1

Bosnia and Herzegovina by Dino Jahić

Capital: Sarajevo

Population: 3.8 million

GNI/capita, PPP: US$10,550

Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

National Democratic

Governance 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.75 5.75

5.75

Electoral Process 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25

Civil Society 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50

Independent Media 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75

Local Democratic

Governance 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75

4.75

Judicial Framework

and Independence 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50

4.50

Corruption 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00

Democracy Score 4.04 4.11 4.18 4.25 4.32 4.36 4.39 4.43 4.46 4.50

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report.

If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale

of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an

average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the

author(s).

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With progress practically nonexistent, the overall state of democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is

declining year after year. Politicians fail to respect the will of citizens, who are at the same time unable to

hold leaders accountable for their actions. Despite agreeing on economic and social reforms and

committing to European Union (EU) accession—and finally, after seven years, activating a Stabilization

and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in June 2015—the authorities failed to take any concrete

actions. Constant crises, produced by interparty, personal, and ethnic conflicts on all levels of governance,

are paralyzing all institutions, including the judiciary. The current system exists as a purpose unto itself,

feeding an enormous bureaucratic machine and awarding those loyal to it. This status quo, however, may

become more difficult to sustain in the future as the standby arrangement with the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) expired in July. Following the IMF’s decision not to disburse the remaining loan monies,

both the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of BiH (FBiH) turned to commercial

creditors to ensure their financial stability. The move raised criticism because not all terms of the loans

were made public. In addition, the FBiH announced that it will decrease the amount of money distributed

to cantons, which will heavily affect their functioning.

After years of constant quarreling and refusals to form a coalition, the Party of Democratic Action

(SDA) leader, Bakir Izetbegović, and Alliance for a Better Future (SBB) leader, Fahrudin Radončić,

reached a coalition agreement in October. This unlikely development suggested that they are interested in

retaining power above all other objectives. The first coalition of FBiH parties, formed in March by the

SDA, the Democratic Front (DF), and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), lasted less than 100 days; the

DF left in June. Affairs were at a standstill for most of the year, with parties waiting to appoint their

representatives into governing positions and to reach agreement on the distribution of privileges for their

members.

While the RS government is relatively stable, the ruling Alliance of Independent Social

Democrats (SNSD) and its leader Milorad Dodik called a referendum on the state-level judiciary,

potentially threatening the country’s stability. The referendum was also a convenient excuse to remove

economic problems, like the budget deficit, from the public discourse—a standard political practice in

BiH. Dodik has been undermining state institutions for years, especially the judiciary, claiming that only

Serbs get convicted for war crimes and that state judicial bodies are biased against the RS. Members of

Parliament (MPs) from SNSD boycotted sessions and blocked decision-making in the BiH parliament for

a significant part of the year, while in December RS police suspended cooperation with state institutions.

Due to overlapping jurisdictions, numerous institutions without real power, political pressures,

and a lack of will, there was little progress achieved in fighting the country’s widespread corruption. The

legal and institutional framework remains weak, enforcement is lacking, and in 2015 implementation of

several anticorruption laws was postponed because institutions were not ready. In addition,

whistleblowers usually encounter problems instead of support when reporting corruption.

Conflict of interest is not properly monitored and cases are rarely discovered. Despite many

arrests and investigations, high-profile politicians rarely get convicted, which intensifies distrust toward

the judiciary and police. The judicial system’s ineffectiveness is a serious problem, with entities failing to

implement even verdicts of the state Constitutional Court. Key evidence is often lost, while trials last for

years. According to reports from the security services, office holders and legislators collaborate with

criminals. Several scandals have revealed that judges and investigators are not immune to wrongdoings

themselves. For instance, Court of BiH judge Azra Miletić was arrested in February and accused of taking

bribes from a former cantonal police commissioner and his accomplice, who were being tried for

organized crime and abuse of office at the time.

The country’s mood is bleak, and people have little faith that positive change is possible. The

momentum of the 2014 protests has ebbed, and no significant protests sprung up in 2015. In both entities,

politicians are quick to adopt important legislation, such as labor laws, in urgent procedures, making

constructive criticism impossible. In February, RS authorities expanded the definition of “public spaces”

3

to include the internet, which now allows them to legally restrict the space for civil society activity and

journalism. This move was widely considered a blow to democracy. To prevent protests, police

throughout the country are provided with new equipment, and authorities in some parts of FBiH, like

Tuzla Canton, have limited the legal ways for people to publicly express dissatisfaction. In two separate

bills, RS authorities also attempted to take control of NGOs that are financed by international donors and

limit public gatherings. These legislative drafts were eventually withdrawn from the parliament.

During 2015, ethnic relations were much more tense than in recent years, with incidents on all

sides. In the RS, Bosniak returnees were beaten up on numerous occasions. In April, an alleged radical

Islamist attacked a police station in the Serb-dominated city of Zvornik, killing one officer and injuring

two others. In November, a gunman killed two Bosnian soldiers in Sarajevo before blowing himself up.

Authorities dealing with radical Islamism have neglected the problem for years and politicized the issue

for the purpose of everyday political fights instead of addressing root causes.

Tensions between BiH and Serbia reached a peak when police arrested former Srebrenica war

commander Naser Orić in June, based on the request of Serbian authorities. Following the arrest, SDA

president and member of BiH Presidency Bakir Izetbegović canceled the visit of Serbian President

Tomislav Nikolić, while Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia’s prime minister, was attacked with stones and water

bottles in July during a commemoration for the victims of the Srebrenica massacre. Relations between the

two countries had improved somewhat by year’s end.

Publication of the 2013 census results was further postponed during the year; this time,

authorities could not agree on how to process the data. The 2013 census was the first since 1991, and its

results will likely affect future governing structures, which are still based on 1991 ethnicity data.

Changes:

Corruption rating declined from 4.75 to 5.00 because corruption permeates all aspects of

political and social life in BiH, and anticorruption efforts are undermined by the institutions

themselves.

Outlook for 2016

Despite general commitment to EU integration and reforms, it is difficult to envisage a major

improvement in the near future in any of these areas. Should BiH authorities submit the application for

EU accession, it would be meaningless because the required conditions remain unfulfilled. The local

election campaign is expected to take up most of the year, diverting attention from dealing with the

country’s problems. It is hard to imagine a serious determination to fight corruption in the near future, but

more politicization of the judiciary, including political arrests, is quite likely.

The expiration of the IMF loan left a huge gap in the entities’ budgets, which will only increase

with the announcement of the 2016 FBiH budget that aims to send less money to cantons. For a short

time, entity governments are capable of maintaining a fragile fiscal stability while buying social peace,

but serious cuts or new arrangements with monetary institutions are necessary to keep the system

working. Otherwise, social unrest is to be expected, especially if the governing structures fail to pay civil

servants’ salaries on time.

4

MAIN REPORT

National Democratic Governance

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.75 5.75 5.75

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is divided into two autonomous administrative units: the Serb-

dominated Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of BiH (FBiH), composed of 10 cantons; and

the Brčko District, a separate unit with its own governing institutions. In the RS, the Alliance of

Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) holds a relatively stable majority and dominates the RS

government. On the state level, however, their opposition, a group led by the Serb Democratic Party

(SDS), participates in the ruling coalition, a fact that led to endless disputes throughout the year.

Unlike in the RS, where parties formed a government soon after the elections, in the other entity, the

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the parties’ inability and unwillingness to agree

postponed government formation both on the entity and state level until late March 2015. The initial

coalition consisted of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), and

Democratic Front (DF),1 but the last party left in June. In October, the SDA formed a new coalition

with their strongest opponent up to then, the Alliance for a Better Future (SBB).2 At the entity level,

the replacement of DF ministers who had left earlier caused additional delays, while at the state level,

two ministers were yet to be appointed by year’s end.

