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Book ReviewsDr Jez Littlewood aa Norman Paterson School of International Affairs,Carleton University , CanadaPublished online: 10 Sep 2008.

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Book Reviews

Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,

Antonio Giustozzi. London and New York: Hurst and Company, Columbia Univer-

sity Press, 2007, pp. 259. $24.95/£45.00 (hardcover); £16.99 (paperback, UK only).

Antonio Giustozzi’s book represents a significant contribution that enhances our

understanding of the current insurgency in Afghanistan. It is a great pity that this

study was not available in 2005 when the British government made the decision to

commit significant forces to reclaim Helmand province on behalf of the central gov-

ernment in Afghanistan. At the time this was seen as an uncontroversial decision that

entailed minimal risk to British forces. Indeed, so confident was the British govern-

ment that the Defence Secretary declared to Parliament in February 2006 that he

believed it unlikely that the British would fire a single shot over the proposed three

years of their deployment. How ironic then that, in the summer of 2006, NATO Com-

mander General Richards described the ferocity and intensity of the fighting in

Helmand as the most intensive combat experienced by British forces since the

Korean War (1950–1953). Obviously something went wrong in terms of the UK’s

intelligence picture on Afghanistan; a fact reaffirmed by subsequent reports, which

highlight that British commanders had virtually no real information on the situation

facing them in Helmand when they deployed in May 2006.

Clearly the biggest surprise that confronted them was the strength, motivation,

and determination of the insurgency from a movement that was believed moribund

and demoralised. What Giustozzi’s book does extremely well is to explain how

this movement, which had been defeated so easily in 2001, reorganised itself to

become the tenacious political and military grouping that it is today. A particular

strength of this study is that its author does not claim to be an expert on insurgency

and, most importantly, he does not attempt to provide a game plan on how to defeat

the Taliban. I fully support his decision not to engage in the policy-orientated litera-

ture on insurgency and counter-insurgency. In doing this he has avoided the path fol-

lowed by many current thinkers on the subject of insurgency – a path that all too

frequently results in a rather formulaic discussion, which is often sterile because it

lacks a meaningful context. Instead, he has simply focused on trying to understand

and explain the phenomenon that is the ‘Neo Taliban’. As such this is a welcome

addition to an area that has not been well served by the academic community so far.

The book has two other strengths. First he has carried out much of the research for

this project in country and therefore has a better sense than most of how conditions

are on the ground. Second, as he readily admits, the book grew out of a wider study

examining the fragility of the Afghan state. The decision to write a piece on the insur-

gency only happened because his research coincided with the revival of this move-

ment and he thought it opportune to write a small article which in the end, because

of the complexity of the topic, became a book. However, in conducting this analysis,

Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.29, No.2 (August 2008), pp.384–410ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13523260802284480 # 2008 Taylor & Francis

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Giustozzi was able to draw upon a wide range of research that embraced the broader

historical, political, social, economic, and military setting in the country and this has

been used to good effect in explaining the current insurgency.

Equally important, this diverse pool of information is developed in a logical,

coherent, and easily accessible format and each chapter addresses a fundamentally

important question relating the resurrection of this movement. The study examines

the following areas: the sources or drivers behind the insurgency, the recruitment pol-

icies adopted by the Taliban, the organization of the movement, its strategy, its tac-

tical game plan, and finally NATO’s counter-insurgency campaign against it.

What is particularly interesting is how Giustozzi justifies the distinction between

the new and old Taliban. Whilst he acknowledges the continuity that exists in terms

of their commitment to an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam based on the

Deobondi tradition, there are important differences which have served to reinforce

the effectiveness of this movement. Of particular importance here has been the

absorption of foreign jihadist allies and the importation of new technologies and

tactics from other Islamist insurgent groups operating in places such as Iraq. Of

great significance here is the cleverness of the Taliban’s information warfare strategy,

a development which has both shocked and surprised the British.

An aspect of the study that is particularly interesting is his analysis of how strong

the Neo Taliban was as a fighting movement in 2006–2007. It is perhaps not surpris-

ing that his estimates are far higher than NATO’s. However, his analysis seems to be

based on a credible foundation of information and if accepted, should be a cause for

concern for the international coalition which is currently struggling to get to grips

with this foe.

It is also interesting that so few members from the old Taliban joined the Neo

Taliban. Instead, the majority of the organization’s fighters come from Pashtun

tribal youth. Giustozzi’s analysis of why this social group has joined is interesting

and has important policy implications in terms of how the insurgency can be

tackled. What is clear is that the motivations for joining the insurgency are frequently

no different from past insurgencies: money, security, and personal status, factors

which we tend to dismiss when thinking about Islamist insurgencies. To some

extent these basic motivations are reaffirmed by the employment of casual fighters

paid on a monthly basis by the Taliban. However, Giustozzi stresses that the existence

of this practice is not evidence that the Neo Taliban are merely mercenaries as some

have claimed.

An extremely useful and informative component of this book is the chapter on the

organization of the Taliban. This examines the command and control arrangements

that exist within the organization, and most importantly, how the organization

funds its operations. It is within this domain that Giustozzi examines the relationship

between the drug trade and the Taliban. Once again, he challenges what has become

orthodoxy in government and military circles, that the Taliban rely heavily on the

drug trade to fund their operations, which if true has important implications for

the future development of a counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency strategy in

Afghanistan. Less controversial, but nevertheless interesting, is Giustozzi’s analysis

of the Neo Taliban’s strategy, which confirms the earlier speculative commentaries

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made by analysts in 2005 and early 2006, but what is most interesting are the parallels

made between the present and past insurgencies, which again feed into the wider

policy debate on the appropriate counter-insurgent strategy to be employed when

fighting an Islamist insurgency. The final chapter provides a brief overview of the

counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the United States and the Afghan govern-

ment. Whilst this chapter is not as comprehensive as the others, it is nevertheless a

vital component of the overall study simply because it explains why and how

failure of the state and its security forces has fed and strengthened the insurgency.

In sum, this is an excellent book and should be standard issue to all NATO com-

manders deploying into Afghanistan!

Warren Chin

King’s College London

Joint Services Command and Staff College

Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric

Warfare, James R. Blaker. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007,

pp. 264. $44.95/£25.95 (hardcover).

The debate surrounding the transformation of the US military had been simmering

since the early 1990s; however, it heated up in 2001 when newly elected President

George W. Bush appointed Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld

entered office with a mandate from President Bush to transform the US military

into a smaller, more technologically advanced, and more effective force. In Trans-

forming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric

Warfare James R. Blake, vice president and senior analyst at Science International

Applications Corporation (SAIC), introduces the reader to the late Admiral Arthur

Cebrowski, the man that Secretary Rumsfeld hand-picked to implement the trans-

formation that the Bush administration felt was so desperately needed in the Amer-

ican armed forces. Having served in numerous positions within the Department of

Defense that placed him on the leading edge of transformation policy and in daily

contact with Admiral Cebrowski, Blaker is well qualified to tell this story.

Blaker explains how Admiral Cebrowski’s military assignments and education

placed him at the forefront of military transformation. During the 1990s, Cebrowski

joined with other likeminded reformers to develop a new theory of war, codified in

the term Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Blaker argues that Cebrowski felt that

NCW theory would be to the information era what Carl von Cluasewitz’s On War

was to the industrial era. Whereas Clausewitz’s theory emphasized the use of

massed armies, attrition warfare, and centralized command and control to obtain

military objectives, Blaker states that Cebrowski’s NCW theory ‘envisioned a new

force characterized by numerous small, fast, networked units; organized around

extensive self-synchronization at the tactical level; and operating interdependently

in a distributed manner across board expanse’ (p. 19). Cebrowski claimed that

warfare conducted in this manner would present an enemy with overwhelming

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complexity, which would rapidly erode his will to resist and convince him that his

position was untenable.

In proselytizing his transformation message, Cebrowski stressed that information/

knowledge would substitute for mass on the battlefield and that speed of innovation,

coupled with a willingness to change and agility in adapting new technologies to the

future operational environment, would define the dominant military power(s) in the

21st century. Not only would information technology cut through Clausewitz’s Fog

and Friction of war; but also, it would break down cumbersome conventional

command structures by linking the sensors, decision-makers, and shooters in real-

time, thereby fostering self-synchronization. According to Cebrowski, this was the

essence of Network Centric Warfare and a force with these capabilities would

possess an enormous advantage over an opponent without them. Moreover,

because NCW held the promise of quick, decisive operations with relatively

minimal friendly and enemy casualties and damage, Cebrowski felt NCW had a

moral ( jus in bello) quality to it.

