blumenberg and the rationality of rhetoric · blumenberg argues that rhetoric is a form of...

J. M. FRITZMAN

Blumenberg and the RationaUty of Rhetoric

am not celebrating rhetoric hère as an innate créative gift that man possesses. To iUuminate it anthropologically is not to demonstrate that it gives man a spedal "metaphysical" distinction.

As a behavioral characteristic of a créature that Uves "nevertheless," it is UteraUy a "certificate of poverty." I would hesitate to caU it a "cunning of reason;" not only because it would then be in even more questionable company but also because I would like to hold to the idea of seeing in it a form of rationaUty itself—a rational way of coming to terms with the provisionaUty of reason.i Drawing on the work of the German phUosopher Hans Blu

menberg , Michael C a h n has called for a rhetorical reading of rhetoric that acknowledges that the critique of metaphors is as much

Kaarina Beam, James A. Berlin, Nancy Dejoy, Mar\fred Kuehn, Larry May, WiUiam L. McBride, David James MiUer, Terry Loren Moseley, Ramsey Eric Ram-sey, Calvin O. Schrag, and C. A. Wieczorek are thanked for their comments on an earUer version of this article. Also, Michael Leff and an anonymous reviewer for Rhetorica are thanked for suggestions which led to useful revisions.

'Hans Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Significance of Rhetoric," trans. Robert M. WaUace, in After Philosophy: End or Transformation, ed. Kenneth Ba)aies, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 452.

©The International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Rhetorica, Volume X, Number 4 (Autunm 1992)

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424 R H E T O R I C A

an exercise of rhetoric as their employment.2 Cahn observes that "rhetorical reading is, of course, not restricted to the discipUne of rhetoric itself. Every discourse of knowledge which addresses a certain audience, searching either for students or trying to persuade opponents, can be analyzed fruitfuUy along thèse Unes of discipUnary analysis."^ SimUarly, Timothy M. Engsfrôm calls for a rhetorical reading of philosophy, rejecting with Blumenberg the idea that phUosophy provides metaphysical, ethical, or epistemological foundations.4 Blumenberg's work contains the resources for conceptuaUzing philosophy as proceeding rhetoricaUy. The chief merit of his approach Ues in perspicuously presenting, independently of the Anglo-American and Continental phUosophical fraditions, the stakes involved in a rhetorical reading of philosophy. Nevertheless, his approach has certain Umitations that must be criticized in order to develop a rhetorical reading of philosophy that remains rhetorical.

I

Blumenberg argues that rhetoric is a form of rationaUty, and he considers the impUcations of a philosophy that proceeds rhetoricaUy. From Plato until Husserl—and, in certain quarters, to the présent day—philosophers claimed that rhetoric merely appeals to the opinions of the crowd, whUe phUosophy is concerned with discovering fruth. Thèse phUosophers understood truth as foundational truth, essential fruth. Foundational fruth was to be urù-versally self-evident and self-legitimating. Once discovered, foundational truth only needs to be comprehended to see that it is frue and not in need of further justification. Foundational truth was to ground both knowledge claims and value judgments. According to thèse thinkers, there is an absolute distinction between knowledge and opinion. Knowledge is correct belief accompanied by a rational account which appeals to foundational truth, whUe opin-

^Michael Cahn, "Reading Rhetoric RhetoricaUy: Isocrates and the Marketing of Insight," Rhetorica 7 (Spring 1989): 121-144.

3Cahn, 144. ••Timothy M. Engstrom, "Philosophy's Arvxiety of Rhetoric: Contemporary

Revisions of a Politics of Séparation," Rhetorica 7 (Summer 1989): 226.

Blumenberg and RationaUty 425

ion is beUef supported only by appeaUng to other beUefs accepted by the rhetor's audience.s

Blumenberg urges that the fraditional confrast between philosophy and rhetoric is plausible only as long as philosophy can assert either that it afready possesses foundational truth, or that it is only a step away from aequiring it. Notoriously, phUosophy has been unable to provide foundational fruth. To be sure, various phUosophers hâve claimed to hâve discovered such fruth, but thèse assertions hâve never passed unchaUenged. Thèse confroversies are a sign that the goods hâve yet to be deUvered. For foundational truth would be self-evident, and nothing self-evident is a matter of chspute. Not only has phUosophy been unable to discover foundational truth, it has not demonsfrated that such truth exists.

