I

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan

11Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan

I. PHILIPPINE LAND LAWS: HISTORY AND APPLICATION

A. The General Rules

The bedrock of all Philippine land laws is the Regalian Doctrine, which is contained in Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It provides that all lands of the public domain, except agricultural lands, belong to the State and cannot be alienated. The doctrine, which was first enacted in the 1935 Constitution, was adopted to preserve the States natural resources and land in favor of Filipinos.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

160 SCRA 228 (1988)

Facts: Jose dela Rosa sought to register a parcel of land. The land was divided into 9 lots. Lots 1-5 were purchased from Balbalio while Lots 6-9 were purchased from Alberto. Both Balbalio and Alberto claim to have acquired the lots by virtue of prescription.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Atok Big Wedge Corp. and the Bureau of Forestry Development. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground of valid mining claims, while the Bureau of Forestry objected because the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, hence, not subject to alienation.

The trial court denied the application. The CA reversed TC, affirming the surface rights of dela Rosa over the land while reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Held: Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property by virtue of their respective mining claims.

Ratio:. While it is true that the property was considered forest land, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties from the perfection of the mining claims of Benguet and Atok.

The evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by dela Rosa was insufficient to support claim of ownership. Even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of dela Rosa had really been in possession of the property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not.

The theory of the CA that the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface is erroneous. It is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height (Art. 437, NCC). The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The rule is, once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State (the Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land) to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private property, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein.

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

181 SCRA 443 (1990)

Facts. Director of Lands issued sales patent over two parcels of land in favor of Sunbeam. After registration, the Register of Deeds issued OCT. Subsequently, OCT was cancelled and TCTs were issued in favor of Coral Beach Devt Corp. The Republic instituted before the CFI a civil action for reversion as the land was classified as forest land.

Trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land. CA set aside the Order of Dismissal and ordered presiding judge to receive the answers of Sunbeam and Coral Beach in the action for reversion.

Ratio: The Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

Police Power

Miners Association vs Factoran

240 SCRA 100 (1995)

FACTS: The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders promulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers.

Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.

Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279 where all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.

On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation." requiring the persons or entities to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims

ISSUE: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining .

HELD: Well settled is the rule that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to in this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. The State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being coextensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest, extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

Oposa Vs Factoran

224 SCRA 792 (1993)

FACTS: The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit (minors and parents) and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests. Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements."

HELD: All timber licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. It is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state

Social Justice

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. FUNTILAR (142 SCRA 57)

FACTS: In 1972, Mariano Funtilar and the Heirs of Felipe Rosete applied for the registration of land in Mulanay, Quezon. Such parcel originally belonged to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until she died in 1936. Sometime in 1940, the land was forfeited in favor of the Govt for failure to pay real estate taxes but the same was redeemed in 1942 by one of the three children of Candida. The land now in dispute was adjudicated to petitioners-respondents, as heirs of Fernandez. The Director Lands and Dir. of Forest Devt filed an opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894; that neither have they been in open, continuos, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least 30 years immediately filing the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the applicants. On appeal, the Intermediate appellate Court affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:WON applicants-respondents have met the requirements of possession for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of their application in 1972 as to entitle them to registration

Held:Yes. The Court is satisfied from the evidence that long before her death in 1936, Candid Fernandez already possessed the disputed property. This possession must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through the administrator and later, to the applicants-respondents who are her grandchildren. It would also be absurd under the circumstances that the government would order the forfeiture of the property if the property were a forestland.

As to petitioners allegation that the land was unclassified public forest until Sept. 15, 1953 when it was declared alienable and disposable, the Court said that the Regalian doctrine must be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui vs. Dir. Of Forestry (applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain) is warranted whenever a part of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of act 496, as amended or the land Reg. Act and CA 141 or the Public Land Act, then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their on implementation. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with understanding but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged.

REPUBLIC VS. CA (201 SCRA 3)

Private respondents, the Parans, are applicants for registration of a parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet which they claim to have acquired from their father Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical, exclusive and open possession thereof since time immemorial.. The Dir. of lands filed an opposition, alleging among others, that the land is part of the public domain. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal likewise opposed the registration, stating that the land is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve covered by Proclamation No. 217 dated Feb. 16, 1929. The trial court found in favor of the applicants. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by the Sol Gen. Hence, this petition.

Issue:WON land is part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve and hence not subject to registration.

Ratio:The applicants are members of the Ibaloi tribe whose application for registration should be considered as falling under Section 48 (c) of CA 141, said subsection having been added by RA 3872 on June 18, 1964. Under the said section, members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of public domain, whether disposable or not. They may therefore apply for public lands although such are legally forest lands or mineral lands, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture. However, PD 1073 effective January 25, 1977 amended Section 48 (c), making the said provision applicable only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

It is important to note that the application of the Parans was filed in 1970 and the land registration court affirmed their long-continued possession of the lands in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48 (c) was in legal effect. Private respondents imperfect title was perfected or vested by the required period of possession prior to the issuance of PD 1073 thus, their right in respect of the land they had possessed for 30 years could not be divested by said PD. The Court stressed its pronouncement in Dir. of Lands vs. Funtilar that the Regalian doctrine must be applied together with constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. The Declarations of Real Property submitted by applicants likewise indicated that the land had become suitable to agriculture. Clearly, the requirements of Section 48 (c) were satisfied.

Time Immemorial Possession

Time immemorial possession is deemed to be part of the general rule and not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. Land held under a concept of ownership since immemorial is deemed to have been private and therefore never to have come within the ambit of the Regalian Doctrine.

CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVT

(41 Phil 935)

FACTS: Plaintiff, an Igorot from Benguet, filed application to Phil. Court of land registration. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. They had been recognized as owners by the Igorots. No document of title, however, was issued from the Spanish crown. The application was granted on 1904. On appeal to the CFI, on behalf of the Govt of the Phils. and also of the US, the application was dismissed. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:WON plaintiff owns the land

Held:Yes. Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone that province the registration to which the plaintiff was entitled by Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it foes not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all the rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest and never to have been public land. If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.

