boston property exchange trans v. iantosca, 1st cir. (2013)

7/26/2019 Boston Property Exchange Trans v. Iantosca, 1st Cir. (2013)

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United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

No. 11- 2475

BOSTON PROPERTY EXCHANGE TRANSFER COMPANY,f / k/ a Beni st ar Pr oper t y Exchange Tr ust Company, I nc. ,

Pl ai nt i f f , Appel l ant ,

v.

J OSEPH I ANTOSCA, i ndi vi dual l y and as a Tr ust ee of Faxon Hei ght sApar t ment s Real t y Trust and Fer n Real t y Trust ; BELRI DGE

CORPORATI ON; GAI L A. CAHALY; J EFFREY M. J OHNSTON; BELLEMORE

ASSOCI ATES, LLC; MASSACHUSETTS LUMBER COMPANY, I NC. ; ZELLEMcDONOUGH & COHEN LLP; ANTHONY R. ZELLE, P. C. ; and NYSTROM,

BECKMAN & PARI S, LLP,

Def endant s, Appel l ees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[ Hon. Nat hani el M. Gor t on, U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

Bef or eLynch, Chi ef J udge,

Sout er , * Associ at e J ust i ce,and Sel ya, Ci r cui t J udge.

J oseph M. Past or e I I I wi t h whom Smi t h, Gambrel l & Russel l ,LLP, Sean T. Carnat han and O' Connor , Carnat han, & Mack LLC were onbr i ef f or appel l ant .

Ant hony R. Zel l e wi t h whomThomas W. Evans and Zel l e McDonough

& Cohen, LLP wer e on br i ef f or appel l ees J oseph I ant osca,i ndi vi dual l y and as Tr ust ee of Faxon Hei ght s Apar t ment s Real t y Tr ust and Fer n Real t y Tr ust , Bel r i dge Cor porat i on, Gai l A. Cahal y, J ef f r ey M. J ohnst on, Bel l emor e Associ at es, LLC, and Massachuset t sLumber Company, I nc.

* The Hon. Davi d H. Sout er , Associ at e J ust i ce ( Ret . ) of t heSupr eme Cour t of t he Uni t ed St at es, si t t i ng by desi gnat i on.



Ti mot hy O. Egan wi t h whom George A. Ber man, Ti mot hy M.Pomarol e and Peabody & Ar nol d LLP were on br i ef f or appel l ees Zel l eMcDonough & Cohen LLP, Anthony R. Zel l e, P. C. , and Nyst r omBeckman& Par i s LLP.

J une 12, 2013



SOUTER, Associate Justice. As pl ai nt i f f s i n a pr i or

sui t , sever al of t he def endant - appel l ees her e ( t he def endant s)

obt ai ned a st at e cour t j udgment f or $19. 2 mi l l i on agai nst t he

pl ai nt i f f - appel l ant her e, Bost on Pr oper t y Exchange Tr ansf er Company

( BPE) , f ormer l y Beni st ar Proper t y Exchange Trust Company. I n order

t o sat i sf y t hat j udgment , t he successf ul , pr esent def endant s

obt ai ned an or der f r om t he st at e cour t assi gni ng t o t hem BPE' s

r el at ed ar bi t r at i on cl ai ms agai nst Pai neWebber . I n t hi s f eder al

act i on, BPE cl ai ms damages f r om t he def endant assi gnees and t hei r

l awyer s f or mi shandl i ng t he Pai neWebber arbi t r at i on. The di st r i ct

cour t di smi ssed al l of BPE' s cl ai ms, ei t her on a mot i on t o di smi ss

or on summar y j udgment . We af f i r m.

I .

Thi s i s t he l at est of over a decade of st at e and f eder al

cases ar i si ng out of t he f i nanci al mi sconduct of BPE and i t s owner

Dani el Carpent er . 1 I n what t he par t i es ref er t o as t he Cahal y

l i t i gat i on, t he f ol l owi ng evi dence l ed t o f i ndi ngs t hat BPE,

Car pent er , and ot her def endant s wer e l i abl e f or var i ous f or ms of

f i nanci al mi sconduct . See gener al l y Cahal y v. Beni st ar Pr op. Exch.

1 See, e. g. , I ant osca v. St ep Pl an Ser vs. , I nc. , 604 F. 3d 24

( 1st Ci r . 2010) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 494 F. 3d 13 ( 1st Ci r .2007) , cer t . deni ed, 552 U. S. 1230 ( 2008) ; Uni t ed St at es v.Carpent er , 405 F. Supp. 2d 85 ( D. Mass. 2005) ; Cahal y v. Beni st arPr op. Exch. Tr ust Co. , 885 N. E. 2d 800 ( Mass. ) , cer t . deni ed, 555U. S. 1047 ( 2008) ; Cahal y v. Beni st ar Pr op. Exch. Tr ust Co. , 864N. E. 2d 548 ( Mass. App. Ct . 2007) ; Cahal y v. Beni st ar Pr op. Exch. Tr ust Co. , 2003 WL 21246167 ( Mass. Super . Ct . Feb. 25, 2003) .

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Tr ust Co. , 864 N. E. 2d 548, 552- 53, 559- 60 ( Mass. App. Ct . 2007) ;

Cahal y v. Beni st ar Pr op. Exch. Tr ust Co. , 885 N. E. 2d 800, 807- 09

( Mass. ) , cer t . deni ed, 555 U. S. 1047 ( 2008) . BPE was a f i nanci al

i nt er medi ar y f or " l i ke- ki nd" proper t y exchanges under sect i on 1031

of t he f eder al t ax code, whi ch al l ows a pr oper t y owner t o avoi d

r ecogni zi ng capi t al gai ns f r om a sal e by usi ng t he pr oceeds t o

pur chase a si mi l ar or "l i ke- ki nd" pr oper t y wi t hi n 180 days. The

sel l er must l odge t he pr oceeds f r om t he sal e wi t h a qual i f i ed

i nt er medi ar y (or one of sever al ot her r egul at or y saf e har bor s)

unt i l t he f unds ar e used t o buy t he r epl acement pr oper t y. See 26

C. F. R. § 1. 1031( k) - 1( g) .

The Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s, who ar e among t he def endant s i n

t hi s case, wer e si x i ndi vi dual s or compani es t hat used BPE when

engagi ng i n l i ke- ki nd exchanges. 2 BPE hel d t hei r f unds under

agr eement s pr ovi di ng t hat t he moni es woul d be avai l abl e on demand,

pr i or t o whi ch t hey woul d be hel d i n escr ow account s, ei t her a

"money market " account earni ng t hr ee per cent i nt er est or an

" i nvest ment " account ear ni ng si x per cent .

