bls_1161_1954.pdf

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY,1954-60

MARCH 1954

Bulletin No. 1161

U N ITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABO R Jam es P. M itche ll, Secretary

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Ewan C la gu e ,C o m m iss io n e r

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M i l i t a r y M a n p o w e r

R e q u i r e m e n t s an d Supp ly ,

1954-60

N o . 19 in a S e r i e s of M a n p o w e r R e p o r t s

Bulletin No. 1161

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR James P. Mitchell, Secretary

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Ewan Clague, Commissioner

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LETTER OF TRANSMITALL

United States Department of Labor,Bureau of Labor Statistics,Washington 25, D. C. , February 19, 1954.

The Secretary of Labor:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on M ilitary Manpower Requirements and Supply, F isca l Years 1954-60. This report, originally prepared at the request of the Office of Defense M obilization, is one of several studies of m ilitary manpower problem s prepared in the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The Bureau wishes to acknowledge the cooperation of the Department of Defense, the Selective Service System, the Office of Health, Education, and W elfare, the Bureau of the Budget, and other Federal agencies in providing unpublished data or commenting on drafts of this report.

This report was prepared by Stuart A. Pettingill and Stuart H. Garfinkle of the D ivision of Manpower and Employment Statistics, Seymour W olfbein, Chief. Some of the techniques and methods of estimating used w ere developed in an earlier study in the series , prepared under the supervision of Caiman R. Winegarden.

Ewan Clague, Com m issioner.

Hon. James P. M itchell,Secretary of Labor.

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F oreword

On August 1, 1953, the President of the United States asked the National Security Training Com m ission to submit to him, by D ecem ber 1, 1953, recommendations with respect to the feasibility and desirability of initiating a national security training program (6 months universal m ilitary training) during a period in which inductions for 2 yeard* serv ice in the Arm ed F orces would also be made. At the same time, he asked the D irector of Defense M obilization to submit a report on the availability of manpower to sim ultaneously operate a m ilitary training program , supply m ilitary personnel for active serv ice , and m eet the needs of the civilian economy.

The D irector of Defense M obilization established a Committee on Manpower R esources for National Security to assist him in evaluating the facts and formulating recom m endations, and he asked the Department of Labor, and other Government agencies to provide information and recommendations bearing on these subjects. The Bureau of Labor Statistics was requested to prepare the present report and additional statistical analyses.

The purpose of this report is to provide estimates of the manpower pool available for m ilitary serv ice under alternative assum ptions as to the strength of the Armed F orces and national m ilitary manpower polic ies . No specific m ilitary manpower recom m endations or suggestions are made or intended in this report.

A prelim inary draft of the present report, identified as Manpower Report No. 19, which received lim ited circulation within the Government, was used by the National Security Training Com m ission and the Committee on Manpower R esources for National Security in preparing their reports. This prelim inary report was amended and augmented in the form of addenda (which also received only lim ited circulation) in order to take account of changes in Arm ed F orces strength p ro jec- tions ^and to supply additional information on alternative levels of m obilization.

Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics has studied m ilitary manpower problem s for many years and prepared a number of reports, the distribution of these reports has been lim ited because of security considerations. This report is the first which has been based on Armed F orces requirem ents data released for publication by the Department of Defense. In view of the general public interest in the problem s, the present report is being published. It covers the m aterial contained in the prelim inary draft and addenda as well as revisions based on data received m ore recently from the Selective Service System*s 1 percent

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sample inventory of registrants, the Office of Education, and other sources. These supplementary data have perm itted further refinements in techniques and m ore accurate projections. F or this reason some of the data in this report differ from those credited to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the reports of the Committee on Manpower R esources for National Security and the National Security Training Com m ission. However, these d ifferences do not involve magnitudes which alter any conclusions which could be drawn from the original data.

The firs t part of this report deals with the number of men available for m ilitary service under current laws and regulations if the strength of the Armed F orces were maintained for the rest of the decade at approxim ately the level projected for the end of fisca l year 1955. On the basis of this analysis, subsequent sections show the effect on manpower supply of: (a) a National Security Training P rogram ; (b) the maintenance of Arm ed F orces at approxim ately the level of the Korean em ergency; and (c) maintaining the A rm ed F orces at roughly their current level. The closing sections deal with m ilitary manpower supply for a " stepped-up1! partial m obilization such as might result from a further deterioration of the international situation, and for a full m obilization.

The hypothetical projections of Arm ed F orces strength of 3. 03 and 3. 36 m illions, respectively , used in this report were provided by the Department of Defense; their use beyond fisca l 1955 does not re flect actual plans and p olicies of the Department of Defense which has not established plans for these years. The alternatives in the section dealing with a stepped-up partial m obilization are not intended as recom m endations or suggestions by the Department of Labor, but solely as illustrations of the problem s involved in reaching and maintaining an Arm ed F orces strength of 5 m illion men. Sim ilarly, the levels of Arm ed F orces strength used to illustrate problem s arising in a stepped-up partial m obilization and a full m obilization situation are m erely assumptions, and do not represent Department of Defense plans.

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CONTENTS

Page

Summary of conclusions ...................................................................... 1

M ilitary manpower re q u ire m e n ts ............................................... . 3

Manpower available for serv ice ......................................................... 6Selective Service manpower pool as of July 1,

1953 ................................................................................r ................... 7Inflows to the Selective Service pool, fisca l

years 1954t 6 0 ................. 8The year-end pool, 1954-60 .......................................................... 8

The effect of a National Security Training Program onthe p o o l .................................................................................................. 13

The m ilitary manpower pool with Arm ed F orces strengthat 3. 36 m il l io n s .................................................................................. 15

The m ilitary manpower pool with Arm ed F orces strengthat 3. 5 m il l io n ...................................................................................... 17

M ilitary manpower requirem ents and supply for a stepped-up partial m ob iliza tion ..................................... 18

M ilitary manpower supply for full m obilization . . . ................ 25

Appendixes:

A . -C hart illustrating the flows of manpower into andout of the Arm ed F o r c e s ............................................................ 30

B . -T h e Selective Service manpower pool at the starto f fisca l year 1954 ........................................................................ 32

Tables:

1. P rojected A rm ed Services manpower requirem ents, gains and losses to civilian life , fisca l years 1954-60 ........... ........................................................................

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Tables - Continued Page

2. Yields to the Selective Service pool, by Selective Service classification , July 1,1953 ............................................................................................. 9

3. P rojections of Selective Service manpower pool, fisca l years 1954-60 (Arm ed F orces strengthof 3. 03 m illion m e n ).................................................................H

4. The year-end m ilitary manpower pool with200, 000. men in a National Security Training program each y e a r ....................................................................14

5. Y ear-end m ilitary manpower pool under varying reenlistm ent and rejection r a t e s ..................................16

6. Arm ed F orces requirem ents resulting from expansion of net strength from 3. 36 m illion to5 m il l io n ........................................................................................19

7. Estimated maximum yield to the Arm ed F orces from various sources of m ilitary manpower,fisca l year 1955 ....................................................... 21

8. P ro jected year-end m ilitary manpower pool,fisca l 1954-60, based on various assumptions as to sources of manpower for the buildup and maintenance of 5 m illion Arm ed F o r c e ..............................23

9. Age distribution of the Arm ed F orces under ahypothetical full m obilization ............................. . . . ...........27

10. Population of m ilitary age on July 1, 1954, bym ilitary status and a g e ............................................................ 28

Appendix tables:

A. Yield to the Selective Service pool by SelectiveService classification , July 1, 1953 ............................... . .3 3

B. Estimated distribution of college and university students, fa ll 1953, by Selective Service status asof July 1, 1953 ............................................................................34

C. Derivation of the rejection rate for the malepopulation aged 22-24 in A pril 1953 ............................... .. 37

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D. Estimated additions to Selective Service pool from18 -1 /2 year olds, fisca l years 1953-60 ........................... 40

Charts:

1. Estimated m ilitary manpower pool, fisca l years1954-60 ........................................................................................... ix

2. Estimated year-end m ilitary manpower pool,fisca l years 1953-60 under various Arm ed F orces strength p r o je c t io n s ................................................................... 12

3. Flow chart illustrating the movement of people intoand out of the m ilitary manpower pool and the Arm ed F o rce s , fisca l year 1955 .......................................................... 30

Appendix tables - Continued Page

v ii


viii

Chart 1. ESTIMATED MILITARY MANPOWER POOL

Fiscal Years 1954-60

1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS


MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY, 1954-60

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

An appraisal of the m ilitary manpower poo l1 in relation to projected Arm ed F orces requirem ents through fisca l I960 (the year ending June 30, I960), leads to the following m ajor conclusions bearing on the form ulation of manpower policy :

1. M ore men will be available for m ilitary serv ice than are required to maintain Armed F orces strength at 3, 030, 000 through fisca l 1960 under present Selective Service laws and deferment policies (chart l).

