bob plant.derrida and pyrrhonism

8/20/2019 Bob Plant.derrida and Pyrrhonism

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!J Routledge

ANGELAKI

journal of the theoretical humanities

volume 11 number 3 december !!"

The formulae ‘‘perhaps’’ and ‘‘perhaps not,’’

[. . .] we adopt in place of ‘‘perhaps it is and

perhaps it is not’’ [. . .]. But here again we do

not fight about phrases [. . .] these expressions

are indicative of nonassertion.

extus "mpiricus, #utlines of $%rrhonism

#ne could spend %ears on [. . .] the perhaps

[. . .] whose modalit% will render fictional and

fragile ever%thing that follows [. . .]. #ne does

not testif% in court and before the law with

‘‘perhaps.’’&ac'ues (errida, (emeure) *iction and

Testimon%

I the #$rrhonian thera#$ %a&

the abandonment of belief

Therapeutic ob+ectives governed a number of

ancient philosophies, but none more so than

$%rrhonian scepticism. *or the $%rrhonist, it is

the human tendenc% toward belief -that is, belief

per se that re'uires philosophical treatment./

#nl% b% eliminating our ontological, epistemic

and normative commitments can we attain an

‘‘untroubled and tran'uil condition of [the] soul’’

or ataraxia.0 The $%rrhonists are not devoted to

an% single methodolog%,1 but +ust as ph%sicians

‘‘have remedies which differ in strength [. . .] so

too the ceptic propounds arguments which differ

in strength.’’2 This, combined with the re+ection

of theoretical commitments, thus leads extus to

describe $%rrhonism as a ‘‘tone of mind,’’3 an

‘‘abilit%, or mental attitude.’’4 The $%rrhonian

attitude toward reason is therefore extremel%

pragmatic. 5ational procedures are valued onl%

insofar as the% facilitate existential health in a

given therapeutic context.6 Ta7ing these curative

aspirations into account, we must determine

what, according to the $%rrhonist,

bob #lant

'ER(A') . . . jac*ues

derrida and #$rrhonian

sce#ticism

constitutes a ‘‘health%’’ life. 8n order to answer

this 'uestion, however, we need to sa% something

about the $%rrhonist’s metaphilosoph%.

9lthough extus divides philosoph% into ‘‘the

(ogmatic, the 9cademic, and the ceptic,’’: his

principal concern is with the latter.; 8ndeed,

extus immediatel% problemati


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derrida and pyrrhonian scepticism

in character. *or $%rrhonism, however, it is

precisel% this most elementar% of beliefs = and the

haught% assertiveness which accompanies it = that

re'uires therapeutic dissolution.1 8ndeed, this is

wh% the $%rrhonist eliminates ‘‘truth’’ from her conceptual vocabular%, replacing ‘‘it is’’ with ‘‘it

appears to me to be.’’2 This eliminative strateg%

is central to extus’s argument because

emphasi and in order to possess an accepted

criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first

be decided.’’4 But ‘‘no one [. . .] disputes that the

underl%ing ob+ect has this or that appearance> the point in dispute is whether the ob+ect is in realit%

such as it appears to be.’’6 This manoeuvre thus

enables the $%rrhonist to distinguish herself from

her philosophical competitors. *or in their respec

tive claims to have provided the most ade'uate

foundations upon which to live, philosophers fail

to see that their theories simpl% compound the

problem the% aim to resolve.: "ngagement with

an% of these schools re'uires a variet% of

ontological, epistemic and normative commit

ments, but it is precisel% these that increase

existential disease insofar as the% impede natural

instinct./; ?hat is needed if ataraxia is to be

attained is not dogma, but rather a natural

flexibilit% in the face of life’s unpredictabilities./

?hat ultimatel% guides this teleolog% of

‘‘'uietude’’// is the realm of unhampered

animalit%. (iogenes thus famousl% notes of

$%rrho that when

fellowpassengers on board a ship were all

unnerved b% a storm, he 7ept calm and

confident, pointing to a little pig [. . .] that

went on eating, and telling them that such was

the unperturbed state in which the wise man

should 7eep himself./0

9pocr%phal though the stor% ma% be, the general

sentiment is clearl% opposed to the traditional

philosophical tendenc% to elevate the ‘‘human’’

far above that of the ‘‘animal.’’ But for the

$%rrhonist, humanit% has much to learn from its

animal neighbours./1 9fter all)

?hat creature escapes being wrec7ed in the

tempest@ The creature who goes through life

onl% as natural instinct prompts it, without

ambitious enterprises [. . .]. Aot builders of

fortresses, but nomads, who move along

gra


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plant

pursues an%thing.’’00 8n other words, ‘‘the added

opinion’’ that something is naturall% good or bad

‘‘is worse than the actual suffering itself.’’01

ulnerabilit% is an inextricable feature of human

life. extus’s point is that while such burdenscannot be wholl% eliminated, one can nevertheless

avoid aggravating them unnecessaril%.02 The

$%rrhonist’s aspirations are not therefore entirel%

utopian, for, although ataraxia is his aim

regarding matters of superfluous belief, he does

not thin7 the same level of unperturbedness is

possible in all areas of life. Certainl% ‘‘he is cold

at times and thirst%, and suffers various affections

of that 7ind,’’ but ‘‘whereas ordinar% people are

afflicted b% [both . . .] the affections themselves

and [. . .] b% the belief that these conditions are

evil b% nature,’’ the $%rrhonist ‘‘escapes [. . .]