In January, the Presidency of BiH, a tripartite rotating institution, signed a Statement of Commitment

toward the European Union (EU),3 which was later confirmed by the parliament of BiH and most

party leaders. The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a key step toward EU

membership, was activated by the EU Council in April and became effective on June 1.4 Only ten

days after its coming into force, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn canceled his visit

because of the authorities’ failure to take any concrete steps as a follow-up to the January statement.5

No progress was made, for example, on outlining a coordination mechanism between all levels of

government on EU matters.6

In July, the Council of Ministers and both entity governments adopted a so-called reform agenda,

which is supposed to start a broad set of reforms in the public sector.7 As part of the process, both

entities adopted new labor laws. Unions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) protested,8

arguing that the laws go against workers’ interests.9 In FBiH, the Law on Public Servants was

amended despite warnings from NGOs and the international community that it allows for more

political appointments in managerial positions.10

Milorad Dodik, RS and SNSD president, as part of a longtime wider campaign against state-level

institutions, constantly accused others of undermining RS institutions.11

In an apparent effort to clear

his name, Dodik filed a criminal charge against himself in November and provided his opponents’

accusations as evidence.12

From the beginning of the year, SNSD withdrew its deputies from the state

parliament and blocked decision-making.13

The deputies argued they would not attend sessions while

Šefik Džaferović, an SDA member who had allegedly failed to report war crimes against Serbs,14

is

the president of the House of Representatives.15

They returned in August after Džaferović’s mandate

ended.

On July 1, the standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expired, and the IMF

decided not to pay the rest of the loan based on the authorities’ failure to implement fiscal and social

reforms. This left huge gaps in the entity budgets, forcing them to turn to commercial creditors. To

prevent social unrest and continue payments to the public sector, the FBiH planned to borrow 100

million euros16

and the RS 265 million euros. The RS loan triggered criticism because it originated

from a little-known Florida-based fund, apparently managed by a Russian citizen.17

5

In June, after former Srebrenica war commander Naser Orić was arrested in Switzerland, Bakir

Izetbegović, SDA president and member of the BiH Presidency, canceled the visit of Serbian

president Tomislav Nikolić.18

During the commemoration for the victims of the Srebrenica massacre

on July 11, protesters threw stones and water bottles at Serbian prime minister Aleksandar Vučić,

contributing to instability in the region.19

Tensions subsided in November when Izetbegović called

Nikolić to visit the Bosnian capital, and the Serbian and Bosnian governments held their first joint

session in Sarajevo, signing several agreements.20

In the same month, Vučić went to Srebrenica again

to pay respects to the victims of the massacre and promised donations in an investment summit.21

Despite plans to do so, the authorities failed to publish the results of the 2013 census as they could not

agree on data processing methods, particularly on determining residency status. The 2013 census is

the first since the war, and its results are expected to have an impact on ethnic representation in future

governing structures. 22

Electoral Process

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25

Since parliamentary elections took place in 2014 and local elections are scheduled for 2016, the year

2015 saw no major changes. Still, because elections in BiH are conducted every two years, politicians

and political parties are constantly campaigning, which exacerbates government inefficiency on all

levels.

In May, a Central Election Commission (CIK) report revealed that during the 2014 elections,

electoral committees made mistakes in 88 out of the more than 5,000 voting posts.23

Earlier in the

year, Stjepan Mikić, the president of CIK, said that the functioning of the electoral committees

constitutes the biggest problem in the electoral process and added that the Electoral Law needs to be

amended.24

Since its adoption, the law has been changed 19 times, but several deficiencies remain.

Members of electoral committees are elected from party membership (which affects their

independence), ethnicity can easily be misused to access high salaries in elected positions, and the

law still discriminates against some minorities.25

The BiH constitution allows that only the country’s three main ethnic groups—Croats, Serbs, and

Bosniaks—be elected to the state Presidency and House of Peoples. In the 2009 Sejdić-Finci case

brought by Romany and Jewish defendants, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that

this practice violates human rights norms. In 2014, the court made a similar ruling in the case of Azra

Zornić, who complained that she could not run for office because she declared herself a citizen of

BiH, with no ethnic affiliation. No concrete steps were taken in 2015 to resolve these issues.

During 2015, early elections were held in six municipalities.26

In four cases, the mayors had taken on

higher-level positions after the 2014 elections, while in two municipalities, mayors were removed by

no-confidence votes.

The newly founded RS municipality Stanari, near Doboj, held its first election in February. The

SNSD candidates won in a close race against SDS and other opposition parties, both in the municipal

council and for the mayoral position.27

Civil Society

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50

6

In February, only a few hundred people showed up to mark the anniversary of the 2014

antigovernment protests, which resulted in major civil unrest stemming from public resentment and

disappointment over the country’s failure to achieve lasting change.28

The joint July protest of trade

unions in Sarajevo against the adoption of a new FBiH Labor Law also failed to make any impact.

Union leaders were divided on the issue, and the new law was adopted on the day of the protest

without resistance.29

In the RS, a union leader was expelled from the National Assembly session

during the adoption of the same law.30

Smaller protests took place sporadically across the country,

usually led by workers of ruined companies, but did not lead to any change. In Tuzla, workers clashed

with police in August31

and blocked streets in several instances.32

Organizing protests will become more difficult overall in the future. After the 2014 demonstrations,

police departments across the country invested more than 11.5 euros million in new antiprotest

equipment, such as shields, nightsticks, tear gas, and even rubber bullets.33

In October, police

removed tents that workers set up near the Tuzla cantonal government building34

after the cantonal

assembly amended the Law on Public Gathering in a shortened procedure and without public debate.

According to the amendment, individuals may now legally protest only when they notify the

authorities in advance; protests may take place only between 8:00 am and 10:00 pm; and protests

cannot be held in proximity of public institutions.35

In February, the Law on Public Peace and Order was amended in the RS to expand the definition of

“public space” to include the internet. This change could potentially have negative effects on freedom

of assembly and allow police to put pressure on journalists as well as activists organizing protests. It

could also result in the criminalization of social media use.36

In an explanation of the amendments,

the RS government noted that “social media is being used to organize violations of the public peace

and order.”37

Incidentally, all major protests and gatherings have been organized and coordinated via

social media, including those in 2014.

In May, a draft law was proposed in RS that aimed to limit the time protesters may spend near

government institutions. After the parliamentary Committee for European Integration and Regional

Cooperation argued that it is too restrictive and would violate EU legislation, the draft was

withdrawn.38

A separate draft law—similar to a recent law in Russia—would have allowed for

government control of foreign-funded NGOs but was withdrawn after an unfavorable opinion in the

same committee. Human rights advocates strongly criticized the law, with Transparency International

(TI) arguing that its adoption would have allowed authorities to ban organizations they do not like.39

BiH still lacks a common registry of civil society organizations. Financed overall by local

governments or international donors, NGOs have little influence on policymakers and governments.

Those financed by local governments are highly dependent on politics and usually need not report on

their activities and spending. Some NGOs funded by international donors play an important watchdog

role in monitoring corruption, human rights, and governmental spending but have failed to make a

strong impact on government structures.