Hence, phUosophy must renounce its pretensions and no longer oppose itself to rhetoric. Because appeals to foundational truth are not possible, persons must rely on opinions that are not certain, but only more or less plausible. They must appeal to what Blumenberg refers to as "institutions." That is, individuals must rely upon some previously existing consensus: "What the heading of 'institutions' covers is, above ail, a distribution of burdens of proof. Where an institution exists, the question of its rational foundation is not, of itself, continuaUy urgent, and the burden of proof always Ues on the person who objects to the arrangements that it carries with it."^ Rhetoric's task is to provide consensus. It does this by basing its arguments upon generally accepted behef s.

Blumenberg anticipâtes the objection that rhetoric could be evaded by resolutely foUowing fradition until phUosophy uncov-ers foundational fruth: "PhUosophy's program succeeds or faUs, but it does not yield any profit in instaUments. Everything that remains, this side of defirùtive évidence, is rhetoric. "^ The suggestion that fradition should be foUowed only can be argued rhe-

'See also Samuel IjsseUng, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict (The Hague: Mar-tinus Nijhoff PubUshers, 1976).

*Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth, trans. Robert M. WaUace, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 166.

'Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach," 435. Having définitive évidence would require a unanimity where ail possible arguments hâve been heard, and aU possible experiments had been performed. This concept only can serve as a regulative idéal that guides inquiry.


toricaUy, by relying upon previously existing institutions. Undis-covered foundational fruth cannot support any daim. AU argumentation must proceed rhetorically.

It is a mistake to oppose the truths reached by phUosophy with the effects produced by rhetoric. PhUosophy's fruths always rely upon rhetoric's effects. As long as phUosophers beUeved that their business is deUvering foundational fruth, they had to conceal—from others and themselves—thefr reUance upon rhetoric. However, there is no need to hide phUosophy's dependence on rhetoric once it is recognized that phUosophy proceeds rhetoricaUy. As Blumenberg perceives, "the antithesis of truth and effect is superficial, because the rhetorical effect is not an alternative that one can choose instead of an insight that one could also hâve, but an alternative to a définitive évidence that one cannot hâve, or cannot hâve yet, or at any rate cannot hâve hère and now."^ Philosophy can exhibit its rhetoricalness when it abandons the quest for foundational fruth.

Persons frequently are compelled to make dedsions without obtairùng conclusive reasons: "To see oneself in the perspective of rhetoric means to be conscious both of being compeUed to act and of the lack of norms in a finite situation."^ Since creating institutions and making practical décisions do not aUow an urùirrùted amount of time for investigation and deUberation, persons must foUow what Blumenberg terms the "principle of insuffident reason." Dedsions must be made even when there are not defirùtive reasons and information for beheving them correct. It is rhetoric's task to discover the best—or least bad—options, and to persuade others to accept them.

Rhetoric also can delay the process of making dedsions. Precisely because new information is generated so rapidly, and because there exist reams of data, there is a pressure to make quick décisions so as to appear neither weak nor vacUlating. The forms and fropes of rhetoric create a space in which deUberation and reflection can occur. When there are estabUshed rules of procédure, immédiate action is disaUowed. Time is gained to discover, criticaUy examine, and debate the issues vdthout being thought indecisive. By means of rhetoric, one action—or something said or written—can be substituted for another: "In this connection the

^Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach," 436. 'Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach," 437.


cfrcumstance of being compeUed to act, which détermines the rhetorical situation and which demands primarily a physical reaction, can be fransformed, rhetoricaUy, in such a way that the enforced action becomes, by 'consensus,' once again 'merely' a rhetorical one."10 Even in situations that demand a response, the seeming necessity of acting in a spécifie manner can be avoided.