The older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for plaintiff indicate clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Phils. Into trespassers or even into tenants at will.

ANKRON VS. GOVT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS (40 Phil 10)

FACTS: Petitioner sought to register a parcel of land which he brought from the Moros, which the latter formerly occupied, cultivated and planted under claim of ownership for more than 44 years. The only oppositor was the Director of Lands, alleging that the land was property of the US under the control and administration of the Govt of the Phil. Islands. No proof whatsoever was offered by the oppositor. The lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel be registered in Ankrons name subject however to the right of the government to open a road thereon. From that decree, the Dir. appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON applicant proved his possession and occupation in accordance with the provisions of section 54 (6) of act 926Held: Yes. Under the said paragraph, the important requisites for registration are: (1) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; and (2) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, shall have been in the open, continuos possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of the said Act.

In the present case the applicant proved and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action. No question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the right of the Moros to acquire absolute ownership and dominion of the land which they have occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long period of years.

Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question

to be settled in each particular case. The mere fact that land is a manglar (mangrove swamp) is not sufficient in itself to show that it is agricultural, forestry or mineral. It may belong to one or the other class. Considering that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the public lands in the Phils. are agricultural lands, the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands.

ABAOAG VS. DIR. OF LANDS

(45 Phil. 518)

FACTS: Petitioners are among those Igorots who, in 1884, were given by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of Sison, Pangasinan, a tract of land in order that they may cultivate the same and increase the population of the said municipality. At the time of delivery, said land was unoccupied and unimproved public land. Said Bagos or Igorots entered upon said land, took possession of it and have continued to live upon the same and have cultivated it since that date. In 1919, petitioner, et al. presented a petition for registration with the CFI of Pangasinan. Oppositors filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that petitioners had not presented proof sufficient to show that they are entitled to the registration of the land. Said motion was granted. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:WON dismissal of the case was proper.

Held:No. No suggestion is made that the gobernadorcillo and the principalia of the town of Alava, now Sision, were not authorized in 1884, as representatives of the then existing Govt, to give and to deliver the land in question to the petitioners and their ancestors for the purposes for which the land was so given. Neither was it denied that it was agricultural land. No pretension is made that the land might not be registered under the Torrens system had the petitioners invoked the benefits of the public land law. No contention is made on the part of petitioners that they were ever given a title to the land. Their contention is simply that they were given the land; that they accepted the same; that they lived upon the land, and cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it to the exclusion of all others for a period of about 39 years and that therefore they are entitled to have the same registered under the Torrens system; that they have occupied and cultivated the same for a period sufficient to give them title and to have the same registered. This is like the case of Carino vs. Insular Government.

In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754: Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession as a valid title by prescription. To this, the Court added that every presumption of ownership under the public land laws is in favor of the one actually occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive him of it.

MANARPAAC VS. CABANATAN

(21 SCRA 743)

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed complaint against defendants, alleging that they have been, since time immemorial, in possession of two parcels of land, which were fraudulently included in the free patent application of defendant. Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss. Such was granted by the lower court holding that the free patent having been issued on November 3, 1959 and the first complaint was filed on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree, was therefore filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:WON dismissal was proper

Held:No. From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that through fraud and irregularity, defendant succeeded in securing a certificate of title. The foregoing recital of facts are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least, are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence.

The complaint likewise states a sufficient cause for action for recovery of possession of the land. Settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

B. Exceptions

Mining Claims

REAVIS V. FIANZA

40 PHIL 1017 (1909)

The Philippine Act of 1902 provides, That where such a person or association, they and their grantors have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this Act, in the absence of any adverse claim The period of prescription is ten years.

Fianza and his Igorot ancestors had been in possession of the land and had been working their mining claims for more than 10 years but this was before the enactment of the Phil. Act of 1902. Reavis, an American, applied for a mining patent over the same land during the effectivity of this law.

Reavis argued that first, ownership of the land surface does not automatically vest ownership over the mining rights. Second, mines can only be acquired in accordance with government-prescribed regulations. Therefore, Fianza had no legal rights to the mines since there was no compliance with the procedural requirements laid down in the Phil. Act. of 1902. Furthermore, Fianza held no patent.

The Supreme Court did not deal squarely with the first argument. However, the issue was somewhat more resolved in its disposition of the second argument. It was held that Fianza and his ancestors have, through their possession of more than 10 years under Spanish Law and their working of the mining claims within such period, acquired ownership rights over the questioned land and the mining claims. This is notwithstanding the fact that no patent was held or applied for by Fianza under the provisions of the Phil. Act of 1902 since the right to have a patent that will confer title is also a right to have the thing.

McDANIEL V. APACIBLE AND CUISIA

42 PHIL 749

On June 17, 1916, in accordance with the Phil. Act of 1902, McDaniel located 3 petroleum placer mineral claims in Tayabas. Notices of their location were recorded in the office of the mining recorder. Furthermore, there was continuous possession and annual assessment work over the said claims.

Act No. 2932 which was approved on August 31, 1920 provided that all public lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils and gas, on which no patent, at the date this Act takes effect, has been issued, are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location and lease On June 18, 1921, in accordance with Act No. 2932, Cuisia applied with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land that included McDaniels 3 claims.

However, Actd No. 2932 further provided that parties having heretofore filed claims for any mineral lands containing said minerals, shall be given preference to lease their respective claims, provided they file a petition to that effect within 6 months from the date of the approval of this Act. Therefore, all parties having mineral claims prior to the approval of Act No. 2932 had until Feb. 28, 1921 to file a petition with the Government to lease the corresponding public lands. Otherwise, their preference over other applicants shall be forfeited.

McDaniel sought to prohibit the Government from granting Cuisias lease application mainly on the argument that Act No. 2932 is unconstitutional since it deprives him of his property without due process of law.