However, the armed services were sceptical of Cebrowski’s message. It was not

that the services opposed change or that they found fault with the conceptual under-

pinnings of NCW; rather, it was the accelerated pace of Defense Transformation that

Cebrowski advocated, coupled with the resultant changes in force structure within

and among the services, that gave military decision-makers pause. If implemented

as he wished, Cebrowski’s initiatives would have put many service acquisition pro-

grams at risk and realigned several service warfighting jurisdictions, e.g. shifting the

primary indirect fire support role for the Army from the field artillery to the US Air

Force. Undeterred by the objections he encountered within the Department of

Defense (DoD), Cebrowski relentlessly advocated accelerated change to a fully

Network Centric Force. To implement NCW Adm. Cebrowski recommended

changes to American overseas basing strategy, a trifurcated networked force struc-

ture, and a unique unit rotation policy.

While this book is a fitting testimony to the vision and initiatives of the late

Admiral Cebrowski, it is not an objective account of American Defense Transform-

ation. Blaker’s work is based on his close association with Adm. Cebrowski and the

numerous interactions and correspondence that he had with Cebrowski over a number

of years. Blaker states that Adm. Cebrowski ‘never explicated his new theory in

detail, comprehensively or systematically in writing’ (p. 17). Consequently, while

Blaker extensively quotes Cebrowski in the text, the reader is left wondering if this

is Cebrowski’s theory or the author’s interpretation of it; and if Cebrowski would

have reached the same conclusions that Blaker attributes to him. Likewise,

Blaker’s discussion of Cebrowski’s basing, force structure, and unit rotation rec-

ommendations is absent any account of service critique, which these recommen-

dations most certainly would have engendered.

In contrasting Cebrowski’s NCW theory with Clausewitz’s theory of war, Blaker

presents a generally accurate if somewhat narrow interpretation of Clausewitz’s

views on mass, attrition, and the importance of technology and intelligence in the

conduct of war. Emphasizing that the aim of war is to disarm the enemy and stressing

the application of decisive force to the key point on the battlefield, Clausewitz’s

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discussion of mass and attrition is much more nuanced than Blaker would have the

reader believe. Both these concepts, massing the effects against vital points and dis-

arming the enemy, which Blaker’s attributes to Cebrowski’s NCW theory, are in fact

refined assertions of Clausewitz. Unlike Clausewitz’s theory, there is relatively little

discussion of the political objectives in war; instead, the author focuses primarily on

the cognitive, technological, force structure, and operational considerations required

for implementing NCW. Much of the above could have been clarified had the author

cited the assertions of authors other than Adm. Cebrowski.

Readers may also find the discussion of Adm. Cebrowski’s epiphany on the moral

certitude of NCW-conducted warfare a bit overstated. Blaker emphasizes the role that

Adm. Cebrowski’s religiosity and Roman Catholic upbringing had in shaping his

views on warfare; however, the ethical convictions of Adm. Cebrowski and the

moral implications of NCW might have been better addressed within the context

of Just War Theory, particularly Jus in Bello.

In discussing Defense Transformation and the role Admiral Cebrowski played in

it, Blaker achieves his purpose in writing this book. For the advocates of Network

Centric Warfare, Transforming Military Force is a chronicle of the uphill struggle

against bureaucratic inertia, service parochialism, and the difficulty of implementing

a new theory of warfare in the information age. However, the sceptics of NCW will

find this book informative in understanding intellectual underpinnings of NCW, but

sadly lacking in clarifying the assumptions surrounding NCW or its applicability,

other than in a very general sense, to the irregular warfare challenges of the future.

Dr Kevin P. Reynolds

United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. Dulles,

VA: Potomac Books, 288 pages. $29.95 (hardcover).

Bruce Becthol, professor of international relations at the US Marine Corps Command

and Staff College, has written a timely book on a topic that the international commu-

nity is increasingly concerned with: threats from North Korea. He asks, why will the

threat ‘continue to be among the most important challenge faced by decision makers

in Washington, DC?’ (p. ix).

The book lists several reasons. North Korea’s nuclear program comes as the first.

Its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program is posing an especially great threat

because it is easier to hide than a plutonium program. The North Korean HEU

program began as early as 1990s and grew out of a ‘barter deal’ (p. 17) with Pakistan

that sent necessary technology, equipment, and blueprints’ (p. 17) in return for mis-

siles. North Korea’s nuclear program is more threatening given its missile program to

deliver the weapons than otherwise. Its missiles continue to improve. Now, the

Taepo-Dong 2, one of its newly developed missiles, could ‘potentially hit the

western United States’ (p. 40). Moreover, North Korea seems to have developed

yet another long-range missile, called ‘Taepo-Dong X’ (p. 45). It is interesting to

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learn that Iran, another part of ‘Axis of Evil’, as named in the 2002 Bush address, has

a connection to this missile development (p. 44; pp. 48–50).

The author also reminds readers of the threat posed by North Korea’s conventional

forces, including the sheer size of armed forces – 1.1 million (p. 56) – the presence of

‘advanced fighters such as MiG-23s and 29s, as well as Su-25s’ (p. 58), submarines

(p. 59), a significant increase in artillery pieces (p. 62), and short-range missiles

(p. 63). Another aspect of the North Korean threat of this kind is its special operations

forces (SOFs) made up of 100,000 personnel, ‘the world’s largest’ (p. 63) who are

trained and ready to ‘attack key command and control nodes, air bases, or any other

high value targets in South Korea’ (p. 64). This threat has not remained idle, appearing

in Becthol’s case study of a military conflict between two Koreas in 2002 over a disputed

sea border, resulting in casualties on both sides. How can the regime afford all these

military assets given its record of constant poverty and devastating natural disasters?

The author’s answer is North Korean illicit economic activities. For example, Central

Committee Bureau 39 was founded to produce a slush fund and led by Kim Il-sung

and later his son, Kim Jung-il. Banks in Macao and Luxembourg were used for

its money-laundering operations (p. 89). In addition, the regime has engaged in drug-

trafficking (pp. 90–1) and counterfeiting the American dollar and even American

cigarettes (pp. 92–6).

How serious is the threat from the North Korean regime – not just a rogue, but the

‘Red Rogue’? The list of threats discussed by the author unfortunately does not

provide satisfying answers largely due to two omissions – one major and one rela-

tively minor – and one editorial issue of this book. The first is the omission of com-

parison. A three-year-old boy’s physical power is not really threatening to an adult;

however, to ants or frogs his approach alone can be lethally frightening. In other

words, a threat is always relative. Therefore, any discussion of threat from North

Korea that does not take into account its neighbour’s power is incomplete. Therefore,

when the author claims that ‘[N]o matter what one’s political philosophy is, it cannot

be denied that all three of these Cold War paradigms [the maintenance of a nuclear

arsenal and missile platforms; large conventional forces; refusal to join the global

capitalist economy] exist in North Korea’ (p. 28), he was only half correct. Regard-

less of one’s political philosophy, it cannot be denied that North Korea is significantly

weaker, and its threat is hence radically smaller, than the USSR and its threat. So let’s

rephrase the question: can North Korea initiate anything remotely similar to mutual

assured destruction with the US, as the author implies? The answer can be found in

the book. Some missile tests were conducted only ‘presumably’ (p. 51); the newest

aircrafts were received ‘during the mid- to late 1980s’ (p. 58); submarines are

either ‘older, Soviet made’ or ‘indigenously produced’ (p. 59); military exercises

have declined due to ‘fuel shortages’ (p. 61); the SOF relies on ‘300 AN-2 COLT

(WWII vintage)’ (p. 64). It is not that difficult to conclude North Korean forces –

strategic and conventional – are not really that strong compared to the might of

South Korea – 11th-largest economy of the world and a major consumer of US mili-

tary equipment – combined with the US forces stationed in South Korea and Japan.

Therefore, to claim that North Korea is threatening, the author should be clearer about

‘to what and how’.

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The second omission is about sources. The entire book is largely based on secondary

material, with some exceptions. When news media is used, moreover, these tend not

to be local sources, except a few South Korean newspapers. This undermines the

credibility of some observations and claims that are too serious or important to be

backed by only secondary sources. For example, let’s look at one claim linking

North Korea to international terrorism – a link that helped justify the American inva-

sion of Iraq: ‘North Korean weapons brokers and technicians are likely to have

contact with terrorist organizations supported by and currently located in Tehran’

(p. 50). Looking at a footnote, we learn that the author used The Asian Times as

the source. The few Korean sources that the author uses tend to be newspapers –

Chosun Ilbo, Donga Ilbo and Joongang Ilbo – notorious for unbalanced reporting,

which can impair the credibility of his arguments.