The size of the Selective Service manpower pool will increase steadily to I960, and the average age of induction will gradually rise to over 21 years by the end of fisca l I960. This increase would perm it a liberalization of deferment p o licies and practices if deemed desirable on other grounds.

2. Sufficient manpower would be available to conduct a National Security Training Program covering 200, 000 men a year, provided Arm ed F orces strength would not have to be again increased to m eet a new em ergency. The desira bility of instituting such a program , however, depends upon other factors than the supply of manpower.

3. If Arm ed F orces strength is further reduced in future years, there will be a m ore rapid increase in the size of the Selective Service manpower pool.

4. On the other hand, the maintenance of Arm ed F orces strength at 1953 levels (approxim ately 3. 5 m illion) would cause a stringency in manpower supply by fisca l 1959. This illustrates the extrem e sensitivity of the pool to relatively small changesin Arm ed F orces strength when projected over a period of years.

lIn this report, the Selective Service manpower pool re fers to the estimated number of men who, at the end of each fisca l year, are physically and otherwise qualified; who are liable for the draft; and who would not be exempt from the draft or eligible for deferm ent if they w ere reached for induction.

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During the present period of international tension, there is always the possib ility of again having to increase Arm ed F orces strength. This consideration must be carefully weighed by manpower policy officia ls before any changes are made in present m ilitary manpower p o lic ies .

5. From now until I960, m ilitary manpower supply would be roughly in equilibrium with Arm ed F orces requirem ents if the Arm ed F orces strength were maintained at about 3. 36 m illion. This, of course, assum es the continuation of present number of enlistments, and present rejection and reenlistm ent rates and Selective Service laws and regulations. Larger Arm ed F orces would continue to deplete the pool until after I960 (when there will be a substantial increase in number of men reaching m ilitary age) and sm aller Arm ed F orces would result in an accumulation of men available for serv ice .

6. If another em ergency like that in Korea required a stepped-up partial m obilization, enough men could be obtained to expand the Arm ed F orces to 5 m illion in 1 year 's time. Since the initial expansion would probably require an extension of the term s of service of men in the Arm ed F orces and the reca ll of R eserves, appropriate changes would have to be made in Selective Service laws and regulations and in legislation relating to the m ilitary reserves .

The maintenance of Arm ed F orces of this size would be increasingly difficult each year. This level could only be maintained by increasing the term of serv ice of inductees and by a drastic reduction in deferm ents. These m odifications would also require changes in current laws and regulations.

7. Arm ed F orces as large as in W orld War II could be raised within 3 years, but this would require obtaining a higher yield from men of m ilitary age than was achieved during World War II owing to the slight decline in the population of men of prim e fighting age (18 through 29 years).

8. These estimates are believed to be generally conservative and sufficiently accurate, under the assumptions stated, to providea statistical fram ework for manpower, policy . The conclusions of this report are, of course, subject to reexamination as new data becom e available.


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9. Since the pool is extrem ely sensitive to relatively small changes in Armed F orces strength, the form ulation of m ilitary manpower policies requires a continuing reappraisal of such changes and other variables affecting the size of the manpower pool. Information should be collected and analyzed on such key points as rejection rates, enlistment and reenlistm ent rates, and the draft classification of students which also affect the size of the pool.

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The rapid expansion of the armed serv ices after the Korean outbreak w ill continue to affect manpower procurem ent through fisca l 1960. During the first year after the outbreak of Korean hostilities (fisca l 1951), the Arm ed F orces were expanded over twofold. This expansion was achieved by calling up about 750,000 reserv ists and national guardsmen, by voluntary enlistments of 700, 000, and by inducting alm ost 600, 000 men through the Selective Service System. The next year (fisca l 1952) was largely a replacem ent year since net strength increased by only 400, 000.

The larger number of inductions in fisca l 1951, as com pared with fisca l 1952, created a replacem ent cycle which w ill continue through fisca l 1960. Arm ed F orces requirem ents are now somewhat higher in odd numbered years than in even numbered years. However, as a result of the projected reduction in Arm ed F orces strength during fisca l years 1954 and 1955, the amount of the yea r-to -yea r variation will be sm all.

The Arm ed F orces strength projections fof future years and the estim ates of expected gains and losses upon which this report is based w ere provided by the Department of Defense (table l). These figures pro ject a decline in net strength during fisca l 1954 from 3. 56 m illion to 3. 36 m illion, and during fisca l 1955 to 3. 03 m illion. Thereafter, it is assumed that net strength w ill remain constant at 3. 03 m illion through fisca l 1960. In preparing their estim ates of Arm ed F orces gains and lo sse s , the Department of Defense relied upon recent operating experience, m odified wherever changes could be anticipated. The Department of Defense based its projections on the following stated assumptions as to the future:

1. No active m ilitary combat such as occurred in Korea.

2. Extension through fisca l 1960 of the Universal M ilitary Training and Service Act and current regulations, with 24 months of serv ice for inductees.


Table 1 .-Projected Armed Services Manpower Requirements# Gains and Losses to Civilian Life* Fiscal Years#195U-60(In thousands)

Armed Forces Fiscal year* 195U : 1955 : - 1956V ; 1957V :.. _ 19583/!....... - - 19593/ i 19603/

Net strength# start o f year ........ ............................. 3*350 3*030 3*030 3*030 3*030 3*030

Personnel leaving service: 2 /Inductees ................................................................ . 510 270 300 260 320 280Enlistees ................................................................. . 510 510 U50 Uoo UUo laoOfficers ............................................... ................. 60 60 60 60 60 60

Total ..................................................................... . 590 1*080 5Uo 810 72o m 75oPersonnel entering service:

Inductees .......................................... ........... . .. 290 3io 280 330 300 330 310Enlistees ................................................................. . . . . 180 210 330 260 210 270 230

Subtotal from the Selective Service p o o l ........ . (520) (610) (590) (5io) (600) (5to)O fficers 3 / ................................... . ko 1*0 Uo 1(0 iso UoOther V ...................................................................

T o t a l ..................................................................... .190 190 180 170 180 170

m 75o 5IEo 5io 750 82o TFoNet strength# end o f y e a r .......................................... . 3*030 3*030 3*030 3*030 3*030 3*030

V Ehd of f is ca l year 1955 strength projected through fis ca l year I960; the actual strengths for fis ca l year 1956 and beyond have not been established. The figures noted are considered reasonable for purposes o f this study.

2f Excludes immediate reeniistments and interservice transfers.2 / O fficer gains from ROTC# Reserves# and draft commissions.ij/ Includes female enlistments# male enlistments under 18-1/2# and other enlistments outside draft ages# enlist

ments o f men with prior service# and ailistments o f Reserves in deferred or exempt categories.Sources U. S. Department o f Defense.


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3. Continuation of GI b ill benefits, i. e. , under V eterans1 Readjustment A ssistance Act of 1952.

4. Approximate present manpower supply (as a pool for voluntary enlistments) with inductions lim ited mainly to men over 19-1/2 years of age.

5. No m aterial change in present econom ic conditions and employment level.

6. No inductions under a National Security Training P rogram , but only inductions for 24 months of m ilitary serv ice .

Estimates of the number of personnel leaving the Arm ed F orces range between 720, 000 and 890, 000 in even numbered years and between 810, 000 and 1, 080, 000 in odd numbered years. Im plicit in these estim ates are assumptions as to the number who w ill reenlist (immediate reenlistm ents are not shown as either a gain or loss in table l). The Department of Defense estimated that approxim ately 30 percent of their voluntary enlistees would reenlist when their term s of serv ice expire, but that only 5 percent of the inductees would reenlist. This estimate was based on their m ost recent experience. One of the reasons for using a low er estimated reenlistm ent rate than used in earlier reports is the reasonable assumption that the large number of men who enlisted during the past 3 years as an alternative to being drafted will be less likely to rem ain in the serv ice .