with less discomfort.’’ Thus, while in ‘‘matters of opinion the ceptic’s "nd is 'uietude, in regard to

things unavoidable it is ‘moderate affection.’ ’’03

uffering ma% be naturall% unpleasant and often

best avoided,04 but believing such things to be

‘‘b% nature’’ evil simpl% increases one’s initial

distress.06 To attain ataraxia, one does not then

re'uire explanations, but the abilit% to resist

supplementing unavoidable torments with

theoretical speculation. 8nsofar as the ‘‘end of the

ceptic s%stem’’0: is ataraxia, it is unli7el% that

the $%rrhonist can purge herself of all traces of

dogmatism.1; *or in one thing she has a little

‘‘hope’’>1 that ataraxia is itself a goal worth

pursuing = and not merel% for herself.1/ -The

claim that ‘‘$%rrho [. . .] leaves nothing at all to

see7 after’’10 thus remains 'uestionable. ?ithout

this minimal commitment, there would be no

motivation either to practise or to advocate the

$%rrhonian attitude.11 8n short, $%rrhonism

necessaril% involves a normative = and to that

extent dogmatic = dimension.12

This brings us to the 'uestion of how the

$%rrhonist actuall% goes about undermining

(ogmatism. extus explains) ‘‘?e oppose either

appearances to appearances or ob+ects of thought

to ob+ects of thought [. . .]. *or instance, we

oppose [. . .] thoughts to thoughts, when in

answer to him who argues the existence of

$rovidence from the order of the heavenl% bodies

we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill

and the bad fair well.’’13

Daving persuaded the (ogmatist of the e'ual

plausibilit% -‘‘e'uipollence’’14 of his assertion

being either true or false, this 'uasidialectical16

move provo7es a radical ‘‘agnosticism.’’1: -The

emphasis on rhetoric should be dul% noted, for given the nontheoretical, nondogmatic aspira

tions of the $%rrhonist, she cannot ris7 getting

‘‘infected’’ b% the (ogmatist’s discourse. 9ll she

can legitimatel% sa% is ‘‘this is what m% exp

eriences cause me 'uite naturall% to do> and this is

what 8 have so far observed to result from these

doings. ee what happens in %our own case.’’2;

9s previousl% noted, rational debate is of purel%

therapeutic concern here, for the $%rrhonist will

happil% emplo% the same argument in one

situation, which, in another, she would subvert.2

Thus, the value of argumentation is ‘‘persua

siveness,’’ rhetoric ‘‘simpl% replaces logical

validit%.’’ 9n% number of ‘‘logical sins’’2/ ma% be

committed, so long as the% successfull%

undermine dogmatism and generate ataraxia.20

?hat the $%rrhonist attempts to bring about here

is an experience of radical indecision = an

epistemological limbo where a decision for or

against a specific belief seems arbitrar%. The

$%rrhonist’s intention is not then to bring about

doubt in the patient. 8ndecision is rather an

aporetic state of ‘‘being at a loss’’ -epoche> a

‘‘paral%sis’’21 or ‘‘standstill of reason’’ through

which one will ‘‘neither den% nor assert an%

thing.’’22 -?hat distinguishes this radical hesi

tanc% from doubt = and thus what separates

$%rrhonism from other forms of scepticism = is

that while doubt implies understanding, ‘‘being at

a loss’’ does not. #ne can onl% doubt an assertion

if one understands what that assertion = and its

denial = might mean. #f course, this ‘‘being at a

loss’’ does not appl% to immediate

phenomenological appearances. *or although the

$%rrhonist ‘‘withholds assent [. . .] from all

categorical assertions [. . .] he is willing to sa%

how things now seem to him to be, but on the

'uestion of how the% are in fact, he ta7es no position.’’23 ?hile ‘‘being at a loss’’ ma% initiall%

provo7e ‘‘speechlessness,’’24 the $%rrhonist need

not remain silent or ‘‘wholl% inactive’’26 because

he onl% expresses sub+ective appearances.2: Thus,

extus explains that he adopts the ‘‘formulae

‘perhaps’ and ‘perhaps not,’ [. . .] and ‘ma%be’

13 +


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and ‘ma%be not’’’ in place of ‘‘‘perhaps it is and

perhaps it is not’ [. . .] these expressions are

indicative of nonassertion.’’3; To summari and she will have no beliefs.’’31

Aussbaum continues)

the removal of belief removes arrogance and

irascibilit% [. . .]. (ogmatists [. . .] are self

loving, rash, puffedup [. . .] s7eptics, b%

contrast, are calm and gentle [. . .] dogmatists

[. . .] impos[e] their own wa% on others> thes7eptic, b% contrast, is tolerant.32

(espite the confusion between indifference and

tolerance in this passage, one can trace a certain

rationale in Aussbaum’s portrait. till, other

features of $%rrhonism present a more troubling

image.33 These can best be explored b% consider

ing Aussbaum’s additional point> that in 7eeping

‘‘himself to himself’’ and letting ‘‘others go their

wa%,’’ the $%rrhonist is not ‘‘a slave to social

pre+udices.’’34 This claim demands interrogation

given the radical sort of ‘‘conservatism’’36 the

$%rrhonist favours.3:

Thus, earlier on, Aussbaumrightl% suggests of the $%rrhonian convert that as

she becomes increasingl%

used to the s7eptic wa% she will [. . .] come to

hold all of her convictions [. . .] more lightl%>

so she will need, progressivel%, wea7er [. . .]