I n 1998, Carpent er opened t r adi ng account s f or such f unds

at Merr i l l Lynch, superseded i n 2000 by new account s at

2 The pl ai nt i f f s i n Cahal y, al l of whom ar e def endant -appel l ees i n t hi s case, wer e Gai l A. Cahal y; J ef f r ey M. J ohnst on;Bel l emore Associ at es, LLC; Massachuset t s Lumber Company, I nc. ; J oseph I ant osca, i ndi vi dual l y and as t r ust ee of t he Faxon Hei ght sApar t ment s Real t y Tr ust and Fer n Real t y Tr ust ; and Bel r i dgeCor por at i on. Cahal y, 864 N. E. 2d at 548 n. 1.

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Pai neWebber . Cont r ary t o t he escr ow agr eement s, Carpenter engaged

i n aggr essi ve and hi gh- vol ume t r adi ng of opt i ons on t echnol ogy

st ocks, r endered t he more r i sky by margi n f undi ng wi t h money

borr owed f r om t he br oker age houses. Al t hough t he t r adi ng was

successf ul f or a t i me, Carpent er began t o l ose money qui ckl y when

t echnol ogy st ocks f el l shar pl y i n 2000, t he consequences bei ng t hat

BPE was unabl e to retur n t he exchangors' f unds as r equi r ed, and

ul t i mat el y l ost about $8. 6 mi l l i on of t hei r money.

BPE was f ound l i abl e f or ( i nt er al i a) conver si on, br each

of cont r act , br each of f i duci ar y dut y, i nt ent i onal

mi sr epr esent at i on, and vi ol at i on of t he Massachuset t s consumer

pr ot ect i on st at ut e, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. 3 These j udgments wer e

uphel d on appeal by t he Massachuset t s Appeal s Cour t and t he Supreme

J udi ci al Cour t of Massachuset t s, Cahal y, 864 N. E. 2d at 559- 60;

Cahal y, 885 N. E. 2d at 822, and t he Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s obt ai ned a

f i nal j udgment agai nst BPE of some $19. 2 mi l l i on, i ncl udi ng

puni t i ve damages, i nt er est , at t or neys' f ees, and cost s.

At t he t i me of t hat j udgment , BPE was about t o begi n

ar bi t r at i on of cl ai ms agai nst Pai neWebber , whi ch i t char ged wi t h

3 The t r i al j udge gr ant ed summary j udgment f or t he Cahal ypl ai nt i f f s on t hei r breach of cont r act and conver si on cl ai ms. The

pl ai nt i f f s t hen pr evai l ed at a j ur y t r i al on t hei r f i duci ar y dut yand mi sr epr esent at i on cl ai ms, al ong wi t h cl ai ms under New Yor k andConnect i cut consumer protect i on st atut es. I n a subsequent bencht r i al , t he t r i al j udge f ound f or t he pl ai nt i f f s on t he Chapt er 93Acl ai m. The pl ai nt i f f s al so pr evai l ed on cer t ai n causes of act i onagai nst ot her def endant s, i ncl udi ng Car pent er , t hough onl y t he j udgment agai nst BPE i s di r ect l y r el evant here.

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r esponsi bi l i t y f or i t s debacl e, as descri bed f ur t her bel ow. The

Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s f i l ed a mot i on wi t h t he Super i or Cour t t o compel

assi gnment of BPE' s l egal cl ai ms t o t hem t o hel p sat i sf y t hei r

j udgment agai nst BPE, a move BPE st r enuousl y opposed. Then-

Super i or Cour t J udge Bot sf or d ( who pr esi ded over t he Cahal y t r i al s)

gr ant ed t he mot i on i n t he f ol l owi ng assi gnment order :

Af t er hear i ng, and pur suant t o G. L. c. 223A,§ 86A, and c. 214, § 3( 6) , i t i s Or der ed t hatBeni st ar Proper t y Exchange Tr ust Company,I nc. ' s l egal cl ai ms agai nst UBS Pai neWebber ,I nc. ( Pai neWebber ) be assi gned f or pr osecut i ont o t he pl ai nt i f f s i n t hi s act i on. Any act i ont hat t he pl ai nt i f f s, as assi gnees, may t akewi t h respect t o t he pendi ng NASD pr oceedi ngsi s a mat t er f or t he ar bi t r at or s t o deci de, nott hi s cour t . Any damages t hat may be awar dedt o Beni st ar Pr oper t y agai nst Pai neWebber aret o be hel d i n escrow by t he pl ai nt i f f s( t hr ough t hei r counsel ) pendi ng f ur t her or derof t hi s Cour t .

Ther eupon, t he Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s and t hei r l awyer s ( who

ar e al so def endant s her e) t ook cont r ol of t he ar bi t r at i on agai nst

Pai neWebber . They pr ompt l y r epl aced BPE' s st atement of cl ai mwi t h

an amended cl ai m based on a compl et el y new t heor y of l i abi l i t y.

BPE says her e t hat i n doi ng t hi s, t he def endant s " hi j acked" t he

ar bi t r at i on cl ai ms i n a way t hat vi ol at ed t hei r l egal dut i es as

assi gnees and at t orneys.

Each t heor y, of cour se, st ar t s wi t h Pai neWebber ' s

r el at i onshi p wi t h BPE thr ough the br oker age account s al r eady

ment i oned, whi ch ext ended f r omOct ober 2000 t hr ough J anuar y 2001.

As t echnol ogy st ocks decl i ned i n t hi s per i od, BPE' s l osses r ose t o

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$4 mi l l i on i n November and $5. 5 mi l l i on by December 18.

Pai neWebber event ual l y deci ded t o cut i t s l osses f r om t he mar gi n

t r ansact i ons by f or ci ng BPE t o cl ose i t s account s and l i qui dat e i t s

t r adi ng posi t i ons i n December 2000 and ear l y J anuary 2001. The

crux of BPE' s or i gi nal ar bi t r at i on cl ai m was t hat Pai neWebber

caused BPE' s own l osses by f or ci ng i t t o st op t r adi ng: i f

Pai neWebber had al l owed BPE t o cont i nue t r adi ng, BPE woul d

al l egedl y have benef i t t ed f r oma mar ket r al l y i n l at e December 2000

and J anuary 2001 t hat coul d have erased t he l osses. BPE argued

t hat Pai neWebber bor e r esponsi bi l i t y not j ust f or l osi ng t he $8. 6

mi l l i on, but f or t he Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s' ent i r e j udgment agai nst

BPE, whi ch i t t hen est i mated at about $20. 5 mi l l i on. BPE sought

i ndemni f i cat i on f or t he Cahal y j udgment , cont r i but i on f or cost s and

at t or neys' f ees r el at ed t o t he Cahal y l i t i gat i on, and compensat i on

f or ot her f unds t hat i t sai d Pai neWebber wi t hhel d wr ongf ul l y f r om

BPE. I n t ot al , BPE r equest ed compensat ory damages of $29. 5

mi l l i on, al ong wi t h puni t i ve damages of $58. 9 mi l l i on, whi ch woul d

t r ebl e t he awar d sought t o $88. 4 mi l l i on.