Although these estimates are the best that can be made from current information and experience, reenlistm ent rates vary widely with econom ic conditions; the age, rank, or length of serv ice of the men whose enlistments are expiring; and other factors. Computations w ere made in an earlier study of the effect o f varying reen listment rates upon the Selective Service pool. Although computations in table 5 (p. 16) were based upon a higher Arm ed F orces net strength, they illustrate the effect of such variations on the year-end pool.

Expected gains, of course, equal losses (except in fisca l years 1954 and 1955 when net strength is being reduced). About 1 out of 4 of the men needed to make up Arm ed F orces losses in fisca l years 1954-60w ill com e from outside the pool, according to Department of Defense estim ates. O fficer gains from ROTC, the R eserves, and direct com m issions are estimated at 40, 000 each year. An estimated 130, 000 men under 18-1/2 years of age are expected to


enlist each year. This figure, based on the actual fisca l 1953 experience, is about 30, 000 below earlier projections because the Department of Defense anticipates a reduction in these enlistments resulting from the end of the fighting in Korea. Men with prior serv ice , women, and other groups outside the pool are expected to provide an additional 40, 000-60, 000 enlistments a year.

However, the great m ajority of men will have to com e from the pool, either by voluntary enlistment or induction. The number required will vary between 470, 000 and 610, 000 in even numbered years and 520, 000-600, 000 in odd numbered years.

One of the critica l points in projecting requirem ents from the pool is estimating the number of men who will enlist rather than wait to be inducted. Since a 4 -year enlistment provides the same manpower for the m ilitary as two inductions, a dropoff in enlistments from the pool would increase the total requirem ents from the pool. Recent experience is not a very reliable guide in estimating expected enlistments from the pool in fisca l years 1954-60 because of the fighting in Korea and several periods when enlistments in the Arm ed F orces w ere restricted by quotas during fisca l years 1949-53. For these and other reasons, estimated enlistments from the pool may contain a considerable m argin of error . However, any change in the number of enlistments from the pool which might result from the end of the fighting in Korea would not affect the size of the pool until 2 years later.

MANPOWER AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE

In the first year of Korean hostilities (fiscal 1951) it was necesi- sary to draw alm ost 1 m illion men from the Selective Service manpower pool through induction or enlistment in the Arm ed F orces . Amost 800, 000 men were withdrawn from the pool in fisca l 1952 and over 800, GOO in fisca l 1953 These drains rapidly exhausted the large backlog of draft eligibles available when Korean hostilities began. As a result, the Selective Service System was operating on a current basis in fisca l 1952 and 1953 since the year-end pool contained fewer men than were needed for the next year*s draft ca lls.

As of August 25, 1953, all new dependency deferm ents w ere e lim inated except in cases of extreme hardship. This rem oved one m ajor factor contributing to the stringency of the pool and as a result alm ost all physically and mentally qualified men now reaching the age of liability (with the exception of those enlisting in the National Guard before age 18 and a few other small groups) will eventually be available for serv ice.


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A lm ost three-fourths of the 5. 4 m illion persons whom the Arm ed F orces will need to draw from civilian life in fisca l years 1954-60 w ill com e from these men who are subject to induction.This includes both those who actually w ill be inducted and those subject to induction who enter m ilitary serv ice through enlistment.

To determine the prospective supply of men subject to induction, estimates w ere prepared of the numbers of men who are or will becom e liable for induction under the Universal M ilitary Training and Service A ct of 1951 and present draft regulations.These estimates do not correspond with Selective Service data as to the number of registrants in various classifications because they allow both for expected losses from groups currently c la ss ified as available for serv ice and for future gains from new reg is trants and from certain deferred categories. In the absence of d irect data on a number of key points relating to the availability for serv ice of registrants, the estimates w ere made by indirect methods, using collateral data on population characteristics *tnd school enrollm ents, as well as Selective Service classification re ports and their 1 percent sample inventory of registrants. The estim ates may contain a considerable m argin of e rror . However, assumptions and methods leading to conservative estimates of availability generally have been used. 2

There were two m ajor steps in estimating the number of men available for serv ice . The firs t was to estimate the Selective Service pool as of the start of fisca l 1954; that is , the expected yield to the Arm ed F orces from those registered at that time and not in deferred classes . The second was to estimate the number of men becom ing available for serv ice each year from deferred classes and from young men reaching draft age.

Selective Service manpower pool as of July 1, 1953

At the start of fisca l 1954, there were approxim ately 1 m illion Selective Service registrants who w ere not in deferred or exempt classes or in the Arm ed F orces . More, than half of these men were classified in I-A but had not received Arm ed F orces induction examinations. In estimating the yield from these sources, allowances w ere made for students enrolled in high school or college in the 1953 fa ll term . (See b e lo w .) A lso subtracted w ere the estimated

2See appendix B for a description of sources of data, assum ptions, and estimating techniques.


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numbers who would be found unfit for serv ice , those who would receive hardship dependency deferm ents, or those who had becom e fathers between July 1, 1953, and August 25, 1953, before being reached for induction. This left an estimated 550, 000 men in the pool at the beginning of fisca l 1954 (table 2).

Of the estimated 745,000 fu ll-tim e male nonveteran students of draft age enrolled in institutions of higher learning in the fa ll of 1953, there w ere approxim ately 210, 000 who could not be accounted for in Selective Service classification reports, after allowances for the number of students in deferred or postponed c lasses , or disqualified for serv ice . These students w ere presum ed, therefore, to be in the I-A and "not c lassified " groups. Although not in specifica lly deferred or exempt c la sses , they w ere excluded from the July 1, 1953 base period pool. This was consistent with the as sumption that current deferm ent and postponement po lic ies would have the net effect of deferring nearly all college students until they graduate or drop ou t.3 A ccordingly, the yield from all college students, whether or not in specifica lly deferred c la sses , was included in the inflows to the pool. A sim ilar procedure was followed with respect to high school students.

The flow chart in appendix A (chart 3) illustrates the com plexity of the flow of manpower from civilian life into and out of the Selective Service manpower pool and the Arm ed F orces . The chart shows the flows during fisca l 1955.

Inflows to the Selective Service pool, fisca l years 1954-60

Approxim ately 660, 000 men w ill be added to the Selective Service pool during fisca l 1954. The numbers of men becom ing available for serv ice each year will increase gradually until they reach alm ost 800,000 during fisca l i960. These inflows to the pool w ill consist largely of students who graduate or drop out o f school and nonstudents reaching 18 -1 /2 , after allowance for enlistment prior to this age, and R eserve or National Guard status. Appendix B describes in detail how inflows to the pool w ere estimated.

The year-end pool, 1954-60

Owing to the projected decreases in Arm ed F orces strength during fisca l years 1954 and 1955, the number of men becom ing

3 College students may be deferred on the basis of c lass standing, Selective Service college qualification test s cores , or enrollment in ROTC units. In addition, when firs t reached for induction, students may receive postponements to the end of their current academ ic year. (For a m ore detailed d iscussion of student deferm ent standards, see appendix B .)


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Table 2 .-Yields to the Selective Service Pool* by Selective Service Classification* July 1* 1953(In thousands)

Cl as s i f i cation Total number * Estimated in class 1/ j deductionsEstimated net yield to pool

515 _- 250

210-

20 -100

- 25o

75

15 -155 -

20- 5o

55o

Total I-A* examined and acceptable ........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270Less: Last minute deferments ................................................ ...............

Rejections at induction stations ..................... . ........................ .Yield to p o o l ...............................................................................................

Total I-A* not examined* 18-1/2-25 years of age .................................... 580Less: Students not elsewhere classified (and elig ib le for deferment)

Other deferments ..............................................................................Rejections (IV-F) expected from men not e lig ib le for deferment

Yield to p o o l ............ ....................................................................................

Total not classified over 18-1/2 years of age .................................. 180Less: Men who have already served in the Armed Forces .....................

High school students (elig ib le for deferment) ................. .College students (e lig ib le for deferment) ..............................Other deferments ...............................................................................Rejections (IV-F) expected from men not e lig ib le for

deferment ................... .......................................... ..........................Yield to p o o l .......... ................... ..........................................................

Total number* July 1* 1953 ...................................................................... 2/ 1*030

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1 / Computed from Selective Service data*

2/ There were 13*070*000 men in classes not shown in this table and 350*000 men (under 18-1/2) who had not been classified on July 1* 1953. However* none o f these men could have been available for service on July 1* 1953


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available for serv ice thereafter w ill exceed the number leaving to enter the Arm ed F orces each year. T herefore, the Selective Service pool w ill increase steadily from the 550, 000 men who were available at the beginning of fisca l 1954 to 1,670, 000 men at the end of fisca l 1960 (table 3).