arguments. 9rgument graduall% effects its own

removal from her life. 9t the end [. . .] the

bare posing of a 'uestion will alread% induce

a shrug of indifference, and further argument

will prove unnecessar%.4;

The critical point here is that there is nothing

within $%rrhonism to stop this ‘‘shrug of

indifference’’ also manifesting itself in the

ethical=political realm.4 8ndeed, in extus’s own

account, we are explicitl% told that, given the

‘‘e'ual plausibilit%’’ of different lifest%les,4/ the

acceptance of the prevailing ‘‘laws and customs’’

provides the $%rrhonist with criteria for what is

good and bad ‘‘in the conduct of life.’’40 8n short,

the $%rrhonist follows ‘‘a line of reasoning which,

in accordance with appearances, points [her] to a

life conformable to the customs of [her] countr%

and its laws and institutions.’’41

These passages donot merel% suggest = as Aussbaum remar7s = that

prevalent ‘‘Customs of friendl% and marital

lo%alt% will be observed.’’42 Ta7ing into account

that the normativit% of the pre$%rrhonian life is

extricated along with belief,43 and that the

$%rrhonist values her abilit% for social

conformism,44 the claim that she would be

immune to ‘‘social pre+udices’’ becomes

untenable. *or if the $%rrhonist finds herself in a

cultural context ingrained with ‘‘social

pre+udices,’’46 then how could she legitimatel%

avoid indulging in them@ 9fter all, to shun these

activities would be conducive neither to theattainment nor to the maintenance of ataraxia. 8n

her defence, one might argue that the $%rrhonist

could attain ataraxia because she would not adopt

the beliefs fuelling such pre+udices. The

$%rrhonist would not then, for example, believe

those of &ewish origin to be fit onl% for

extermination. he would not believe

homosexualit% to be an abomination before Eod.

Aor would she believe that women were naturall%

subordinate to men. he would, however, follow

others and engage in racist, homophobic, andFor

sexist activities if doing otherwise would

+eopardi


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life is what she see7s to erase> as Aussbaum notes,

the $%rrhonist has no view ‘‘about how things

ought to go on.’’6; There is then something

paradoxical about $%rrhonism, for in her desire to

be noncommittal, the $%rrhonist occupies asubstantive ethical=political position.6 To refrain

from -explicitl% ma7ing ethical=political deci

sions is alread% to be -implicitl% engaged in

ma7ing at least one ver% important decision)

namel%, to refrain from ma7ing -explicit ethical=

political decisions. -8nsofar as the $%rrhonian

convert hopes to reach a point where such

deliberate ignorance becomes mere oblivious

ness,6/ this itself bears witness to a substantive

ethical=political position. (espite her protesta

tions, the $%rrhonist nevertheless sa%s ‘‘%es!’’ to

noncommitment,60 and as such her alleged

‘‘indecision’’ is little more than a fantas%. #f course, it is not clear that the decision in favour of

indecision can even be +ustified on $%rrhonian

grounds. *or if the $%rrhonist finds herself in a

culture which values the abilit% of individuals to

ma7e their own ethical=political decisions then

she will be forced b% her own teleolog% to ma7e

further ethical=political decisions and actions = or

at least appear to others to be doing so. 8t is

doubtful that merel% emulating the decisions of

others would be conducive to the unperturbed

life, because one must first choose who, what,

when and how to emulate. 9s (errida remar7s)

‘‘8nheritance implies decision, responsibilit%,

response and, conse'uentl%, critical selection,

choice. There is alwa%s choice, whether one li7es

it or not, whether it is or isn’t conscious.’’61 *or

the $%rrhonist, then, a pluralistic democrac%

would generate more anxieties than a totalitarian

dictatorship. To summari


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/. Contrar% to $%rrhonism’s teleolog% of

liberation, (errida = following Gevinas = pro

mises nothing in this regard.:1 8ndeed, such

catharsis is what (errida warns against in his

persistent condemnation of theoretical, ethical and political ‘‘good conscience.’’:2 But neither is there

a sense of resignation in (errida’s wor7,:3 for he

does not thin7 that philosoph% is eliminable in the

wa% the $%rrhonist supposes. 8ndeed, (errida

emphaticall% re+ects antiphilosophical gestures,

not least because ‘‘‘ever%da% language’ is not

innocent or neutral. 8t is in the language of

?estern metaph%sics, and it carries with it [. . .] a

considerable number of presuppositions.’’:4

Thus, what interests (errida is how seemingl%

inhospitable concepts necessaril% ‘‘contaminate’’

one another.:6

0. The dominance of ‘‘the animal’’ in

$%rrhonism has no counterpart in (errida’s wor7.

?hile he is concerned with the ‘‘'uestion of so

called animalit%,’’:: this does not denote a

nostalgia or %earning for the animal as a site of

lost = or recoverable = innocence. 9ccording to

the $%rrhonist, following her therapeutic proce

dures enables one ‘‘to shed completel% one’s

humanit%.’’;; (errida’s position is more circum

spect = he even insists that the locution ‘‘the

animal’’ should be 7ept ‘‘within 'uotation

mar7s.’’; ?hile (errida does not thin7 that ‘‘the

‘animal’’’ is fundamentall% distinct from

‘‘man,’’;/ neither does he believe ‘‘in some

homogeneous continuit% between what calls itself

man and what [man] calls the animal.’’;0 *or

(errida, ‘‘there is no animal in [. . .] general [. . .]

separated from man b% a single indivisible

limit,’’;1 for ‘‘none of [the] traditional concepts of

‘what is proper to man’ and thus of what is

opposed to it can resist a consistent scientific and

deconstructive anal%sis.’’;2 &ust as (errida’s

wor7 on hospitalit% is not an altogether new

departure, neither is his preoccupation with ‘‘the

animal’’ = both are implicit in his account of

iterabilit%.