The Supreme Court sustained McDaniels argument. It held that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. Such perfected, valid and subsisting appropriation shall be deemed to have taken place when all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims have been complied with and the claims were never abandoned or forfeited. This is notwithstanding the fact that no patent has been issued since the right to a patent vests full equitable title with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership. Furthermore, the claim and the location is perfected not only against 3rd persons but also against the Government.

GOLD CREEK MINING CORP. V. RODRIGUEZ

(66 PHIL 259)

On Jan. 1, 1929, Gold Creek Mining Corp. located a mining claim in Benguet. Notice of the location was recorded in the office of the mining recorder. Furthermore, there was continuous possession and annual assessment work over the said claim. Before Nov. 15, 1935, the date of effectivity of the 1935 Const., Gold Creek Mining applied with the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce for a patent.

However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and the Director of the Bureau of Mines refused to approve the application on the ground that the issuance of the patent amounted to an alienation of natural resources which is prohibited under the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that the patent must be issued. It is clear that the 1935 Constitution prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land. However, natural resources only includes mineral lands of the public domain and not mineral lands already withdrawn from the public domain prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Perfected, valid and subsisting mining claims prior to the 1935 Const., whether or not a patent has been issued therefor, are included in the latter category. They are no longer part of the public domain and therefore, are beyond the constitutional prohibition on the alienation of natural resources.

STANDARD MINERAL PRODUCTS, INC. V. CA

Deeunhong was a registered owner of 120 hectares of land in Antipolo under a transfer certificate of title. Standard Mineral Products, Inc. undertook the prospecting and locating of a mining claim in the said land without first securing written permission from Deeunhong. After locating a claim, SMPI applied for a mining lease with the Bureau of Mines over a portion of the land, which was opposed by the registerd owner.

In a separate civil case for reversion of the land to the State, it was found that the land was essentially agricultural and not mineral land.

The Supreme Court held that SMPI is not entitled to the surface rights due to its non-compliance with the Mining Act provision which requires written permission from the landowner prior to the prospecting and locating of mineral claims. Such written permission must also accompany the application of a mining lease with the Bureau of Mines.

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Titles

SUSI V. RAZON AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 48 PHIL 427 (1925)

Susi and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adverse and public possession since time immemorial in the concept of owner and for value of a certain parcel of unregistered land in Pampanga. On the other hand, Razon was able to purchase the same parcel of land from the Government for which an original certificate of title was issued.

The Supreme Court held that Susi was the absolute owner and that the sale to Razon and the corresponding certificate of title issued in her name is null and void. Reiterating the doctrine laid down in Carino v. Insular Govt., the Supreme Court held that that there is a presumption juris et du jure that all the necessary requirements have been complied with when there had been actual and physical possession, personally or through predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively, and publicly since July 26, 1894 with a right to a certificate of title to said land. Therefore, by operation of law, Susi had already acquired not only a right to a grant but a grant from the Government much prior to the application of Razon. The questioned land was already private and was not part of the public domain anymore . Therefore, the Director of Lands no longer had any control or jurisdiction over Razons application.

MERALCO V. CASTRO-BARTOLOME

114 SCRA 799 (1982)

A certain parcel of land was possessed by Ramos since 1941. In 1947, Ramos sold the land to the Piguing spouses. IN 1976, the Piguing spouses sold the land to MERALCO, a domestic corporation. Subsequently, MERALCO applied for the registration of the parcel of land which was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines.

The trial court dismissed MERALCOS application on the ground that it is not qualified to apply for registration since the Public Land Act allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land.

MERALCO argued that first, the questioned land was no longer public but was now private land since its predecessors-in-interest had possessed such land in the concept of owner for more than 30 years. Furthermore, it argued that it invoked the provision of the Public Land Act in behalf of the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land.

The Supreme Scourt affirmed the dismissal of MERALCOs application. It held that the questioned land was still public land and shall remain so until a certificate of title is issued to a Filipino citizen. Consequently, MERALCO, being a juridical person, is therefore disqualified to apply for registration of such public land.

The doctrine enunciated in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain since time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public, cannot be properly invoked by MERALCO since its predecessors-in-interest had not been in possession since time immemorial or beyond the reach of memory, i.e. before 1880.

Citing Oh Cho, the Supreme Court held that the immediate predecessors-in-interest must apply for registration of the land in order to secure a grant under the Public Land Act. Without such registration, the immediate predecessor-in-interest did not have any vested right amounting to title which was transmissible.

NOTE: This ruling was subsequently overturned in the case of Director of Lands v. IAC (Acme case).

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC & acme

146 SCRA 509 (1986)

In the case, the Supreme Court held that the ruling in the case of Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome is no longer deemed to be binding. Notwithstanding the prohibition in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except by lease not exceeding 1000 hectares, still a private corporation may institute confirmation proceedings under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act if, at the time of institution of the registration proceedings, the land was already private land. On the other hand, if the land was still part of the public domain, then a private corporation cannot institute such proceedings.

The correct rule is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals & Paran

(August 21, 1991)

There is no question that a positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department of the Government is needed to declassify land which had been classified as forestal and to convert it into alienable or disposable lands for agricultural or other purposes. In the case of Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, the Court considered the reports of the District Forester and the District Land Officer as adequate proof that the land applied for was no longer classified as forestal.

We consider and so hold that once a parcel of land Is shown to have been included within a Forest Reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the parcel of land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent withdrawal therefrom or declassification is shown. A simple, unsworn statement of a minor functionary of the Bureau of a minor functionary of the Bureau of Forest Development is not, by itself, such evidence.

Oh Cho v. Director of Lands

75 PHIL 890 (1946)

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act. No. 496) or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. 141)

The applicant failed to show that he has title that may be confirmed under the LRA. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be time immemorial possession, which would justify the presumption that the land had never been public land. The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the provisions of the Public Land Act (C.A. 141). Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot because he is an alien.