During the year, ethnic tensions were high in BiH. Bosniaks were attacked several times; for

example, three young men were beaten up in Prijedor in August.40

In the Croat-dominated town of

Tomislavgrad, a mosque was damaged, also in August,41

while five teenage soccer players from a

mainly Croat town were attacked in March in the predominantly Bosniak capital Sarajevo.42

The

attacks led to an increase in hate speech and calls for violence online.43

According to the Union for

Sustainable Return and Integration in BiH, the safety of returnees was worse in 2015 than in the years

following the war.44

In April, an alleged radical Islamist attacked a police station in Zvornik, in the RS, killing one officer

and injuring two others before being shot dead.45

In November, five days after the Paris terrorist

attacks, a gunman, also allegedly connected with radical Islamism, shot dead two Bosnian soldiers

and fired shots at a city bus in Sarajevo before blowing himself up in his house when police

surrounded him.46

In late December, 11 men were arrested in Sarajevo, allegedly connected with ISIS

and preparing a terrorist attack.47

7

Political, religious, and ethnic divisions are reflected in every segment of life, including in the

educational system. In FBiH, the segregated “two schools under one roof” system still persists.48

In

parts of the RS, some Bosniak parents prevented their kids from attending classes for the second year

in a row,49

protesting the lack of “national subjects” like history and language. In June, the RS

Education Ministry changed the name of the Bosnian language to “Bosniak” in official documents,

after which some parents refused to sign their children’s end-of-year reports.50

While the Office of the

High Representative (OHR) noted that the three languages in BiH are Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian

(not Bosniak),51

for years it was impossible to register a newborn as Bosnian. Infants could only be

registered as Bosniak, Serb, Croat, or “Other.” In January, this form of ethnic discrimination was

successfully challenged for the first time.52

Independent Media

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75

The Bosnian media market is oversaturated, which results in less advertising money for individual

outlets and makes media more susceptible to financial and political pressures. In 2015, 10 daily

newspapers, 8 news agencies, more than 100 print periodicals, 46 television stations, and 151 radio

stations operated in the country.53

In order to survive, many private and public outlets depend on

public financing, including advertising by public companies. This makes them easy targets for the

political centers of power and threatens their professional integrity.

Low salaries and high unemployment have been a problem in the media sector for years. Journalism

graduates, with an average monthly salary of 340 euros, are among the lowest paid degreed

professionals in the country. BiH trains around 400 new journalists or communications majors every

year, while the actual need is not even half that number.54

Two independently conducted research

papers, published in March and April, showed that political and economic pressures are the main

factors affecting the work of reporters55

and the main barriers to a free press. According to a survey,

more than two-thirds of respondents think media are not free or are only partly free in both entities.56

In July, state radio and television BHRT announced it was having liquidity problems.57

Two months

later, the institution laid off 80 people and announced it would lower salaries.58

BHRT cited the debts

of two other members of the Public Broadcasting System, entity radio and television RTRS and RTV

FBiH, and a 10-percent decrease in TV subscription tax collection as the main reasons behind the

layoffs. The problem had yet to be solved by year’s end.

Media reporting remained “deeply divided ethnically and politically,” especially in the public service

and print media, which resulted in a lack of solidarity among journalists, even when they are

threatened, and diminished their power in collective organizing.59

In 2014, 44 cases of endangering

the freedom of the press were reported,60

and the trend continued throughout 2015. In March, RS

president Dodik insulted an Oslobođenje reporter and said that he personally canceled subscriptions

to that newspaper for all RS institutions.61

In the same month, another SNSD representative called a

reporter of the Srebrenica TV station and said that they “can expect all the worst now.”62

In October,

the car of a correspondent for the public broadcaster BHRT was set on fire, following several

threats.63

Since 2006, 67 criminal offenses have been committed against journalists, but only 15

percent of the cases have been solved in their favor, and many are still pending.64

The full transition from analog to digital broadcasting was planned to be completed by June 17,

2015,65

but a bureaucratic deadlock stalled the process—the RS did not want to be jointly managed by

the three public broadcasters. As stakeholders finally agreed on equipment allocation in mid-2015,

test runs were scheduled to start, but nothing happened by the end of the year.66

The procurement

procedure for the second phase of equipment has yet to start. First, BiH authorities refused to shut

down analog transmitters because it was estimated that half of the population would be left without

8

television. However, since analog broadcasting is disrupting digital broadcasting in neighboring

countries, Bosnia had to shut down a transmitter that supplied the east of the country with programs

when Serbia complained in June.67

As a result, thousands remained without access to state television.

In its annual report, the BiH Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) noted there were 2.78

million internet users at the end of 2015, which is 72 percent of BiH’s population.68

Thanks to the

widespread use of smartphones, there is a rise in consumption of media over the internet. The number

of websites is constantly increasing, but ownership of online media is unregulated and there is no

effective oversight. In many cases, owners are unknown and often even basic contact information is

lacking, which allows for political control and copyright violations.69

The director-general of the CRA has been serving in an acting capacity since 2007. In 2014, the CRA

Council selected a new director, but the Council of Ministers never confirmed the appointment.

Instead, in December 2015, they appointed a new interim director—a prominent SDS party figure—

which is worrying in terms of the regulator’s political independence.

Local Democratic Governance

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75

The rights of cities and municipalities are protected by entity constitutions and the laws on local self-

governance. Ten cantons—the levels of power between municipalities and FBiH—were supposed to

harmonize their legislation with the entity law, but progress has been slow. By 2015, only two had

done so.70

This led to unclear distribution of power and overlapping jurisdictions in certain areas, like

the judiciary and management of natural resources, but no implementable solution seems to be in

sight.

Local self-governments are financed from several sources, including local revenues and taxes, as well

as grants, transfers, and donations from higher up. The last makes them highly dependent and subject

to political pressure. Tax incomes, grants, and transfers declined in both entities between 2011 and

2013, but especially in the municipalities and cities of the RS.71

At the same time, the cost of salaries

has been rising in most local governments,72

which threatens financial sustainability.

In terms of financing, the BiH capital Sarajevo has had a special position. Until 2014, it had been

financed by Sarajevo Canton, but this practice discontinued with the adoption of the new FBiH Law

on Public Revenues in 2014. In September, the Sarajevo mayor said the capital would sue the canton

for endangering its functioning and asked to be included in the FBiH budget.73

In November, the

FBiH government agreed to include Sarajevo74

but announced a decrease in financial transfers to

smaller and financially less sustainable cantons, which can potentially lead to their collapse.75

In a separate unresolved issue, the city of Mostar lacked legally elected representatives as of year’s

end. Due to a 2010 Constitutional Court ruling that noted the Mostar Statute is discriminatory, the

city has failed to hold elections since 2008. In addition to the statute, the Electoral Law should also be

amended, but Bosniak and Croat politicians, especially the members of ruling SDA and HDZ parties,

have been unable to reach an agreement.76

In June, a paper by the Centers for Civic Initiatives showed that only one-fifth of BiH cities and

municipalities provide transparent and up-to-date information. Most of their websites are outdated,

have little content, and are often used to promote their leaders and local politicians instead of

publishing relevant information on local services. About ten local governments do not have

websites.77

In July, TI published preliminary results of research noting that local self-governments lack the

instruments and capacity, as well as support from higher levels, to fight corruption.78

9

Judicial Framework and Independence

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50

With four separate administrative levels (BiH, RS, FBiH, and the Brčko District), conflicts of

jurisdiction are frequent, and the court system is plagued by backlogs, lack of staff, and political

pressures. Trials are stalled for years while courts and prosecutors’ offices send important cases back

and forth, not wanting to take responsibility for them. An investigation of alleged fraud at Bobar

bank, for example, had been passed around by several prosecutors—the Bijeljina District, RS

Republic, and RS Special prosecutors’ offices—before ending up at the BiH Prosecutor’s Office in

June.79

Throughout the year, RS authorities continued to oppose state judicial institutions. In July, the RS

National Assembly voted to stage a referendum on “anti-constitutional and unauthorized laws

imposed by the high representatives of the international community in BiH, especially the imposed

laws on the Court and the Prosecutor’s office of BiH, and application of their decisions on the RS

territory.”80

The reason behind the call was allegedly the Swiss authorities’ extradition of former

Srebrenica commander Naser Orić, who is suspected of war crimes, to BiH instead of Serbia.81

RS

president Dodik argued that the judiciary is biased against the RS, as shown by the fact that the

majority of those charged with war crimes are Serbs.82

The plan to hold a referendum met with

extensive criticism. In September, High Representative for BiH Valentin Inzko sent a report to the

UN accusing the RS of violating the Dayton Peace Agreement; the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo said

that “nothing good” can come out of it; while the EU Delegation noted that the referendum is shifting

attention from more important social and economic issues. Bosniak representatives added that it

might be a first step towards the secession of the RS.83

Despite plans for the referendum to take place

in November, its date had not been set by year’s end.

