has the longest coastline in
Africa. Together with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti it is often referred to as the
Horn of Africa because of its resemblance on the map to a rhinoceros's horn. It is
bordered by Djibouti on the northwest, Kenya on its southwest, the Gulf of Aden
with Yemen on its north, the Indian Ocean on its East and Ethiopia on the west.
Due to its strategic location in one of the world's main maritime arteries and
trade routes, connecting the Middle East and Europe with the Far East, and its
location on the shores of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, just across the
Gulf of Aden from the Arabian Peninsula, Ethiopia and the Arab world struggled
over expanding their influence zones over Somalia. For Ethiopia, which has always
striven for an outlet to the sea and to world commerce, spreading its control and
influence into Somalia has been vital, while for the Arabs from the Arabian
Peninsula and Egypt, Somalia served as the gate for the proliferation of Islam and
Arab influence into the rest of Africa, especially East Africa.
However, Somalia has over the last two decades deteriorated into one of the
world’s worst security and humanitarian challenges. Characterized by insidious
conflict, political fragmentation and an informal economy, Somalia represents the
archetypal failed state. Throughout its history, Somalia has witnessed a lot of local
conflicts between rival clans and sub-clans as well as some major regional
conflicts with Ethiopia. The common characteristic of all those major conflicts has
been its self-reproducing capacity to develop into violence and insurgency thus
undermining the effective functioning of the central government in Somalia.
Available literature on Somalia has often focused on certain indicators such
as the violent conflicts in southern and central Somalia; the humanitarian situation
in Somalia; inter-state rivalry in the Horn of Africa; and Somalia as a base for
terrorist organisations and organised criminal syndicates as the causative factors
for analysing the failure of the Somali state.
However, the attempts by the international community and by regional
actors to resuscitate a centralised state have so far utterly failed and there are no
signs indicating that they could work in the future. In the light of these failures and
of the catastrophic situation in the country new approaches and solutions are
clearly called for. Such approaches require new conceptualisations of the situation.
This research argued that recognising the impacts of border disputes in the Horn of
Africa will provide adequate conceptualisations of the recurring incidence of state
failure in Somalia.
The conflict in Somalia has repeatedly geared the state into the failed state
discourse focusing on the numbers of regional, continental, and global players
involved; the unprecedented active involvement of foreign players in Somali local
affairs; and the immediate local, regional, and global circumstances at hand as well
as the most important role border disputes has played in Somali conflict.
The research explains how the immediate local, regional, and global
circumstances at hand have made Somalia currently one of the main battlefields
between regional powers and between the US and the Islamists Movements. Thus,
this research analyzed the social and historical roots of border disputes and its
impacts on state failure in Somalia, the course of the disputes, the role of radical
Islam in the dispute; and the intervention of external regional and global players in
the dispute and their motives.
In the course of the research, the following findings were identified by the
researcher as a strategic focus towards understanding the paradox of state failure in
Somalia:
1. The indiscriminate border partition by the colonial powers in the Horn of
Africa is the source and foundation of the regional rivalry that defines the
political situation of member states within the region.
2. The wide religious differences of states in the region contributed to a
perceived regional security and rivalry.
3. The struggle of Somalia towards the “Greater Somalia” philosophy
contributed to regional hostility towards Somalia from rival neighbours.
4. The Nomadic as well as Pastoral dependence in addition to the oil deposits
in Ogaden contributed to the intense struggle by the two rival nations
(Ethiopia and Somalia) for its acquisition.
5. The Economic and Political marginalization of the Somali-inhabited areas of
Ogaden spurred the emergence of insurgency and liberation movements that
seeks to achieve self-determination and to unite themselves with other
Somalis for the dream of “Greater Somalia”.
6. Somalia’s claim of Ethiopia inherent expansionist dynamic as well as
Ethiopia’s black imperialism influenced its support and alliance formation
with Eritrea and an animosity towards Ethiopia and Kenya.
7. The seismic shift in the superpower alignments in the Horn of Africa
contributed to intense regional rivalry and alliance formation by the
countries in the region.
8. The predominance of Clan Politics on a “winner take all” basis has often
contributed to the emergence of competing factions in the state that play key
role in Somalia state failure.
9. The ineffectiveness of the TFG to persuade warlords that had dominated
Mogadishu since the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime particularly the
“Mogadishu Group” influenced the rising force of CSIS and other Islamists
movements.
10.The Ethiopian occupation of Somalia and there constant support for the TFG
have generated a recruiting mechanism for the Somali Islamists.
11.The Ethiopia-Eritrea border disputes affects the efforts towards state-
building in Somalia as both countries fight each other through proxies in
Somalia.
12.The spread of radical Islam and the invasion of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations into Somalia have heightened the regional rivalry as it also
provides justification for invasion into Somali by rival neighbours.
13. The ineffectiveness and inappropriateness of outside interventions in
Somalia particularly U.S under the “War on Terror” has become a key
promoter of conflict in Somalia.
14.Mediation efforts towards state-building in Somalia have often been
hampered by the rival agendas of key member states.
15.Ethiopia’s immediate concern in Somalia is its own National Security this
explains why Ethiopia often supports government that declares animosity
towards Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia.
16.The failure of the reconciliation political process by all the regimes that
headed the TFG have often worsened efforts towards state-building as a
result of marginalization of key actors such as clan leaders as well as Islamic
militias from the process.
17.The emergence of statelessness in Somalia has also influenced the
emergence of piracy which has also assumes international security concern
similar to the trends of failed state.
5.2 CONCLUSION
The restoration of peace and security in Somalia is critical to the
establishment and maintenance of stability in the region. Unless there is genuine
political will and sustained engagement from the region, the continent and the
broader international community on the conflict in Somalia and its resolution,
Somalia is likely to continue to devolve into a vicious cycle of conflict. All actions
to resolve the conflict in Somalia should bear an international stamp that secures
collective responsibility to secure peace and stability in Somalia and the Horn of
Africa. With the parallel reconciliation processes (TFG and the opposition), the
likelihood of the international/donor community taking a step back from the crisis
in Somalia is a real prospect.