From t he st ar t , BPE and t he st at e cour t j udge knew t hat

t he Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s der i ded t hi s posi t i on. One basi s of t hei r

argument f or assi gnment was t hat BPE' s pr oposed t heor y of r ecover y

was " mer i t l ess" and t hat t he ar bi t r at i on panel woul d "cer t ai nl y

never f i nd Pai neWebber l i abl e f or st oppi ng Car pent er f r om

cont i nui ng t o i l l egal l y t r ade t he pl ai nt i f f s ' deposi t or y f unds. "

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Once t he assi gnment was order ed, t he Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s subst i t ut ed

an amended st at ement of cl ai m based on t he t heory t hat Pai neWebber

never shoul d have al l owed Carpent er and BPE t o specul at e i n

t echnol ogy st ock opt i ons wi t h what i t knew or shoul d have known

wer e escr owed pr oper t y exchange f unds. The Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s al so

charged that Pai neWebber commi t t ed pr of essi onal mal pr act i ce i n

br oker i ng unsui t abl e specul at i ve t r ades f or BPE, and t hey cont ended

t hat t he br oker ' s f ai l ur e t o di scer n t he nat ur e of BPE' s busi ness

and st op t he t r adi ng ear l i er const i t ut ed negl i gence and br each of

f i duci ary dut i es, among ot her cl ai ms. The amended cl ai mwas st ated

at $8. 6 mi l l i on i n compensat ory damages pl us at t orneys' f ees,

cost s, and an unspeci f i ed puni t i ve amount .

The ar bi t r at i on panel r ul ed f or BPE on t he basi s of t he

amended t heor y, wi t h an award of $8. 7 mi l l i on i n compensat ory

damages al ong wi t h i nt er est and at t or neys' f ees, f or a t ot al of

$12. 7 mi l l i on, but wi t h no puni t i ve damages. The panel gave no

expl anat i on f or i t s deci si on. I n accor dance wi t h t he assi gnment

or der , t he awar d went t o the Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s t owar d sat i sf act i on

of t hei r j udgment agai nst BPE, but because t he amount was l ess t han

t he j udgment , BPE r ecei ved not hi ng.

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I I .

On December 12, 2008, BPE f i l ed t hi s compl ai nt agai nst

t he Cahal y pl ai nt i f f s and t hei r l awyer s, 4 t he I ant osca def endant s

and t he at t or ney def endant s, i n f eder al di st r i ct cour t , ci t i ng

di ver si t y j ur i sdi ct i on. As amended, t he compl ai nt cl ai med

negl i gence, br each of t he at t or ney- cl i ent dut y of car e, and br each

of f i duci ar y dut y agai nst t he at t or ney def endant s ( Count s I - I I I ) ;

negl i gence, br each of f i duci ar y dut y, and br each of cont r act

agai nst t he I ant osca def endant s ( Count s I V- VI ) ; and vi ol at i on of

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and the Connect i cut Unf ai r Trade Pr act i ces

Act ( CUTPA) agai nst al l def endant s ( Count s VI I and VI I I ) .

Under each t heory, t he der el i ct i on al l eged was t he same:

t hat t he def endant s commi t t ed these vi ol at i ons by j et t i soni ng BPE' s

cl ai m i n t he Pai neWebber ar bi t r at i on i n f avor of t he new one.

Because the ar bi t r at i on pr oduced $12. 6 mi l l i on, not t he $88 mi l l i on

sought under t he di scarded theor y, BPE asked f or t he ent i r e

4 The l awyer s are Ant hony R. Zel l e' s per sonal cor por at i on andt wo l aw f i r ms: Zel l e McDonough & Cohen, LLP, and Nyst r omBeckman &Par i s LLP. These def endant s r epr esent ed t he I ant osca def endant swhen t hey wer e pl ai nt i f f s i n t he Cahal y l i t i gat i on and cl ai mant s i nt he Pai neWebber ar bi t r at i on. Zel l e and hi s f i r m cont i nue t or epr esent t he I ant osca def endant s i n thi s appeal .

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di f f er ence of $75. 4 mi l l i on, 5 al ong wi t h puni t i ve damages of $226. 2

mi l l i on.

I n r esponse to t he def endant s' mot i ons, t he di st r i ct

cour t di smi ssed some cl ai ms but l ef t ot her s i nt act . See Bos. Pr op.

Exch. Tr ansf er Co. v. I ant osca, 686 F. Supp. 2d 138 ( D. Mass.

2010) . I t di smi ssed al l cl ai ms agai nst t he at t or ney def endant s,

hol di ng t hat t he l awyer s owed no dut y t o BPE i n conduct i ng t he

Pai neWebber ar bi t r at i on because of a pot ent i al conf l i ct of i nt er est

bet ween BPE and t hei r cl i ent s, t he I ant osca def endant s, i d. at 142-

43; and t hus BPE had f ai l ed t o st at e a cl ai m agai nst t he at t or ney

def endant s f or vi ol at i on of Chapt er 93A or CUTPA, i d. at 145. The

di st r i ct cour t di smi ssed t he CUTPA cl ai m agai nst t he I ant osca

def endant s, but decl i ned t o di smi ss t he ot her s. I d. at 143- 45.

Fol l owi ng t he di smi ssal or der , t he at t or ney def endant s

moved f or ent r y of par t i al f i nal j udgment i n t hei r f avor on al l

cl ai ms agai nst t hem, as al l owed under Fed. R. Ci v. P. 54( b) . The

di st r i ct cour t si gned t he bot t omof t he f i r st page of t hei r mot i on:

"Mot i on al l owed, " and t he ensui ng ent r y i n t he docket r epor t r ead,

" J udge Nat hani el M. Gor t on: ENDORSED ORDER ent ered grant i ng 46

Mot i on f or Ent r y of J udgment under Rul e 54( b) . . . ( Ent er ed:

5 Al t hough t he awar d r ounds t o $12. 7 mi l l i on, BPE consi st ent l yr ef er s t o t he awar d as $12. 6 mi l l i on. I n i t s compl ai nt , BPE al sost at ed t hat i t sought $88 mi l l i on i n t he Pai neWebber ar bi t r at i on,r at her t han t he act ual $88. 4 mi l l i on. I t used t hese amount s t ocal cul at e i t s sought - af t er compensat or y awar d of $75. 4 mi l l i on. Wewi l l occasi onal l y r epeat t hese r oundi ng er r or s when di scussi ngBPE' s cl ai ms, but t hey have no i mpact on t he subst ance of t he case.