In addition to the above arguments, Blumenberg also appeals to a universal phUosophical anthropology to support the rational-ity of rhetoric and the rhetoricalness of phUosophy. FoUovdng such thinkers as Joharm Gottfried Herder, Paul Alsberg, and Arnold Gehlen, Blumenberg urges that man is a créature of deficien-des.ii Blumenberg vmtes: "The axiom of aU rhetoric is the prindple of frisuffident reason (principium rationis insufficientis). It is a correlate of the anthropology of a créature who is defident in essential respects." 12 In what essential respects is man déficient? Animais other than man possess instincts, and so their reactions to reaUty are immédiate and non-deUberative. They deal directly with reaUty. Man lacks an instinctual repertofre of behavioral responses, and so is incapable of dealing dfrectly vdth reaUty. This makes man a créature of defidencies.

Man survives his encounters with reality by responding rhetoricaUy—indfrectiy, metaphorically, symboUcaUy—to his sur-roundings. He can take one thing as another, interpret something urùcnown as something known, and how he interprets is not pre-determined. Whereas wolves instinctively see sheep as a source of food, man can view them in many ways—as a food source, but

'"Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach," 437. ' 'Johann Gottfried Herder, "Essay on the Origin of Language," trans. Alex

ander Code, in On the Origin of Language: Two Essays by fean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried Herder (New York: Frederick Ungar Pub., 1966), 85-166; and Outlines ofa Philosophy ofthe History ofMan, trans. T. O. ChurchiU (New York: Bergman Pub., 1966). Paul Alsberg, In Quest of Man: A Biological Approach to the Problem of Man's Place in Nature (New York: Pergamon Press, 1970). Arnold Gehlen, Man: His Nature and Place in the World, trans. Qare McMillan and Karl Pillemer (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1988); and Man in the Age of Technology, trans. Patricia Lip-scomb (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1980).

By "man," Blumenberg dénotes what Martin Jay has referred to as "the master idea of humanity as a coUective, universal metasubject." See Martin Jay, "Blumenberg and Modernism: A Reflection on The Legitimacy of the Modern Age," in Fin-De-Siècle Socialism: And Other Essays (London: Routledge, Chapman and HaU, 1988), 149-164.

'^Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach," 447.


also as sources of wool, as pets, as bait to catch a wolf, or as an example of God's love.

II

Blumenberg is correct in thinking that rhetoric is a form of rationaUty and that phUosophy must proceed rhetoricaUy. However, his universal phUosophical anthropology should be rejected. WhUe he daims that man is a créature of deficiencies, it equally weU could be maintained that man is a créature of abundances. Both alternatives mistakenly attempt to describe man in isolation from his natural and social habitats. Both alternatives should be rejected in favor of a view that sees particular persons interacting dialectically with spécifie environments.

Blumenberg observes that phUosophical anthropologists view man either as poor or as rich. Either man is poor—a déficient créature—because he lacks instincts, and so must décide what is to be done. Or man is rich—an abundant créature—because he is not governed by instincts, and so can act creatively. Blumenberg accepts the former alternative. It could be argued, however, that man is an abundant créature. It would be urged that man's lack of instincts means that he does not dwell in the sphère of necessity, but instead in the realm of freedom. Man is a créature of almost unUmited possibUities because he can make geniùne choices about what he wUl do and become.

It could be argued that man is déficient or that he is abundant, and both alternatives could be defended equally well. Each alternative is the inverse of the other, and there is no compeUing argument for preferring one over the other. Together thèse two alternatives constitute an antinomy. This antinomy can be overcome by refusing to accept claims about the essential nature of man, where he is understood as a créature wholly absfracted from any actually existing natural and sodal envfronment. Both alternatives can be rejected by asking under which circumstances it would be apt to comprehend persons as déficient, and when it would be proper to understand them as abundant: créatures of deficiencies or créatures of abundances—relative to what? The error comes in beUeving that there is an absolute distinction between individuals and their environments, and that it is mean-ingful to speak of a substantial human nature that is absfracted from the various environments in which persons find themselves.