Regional politics and security concerns continue to play themselves out
often violently within Somalia. Regional tensions have often been essentially
replicated by political cleavages inside the country and the tendency of regional
powers to use local militias to advance their goals. While it is tempting to portray
some of these tensions as a “clash of civilizations” between a highland Christian
Ethiopian leadership and a lowland Muslim bloc that combines Somalis, Arabs and
other ethnic groups, the reality seems to be more complex. Somalia’s relationship
with Ethiopia is very uneven, with some areas reviling their neighbor and others
looking to it for support.
Clannism in Somalia, even though viewed as a driver of the conflict, could
be transformed to become a critical connector for peace in the country. The risk of
heightened regional insecurity and the possibility of another Ethiopia/Eritrea war
could be triggered by the events playing out in Somalia. The Horn of Africa is
once again at the brink of a protracted period of conflict and all efforts to avert this
must be deployed as a matter of urgency.
Somalia is a threat to international peace and security because of its
potential as a terrorist breeding ground and safe haven. However, it is the
instability resulting from the failure of the Somali state itself that poses the greatest
danger both to the outside world and to Somalis themselves. The current Somali
"government" with the widest international recognition controls little more than
half of the capital, Mogadishu, and is simply unable to combat terrorism in a
meaningful way. It cannot police its borders, provide viable political or economic
alternatives to radical groups, or even gather meaningful intelligence. If left in such
a dismal condition, Somalia will incubate or at least offer shelter to extremist
elements that can operate unchallenged and undetected. Action to reconstruct the
state is needed now, or Somalia will remain a danger for many years to come. The
protagonists in the Somali conflict have long been at an impasse, unable to gain a
decisive political or military advantage. The intervention of regional powers has
deepened the deadlock, not resolved it, while escalating the violence. Current
peace initiatives hold little promise of a breakthrough.
Stalemate is in the interests of neither Somalis nor international security.
Whatever course the U.S. and its allies choose in the war on terrorism, serious
diplomatic and political leverage will have to be brought to bear if Somalia is to
cross the threshold from failed state to frail state and resume its place as a
responsible member of the international community. However, a fresh approach is
clearly required.
In order to achieve both its short-term and long- term counter-terrorism
objectives, it is imperative that the international community re-engage politically in
the complex and difficult process of state reconstruction in Somalia. A functioning
state, capable of cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts and able to support
political and economic development, would be the most effective bulwark against
terrorism. This requires, in the first instance, more direct international
involvement in and greater support for efforts at peace and reconciliation,
principally through what must be a greatly enhanced IGAD initiative. It is critical
that Somalis and their international partners move quickly to construct substantive
alternatives to the vacuum and to foreign-funded Islamist agendas through the
reconstruction of a viable state, with a functional national administration that can
provide security, deliver services, facilitate economic opportunities and resolve
disputes before they escalate to violence. The twin imperatives of fighting
terrorism and reconstructing the state are intimately linked. Military threats,
increased intelligence gathering and perhaps limited, targeted military operations
to seize certain individuals may all have their place and in the short run deter
terrorists from using Somalia as a haven. But such a strategy is unsustainable if it
is not linked with a process aimed ultimately at reconciliation and good
governance.
The most significant external actor in Somali affairs continues to be
Ethiopia. The primary security threat from an Ethiopian perspective would be a
full-blown secessionist movement gaining ground in Ogaden. The secondary one
would be the establishment of an Islamic or, in the worst case, a Jihadist state in
Somalia. Such an entity would risk inciting dissent, and possibly terrorism and
secessionist claims from Ethiopia’s Muslims. Also, any stable and centralised
Somali state that would be acceptable to Ethiopia would have to foreswear
irredentism and pan-Somali ideology in a credible way. This would be very
difficult to achieve. No other actor is as decisive to the outcome in Somalia as is
the government of Ethiopia. Its military occupation of southern Somalia is the
main catalyst for the armed insurgency; its troops before their withdrawal
constitute an essential source of protection for the TFG, without which the
government would have quickly be driven out of the capital; and it enjoys direct
backing by the United States.
Most diplomats following Somalia – including US officials who enjoy
closer ties to Ethiopian decision-makers – express uncertainty about Ethiopian
policy objectives in Somalia. Many angry Somali pundits argue that Ethiopia is
committed to perpetuating a state of warlordism and chaos on Somalia and that
Somalia can never be at peace until the Ethiopian state is brought down. Others
claim Ethiopia will be satisfied with nothing less than a puppet government in
Mogadishu, replicating in Somalia its authoritarian rule over the nominally
autonomous ethnic federal states within its own borders.
Still others accuse Ethiopia of being unwilling to accept any role for
Islamists in Somalia, a position which guarantees perpetual conflict given the
ascent of political Islam as a major force in Somalia politics. Uncertainty about the
kind of government Ethiopia is willing to accept in Mogadishu is likely to remain.
But a few points about Ethiopian interests and positions are clear, and serve as
points of departure for more effective diplomatic strategy. First, since the late
1990s Ethiopia has been a key actor in the Somalia crisis. This point is obvious,
and yet Ethiopia has never been brought directly into reconciliation talks, which
have always focused only on Somali actors. For all the many conflict drivers
exacerbating Somalia’s prolonged state of collapse, the most important has been
Ethiopia’s prolonged struggle against the coalition of anti-Ethiopian groups based
in Mogadishu. Ethiopia has worked against this “Mogadishu Group” indirectly,
through its Somali clients (until 2004, via the SRRC) and now directly in its
military occupation of southern Somalia. Resolution of the Somali crisis will, at
some point, require that Ethiopia and this Mogadishu-based coalition reach a
modus Vivendi. That the previous decade of diplomatic work on Somalia has not
focused on bringing these two main protagonists in the conflict together for direct
talks underscores the weakness of the conflict analysis informing past diplomacy in
Somalia.