Caution should be used in interpreting these findings. The Selective Service pool does not rem ain constant during the year. Since a fa irly large number of high school and college students m ove into the pool in late May and early June each year, because of graduations and dropouts, the pool reaches its lowest level in the months im m ediately preceding this influx. The pool level also fluctuates because of variations in monthly m ilitary requirem ents.

Furtherm ore, the indirect methods used in making these esti- m ates--and the basic assumptions as to enlistm ents, reenlistm ents, and rejection ra tes--m a y involve some e r r o r .4 While e rrors in estimating the base period pool are m erely carried across in each year-end pool, e rrors in projecting inflows to the pool, or outflows to the arm ed serv ices, may be compounded each year since they are derived by the same technique and from the same assumptions. It is im probable, however, that such errors would all be in one d irec tion. F or these and other reasons, the pool projections becom e less reliable with each succeeding year.

Despite all the uncertainties involved in estimating so far into the future, the evidence is clear that the supply of manpower is m ore than ample to maintain an Arm ed F orces strength o f 3. 03 m illion through fisca l 1960 (table 3). This would be true even with m ore pessim istic assumptions as to reenlistm ent and rejection rates.

Since m ore men becom e available each year than enter the Arm ed F o rce s , the average age of induction w ill r ise gradually until it reaches over 21 by fisca l i960. If Arm ed F orces strength is reduced below 3 m illion in future years, there w ill be even m ore manpower available for m ilitary serv ice . On the other hand, the maintenance of Arm ed F orces strength at current levels would cause a stringency in manpower supply by fisca l 1959. The extrem e sensitivity of the year-end pool to relatively sm all changes in Arm ed F orces strength projected over a period of years is shown in chart 2.

4 Table 5, p. 16, indicates the range of e rror in the estim ates which would result from changes in these variables.


Table 3 .-Projections o f Selective Service Manpower Pool* Fiscal Years 195U-60(Armed Forces Strength o f 3.03 M illion Men)

(In thousands)

- - --- ------------------------ ----- --- " ---------- ---------- ---------T"Pool ;

Fiscal year

19$k : 1955 ! 1956 # : 1957 : 1958 : 1959 I i960

Pool, start o f year .................................................... 55o 7U0 890 970 1,090 1,300 1*10:0

Plus men becoming available for service:18-1/2 year olds .................................................. U20 1*30 hho 1:60 1:60 1:80 5ioDeferments expiring (largely students) . . . . 2U0 2U0 250 250 260 260 260 1

Total men becoming a v a ila b le .................. .......... fm /57o pros pm pm pm HHLess men leaving to enter the armed serv ices . -U70 -520 -610 -590 -5io -600 -5Uo 1

Pool, end o f y e a r ........................ .............................. 7h0 890 970 1,090 1,300 1,14:0 1,670


12

Chart 2. ESTIMATED YEAR-END MILITARY MANPOWER POOLFISCAL YEARS, 1953-60

Thousands of Men

Under Various Armed Forces Strength Projections ...


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As long as the international situation remains uncertain there is always a possib ility of having to increase the Arm ed F orces strength again. If such a situation occu rs the substantial manpower pool shown by these estim ates would gradually disappear. If the assumption is made, however, that the reduction in Arm ed F orces strength below 3 m illion would continue to I960, this would perm it changes in present laws and regulations with respect to increasing deferm ents, raising mental and physical standards, or instituting a program of universal m ilitary training. The desirability of such changes, of course, would depend on many other factors beyond the scope of this report, factors which might be of overriding importance to those responsible for formulating manpower policy .

THE EFFECT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAM ON THE POOL

The National Security Training Com m ission has proposed a program of universal m ilitary training which would operate concurrently with inductions for 2 years ' serv ice in the Arm ed F orces . A ll physically and otherwise qualified young men reaching 18 years of age would be liable for 6 months' National Security Training or 2 years ' serv ice in the Arm ed F orces . Men not needed for serv ice would be selected by lot and inducted for National Security Training through the Selective Service System. Upon com pletion of their training, they would serve in an im m ediately callable reserve for 7 -1 /2 years.

With Arm ed F orces strength stabilized at 3. 03 m illion men in fisca l years 1954 to 1960, sufficient manpower would be available to conduct a National Security Training P rogram covering 200, 000 men a year without any further change in laws and regulations other than those required to implement the program (taSle 4).

If laws and regulations w ere changed, as proposed by the National Security Training Com m ission, 5 m ore than 200, 000 men could be trained each year and still leave over 400, 000 men in the pool at the end of each year. They have proposed modifying current laws and regulations to make National Security Training a prerequisite for the deferm ent of men who join the National Guard before reaching age 18-1/2 and so that college students (or high school graduates planning to attend college) selected in a National Security Training lottery would not be eligible for deferm ent from National Security Training.

5In their report to the President , "20th Century M inutem en," National Security Training Com m ission, D ecem ber 1, 1953.


Table U.-The Year-End M ilitary Manpower Pool With 200*000 Men in a National Security Training Program Each Year

(In thousands)

Fiscal year The year-end pool

19# ................................................................................. 770

19# ................................................................................. 630

1957 ................................................................................. 530

1958 ................................................................................. 520

1959 ............................................................. IiIiO

1960 ................................................................................. U5o

3 / Assumptions: ( l ) The training program begins on January 1* 19^5J (2) 100*000 men are trained in f i s c a l 1955 and 200*000 each year th erea fterj (3) The ra tio o f trainees to training s t a f f i s 5 :1 . The training s ta f f is in addition to the projected Armed Forces strength and regular serv ice personnel detached fo r training can be replaced fo r inductees j (i|) A ll other assumptions as in table 3.


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THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL, WITH ARMED FORCES STRENGTH AT 3. 36 MILLIONS

If international conditions require the maintenance of Arm ed F orces of 3. 36 m illion m en --a level that was considered at one time by the Department of D efense--enough men would be available to maintain this strength through fisca l 1960 without any changes in legislation or deferm ent policy if the basic assumption as to re enlistment and rejection rates remained valid. The estimated year- end Selective Service pool would be as follow s:

F isca l year

19531954195519561957195819591960

Y ear-end pool1 (in th ou sa n d s)___ 550___ 740___ 550___ 610___ 510___ 680___ 590___ 760

1 These pool figures w ere computed from the same manpower supply figures used earlier in this report, from Arm ed F orces strength projections at the 3. 36 m illion level, and from expected accessions and separations provided by the Department of Defense which w ere based upon the same assumptions as their 3 .03 m illion projections.

These estimates indicate that fisca l 1957 would be the m ost critica l year, with a year-end pool of 510, 000 men less than the projected inductions (515, 000) for that year. Enough men would be left in the pool to perm it the Selective Service System to m eet its monthly ca lls and still maintain a flow of registrants undergoing classification or examination p rior to induction. 6

6A s pointed out previously, the Selective Service pool does not re main constant during the year. M oreover, an error in projecting inflows to the pool or in estimating reenlistm ent and rejection rates could have a significant effect upon the size of the year-end pool.


Table 5* Year-End Military Manpower Pool Under Varying Reenlistment and Rejection Rates

(in thousands)

Fiscal year195k ; 1955 ! 1956 ! 1957 * 1958 ; 1959 ! 1960

Reenlistment rates assumed, rejection rate and otherfactors constants

Low reenlistment rates (20 percent) 1 / ....................... 690 k50 WO 290 38O 230 350

Best estimate (30 percent) 1 / r % 0 550 610 510 580 590 7601

High reenlistment rates (i+0 percent) 1 / *............... .. 800 670 790 71*0 980 950 1,170

Rejection rates assumed, reenlistment rate and otherfactors constant:

High rejection rates 2 / ........................... ..................... 700 1*90 530 hlO 560 WO 590

Best estimate j j / .......................................................... n c o 550 610 510 680 590 760

Low rejection rates k f *........ .............................. .. 790 620 700 620 810 71*0 91*0

1 / Assumes that 20, 30, or k0 percent, respectively, of a ll voluntary enlistees w ill reenlist when their terms of~service expire*

2 / Assumes a rejection rate of 27 percent for the entire nonstudent population, 2k percent for high school students, and 13 percent fo r college students*

3 / Assumes a rejection rate of 25 percent for the entire nonstudent population, 22 percent fo r high school students, and 12 percent for college students*

k/ Assumes a rejection rate of 23 percent for the entire nonstudent population, 20 percent for high school students, and 11 percent fo r college students*


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Table 5 indicates what would happen to the year-end pool if two of the m ajor variables affecting the size of the p oo l--th e re enlistment and rejection ra tes--w ere altered. If the proportion of enlistees who reenlist upon completing their term s o f serv ice w ere to decline from current levels (approximately 30 percent) to 20 p e r - cent in fisca l 1959 the year-end pool would approach the lowest operating level considered adm inistratively feasible by the Selective Service System.