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06/ 10/ 2010) . " The di st r i ct cour t di d not pr oduce a separ at e

document si gni f yi ng t hat a j udgment had been ent ered, nor di d t he

cour t make any f i ndi ngs t o support gr ant i ng t he mot i on.

Di scover y cont i nued f or t he r emai ni ng cl ai ms agai nst t he

I ant osca def endant s, and both si des f i l ed mot i ons f or summary

j udgment . BPE' s was deni ed, and t he I ant osca def endant s' was

gr ant ed as t o al l r emai ni ng cl ai ms. See Bos. Pr op. Exch. Tr ansf er

Co. v. I ant osca, 834 F. Supp. 2d 4 ( D. Mass. 2011) . The di st r i ct

cour t hel d t hat t he Super i or Cour t ' s assi gnment or der was not a

cont r act , and t hat i t i mposed no dut y t o pr osecut e BPE' s

arbi t rat i on cl ai m on i t s or i gi nal t heory. I d. at 8- 9. BPE' s

Chapt er 93A cl ai m was di scar ded f or f ai l ur e t o show t hat t he

def endant s exceeded t he scope of t he assi gnment order or act ed i n

an unf ai r or decept i ve manner . I d. at 10.

I I I .

Pr ecedi ng t he mer i t s i ssues, t her e i s a quest i on about

our appel l at e j ur i sdi ct i on over t he at t or ney def endant s. They

argue t hat BPE' s appeal was unt i mel y as t o t hem because t he

di st r i ct cour t ' s endor sement of t hei r Rul e 54( b) mot i on r i pened

i nt o a f i nal j udgment f or whi ch t he appeal per i od r an out bef or e

BPE f i l ed i t s not i ce of appeal . Thi s obj ect i on i s not wel l t aken.

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4( a) ( 1) ( A) , a not i ce of appeal

gener al l y must be f i l ed wi t hi n t hi r t y days of t he "ent r y of t he

j udgment or or der appeal ed f r om. " See al so Budi ni ch v. Bect on

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Di cki nson & Co. , 486 U. S. 196, 203 ( 1988) ( t i me l i mi t i s " mandat or y

and j ur i sdi ct i onal ") . Typi cal l y, under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, t her e i s

an appeal abl e j udgment onl y when t he di st r i ct cour t i ssues an order

t hat di sposes of al l cl ai ms agai nst al l par t i es ( wi t h some

except i ons not per t i nent her e) , "l eav[ i ng] not hi ng f or t he cour t t o

do but execut e t he j udgment . " Cat l i n v. Uni t ed St ates, 324 U. S.

229, 233 ( 1945) . Rul e 54( b) of t he Feder al Rul es of Ci vi l

Procedur e pr ovi des f or an except i on, however , under whi ch a

di st r i ct cour t can ent er par t i al f i nal j udgment r el at ed t o a subset

of t he cl ai ms or par t i es i nvol ved, but "onl y i f t he cour t expr essl y

det er mi nes t hat t her e i s no j ust r eason f or del ay. "

The at t or ney def endant s say t hat t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

"endorsed order " si gned on a page of t hei r Rul e 54( b) mot i on i s a

f i nal j udgment as t o t he cl ai ms agai nst t hem. And al t hough a

j udgment cust omar i l y r equi r es ent r y of a separ at e document i n t he

ci vi l docket , Fed. R. Ci v. P. 58( a) , under Fed. R. Ci v. P.

58( c) ( 2) ( B) , j udgment ent ers af t er 150 days have passed si nce a

j udgment or der was pl aced on t he ci vi l docket , even i f no separ at e

document was f i l ed. The at t orney def endant s t her ef ore argue t hat

j udgment i n t hei r f avor enter ed 150 days af t er t he endor sed or der ,

i n November 2010, maki ng t hi s appeal unt i mel y as t o t hem, havi ng

been f i l ed more t han a year l at er on December 12, 2011.

Thi s ar gument mi sses t he mar k, because Rul e 58( c) detai l s

when a j udgment has ent er ed, i f t i mi ng i s t he onl y quest i on, but i t

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does not address whet her a j udgment has ent ered, when t he i ssue

i mpl i cat es mor e t han t i mi ng. The j ur i sdi ct i onal quest i on her e i s

i n t he l at t er cat egory, and t o det er mi ne whet her t he endorsed order

was a j udgment , i t i s Rul e 54( b) t hat cont r ol s. By i t s t er ms t he

endorsed order was not a j udgment ; t hus, j udgment i n f avor of t he

at t or ney def endant s di d not become f i nal unt i l t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

summary j udgment order di sposed of t he r emai ni ng cl ai ms.

Rul e 54( b) r eads t hi s way:

Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving

Multiple Parties. When an act i on present smor e t han one cl ai m f or r el i ef - - whet her as acl ai m, count er cl ai m, cr osscl ai m, ort hi r d- par t y cl ai m- - or when mul t i pl e par t i esar e i nvol ved, t he cour t may di r ect ent r y of af i nal j udgment as t o one or more, but f ewert han al l , cl ai ms or par t i es onl y i f t he cour texpr essl y det er mi nes t hat t her e i s no j ustr eason f or del ay. Ot her wi se, any or der orot her deci si on, however desi gnat ed, t hatadj udi cat es f ewer t han al l t he cl ai ms or t her i ght s and l i abi l i t i es of f ewer t han al l t he

part i es does not end t he act i on as t o any of t he cl ai ms or part i es and may be revi sed atany t i me bef ore t he ent r y of a j udgmentadj udi cat i ng al l t he cl ai ms and al l t hepar t i es' r i ght s and l i abi l i t i es. ( emphasi sadded)

As t he Supr eme Cour t has put i t , a di st r i ct cour t

ent er i ng a Rul e 54( b) j udgment must go t hr ough two st eps: i t must

"det er mi ne t hat i t i s deal i ng wi t h a ' f i nal j udgment ' " t hat

pr ovi des an ul t i mat e di sposi t i on on a "cogni zabl e cl ai m f or

r el i ef , " and i t must "det er mi ne whet her t her e i s any j ust r eason

f or del ay. " Cur t i ss- Wr i ght Cor p. v. Gen. El ec. Co. , 446 U. S. 1, 7-

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8 ( 1980) ; accor d Wi l l hauck v. Hal pi n, 953 F. 2d 689, 701 ( 1st Ci r .