Dodik already launched a similar initiative in 2011 but eventually stepped back thanks to EU

engagement and the so-called Structured Dialogue on Justice. The dialogue was supposed to make the

judicial system more independent, effective, and accountable, but little has been achieved in practice.

A 2012 draft Law on the Courts of BiH included the establishment of a state-level Appeals Court,

which never came to fruition because RS authorities did not want the state to have such extensive

jurisdiction. This postponed the adoption of the “Strategy for Justice Sector Reform 2014–2018” and

led the EU to stop payments of a grant assisting war crimes prosecutions in early 2015.84

The strategy

was finally adopted in September,85

and the representatives of BiH agreed on continuing with the

Structured Dialogue. RS authorities drafted their own Law on Courts of BiH in August, and now the

key discussion in the Dialogue is about the jurisdiction and role of the state court.86

A November verdict of the BiH Constitutional Court that banned Republika Srpska Day (held on

January 9) exemplified the judiciary’s politicization. The initiative came from Bosniak politicians

who said the date has a positive meaning only for Serbs. RS politicians decided to ignore the court’s

decision. In December, after the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) conducted an

action at the police and municipality buildings of the RS town Novi Grad, the RS government decided

to stop all cooperation with state police and judicial bodies.87

RS Police Minister Dragan Lukač even

said they would use weapons if weapons were pointed at them.88

Tensions subsided by year’s end,

and police structures resumed cooperation.

Prosecutions, especially high-profile cases, are often unsuccessful because of procedural mistakes,

such as the disappearance of original documents. Key documents went missing in a 2005 case against

Milorad Dodik and a 2010 case against member of BiH Presidency Dragan Čović.89

In November,

one state prosecutor received a 20-percent salary cut for three months because she had failed to take a

single action for almost eight years in the two war crimes cases she had been adjudicating.90

10

The judicial system is overwhelmed with old cases. Besides war crimes cases—with more than 1,200

investigations ongoing as of 201591

and additional cases launched against unknown assailants—the

highest number of pending cases are connected to 1.8 million unpaid utility bills, 49 percent in

Sarajevo Canton.92

In addition, authorities in both entities have failed to implement 91 verdicts of the

Constitutional Court since 2004. The court transferred these cases to the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH,

but no indictments had been raised by year’s end.93

In 2015, several judicial employees ran afoul of the law, including three judges.94

An investigator of

the state Prosecutor’s Office, Mujo Smajlović, was accused in October of taking a bribe and offering

special treatment to suspects and defendants.95

Earlier, in February, Court of BiH judge Azra Miletić

was arrested on allegations of taking bribes from former Una-Sana Canton police commissioner

Ramo Brkić, who had been on trial for organized crime, the production and sale of narcotics, and

abuse of office. Her colleague, Dragica Miletić, was indicted and suspended in the same month for

abuse of office while working for the BiH Attorney General. She was acquitted later in the year.

Corruption

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00

The Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption

(APIK) was founded in 2009, but its functioning has been undermined from the start. The agency is in

charge of implementing the Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption 2015–2019 and its Action Plan,

which were adopted in May after five months of delay.96

Still, since the previous strategy is far from

being fully implemented, no major progress can be expected. In June, APIK director Sead Lisak said

that based on the reports they receive, corruption is mostly widespread in the public administration,

healthcare, education, judiciary, and police.97

Later in the year, Lisak added that he is unsatisfied with

the work of the police and prosecutors.98

Conflict of interest at the state level has not been monitored since 2013, when the government

transferred this jurisdiction from the Central Election Commission (CIK) to a commission dominated

by members of the state parliament. The change was widely criticized as an impediment to effective

control. In October, the FBiH parliament amended the FBiH Conflict of Interest Law and made the

state commission responsible for its implementation as well.99

Since its formation, however, the

commission has yet to take any formal steps. Another hindrance is that conflict of interest laws

among different levels of governance are not harmonized, and while information on politicians’ assets

is collected by the CIK, it is not published or checked by any institution.100

Despite recommendations

from the Ombudsman’s Office, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council has declined to disclose

prosecutors’ and judges’ asset declarations, which damages public trust in the transparency of the

judiciary.101

Whistleblower protection is insufficient; the law on whistleblower protection has been adopted only

at the state level, and individuals are afraid to report corruption because of threats. APIK received

seven requests for whistleblower status in 2015, but following additional checks, approved only two

as valid.102

As a positive development, an individual who was fired after reporting corruption in the

BiH Office for Indirect Taxation regained his employment thanks to his whistleblower status.103

FBiH lawmakers approved a set of laws on corruption in 2014, including laws on the prevention of

corruption and organized crime, on confiscation of illegally acquired property, and amendments to the

laws on criminal proceedings and courts. Their implementation was scheduled to start in January

2015 but was postponed due to lack of “material, technical and infrastructural capacities,”104

which

shows that the institutions were unprepared.

In the RS, the National Assembly concluded that the 2014 recordings of RS prime minister Željka

Cvijanović—allegedly discussing the bribing of MPs to secure a majority for her SNSD party—were

11

published with the aim of “destabilizing” the RS and the constitutional order. The SNSD-dominated

assembly claimed there was no political corruption105

but declined to discuss the content of the

recordings. TI noted that while in 2014 RS police said the tapes were fake, the Special Prosecutor’s

Office notified TI in April 2015 that no forensic investigation took place.106

Former FBiH president Živko Budimir and his associates were arrested in 2013 for allegedly illegally

pardoning criminals, but their trial did not begin until two years later. They are charged with

corruption, abuse of office, and illegal mediation.107

In July, the FBiH Law on Pardons was amended

to allow the FBiH president to issue pardons without prior consultation with vice presidents and to

issue duplicate pardons to the same people—exactly what Budimir did while in office and the offense

for which he now stands trial.108

According to the Report on the State Security in BiH, civil servants, office holders, and legislators

collaborate with criminals in exchange for cash or other services.109

Several high-level cases were

under investigation in 2015, but similar cases in the past demonstrated a will to investigate more than

a real effort to prosecute corrupt officials. In July, the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH indicted state

Minister of Defense Marina Pendeš for paying a salary to her HDZ party colleague and former

member of the BiH Presidency Ivo Miro Jović despite never showing up to work.110

In September,

People’s Party Work for Betterment leader Jerko Ivankovic Lijanovic was arrested on suspicion of

abuse of office during his time as FBiH minister of agriculture.

AUTHOR: DINO JAHIĆ

Dino Jahić is a journalist, editor, and media trainer in Sarajevo and Belgrade. He is a graduate of the

journalism department of the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo.