There is no absolute distinction between an organism and its envfronment. The fransactional interrelation of organism and envfronment is dialectical. It is a dynamic, engaged reciprocity. As Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin perceive: "The orgarùsm and the envfronment are not actually separately determined. The envfronment is not a structure imposed on Uving beings from the outside but is in fact a création of those beings. The envfronment is not an autonomous process but a reflection of the biology of the spedes. Just as there is no orgarùsm vdthout an envfronment, so there is no envfronment without an organism."i3 To be sure, or-ganisms and envfronments can be distingiùshed for certain pur-poses. However, this distinction is pragmatic and heuristic, not absolute. What is considered the orgarùsm and what its environment dépends upon the level of analysis, upon the perspective adopted. Owls are part of the envfronment of field mice, and mice are included in the owls' envfronment. The mutuaUy redprocal connection between organism and envfronment is a two-way sfreet, a complex matrix of interconnected feedback loops. As John Dewey notes in his 1938 Logic: "Whatever else orgarùc life is or is not, it is a process of activity that involves an environment. It is a fransaction extending beyond the spatial Umits of the orgarùsm. An organism does not live in an environment; it Uves by means of an envfronment. . . . There are things in the world that are indiffèrent to the Ufe-activities of an orgarùsm. But they are not parts of its envfronment, save potentiaUy. The processes of Uving are enacted by the envfronment as truly as by the orgarùsm; for they are an intégration."i* Organisms do not merely adapt to thefr envfronments, they also alter thefr surroundings to meet thefr needs.

The dialectical interaction of organisms with thefr envfronments wUl remain obscure if thèse are viewed orùy from a synchronie perspective. Viewed synchronically, it wUI appear that organisms simply hâve a determinate set of needs, and that thefr environments either do or do not possess the resources to satisfy those needs. However, from a diachrorùc perspective it can be seen that organisms not only adapt themselves to survive, but

'^Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), 99.

'^John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry; The Later Works-1925-1953, vol. 12, 1938, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern fllinois Univ. Press, 1986), 32.


that they also alter thefr envfronments. Levins and Lewontin recogrùze that "it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that organisms construct every aspect of thefr envfronment themselves. They are not the passive objects of external forces, but the creators and modula tors of thèse forces, "is Neither the needs of orgarùsms nor the resources provided by their envfronments are simply giv-ens. Both needs and resources are subject to modification.

Blumenberg is mistaken in beUeving that animais hâve instincts where thèse are understood as hereditary and unalterable responses to stimuh. To be sure, animais often exhibit a propen-sity to respond in a characteristic manner to a given stimulus, and this propensity may involve a hereditary component. Nevertheless, in order for the animal to respond to a stimulus, it must interpret its sensations as a stimulus, i* How the animal understands thèse sensations is altérable. Wolves frequently perceive sheep as a food source. Although their procUvity to view sheep as prey may be partially inbred, it is not inévitable that they wiU see sheep as food. A wolf cub raised vdth a lamb vdll not view it as a potential meal when both mature. This wolf even may protect the sheep. The mère présence of sheep is not itself suffident to occasion any spécifie response from wolves. Within limits, arûmals choose how they vdll interact with thefr surroundings.

If instincts are hereditary tendendes to exhibit certain behav-iors, then animais possess them. Nevertheless, arùmals resemble humans in that they too interpret one thing as another. Humans generally hâve greater interpretive abiUties than do arùmals, of course, and so hâve the potential for more interactions with thefr environments. The distinction between arùmals and humans is not absolute, but instead Ues on a continuum. Arùmals do not deal dfrectly with reaUty any more than do humans. Both deal indirectiy with reaUty. More spedfically, animais and humans interact dialecticaUy with thefr envfronments.