The benefits provided in the Public Land constitute a grant or concession by the State. Before they could acquire any right, the applicants immediate predecessor in interest should comply with the condition precedent, which is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This is the applicants immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person buy not by the applicant, since he is disqualified.

Indigenous Peoples' Rights

PD 705

Forestry Reform Code

SECTION 52.Census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants and residents in forest lands. Henceforth, no person shall enter into forest lands and cultivate the same without lease or permit.

A complete census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants and residents in forest lands with or without authority or permits from the government, showing the extent of their respective occupation and resulting damage, or impairment of forest resources, shall be conducted.

The Bureau may call upon other agencies of the government and holders of license agreement, license, lease and permits over forest lands to participate in the census.

RA 6657

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

SECTION 9.Ancestral Lands. For purposes of this Act, ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural community shall include, but not be limited to, lands in the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the community and its members: Provided, That the Torrens Systems shall be respected.

The right of these communities to their ancestral lands shall be protected to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being. In line with the principles of self-determination and autonomy, the systems of land ownership, land use, and the modes of settling land disputes of all these communities must be recognized and respected.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the PARC may suspend the implementation of this Act with respect to ancestral lands for the purpose of identifying and delineating such lands: Provided, That in the autonomous regions, the respective legislatures may enact their own laws on ancestral domain subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles enunciated in this Act and other national laws.

RA 6734

Organic Act for Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

SECTION 2.The Autonomous Region is a corporate entity with jurisdiction in all matters devolved to it by the Constitution and this Organic Act as herein enumerated:

(1)Administrative organization;

(2)Creation of sources of revenues;

(3)Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4)Personal, family and property relations;

(5)Regional, urban and rural planning development;

(6)Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7)Educational policies;

(8)Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;

(9)Powers, functions and responsibilities now being exercised by the departments of the National Government except:

(a)Foreign affairs;

(b)National defense and security;

(c)Postal service;

(d)Coinage, and fiscal and monetary policies;

(e)Administration of justice;

(f)Quarantine;

(g)Customs and tariff;

(h)Citizenship;

(i)Naturalization, immigration and deportation;

(j)General auditing, civil service and elections;

(k)Foreign trade;

(l)Maritime, land and air transportation and communications that affect areas outside the Autonomous Region; and

(m)Patents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights; and

(10)Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the Region.

ARTICLE XI

ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, ANCESTRAL LANDS AND AGRARIAN REFORM

SECTION 1.Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Government shall undertake measures to protect the ancestral domain and the ancestral lands of indigenous cultural communities.

All lands and natural resources in the Autonomous Region that have been possessed or occupied by indigenous cultural communities since time immemorial, except when prevented by war, force majeure, or other forms of forcible usurpation, shall form part of the ancestral domain. Such ancestral domain shall include pasture lands, worship areas, burial grounds, forests and fields, mineral resources, except: strategic minerals such as uranium, coal, petroleum, and other fossil fuels, mineral oils, and all sources of potential energy; lakes, rivers and lagoons; and national reserves and marine parks, as well as forest and watershed reservations.

Lands in the actual, open, notorious, and uninterrupted possession and occupation by an indigenous cultural community for at least thirty (30) years are ancestral lands.

SECTION 2.The constructive or traditional possession of lands and resources by an indigenous cultural community may also be recognized subject to judicial affirmation, the petition for which shall be instituted within a period of ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. The procedure for judicial affirmation of imperfect titles under existing laws shall, as far as practicable, apply to the judicial affirmation of titles to ancestral lands.

The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, titles secured under the Torrens system, and rights already vested under the provisions of existing laws shall be respected.

SECTION 3.As used in this Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the Autonomous Region who are:

(1)Tribal peoples whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; and

(2)Bangsa Moro people regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations that inhabited the country or a distinct geographical area at the time of conquest or colonization and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own socioeconomic, cultural and political institutions.

SECTION 4.The customary laws, traditions, and practices of indigenous cultural communities on land claims and ownership and settlement of land disputes shall be implemented and enforced among the members of such community.

SECTION 5.The Regional Government shall require corporations, companies and other entities within the ancestral domain of the indigenous cultural communities whose operations adversely affect the ecological balance to take the necessary preventive measures and safeguards in order to maintain such a balance.

SECTION 6.Unless authorized by the Regional Assembly, lands of the ancestral domain titled to or owned by an indigenous cultural community shall not be disposed of to nonmembers.

SECTION 7.No portion of the ancestral domain shall be open to resettlement by nonmembers of the indigenous cultural communities.

SECTION 8.Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Assembly shall enact an Agrarian Reform Law suitable to the special circumstances prevailing in the Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE XIII

ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

SECTION 1.Consistent with the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Government may enact regional laws pertaining to the national economy and patrimony applicable and responsive to the needs of the Region. However, nothing herein shall be construed as to authorize the Regional Government to require lesser standards respecting the protection, conservation and enhancement of the natural resources than those required by the National Government.

SECTION 2.Except for strategic minerals such as uranium, coal, petroleum, and other fossil fuels, mineral oils, all sources of potential energy, as well as national reserves and aquatic parks, forest and watershed reservations as may be delimited by national law, the control and supervision over the exploration, utilization and development of the natural resources of the Autonomous Region is hereby delegated to the Regional Government in accordance with the Constitution and national laws.

The Regional Assembly shall have the authority to grant franchises and concessions but the Regional Governor may, by regional law, be authorized to grant leases, permits and licenses: Provided, That, any lease, permit, franchise or concession shall cover an area not exceeding the limits allowed by the Constitution and shall subsist for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years; Provided, further, That existing leases, permits, licenses, franchises and concessions shall be respected until their expiration unless legally terminated as provided by law; and Provided, finally, That when the natural resources are located within the ancestral domain, the permit, license, franchise or concession, shall be approved by the Regional Assembly after consultation with the cultural community concerned.