1 Srecko Latal , “Bosnia Beats Deadline to Form New Governments”, Balkaninsight.com, 1 April 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-gets-new-governments-budget-at-minute-to-twelve 2 Mimi Đurović Rukavina,“Dogovorena koalicija između SDA i SBB na svim nivoim, potpisivanje slijedeće

sedmice” [SDA-SBB Coalition Agreed on all Levels, Signing in the Next Week], Oslobodjenje.ba, 14 October

2015, http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/novi-sastanak-izetbegovica-i-radoncica-o-formiranju-vlasti-u-fbih 3 E.S.H.,“Članovi Predsjedništva BiH potpisali izjavu o opredjeljenosti ka Evropskoj uniji” [Members of Presidency

of BiH Signed a Statement on Commitment Towards European Union], Klix.ba, 29 January 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/clanovi-predsjednistva-bih-potpisali-izjavu-o-opredijeljenosti-ka-evropskoj-

uniji/150129111 4 While the SAA was signed in 2008, it did not come into force due to unfulfilled commitments, including important

constitutional changes related to the country’s ethnicity-based limitations on political representation. In 2014, the

EU shifted its focus to economic issues, social welfare, and the judiciary. 5 “Johannes Hahn otkazao posjetu BiH: Vlasti moraju interese građana staviti ispred stranačkih” [Johannes Hahn

cancelled visit to BiH: Authorities Have to Place Citizens’ Interests Before Parties’ Interests], Klix.ba, 10 June

2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/johannes-hahn-otkazao-posjetu-bih-vlasti-moraju-interese-gradjana-staviti-

ispred-stranackih/150610124 6 “Rad Vlada godinu dana nakon izbora” [Work of Governments, a Year After Elections], Istinomjer.ba, 13 October

2015, http://istinomjer.ba/rad-vlada-godinu-dana-nakon-izbora/ 7 Elvira M. Jukic, Srecko Latal, “Bosnian State, Entities, Adopt Key Reforms”, Balkaninsight.com, 24 July 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/as-bosnia-adopts-reform-documents-unions-plan-strikes 8 Zvjezdan Živković,“Sarajevo: Usvojen Zakon o radu, završen protest radnika” [Labour Law Adopted, Protest of

Workers Over], Slobodnaevropa.org, 30 July 2015, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/u-sarajevu-protesti-

zbog-novog-zakona-o-radu/27160282.html 9 “Provisions and the adoption method of the Labour Law of the Republic of Srpska are unaccaptable”, Ti-bih.org,

25 December 2015, http://ti-bih.org/neprihvatljive-odredbe-nacin-usvajanja-zakona-o-radu-rs/?lang=en 10

E. Mušinović, “Uoči današnje sjednice: Žestoke kritike na Prijedlog Zakona o državnoj službi FBiH” [Before

Todays’ Session: Strong Criticism on the Draft of the Law on Public Servants], Klix.ba, 23 October 2015,

12

http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/uoci-danasnje-sjednice-zestoke-kritike-na-prijedlog-zakona-o-drzavnoj-sluzbi-

fbih/151022142 11

“Milorad Dodik:Srbija i Republika Srpska će biti jedno” [Milorad Dodik: Serbia and Republic of Srpska Will Be

One], Blic.rs/SRNA, 18 October 2015, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/599206/Milorad-Dodik-Srbija-i-Republika-

Srpska-ce-biti-jedno 12

“Dodik podnio tužbu protiv sebe” [Dodik sued himself], Klix.ba/FENA, 2 November 2015,

http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-podnio-tuzbu-protiv-sebe/151102080 13

Elvira M. Jukic, Srecko Latal, “Serb Party Boycott Deepens Bosnia’s Paralysis”, Balkaninsight.com, 18 March

2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serb-party-risks-sanctions-for-new-blockades 14

“Poslanici SNSD-a napustili sjednicu Predstavničkog doma PSBiH” [SNSD PMs Left Session of the House of the

Representatives], Klix.ba/FENA, 23 February 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/poslanici-snsd-a-napustili-

sjednicu-predstavnickog-doma-psbih/150223047 15

Parliament of BiH contains two chambers: House of Representatives and House of Peoples. 16

N.N.,“Vlasti potvrdile: FBiH će se zadužiti kod komercijalnih banaka za 200 miliona KM” [Authorities

Confirmed: FBiH will take 200 million of KM from Commercial Banks], Klix.ba, 17 September 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vlasti-potvrdile-fbih-ce-se-zaduziti-kod-komercijalnih-banaka-za-200-miliona-

km/150917063 17

Srecko Latal, “Bosnian Serb Leaders Under Fire Over Loan”, Balkaninsight.com, 16 October 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-loan-for-bosnian-serb-entity-triggers-controversy-10-16-2015 18

Srecko Latal, “Bosnia-Serbia Relations Hit as Nikolic Cancels Visit”, Balkaninsight.com, 16 June 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/tensions-deepen-in-relations-between-bosnia-and-serbia 19

Denis Dzidic, Katarina Panic, “Attack on Vucic at Srebrenica Widely Condemned”, Balkaninsight.com, 13 July

2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vucic-srebrenica-attack-brings-new-instability-for-region 20

Rodolfo Toe, „Serbia, Bosnia Pledge Closer Ties After Tensions“, Balkaninsight.com, 4 November 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-bosnia-vow-to-boost-ties-after-tensions-11-04-2015 21

„Vucic visits Srebrenica memorial center“, B92.net, 11 November 2015,

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=11&dd=11&nav_id=96015 22

N.N.,“Potvrđeno: Kasnit će objava rezultata popisa stanovništva” [Confirmed: Publishing of Census Results will

be Late], Klix.ba, 21 May 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/potvrdjeno-kasnit-ce-objava-rezultata-popisa-

stanovnistva/150521084 23

“Usvojen izvještaj o nepravilnostima u radu biračkih odbora” [A Report on Irregularities in Work of Electoral

Committees Adopted], Izbori.ba, 7 May 2015, http://izbori.ba/Default.aspx?CategoryID=64&Lang=3&Id=1744 24

“Mikić: Potrebne izmjene izbornog zakona” [Mikic: Changes of Electoral Law Needed], Nezavisne.com/SRNA, 5

February 2015, http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Mikic-Potrebne-izmjene-izbornog-zakona/287366 25

Aida Đugum,“Slabe karike izbornog zakona: Od manipulacije glasovima do korupcije” [Weak Parts of Electroal

Process: From Manipulation With Votes to Corruption], Slobodnaevropa.org, 6 March 2015,

http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/slabe-karike-izbornog-zakona-od-manipulacija-glasovima-do-

korupcije/26885908.html 26

Early Elections 2015: Results for Fojnica, Živinice, Kalesija, Domaljevac-Šamac, Stanari and Istočni Drvar, http://izbori.ba/Default.aspx?CategoryID=544&Lang=3 27

Early Elections 2015: Results for Stanari,

http://izbori.ba/Rezultati/2015/Prijevremeni_izbori_1/potvrdjeni/files/Glavni_report_trka_8_opstina_040.html 28

I.P.,“Stotine građana u BiH obilježilo godišnjicu februarskih protesta” [Hundreds of Citizens Marked Anniversary

of February Protests], Klix.ba, 7 February 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/stotine-gradjana-u-bih-obiljezilo-

godisnjicu-februarskih-protesta/150207035 29

Zvjezdan Živković,“Sarajevo: Usvojen Zakon o radu, završen protest radnika” [Labour Law Adopted, Protest of

Workers Over], Slobodnaevropa.org, 30 July 2015, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/u-sarajevu-protesti-

zbog-novog-zakona-o-radu/27160282.html 30

“VIDEO: Ranka Mišić izbačena iz sale Narodne Skupštine RS”, [Ranka Misic Expeled From the National

Assembly], N1info,com, 28 December 2015, http://ba.n1info.com/a75439/Vijesti/Vijesti/VIDEO-Ranka-Misic-

izbacena-iz-sale-Narodne-skupstine-RS.html 31

“Tuzla: Radnici TTU-a se sukobili sa policijom ispred zgrade Vlade TK” [Tuzla: TTU Workers Clashed With