Another source of potential distraction is editorial. The book deviates from the

major theme toward the end to comment more generally on Korean affairs. For

example, the author blames South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun for the mal-

functioning alliance with the United States (p. 151); for refusing ‘to discuss using

any of [the foreign currency reserves] to pay for the relocation of the Youngsan

Army garrison’ (p. 158); for pursuing a ‘self-reliant’ force with ‘independent capa-

bility’ (p. 168); and even for deteriorating civil-military relations. And alas, there

is little empirical evidence for these accusations. In conclusion, this book sheds

helpful light on important issues, but the shadow remains too big and dark to be

cheerful.

Taehyun Nam

Salisbury University, Maryland

The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, Dennis

J. Blasko. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 228. $170.00 (hardcover);

$45.95 (paperback).

China’s People’s Liberation Army is a credible deterrent against the security chal-

lenges that Beijing fears would tear the country apart from within, according to

Dennis J. Blasko, a former US Army officer who in the mid 1990s served as an

Attache in Beijing and Hong Kong. No longer menaced by Soviet might, pressured

by Indian border claims, or peeved at Vietnamese intransigence, today the PLA is

only one element of China’s ‘comprehensive national power’ being used to keep

Taiwan from further splitting, as well as to safeguard internal stability in Tibet, Xin-

jiang, Shenyang, and throughout the country.

Readers excited by the paperback’s ominous cover photo of a PLA infantry platoon

charging through an amphibious assault landing exercise will find little drama within

the book. Blasko’s text is a sober catalogue, a self-conscious primer for professional

experts far more detailed than the ‘introduction to the Chinese ground forces’ envi-

sioned by the author. Using Chinese sources to build upon 23 years’ experience,

Blasko deftly takes readers under the hood of the Chinese military machine.

390 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY

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Capable of working in tandem with a range of civilian and paramilitary police,

Blasko depicts the PLA as Beijing’s last line of defence against social unrest. China

hopes its security forces will buy it enough time for economic development and political

cohesion to take hold. Blasko writes that ‘PLA ground forces are garrisoned throughout

the country to protect China’s sovereignty from foreign and internal enemies, support

national economic development, and assist in the maintenance of domestic stability . . .In the post September 11 world, Beijing often categorizes China’s most likely potential

enemies as “terrorists, separatists, and extremist forces”’ (p. 66).

The Chinese army Blasko describes is also preparing to defend China from an

enormously powerful United States military in a confrontation most likely triggered

by a bid for permanent Taiwanese independence. China’s preparations are apparently

focused on keeping the United States out of any conflict long enough to achieve a fait

accompli, it hopes that these military preparations will deter Taiwan from attempting

permanent separation from the mainland. China’s efforts to develop high and low

technology countermeasures to precision-guided munitions, to buy or build anti-

carrier missiles, and to disable enemy satellites all attempt to asymmetrically tip

the cross-Strait balance in its favour.

Beijing appears increasingly confident that Taiwan will one day rejoin the main-

land so long as foreign forces do not meddle in China’s ‘internal’ affairs. Neverthe-

less, discussing China’s 2004 Defence White Paper, Blasko moves beyond raw

military capabilities, writing that ‘the importance to the PLA of preventing Taiwan

independence is underscored by the declarative statements: “It is the sacred res-

ponsibility of the Chinese armed forces to stop the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces

from splitting the country”’ (p. 67). Regardless of the military balance, talk of

sacred duty and ‘crushing’ a serious bid for independence ‘at any cost’ should give

pause even to the most sceptical reader who considers a cross-Strait confrontation

unlikely.

China’s military, Blasko writes, is today capable of defending the country but not

of projecting military power beyond the strategic periphery. In crafting this assess-

ment, Blasko deftly describes not only PLA capabilities but also PLA shortcomings

in air- and sea-lift, close air support, and key special operations functions:

. While ‘the PLA’s capability to conduct amphibious operations increased tremen-

dously over the ten-year period starting from 1996 to the middle of the first

decade of the twenty-first century’ (p. 156), Blasko finds amphibious operations

still limited by both the number of vessels and the ground units capable of sup-

porting such operations.. Airpower capable of inserting troops or supporting joint operations is also sorely

lacking, despite concerted efforts since 2001 to correct the problem.. Close air support, the hallmark of America’s early efforts in Afghanistan against

the Taliban and Iraq in 2003, is reportedly not incorporated into PLA planning.

‘Conspicuous in its absence,’ Blasko assesses, ‘is any discussion of air power

in direct support of front line troops, which is controlled by ground observers

and flexible in its ability to react to changing conditions on the battlefield’

(p. 108).

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. Finally, China’s special operations forces are not built to covertly train foreign

militaries or lead guerrilla bands in operations deep in enemy territory – key

force multipliers in modern warfare (e.g. p. 158).

Beyond PLA shortcomings, Blasko aids the reader by prodding those who down-

play China’s efforts at increasing transparency of budget and capabilities, pointing

to China’s improving white papers and inviting foreign observers to training mis-

sions. China’s military budget is likely several times greater than the figure offi-

cially reported. Nevertheless, due to the qualitative difference in firepower and

the continued lack of realism in training despite great strides, Blasko cautions

against simple numeric comparisons of Chinese and western forces. Further, ‘the

skill, discipline, and toughness of the individual Chinese soldier’ is an observation

‘commonly made by foreigners who have the opportunity to see PLA units in train-

ing’ (p. 162).

In sum, Blasko has crafted an excellent description of the contemporary PLA, produ-

cing a work both clear in its writing and thorough in its research. This book will be useful

to students and practitioners struggling to gauge and balance the ‘China threat’ amid the

many security challenges we face, as well as those students fond of traditional military

studies. Blasko sees the Chinese army adapting to a changing security environment,

adjusting its threat perceptions, and modernizing to meet the realities of contemporary

warfare; may we be so fortunate as to never see these forces in action.

Dr Martin I. Wayne

Falls Church, Virginia

Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World, Ivo H. Daalder

(ed.). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, pp. 190. $19.95

(paperback).

The Political Road to War with Iraq: Bush, 9/11 and the Drive to Overthrow Saddam,

Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, pp. 228. $150.00 (hard-

cover); $37.95 (paperback).

One central issue has come to dominate today’s international political discourse.

The invasion of Iraq (along with the broader construct of the American global

war on terror that has provided its intellectual and strategic rationale) has become

the global controversy of our time. Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers’ The Political

Road to War with Iraq and Ivo Daalder’s Beyond Preemption provide two timely

and different approaches to assessing the invasion. The Political Road focuses on

events, reactions, and developments in strategic thinking over two decades

leading to the Iraq war, with a particular emphasis on the late Clinton and early

Bush administrations. The authors show linkages between events and the evolving

strategic perspectives of think tanks, congressional figures, and administration

leaders before the war. Beyond Preemption does not take the pragmatic approach

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of examining the power brokers who have successfully influenced policy. Rather, its

focus is a cross-national sample of politicians, strategists, diplomats, and inter-

national lawyers that the Brookings Institute conducted over three years. The goal

is a clearer understanding of its ramifications for the global community.

Each book has a slightly different purpose and is able to accomplish this with its

respective approach. As an edited book, Beyond Preemption also presents different

perspectives from its contributors on related but disparate topics, while The Political

Road argues for a unified thesis. One theme across both books (as with more and more

such literature since 2003) is a deep scepticism of the American project in Iraq and

the Bush administration. Of the two books, The Political Road presents the rationale

of the Bush administration more cogently, allowing for a more compelling critical

analysis.

The Political Road to War with Iraq is divided into three parts: containing

Saddam, regime change, and the neoconservatives. The first part of the book dis-

cusses the fundamental flaws of the unsustainable containment policy that had

been in effect prior to the invasion. Beginning with the context of the relevance of

the region to American oil interests, the authors draw back as far as the 1956 Suez

crisis. Ritchie and Rogers then discuss mounting pressures from multiple sources

on the post-Gulf War American-led containment policy. Saddam Hussein’s govern-

ment began taking increasing liberties and showing increasing defiance by flouting

agreements that ended the war in 1991, culminating with the expulsion of UN

weapons inspectors in 1998. Iraq was also reestablishing better relationships with

the neighbours that Saddam had left betrayed and shocked by his invasion of

Kuwait. Foreign policy conservatives in the US were at the same time growing

more and more critical of the containment policy that was losing efficacy as a con-

straint on the Hussein regime. Pressure from leftist sources was mounting; also,

Hussein was able to appeal successfully to sympathies in the region, within the

US, and in Europe over the crushing burden of the sanctions regime. Ritchie and

Rogers explain, ‘Both sets of critics argued that only two options remained. The

first was to do nothing and gradually release Baghdad from the obligations

imposed . . . The other option was to pro-actively work to replace the regime by

uniting, training, and arming the Iraqi opposition’ (p. 52).