Second, Ethiopia has legitimate security concerns in Somalia that must be
recognised and addressed by the Somali opposition if Ethiopia is to accept a
negotiated settlement in Mogadishu. The temptation in Somali opposition circles to
dismiss Ethiopian security needs is a non-starter. If a Somali government or
political movement embraces irredentist policies against Ethiopia, provides
logistical support to armed insurgencies aimed at the Ethiopian government, allows
itself to be used as a platform for radical Islamists, or pursues close relations with
Ethiopia’s regional rival Eritrea, the government in Addis Ababa can be expected
to work against that government. The need to recognise Ethiopia’s security
imperatives is a painful but essential concession that Somali political movements
of all types must accept if Ethiopia is to support a revived Somali central
government.
Ethiopia is arguably the only external actor with both vital interests in the
political outcome in Somalia and with the military power and capacity to act in
pursuit of those interests. By contrast, other external actors tend to dabble
opportunistically in Somalia, either because Somalia is of secondary importance
or, in the case of states like Kenya, because they like the capacity to play a robust
role inside Somalia. This is another reason Ethiopia’s interests must be placed at
the centre of realistic political solutions in Somalia. Ethiopian leaders have clearly
been taken by surprise at the persistence and strength of the armed insurgency and
have been deeply frustrated at the inability of the TFG to become functional. There
is no question that Ethiopia miscalculated when it opted to occupy Mogadishu,
misreading both Somali politics and the willingness of other African leaders to
supply peacekeepers to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The
current situation is unquestionably not the outcome Ethiopia expected or wants in
Somalia. But the lack of clearly preferably alternatives from Ethiopia’s perspective
means that the Meles government is likely to continue with the same course of
action – including its preference for heavy-handed counterinsurgency tactics
involving collective punishment and disproportionate response all of which are
capable of jeopardising every efforts towards state-building in Somalia
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the research findings identified in the course of the research as
well as the analysis of the border disputes in the Horn of Africa and its resulting
consequences on Somalia state failure, the rising trend of State Failure in Somalia
can be addressed if the contending actors in the Somali conflict implement the
following recommendations:
5.3.1 POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND STABILITY
The situation in Somalia requires urgent and active commitment from both
internal parties to the conflict, the TFG and the opposition groups. Political
reconciliation needs to be given the highest priority if any progress is to be made
towards peace and stability. The TFG has to be persuaded to initiate a genuine,
inclusive process of political reconciliation, and the opponents of the TFG, at least
the political opposition groups, need to be actively engaged to ensure their
participation.
The option preferred by the TFG of applying a selective social reconciliation
mechanism to mitigate the current tensions and conflict in Somalia is not a viable
option. Inclusive citizens’ participation, the prospect of political tolerance and
power-sharing with the new opposition currently based in Asmara must be on the
table for any meaningful political reconciliation to take root in Somalia. Efforts
should also be directed towards political as well as economic incorporation for the
people of Ogaden by the Ethiopia government as this will reduce the grievance and
hostile posture of the Somali-inhabited areas towards the Ethiopian government.
5.3.2 PEACE AND SECURITY
International pressure needs to be intensified on external regional actors to
disengage their vested interests that continue to exacerbate the conflict in Somalia.
This would create the necessary space for the Somali people to express their
aspirations through inclusive political dialogue. The withdrawal of Ethiopian
troops from Somalia appears to have assisted the pace of insurgency in Somalia,
but the on-going dispatch of soldiers from Burundi, Uganda and Nigeria might also
stimulate the perception of occupation within Somalia which might also frustrate
every effort towards restoring order in Somalia. The enforcement of the UN arms
embargo on Somalia need to also be intensified to put an end to illicit arms flows
that feed the conflict system in Somalia.
Immediate measures should be taken to stabilise the current situation in
Somalia and secure the cessation of hostilities and the enforcement of peace in the
country. The AU peacekeeping mission to Somalia has to be strengthened through
the deployment of sufficient troops to fulfil its mandate but it must present a non-
partisan posture to all the warring factions in Somalia. The peacekeeping mission
in Somalia requires urgent international support and this could be in the form of a
robust hybrid peacekeeping mission that would create the enabling environment
necessary for political dialogue and reconciliation. This can only be achieved
through a commitment of the requisite logistical and financial resources from the
larger international community.
The proposed peacekeeping mission must have within its mandate the
ability to enforce peace and conduct comprehensive security sector reform in
Somalia as a means to ensuring structured capacity of the Somali people to keep
and maintain peace in their country. This factor can also assist in curtailing the
activities of the pirates.
5.3.3 REGIONAL SECURITY
The situation in Somalia continues to negatively impact on stability in the
region. The conflict situation has drawn in external regional actors actively
involved in the conflict, most notably, Ethiopia and Eritrea, who continue to use
Somalia as a proxy for their simmering border dispute. There has to be greater
international pressure on the two countries to disengage from the Somalia conflict.
In addition, greater efforts have to be put into the resolution of the Ethiopia/Eritrea
border dispute, if the two countries are to be successfully disengaged from
Somalia. The TFG will negotiate only if pressured by Ethiopia, and the United
States has more leverage on Ethiopia than any other external actor.
By contrast, Washington lacks direct leverage with the new Somali
opposition and has excluded clan elders. Therefore, diplomacy targeting this group
should focus on getting governments in the region and in the Arab League to
persuade them to accept a comprehensive reconciliation and power-sharing
arrangement. The current conflict in Somalia, which is a major concern for all
neighbouring states in the region, continues to have a negatively re-enforcing
impact on regional peace, security and stability in the greater Horn region.