Police in front of the Tuzla Government Building], Klix.ba, 13 August 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tuzla-

radnici-ttu-a-se-sukobili-sa-policijom-ispred-zgrade-vlade-tk/150813032

13

32

D. Brkić,“Radnici Aide se naguravali s policijom, Bego Gutić napustio Vladu TK” [Aida Workers Pushed Police,

Bego Gutic Left Tuzla Canton Government], Klix.ba, 16 March 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/radnici-aide-se-

naguravali-s-policijom-bego-gutic-napustio-vladu-tk/150316069 33

Semir Mujkić, “Vlasti u strahu: Za gušenje građanskih nemira policiji kupljena oprema vrijedna 23 miliona KM”

[Authorities in Fear: For Suppression of Citizens’ Unrest Police got Equipment Worth 23KM million], Zurnal.ba, 8

Januray 2015, http://zurnal.ba/novost/18625/vlasti-u-strahu-za-gusenje-gradanskih-%20nemira-policiji-kupljena-

oprema-vrijedna-23-miliona-km 34

M.H,“Policija uklonila šatorsko naselje sindikata solidarnosti u Tuzli” [Police Removed Tents of the Solidarity

Sindicate in Tuzla], Klix.ba, 17 October 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/policija-uklonila-satorsko-naselje-

sindikata-solidarnosti-u-tuzli/151017008 35

“Tuzla: Izmjene i dopune Zakona o javnom okupljanju” [Tuzla: Changes and Additions to the Law on Public

Gathering], Bhrt.ba, 2 October 2015, http://www.bhrt.ba/bhr1-emisije/tuzla-izmjene-i-dopune-zakona-o-javnom-

okupljanju/ 36

“Newly Adopted Legislation Criminalises Posts on Social Media”, Civilrightsdefenders.org, 9 February 2015,

http://www.civilrightsdefenders.org/news/newly-adopted-legislation-threatens-freedom-of-expression/ 37

Government of Republic of Srpska, “Prijedlog Zakona o javnom redu i miru”, [Draft Law on Public Peace and

Order], December 2014, http://www.cenzolovka.rs/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Prijedlog-Zakona-o-javnom-redu-i-

miru-RS.pdf 38

Uroš Vukić, “Pao zakon o javnom okupljanju” [Law on Public Gathering not Adopted], Nezavisne.com, 18 May

2015, http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Pao-zakon-o-javnom-okupljanju/305833 39

“Severe Blow to the Work of NGOs”, Ti-bih.org, 11 May 2015, http://ti-bih.org/udar-na-rad-nevladinih-

organizacija/?lang=en 40

“Trojica mladića Bošnjaka vrijeđani i pretučeni u Prijedoru” [Three Young Bosniaks Insulted and Beaten up in

Prijedor], Klix.ba, 12 August 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/crna-hronika/trojica-mladica-bosnjaka-vrijedjani-i-

pretuceni-u-prijedoru/150812123 41

“Osumnjičenima za napad u Omerovićima određen pritvor” [Suspects for the Attack in Omerovici in Custody],

Klix.ba/FENA, 18 August 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/osumnjicenima-za-napad-u-omerovicima-odredjen-

pritvor/150818090 42

Elvira M. Jukic, “Hooligan Attack Raises Ethnic Tensions in Bosnia”, Balkaninsight.com, 16 March 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hooligan-attack-raises-ethnic-tensions-in-bosnia 43

“Zajednička reakcija BHN, HND i NUNS nakon događaja u Zvoniku” [Joint Reaction of BHN, HND and NUNS

After Zvornik Events], Bhnovinari.ba, 29 April 2015, http://www.bhnovinari.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=745%3Azajednika-reakcija-bhn-hnd-i-

nuns-a-nakon-dogaaja-u-zvorniku&catid=62%3Asaopenja&Itemid=240&lang=bs 44

E.F.,“Povratnici ugroženiji sada nego u prvim godinama nakon rata” [Returnees are More Endangered Now than

in First Years After the War], Klix.ba, 21 July 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/povratnici-ugrozeniji-sada-nego-

u-prvim-godinama-nakon-rata/150721073 45

Elvira M. Jukic, “Bosnia Police Station Attack Raises Ethnic Tensions”, Balkaninsight.com, 28 April 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/deadly-terrorist-attack-on-police-station-raises-ethnic-tensions-across-

bosnia 46

“’Islamist’ gunman kills two Bosnian soldiers in Sarajevo”, Bbc.com, 19 November 2015,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34866890 47

Dženana Halimović, “Hapšenjima u Sarajevu spriječen eventualni teroristički napad” [Arrests in Sarajevo

Prevented a Potential Terrorist Attack], Slobodnaevropa.org, 22 December 2015,

http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/hapsenja-sarajevo-terorizam-federalna-uprava-policije/27442531.html 48

Croat and Bosniak children study in the same building but have separate entrances, classrooms, and curricula. 49

Nataša Tadić, “Roditelji djece iz Konjević Polja najavili bojkot nastave” [Parents of the Konjevic Polje Children

Announced Boycott of the Classes], Ba.n1info.com, 18 August 2015, http://ba.n1info.com/a58619/Vijesti/Vijesti/Djeca-iz-Konjevic-Polja-nastavu-pohadjaju-u-sklopu-vjerskog-

objekta.html 50

Katarina Panic, “Bosnian Serbs’ Renaming of Language Anger Bosniaks”, Balkaninsight.com, 25 June 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-s-serb-entity-change-of-language-name-upsets-bosniaks 51

Er.M.,“Stav OHR-a jasan: Tri službena jezika u BiH su bosanski, hrvatski i srpski” [OHR Attitude Clear: Three

Official Languages in BiH are Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian], Klix.ba, 17 October 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/stav-ohr-a-jasan-tri-sluzbena-jezika-u-bih-su-bosanski-hrvatski-i-srpski/150623075

14

52

Elvira M. Jukic, “Bosnian Baby Beats Ethnically Divided System”, Balkaninsight.com, 23 June 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-baby-beats-ethnically-divided-system 53

“Print media in BiH”, Press Council of BiH, Vzs.ba, January 2016,

http://www.vzs.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=5&Itemid=8; “Licences”, Communications

Regulatory Agency, Rak.ba, January 2016, http://rak.ba/eng/index.php?uid=1276851773 54

“Working Conditions for Journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Journalists in a Gap Between Devastated Media

and Legal Insecurity”, Media.ba, February 2015, http://www.media.ba/sites/default/files/working_conditions_bosnia_and_herzegovina_march_2015.pdf 55

Ibid. 56

“Predstavljeni rezultati istraživanja ‘Mediji u BiH 2015: medijske slobode, profesionalizam i izazovi’” [Results of

the Research ‘Media in BiH 2015: Media Freedom, Profesionalism and Chalenges’ Presented], Bhnovinari.ba, 3

May 2015, http://www.bhnovinari.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=748%3Apredstavljeni-

rezultati-istraivanja-qmediji-u-bih-2015-medijske-slobode-profesionalizam-i-

izazoviq&catid=63%3Adogaaji&Itemid=241&lang=bs 57

“BHRT: Konstantan pad naplate RTV takse” [BHRT: Constant Drop in Collection of TV Tax], Klix.ba/FENA, 16

July 2015, http://www.klix.ba/biznis/bhrt-konstantan-pad-naplate-rtv-takse/150716092 58

“Zbog finansijske krize na BHRT-u bez posla ostalo 80 radnika” [Thanks to Financial Crises on BHRT, 80

Employees Were Fired], Klix.ba, 22 September 2015, http://www.klix.ba/biznis/zbog-finansijske-krize-na-bhrt-u-

bez-posla-ostalo-80-radnika/150922027 59

“Working Conditions for Journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Journalists in a Gap Between Devastated Media

and Legal Insecurity”, Media.ba, February 2015, http://www.media.ba/sites/default/files/working_conditions_bosnia_and_herzegovina_march_2015.pdf 60