;3

8 raise the 'uestion of hospitalit%here because (errida’s concern with animalit% is

intimatel% connected with his reflections on the

‘‘deconstruction of the athome’’;4 = that is, on a

hospitalit% that might ‘‘open itself to an other that

is not [...] even m% neighbour or m% brother,

[but] perhaps an ‘animal.’ ’’;6

?hile (errida does not offer a s%stematic

anal%sis of ‘‘the animal,’’ his moral sentiments are

clear) ‘‘no one can den% the unprecedented

proportions of [the] sub+ection of the animal [. . .].

Ao one can den% seriousl% [. . .] that men do allthe% can in order to dissimulate this cruelt% or to

hide it from themselves, in order to organi


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even prepared for the surprise, it is not an

event. 8t is the same with the other [. . .] the

experience of the otherness of the other

implies that the other ma% come when 8 am

totall% unprepared) that is the condition of the

other remaining other [. . .]. *or the other to

happen, to come to me [. . .] the perhaps is

needed.1

Hnli7e the $%rrhonist, (errida does not use the

‘‘perhaps’’ and ‘‘ma%be’’ s%non%mousl%. *or

while the ‘‘ma%be’’ has ‘‘a relation to the future,

to possibilit%, to something possible which ma%

occur or not occur,’’ the ‘‘perhaps [. . .] does not

necessaril% [. . .] fall under the ontological

categor% of being present.’’ 9nd this is wh%

(errida wants to ‘‘distinguish between the future

and what is to come.’’2 The ethical orientation of

this distinction becomes more apparent when he

alludes to a ‘‘messianicit% without messianism,’’

which (errida describes as ‘‘the opening to the [. .

.] coming of the other’’ or ‘‘the advent of +ustice [.

. .] without hori


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programme’’@02 De is not unaware of this

tension)

8n order to be responsible [. . .] a decision

should not limit itself to putting into operation

a determinable or determining 7nowledge, the

conse'uence of some preestablished order.

But, conversel%, who would call a decision that

is without rule, without norm, without

determinable or determined law, a decision@03

9 responsible decision is neither a simple reaction

nor freefloating. 5ather, ‘‘[t]he undecidable

remains caught, lodged, as [. . .] an essential

ghost, in ever% decision.’’04 (errida does not

therefore simpl% oppose the ‘‘programmatic’’ and

‘‘responsible’’ decision, but suggests that the two

are inseparable. The ‘‘incalculable’’ is alwa%s

‘‘part of the game’’06

because even in the most‘‘calculable’’ situation, ‘‘the decision to calculate

is not of the order of the calculable.’’0: That is,

one might determine one’s decisions b% some

calculus, but the decision to do this cannot itself

be determined b% the calculus.1; 9s (errida

remar7s of the foundations of law, we might sa%

here that the criteria for decision ‘‘exceed the

opposition between founded and unfounded.’’1

9lthough he ac7nowledges the aporia of

+udgement criteria,1/ (errida nevertheless resists

the $%rrhonian teleolog% of ataraxia = a resistance

that occasionall% prompts him to spea7 of a 'uasi

Jier7egaardian ‘‘leap.’’10 There is no liberation

from responsibilit% or ‘‘the mad moment of

decision,’’11 because here there could onl% be the

corrupt assurance of ‘‘good conscience’’>12 of

having applied the rule absolutel% correctl%. 9fter

all, how does one +ustif% appl%ing this criterion

and not another, or account for the necessar%

exclusion of other programs b% the

implementation of this one@13 9nd how does one

+ustif% appl%ing a rule in this wa% rather than

that@ uch 'uestions render the $%rrhonist ‘‘at a

loss,’’ for she is content to %ield to the aporia.

(errida, however, spea7s of a ‘‘nonpassive

endurance of the aporia’’ which is ‘‘the condition

of responsibilit% and of decision.’’14 8n other

words, ‘‘the aporia is not a paral% that ‘‘good

conscience’’ is a scandalous luxur%. The ris7 of

$%rrhonianli7e paral%sis cannot be eliminated,

but this ris7 is constitutive of the decision and

responsibilit%.2 9s a finite being, ever% decision 8

ma7e sacrifices ever% other> ever% ‘‘responsible’’

act toward this other -or these others is, b%

definition, at the expense of that other -or those

others.2/ The impossibilit% of 7nowing that 8 have

made the absolutel% right decision -or assuring

m%self that ‘‘8 am +ust’’20 is due to this sacrificial

structure. ?hat therefore interests (errida

is the experience of the desire for the

impossible [. . .] [that] we do not give up the

dream of the pure gift, in the same wa% that we

do not give up the idea of pure hospitalit%.