5.2.4 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS’ INVOLVEMENT
There should be stronger and more determined political will, both on the
continent and internationally, to commit to the resolution of the conflict in
Somalia, if peace and stability are to be restored in Somalia. The AU should
demonstrate proactive leadership on the Somalia conflict, particularly on initiatives
towards political reconciliation. The broader international community should
commit and mobilise resources towards the restoration of peace, and there has to
be sustained engagement on its part on the Somali question.
The external actors involved in initiatives towards resolving the conflict
situation in Somalia need to engage in continuous in-depth analysis of the
situation. Any meaningful responses to bring about sustainable peace, security and
stability in Somalia must be underpinned by continuous in-depth analysis of the
context in Somalia. Current initiatives are driven largely by macro-level situational
analysis, mainly when there is a flare up in violence in the country. This kind of
analysis not only presents a snapshot frame of the larger context at a particular
moment, but also does not capture the key drivers and dividers feeding the conflict
and more often than not, the connectors and opportunities that exist for peace. The
risk, therefore, is that, any responses modelled on macro-situational analysis may
not be effective, appropriate or timely.
5.3 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Apart from the recommendations above, the following policy should also be
considered by the following actors as a means of enhancing the state-building
process in Somalia.
5.3.1 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (UNITED NATIONS/ EUROPEAN
UNION/ARAB LEAGUE)
• Overcome its stance of benign neglect of Somalia and treat Somalia as a priority
case.
• Signal willingness to accept and work with any government that emerges in
Somalia, rather than seek to impose one, work with that government to dissuade
it’s from acts of extremism.
• Take strong and resolute measures to deal with local grievances including those
that relate to illegal exploitation of Somali maritime resources and toxic waste
dumping off the coast of Somalia (including banning the dumping chemical waste
and the illegal fishing in Somali waters).
• Mount a full-scale diplomatic effort to support humanitarian activities in Somalia.
5.3.2 UNITED STATES
• Develop a policy strategy towards Somalia that is not solely underpinned by the
war on terror and its security agenda but rather one that supports locally owned
efforts even when this could offend United States’ sensibilities.
5.3.3 AFRICAN UNION (AU) AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)
• Maximize diplomatic efforts to focus international attention on the need to go
beyond military deterrence in order to address the underlying challenges of
establishing a functioning government in Somalia.
• Bolster points of stability in Somalia by identifying and working with local
authorities/ groups toward the promotion of an inclusive government.
• Promote the agenda of political reconciliation to stabilize the country
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbink, J. (2003), “Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects for Peace in the Horn of Africa”, in Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol.21 no.3.
Abubakar, N. L. (2006), “Somalia: When Will Somalia Have Functional Government?”Weekly Trust, 30 October.
ACED: Armed Conflict Events Database.(2000). Ethiopian Civil War. M http://onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr70/fethiopia1974.htm Retrieved March.
Adam, H. M. (1999), “Somali Civil War” , in Civil Wars in Africa, T. M. Ali and R.O. Matthews (Eds.), Montreal: McGill University Press: pp169-193.
Africa Watch Committee. (1990), Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People, New York.
Agyeman-Duah, B. (1986), “The U.S. and Ethiopia: The Politics of Military
Assistance,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 12, No. 2, 287-307.
Ajala, A. (1983), “The nature of African boundaries” In Africa Spectrum 18, pp177-188.
Ambert A.M. et al (1995), “Understanding and evaluating qualitative research”,
Journal of marriage and the Family 57, no.4, 879-893.
http://links.jstor.org/sici (accessed 12 July 2011).
Anonymous, (1977b), “Heavy Attacks on Ethiopian Army in Eritrea and the East
Reported,” The New York Times, 19 July.
Asiwaju, A. I. (1985), “The conceptual framework”, in A. I. Asiwaju (Ed.),Partitioned Africans, New York: St. Martin’s: pp. 1-18.
Asiwaju, A. I. (1993), Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in
African peace and security, New York: United Nations: pp. 72-99
Aynte, A. (2010), “The Anatomy of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Jihadists” Paper
presented to 9th Horn of Africa Conference with Focus on Somalia. The Role of DemocraticGovernance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia, 4-6 June, Lund, Sweden.
Ayoob, M. (1980), “The Horn of Africa”, in Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, edited by Mohammed Ayoob, London: Croom Helm.
Bach, D. (1995), “Contraintes et ressources de la frontière en Afriquesubsaharienne[Constraints and resources of the border in sub-Saharan Africa]”Revue Internationale de PolitiqueComparée, 2(3).
Bahru, Z. (2001), A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991, Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.
Barbour, K.M. (1961), “A geographical analysis of boundaries in inter-tropical Africa”, in K. M. Barbour & R. M. Prothero (Eds.), Essays on African population,London: RoutledgeKegan Paul, pp. 303-323.
Bayart, J. F. (1996), “L’historicité de l’Etatimporté” In J. Bayart (Ed.), Lagreffedel’Etat, Paris: Khartala, pp. 11-39
Bello, A. (1995), “The boundaries must change” In West Africa, p. 546.
Bennett, D. S. (1998), "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration", inAmerican Journal of Political Science 42(4), pp 1200-1232.
Besteman, C. (1996), “Violent politics and the politics of violence: the dissolution
of the Somali nation-state” in American Ethnologist 23(3), pp 579-596.
Bilgin, P. and Morton, A. D. (2004) ‘From “Rogue” to “Failed” States: The Fallacy of Short-termism’, Politics, vol. 24, no. 3, 169-180.
Boleslaw A. B. (2005), International Law: A Dictionary.
Bradbury, M. (2008), Becoming Somaliland, London.
Brons, M. H. (2001), Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia. From
Statelessness to Statelessness?, Utrecht: International Books.
Brownlie, I. (1979), African boundaries: A legal and diplomatic encyclopedia, London: C.Hurst.