1991) . Thi s cour t has sai d t hat i n most cases, some conci se

f i ndi ngs "wi l l l i kel y be needed" t o expl ai n why t her e i s no j ust

r eason f or del ay, Spi egel v. Tr s. of Tuf t s Col l . , 843 F. 2d 38, 43

n. 4 ( 1st Ci r . 1988) , and i n si mpl y si gni ng hi s name t o t he at t or ney

def endant s' mot i on, t he di st r i ct j udge made no such f i ndi ngs. That

woul d be t he end of t he mat t er , save f or t he f act t hat i n at l east

t wo cases we have rel axed t he usual r equi r ement of Rul e 54( b)

f i ndi ngs i n or der t o hear an appeal i mmedi at el y i n t he i nt er est s of

j ust i ce. See Qui nn v. Ci t y of Bost on, 325 F. 3d 18, 26- 27 ( 1st Ci r .

2003) ; Fei nst ei n v. Resol ut i on Tr ust Cor p. , 942 F. 2d 34, 39- 40 ( 1st

Ci r . 1991) .

The at t or ney def endant s here ask f or si mi l ar r el axat i on

of t he bl ack- l et t er f i ndi ngs r equi r ement , but car ef ul at t ent i on t o

t hei r ci r cumst ances f ai l s t o show why t hey shoul d have i t . Rul e

54( b) can pr ove pi vot al t o t he quest i on of appel l at e j ur i sdi ct i on

i n t wo si t uat i ons. I n t he f i r st , t he di str i ct cour t di sposes of a

subset of t he cl ai ms, and t he appel l ant at t empt s t o appeal t he

or der i mmedi at el y. I n t hat si t uat i on, a val i d Rul e 54( b)

det er mi nat i on of no j ust r eason f or del ay woul d pr ovi de t he

appel l at e cour t wi t h j ur i sdi ct i on, and a tol er ance f or ar guabl y

i nadequat e f i ndi ngs woul d do t he same. By cont r ast , as i n t hi s

case, Rul e 54( b) can al so be i nvoked t o depr i ve an appel l at e cour t

of j ur i sdi ct i on, when a di st r i ct cour t di sposes of t he subset and

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t he l osi ng par t y wai t s unt i l t he concl usi on of l i t i gat i on t o

appeal . The appel l ee t hen ar gues t hat t he appeal i s unt i mel y as t o

t he cl ai ms t hat wer e di sposed of ear l i er because t he appel l ant di d

not appeal wi t hi n 30 days of t he pur port ed Rul e 54( b) order .

Our pr i or cases t r eat i ng t he r equi r ement f or a Rul e 54( b)

f i ndi ng as mal l eabl e have r est ed on concl usi ons t hat ei t her t he

publ i c or pr edomi nant equi t abl e i nt er est wei ghed i n f avor of

adj udi cat i ng t hose appeal s. See Qui nn, 325 F. 3d at 27 ( "The most

i mpor t ant f act or counsel i ng i n f avor of al l owi ng an i mmedi at e

appeal i n t hi s case i s t he publ i c i nt er est. . . . I n shor t , t he

nat ur e of t he i ssue cal l s out f or i mmedi at e r esol ut i on. ") ;

Fei nst ei n, 942 F. 2d at 40 ( "A wei ghi ng of t he f act or s r el evant t o

t he use of Rul e 54( b) t i l t s shar pl y i n f avor of al l owi ng t he

appeal s t o go f or war d. " ( ci t at i on omi t t ed) ) . 6 Whi l e we do not hol d

t hat t he r i gor of Rul e 54( b) i s di mi ni shed onl y when t he r esul t

woul d be t o enter t ai n an i mmedi at e appeal , her e we know of no

6 Ot her ci r cui t s l i kewi se have occasi onal l y r el axed t he Rul e54( b) r equi r ement s when doi ng so woul d al l ow t he cour t t o hear ani mmedi at e appeal . See, e. g. , St . Paul Fi r e & Mar i ne I ns. Co. v.Pepsi Co, I nc. , 884 F. 2d 688, 693 ( 2d Ci r . 1989) ( " [ W] e haver ecogni zed an except i on t o Rul e 54( b) ' s r equi r ement s wher e thequest i on of whet her a Rul e 54( b) cer t i f i cat e was i mpr ovi dent l ygr ant ed i s a cl ose one, [ and ther ef or e] we may decl i ne to di smi ss

t he appeal chi ef l y because we bel i eve t hat our di sposi t i on of t heappeal . . . wi l l make possi bl e a mor e expedi t i ous and j ust r esul tf or al l par t i es. " ( second and t hi r d al t er at i ons i n or i gi nal )( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ) ; Aker s v. Al vey, 338 F. 3d 491,495 ( 6t h Ci r . 2003) ( "Because t hi s case has al r eady been br i ef edand argued on appeal , however , t he scal es of j udi ci al economy ar enow t i pped i n f avor of di sposi ng of t he appeal on t he mer i t s. " ) .

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publ i c i nt er est or ot her equi t abl e ar gument f or r el axat i on of t he

usual r equi r ement of f i ndi ngs. For want of t hem, t her ef or e, t he

endor sed or der di d not qual i f y as a f i nal j udgment under Rul e

54( b) , t he t i me di d not r un f r omt he endor sement , and t he appeal i s

t i mel y now as t o al l def endant s.

I V.

Ther e i s one mor e i ssue enough i n need of at t ent i on at

t he t hr eshol d t hat we r ai se i t our sel ves, t hough we do not r esol ve

i t . We ar e puzzl ed t hat t hi s l awsui t ever ended up i n f eder al

cour t or r emai ned i n t he f eder al f or um as l ong as i t has. BPE

cl ai ms i nj ur y mai nl y under Massachuset t s l aw. I t s cl ai m has no

mer i t i f t he def endant s' act i on was aut hor i zed by t he t er ms of t he

st ate cour t assi gnment and t hat assi gnment was pr oper l y or der ed

under st at e l aw. The par t i es wer e i n l i t i gat i on bef or e t he

Massachuset t s st ate cour t s, and BPE has pr ovi ded no convi nci ng

expl anat i on f or i t s f ai l ur e t o seek resol ut i on t her e of t he scope

and pr opr i et y of t he ass i gnment order and t he def endant s'

conf or mi t y t o i t , i nst ead wai t i ng year s t o pur sue t hese mat t er s i n

f eder al cour t .