The twin errors of conceptuaUzing man either as defident or as abundant resuit from the faUure to recognize that humans interact dialecticaUy with thefr envfronments. Persons both adapt themselves to meet the exigendes of thefr envfronments, and

'^Levins and Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist, 104. '*See John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Early Essays: The

Early Works of fohn Dewey-1882-1898, vol. 5, 1895-1898, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, (Carbondale: Southern UUnois Univ. Press, 1972).


modify those envfronments to accompUsh their purposes. While individuals must respond to the situations in which they find themselves, thèse conditions never détermine the manner of thefr response. 17 If talk of defidendes and abundances is retained at aU, it must be asked whether particular persons interacting with spécifie environments aie defident or abundant créatures. Whether particular individuals in thefr fransactions vdth others and with thefr spécifie contexts are déficient, abundant, or something else en-tfrely dépends upon thefr interpretive understanding of themselves and thefr situations.

There is no man-as-such. There are only persons interacting with thefr habitats. Refusing to speak of man-as-such, and instead talking of persons interacting with thefr envfronments, wUl not aUow the construction of urùversal phUosophical anthropologies that take man-as-such as thefr object of study. Speaking of par-ticvdar persons within spécifie envfronments, though, does aUow for régional phUosophical anthropologies that study and compare various groups of persons in the context of thefr situations.i^

Could the friends of Blumenberg successfully respond tu quoque to the above critidsms, arguing that even a régional phUosophical anthropology must be based on a notion of man-as-such? The Blumenbergians would urge that whUe régional anthropologies claim to restrict themselves to talk of particular groups of persons in spécifie situations, thèse anthropologies surreptitiously rely on a view of man-as-such dialecticaUy interacting with his envirortment. They would allow that thèse anthropologies do not conceive of man as a déficient or an abundant créature, but they would daim that man is a dialectical créature for those anthropologies. Far from abandoning the notion of man-as-such, they would say, thèse anthropologies only reject viewing man as defident or as abundant, but the idea of man-as-such stUl is retained fri the concept of man as dialectical. They would conclude that the above critidsms of Blumenberg's urùversal phUosophical anthropology remain on the same terrain.

'^Compare Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, (New York: Intemational PubUshers, 1963), 15: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under conditions chosen by themselves, but under conditions directly encountered, given and transmitted fi-om the past."

'SFor example, see Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology (New York: Zone Books, 1987).


This response faUs because it does not distinguish between substantive and non-substantive concepts of human nature. It is possible to abstract from spécifie groups of persons in particular situations, of course, and to formulate propositions concerning ail persons in aU situations. Such statements do not imply a substantive concept of human nature, of man-as-such, unless they possess a determinate content. The claim that ail persons dialecticaUy interact with thefr envfronments does not possess a deterrrùnate content. Inferences cannot be drawn concerning the spécifie manners in which individuals interact with thefr surroundings from the fact that they do so dialecticaUy. Only after a group of persons interacting with an environment has been specified and an account, a history, given of their previous interactions can such inferences be made. There can be no meaningfui discussion of persons that ignores their environments. To say that aU individuals dialecticaUy interact with their circumstances does not entaU the acceptance of a substantive concept of human nature. The above criticisms of Blumenberg do not remain on the same terrain as the urùversal phUosophical anthropology they reject.

Must Blumenberg's behef that rhetoric is a form of reason be rejected because the notion of man-as-such, including man as a déficient créature, is suspect? The rationaUty of rhetoric would be suspect if the only argument in its favor were a reUance on the view of man as a créature of deficiencies. In discussing the conséquences of foundational fruth's absence, though, Blumenberg convincingly argues for the rationaUty of rhetoric. This latter argument is independent of the former. The contemporary sigrùficance of rhetoric can be acknowledged while abandoning Blumenberg's anthropological approach.

III

Does accepting the rationaUty of rhetoric mean losing the distinctions between knowledge and opirùon, truth and error, reaUty and appearance, and conviction and persuasion? The discussion hère wiU be restricted to the first distinction, and what is said with regard to it wiU apply—mutatis mutandis—to the others as weU. WhUe opirùon may be correct or mistaken, knowledge frequently is defined as correct opinion accompanied by a justification, an account or reason for accepting the opirùon. This defirùtion of


knowledge will be accepted as a first approximation. How is justification to be understood?