Boyd, J. B. (1979), “African boundary conflict: An empirical study”, in African
Studies Review 22, pp 1-14.
Brown, D. H. (1961), “Recent Developments in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier
Dispute” International Comparative Law Q. 10(1), pp 167-176.
Butterworth, R. L. (1980), Managing Interstate Conflict, 1975-79: Data with
Synopses.Final Report. Unpublished mimeograph, 356 pp
Buzan, B and Waever, O. (2004), Regions and Powers the Structure of
International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chaliand, G. (1978), “The Horn of Africa’s Dilemma,” Foreign Policy, No. 30,
116-131.
Chege, M. (1987), “Conflict in the Horn of Africa”, in Africa: Perspectives on
Peace and Development, edited by Emmanuel Hansen, London: Zed
Books.
Clapham, C. (1996a), Africa and the international system, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Claude, I. (1964), Power and International Relations, New York: Random House.
Cliffe, L. (1999), “Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa”, in
Third World Quarterly, vol.29 no.1.
Combating Terrorism Center (2006), “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities”. CTC, Department of Social
Sciences,United States Military Academy, West Point.
Cooper, T. (2003), Ogaden War, 1977-1978, ACIG.org.
Cottam, M. and Cottam, R. (2001), Nationalism and Politics: the political behavior of nation states. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Danfulani, S. (1999), “Regional Security and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of
Africa: Somalian Reconstruction after the Cold War.”International Studies,
vol.36 no.1.
Daniel, T. (1999), The “Failed State” and International Law, 81 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 731, 733–34.
Darnton, J. (1978), “Ethiopia Reports Recapture of Key Ogaden Town,” The New
York Times, 6 March.
David, S. (1979), “Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage”, in
International Security, vol.4 no.2.
David, A. (2009), Why the Somali Pirates are Winning,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/apr/09/piracy-
somalia-alabama-us-navy.
Davidson, B. (1992), The Black man’s burden: Africa and the curse of the nation
state. NewYork: Times Books.
De Waal, A. (2007), “Sudan: International Dimensions to the State and its Crisis”, In Crisis States Research Centre Occasional Paper no.3. Debiel, T. (2002) Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in CrisisRegions. London: ZED Books.
De Waal, A. (2007), “Class and power in a stateless Somalia”, 20 February 2007
http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/dewaal/.
Diehl, P. and Goertz, G. (2000), War and Peace in International Rivalry, Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Donald G. M. (2002), “A New Scrutiny of Somalia as the Old Anarchy Reigns”, The New York Times, 10 February.
Doombos, M et al. (1992), Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace,
Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan, The Hague:
Institute for Social Studies.
Dorff, R. H. (1996), ‘Democratisation and Failed States: The Challenge ofUngovernability’, Parameters, vol. 26, no. 2, 17-31.
Dorff, R. H. (1999), ‘Responding to the Failed State: The Need for Strategy’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 10 (Winter): 62-81.
Dorff, R. H. (2000), ‘Responding to the Failed State: Strategic Triage’, in BeyondDeclaring Victory and Coming Home, eds. A. J. Joes and M. Manwaring. Westport,CT: Praeger, 225-243.
Dorff, R. H. (2005), ‘Failed States after 9/11: What Did We know and What HaveWe Learned?, International Studies Perspetives, vol. 6, no. 1, 20-34.
Ejigu, M. (2005), “Deforestation, environmental insecurity, poverty and conflict in
The Horn of Africa and Great Lakes”, ETFRN News 43-44/05
http://www.etfrn.org/etfrn/newsletter/news4344/articles/2_12_Ejigu.pdf
Europe Regional Survey for Africa South of the Sahara (2006), London, pp. 1054-
64.
European Union (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World http://www.isseu.org/solana/solanae.pdf access 20070508
Farer, T. (1979), War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm, New
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Firebrace, J. and Smith, G. (1982), the Hidden Revolution, London: War on Want.
Fukuyama, F. (2004) State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century. London: Profile Books.
Garowe Online 10 November 2008, “New rebel outfit to fights Somaliland security
forces”.
Gebru, T. (1991), Ethiopia: Power and Protest, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Gebru, T. (2002), “From Lash to Red Star: the Pitfalls of Counter-insurgency in
Ethiopia, 1980-82,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40 No. 3, 465-
498.
George, A.L. and Andrew B. (2005), Case Studies and theory development in the
social sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerbu, T. (1985), “Peasant Resistance in Ethiopia: The Case of the Weyane,”
Journal of African History, Vol. 25, 77-92.
Gibler, D. M. and Sarkees, M. (2002), Coding Manual for v3.0 of the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816-2000, Typescript.
Giddens, A. (1984), The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gilkes, P. (1991), Revolution and Military Strategy the Ethiopia Army in the
Ogaden and in Eritrea 1974-84, Proceedings of the Eleventh International
Conference of Ethiopia Studies, Addis Ababa, April 1-6.
Gilkes, P. and Plaut, M. (1999), War in the Horn: the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Gibler, D. M., Rider, T., et al. (2005), "Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Interdependent Racing and the Likelihood of Conflict in Rival States" Journal Of Peace Research 42(2),pp 131-147.
Gorman, R. (1981), Political Conflict in the Horn of Africa, New York: Praeger.
Griffiths, I. (1996),”Permeable boundaries in Africa”, in Paul Nugentand A. I.
Asiwaju (Eds.), African boundaries, London: Pinter, pp. 68-83
Gurr, T. R. (1998) ‘The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S.
Foreign Policy Planning’, paper presented at the conference on “Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences”, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 25-27 February 1998,http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/failed%5Fstates/1998/papers/gurr.html (accessed 17 March 2011).
Haggai, E. (2010), Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Sudan. London: Lynne Rienner.
Hagmann, T. (2007), “The political roots of the current crisis in Region 5”, 21
September 2007 www.ssrc.org .