Speci f i cal l y, BPE argues t hat when t he def endant s amended

BPE' s ar bi t r at i on cl ai m agai nst Pai neWebber , t hey vi ol at ed t he

assi gnment order and br eached var i ous st at e l aw dut i es i ncumbent on

t hem as assi gnees and t hei r l awyer s. At t he t i me of t he di sput ed

amendment i n J ul y 2005, BPE and t he def endant s i n t hi s l awsui t were

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engaged i n the Cahal y l i t i gat i on bef or e t he Massachuset t s s t at e

cour t s. BPE conceded at or al ar gument ( as i t sur el y had t o) t hat

i t coul d have compl ai ned at t he t i me to t he Super i or Cour t j udge

who i ssued t he assi gnment or der , J udge Botsf or d. J udge Bot sf or d

coul d have el uci dated t he scope of t he assi gnment order and t he

st at e l aw dut i es t hat arose f r om t hat or der . I f she had r ul ed f or

t he pr esent def endant s, we woul d not be hear i ng argument now. I f

she had r ul ed i n BPE' s f avor , she woul d have been abl e t o change

t he cour se of t he Pai neWebber ar bi t r at i on bef or e i t was t oo l at e.

But BPE di d not compl ai n t o J udge Bot sf or d. I nst ead, i t passed up

any oppor t uni t y f or a r emedy i n t he Super i or Cour t at t he t i me of

t he assi gnment order and at t he t i me t he cl ai m was amended. And

af t er t he ar bi t r at i on panel pr oduced an award t hat BPE t hought was

i nsuf f i ci ent , BPE wai t ed near l y t hr ee year s and t hen br ought a new

l awsui t i n f eder al cour t , t ur ni ng on i ssues t hat coul d have been

appr opr i at el y r esol ved i n t he under l yi ng st at e l i t i gat i on but wer e

not pur sued.

I t i s besi de t he poi nt t hat Er i e Rai l r oad Co. v.

Tompki ns, 304 U. S. 64 ( 1938) , r equi r es f eder al cour t s exerci si ng

di ver si t y j ur i sdi ct i on to pr onounce on quest i ons of st at e common

l aw, f or t he i ssue posed by t hi s si t uat i on i s not how quest i ons of

st at e l aw shoul d be answered, but when t hose quest i ons shoul d be

r ai sed. When f eder al par t i es have al r eady been bef or e a st at e

cour t , and t he f eder al pl ai nt i f f had and passed up an oppor t uni t y

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f or t he st at e cour t t o r esol ve st at e l aw i ssues, why shoul d i t s

f ai l ur e t o avai l i t sel f of st at e cour t r emedi es di l i gent l y not be

t r eat ed i n f eder al cour t as a wai ver of t hose cl ai ms?7

Al t hough a st r ong argument t hus exi st s t hat BPE wai ved

st at e l aw cl ai ms t ant amount t o t hi s ent i r e l awsui t , at no poi nt i n

t he di st r i ct cour t or on appeal have t he def endant s r ai sed t he

wai ver i ssue or suggest ed t hat t hi s di sput e does not bel ong i n

f eder al cour t . We br oached t he i ssue sua spont e at or al argument ,

but counsel f or each si de seemed unpr epared t o of f er devel oped

7 Ot her f eder al cour t s have decl i ned t o adj udi cat e cl ai ms i nanal ogous ci r cumst ances. For exampl e, i n Snyder v. Of f i ce of Per sonnel Management , 136 F. 3d 1474 ( Fed. Ci r . 1998) , t he FederalCi r cui t r ej ect ed an ar gument t hat a Texas st at e cour t ' s di vor cedecr ee was i nval i d and unconst i t ut i onal . The OPM had r el i ed on t hedecree t o awar d a por t i on of t he pet i t i oner ' s ci vi l ser vi ce pensi ont o hi s ex- wi f e. I d. at 1477. The Feder al Ci r cui t decl i ned t o heart he col l at er al chal l enge t o t he st at e cour t or der because t hatchal l enge shoul d have been br ought i n st at e cour t . I d. at 1479;accor d Adl er v. Of f i ce of Per sonnel Mgmt . , 437 Fed. App' x 928, 931

( Fed. Ci r . 2011) ( "The pr oper f or um f or a const i t ut i onal chal l enget o t he Wi sconsi n Or der i s a Wi sconsi n st at e cour t . " ) .

Si mi l ar l y, i n Al l st at e I nsur ance Co. v. West Vi r gi ni a St at eBar , 233 F. 3d 813 ( 4t h Ci r . 2000) , t he Four t h Ci r cui t r ef used t ohear an at t ack on a st at e admi ni st r at i ve pr oceedi ng t hat coul d havebeen br ought i n t he st at e cour t . A West Vi r gi ni a st at e l egaldi sci pl i nar y t r i bunal had r ul ed agai nst Al l st at e f or engagi ng i nt he unaut hor i zed pr act i ce of l aw, and Al l st at e subsequent l y br oughta f eder al compl ai nt chal l engi ng t he adver se r ul i ng. I d. at 815. The Four t h Ci r cui t r ef used t o hear a const i t ut i onal chal l enge t hatAl l stat e f ai l ed t o r ai se i n t he stat e cour t , not i ng, "[ b] y f ai l i ngt o r ai se hi s cl ai ms i n st at e cour t a pl ai nt i f f may f or f ei t hi s

r i ght t o obt ai n r evi ew of t he st at e cour t deci si on i n any f eder alcour t . " I d. at 819 ( ci t i ng D. C. Cour t of Appeal s v. Fel dman, 460U. S. 462, 484 n. 16 ( 1983) ) .

Though not per f ect l y on poi nt , t hese cases provi de somesuppor t f or t he not i on t hat once t he par t i es wer e i n st at e cour t ,i t was onl y t her e t hat BPE had t he oppor t uni t y t o r ai se cl ai msr el at ed t o t he assi gnment or der .

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argument on t he mat t er . Because i t was the def endant s' bur den t o

r ai se t hi s i ssue, and t hey have not done so, i t may be unf ai r t o

deny BPE' s cl ai m on a gr ound t hat was not st at ed unt i l appel l at e

or al ar gument and to whi ch BPE was not war ned to r espond or asked

t o addr ess af t er ar gument . We wi l l t her ef ore go no f ur t her her e

t han t o caut i on counsel i n f ut ur e cases about t he r i sk of r esor t i ng

t o di ver si t y j ur i sdi cti on as a subst i t ut e f or a f or egone

oppor t uni t y i n under l yi ng st at e cour t l i t i gat i on bet ween t he same

par t i es.