"ven if we 7now it is impossible and that it

can be perverse.21

?h% ‘‘perverse’’@ Because m% hospitalit% toward

this other ma% itself demand m% hostilit% toward

that other. To summari


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that here -and elsewhere, we find a certain

slippage between truth and truthfulness> that

(errida is attempting to circumvent the 'uestion,

demands and responsibilities of truth b% focusing

instead on truthfulness. But can one evade truthso easil%@ 8 do not thin7 so, and 8 doubt (errida

thin7s so either -‘‘8n the name of [. . .] which

other ‘truth,’ [could he]@’’.2: ?hat (errida is

-perhaps highlighting is that, prior to concepts of

truth, we are alread% bound up with it. Truth is

‘‘not a value one can renounce’’ because it is not

something one can voluntaril% pic7 up or cast

aside. Thus, when he remar7s that ‘‘&ustice [. . .]

outside or be%ond law, is not deconstructible,’’3;

much the same could be said of truth ‘‘outside or

be%ond’’ theoretical truth. This, 8 suggest, is how

we should read (errida’s following remar7s on

the promise) ‘‘There is a language of the promise

next to other languages [. . . but] be%ond

determined promises, all language acts entail a

certain structure of the promise, even if the% do

something else at the same time. 9ll language is

addressed to the other in order to promise him or

her to spea7 to him or her in some wa% [. . .] there

is in the simple fact that 8 am spea7ing to the

other a [. . .] commitment to go to the end of m%

sentence, to continue [. . .] one cannot imagine a

language that is not in a certain wa% caught up in

the space of the promise [. . .] 8 do not master it

because it is older than me [. . .] 8t is before me.

9s soon as 8 spea7, 8 am in it.’’3 o, when

(errida claims that he has ‘‘a commitment to

[. . .] 'uestion the possibilit% of the truth, the

histor% of the truth, the differences in the concept

of truth,’’3/ one should not ta7e this to be of a

sceptical hew. *or, ‘‘the moment said to be

epistemic, the content of 7nowledge, truth, or

revelation, alread% depends [. . .] on a

performative promise) the promise to tell the

truth.’’30 But this focus on testimon% = and

specificall% ‘‘the testimonial pledge of ever%

performative’’31 = does not -as it does for the

$%rrhonist sub+ectivi32

8n sa%ing) 8 swear to tell the truth, where 8

have been the onl% one to see or hear and

where 8 am the onl% one who can attest to it,

this is true to the extent that an%one who in

m% place, at that instant, would have seen or

heard or touched the same thing and could

repeat [. . .] the truth of m% testimon%.33

The range and depth of testimonial truth can

hardl% be exaggerated. *or while all ‘‘theoretical

7nowledge is circumscribed within this testimo

nial space,’’ this same ‘‘[t]estimon%, which

implies faith or promise’’ governs ‘‘the entire

social space.’’34 That is) ‘‘Kou cannot address the

other, spea7 to the other, without an act of faith,

without testimon% [. . .]. Kou address the other and as7, ‘believe me.’ "ven if %ou are l%ing [. . .]

%ou are addressing the other and as7ing the other

to trust %ou. This ‘trust me, 8 am spea7ing to %ou’

is of the order of faith, a faith that cannot be

reduced to a theoretical statement [. . .] this faith

is absolutel% universal [. . .]. "ach time 8 open m%

mouth, 8 am promising something [. . .] the

promise is not +ust one speech act among others>

ever% speech act is fundamentall% a promise [. . .].

There is no societ% without faith, without trust in

the other.’’36

%d& s$no #sis

9ccording to (errida, the thin7ing of +ustice,

responsibilit% and hospitalit% demands that we

‘‘endure’’ the ‘‘experience of the impossible’’3: = or

more accuratel%, the ‘‘experience of the desire for

the impossible.’’4; 9s we have seen, one stri7ing

example of this is his insistence that ‘‘the so

called responsible decision’’ must not merel% be

the ‘‘technical application of a concept’’ or ‘‘the

conse'uence of some preestablished order.’’4

5ather, it ‘‘must arise against a bac7ground of the

undecidable,’’ even though ‘‘the undecidable

inscribes threat in chance, and terror in the ipseit%

of the host.’’4/ 8n an interesting ethical twist to

the $%rrhonian narrative, this bac7drop of

undecidabilit% neither constitutes nor sanctions

paral%sis in the face of sacrificial choices.40

9ppealing to one’s inherited

1 .


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cultural practices and values -or, to borrow

?ittgenstein’s phrase, one’s ‘‘worldpicture’’41

ma% be epistemicall% legitimate, but it will never

be ethicall% sufficient to +ustif% ‘‘good con

science.’’ *or an% worldpicture must be inhabitable b% other others. 8f, as Gevinas and (errida

suggest, the other ‘‘haunts’’42 m% beinginthe

world as such, then the specificities of m% world

picture will provide neither a means of exorcism

nor a 'uarantine in which to withdraw)

since there is [. . .] no hospitalit% without

finitude, sovereignt% can onl% be exercised b%

filtering, choosing, and thus b% excluding and

doing violence. 8n+ustice, a certain in+ustice,

and even a certain per+ur%, begins right awa%,

from the ver% threshold of the right to

hospitalit%.43

That 8 choose %ou over her, friends over strangers,

m% famil%, communit% or even species over

‘‘others’’ = all this 8 habituall% +ustif% for the sa7e

of law, and perhaps sanit%. But that in this ver%

+ustification 8 appl% this criterion over another, 8

cannot absolutel% +ustif%.44 ?e must of course

‘‘calculate’’ between possible choices46 = (errida is

not advocating random or arbitrar% action -neither

of which would constitute a ‘‘decision’’.4:

Gi7ewise, one has a responsibilit% to accumulate as

much 7nowledge as possible upon which to

+udge6; = we must not be wilfull% antirational

-after all, how could this be +ustified without

appeal to another rationalit%@.6 But the decision

to calculate is not itself ‘‘of the order of the

calculable.’’6/ Iore specificall%, the ‘‘decision

between +ust and un+ust is never insured b% a

rule’’60 because the +ustice of the rule = and there

might alwa%s be a better +ustice and a better

rule61 = would thereb% have to be assumed.