Hagmann, T. and Khalif, M.H. (2006), “State and politics in Ethiopia’s Somali
Region since 1991” in Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali
Studies, Vol.6, 2006.
Harmony Project/Combating Terrorism Center, “Al-Qaida’s (mis)adventures in the
Horn of Africa”.
Hassan, A. A. (2009), “Al Shabab Threat Clouds the Horn of Africa” 3 February.
URL: http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Feb/03_alshabab_ahmed.html
accessed 5 March 2011.
Healy, S. (2008a), “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts
Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel” In Chatham House Horn of
Africa Group Report.
Healy, S. (2008b), “Ethiopia-Eritrea Dispute and the Somali Conflict” Paper
presented at the Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and
Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa.
Herbst, J. (1990), “War and the state in Africa”, in International Security, 14, pp11 – 139.
Herbst, J. (1996-7) ‘Responding to State Failure in Africa’, International Security,vol. 21, no. 3, 120-144.
Herbst, J. (2000), States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority And control, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) A More SecureWorld: Our Shared Responsibility, New York: United Nations.
Hobbes, T. (1996), Leviathan. Rev. student ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Hoehne, M. V. (2007), “Puntland and Somaliland clashing in Northern Somalia: Who cuts the Gordian knot?” Available athttp://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hoehne/printable.html
Holsti, K. J. (1996), The state, war and the state of war, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Human Rights Watch reports in July 2007
(http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/07/02/ethiop16327.htm ) and June 2008
(http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/ethiopia0608/)
Ibrahim, M. (2009), “The Geopolitical Implications of the Somali ‘Islamic Courts’
Activities in the Horn of Africa” http://arts.monash.edu.au/politics/terror
research/proceedings/gtrec-proceedings-2009-05-mohamed-ibrahim.pdf
accessed March 11, 2011
Ignatieff, M. 2002. 'Intervention and State Failure', Dissent, Winter.
Imru, Z. (1989), The Horn of Africa: A Strategic Survey, Washington DC: International Security Council.
International Crisis Group (2002), Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed
State ICG Africa Report N° 45, 23 May 2002.
International Crisis Group (2003), “Somaliland: Democratisation and its
Discontents” ICG Africa Report No 66, 28 July, 2003.
International Crisis Group (2004), Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?.21 December 2004.
International Crisis Group (2005a), Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing hearts and minds? Brussels: ICG Africa Report 95. July 11.
International Crisis Group (2005b), Somalia’s Islamists. Brussels: ICG Africa Report 100. December 12.
International Crisis Group (2005), “Somalia’s Islamists”, Africa Report No. 100
International Crisis Group (2008), “Beyond the fragile peace between Ethiopia and
Eritrea: Averting new war” in Africa Report No. 141, June 2008
International Crisis Group (2008), Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State Crisis Group Africa Report N°147, 23 December 2008
International Institute for Strategic Studies (1972), The Military Balance 1972
1973, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (1989), The Military Balance 1989
1990. London: Brassey’s.
Jaynes, G. (1979), “The Ogaden War Sputters On,” The New York Times, 30
December.
Jeffrey G. (2006), “Somalia’s Islamists vow never to surrender,” The New York
Times, 30 December.
Jeffrey G. (2008), “Somali’s president appoints premier”, The New York Times, 17
December.
Joireman, S. (2004), “Secession and its Aftermath: Eritrea”, in Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts, edited by Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff. New York: Palgrave McMillan.
Kapil, R. L. (1966), “On the conflict potential of inherited boundaries in Africa”
World Politics18, p 656-673.
Kassim, M. M. (1995), “Aspects of the Benadir Cultural History: The Case of the
Bravan Ulama” in Ahmed, A. J (ed.) The Invention of Somalia
Lawrenceville, N J:The Red Sea Press.
Kaufman, M. (1978), “Somalis Abandoning North Ogaden,” The New York Times,
9 March.
Kautilya, J. (1960), Arthasastra, Mysore: Mysore Publishing and Printing House.
Korn, D. (1986), Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union, Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.
Kugler, J. and Lemke, D. Eds. (1996), Parity and War: Evaluations and
Extensions of the War Ledger, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Kum, J.M. (1993), Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in
African peace and security, New York: United Nations. pp. 49-71
Laitin, D. (1979), “The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siad’s Role in Somali
History,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 95-115.
Laitin, D.D. and Samatar, S. S (1987), Somalia: nation in search of a state,
London:Westview Press.
Langley, J. (1973), Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa: 1900-1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lauren P. et al (2009), Piracy off the Horn of Africa 4 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS
Report for Congress Order Code RL 40528, Apr. 21, 2009).
Lefebvre, J. (1991), Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and
Somalia, 1953-1991, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Lefebvre, J. (1992), “The geopolitics of the Horn of Africa”, in Middle East
Policy 11, p 7-22.
Lefebvre, J. (1996), “Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power
Intervention in the Horn of Africa”, in Middle East Journal, vol.50 no3.
Lemke, D. (2002), Regions of war and peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Legum, C. (1985), “The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa in International Perspective”, in The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, edited by William Dowdy and Russell Trood, Durham: Duke University Press.
Legum, C. and Bill L. (1979), The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis, New York: Africana Publishing Company.
Lewis, I. M. (1963), “Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism”, in Modern African Studies1 (2), p 147-161.
Lewis, I. M. (1988), A Modern History of Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Boulder, Westview Press.
Lewis, I.M. (1989), “The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary
Nationalism,” African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 353, 573-579.
Lewis, I.M. (2004), “Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox” in
Africa 74(4),pp 489-515.
Lewis, I. (2008), Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, London.
Le Sage, A. (2001), “Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia,”
Rev. Afr. Pol. Econ. 29(89): 472-477.
Library of Congress Country Research. (1993), Country Study: Ethiopia. Call Number DT373 .E83 1993.http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/ettoc.html. Retrieved March 2010
Lyons, T and Ahmed I. S (1995), “Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral
Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction” in Brookings
Occasional Papers,Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Marchal, R. (2007), “Warlordism and Terrorism: how to obscure an already
confusing crisis? The case of Somalia”, in International Affairs.