V.

Addr essi ng t he mer i t s, we st ar t wi t h BPE' s appeal of t he

summary j udgment i n f avor of t he I ant osca def endant s, whi ch we

exami ne de novo, vi ewi ng the f act s and dr awi ng al l r easonabl e

i nf er ences i n f avor of t he nonmovi ng par t y ( i n t hi s case, BPE) ,

Rar ed Manchest er NH, LLC v. Ri t e Ai d of N. H. , I nc. , 693 F. 3d 48, 52

( 1st Ci r . 2012) , and af f i r mi ng onl y i f "t her e i s no genui ne di sput e

as t o any mater i al f act and t he movant i s ent i t l ed t o j udgment as

a mat t er of l aw, " Fed. R. Ci v. P. 56( a) . But because we may af f i r m

on any basi s apparent f r omt he r ecor d, Hoyos v. Tel ecor p Commc' ns,

I nc. , 488 F. 3d 1, 5 ( 1st Ci r . 2007) , i t i s unnecessar y t o r each any

of t he many di f f i cul t st at e l aw i ssues about t he exi st ence and

scope of var i ous dut i es r ai sed by BPE' s cl ai ms on appeal .

As f or t he t or t cl ai ms, we af f i r m summar y j udgment f or

t he def endant s on al l of t hem because BPE f ai l ed t o pr ovi de any

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evi dence t o meet an essent i al el ement of each: t hat t he def endant s

caused i t t o suf f er damages. 8 Ever y one of t hese causes of act i on

r equi r ed BPE t o pr ove t hat t he def endant s' r evi si on of t he

ar bi t r at i on cl ai m l ef t BPE wor se of f f i nanci al l y by some

ascer t ai nabl e amount t han woul d have been t he case i f BPE' s own

t heory of r ecover y had been pur sued. Cour t s somet i mes l i st t he

r equi r ement as a si ngl e el ement and somet i mes l i st causat i on and

damages separ at el y, but t he subst ance i s t he same: t he pl ai nt i f f

must show t hat t he def endant ' s al l egedl y tor t i ous conduct put t he

pl ai nt i f f i n a wor se posi t i on t han he woul d have been i n but f or

t he mi sdeed.

BPE says t hat t he def endant s har med i t by subst i t ut i ng an

amended ar bi t r at i on cl ai m f or i t s or i gi nal , but t he amended cl ai m

pr oduced an award of $12. 6 mi l l i on. Thus, t o pr ove causat i on of

damages, BPE woul d need t o show t hat i t woul d have recover ed mor e

t han $12. 6 mi l l i on on i t s or i gi nal t heor y. Cf . Fi shman v. Br ooks,

487 N. E. 2d 1377, 1380 ( Mass. 1986) ( "A pl ai nt i f f who cl ai ms t hat

hi s at t or ney was negl i gent i n t he pr osecut i on of a t or t cl ai m wi l l

8 See Donovan v. Phi l i p Morr i s USA, I nc. , 914 N. E. 2d 891, 898-99 ( Mass. 2009) ( negl i gence) ; Corr ei a v. Fagan, 891 N. E. 2d 227, 232( Mass. 2008) ( l egal mal pr act i ce) ; Hanover I ns. Co. v. Sut t on, 705

N. E. 2d 279, 288 ( Mass. App. Ct . 1999) ( br each of f i duci ar y dut y) ;Weeks v. Harbor Nat ' l Bank, 445 N. E. 2d 605, 607 n. 2 (Mass. 1983)( Chapt er 93A) ; St evenson Lumber Company- Suf f i el d, I nc. v. ChaseAssocs. , I nc. , 932 A. 2d 401, 406 ( Conn. 2007) ( CUTPA) ; cf .Anki ewi cz v. Ki nder , 563 N. E. 2d 684, 686 ( Mass. 1990) ( "Al l t or t sshar e t he el ement s of dut y, br each of t hat dut y, and damagesar i si ng f r om t hat br each. ") .

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pr evai l i f he pr oves t hat he pr obabl y woul d have obt ai ned a bet t er

r esul t had t he at t or ney exer ci sed adequat e ski l l and car e. ") . Thi s

means t hat i n an act i on based on al l eged mi shandl i ng of a l egal

damage cl ai m, such as l egal mal pr act i ce, i t i s essent i al t o

est abl i sh t he l i kel i hood of a bet t er r esul t had t he pr oceedi ng been

di f f er ent f r om t he def endant ' s chosen cour se.

Her e, BPE f ai l ed t o put f or war d any evi dence t hat i t s

or i gi nal ar bi t r at i on t heor y agai nst Pai neWebber had any r easonabl e

chance of l eadi ng t o a r ecover y of mor e t han $12. 6 mi l l i on.

I ndeed, t he di st r i ct cour t and appel l at e r ecor d i s not abl e f or t he

t ot al absence of any di scussi on by BPE of t he mer i t s of i t s

or i gi nal cl ai m, and t he wi t ness who spoke f or BPE as much as

admi t t ed t hat he had no evi dent i ar y basi s f or such a cont ent i on, i n

t he f ol l owi ng deposi t i on t est i mony:

Q Do you have any f act s or i nf ormat i on t hatwoul d suppor t t he cont ent i on t hat t hearbi t r at i on panel woul d have awarded more t hani t di d t o [ BPE] i f [ t he def endant s] had notamended [ t he] st at ement of cl ai m?

A The onl y f act or i nf or mat i on I have on t hati s t he f act t hat t hey di dn' t awar d mor e,because t he st at ement of cl ai m was amended.

The I ant osca def endant s cl ear l y r ai sed t hi s i ssue i n

t hei r memor andum i n suppor t of summar y j udgment . I t el i ci t ed

not hi ng more by way of r esponse t han t he f act s t hat t he def endant s

amended t he arbi t r at i on cl ai m, and t he amended cl ai m pr oduced $8. 7

mi l l i on i n compensat or y damages, or $12. 6 mi l l i on i n t ot al . I t

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shoul d be unnecessary t o poi nt out t hat an award of $12. 6 mi l l i on

on t he amended cl ai m i ndi cat es not hi ng about what t he cl ai m as

or i gi nal l y st at ed woul d have pr oduced.