The book then moves on to the Bush administration’s transition to power, the

search for a new approach, and the catalyst for change provided by the 9/11

attacks. The authors’ detailed research on the evolving opinions and influence

of key players provides several insights. One of note is that Clinton administration

leaders considered regime-change options long before the invasion but dismissed

them due to the lack of unity among Iraqi opposition factions. Quotations from

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and General Anthony Zinni convincingly

make this point. As of this writing, progress in Iraq seems frustratingly debilitated

by the failure of any political reconciliation process. Another insight was the

extremely limited influence of neoconservatives when the Bush administration

first took power. The authors document the emergence of Cheney and Rumsfeld

as influential (yet still only partially convinced) neocons after 9/11. Before the

attacks, the administration had focused almost exclusively on domestic policy

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and these two powerful figures remained much more sceptical of the neoconserva-

tive perspective.

In retrospect, particularly after reading The Political Road, the inevitability of the

war seems intuitive. The authors point out, however, that ‘the majority opinion

among international relations analysts, right up to the end of 2002, was that a war

with Iraq was unlikely [and] a diplomatic solution was probable’ (p. 163). This mol-

lified me because, as a member of the intelligence community at the time, such had

been my own assessment. The authors argue, however, in hindsight, that there was an

overwhelming probability that the Bush administration would invade Iraq, but that

‘inevitability’ is a term whose subjectivity makes it go beyond the scope of their argu-

ment. The authors conclude by arguing that the exit from the situation will be much

less easy and seamless than the entrance into it.

Beyond Preemption focuses on the impact of the war on the international commu-

nity and the ability to mobilize collective action in the future. One opinion that seems

common to the different contributing authors is that collective action in places such as

Darfur, where the international community seems embarrassingly ineffective, has

become more difficult because of Iraq. This argument seems to ignore examples

before Iraq, however, such as Kosovo or Rwanda, where Security Council authoriz-

ation to prevent ethnic fighting was equally elusive. Even in the early days of the UN,

UN authorization for the use of force after North Korea’s invasion of the South

occurred only because the Soviet boycott of the Security Council prevented a

Soviet veto. To me, Iraq hardly seems to change the dynamics of a collective body

divided by the divergent national interests of its great power members.

Beyond Preemption, however, views the Iraq War as a significant paradigm shift

that has altered the dynamics of international opinion on the use of force. The book

begins with a forward by Brookings president Strobe Talbott and an introduction by

editor Ivo Daalder. The contributing authors then discuss the use of force to prevent

the proliferation and use of WMD, to fight terrorism, and to conduct humanitarian

intervention. Changing state sovereignty norms are addressed in all of these chapters.

A summary chapter, ‘What the World Thinks’, by congressional staffer Anne Kramer

covers these themes as well as sharing the outcome of the Brookings cross-national

survey. Finally, a series of appendices includes two recent landmark US National

Security Strategies and three UN reports, including The Responsibility to Protect.

Absent is any biographical information on chapter authors that would be expected

in an edited volume, but following the appendices is the list of names and institutional

affiliations that also appears on the back cover.

The foreword by respected scholar and diplomat Strobe Talbott gave me pause as I

began to read this book. Several unsupported assertions made me question where the

rest of the book would lead. In two sentences, Ambassador Talbott argued that Amer-

ican intervention in Afghanistan has been unsuccessful because of a diversion of atten-

tion to Iraq, and that Iraq has been unsuccessful because of its illegitimacy in the eyes of

world opinion. While both of these arguments may be true, I think they are a bit too

controversial to make without further development. Setbacks in both Afghanistan

and Iraq could be due to the committed and canny Islamist insurgencies in those

countries, the monumental size of the task that could not be accomplished even with

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more attention or allied support, or flawed execution (which the author mentions but

dismisses as not the primary factor). Mr Talbott then claims a few paragraphs later

that ‘since 1945, most states have generally lived up to these rules’, by which he

means the UN Charter’s prohibition of ‘the use of force in interstate relations [that]

recognizes only two exceptions . . . defend[ing] themselves and . . . authorization of

the UN Security Council’. I am not sure that a historical review would agree that

there has been such minimal use of interstate force since 1945. Examples coming to

my mind without consulting any outside reference, include Afghanistan in the 1980s,

Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, Israel, Kashmir, and numerous small-scale wars in

the developing world.

After moving beyond the foreword, I found Daalder’s introduction to provide less

sweeping and more supported claims. Although I do not agree with his entire perspec-

tive, I found that he sets up his book nicely and provides a coherent case against the

preemption doctrine articulated by the Bush administration after 11 September.

James Steinberg then addresses the difficult problem of using force to combat

the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Steinberg is sympathetic to the need

for force, even preemptive force, to prevent the destabilizing and risky consequences

of the spread of WMD, but he also recognizes the difficulties of using force for

this purpose.

Bruce Jentleson’s following chapter on the use of force against terrorism seems to

provide a more sceptical assessment of both the legitimacy and efficacy of using

force. He also raises the issue of international opinion, citing in particular those

countries that might find themselves the sites of counterterrorist intervention (such

as Sudan, Iran, and Libya) as highly critical of both its efficacy and legitimacy.

Susan Rice and Andrew Loomis discuss the tensions between sovereignty and

intervention and the evolution of this dynamic that occurred throughout the 1990s.

Much of this discussion is a review of ideas that circulated the scholarly field in

the early part of this decade. However, they include discussion on Iraq and Darfur

in particular. Their conclusion makes an impassioned call for international involve-

ment in Darfur, but this reviewer remains highly pessimistic of the ability of the inter-

national community to mount an appropriate response to that catastrophe.

The last chapter by Anne Kramer provides an overview of the various concepts

discussed in the book with a focus on how respondents to the Brookings survey

reacted. I found this chapter to be the least compelling of the main chapters of the

book for two reasons. First, references to the respondents seemed inconsistent, some-

times using terminology such as ‘Russians and Middle Eastern participants expressed’

(p. 129) and other times ‘India, Pakistan, and Israel agreed’ (p. 111). I found the latter

characterization problematic because the survey of these mid-level functionaries could

not really merit the metonymy used to suggest a state position. (This could be a merely

stylistic issue.) The second concern presents a more fundamental difficulty. The

chapter meandered and was hard to follow. It was difficult to determine the author’s

goal, and only after reaching the 36th page of the chapter did the author present her

framework synthesizing her findings. I would have found this much more useful at

the beginning of the chapter and found the chapter much more cogent and readable

had it been organized around this framework.

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Altogether, Beyond Preemption is an interesting read that provides a timely

assessment of an important topic. I found The Political Road to War with Iraq to

provide both more new facts as well as stronger arguments, although I admit that

my scepticism regarding the internationalist assumptions of Beyond Preemption

most likely have biased my opinions of that book. Both books present arguments

deeply sceptical of the Bush administration’s global war on terror as it has played

out in Iraq, which has now become that effort’s central front. As the US is in the

midst of an election campaign to prepare for a new administration, these timely con-

tributions to the scholarly literature in international relations will help inform scho-

lars and policymakers as new ideas are developed to deal with the difficult realities

that confront the world in Iraq and beyond.

Matthew J. Morgan

McKinsey & Company, Atlanta

Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution,

Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri. London and New York: I.B. Tauris,

2007. pp. 215. $45/£20 (hardback).

One of the most important questions for American security policy since 2003 has

been what to do about the growing regional power of Iran. Any American effort at

coercive ‘regime change’ seems increasingly unlikely and threatens to create far

more problems throughout the region than it could possibly solve. In this regard,

the illusions surrounding the US-led invasion of Iraq have now been dispelled, and

it is no longer possible to maintain with credibility that the default position for an

ousted authoritarian regime is a liberal democracy. Unfortunately, it also remains

unclear as to how the United States can help change the behaviour of the Iranian gov-

ernment and engage in an effective and meaningful dialogue on the major issues

dividing the two countries. Also, and of special interest to policymakers, is the

concern about whether the 2005 electoral victory of the Iranian right has been con-

solidated and institutionalized to the extent that any attempt to reform the Iranian

system from within is doomed for the foreseeable future.

While no book can answer the above questions with certainty, Ehteshami and

Zweiri’s recent work can at least help us think about them in an informed way.