Marcus, H. (1994), A History of Ethiopia, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mark M. (2007), “Pentagon sees move in Somalia as blue- print”, The New York
Times, 13 January 2007
Markakis, J. (1987), National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Markakis, J. (1998), Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa, London: SAGE
Publications.
Mayall, J. (1990), Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mazrui, A. A. (1998),“The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa”, inPeacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, eds. O. A. Otunnu and M.W. Doyle. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 233-243.
Medhane , T. (2004),“New Security Frontiers in the Horn of Africa”, in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue on Globalization.
Menkhaus, K. (2003), “State Collapse in Somalia; Second Thoughts” in Review of
African Political Economy no.97, pp 405-422.
Menkhaus, K. J. (2005), “Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse” In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Cambridge: World Peace Foundation.
Menkhaus, K. (2006), “Governance without Governance in Somalia: Spoilers,
State Building and the Politics of Coping” in International Security Vol.31
No.3, pp.74-106.
Menkhaus, K. (2007),”The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts” in African
Affairs 106/204, pp 357-390.
Mesfin, B. (2002), The Horn of Africa as a Security Complex: Towards a
Theoretical Framework
Metz, H. C. (1992), Somalia: A Country Study, Washington, D. C: Library of Congress.
Meier, P. (2007), “Networking disaster and conflict early warning systems for
environmental security, unpublished paper, 21 February 2007 http://conflict
reduction.org/meier/Networking%20Systems.pdf
Meier, P. and Bond, D. (2005), “Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in
The Horn of Africa”, paper given at an international workshop on human
security and climate change, June 2005
http://www.gechs.org/downloads/holmen/Meier_Bond.pdf
Meredith, M. (2005), The Fate of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence,
New York: Public Affairs.
Middleton, R. (2002), “Piracy in Somalia. Threatening global trade, feeding local
wars”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, Africa Programme AFP BP 08/02
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
Milliken, J. ed. (2003) State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. London:Blackwell.
Mohammed, A. (2007), “Ethiopia’s strategic dilemma in the Horn of Africa”, 20
February 2007 www.ssrc.org
Möller, B. (2008), “The Horn of Africa and the US ‘War on Terror’ with a Special Focus on Somalia”, in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed.), Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa, Research Report in Social Anthropology 1, Lund: Lund University.
Moseley, R. (1980), “Flights From Chaos and Death,” Chicago Tribune, 25 May.
New York Times April 3, 1977 Kandell, J. ...Poor Nations Are the Buyers
Nkiwane, S. M. (1993), Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in African peace and security, New York: United Nations. pp. 29-37
Nugent, P. (1996), “Arbitrary lines and the people’s minds: A dissenting view on colonial boundaries inWest Africa” In Paul Nugent & A. I. Asiwaju (Eds.), African boundaries London: Pinter.pp.35-67.
Nugent, P. and Asiwaju, A. I. (1996), “Introduction: The paradox of African boundaries”, in PaulNugent& A. I. Asiwaju (Eds.), African boundaries, London: Pinter.pp. 1-17
Nordquist, K.A. (1992), Boundary Conflicts and Preventive Diplomacy, Ph.D.
diss., Dept. for Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
Nyugen, A.(2005),”The Question of ‘Failed States”, View on Asia Briefing Series:
Sydney,Australia.
OCHA (2008), “Horn of Africa Crisis Report” A Report for the Regional
Humanitarian Partnership Team.
Odugbemi, S. (1995), “Consensus and stability”, in West Africa, p501-503.
Ofcansky, T. P. (1992), “National Security” In Somalia: Country Study, Helen C.
Metz (Ed.), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office: p 181-189.
Omaar, R. (1991), Somalia: At War with Itself in Current History, pp 230-234.
Ottaway, M. and Ottaway, D. (1978), Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution, New York:
Africana.
Ottaway, M. (1982), Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, New
York: Praeger.
Ottaway, M. (1999), “Keep out of Africa”, in Financial Times, Retrieved March 8,
2011, from http://www.ft.com/search9/cgi/vtopic
Ottaway, M., Jeffrey H. and Greg M. (2004), “Africa’s Big States: Toward a New Realism”, in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook.
Patman, R. (1990), The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The diplomacy of
intervention and disengagement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Paul, T. (1994), Asymmetric Conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pazzani, A. (1994), "Morocco VersusPolisario", in Modern Africa Studies
32(2), p 265-278.
Porter, B. (1984), The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy
in Local War, 1945-1980, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (2005) Investing in Prevention. London.
Przeworski, A. 1991.Democracy and the Market.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quaranto, P. J. (2008), “Building States While Fighting Terror. Contradictions in
United States Strategy in Somalia from 2001 to 2007” in ISS Monograph
Series No 143, May 2008
Reno, W. (2000), “Shadow states and the political economy of civil wars” In
Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars, eds. Mats Berdal and
David Malone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications. P 43-68.
Rinehart, R. (1982), “Historical Setting,” in Somalia: A Country Study, Harold D. Nelson (Ed.), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p 38.
Roger M. (2008), Piracy in Somalia, available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203_1008piracysomalia.pdf
Rotberg, R. 2002. 'The New Nature of Nation-State Failure', Washington Quarterly,XXV.
Rotberg, R. I. (2003) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror.Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution.
Rotberg, R. I. (2004) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton:Princeton University Press.
Rotberg, R. I. ed. (2005), Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge: World Peace Foundation.
Rupiya, M. (2008), “Interrelated Security Challenges of Kenya and Uganda in
Eastern and Horn of Africa”, Paper presented at the Conference on the
Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa,
Addis Ababa.
Sample, S. (2002), "The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor States vs. Major Powers", in Journal of Peace Research 39(6),pp 669-692.