5ecalling the paradox of $%rrhonian 'uietism, we

might therefore sa% that one is alwa%s alread%

within the decision, for even when 8 am

indecisive = even when 8 sa% ‘‘no!’’ to the

decision = 8 have alread% said ‘‘%es!’’ to

indecision. -#ne ‘‘decides to put off deciding’’ =

one ‘‘decides not to decide.’’62 This beinginthe

decision is not itself deliberative or 'uasi

contractual, but rather due to the ver% structure of

human finitude.63 8n this sense, what (errida is

attempting to articulate is the

'uasiperformative bac7drop against which all

particular deliberations occur.64 But this tas7 is

difficult = if not itself impossible = insofar as

ever% discourse -or metadiscourse presupposes

the preperformative ‘‘%es,’’ ‘‘promise,’’ and‘‘believe me’’ for itself.66

8 have suggested that (errida’s repeated

emphasis lies on the vigilance demanded b% the

‘‘bad conscience’’ of ethical=political life. There

ma% seem to be something ‘‘terrible’’6: about all

this, but we should recall that such aporias do not

delineate a ‘‘trap.’’ 5ather, these are the ver%

‘‘condition of a decision’’:; and of responsibilit%

itself. ?hat characteri


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plant

De was therefore ‘‘7ept alive b% his ac'uaintances

who followed him around,’’ for

man% times [$%rrho] would leave town with

out telling an%one beforehand, and ramble

around with whomever he might meet. 9nd

once, when 9naxarchus fell into a ditch, he

passed b% him and did not give him an% help.

ome blamed him for this, but 9naxarchus

himself praised his indifference and lac7 of

sentimentalit%.:3

?ithout the encumbrance of belief and

commitment one is, li7e the wild animal, left onl%

with fleeting ‘‘appearances’’:4 and the guidance

of instinct.:6 The changing world simpl% stri7es

the $%rrhonist who, in turn, maintains a state of

passive ac'uiescence with regard to her natural

and cultural environment. *ollowing her most primitive instincts for food and shelter, the

$%rrhonist -one imagines eats, drin7s, and pla%s,

copulates and recuperates. But, as (iogenes

suggests, this state of obliviousness constantl%

places her worldl% orientation under threat.

-‘‘(eath b% misadventure’’ would be a common

$%rrhonian epitaph. #n her nomadic wanderings,

the $%rrhonist implicitl% relies on the hospitalit%

of those prepared to welcome her, to feed, clothe,

and protect her from her own indifference. 8n this

sense, the $%rrhonist embodies the 'uasi

messianic ‘‘other’’ (errida describes as arriving

without warning. But there is another sense in

which the $%rrhonist can be thought of as ‘‘other’’

= perhaps the ‘‘other’’ par excellence. *or all this

tal7 of hospitalit% might bother us, but it would

not trouble the $%rrhonist> she stopped thin7ing

-and caring about it long ago. *or the real

challenge posed b% $%rrhonism is not that of

sceptical doubt but that of radical indifference. 8f

she doubted the realit% and depth of ethical=

political responsibilities that would at least impl%

some common ground between us = as (errida

notes) ‘‘even the prospect of arguing [is] alread%

to recognise that arguing [is] possible.’’:: But

what are we to sa% when faced with genuine

apath% = when we find ourselves in a 'uasi

$%rrhonian state of ‘‘being at a loss’’@ ?hat

happens to (errida’s passion for 7eeping the

‘‘perhaps’’ a condition of the ‘‘event’’ when she

who comes is not so much radicall% evil

as radicall% indifferent@/;; Can we sa% an%thing

more than that encountering such indifference

remains a necessar% possibilit%@/;

?hile indifference encompassed all areas of

$%rrho’s own life, his followers seem rather lesstriumphant. *or insofar as $%rrhonism remains a

therapeutic philosoph%, it is fundamentall% con

cerned, not onl% with conceptual suffering but

with the conceptual suffering of others. The

‘‘paral%sis of reason’’ and elimination of norma

tivit% from human life leave this fact

untouched./;/ Can this best be accounted for as

ineptitude on the part of $%rrho’s disciples@ #r

rather, might this concernfulness be immune to

the ‘‘paral%sis of reason’’ precisel% because it

does not find its ‘‘impulse [. . .] drive, or [. . .]

movement’’/;0 in reason@ $erhaps, as ?ittgenstein

suggests, ‘‘it is a primitive reaction to tend, totreat, the part that hurts when

someone else is in pain> and not

merel% when oneself is.’’/;1 That

is, perhaps ethical concern is

itself ‘‘something animal.’’/;2

notes

1 )ee >artha Nussbaum< ==)ce#tic 'urgatives9

4hera#eutic Arguments in Ancient )?e#ticism


12/20


. )e@tus 3:2!B see also Nussbaum .!< ..: Fhile the

strength of treatment ma$ alter< there remains an essential

methodolog$ of o##ositional argumentation here

%)e@tus1:313&:It is therefore misleading for )e@tus to

claim that '$rrhonism lac?s a method: )ee 7errida;s

remar?s on ==o##osition;; in Jac*ues 7errida< Limited Inc

%Nor thDestern '< 1++-& 11" 1-: (ereafter LI:

" )e@tus1:12-:

- )e@tus1:2:

2 )ee 7iogenes Laertius +:---2B (oo?Da$ 1B Nussbaum

.2:

+ )e@tus1::

1! )ee )e@tus 1:3: )e@tus describes the (eraclitean

%1:1! ff:&< C$renaic %1:1. ff:& and 'rotagorean %1:1" ff:&

#hiloso#hies as ==7ogmatic: Anscombe %8@ford9

lac?Dell< 1+.2& x 131 %hereafter 'I&B Lectures and

Conversations on Aesthetics< 's$cholog$ and Religious

elief< ed:C: arrett %8@ford9 lac?Dell:

Anscombe %8@ford9 lac?Dell< 1++!& x 32

%hereafter 4&&: Note Richard Rort$;s voluntar,

ism on this matter %'hiloso#h$ and )ocial (o#e%(armondsDorth9 'enguin< 1+++& @viii @i@< @@ii<

1-" %hereafter ')(&&< and #assages of a more

voluntaristic flavour in Fittgenstein %Noteboo?s

1+11+1"< trans: G:E:>: Anscombe %8@ford9

lac?Dell< 1+-+& +2 %hereafter N&&:

1" )ee (oo?Da$ +:

1- )e@tus :!B see also1:11 ff:B 7iogenes Laertius +:+!<

++.: Richard 'o#?in reiterates man$ of these issues in

relation to the e#istemological crisis of the Reformation

%4he (istor$ of )ce#ticism fr o m E ra s m u s t o ) #i n oa

%er?ele$9 of California '< 1+-+& 1


13/20

plant

3" )e@tus 1:+3!B see also 7iogenes Laertius +:1

! 2 :

3- )ee InDood and Gerson 32B John 7: Ca#uto<

Against Ethics9 Contributions to a 'oetics of 8bligation

Dith Constant Reference to 7econstruction%loomington9 Indiana '< 1++3& +: (ereafter

AE4(:

32 )ee )e@tus1:-2:

3+ )e@tus1:.:

! )ee Nussbaum .-< .+:

1 )e@ tus 1:1 :

)ee Nussbaum ..:

3 Long and )edle$ !:

)ee Nussbaum .:

. 8f course< even conceding this< the '$rrhonist

could still justif$ himself on #ragmatic groundsB that

although a life totall$ devoid of commitment ma$

be im#ossible< '$rrhonism still offers the best Da$

of minimiing such troublesome commitments:

" )e@tus 1:3: 4here are ten ==modes;; of

'$rrhonian argumentation %)e@tus 1:3" ff:B

7iogenes Laertius +:-+22&:

- )e@tus1:1!:

2 )ee 'o#?in "3:

+ 7iogenes Laertius +:"1B see also +:-:

.! Nussbaum .!B see also InDood and Gerson

121 2 :

.1 )ee 7iogenes Laertius +:-1:

. Nussbaum .2:

.3 Nussbaum thus rightl$ draDs attention to the

#rinci#le of non,contradic tion in the '$rrhonian

method %Nussbaum .2&< for this is re*uired in

order to bring the #atient to a state of indecision

betDeen e*uall$ #lausible %though mutuall$ incom#a,

tible& commitments:

. Nussbaum .3!:

.. Nussbaum .2B see also .-B (oo?Da$ .: Ishall not discuss here the dis0similarities betDeen

the '$rrhonian and (usserlian e#oche %see

Edmund (usserl< Cartesian >editations9 An

Introduction to 'henomenolog$< trans: 7: Cairns

%4he (ague9 >artinus Nijhoff< 1+"+& xx -+

%hereafter C>&&:

." ==Introduction;; in : >ates< 4he )?e#tic Fa$9)e@tus Em#iricus;s 8utlines of '$rrhonism %8@ford9

8@ford '


14/20


-. Nussbaum ..:

-" )ee Nussbaum .31< .3:

-- )ee Nussbaum .3.: 4he f inal #art of the

)ce#tic Fa$ is ==instruction of the arts;; %)e@tus

1:3B see also urn$eat 1"&:

-2 8r Dhat De Dould consider to be ==#rejudices:;;

4his *ualification highlights a dee#er #roblem9 that

the ver$ notions of ==#rejudice;; and ==intolerance;;

%and thus b$ im#lication ==o#enness;; and ==tol,

erance;;& cannot even get a foothold in a

'$rrhonian frameDor?:

-+ )ee Annas and arnes 1"+: 4his troubling

dimension of '$rrhonism is nicel$ dramatied b$

the ==diabolical old man;; in Catch-22 %Jose#h

(eller< Catch-22 %London9 Corgi< 1+"1& "1,"&: 4o

Dhat e@tent engaging in such behaviour actuall$

leads to the ==a##ro#riate;; beliefs %and to Dhate@tent ==conversion;; can be induced b$ such

means&< I leave an o#en *uestion:

2! Nussbaum .31:

21 >uch the same can be said of '$rrhonism;s su#,

#osed lac? of e#istemic and ontological

commitments:

2 )ee Nussbaum .2< .!< .":

23 As 7errida #uts it< the ==yes is co,e@tensive Dith

ever$ statement [...] yes is the transcendental con,

dition of all #erformative dimensions;; %Jac*ues

7errida< Acts of Literature %London9 Routledge<

1++& +"+2B see also -< .-< ".< 22< +"+2<3! %hereafter AL&B ==4he Hillanova Roundtable9 A

Conversation Dith Jac*ues 7errida: 7oole$ and >: (ughes

%London9 Routledge< !!1& 3+B see also .< .1

%hereafter 8C6&B >onolingualism of the 8ther9 8r<

4he 'rosthesis of 8rigin< trans: ': >ensah

1. !