This study deals with the rise of the ‘new right’ or ‘neoconservatives’, whom the

authors view as epitomized by Iranian president Mamoud Amadinejad. Ehteshami

and Zweiri also suggest that the Iranian neoconservatives reflect a style and approach

to practical problems that is significantly different from those of more traditional con-

servatives and especially the clerics. In describing Amadinejad and his movement as

‘neoconservatives’, the authors have seized upon a highly loaded term familiar to

most Western readers. Iranian neoconservatives are defined as highly ideological

Islamists who are also populist, pro-military, and make a recurring effort to speak

to the economic problems of average people. The application of this word to ultra-

conservative economic populists is believed to have originated with their Iranian

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critics and not with Americans, who might find the term entertaining in an Iranian

context. Iranian critics clearly found it amusing to compare some of their most

extreme leaders with the US neoconservatives who seldom come out well in the

Iranian media and in some cases have called for military strikes against Iranian

nuclear and other targets. Ehteshami and Zweiri have picked up on this terminology

and clearly do not view the term as a compliment.

In order to understand the reasons for the rise of neoconservatism, the authors

undertake an examination of Iran’s failed ‘reform revolution’, which began with

the election of Muhammad Khatami in May 1997. Khatami is described as having

been able to associate himself with the most deeply held political and social aspira-

tions of the Iranians people in an election where he was initially viewed as a token

challenger to the presidential candidate selected by the regime. Moreover, Iranian

elections were dominated by reformists seeking to liberalize Iranian politics from

1997 until the 2003 local elections. These six years of popular backing gave the refor-

mers considerable legitimacy to confront the unelected organs of government. Yet, in

a 1999 defining moment, President Khatami backed down in a showdown with une-

lected political leaders and the security establishment leading to the beginnings of a

process of disillusionment with his role as a reformist standard bearer. This confron-

tation occurred when the security forces responded to a major 1999 student protest

with a strongly worded letter to Khatami. In this letter, 24 senior military comman-

ders threatened the president with forceful intervention on Iran’s streets to suppress

unrest as well as unspecified action against the elected government. Khatami’s own

defence minister stated in July 1999 that the armed forces would restore order ‘at any

cost’. Khatami’s retreat on this issue strongly encouraged conservative assertiveness

on other matters, and throughout his remaining years in power he faced bitter chal-

lenges by determined opponents. The 1999 confrontation also helped to accelerate

what Ehteshami and Zweiri call the militarization of politics involving the increased

political influence of the armed forces and especially the Islamic Revolutionary

Guards Corps (IRGC).

The neoconservatives’ rise to power since Khatami left office has often been

viewed as the result of the non-elected branches of the Iranian government carefully

rigging the political system as well as public disillusionment with the leadership of

the reform movement. These aspects of the situation are clearly present, but such

an explanation leaves out other key elements of the story. In order to take elected

power from reformers, critical segments of the Iranian conservative movement (the

future neoconservatives) were adjusting to political realities while the efforts of the

reformers were faltering. The neoconservatives structured their election platform to

acknowledge that political reform was important but stressed that economic reform

was at the top of their agenda. They also substantially redefined political reform

with a rhetorical emphasis (and no real follow-through) on anti-corruption measures.

This approach is sometimes described by Iranian advocates as a Chinese model of

reform which separates economics and politics. Attempts to force people to reform

their lifestyle to avoid Western influences appear to be secondary and seem half-

hearted. Unfortunately for the neocons, they have had trouble meeting the economic

expectations that they have raised. It remains to be seen if they will be able to do

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so, but their efforts should clearly be aided by the tripling of the price of oil since

2003.

The career of President Ahmadinejad is viewed by the authors as a useful window

into the neoconservative movement. Upon his election, Amadinejad was widely

mistaken in the West for one of the hostage-takers who seized the US embassy in

1979. While this suspicion was later proven to be incorrect, his actual resume, if any-

thing, is even more chilling. In the early 1980s he was part of the ‘internal security’

section of the IRGC, where he was reported to have ‘earned notoriety as a strong per-

sonality and an interrogator’. He also worked for some time as a security official in

Evin prison, according to a state-run website associated with outgoing President

Khatami. During the Iran–Iraq war, Amadinejad was involved with a still unidenti-

fied covert action in the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. Later, the future president progressed to

a number of senior positions in the IRGC, including that of the commander of the

elite Quds Force. It is also alleged that during his IRGC career, he was involved

with planning the assassination of dissident Iranians in Europe. His post-IRGC

career is more prosaic. After leaving the security forces, he obtained a PhD in

traffic management and a number of jobs in municipal government and education

until becoming the mayor of Tehran and then the Iranian president. He seems to

have made the transition from a senior security official to a bombastic politician

without too much difficulty.

In conclusion, the authors suggest that the struggle between reform and reaction

in Iran is by no means over. They indicate that Western critics have often wrongly

viewed the rise of the Iranian reform movement as ‘preordained’, seeing it as the

natural outcome of an expected worldwide flowering of democracy. When this

trend did not endure, some of these same observers plunged into despair, assuming

that Iran would be wrapped in an ideological straitjacket for decades to come. Ehte-

shami and Zweiri view this outcome as a realistic possibility, but they also suggest

that the reform movement may well re-emerge in a new, altered, and perhaps even

stronger form if the neoconservatives are not constantly bolstered by US threats.

They further assert that the divisions between neoconservatives and traditional con-

servatives will become more confrontational over time because their differences

(especially the differing emphasis given to social issues) are quite profound. It

will, of course, remain difficult for the United States to address the Iranian challenge

in ways that contain the Iranian threat while still avoiding the prospect of feeding

Iranian neocon propaganda efforts to build support by emphasizing the dangers

poised by the United States. This aspect of the problem is not fully addressed by Ehte-

shami and Zweiri, but one can postulate that hard-headed diplomacy, enhanced local

missile defence for Israel, and extended deterrence for US Gulf allies may be part of

any such strategy. Many problems, nevertheless, do not come with a perfect solution,

and Ehteshami and Zweiri help point out that many of the most bedevilling problems

in dealing with Iran will probably remain with us for some time to come.

W. Andrew Terrill, PhD

Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Carlisle, Pennsylvania

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US–Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words, Sumit

Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (eds.). Abingdon and New York: Routle-

dge, 2006, pp. 226. $170.00 (hardcover); $42.95 (paperback).

This edited volume on Indian–American strategic ties is a timely one, taking stock of

the bilateral ties from a historical perspective as well as seeking to understand the

issues that are currently shaping the new directions in Indo-American strategic

cooperation. While almost all of the authors agreed that it was the US Secretary of

State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to India in March 2005 that gave a new direction to

the strategic relationship, most authors also recognize that something radical has to

happen to give a spark to this strategic partnership. Whether the Indo-American

nuclear deal represents this is unclear because, unfortunately, most chapters appear

to have been written prior to the deal being announced.

The volume is divided thematically into three sections. While the first three chap-

ters look at the broad spectrum of Indo-American relations and the possible future

directions, next four chapters cover specific aspects of mutual relations, ranging

from defence and military ties to counter-terrorism cooperation. The third section

focuses on the strategic trade in dual-use technology as well as Indo-American

cooperation in peace-keeping operations.

In one of the better chapters in the volume, Devin Hagerty, who teaches political

science at the University of Maryland, examines bi-lateral relations from a theoretical

perspective, and has characterized the emerging relationship between India and the

United States as an evolving ‘entente’ (p. 27), which in effect is short of an alliance,

in the absence of an agreement detailing the conditions under which they ‘will or will

not employ military force’ (p. 27). He points to several factors that will determine the

bilateral ties, including the role of both India and the United States in shaping the new

Asian security framework and the rise of China.

Arthur Rubinoff, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto,

stresses the often clashing goals and the myopic policies that American pursues,

and the lack of a long-term vision. Rubinoff has further detailed the huge baggage

of history in Indo-American relations, and Indian scepticism in dealing with the

United States. He points to Washington’s ‘lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns’

(p. 55) as also the cloud of ‘ambiguity and mistrust’ (p. 55) in the relationship

which could all come in the way of better Indo–US relations. While he sees

immense scope in the 2005 India–US nuclear agreement, he notes that it was ‘a tac-

tical error’ on the part of the US administration to not brief the key non-proliferation

legislators and have them on board, an assertion amply validated since. Dipankar

Banerjee has provided a detailed historical overview of the bilateral ties, right

from the time of Indian independence until now, as well as the challenges for the

future.

In another excellent chapter, V.P. Malik, former Chief of the Indian Army,

traces Indo-American defence ties from the time of Indian independence.

Ironic it may be, but the United States was the first country to give military aid

to India after independence. While detailing the major facets of these burgeoning

military and defence ties, he also amplifies on the future prospects as well as the

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dynamics – which includes domestic politics in both countries, changes in

international circumstances such as the rise of China and India’s rising profile –

that would come into play in this relationship. Malik seems to be in agreement

with Hagerty on the prospects for the relationship, stating that given the ‘differ-

ences in national and strategic interests’, Indo–American relations would ‘at best

remain a strategic partnership and not alliance’, which is to say that the two

countries would cooperate wherever there is a ‘convergence of views and substan-

tial domestic consensus’ (p. 99).