THE MILITARY MANPOWER POOL WITH ARMED FORCES STRENGTH AT 3. 5 MILLION

The maintenance of an Arm ed F orces strength of 3. 5 m illion men (approxim ately the present level) would bring the estimated year-end pool in fisca l 1959 and 1960 below the lowest operating level considered adm inistratively feasible by the Selective Service System. The estimated year-end pool (for an Arm ed F orces strength of 3. 5 m illion) is shown in the following tabulation:

F isca l year

1954195519561957195819591960

Year-end pool1 (In th o u sa n d s )......... 600. . . . . 400. . . . . 320..... 210 . . . . . 230......... 140. . . . . 160

1 These projections are based on the same assumptions that w ere used in projecting the pool estimates for Arm ed F orces of 3. 36 m illion. It was assumed that the difference in strength (between 3. 36 and 3. 5 m illion) would be made up entirely by induction and that these additional inductees would experience the same attrition rates (6 percent) while in the serv ice as other inductees.

Arm ed F orces of this size could be maintained in fisca l years 1959 and I960 by relatively small changes in Selective Service regulations or procedures, e. g. , by reducing deferm ents and lowering rejection standards. This, of course, assum es the continuation of the present reenlistm ent experience. Any substantial drop in re enlistments would necessitate m ore drastic revisions in Selective

302191 0 - 54 - 4Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

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Service regulations and might require changes in legislation.

It is concluded, therefore, that Arm ed F orces of 3. 5 m illion men is about the maximum that could be maintained until I960 within the fram ew ork of current laws and regulations.

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY FOR A STEPPED-UP PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

The possib ility of a m ilitary em ergency short of fu ll-sca le w ar, but requiring largeT Arm ed F orces than we now have, must be considered in assessing the adequacy of our m ilitary manpower supply. During its deliberations, the Committee on Manpower R esources for National Security requested information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the m ilitary manpower problem s which would result from a partial m obilization to meet another K orean-type em ergency. Since some assumptions as to thetitning and extent of the expansion in Armed F orces strength are necessary for such estim ates, the com m ittee requested that the Bureau use the following illustrative assumptions in the analysis: a national em ergency might occur on July 1, 1954, which would require a buildup of Arm ed F orces strength to 5 m illion men; and this expansion would have to be completed within 1 year (by June 30, 1955) and be maintained indefinitely. Both the strength figure and the dates were selected purely for illustrative purposes, and in no way reflect strategic plans of the Department of Defense.

In preparing these estim ates, no allowances w ere made for com bat losses . The estim ates, therefore, may understate the difficulties involved in a partial m obilization. An allowance of 6 percent a year was made for normal attrition among all m em bers of theArm ed F o r c e s - -a rate consistent with the experience of the Department of Defense. M ajor reasons for this attrition are physical and mental disabilities developing during a m ilitary serv ice , unsuitability fo r serv ice , and desertions.

Expanding the Arm ed F orces to 5 m illion men would represent m ore than a partial m obilization. This is about the same number of men as w ere m obilized in World War I. Never in the history of this country, not even in W orld War II, w ere so many men under arm s for so long a period as that projected in the present report.

Increasing the Arm ed F orces from 3. 36 m illion to 5 m illion men would require an additional 1. 9 m illion men, after allowing for norm al attrition, and assuming that the term of serv ice of all men in Arm ed F orces whose tours of duty expire during fisca l 1955 would be extended 1 year (table 6). This assumption has been used in all the computations in this section because the requirem ents for such an unprecedented peacetim e strength suggests an immediate deployment in strength which could be obtained in no other way.


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Table 6 .-Armed Forces Requiremaits Resulting From Expansion o f Net Strength From 3.36 M illion to 5 M illion

(to thousands)

Aimed Forces strength goal* June 30* 1955 .............. ......... 5*000

Armed Forces strength* June 30* 195U ................ . . 3>360Less 6 percent a ttrition 1 / ...................................... -200

Personnel remaining on June 30* 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . -------- - 3*160

Net inflows required to achieve 5 m illion net strength by June 30* 1955 ................................ .. ......... I*81j0

Gross inflows required (a fter allowing fo r a ttr ition on inflows at 3 percent 2j (1*8U0 + .9 7 ) . . . ------- 1*900

1J The Department o f Defense estimates normal attrition at 6 percent per year.

2 / Since these men would enter m ilitary service during the year* they would be subject* on the average* to only a ha lf year's a ttr ition .


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The manpower problem s involved would be m ore difficult in some ways than those presented by full m obilization. Under full m obilization, alm ost everyone qualified for serv ice would have to enter the Arm ed F o rce s , including ex-serv icem en . In a large partial m obilization, however, som e but not a ll--m e n of m ilitary age with p rior serv ice might have to serve again. P olicym akers would be faced with the problem of "double jeopardy" for some groups in the face of a general d esire to equalize the burden of m ilitary serv ice among all groups.

To achieve and maintain Arm ed F orces of 5 m illion men would require changes in Selective Service laws and regulations and in legislation relating to the m ilitary R eserves. The alternative sources of the additional manpower required and the estimated number of men each alternative would produce are shown in table 7.It is apparent that no single one of the alternatives shown would provide enough men to expand the Arm ed F orces to 5. 0 m illion men.It is also apparent that it is feasible to raise the 1.9 m illion men required by some combination of alternatives. The choice of alternatives would depend in large m easure upon the nature and anticipated duration of the em ergency.

A national em ergency which would require the immediate d e ployment of large Arm ed F orces would necessitate recalling m ost of the active R eserves and the National G uard--since these men would require a minimum of training in addition to extending the term of serv ice of men already in the Arm ed F o rce s . On the other hand, a steady deterioration of the international situation might perm it a buildup to 5 m illion men without the use of men with p rior serv ice except for o fficer and technical personnel drawn from the R eserves.

While it is feasible to obtain enough men to increase the Arm ed F orces to 5 m illion, the maintenance of fo rce s of this size is much m ore difficult, and the difficulty increases each year. The yield from among young men reaching m ilitary age cannot be expanded appreciably, although some additional men might be obtained by lowering rejection standards and tightening deferm ent p o lic ies . Lowering the age of liability or eliminating student deferm ents, while providing an immediate increm ent of untrained men in an em ergency, w ill not provide any m ore men over an extended period of time because these men eventually see serv ice anyway. M oreover, the elimination of student deferm ents might jeopardize the future supply of trained scientists, technical and other personnel, and thereby endanger the national security.

The continued maintenance of an Arm ed F orce of 5 m illion men can only be accom plished by extending the term of serv ice . How long a tour of duty would be required depends on other m ilitary


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Table 7 .-Estimated Maximum Yield to the Armed Forces From Various Sources o f M ilitary Manpower* F iscal Year 1955

(In thousands)

Source I1 Estimated number

"One-year extension o f the terms o f service o f a l l men inthe Armed Forces (assumed in a l l computations) . . ........ .. 1 / 1*290

Recall o f a l l active Reserve and National Guardsmen . . . . . 1*770

Exhausting the Selective Service manpower pool .............. .. 1*U70

Eliminating a l l student deferments* including ROTC . . . . . . . 2/ 710

Drafting pre-August 2f>* 1953 fathers ........ ............................... 750

Lowering age o f l ia b i l i t y to 18 ....................................................... Zj U30

Drafting able-bodied veterans under age 26 with less than2k months' service ..................................................... W 75

Increased use o f women......................................................................... 5 /

Manpower which might be obtained from increasing male enlistments outside the draft age and increasing reenlistments ........................................................ $1

3 / Resulting from a 1-year extension o f the terms o f service o f a l l men whose tours o f duty expire in f is c a l year 1955* less an allowance o f 6 percent fo r normal attrition* and 1-year extension o f the terms o f service o f a l l inductees whose tours o f duty expire in f is c a l 1956* less an allowance o f 6 percent fo r normal a ttr ition .

2 / The number o f additional men which could be obtained i f a l l student deferments were eliminated on June 30* 195k.