SECTION 3.The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, except those enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 2 hereof, shall be allowed to all Filipinos and to private enterprises, including corporations, associations, cooperatives, and such other similar collective organizations with at least sixty percent (60%) of their capital investment or capital stocks directly controlled or owned by Filipinos who are preferably residents of the Region.

SECTION 4.Small-scale mining shall receive support from and be regulated by the Regional Government, considering ecological balance, the safety and health and the interest of the communities and the miners where such operations are conducted.

SECTION 5.The Regional Government may, in the interest of regional welfare and security, establish and operate pioneering utilities. Upon payment of just compensation, it may transfer the ownership of such utilities to cooperatives or other collective organizations.

SECTION 6.The Regional Government may, in times of regional emergency declared by the President, when the public interest so requires and under reasonable terms and safeguards prescribed by the Regional Assembly, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

SECTION 7.The Regional Assembly shall enact laws for the just compensation, rehabilitation, relocation, and other similar measures of inhabitants adversely affected in the harnessing of natural and mineral resources in the Region.

The Regional Assembly shall likewise provide for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by said harnessing of natural and mineral resources in the Region.

SECTION 8.The Regional Government shall actively and immediately pursue reforestation measures to ensure that at least fifty (50%) of the land surface of the Autonomous Region shall be covered with trees, giving priority to land strips along eighteen percent (18%) in slope or over by providing infrastructure, financial and technical support to upland communities especially the Lumads or tribal peoples.

SECTION 9.The Regional Government shall prohibit the use, importation, deposit, disposal and dumping of toxic or hazardous substances within the Autonomous Region.

SECTION 10.The Regional Government shall adopt policies to promote profit sharing and broaden the base of ownership of business enterprises.

SECTION 11.The Regional Government shall provide incentives, including tax holidays, for investors in businesses that will contribute to the development of the Region.

It shall provide the same incentives to all companies doing business in the Region which reinvest at least fifty percent (50%) of their net profits therein, and to all cooperatives which reinvest at least ten percent (10%) of their surplus into socially-oriented projects in the Region.

SECTION 12.The Regional Government shall give priority to the establishment of transportation and communication facilities for the economic development of the region.

SECTION 13.In the delivery of power services, priority shall be given to provinces in the area of autonomy which do not have direct access to such services.

SECTION 14.The Regional Government is hereby empowered to create pioneering firms and other business entities needed to boost economic development in the Region.

Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

SECTION 15.The Regional Government shall recognize, promote and protect the rights and welfare of farmers, farmworkers, fishermen and fishworkers, as well as farmers, and fishworkers' cooperatives and associations.

SECTION 16.The Regional Government shall encourage agricultural productivity and promote a diversified and organic farming system.

SECTION 17.The Regional Government shall give top priority to the conservation, protection, utilization and development of soil and water resources for agricultural purposes.

SECTION 18.The Regional Assembly shall enact on Aquatic and Fisheries Code which shall enhance, develop, conserve and protect marine and aquatic resources, and shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, including seaweeds. This protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds, up to and including all waters twelve (12) nautical miles from the coastline of the Autonomous Region but within the territorial waters of the Philippines, regardless of depth, the seabed and the subsoil that are included between two (2) lines drawn perpendicular to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the Autonomous Region touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel to the general coastline.

Further, it shall provide support to subsistence fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production and marketing assistance and other services.

Fishworkers shall also receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

Science, technology and other disciplines shall be developed and employed to protect and maintain aquatic and marine ecology.

SECTION 19.The Regional Assembly may, by law, create a Bureau of Agriculture and Fisheries and define its composition, powers and functions.

Trade and Industry

SECTION 20.The Regional Government recognizes the private sector as the prime mover of trade, commerce and industry. It shall encourage and support entrepreneurial capability in the Region and shall recognize, promote and protect cooperatives.

SECTION 21.The Regional Government shall promote and protect small and medium-scale cottage industries by providing assistance such as marketing opportunities, financial support, tax incentives, appropriate and alternative technology and technical training to produce semi-finished and finished products.

SECTION 22.The Regional Government shall give support and encouragement to the establishment of banks in accordance with the principles of the Islamic banking system, subject to the supervision by the central monetary authority of the National Government.

SECTION 23.Subject to national policies, the Regional Government shall regulate traditional barter trade and countertrade with neighboring countries.

SECTION 24.The Regional Government shall encourage, promote, undertake and support the establishment of economic zones, industrial centers and ports in strategic areas and growth centers of the Region to attract local and foreign investments and business enterprises.

SECTION 25.The Regional Government shall undertake measures to promote consumer education and to ensure that the rights, interests and welfare of the consumers are protected.

SECTION 26.The Regional Government shall promote the preferential use of labor and locally produced goods and materials by adopting measures to increase their competitiveness.

SECTION 27.Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional Government shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its jurisdiction in accordance with its goals and priorities.

Tourism Development

SECTION 28.The Regional Government shall, with the assistance of the National Government and the participation of the private sector, develop tourism as a positive instrument toward accelerated regional development. Tourism development shall promote greater pride in and commitment to the nation: Provided, That the diverse cultural heritage, and moral and spiritual values of the people in the Autonomous Region shall be primarily considered and respected.

SECTION 29.The Regional Assembly may, by law, create a Tourism office, and shall define its composition, powers and functions.

RA 7076

People's Small-Scale Mining Act

SECTION 7.Ancestral Lands. No ancestral land may be declared as a people's small-scale mining area without the prior consent of the cultural communities concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as people's small-scale mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining contracts.

RA 7586

National Integrated Protected Areas System

Sec 4

d. "Indigenous cultural community" refers to a group of people sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, and who have, since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized a territory;

SECTION 13.Ancestral Lands and Rights Over Them. Ancestral lands and customary rights and interest arising shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral lands within protected areas: Provided, That the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent: Provided, however, That all rules and regulations, whether adversely affecting said communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and hearing to be participated in by members of concerned indigenous community.