A chapter on Indian-American military interaction by John Gill, associate

professor of the Near East-South Asia Center, identifies the rationale, benefits, and

areas for deepening the military-to-military interaction. Hill notes that ‘sustained

and increasingly sophisticated interaction’ will enable a better understanding of

each other’s policies and perspectives, help ‘reduce suspicion’, and open up channels

of communication between individuals/institutions that will ‘lay the foundation for

consultation and possible collaboration in future crises’ (p. 114).

The two chapters on counter-terrorism cooperation, by Polly Nayak, a private

consultant and B. Raman, former Indian intelligence officer, narrate the troubled

cooperation on counter-terrorism, despite both countries being victims of this

menace as well as the obstacles that may continue in the relationship. American

reliance on Islamabad continues to complicate the bilateral cooperation on

counter-terrorism.

Varun Sahni, professor of international politics at the Jawaharlal Nehru Univer-

sity, provides a fine analysis of Indo–American strategic trade, timely considering

the current debate on the nuclear deal. As he correctly points out, whether India is

able to gain access to dual-use technology is going to be the ‘litmus test’ of the

new strategic partnership (p. 178). Trade in nuclear and space matters has been

complicated as they have been clubbed together in one basket. In general, analysts

consider nuclear and missile proliferation issues under the overall rubric of prolifer-

ation. However, in the context of US–India relations, the author has suggested that it

might be ‘analytically useful and politically helpful to separate these two issue areas

in the US-India bilateral context’ (p. 181).

Lastly, two chapters look at peace-keeping operations and US Army’s new peace

operations era. Generally, India has had problems with peace-keeping operations

that have not been mandated by the United Nations, limiting the scope of

Indo-American joint cooperation, as General Shantonu Choudhry, former Vice

Chief of Indian Army, brings out in his chapter. However, his contention that

India might not take part in bilateral peace operations not mandated by the United

Nations is questionable. For instance, India’s intervention in two cases, Sri Lanka

and the Maldives, did not have a UN mandate. Finally, William Flavin, Professor

of Multinational Dimensions of Stability Operations at the US Army War

College, traces the evolution of peace operations in various US Army Field

Manuals. Given the nature of the emerging threats, which are rather loose networks,

Flavin highlights the need for joint forces and to ‘act from multiple directions in

multiple domains concurrently’ (p. 217).

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Though the volume suffers because it was not fully able to come to grips with

recent important developments, such as the nuclear deal, it represents a useful

addition to the literature for students of Indo-American relations.

Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan,

Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Human Security. Reflections on Globalization and Intervention, Mary Kaldor.

Cambridge and New York: Polity Press and Wiley, 2007, pp. 240. $69.95/£55.00

(hardcover); $24.95/£15.99 (paperback).

In Human Security, Mary Kaldor, Professor of Global Governance at the LSE, argues

‘for a new approach to security based on a global conversation – a public debate

among civil society groups and individuals as well as states and international insti-

tutions’ (p. 2). Such a work is both timely and intriguing, and at the top of the

agenda amongst both politicians and academics. Kaldor is an important voice in

this debate. One could disagree with statements made in her work, but they are

impossible to ignore. The book is a compilation of seven essays addressing changing

concepts of security and new approaches to sovereignty.

In her introduction, Kaldor outlines the book as a logical follow-up on her work

on ‘new wars’ in the 1990s. In A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention 1991–2000,

originally written for the first edition of the Global Civil Society yearbook, she out-

lines the evolution of humanitarian intervention during a decade. And one important

insight is that ‘During the 1990s there was a fundamental change in the norms gov-

erning the behaviour of states and international organizations’ (p. 17). The essay

gives the reader an exceptional overview and introduction to the humanitarian inter-

ventions of the past decade. This first chapter lays the empirical foundations for the

book as a whole. What is important is how civil society actors are put in the fore-

ground. This is a logical move, as Kaldor claims that the state is just one amongst

a range of prominent actors defining a new global society. The second chapter, Amer-

ican Power: From Compellance to Cosmopolitanism?, written for International

Affairs just after 9/11, addresses American power under the Bush administration.

Kaldor is not surprisingly critical of what she characterises as ‘the bizarre combi-

nation of unilateralism and idealism’ (p. 13) in American foreign policy. There is

not enough room to evaluate such statements here, but they clearly show Kaldor’s

inclination to use highly normative rhetoric. What is important here is that Kaldor

in this essay acknowledge the very important fact that ‘Nowadays, it is extremely dif-

ficult to control territory military and to win an outright military victory’ (p. 79).

In essay three, Nationalism and Globalization, first published in Nations and

Nationalism, the main ambition is to show how nationalism ‘is reconstructed and

reinvented out of the past’ (p. 105). Kaldor argues that war constructs nationalism.

The starting point for analysis is the most appreciated notion that nationalism is an

imagined idea. Essay four, Interventions in the Balkans: An Unfinished Learning

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Process, deals with the humanitarian interventions in a European context. The Balkan

wars are represented as a learning process. Kaldor states that the interventions in the

Balkans can be analyzed along two dimensions or two types of security philosophies:

the traditional geopolitical approach, defence of territory, and cosmopolitan, defence

of human beings. While, on the one hand, acknowledging that the geopolitical

approach still can explain state behaviour in the region, ‘the cosmopolitan approaches

have become more salient’ (p. 123).

In the last three chapters we find an aspiration for new political arrangements and

here the concept of human security is seen as highly relevant. Chapter five, The Idea

of Global Civil Society, was published in International Affairs, based on ideas

contained in Kaldor’s book; Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. One will

find some additions to the article, but the core arguments are the same. It is significant

that the author does not claim the demise of states but ‘sovereignty is likely to be

much more conditional than before – more and more dependent on both domestic

consent and international respect’ (p. 134). The main ambition in this chapter is to

explore the concept of civil society, both historically and in different geographical

contexts.

Chapters 6 and 7 are based on Kaldor’s work on the notion of human security.

In chapter 6, Just War and Just Peace, Kaldor questions the just war theory and

calls for a theory of just peace. Chapter 7, Human Security, addresses the concept

of human security directly. This new approach to security may ‘offer a new approach

both to security and to development’ (p. 182). Kaldor aims high and touches upon a

wide range of highly interesting approaches on how to grasp and analyse a complex

global reality. One could argue that this leads to a lack of analytical depth, but at the

same time this wide scope offers its audience easy access and insight to pressing

topics within the area of post-cold war international relations. The book is a

central contribution to the debate on new security trends and new approaches to

sovereignty. However, one has to remember that a concept such as human security

is both elusive and appealing, and thus a broadening of the security agenda could

also lead to lack of clarity.

Svein Vigeland Rottem

Fridtjof Nansen Instiute, Oslo

Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime, Barry Kellman. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 362. $80.00/£40.00 (hardcover); $28.99/

£14.99 (paperback).

‘Bioviolence’, according to Professor Barry Kellman, is ‘the infliction of harm by the

intentional manipulation of living micro-organisms or their natural products for

hostile purposes’ (p. 1). Kellman provides a good pathway through the limits of think-

ing only in terms of the deliberate use of disease by terrorists or only in terms of state

use of biological weapons. Avoidance of this either-or distinction is an important

point made early on: ‘[T]here are real differences among the many potential

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perpetrators of intentionally inflicted disease, but those differences are secondary to

the challenge of preventing any and all hostile plots to make people ill’ (p. 6). A more

nuanced explanation of why the term ‘bioterrorism’ is eschewed is offered later on.

The focus on prevention is the key theme of this book. The vision is a bold re-orienta-

tion of national and international governance structures to prevent the use of biologi-

cal weapons.

At heart the book is a primer on biological weapons in two parts. Part I of the text

addresses the question of why we should be worried about ‘bioviolence’, some of the

potential microbial and other agents and means of attack – agricultural attacks, for

example – and a summary of developments in science and technology that have

implications for biological weapons. It then goes on to cover the principal history of

biological weapons, including known state programs, alleged programs, and Islamic

terrorism and its interests in biological weapons. Interest by other non-state actors –

for example, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, right-wing and extremist Christian groups in

North America – are also addressed in this section. Part II of the text examines the

different elements of what Kellman refers to as ‘The Global Strategy for Preventing

Bioviolence’ (pp. 85–246) covering law enforcement, transport, legislation,

science, public health, international efforts, and the challenge of global governance.