Thi s hol e i n BPE' s evi dent i ar y prof f er woul d suppor t t he

j udgment i n any case, but i s al l t he mor e st r i ki ng owi ng t o t he

evi dent l y f anci f ul char act er of BPE' s or i gi nal t heor y of t or t i ous

conduct . I n t he Cahal y l i t i gat i on, t he j udge and j ur y f ound t hat

BPE commi t t ed ( i nt er al i a) br each of cont r act , conver si on, and

br each of f i duci ar y dut y by specul at i ng i n t echnol ogy st ock opt i ons

wi t h cl i ent s' escrowed f unds. Yet BPE' s or i gi nal ar bi t r at i on

posi t i on was t hat Pai neWebber shoul d be hel d l i abl e f or r ef usi ng t o

l et BPE cont i nue i t s pr oven unl awf ul t r adi ng. Not onl y t hat , but

because Pai neWebber f i nanced t he t r adi ng by pr ovi di ng BPE wi t h

" l arge amounts of margi n debt , " Pai neWebber woul d have had t o

cont i nue t o put i t s own money at r i sk t o support unl awf ul conduct

t hat was pi l i ng up r api d l osses. 9 A f i ndi ng of l i abi l i t y i n

9 Yet anot her r eason exi st s t o doubt t he pot ent i al of BPE' sor i gi nal t heor y. BPE cl ai med t hat i f i t had been al l owed t o t r adet echnol ogy st ock opt i ons f or l onger , i t coul d have r ecover ed i t sl osses i n a subsequent st ock mar ket r al l y. But t he r al l y pr ovedshor t - l i ved. We t ake j udi ci al not i ce t hat f r om December 20, 2000,t hrough J anuar y 24, 2001, t he NASDAQ Composi t e I ndex ( a l eadi ngi ndex of t echnol ogy st ocks) r ose f r om2332. 78 t o 2859. 15, a j ump of 22. 6%; yet t he i ndex t hen suf f er ed a f ur t her pl unge, dr oppi ng t o

1638. 8 on Apr i l 4, 2001; t o 1423. 19 on September 21, 2001; and t o1114. 11 on Oct ober 9, 2002 ( a dr op of 61. 0% f r om t he J anuary 2001peak) . See Yahoo! Fi nance, NASDAQ Composi t e St ock,ht t p: / / f i nance. yahoo. com/ q/ hp?s=%5EI XI C+Hi st or i cal +Pr i ces ( l astvi si t ed May 31, 2013) . BPE' s or i gi nal t heory t hus depended on t heassumpt i on t hat i t woul d have st opped t r adi ng af t er t he br i ef J anuar y 2001 r al l y, and so woul d have avoi ded t he sust ai ned decl i ne

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r esponse t o t hi s appr oach seems i nconcei vabl e t o us, and t he l ack

of any evi dence of damages seems as i nevi t abl e as i t i s f at al .

BPE' s onl y r emai ni ng i ssue on t he summary j udgment f or

t he I ant osca def endant s goes t o t he br each of cont r act cl ai m, whi ch

we addr ess separatel y because of t he Massachuset t s r ul e t hat

causat i on of damages i s not an el ement of br each of cont r act , as a

pl ai nt i f f i s ent i t l ed t o at l east nomi nal damages upon pr ovi ng a

br each. See Nat han v. Tremont St orage Warehouse, I nc. , 102 N. E. 2d

421, 423 ( Mass. 1951) . We af f i r m t hi s por t i on of t he di st r i ct

cour t ' s j udgment on t he gr ound that t he ass i gnment order was not a

cont r act . Wher eas the el ement s of a cont r act i ncl ude vol unt ar y

of f er and accept ance, Qui nn v. St at e Et hi cs Comm' n, 516 N. E. 2d 124,

127 ( Mass. 1987) , BPE di d not bar gai n f or , of f er , or accept t he

assi gnment order , whi ch was i mposed on i t over i t s st r ong

obj ect i on. The Massachuset t s cour t s have i nst r uct i vel y hel d t hat

a f or m l i st i ng pr obat i on condi t i ons i s not a cont r act because i t s

"enf or ceabi l i t y . . . i s der i ved not f r om t he agr eement of t he

def endant , but f r om t he f or ce of t he j udge' s or der . " Commonweal t h

v. MacDonal d, 736 N. E. 2d 444, 447- 48 ( Mass. App. Ct . 2000) ; accor d

Commonweal t h v. MacDonal d, 757 N. E. 2d 725, 727 ( Mass. 2001) ( "The

pr obat i on f or m i s not a cont r act . ") . By t he same t oken, t he

assi gnment or der i s not a cont r act .

t hat f ol l owed. Thi s assumpt i on of mar ket cl ai r voyance i s not whatt he r ecord suggest s.

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What we have sai d about t he f at al f l aw i n t he tor t cl ai ms

al so di sposes of t he appeal f r om t he di smi ssal on a Rul e 12( b) ( 6)

mot i on of al l cl ai ms agai nst t he at t orney def endant s and t he CUTPA

cl ai m agai nst t he I ant osca def endant s. I ant osca, 686 F. Supp. 2d

at 143- 45. I t i s t r ue t hat t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on at t he

st age of t he pr oceedi ngs bef ore summary j udgment r el i ed on t he

scope of dut y owed by l awyer s t o non- cl i ent s and t he meani ng of t he

Massachuset t s and Connect i cut consumer protect i on st atut es. But

t her e i s no need t o get t o t hese st ate l aw i ssues because even i f

t hese cl ai ms had sur vi ved a mot i on t o di smi ss, t hey woul d have

f ai l ed on summary j udgment owi ng t o BPE' s f ai l ur e t o pr ovi de

evi dence of causat i on of damages. See note 8, above. BPE' s t heor y

of damages was i dent i cal f or t he di smi ssed cl ai ms and f or t he

survi vi ng ones ( t hat i t was harmed because i t was pr event ed f r om

pr esent i ng an arbi t r at i on cl ai mt hat woul d have won more t han $12. 6

mi l l i on) , and t her e i s no r eason t o doubt t hat i t s f ai l ur e t o

pr of f er any suppor t i ng evi dence woul d have pr oven equal l y f at al t o

t he cl ai ms di smi ssed. Nei t her at summary j udgment nor i n br i ef i ng

and ar gument here has BPE suggest ed t hat t he di smi ssal as t o t he

at t orney def endant s af f ect ed access t o any i ndi cat i on of damage

causat i on or di scour aged t he pr of f er of any such evi dence. We

t her ef or e af f i r mt he di st r i ct cour t ' s di smi ssal as t o t he at t or ney

def endant s and t he CUTPA cl ai m on t he gr ound t hat t he cl ai ms

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af f ect ed woul d i nevi t abl y have f ai l ed at t he summary j udgment

st age.

Affirmed.

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boston property exchange trans v. iantosca, 1st cir. (2013)

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