Samatar, A.I. (2004), “Ethiopian federalism: Autonomy versus control in the
Somali region”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2004
Sautter, G. (1982), “Quelquesréflexionssur les frontièresafricaines [A few reflectionson African borders]”, in Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch (Ed.), Problèmesfrontièresdans le tiersmonde[Border problems in the ThirdWorld],Paris: Université de Paris.
Schraeder, P. J. (2005), “From Irredentism to Secession: The Decline of the
Pan-Somali Nationalism,” in Nationalism in Post-Colonial andPre-
Communism States, Lowell W. Barrington (Ed.), pp.107-141.
Schneckener, U. (2004) ‘States at Risk: Zur Analyse fragilerStaatlichkeit’, in
States at Risk: Fragile StaatenalsSicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, ed. U.Schneckener. Berlin: StiftungWissenschaft und Politik, 5-27.
Schwab, P. (1985), Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society, Boulder: Lynne
Rienner.
Security, G. (2006), Ogaden War.
Selassie, B. (1990), “Empire and Constitutional Engineering: The PDRE in
Historical Perspective,” in Marina Ottaway, (ed.), The Political Economy of
Ethiopia, New York: Praeger, 115-136.
Senese, P. D. and Vasquez, J. (2005), "Assessing the Steps to War ", in British Journal of Political Science 35: 607-633.
Sheehan, M. (2005), International Security: An Analytical Survey, Boulder: LynneRienner.
Sheik-Abdi, A. (1977), “Somali Nationalism: Its Origins and Future,” The Journal
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, 657-665.
Shinn, D. (2009), “Horn of Africa: Priorities and Recommendations”, Testimony
to the Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, Washington DC.
Singer, J. D. (1987). "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985." International Interactions 14: pp 115-132.
State Failure Task Force (2003) State Failure Task Force: Phase III Findings. Washington, D.C.
“Somali Protests Ethiopian” (1999). BBC News, April 11. Available on the web at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hhi/africa/31651.stm
“Somalia Remains A Nation In Name Only – Four Years after U.N. Intervention,
It’s Overrun by Gangs, Ruled by No One” (1998), The Seattle Times/The
Philadelphia Inquirer, 9 February.
Southall, A. (1985), “Partitioned Alur” In A. I. Asiwaju (Ed.), Partitioned Africans,New York: St. Martin’s. pp 87-103
Taylor-Powel, E. (2003), Analyzing qualitative data, Program Development and
Evaluation. http://learningstore.uwex.edu/assets/pdfs/g3658-12.pdf
(accessed 13 July 2011).
The Free Dictionary. http://www.thefreedictionary.com (accessed 10 July 2011).
Thompson, W. (2001), "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics", inInternational Studies Quarterly 45, p 557-586.
Tiruneh, A. (1993), The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987, New York: Cambridge University Press, p 219.
Touval, S. (1963), Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for
Unity in the Horn of Africa, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Touval, S. (1969), “The sources of status quo and irredentist policies” Carl
G.Widstrand (Ed.), African Boundary Problems, Sweden: Scandinavian
Instituteof African Studies, pp. 101-118
Turner, J. W. (1993), “Historical Setting” In Ethiopia: A Country Study, Helen C.
Metz (Ed.), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
United Nations Development Program. (2001), Human Development Report 2001
Somalia. New York.
United Nations, Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. (1993),
Disarmament: Workshop on the role of border problems in African peace and security, New York: United Nations, pp. 3-28
U.S.A. (2006), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
March 16, 2006.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (1982), World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979, Washington: ACDA.
“US Backs Ethiopia’s Invasion of Somalia” (2006), World Socialist Web Site,
December 28. Available on the web on http://www.wsws.org/
articles/2006/dec2006/soma-d28.shtml
Usama, A. (2009), “Security across the Somalia-Lamu Interface”, Chonjo, No.6.
Vaughan, S. and Tronvoll, K. (2003), “Structures and relations of power:
Ethiopia”,SIDA, 2003 http://www.addisvoice.com/resources/Structure-of-
power.pdf
Valeriano, B. (2003), Steps to Rivalry: Power Politics and Rivalry Formation.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.
Vasquez, J. A. (1993), The war puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vasquez, J. (2001), "Mapping the Probability of War and Analyzing the Possibility of Peace", in Conflict Management and Peace Science 18(2): 145-174.
Wasara, S. (2002), “Conflict and State Security in the Horn of Africa:
Militarization of Civilian Groups”, African Journal of Political Science,
vol.7 no.2.
Watson, P. (1986), “Arms and Aggression in the Horn of Africa,” Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 40, Is. 1, (1986), 159-176.
Weber, A. (2008), “Will the Phoenix Rise again? Commitment or Containment in The Horn of Africa” Paper presented at the Fourth Expert Meeting on Regional Security Policy at the Greater Horn of Africa, Cairo.
Webersik, C. (2004), “Differences that Matter: The Struggle of the Marginalised in
Somalia” Africa 74 (4), pp 516-532.
Whitehouse, D. (2007), “Why did Ethiopia invade Somalia? The US proxy war in Africa”, in Socialist Worker, 15 January. URL: http://mostlywater.org/the_u_s_proxy_war_in_africa accessed 3 March 2010.
Wiberg, H. (1979), “The Horn of Africa,” Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, Vol.
16, 189-196.
Woodward, P. (1996), The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations,
London:Tauris Academic Studies.
Woodward, P. (2003), The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations,
New York: I.B. Tauris.
Wren, C. (1980), “Forgotten War in Ethiopia’s Ogaden Heats Up Again,” The New
York Times, 26 May.
Young, C. (1996), “The impossible necessity of Nigeria: A struggle for
nationhood”, in Foreign Affairs, 75(6), p 139-143.
Zartman, I.W. (1985), Ripe for Resolution, New York: Oxford University Press.