Readers with expertise and detailed knowledge about biological weapons, their

history, the science, and past and contemporary efforts at disarmament, non-prolifer-

ation, and technology controls might find plenty to quibble in Kellman’s sweep of the

complete picture; but this is not a book intended to delve deep into all the areas of

interest. By covering the varied territory and disciplines, explaining the history and

the present, and addressing most of the tensions inherent to current policy and

practice, Kellman is providing the reader with a fairly complete overview of the

subject and the problem. For that, and the readable nature of the writing which

pulls the reader along without falling into hyperbole too often, Kellman deserves

credit. As it stands, this is a good book for anyone looking to understand the scale

and the scope of the problem of biological weapons: it is certainly one I would

recommend to any reader new to the topic.

Worth noting, and bearing in mind while reading this book, is the observation on

page 87 that not everything that can be done to prevent bioviolence should, or could,

be pursued, and that not every preventive measure produces benefits which are

worth the costs. Readers with an affiliation with the principal international control

measure – the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – are likely to be

upset by Kellman’s proposals for the Convention, including potentially limiting it

to only lethal biological weapons in order to permit development and possible use

of incapacitants (aka ‘non-lethal’) biological weapons. Nevertheless, this is one

example of a valid question that needs to be asked and coherent answers provided

by governments, civil society, and the broader international community rather than

be swept under the carpet, ignored, or placed in the ‘too hard’ box. Here, and

elsewhere, Kellman does not shy away from these difficult issues. The reader might

not agree with the responses proposed, but at least the tough questions are being asked.

For me, the most interesting chapter is the final one: ‘The Challenge of Global

Governance’ (pp. 222–41). In preceding chapters, Kellman illustrates the complexity

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of the biological weapons problem and its impact across numerous disciplines and

governance sectors. For example, he quite correctly points out that the deliberate

use of disease as a weapon and the natural occurrence of disease as one of humanity’s

biggest killers cannot be separated from each other: progress in one area can – and

Kellman argues should – be leveraged to bring benefits in the other area. It is this

synthesis and exploitation of connections which serve as a good example of the

vision in this book and the strategic thinking behind it. The focus of other readers

may end up on the proposals for three new commissions in the United Nations.

These would promote bioscience for humanity, coordinate bioviolence prevention

across national and international bodies, and enforce through the Security Council

the prohibition against the use of biological weapons. This layered international

approach is one way to address what Kellman terms the ‘security-science-develop-

ment’ challenge that has bedevilled biological weapons controls in the past and

present. Again, the reader does not have to agree with all or any of the proffered sol-

utions, but for vision, recognition of the tensions and complexities of the bioviolence

problem, and a willingness to engage in the debates holistically, Kellman deserves

praise.

There is much to consider in these proposals and pleasingly – at least for this

reader – the issues are addressed from multiple perspectives. Whether or not the pro-

posals gain traction is a moot point: the strength of this book is its sweep of the actual

problem and the engagement with difficult issues and the tensions in policymaking at

the national and international level. For that, both biological weapons experts and

those less familiar with the subject will gain from reading this book.

Dr Jez Littlewood

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University, Canada

United States Special Operations Forces, David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb.

New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp.290. $35.00/£20.50 (hardcover).

Special Operations Forces (SOFs) are a controversial part of the total American

military force. The authors of United States Special Operations Forces propose to

give readers a better understanding of the role and capabilities of special operations.

Additionally, the authors of this currently relevant book aim to make a contribution to

the debate on how to best ‘organize and employ these forces for maximum strategic

advantage against the nation’s enemies’ (p. xi). Readers with no knowledge of SOFs

will gain fundamental insights into how soldiers and sailors are selected, trained,

and equipped for special operations. All will benefit from an engaging history of

American special operations.

However, professional military readers as well as civilian policymakers engaged

in making decisions on the future of American warfare will find this book falls short

in clarifying fundamental misconceptions for how to enhance American military

capability by use of SOF capability. The book suffers from the authors’ monolithic

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approval of special operations forces, implicitly slighting any criticism. Therefore,

this book not only raises question about if and how SOFs can better be used, it

also raises provocative organizational questions about if and how the total American

military force should be reformed to capitalize on SOF capabilities.

David Tucker (Associate Professor of Defense Analysis and co-director of the

Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,

CA) and Christopher J. Lamb (Senior Fellow with the Institute of National Strategic

Studies at the National Defense University, Fort Lesley, McNair, Washington, DC)

know their subject. Both have first-hand knowledge of the core controversy and argu-

ment for and against SOF, as veterans of service in the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

Tucker and Lamb argue that better understanding of SOFs has become more

important because of three reasons. First is the wider recognition special forces

gained from successful employment in Afghanistan. Second is the growing promi-

nence of SOFs and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in counterterrorism

operations. And, third, Tucker and Lamb argue that SOF forces may promise unique

capabilities for highly mobile, lethal response to evolving trends in regional warfare.

These factors, according to Tucker and Lamb, indicate that SOFs may be much

more significant and visible element in overall American military capabilities in

the future.

Tucker and Lamb acknowledge that special operations have historically been

controversial. They attribute this not their own strengths and weaknesses, but to

bureaucratic conflict. Tension often existed between 17th and 18th century conven-

tional and unconventional American armed forces. For example, Washington

strove to engage British and Hessian forces ‘in a formal battlefield context’. Irregular

forces were thought to be undisciplined because they ‘found it difficult to stand in the

open and face the fire of British regulars’ (p. 70). By World War II, this presumption

had changed. Irregular units gained recognition as ‘elite’. The readiness of conven-

tional units in World War II suffered when the best soldiers were moved from con-

ventional units to ‘elite’ units. This trend continues today and conventional units

suffer a brain drain when experienced soldiers win coveted assignment in ‘special’

units (p. 78). Tucker and Lamb deal with this controversy by justifying the SOF

view. They never seem to have thought to ask conventional military planners

about how regular force readiness and professional military ethos are threatened by

losses of personnel to ‘special’ units.

Tucker and Lamb contend that core attributes of SOF shape the ways SOF are

used to address security threats. SOF units conduct special missions at an acceptable

level that conventional forces cannot. The distinction between special and elite units

becomes critical, according to Tucker and Lamb, because special missions require-

ments need to be understood as such and ‘SOF will be well prepared for them’.

Tucker and Lamb explain that according to Pentagon policy SOF missions are in

‘hostile, denied, and politically sensitive areas’ (p. 147). Accordingly, SOFs capa-

bilities are designed for small-unit penetration/strike capability (commando skills)

and political, cultural, and linguistic capabilities, the optimistically titled ‘warrior-

diplomat’ or ‘cross-cultural’ skills.

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The recommendations that Tucker and Lamb make for reforming special operations

forces to better capitalize on their capabilities will challenge the sensibilities of both

progressive and traditional military planners. For example, current Pentagon policy

directs the American military services to work jointly, while Tucker and Lamb call

for the establishment of an independent Unconventional Warfare Command and a

Special Operations Strike Command, ‘Giving them the maximum freedom to operate

and produce results consistent with comprehensive American interests’ (p. 234).

Followed to the letter, this recommendation would restructure the total American

armed forces completely, establishing a separate service as a fait accompli!

Tucker and Lamb deny that their recommendations for restructuring the national

security apparatus are motivated to make it more SOF-centric. They argue the need to

restructure is based on the recognition of SOF’s growing prominence in the changing

security environment (p. 234). While some of their other recommendations seem

exaggerated, this reviewer concurs with Tucker and Lamb on this basic point. New

military challenges increasingly call of discrete use of force of the sort that only

SOFs permit. Tucker and Lamb have presented a valuable explanation for how to

do so from the SOF point of view, but leave the door of opportunity open for

future argument by their critics.

Wyman E. Shuler, III

Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb, Charles

Pritchard. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, pp. 228. $26.95

(hardcover).

Failed Diplomacy is an interesting and detailed accounting of the events surrounding

the North Korean nuclear crisis and the six-party talks along with an evaluation of the

George W. Bush administration’s handling of these issues. Former ambassador

Charles ‘Jack’ Pritchard is well placed to write a book of this sort. After serving 28

years in the US Army where he spent nine years in Japan, Pritchard served as the

special assistant to the president for national security affairs and the senior director

of Asian Affairs in the Clinton administration. During the George W. Bush adminis-

tration, he served as US ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North

Korea until his resignation in August 2003. Pritchard also acted as American. repre-

sentative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. He is

currently the President of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, DC.