RA 7611

Palawan Strategic Environmental Plan

SECTION 11.Tribal Ancestral Lands. These areas, traditionally occupied by cultural minorities, comprise both land and sea areas. These shall be treated in the same graded system of control and prohibition as in the others abovementioned except for stronger emphasis in cultural considerations. The SEP, therefore, shall define a special kind of zonation to fulfill the material and cultural needs of the tribes using consultative processes and cultural mapping of the ancestral lands.

RA 7942

Mining Act of 1995

SECTION 3.Definition of Terms. As used in and for purposes of this Act, the following terms, whether in singular or plural, shall mean:

(a)"Ancestral lands" refers to all lands exclusively and actually possessed, occupied, or utilized by indigenous cultural communities by themselves or through their ancestors in accordance with their customs and traditions since time immemorial, and as may be defined and delineated by law.

SECTION 4.Ownership of Mineral Resources. Mineral resources are owned by the State and the exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors.

SECTION 16.Opening of Ancestral Lands for Mining Operations. No ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned.

SECTION 17.Royalty Payments for Indigenous Cultural Communities. In the event of an agreement with an indigenous cultural community pursuant to the preceding section, the royalty payment, upon utilization of the minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties. The said royalty shall form part of a trust fund for the socioeconomic well-being of the indigenous cultural community.

SECTION 18.Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to any existing rights or reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators.

SECTION 19.Areas Closed to Mining Applications. Mineral agreement or financial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed:

(a)In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by the government agency concerned;

(b)Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and historic sites, bridges, highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams or other infrastructure projects, public or private works including plantations or valuable crops, except upon written consent of the government agency or private entity concerned;

(c)In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights;

(d)In areas expressly prohibited by law;

(e)In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with prior consent of the small-scale miners, in which case a royalty payment upon the utilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties, said royalty forming a trust fund for the socioeconomic development of the community concerned; and

(f)Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law and in areas expressly prohibited under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws.

RA 8425

Social Reform Agenda

SECTION 4.Adoption and Integration of Social Reform Agenda (SRA) in the National Anti-Poverty Action Agenda. The National Anti-Poverty Action Agenda shall principally include the core principles and programs of the Social Reform Agenda (SRA). The SRA shall have a multi-dimensional approach to poverty consisting of the following reforms:

(1)Social dimension access to quality basic services. These are reforms which refer to equitable control and access to social services and facilities such as education, health, housing, and other basic services which enable the citizens to meet their basic human needs and to live decent lives;

(2)Economic dimension asset reform and access to economic opportunities. Reforms which address the existing inequities in the ownership, distribution, management and control over natural and man-made resources from which they earn a living or increase the fruits of their labor;

(3)Ecological dimension sustainable development of productive resources. Reforms which ensure the effective and sustainable utilization of the natural and ecological resource base, thus assuring greater social acceptability and increased participation of the basic sectors in environmental and natural resources conservation, management and development;

(4)Governance dimension democratizing the decision-making and management processes. Reforms which enable the basic sectors to effectively participate in decision-making and management processes that affect their rights, interests and welfare.

The SRA shall focus on the following sector-specific flagship programs:

(1)For farmers and landless rural workers agricultural development;

(2)For the fisherfolk fisheries and aquatic resources conservation, management and development;

(3)For the indigenous peoples and indigenous communities respect, protection and management of the ancestral domains;

(4)For workers in the informal sector workers' welfare and protection;

(5)For the urban poor socialized housing; and

(6)For members of other disadvantaged groups such as the women, children, youth, persons with disabilities, the elderly, and victims of natural and man-made calamities the Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS).

Additionally, to support the sectoral flagship programs, the following cross-sectoral flagships shall likewise be instituted:

(1)Institution-building and effective participation in governance;

(2)Livelihood programs;

(3)Expansion of micro-credit/microfinance services and capability building; and

(4)Infrastructure buildup and development.

ON LEGAL MYTHS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: Re-Examining Carino vs. Insular Government

(Marvic M.V.F. Leonen)

Concept of Ownership

There is nothing necessary or natural in ownership, as it is understood now under our Phil. Legal System. The concept of property and ownership arise and take shape not because of any physical or material attribute of the thing being owned. Rather, these concepts are reflections of human associations in relation to things. In other words, specific cultures create their own set of property relationships. Under the Civil Code, one is said to own a piece of land when he exercise, to the exclusion of all others, the right to use, enjoy its fruits and alienate or dispose of it in any manner not prohibited by law. Among the indigenous, unwesternized or unHispanized Phil. Population, there is no such concept of individual and exclusive ownership of land. Ownership more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or territorial control. Ownership is tantamount to work. At best, people consider themselves as 'secondary owners' or stewards of the land, since beings of the spirit world are considered as the true and primary or reciprocal owners of the land. There is also the concept of trusteeship since not only the present generation but also the future ones possess the right to the land.

The Relevance of Legal Issues: Carino Revisited

In a paper written by the Cordillera Studies Program, they point out that the Ibaloi, where Carino belonged, had no concept of exclusive or alienable ownership. Ownership, as we understand it, was only a relatively new development and which by custom applied only to pasture land. The court focused only on the issue whether plaintiff owned the land, without focusing on the kind of property tenure Carino had with respect to the land. The law, which the judge was implementing, was simply not equipped to assist him discover this important point.

The ruling in Carino is so broad that when used indiscriminately as the sole ground to recognize and protect ancestral domains it will work a contradiction. At the same time that it provides an avenue to protect native titles, it opens floodgates for enterprising lowlanders to take advantage of the uplanders legal ignorance. Their land become as alienable as any other property as conceived by the national legal system.