3 / The number o f additional men which could be obtained i f the age o f l ia b i l i t y was lowered from 18-1/2 to 18 years o f age on June 30* 195k* without elimination o f high school student deferments.

kj Approximated.

SJ Cannot be quantified.


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manpower p o lic ies , including the way in which the initial expansion was achieved. The term would be somewhat shorter if reserves w ere called up to achieve the initial expansion than if it w ere achieved by exhausting the pool and eliminating college and p re - August 25, fatherhood deferm ents. It could be shorter still if larger numbers of men and women not subject to the draft could be induced to enlist or if a higher proportion of men in the serv ice were to reenlist.

Each year that the 5 m illion strength level is maintained, policym akers w ill have fewer alternatives to choose from and m ore vexing problem s to solve. F or example, the maintenance of this strength to 1960 and beyond would require a 3-year term of serv ice for all inductees (m ore serv ice than m ost veterans of W orld War H had), the reca ll of m ost of the active R eserves (many of whom have at least one combat tour) and an im provem ent in the current Arm ed F orces enlistment and reenlistm ent experience. As an alternative to recalling R eserves, the term of induction could be extended to 4 years.

Estimates of the year-end Selective Service manpower p oo l w ere made for fisca l years 1955-60 based upon manpower policies which might be adopted to meet two sharply different strategic situations. These p olicies w ere selected only to illustrate the extrem es within which p olicy might be formulated in a hypothetical partial m obilization; they are not intended as recom m endations by the Department of Labor. Owing to limitations of time and staff, the estimates could not be prepared with the detail or accuracy of the estimates contained in the earlier sections of this report.

In the firs t instance "M odel I " the national em ergency re quires an immediate deployment of large Arm ed F orces . Getting the trained men quickly can only be accom plished by extending the term s of serv ice 1 year and recalling m ost of the active R eserve and National Guard for 21-month tours of duty. It is assumed that existing laws and regulations would be m odified to perm it the Selective Service System to: (l ) induct all men for 3 years; (2) draft pre-August 25, 1953, fathers; (3) reduce college deferments when required; (4) low er the age of liability to age 18 when required. It is further assumed that an additional 50, 000 men and women not liable for the draft could be induced to enlist (or reenlist) each year.

The estimated year-end pool and the detailed assumptions as to R eserve reca lls and draft policies are shown in table 8. In this m odel, it would not be necessary to draft fathers until fisca l 1957, although a higher yield could be obtained from this group if they were drafted im m ediately. C ollege deferm ents would not have to be re duced until fisca l 1959 when alm ost half of them would have to be


T able 8. - P r o je c te d Y ea r-E n d M ilitary Manpower P oo l, F is ca l 1954-60, B ased on V arious A ssum ptions as to Sources o f M anpower fo r theBuildup and M aintenance of 5 M illion A rm ed F o r ce . 1

(in thousands)

F is ca lY ear

MODEL I:L a r g e -s c a le r e ca lls of R eserv es and National Guard;

3 -year induction

M ODEL II:L im ited re ca ll o f R e se rv e s or National Guard;

4 - year inductions

1954 800 8001955 1,450 9751956 1, 150 3001957 465 416 21958 310 7851959 2352 3801960 403 24 53

1 Estim ate's a re ba sed on the fo llow ing assum ptions: (l) The A rm ed F o r ce s expand from 3. 36 m illion to 5 m illion during f is ca l year 1955;(2) The term s of s e r v ice o f all m en whose tours of duty expire during fis ca l 1955 are extended 1 year and all inductees w hose term s of se rv ice exp ire during f is c a l 1956 have to serve another year; (3) Enlistm ents fr o m the p o o l, o f f ic e r gains, re en listm ents, etc . , are a ll assum ed to r e m ain the sam e as in the D epartm ent of D efense 3. 36 m illion p ro je c tio n s . (Although this is an u n rea listic assum ption , with 3 - and 4 -y ea rs indu ction s, changes in these rates have only a m oderate e ffe ct upon the p oo l so the p o ss ib le e r ro r is m in im ize d .); (4) The expansion in fis ca l 1955 and the m aintenance of the new strength are achieved by:

MODEL, I

R eca llin g 850, 000 R e s e rv is ts and National G uardsm en and inducting 860, 000 m en fro m the S elective S erv ice pool. 280, 000 m en are obtained fro m outside the p oo l by voluntary enlistm ent. (600, 000 R e se rv is ts and N ational G uardsm en serv e 21-m onth tours of du ty .)

Inducting m en fo r 3 -y e a r term s fro m the follow ing groups in t h e ord e r lis ted :

M ODEL II

Obtaining 1 ,245 , 000 m en fro m the augmented S elective S erv ice p ool, reca llin g 350, 000 R e se rv e and National Guard o ffic e rs and technical person n el fo r 2 -y ea r tours o f duty, and obtaining 305, 000 m en fr o m outside the p oo l by voluntary enlistm ent.

Inducting m en fo r 4 -y e a r term s fro m the sam e groups in t h e same ord er as in M odel I.

P re -A u g u st 1953 fa th ers;Men reaching 1 8 -1 /2 , high school and co llege

graduates, and dropouts;C o llege students (deferm en t standards would

b e tightened);Men 1 8 -1 8 -1 /2 not in high sch ool nor elig ible

fo r c o lle g e deferm ent.

Obtaining 50 ,000 additional en listm ents (or reenlistm ents) each Obtaining 75 ,000 additional enlistm ents (or reen listm ents) each yearyear fr o m m en with p r io r s e r v ice , w om en, and other groups out- fro m m en with p r io r s e r v ice , w om en, and other groups outside th eside the Selective S erv ice m anpow er p oo l. S elective S erv ice m anpower p oo l.

2C o llege deferm en ts would have to be restr ic ted enough to provide an estim ated 200, 000 - 350,000 m en in these y e a rs . This would requ ire the elim ination o f a lm ost half o f a ll c o lle g e deferm ents and reduce co lle g e graduations by 40 percen t. The num ber of graduater students would be cut in half.

3 An estim ated 300, 000 m en age 18 - 1 8 -1 /2 (not in high sch oo l nor e lig ib les fo r co lle g e deferm ents) would have to be drawn into the pool in these y e a rs . This would req u ire low ering the age of registration to 1 7 -1 /2 to p rovide S elective Serv ice with an operating m argin .


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eliminated. This would reduce college graduations by about 40 percent and cut the number of graduations in half. Draft calls until fisca l I960 could be m et from among men over 18 -1 /2 years of age.

During fisca l I960, however, the pool would be alm ost exh a u sted -ev en of 18-year olds. In fisca l 1960, the age of reg istra tion would have to be low ered to 17 -1 /2 to provide the Selective Service System with an operating m argin or additional men would have to be obtained from som e other source.

Although it might be argued that this m odel yields the m ost effective results from a long-range "manpower management" standpoint, it might not be feasible or desirable because:

1. The duration of the em ergency might not be foreseen far enough ahead to implement it;

2. The reca ll of large numbers of veterans in the R eserves and drafting of the pre-August 25 fathers while college students are perm itted to rem ain in school might be unacceptable to the public even though a greater yield could be obtained from this group if they were drafted imm ediately.

The other extrem e--M odel II--m ight be feasible in an em ergency which required an equally rapid buildup but which would not require the immediate deployment of many trained troops. Under such strategic conditions, the expansion and maintenance o f the A im ed F orces might be accom plished largely with untrained men and would not require an extensive reca ll of R eserves and veterans. The term s of serv ice of men in the Arm ed F orces at the beginning of the em ergency would still have to be extended and officer and technical personnel would have to be drawn from the R eserves to provide the large training complement needed for so many untrained ^recruits. Even then, because of the large number of experienced men required as training staff, the effective strength which could be deployed during the early months of the em ergency would be less than under the 3. 36 m illion strength level. While the probability of such a "convenient" em ergency is rather rem ote, the computations on this basis may be useful to illustrate the manpower problem s which would result from using untrained men for the buildup instead of the R eserves.

This m odel is based on the same changes in laws and regulations (except for 4 -year inductions) as the earlier one. Table 8 shows the estimated year-end pool and the detailed assumptions


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it is based upon. The very heavy inductions during fisca l 1955 would require drafting m ost of the pre-A ugust 25, 1953, fathers during that year. College deferm ents would have to be reduced in fisca l 1957, but not as sharply as in "M odel I" until fisca l I960. During fisca l I960, the age of liability would have to be low ered to 18 and the age of registration to 17-1/2.