“E-novinar Newsletter”, Bhnovinari.ba, June 2015, http://bhnovinari.ba/images/stories/pdf/enovinar/bhn_e-

novinar-juni2015__.pdf 61

“Radojičić ostao kod kuće, Vasić u prvim redovima, Dodik zabranio ’Oslobođenje’” [Radojicic Stayed at Home,

Vasic in Front Rows, Dodik Forbid Oslobodjenje], Klix.ba, 14 March 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/snsd-

radojicic-ostao-kod-kuce-vasic-u-prvim-redovima-dodik-zabranio-oslobodjenje/150314040 62

“Saopćenje o prijetnjama novinaru Marinku Sekuliću” [Press Release on Death Threats to Journalist Marinko

Sekulic], Bhnovinari.ba, 16 May 2015, http://www.bhnovinari.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=722%3Asaopenje-o-prijetnjama-

novinaru-marinku-sekuliu&catid=62%3Asaopenja&Itemid=240&lang=bs 63

“Emil Karamatić: Paljevina mog automobila je rezultat mog cjelokupnog rada” [Emir Karamatic: Burning my Car

is the Result of my Pverall Work], Faktor.ba, 7 October 2015, http://faktor.ba/emil-karamatic-paljevina-mog-

automobila-je-rezultat-mog-cjelokupnog-rada/ 64

“Osuda napada na novinara Emila Karamatića” [Condemnation of the Attacks on Journalist Emir Karamatic],

Bhnovinari.ba, 7 October 2015, http://www.bhnovinari.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=827%3Aosuda-napada-na-novinara-

emila-karamatia&catid=62%3Asaopenja&Itemid=240&lang=bs 65

“Digital broadcasting set to transform communication landscape by 2015”, Itu.int, 16 June 2006, https://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2006/11.html 66

“Do kraja godine testni DVB-T signal” [Test DVB-T Signal by the End of the Year], Teve.ba/BHT1, 1 October

2015, http://teve.ba/article/21767/do-kraja-godine-testni-dvb-t-signal 67

“BiH jedina u Evropi bez digitalne tv” [BiH Only Country in Europe Without Digital TV], Teve.ba/BHT1, 18

June, 2015, http://teve.ba/article/21129/bih-jedina-u-evropi-bez-digitalne-tv 68

“Godišnji izvještaj Regulatorne agencije za komunikacije za 2015. godinu” [Annual Report of the

Communications Regulatory Agency for 2015], Rak.ba, Communications Regulatory Agency, April 2016, 5

http://rak.ba/bos/index.php?uid=1272548129 69

“Transparentnost vlasništva nad online medijima u BiH” [Transparency of the Ownership of Online Media in

BiH], Internews.ba, 2015, http://internews.ba/sites/default/files/resursi/transparentnost%20vlasnistva%20nad%20online%20medijima%20u%2

0bih.pdf 70

“Pregled finansija lokalne samouprave u BiH” [Overview of the BiH Local Self-Governments Financing], Cpi.ba,

February 2015, http://www.cpi.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Pregled-finansija-lokalne-samouprave.pdf 71

Ibid. 72

Ibid.

15

73

Jasna Demirović, “Nema novca za Grad Sarajevo, ko je kriv?” [NoMoney for the City of Sarajevo, Who to

Blame?], Ba.n1info.com, 3 September 2015, http://ba.n1info.com/a59008/Vijesti/Vijesti/Problem-finansiranja-

Grada-Sarajeva.html 74

“Riješen problem finansiranja Grada Sarajeva: Manje novca za kantone, posebno za KS” [Problem of City of

Sarajevo financing solved: Less money for cantons, especially SarajevoCanton], Klix.ba, 5 November 2015,

http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/rijesen-problem-finansiranja-grada-sarajeva-manje-novca-za-kantone-posebno-za-

ks/151105058 75

S.H., “Finansijski neodrživi kantoni u 2016. godini od Vlade FBiH neće dobiti pomoć, prijeti im kolaps”

[Financially unsustainable cantons will not receive help from the FBiH Government in 2016, there is a threat for

their collapse], Klix.ba, 18 November 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/finansijski-neodrzivi-kantoni-u-2016-

godini-od-vlade-fbih-nece-dobiti-pomoc-prijeti-im-kolaps/151118081 76

Vera Soldo, “Mostar bez glasa Mostaraca” [Mostar Without the Votes of its Citizens], Dw.com, 6 August, http://www.dw.com/hr/mostar-bez-glasa-mostaraca/a-18632318 77

“Samo petina lokalnih samouprava u BiH redovno objavljuju informacije od javnog značaja za građane” [Only

One Fifth of Local Self-Governments Publish Information of Public Importance for Caitizens on Regular Bases],

CCI.ba, 17 June 2015, http://cci.ba/media/1/39/298.html 78

“Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Bobar Banka case”, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucasio, 20 August 2015,

http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-The-Bobar-Banka-case-

163488 79

“BiH municipalities must adopt plans for the fight against corruption”, Ti-bih.org, 20 July 2015,

http://ti-bih.org/opstine-u-bih-moraju-usvojiti-planove-za-borbu-protiv-korupcije/?lang=en / 80

“Objavljeno u službenom glasniku: Referendum u RS-u 15. novembra” [Published in the Official Gazette: RS

Referendum on November 15], Klix.ba, 25 September 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/objavljeno-u-sluzbenom-

glasniku-referendum-u-rs-u-15-novembra/150925018 81

Denis Dzidic, “Bosnia Confirms Indictment of Srebrenica Commander Oric”, Balkaninsight.com, 10 September

2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-confirms-oric-indictment-09-10-2015 82

Elvira M. Jukic, “Bosnian Serbs to Hold Referendum on State Courts”, Balkaninsight.com, 16 July 2015,

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbs-to-hold-referendum-over-state-judiciary 83

“Inzko obavijestio UN: Republika Srpska krši Dejtonski sporazum” [Inzko Notified UN: RS is Breaking Dayton

Agreement], Slobodna-bosna.ba, 17 September 2015, http://www.slobodna-

bosna.ba/vijest/23956/inzko_obavijestio_un_republika_srpska_krsi_dejtonski_sporazum.html; “Ambasada SAD-a:

Iz ovog referendum ne može proizaći ništa dobro” [US Embassy: Nothing Good can Come out of this Referendum],

Klix.ba, 15 July 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ambasada-sad-iz-ovog-referenduma-ne-moze-proizaci-nista-

dobro/150715130; Er.M.,“EU: Referendumom u RS-u se odvlači pažnja od socijalnih i ekonomskih problema” [EU:

RS Referendum Distracts Attention from Important Social and Economy Issues], Klix.ba, 17 October 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/eu-referendumom-u-rs-u-se-odvlaci-paznja-od-socijalnih-i-ekonomskih-

problema/151015039; M.N.,“Ramiz Salkić za Klix.ba: Ovo je uvod u referendum o otcjepljenju od BiH” [Ramiz

Salkic: This is Introduction to Secession from BiH], Klix.ba, 15 July 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ramiz-

salkic-za-klix-ba-ovo-je-uvod-u-referendum-o-otcjepljenju-rs-a-od-bih/150715122 84

Marija Tausan, Denis Dzidic, “Bosnian Prosecutors Left Without Salaries Due to Delays in EU Grant Payments”,

Justice-report.com/BIRN BiH, 15 April 2015, http://www.justice-report.com/en/articles/bosnian-prosecutors-left-

without-salaries-due-to-delays-in-eu-grant-payments 85

“Usvojena Strategija za reformu sektora pravde u BiH” [Strategy for Justice Sector Reform in BiH Adopted],