The Attempt to entrench Carino as a statutory doctrine

The subsequent attempt at statutory articulation like the Public Land Act, Sec. 48 (c) of CA 141 and RA 3872 only worsened the situation. They seem to build up on the Carino doctrine. The truth is that its concept is totally different. First, unlike Carino, the provisions do not require possession by individuals under a claim of private ownership for as far back as testimony or memory goes. A mere thirty years possession is sufficient. Second, Carino establishes the precedent that the native tittle is presumed never to have been public. Sec. 48 of CA 141 starts from the presumption that the land is initially part of the public domain. Like Carino however, the concept of ownership remains. The prevailing rule is that the lapse of 30 years adverse possession is enough to vest title ipso facto. Judicial confirmation is only a formality.

These rights however, can work against indigenous peoples. First, the recognition of his native title has served to make his land alienable in every sense provided by the national legal system. Its disposition is not confined only to members of his kin or of his village. Ironically, while reiterating native right to ancestral land, the decisions make it possible for a private corporation to acquire the land from the indigenous holder just what happened in the case of Acme. Second, the awareness of the rights provided by the outsiders laws will definitely be a tempting opportunity for a member of a community to treat land, not as something that sustains life that should be revered, but as a commodity that could be sold for profit.

The Bias against indigenous concept of ownership

Other laws applicable to indigenous cultural communities reveal a similar bias against indigenous concept of ownership the constitution notwithstanding. The concept of private right as defined in the Revised Forestry Code excludes orchards and forests since they are plantations of forest and trees of economic value. The Kalinga, however, would own the residential area, the sacred shrine, the burial grounds and possibly the rice terraces. Likewise, a large part of the ancestral domain is expressly excluded by the provision which reads: No land of the public domain 18% in slope or over shall be classified as alienable and disposable It is obvious that in Gran Cordillera, which is so mountainous, virtually all populated areas under this provision are inalienable and indisposable, such that the land cannot be owned by the inhabitants thereof.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Marvic Leonen)

On October 29, 1997, the President signed into law Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. Formally, the law is the legislatures interpretation of some key provisions of the Constitution directly relating to indigenous peoples particularly Sec. 22, Article II and Sec. 5, Article XII. IPRA implements these provisions in the following ways:

Civil and Political Rights

Foremost in the law is its recognition of the right to on-discrimination of indigenous peoples (IPs). Discrimination against the cultural minority, as shown in the cases of People vs. Cayat and Rubi vs. Provincial Board are not only archaic but also outlawed. IPs are entitled to the same rights and privileges as citizens and should not be discriminated against in a any form of employment and should receive more appropriate forms of basic services. The new law even goes further to ensure the rights of women, children and civilians in situations of armed conflict. There is also recognition of IPs right to self-governance. Likewise, the new law defines more precisely the concept of customary law, which will be used not only to arrive at an amicable settlement but also to process it in an acceptable manner that is, the offended party may opt to use the customary processes rather than have the offender prosecuted in the courts of law.

Social and Cultural Rights

IPRA requires that the educational system should become relevant to the needs of children and young people as well as provide them with cultural opportunities. Cultural diversity is recognized. The rights to religion as well as to cultural sites and ceremonies are guaranteed. It is now unlawful to excavate archaeological sites in order to obtain materials of cultural value as well as deface or destroy artifacts.

Recognizing Right and Tenure

to Natural Resources

IPRA supplements the private vested rights recognized by the Constitution by the operation of Carnino, through rights acquired under the Public Land Act and other similar laws. It also creates by law other sources as well as a different concept of ownership. By legislative fiat, ancestral domains and ancestral lands are now legitimate ways of acquiring ownership. Unlike emphasis on individual and corporate holders in the Civil Code, IPRA emphasizes private but community property nature of ancestral domains. Aside from not being a proper subject of sale or any other mode of disposition, ancestral domain holders may claim ownership over the resources within their territory, develop the land and natural resources, stay in the territory, have the rights against involuntary displacement, regulate the entry of migrants, have rights to safe and clean air and water, claim parts of reservations and use customary law to resolve their conflicts. These rights however need to be qualified by the ff. provisions: 1) Sec. 56: Existing Property Rights Regimes; 2) Sec. 57: Granting only priority rights to members of indigenous cultural communities; and 3) Sec. 58: Allows the use of ancestral domains as critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas when deemed appropriate and with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned.

Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

This will act as a mechanism to coordinate implementation of the law as well as a final authority that has jurisdiction to issue Certificates of Ancestral Domains/Land Titles.

THE POLICY CONTEXT

This includes the direct action taken by the communities themselves to ward off encroachments into their territory and threatening their existence, as assisted/organized by various POs and NGOs. There are also various responses from post EDSA governments which reveal the extent of advocacy for indigenous peoples rights. Lastly, there is the pressure from international funding institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Funding for projects had a lot to do with the changing attitude of the government relinquishing control over large portions of the public domain and recognizing rights of upland migrants.

THE DANGERS

IPRA is not the solution to the various problems of IPs. Being a national law, it is too general to address the diversity of the indigenous communities. The premise of national law is that it can meet local problems with generalized solutions. The premise of cultural diversity is able to find creative and unique approaches to the issues as they define them. The law can also be diversionary. It can involve peoples and communities into concerns and activities which may far be removed from those which might better address their concerns bureaucratisation. Lastly, the present language and the new concept of IPRA encourage litigation. Even those situations where the law prescribes customary law will require some form of litigation to determine for instance whether a particular form is customary, to whom it will apply, etc. Normally, it is the party that has the most resources that has the greater possibility of getting a better judgment. Bsid4es, courts of law provide a culture that is radically different from that of the indigenous community.

THE POTENTIALS

Our own experience has shown that the laws even when they find their way to hegemony, is not a monolith that could not be challenged. It adjusts to political advocacy. They also provide for the condition for change. The use of law in many situations of IPs therefore should be marginal. Important but marginal nonetheless. Advocates need to be more strategic to understand the long term needs and aspirations of the community as the latter defines them. The challenge for advocates is to know when to use the law, not so much to maintain the status quo, but to gain leverage for a more just and fundamental change. Its potential lies not in what it really contains, but in how we decide and when to use it.