Suppose that some phUosophers insist that the only acceptable concept of justification is one that appeals to foundational truth, urging that otherwise there is only an incessant brouhaha of competing assertions. Although thèse phUosophers beUeve that the distinction between knowledge and opirùon cannot be maintained unless foundational fruth is discovered, thefr position réfutes itself. For while they claim that one assertion is as good as another, unless it is justified by appeaUng to foundational fruth, such truth remains unavailable. By their own criterion, then, they do not hâve the resources to argue that the distinction between knowledge and opinion coUapses unless justifications are based upon foundational fruth. They only can assert this. Because foundational truth awaits uncovering, they cannot provide an argument for their assertion that the distinction must be based upon a notion of justification that appeals to foundational fruth. As Blumenberg observes, "the principle of insuffident reason is not to be confused with a demand that we forgo reasons, just as 'opinion' does not dénote an attitude for which one has no reasons but rather one for which the reasons are diffuse and not regulated by method."i9

Since there is no good reason for understanding justification in terms of foundational truth, opirùon and, knowledge should be distinguished in a manner compatible with Blumenberg's claim that rhetoric is a form of reason. How may this be done? An opirùon's justification is the arguments that are accepted for thinking it correct. Knowledge may be defined, then, as opirùon accepted as correct, where reasons are provided. What reasons are advanced to support a claim, and whether they prove acceptable, wiU vary from case to case and from audience to audience. The distinction between opinion and knowledge is not absolute, but instead pragmatic and heuristic. Because there is no access to foundational tmth, what is to count as opinion—and what as knowledge—always in principle can be contested. Which reasons are sufficient to estabUsh an opinion as correct, and so as knowledge, can be disputed.

The above understanding of knowledge rejects that offered by Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins. In the chapter on

'•'Blumenberg, "An Anthropological Approach," 448.


"Knowledge" in their Communication and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology, they define knowledge as justified tme beUef, writing that "for any statement that purports to describe the way the world is to quaUfy as 'knowledge,' the proposition that the statement advances must be true, its utterer must believe it to be frue, and it must be supported by justification or évidence suffident to estabUsh it as tme."20 From the examples that Cherwitz and Hikins employ and their rejection of a pragmatic friterpretation of fruth, it is dear that they accept a correspondence theory of truth, where a statement is true if it accurately represents an objective state of affafrs that exists independently of human discourse and théories.

Such a notion of knowledge does not remain rhetorical, and so should be rejected. A correspondence theory of fruth neces-sarUy posits a God's eye-view, a point of view from which a discourse-independent reaUty could be compared with the reasons given for accepting an opirùon.21 Such a viewpoint in tum présupposes access to foundational truth. Since there is no such access, there is no perspective from which beUefs could be compared with discourse-independent reaUty. Any reaUty vdth which humans interact afready is discourse-dependent and theory-laden. How reality is apprehended—better, how it is constituted— dépends upon the discourse and theory employed. A discourse-independent state of affairs exists only in the sense that new discourses and théories wUI be created in the future. BeUefs only can be compared with other beliefs, and the reasons given for accepting one opinion only can be compared vdth the arguments put forward on behalf of another. Allovdng that a universaUy accepted opirùon may be false is to recogrùze that someday persuasive arguments may be given for rejecting even those beliefs now considered obviously correct. Recogrùzing this does not involve comparing beUefs with discourse-independent states of affafrs.

The distinction between knowledge and opinion can be maintained whUe accepting rhetoric as a form of rationaUty. It generaUy is recognized that opinions may be disputed and contested. De-

2°Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, Communication and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology (Columbia: Univ. of South CaroUna Press, 1986), 21.

2'See Hilary Pumam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, (New York: Cambridge Urùv. Press, 1983).


firùng knowledge as opinion accepted as correct, where reasons are provided, also allows for the possibiUty of disputing and contesting of claims that are considered to be knowledge. This formulation of the distinction between knowledge and opinion provides a rhetorical understanding of thèse concepts that remains rhetorical.

blumenberg and the rationality of rhetoric · blumenberg argues that rhetoric is a form of...

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