Mpr.gov.ba, 9 September 2015, http://www.mpr.gov.ba/aktuelnosti/vijesti/default.aspx?id=4679&langTag=bs-BA 86

“Sjednica VSTV-a BiH: U fokusu Nacrt zakona o sudovima BiH” [VSTV Session: Draft of the Law on Courts of

BiH in Focus], Nezavisne.com/FENA, 21 December 2015, http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Sjednica-VSTV-

a-BiH-U-fokusu-Nacrt-zakona-o-sudovima-BiH/343796 87

“Srpska Bodies Cut Cooperation With SIPA, Court and Prosecutor’s Office”, Srna.rs, 10 December 2015,

http://www.srna.rs/novosti/360051/srpska-bodies-cut-cooperation-with-sipa--court-and-prosecutors-office.htm 88

“Lukač: SIPA-e nećemo dozvoliti pretres institucija RS” [Lukac: We Will Not Allow Raids in RS Institutions],

Nezavisne.com/SRNA, 13 December 2015, http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Lukac-Necemo-dozvoliti-

pretres-institucija-Srpske-od-strane-SIPA-e/342032 89

N. Novalić,“Kad papiri utihnu: Kako su iz sefova državnih institucija nestajali ključni dokumenti” [When the

Papers go Quiet: How Key Documents Disappeared from the Safes of State Institutions], Klix.ba, 30 March 2015,

16

http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/kad-papiri-utihnu-kako-su-iz-sefova-drzavnih-institucija-nestajali-kljucni-

dokumenti/150327101 90

“Tužiteljica Tužilaštva BiH kažnjena zbog odugovlačenja u radu” [Prosecutor of the BiH Prosecutor’s Office

sanctioned for stalling], Klix.ba/FENA, 3 November 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/tuziteljica-tuzilastva-bih-

kaznjena-zbog-odugovlacenja-u-radu/151103066 91

Denis Dzidic, “Spor oko Apelacionog suda koči reformu pravosuđa” [Conflict Over Appeal Court Hampers

Judiciary Reform], Balkaninsight.com, 7 May 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bih-spor-oko-

apelacionog-suda-ko%C4%8Di-reformu-pravosu%C4%91a 92

“Održan sastanak Upravnog odbora za smanjenje broja sudskih komunalnih predmeta u Kantonu Sarajevo” [A

Meeting of the Managing Board for Decreasing Number of Utility Court Cases in Sarajevo Canton], Pravosudje.ba,

14 October 2015, http://vsts.pravosudje.ba/vstv/faces/vijesti.jsp?id=57718 93

N.N.,“Ko još mari za Ustavni sud BiH: 91 odluka nikad nije provedena, niko nikada nije odgovarao” [Who Cares

for the Constitutional Court of BiH: Its 91 Decisions Haven’t Been Implemented, but Nobody Was Ever Guilty for

That], Klix.ba, 30 November 2015, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ko-jos-mari-za-ustavni-sud-bih-91-odluka-nije-

provedena-niko-nikada-nije-odgovarao/151130007 94

“Judges in Conflict With the Law”, Cin.ba, 26 February 2015, https://www.cin.ba/en/sudije-u-sukobu-sa-

zakonom/ 95

“Investigator Accused of Taking over EUR10.000 in Bribes”, Cin.ba, 7 October 2015,

https://www.cin.ba/en/istrazitelj-optuzen-za-mito-od-10-hiljada-eura/ 96

“APIK pozdravio usvajanje nove Strategije za borbu protiv korupcije” [APIK Welcomes Adoption of the New

Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption], Apik.ba, 7 May 2015, http://www.apik.ba/aktuelnosti/saopcenja-za-

javnost/default.aspx?id=394&langTag=bs-BA 97

Amra Brkić - Čekić,“Sead Lisak: Zahvatila nas je epidemija zvana korupcija” [Sead Lisak: Epidemic Called

Corruption Caught Us], Oslobodjenje.ba, 30 June 2015, http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/za-one-koji-znaju-

citati/intervjui/sead-lisak-zahvatila-nas-je-epidemija-zvana-korupcija/141986 98

N.A.,“Sead Lisak: Prema onome što rade sudovi, u BiH korupcija ne postoji” [Sead Lisak: According to What

Courts do, There is no Corruption in BiH], 24sata.info, 27 August 2015, http://24sata.info//vijesti/bosna-i-

hercegovina/238237-sead-lisak-prema-onome-sto-rade-sudovi-u-bih-korupcija-ne-postoji.html 99

“The proposed amendments to the Law on Conflict of Interest in Governmental Institutions of the Federation of

BiH are only an interim solution”, Ti-bih.org, 8 October 2015, http://ti-bih.org/predlozene-izmjene-zakona-o-

sukobu-interesa-fbih-samo-prelazno-rjesenje/?lang=en 100

“Conclusions of the Conference Conflict of Interest and Property Records – long-term solutionsfor institutional

and legal framework”, Ti-bih.org, 29 October 2015, http://ti-bih.org/zakljucci-sa-konferencije-sukob-interesa-i-

imovinski-kartoni-dugorocna-rjesenja-za-institucionalni-i-zakonski-okvir/?lang=en 101

“Property Belonging to Judges and Prosecutors to Remain Confidential“, Cin.ba, 4 November 2015,

https://www.cin.ba/en/imovina-sudija-i-tuzilaca-ostaje-tajna/ 102

“APIK organizirao konferenciju o zaštiti uzbunjivača: Bitan korak u prevenciji korupcije” [APIK Organized a

Conference on Whistleblowers Protection: Important Step in Corruption Prevention], Apik.ba, 25 March 2015, http://www.apik.ba/aktuelnosti/saopcenja-za-javnost/default.aspx?id=349&langTag=bs-BA 103

“APIK pozvao građane da bez straha od odmazde prijavljuju korupciju” [APIK Invited Citizens to Report

Corruption Without Fear of Retribution], Apik.ba, 8 June 2015, http://www.apik.ba/aktuelnosti/saopcenja-za-

javnost/default.aspx?id=409&langTag=bs-BA 104

“Historijsko odlaganje borbe protiv korupcije” [Historical Postponement of the Fight Against Corruption],

Istinomjer.ba, 30 January 2015, http://istinomjer.ba/historijsko-odlaganje-borbe-protiv-korupcije/ 105

“Poslanici zaključili da nije bilo političke korupcije” [MPs Concluded There Was No Political Corruption],

Nezavisne.com/SRNA, 5 February 2015, http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Poslanici-zakljucili-da-nije-bilo-

politicke-korupcije/312149 106

“RS Special Prosecutor’s Office Confirmed that Forensic Investigation on Recording of ‘Buying’ of MPs has not

been Conducted”, Ti-bih.org, 16 April 2015, http://ti-bih.org/specijalno-tuzilastvo-rs-potvrdilo-da-nije-radeno-

vjestacenje-snimka-o-navodnoj-kupovini-narodnih-poslanika/?lang=en 107

“Budimir Trial to Start in September”, Cin.ba, 3 July 2015, https://www.cin.ba/en/sudenje-budimiru-pocinje-u-

septembru/ 108

“Legalizing Duplicated Breaks for the Same Crime”, Cin.ba, 30 July 2015, https://www.cin.ba/en/legalizacija-

duplih-pomilovanja/

17

109

“Officeholders and Legislators Collaborate With Criminals”, Cin.ba, 6 August 2015,

https://www.cin.ba/en/predstavnici-izvrsne-i-sudske-vlasti-saraduju-sa-kriminalcima/ 110

“Pendeš Accused Because of Ivo Miro Jović’s Salary”, Cin.ba, 16 July 2015, https://www.cin.ba/en/pendes-

optuzena-zbog-plate-ive-mire-jovica/