In a book that is critical of the Bush administration policy toward North Korea,

Pritchard maintains, ‘the six-party talks failed’ so that the purpose of his book is to

‘to provide insight into the process, in the belief that we have something to learn

from missed opportunities and failed diplomacy’ (p. x). The book begins with a

review of events during the early years of the Bush administration, including the

revelations of a covert nuclear program based on highly enriched uranium (HEU),

the unravelling of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and early US efforts to begin talks

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with North Korea prior to the start of the six-party talks. Part II of the book addresses

US–ROK relations during these years along with a review of the goals and policy

approaches of the states involved in the six-party talks. Particularly noteworthy is

an assessment of the difficulties for US–ROK relations during these years and an

examination of Chinese interests and involvement in the North Korean nuclear

problem. The final section of the book is a recounting and assessment of the six-

party talks that began in August 2003. The book concludes with a brief review of

the 13 February 2007 agreement that provides the current framework for North

Korean denuclearization.

Failed Diplomacy has several important strengths. The book is an excellent

examination of the process of crafting America’s North Korea policy during this

time frame, including a look into the inner workings and decision-making of the

administration. Pritchard chronicles the disputes within the Bush administration

regarding North Korea policy, particularly the disagreements between the various

factions within the administration that were present in the Departments of State,

Defense, the National Security Council, and the Vice President’s staff. He argues

that the administration made many serious mistakes, in part because of ‘the

general lack of knowledge about Korea or Asia within the administration’ (p. 51).

In the early years of the six-party talks, though pledging to pursue a negotiated sol-

ution, Pritchard maintains ‘the administration’s commitment to negotiating a settle-

ment with North Korea through the six-party process exists in name only. North

Korea policy has been fully captured by those in the administration who seek

regime change’ (p. 131). The book also provides insight into the decision-making

process of North Korea, along with its overall lack of understanding of and

confusion about the American political process and changing administrations in

2001. Finally, Pritchard provides a thoughtful and detailed assessment of North

Korea’s motivations for developing its nuclear weapons program.

While critical of Bush administration initiatives, and the North Korean regime,

Pritchard outlines a proposal that he believes had a better chance of succeeding.

The details of his policy proposal include abandoning the goal of regime change

and establishing normal relations with the current North Korean regime, the appoint-

ment of a presidential-level envoy to communicate these positions to North Korea,

conducting bilateral negotiations with North Korea to ensure it has ended its HEU

program, resuming fuel oil shipments when North Korea shut down its nuclear facili-

ties at Yongbyon, and requiring Pyongyang to account for all of its plutonium while

opening its facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. However,

he notes that ‘to enter negotiations toward achieving normalization requires

Washington to make a strategic decision – which it has not yet made – to accept

North Korea’s system of government and leadership much as it has the Chinese, Viet-

namese, Russian, and numerous other nondemocratic or near-totalitarian govern-

ments’ (p. 143).

Pritchard concludes the book with an impassioned plea for the establishment of a

permanent multilateral regional security forum in Northeast Asia. In his plan, initial

membership would include China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States.

North Korea, ASEAN, Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, and Mongolia

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would be invited to attend as non-voting members. Though the organization would

begin out of the six-party talks, its agenda would move beyond North Korea issues

to address a broader range of regional security concerns. For Pritchard, American

leadership in this endeavour is crucial as ‘failure to act in the near future could

well mean that long-term American influence in Northeast Asia will erode – politi-

cally, economically, and militarily’ and ‘the region could then fall back into an ad hoc

process marked by the weaknesses that arise from distrust’ (p. 184).

The book is well written and as an insider’s account, contains many illuminating

anecdotes. Pritchard’s argument for a permanent regional security forum is

well-placed and should be an important project for the next administration,

whether Democrat or Republican. No doubt, appreciation for Failed Diplomacy

will hinge on which side of the North Korea issue one falls. Those who study the

ongoing struggle to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program

and the inner workings of an administration working to address this dilemma will

find Failed Diplomacy to be a very interesting and worthwhile book.

Terence Roehrig

US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

Hezbollah: A Short History, Augustus Richard Norton. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2007, pp. 187. $16.95 (hardcover).

Augustus Richard Norton, Professor of International Relations and Anthropology for

Boston University, is true to the promise in his title Hezbollah: A Short History. He

provides a concise history of this complex, controversial, and violent organization.

Set against the tumultuousness of Lebanon in the last three decades, this is no easy

task, especially when one contemplates the other intervening players such as Israel,

Iran, Syria the United States, and United Nations. Somewhere in the midst of his retell-

ing of the events and developments that have formed and shaped Hezbollah over the

decades, Norton even finds room to make sure his readers do not neglect the religious

and cultural makeup which have shaped and continue to shape Lebanon and

Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Yet in an endeavour this ambitious, there are the inevitable

flaws, which, while frustrating for the reader, are more errors in organization rather

than in content or analysis.

Norton stresses that organizations as multifaceted as Hezbollah do not form in a

vacuum. The historical and political context in which Hezbollah was created is critical

to understanding its actions and its development. Norton begins with a prehistory

describing the emergence of the Lebanese nation, the influence of regional powers

and powerful men, and the Israeli invasion which gave birth to Hezbollah. Although

important attention is drawn to Shi’sm and culture, most of the book is devoted to the

ideological progress of Hezbollah as an armed Shi’a militia and political organiz-

ation. Norton recognizes that during its development in the 1980s Hezbollah was

‘less as a concrete organization than as a cat’s paw’ (p. 72) for Iran and Syria, who

used Lebanon and its constituents as proxies against Israel. But Norton is careful

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to acknowledge Hezbollah’s expansion beyond the initial bombings and kidnappings

into a popular grassroots organization capable of providing community needs and

political participation. Hezbollah faced an identity crisis with the 2000 Israeli

withdrawal from Lebanese territory. After decades of internally defining itself in

opposition to Israel, the six-year relative peace in the region made Hezbollah feel

increasingly obsolete, ultimately driving it to incite Israel into war in 2006, partially

to justify its own existence. Hezbollah’s insecure belligerence continues as it attempts

‘to change the delicate political balance of Lebanon’s sectarian government in its

favor’ (p. 155), destabilizing an already precarious country.

Hezbollah is littered with sharp insights and analysis. I was impressed with

Norton’s examination of the ‘Rules of the Game’ which Hezbollah and Israel

played, with notable exceptions, throughout the Israeli occupation; rules so

entrenched that they were once set to paper (pp. 83–8). The internal dissent and

justifications for Hezbollah’s entrance into Lebanon’s political forum weighed

ideological purity against the prospect of ‘growing political empowerment . . . official

recognition as well as a public podium’ (p. 101). Syrian fear of an organized coalition

against its influence in Lebanese politics drove the assassination of former Prime

Minister Rafiq al-Hariri (p. 127).

Norton’s analysis of the July 2006 war is most intriguing. Hezbollah’s rash

actions against Israel broke the peace in 2006 and sparked immediate and unusual

condemnation from Arab leaders, but as Israeli reaction became increasingly dispro-

portionate, support quickly swung back towards the Lebanese, if not towards Hezbol-

lah specifically. Although there was no overt victory, according to Norton, Hezbollah

emerged from the 2006 war as a model of resistance and fortitude against Israel’s

superior power, sparking fear among ‘ruling elites in the Islamic world . . . that it

may inspire copycat dissent movements in their own societies’ (p. 148). This sugges-

tion has unsettling implications for Sunni Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia or

Bahrain, with Shi’a minorities. Other regional implications can also be drawn from

Norton’s analysis of the tensions between Hezbollah and Israel. Though Norton

never explicitly draws a parallel between Lebanon and Iraq, the implications of

years of Israeli occupation, strengthening Lebanese resistance groups such as

Hezbollah, cannot be lost on readers, especially when one considers the close ties

between Iraqi and Lebanese Shi’a (pp. 75–83).

Hezbollah suffers from organizational problems that will frustrate readers un-

familiar with the ins and outs of Hezbollah and Lebanese history. As someone

only vaguely familiar with Hezbollah and Lebanon, I found the short history slightly

confusing upon first read. Hezbollah is only loosely chronological, focusing instead

on topics such as Hezbollah’s founding and political participation. This structure

typically works well when topics are addressed sequentially as they are introduced;

however, in Hezbollah topics such as Syria’s role in Lebanese politics or the

Lebanese Civil War are raised in chapter one but not fully addressed until much

later. A timeline of events and a short descriptive list of major actors would have

been very helpful.

Despite minor frustrations, Hezbollah is an achievement. It is a testament to the

author’s knowledge and skill that he could condense an extremely complicated and

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expansive topic into such an accessible and understandable form. Non-experts and

students will find the book an ideal introduction for a respectable understanding of

the political intricacies of the region ‘where Hezbollah is clearly fated to play a

continuing and important role’ (p. 159).

Julie Colegrove

Germantown, Maryland

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