How is IPRA different from Carino?

(1) Carino does not distinguish between ancestral land and ancestral domain. IPRA does, however.

(2) Carino refers only to land. IPRA refers to land as well as the natural resources above and below it.

(3) IPRA is applicable only to indigenous peoples. Carino applies to all persons who can prove that their predecessors-in-interest occupied lands since time immemorial.

II. LAND CLASSIFICATION

Lands of the public domain are classified into 4 categories:

(1) Agricultural land

(2) Forest or timber land

(3) Mineral land

(4) National parks

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XII

National Economy and Patrimony

Section 3.Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 4.The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide, for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.

A. Classes of Lands

Public Agricultural Lands

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141*

AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

SEC. 6.The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into

(a)Alienable or disposable,

(b)Timber, and

(c)Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

SEC. 7.For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alien-able or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

SEC. 58.Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the pro-visions of this chapter and not otherwise.

SEC. 59.The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a)Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filing, or other means;

(b)Foreshore;

(c)Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

Montano v. Insular Government

12 Phil. 572

Lands under the ebb and flow of the tide, being reserved for public uses of navigation and fishery and subject to Congressional regulation, are not understood as included in the term "public lands" when used in general laws authorizing private appropriation thereof as homesteads or otherwise. Swamps and marshes not available for the purpose of navigation or public uses may be subjected to private appropriation although covered by the tides.

Of this character are the manglar or mangrove swamps of the Philippine Islands in which grow aquatic trees cultivated and in common use for domestic or commercial purposes. Such manglares when converted by man into fisheries and used as such for the statutory period are the subject of private ownership.

Jocson v. Director of Forestry

39 Phil. 560

That manglares are not forestry lands, within the meaning of the words "timber lands" in the Act of Congress, has been definitely decided by this court in the case of Montano vs. Insular Government. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares [mangroves], fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

Ankron v. Government

40 Phil. 10 (1919)

The Torrens system does not provide for registration of public forestry and mineral lands. Under certain conditions, public agricultural lands may be registered. (Sec. 54, Act No. 926.)

Considering that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral wealth within it, is not in itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the mineral. The proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the minerals which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.

Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question to be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interests, set

aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question.

Heirs of Amunategui v. Director

126 SCRA 69

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

Republic v. De Porkan

151 SCRA 88

It is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government to classify public lands. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Since the disputed tract of public land is neither timber nor mineral lands, the same is alienable or open to disposition as public agricultural lands, under Section 11, C.A. 141 thru homestead settlement or free patent.

Where the possession of a public land dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial period, such possession of the said tract of public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the Government. The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private land. Title over the land has vested on the possessor so as to segregate the land from the mass of the public domain. It is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sustained by the courts, an application therefor being sufficient.

When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof, and once the right to a patent has become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent to a patent actually issued. From that point the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private. The Director of Lands is divested of control and possession when homestead applications are approved and recorded.Forest Lands

May 19, 1975

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705

FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 15.Topography. - No land of the public domain eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over shall be classified as alienable and disposable, nor any forest land fifty per cent (50%) in slope or over, as grazing land.

Lands eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over which have already been declared as alienable and disposable shall be reverted to the classification of forest lands by the Department Head, to form part of the forest reserves, unless they are already covered by existing titles or approved public land application, or actually occupied openly, continuously, adversely and publicly for a period of not less than thirty (30) years as of the effectivity of this Code, where the occupant is qualified for a free patent under the Public Land Act: Provided, That said lands, which are not yet part of a well-established communities, shall be kept in a vegetative condition sufficient to prevent erosion and adverse effects on the lowlands and streams: Provided, further, That when public interest so requires, steps shall be taken to expropriate, cancel defective titles, reject public land application, or eject occupants thereof.

Sec. 16.Areas needed for forest purposes. - The following lands, even if they are below eighteen per cent (18%) in slope, are needed for forest purposes, and may not, therefore, be classified as alienable and disposable land, to wit:

1)Areas less than 250 hectares which are far from, or are not contiguous with, any certified alienable and disposable land;

2)Isolated patches of forest of at least five (5) hectares with rocky terrain, or which protect a spring for communal use;

3)Areas which have already been reforested;

4)Areas within forest concessions which are timbered or have good residual stocking to support an existing, or approved to be established, wood processing plant;

5)Ridge tops and plateaus regardless of size found within, or surrounded wholly or partly by, forest lands where headwaters emanate;

6)Appropriately located road-rights-or-way;

7)Twenty-meter strips of land along the edge of the normal high waterline of rivers and streams with channels of at least five (5) meters wide;

8)Strips of mangrove or swamplands at least twenty (20) meters wide, along shorelines facing oceans, lakes, and other bodies of water, and strips of land at least twenty (20) meters wide facing lakes;

9)Areas needed for other purposes, such as national parks, national historical sites, game refuges and wildlife sanctuaries, forest station sites, and others of public interest; and

10)Areas previously proclaimed by the President as forest reserves, national parks, game refuge, bird sanctuaries, national shrines, national historic sites:

Provided, That in case an area falling under any of the foregoing categories shall have been titled in favor of any person, steps shall be taken, if public interest so requires, to have said title cancelled or amended, or the titled area expropriated.

Mineral Lands

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942

Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

Sec. 3.Definition of Terms. - As used in and for purposes of this Act, the following terms, whether in singular or plural, shall mean:

(aa)"Minerals" refers to all naturally occurring inorganic substance in solid, gas, liquid, or any intermediate state excluding energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials, and geothermal energy.

(ab)"Mineral agreement" means a contract between the government and a contractor, involving mineral production-sharing agreement, co-production agreement, or joint-venture agreement.

(ac)"Mineral land" means any area where mineral resources are found.

(ad)"Mineral resource" means any concentration of minerals/rocks with potential economic value.

(ae)"Mining area" means a portion of th