This manpower policy would be certain to create strong public opposition on the basis of equity. It would create a new class of veterans with m ore serv ice than the veterans of any of the Nation's w ars.

The manpower p olicy adopted in the event of a partial m obilization would probably be a com prom ise between these two extrem es especially since it would probably not be anticipated initially that such an em ergency would continue for 6 or m ore years.

Thus, it appears that the maintenance of Arm ed F orces of 5 m illion for an indefinite period would im pose severe econom ic, socia l, and politica l strains on the Nation.

MILITARY MANPOWER SUPPLY FOR FULL MOBILIZATION

An appraisal of our m ilitary manpower resou rces for full m obilization is an essential part of any analysis of m ilitary manpower requirem ents and supply. The Committee on Manpower R esources for National Security requested information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on our manpower resou rces for full m obilization. Since the population of m ilitary age varies from year to year, the Committee recom m ended that, for purposes of illustration, fisca l year 1957 be assumed as the year in which full m obilization would be achieved. The analysis that follow s is , therefore, purely hypothetical and in no way reflects the m obilization planning of the Department of Defense or of any other agency.

In the absence of data on the probable size of the Arm ed F orces , the following analysis was based on W orld War II Arm ed F orces strength. Although any future period of m obilization would probably be quite different from W orld War II, the W orld War II experience serves as a guide in estimating the manpower available for m ilitary serv ice in event of full m obilization.

No attempt was made to evaluate the feasibility of providing adequate manpower for both the Arm ed F orces and civilian work fo rce . The estim ates, therefore, shed no light on the critica l problem s of balance of m ilitary and civilian manpower. However, studies are now being conducted by Government agencies which explore the optimum balance between Armed F orces strength and manpower requirem ents for war supporting production.


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Owing to the lack of information as to probable combat or civilian losses resulting from enemy action, no allowance was made for such losses . This analysis, therefore, depicts the possib ility of m ilitary manpower m obilization under the m ost favorable conditions--conditions we could not expect would obtain in war.

During W orld War II, the Armed F orces reached a peak of approxim ately 12. 3 m illions in June 1945 after experiencing appreciable combat losses . If the same proportion o f men w ere obtained from each age group as in World War II, the Armed F orces would only reach 12. 3 m illion before allowance for com bat losses (table 9). The m ilitary manpower supply in fisca l year 1957 would, therefore, be somewhat sm aller than in World War II.

M oreover, the Arm ed F orces personnel would be older than during W orld War II because there has been a decline in the population of prim e fighting age (men 18 through 29 years of age) since that time. While this decline is m ore than offset by the increase in the male population in ages 26 to 38, the latter group yields a much lower proportion of men for m ilitary serv ice because m ore men in this group are rejected for physical d isabilities or deferred for occupational or dependency reasons. The disadvantages in using older men in the Arm ed Forces may be partially offset by their greater skills which are required by the increasing technological com plexity of m odern w arfare.

The withdrawal of the same proportion of men in the age groups 30 to 38 as in World War II would probably work greater hardship on war supporting industry than in World War II. Over a m illion m ore men in the age groups 25 to 35 (an age group in which the supply of men would be favorable in 1957 compared with W orld War II) w ere employed in professional and skilled occupations in 1950 than in 1940. 7

For these reasons, it would be m ore difficult to obtain the same number of men as in World War II even though the male population in the age group 18 to 38 has increased slightly since then. The yield from the age groups 18 to 30 would probably have to be increased above that in World War II, although this might be difficult to accom plish.

7Derived from the 1940 and the 1950 Census of Population data on em ployed professional, technical, and kindred w orkers and cra ftsmen, forem en, and kindred w orkers by age groups.


Table 9. Age Distribution of the Aimed Forces Under a Hypothetical Full Mobilization

(In thousands)

Age groupEstimated male

population# June 30# 1957

Men in the Armed Forces on June 30# 1957# using

World War II Armed Forces participation rates

Men in the Aimed Forces on June 30# 191*5

Rate (percent) 1/ Number 2 / Number " if

18 - 25 years ------- 8,830 71 6#l*5o 6,71026 - 29 years ------- 1*#590 53 2,500 2# 51530 - 31* years------- 5 #930 30 1,81*0 l#7853 5 - 3 8 years -------Under 18 and over

1*#700 21 1#020 860

38 years - - - - 1*90 1*30

Total ---------- 2l*#o5o 12,300 12,300

1/ These rates pertain only to men in the service at a given time and underestimate the total yield to the Armed Forces from each age group. A much higher proportion of men in each age group were in service at some time during World War II# but some of these men were discharged before June 191*5 and some entered service after that date.

2/ Includes 300#000 women distributed according to the age of the women in the Aimed Forces on June 30# 19U5.

2 / Includes almost 300#000 women distributed according to age.

Source: Estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from data provided hy the Bureau of Census#the Department of Defense# and the Veterans Administration.


Table 10 .-Population o f Military Age on July 1, 193U, by M ilitary Status and Age

(In thousands)

Age group ' Estimated male population

: In the Armed Forces : Veterans : Other 1 /

Under 18 years ................ 2 / U,300 Uo ii,26018-23 years ...................... 8,810 2,1)20 2,030 U,36026-29 years ................... U,690 290 3,220 1,18030-31) years ....................... 6,060 280 3,100 6803538 years ....................... U,3io 1U0 3,000 1,370

Total 18-38 years . . . . 2/28,370 2/3*360 13,33o 11,830

1/ A very high proportion o f the "other" men w ill not be suitable fo r serviceparticularly in the age groups from which World War XI and Korean military manpower was drawn.

2 / Includes a l l men under 18 years at the beginning o f the m obilization who w ill reach 18 years before June 30, 1937.

3/ Includes 130,000 men over 38 years o f age and 1)0,000 women.

Source: Data estimated by the Bureau o f Labor S ta tistics from data provided by the Bureau o f Census, the Department o f Defense, and the Veterans Administration.


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In summary, our supply of manpower for m ilitary serv ice would be somewhat sm aller than in W orld War II; the Arm ed F o rce s , if as large, would include a sm aller proportion of men of prim e fighting age; and the impact on industry s skilled and professional manpower would be greater.

The initial expansion, however, would be easier than in W orld War II because the m obilization would be starting from a higher base. The Arm ed F orces would have approxim ately 3 m illion men to begin with. In addition, a much larger trained R eserve and a la rger veteran population of m ilitary age is available. There w ill be approxim ately 15 m illion veterans of m ilitary age bn July 1, 1954. This figure includes m ost of the estimated 2 m illion men who w ill be in the R eserves and National Guard at that time (som e R eservists and Guardsmen w ill not be veterans and some w ill be over age 38). A substantial proportion of these men would be available for m ilitary serv ice after allowance for high rejection and occupational deferm ent rates. This relatively large reservo ir of trained men would facilitate the initial expansion and not create the severe training cadre problem s faced in W orld War II (table 10).


30-

Chart 3. FLOW CHART ILLUSTRATING THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE INTO AND OUT OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER

POOL AND THE ARMED FORCESFiscal Year 1955

CDVDUA1N] UFE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS


AP PE N D IX AiX

C hart illu stra tin g the flow s of m anpow er into and out o f the A rm ed F o r c e s

M en and w om en enter the A rm ed F o r c e s in v a r iou s w ays. F o r so m e , m ilita ry s e r v ic e is de layed by d e ferm en t; o th ers fa il to p ass m in im um p h ysica l o r m ental req u irem en ts at one stage o r another; a few a re exem pted . T h ese d iv e rs e situations co m p lica te not on ly the e s tim ating o f our m ilita ry m anpow er potentia l but a lso a ready understanding o f the p r o c e s s and the es t im a tes .

The ch art illu stra tes the flow o f m anpow er fr o m c iv ilia n l ife into and out o f the S e lective S e rv ice m anpow er p o o l and the A rm ed F o r c e s during f is c a l 1955. It should be noted that this is a c lo s e d system in that every on e reach in g m ilita ry age m ust be accou n ted fo r in som e flow . T h ese flow s m ust e ith er enter the p oo l o r A rm ed F o r c e s (shown as tanks o r r e s e r v o ir s in the ch a rt), retu rn to c iv ilia n l i fe , o r go into a future y ea r (and eventually enter the p o o l , A rm ed F o r c e s , o r retu rn to c iv ilia n l ife ) . The flow to and fr o m c iv ilia n l i fe m ust ba lan ce or ca u se co rresp on d in g changes in the le v e l o f the p o o l o r A rm ed F o r c e s " r e s e r v o i r s . " The c ir c le d n um bers below r e fe r to co rresp on d in g num bers on the ch art.