15/20

plant

%)tanford9 )tanford '< 1++2& 2+ %hereafter

>8&: In #articular< 7errida;s em#hasis on the radi,

cal ==otherness;; of the other %A7EL +& and< not

least< the absolute ==sur#rise;; of that Dhich is ==to

come;; sits uncomfortabl$ alongside his remar?s

on iterabilit$< singularit$< and generalit$ %if the

other is indeed radicall$ ==other;; then hoD could

one ever ?noD that there had been an encounter

Dith ==itodernit$0'ostmodernit$ %Cambridge9 'olit$< 1++1&

- %hereafter 4NC&&B and Ca#uto< AE4(B ==4heEnd of Ethics


16/20


%7errida< A7 !"B see also !B 7errida< E4 2-B

G -2B LI 13"B Jac*ues 7errida< 8f )#irit9

(eidegger and the uestion< trans G: ennington

and R: oDlb$ %Chicago9 of Chicago '< 1+2+& ch:

" %hereaf ter 8)&&:

1!-7e rr id a< AR 3":

1!27errida< AR 3"3B see also Jac*ues 7errida< 4he Gift of

7eath< trans: 7: Fills %Chicago9 of Chicago '< 1++.& "+

%hereafter G7&B %various remar?s in& God< the Gift< and

'ostmodernism< eds: J:7: Ca#uto and >:J: )canlon

%loomington9 Indiana '< 1+++& 13.: (ereafter GG':

1!+7errida< 4A 3+B see also 3+-< 1"B Jac*ues

7erridaar@ and )onsar@< ed: >: )#rin?er %London9 Herso< 1+++&

"!:(ereafter >5):

11! 7errida8 2+ n: +B see also Jac*ues 7errida<

Given 4ime9 I: Counterfeit >one$< trans: ': Kamuf

%Chicago9 of Chicago '< 1++& +< 3.< ."< ..

%hereafter G4&B Levinas IR .< 12< .!:

1 )ee 7errida;s remar?s in 7E> +1B 'o1+2B G7

"2B R7 1!< 3< 2+B 65K 31B >8 "B E -!-1:

Note also Kier?egaard;s remar?s on ==ris?;; and

==faith;; %)FK -!-3&:

1. 7e rr id a< A' 1:

1" 7e rr id a< (8) 3.3:

1- )ee Jac*ues 7errida< ==6oreigner uestion;;

and ==)te# of (os#italit$0No (os#italit$


17/20

plant

131 7errida< 8N -: 8r< in Fittgenstein;s Dords< as

though one Das folloDing ==a doctor;s #rescri#tion;;

%Culture and Halue< trans: ': Finch %8@ford9

lac?Dell< 1++& .3B see also 2 %hereafter C5H&&:

4hus< ==6or an event to ha##en< the #ossibilit$ of

the Dorst [...] must remain a #ossibilit$ [...].

8therDise the good event< the good >essiah<

could not ha##en either;; %7errida< R7 +&:

13 7errida< E ""B m$ em#hasisB see also

7errida:

1. 7errida< E "-B see also 7errida< 8N .+B G7

.B 4) :

1" )ee 7errida


18/20


name< Dould be a forgiveness Dithout #oDer9

unconditional but Dithout sovereignt$;; % 7 err id a <

8C6 .+&:

1.1 )ee 7errida< R71!< !BHR1:

1. )ee (eidegger;s remar?s on the ==nullit$;; %54

331&:

1.3 7 er r i da +&< (ofstadter;s remar?s on the

s#atialit$ of the ==7a;; of ==7asein;; in (eidegger;s

Dor? %>ar tin (eidegger< 4he asic 'roblems of

'henomenolog$< trans: A: (ofstadter %loomington9

Indiana '< 1+2& 33 3. %hereafter ''&&< and

(eidegger;s oDn comments on the ==h ere;; a nd ==th

ere;; % 5 4 1-1&:

1"- 7errida< E 2B m$ em#hasis:

1"2 7errida< HR 3B m$ em#hasisB see also

7errida< A7 12: Note also Finch;s remar?s on

==truth,telling;; %NC "&:

1"+ 7errida< 'o 3.+B see also 7errida< 8N 3< 21B

>8 +B GG' "!B R' 3"3-:

1-! 7err i da< GG' -B m$ em#h as is B see a lso --B

7erridaa?e )ense %8@ford9

lac?Dell< 1+2-& 1-+ %hereafter 4R>)&:

1-3 )ee 7errida) 1-+&:

1- Fit tgen s tein< 8 C x1" :

1-. Emmanuel Levinas< ==Ethics of the Infinite


19/20

plant

1-+ )ee 7errida< R7' 232: In an$ case< there Dould

here be a decision to act randoml$ Dhich Dould not itself

be of the order of the ==r a nd om:;;

12! )ee 7errida


20/20


%'5C 1"B see also Jac*ues 7errida< ==)ignature

Event Conte@targins of 'hiloso#h$< trans: A:

ass %righton9 (arvester 'ress< 1+2& 3!-3!&

)incere than?s to John )ellars for his comments on

an earlier draftof this #a#er:

Bob $lant

(epartment of $hilosoph%

Hniversit% of 9berdeen

#ld Brewer%

Digh treet

9berdeen 9B/1 0HBHJ

"mail) r.plantLabdn.ac.u7
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

bob plant.derrida and pyrrhonism

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