(1 ) . The s ize o f the A rm ed F o r c e s , as d eterm in ed by N ational S ecu rity c o n s id e ra tio n s , is the startingpoint in this ch art. D uring f is c a l 1955, p ro je c te d A rm ed F o r c e s strength d e c lin e s fr o m 3 ,3 6 0 ,0 0 0to 3, 030, 000 m en.

(2 ) . Owing to the d ec lin e in net strength , the num ber o f m en leav in g the A rm ed F o r c e s ( l , 090, 000) w illex ceed the inflow fr o m c iv ilia n l ife by 330, 000.

(3) (4) (5 ). An estim ated 2 30 ,000 of the 7 5 0 ,000 p erson n e l w hich the A rm e d F o r c e s w ill have to obtainfro m c iv ilia n l i fe can be obtained outside the S e lective S erv ice p o o l f r o m the f iv e s o u rce s shown onthe ch a rt:

(3) F e m a le e n l is tm e n ts ..................................................................................................................... 10 ,000

(3) O ffic e r gains fr o m the R e s e rv e s and d ir e c t c o m m is s io n s ...................................... 10 ,000

(3) E n listm en ts fr o m am ong m en with p r io r s e r v i c e ........................................ 50, 000

(4) E n listm en ts o f m en under 1 8 -1 /2 y e a rs o f a g e ........................................................ .. 130 ,000

(5) R O TC g r a d u a te s ............................................................................................................................ 30, 000

T o t a l .................................................... 230, 000

(6 ) . The rem ain ing m en (5 2 0 ,000 ) w ill have to be obtained fr o m the S e le ct iv e S erv ice p o o l e ith er throughvoluntary en listm en t o r induction .

(7 ) . The S e le ct iv e S erv ice p o o l conta ins a ll m en (at any given tim e such as the end o f a f is c a l yea r) whoa re p h y s ica lly and oth erw ise qua lified fo r s e r v ic e , lia b le fo r s e r v ic e , and not e lig ib le fo r d e ferm en t. D uring f is c a l 1955, an estim ated 520, 000 m en w ill lea ve the p o o l to enter the A rm ed F o r c e s . Howe v e r , the p o o l w ill be rep len ish ed by an inflow o f an estim ated 670, 000 m en during the y e a r . A s a re su lt, the num ber o f m en in the p oo l w ill in c re a se fro m 7 4 0 ,0 0 0 at the beginning o f the y ea r to 890, 000 at the end o f the y e a r .

(8 ) . The p o o l w ill be augm ented by an estim ated 240, 000 m en w hose d e ferm en ts (o r ca u se fo r d e fe r m ent) e x p ire during f is c a l 1955. T h ese m en w ill have been d e fe r re d fro m s e r v ic e (o r b eca m e e lig ib le fo r d e ferm en t) when they rea ch ed the age o f lia b ility in p r io r y e a rs .

(9 ) . The p o o l w ill a lso be augm ented by 430, 000 m en reach in g age 1 8 -1 /2 during f is c a l 1955.

(10). H ow ever , this is on ly p a rt o f the 1, 125, 000 m en who w ill reach 1 8 -1 /2 y e a rs o f age during f is c a l 1955. How the estim ate o f 4 3 0 ,0 0 0 is rea ch ed and what w ill have happened to the rem a in d er is d eta iled below :

( l l ) . A n estim ated 30, 000 p h y s ica lly and oth erw ise qualified m en w ill have a lrea d y en listed in the N ational G uard b e fo r e they rea ch age 18; they a re exem pt fr o m m ilita ry s e r v ic e as long as they m aintain this status.

(12 ) . A n estim ated 130, 000 m en w ill have d isch a rg ed their m ilita ry ob liga tion b y en listing in the A rm edF o r c e s b e fo r e they re a ch 1 8 -1 /2 (a lso l is te d as item 4).

(13 ) . A p p rox im a te ly 10, 000 m en w ill p rob a b ly be perm an en tly d e fe r re d o r exem pt fr o m s e r v ic e b y law(m ost o f these m en w ill be d iv in ity students).

(14 ) . Of the rem ain ing 9 55 ,000 m en aged 1 8 -1 /2 , an estim ated 4 0 ,0 0 0 w ill be r e je c te d (p la ced in c la s s IV -F )by the lo c a l b oa rd s o f the S e lective S erv ice fo r disqualify ing rea son s that a re so obvious that fo rm a l exam ination is not req u ired .

(15) . An estim ated 330, 000 m en w ill be e lig ib le fo r deferm en t as students and w ill not enter the p o o l untila fter f is c a l 1955.

(16) . Of th ese , 55, 000 w ill be found to be p h y s ica lly o r oth erw ise d isqu a lified fo r s e r v ic e (IV -F ) whenreach ed fo r induction ; the rem ain d er (275 ,000 ) w ill eventually see s e r v ic e .

(17 ) . Out o f the rem ain ing 5 85 ,000 m en , an estim ated 155 ,000 (27 p ercen t) w ould be d isq u a lified fo r s e r v ic e(IV -F ) i f rea ch ed fo r induction . Since part o f th rem ain ing 430 ,0 0 0 qu a lified m en (item 9) w ho enter the p o o l during f is c a l 1955 w ill en list vo lu n ta r ily , the r e je c t io n rate e x p er ien ced by the S e lective S erv ice System w ill be substantially h igher than 27 p ercen t b eca u se they w ill have to exam ine a ll o f the 155, 000 r e je c te e s in o rd e r to get the ba lan ce o f the 430, 000.

(18) . Thus, an estim ated 250, 000 out o f the 1, 125, 000 m en who rea ch age 1 8 -1 /2 during f is c a l 1955 w illeventually be found unfit fo r s e r v ic e . (Sum lo s s e s lis ted in item s 14, 16, and 1 7 .) T h is is the r e je c t io n rate fo r the en tire m ale popu lation o f m ilita ry age 22 p e rce n t . It is con s isten t with the r e je c t io n ra tes e x p er ien ced b y the S e le ctiv e S erv ice System (30 to 40 p ercen t) am ong the m en exam ined fo r induction , s im p ly b eca u se this group contains a ll o f the m en w ho do not m eet A rm ed F o r c e s p h y s ica l and m ental standards a fte r 190, 000 m en w ho m eet A rm ed F o r c e s p h y s ica l and m ental standards have rem ov ed th em selves fro m the S e lective S e rv ice p oo l in va r iou s w ays (s e e item s 4 , 5, and 11) and an additional num ber have en listed volu n tarily (item 17).


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APPENDIX B

I. The Selective Service Manpower P ool at the Start of F isca l 1954

The derivation of the base-period pool is sum m arized in table A. Methods and sources of data used in estimating the net yield from each class are outlined below.

I-A Examined and A cceptab le .- -T h is group consists of registrants who had been found acceptable for serv ice at Arm ed F orces examining stations. A 2-percent deduction was made to allow for those who would be able to establish grounds for deferm ent p rior to induction. An additional 5 percent was subtracted for the number who would: not pass final physical inspection at time of delivery for induction.

I-A Not Examined.- -T h e s e are men 18 -1 /2 years of age and over who had not been granted deferm ent or exemption as of July 1, 1953. They had not yet been sent to Arm ed F orces examining stations, but had been partially screened by their loca l boards fo r obvious disqualifying defects which would result in a IV-F c la ss ification. In estimating the yield from this c la ss , allowances w ere made for the number who at a later date would be classified as deferred or exempt because of physical or mental unfitness, hardship, or employment in essential occupations. The estimated numbers of high school and college students in this class also were deducted. These allowances w ere made as follow s:

1. The I-A Not Examined classification as of July 1, 1953, contained an estimated 210,000 men who w ere enrolled in co lleges and universities in the fa ll of that year. This represents the number of male nonveteran fu ll-tim e college students of draft age who could not be accounted for in other Selective Service c la ss ifica tions. The derivation of this estimate is sum m arized in table B.

Data from the Selective Service Systeml s 1 percent sample inventory supports this conclusion in that it shows sm aller numbers of persons in class II-S in ages 19 and 20 than for the im m ediately older age group. Since m ost freshm en enter college during their 18th year of age, it is clear that many 19- and 20-year old students w ere not c lassified as such in A pril 1953. Actually there are many m ore deferred students aged 19 or 20 than in the next higher age groups because of the heavy dropouts from college .


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Xable A.-Yield to the Selective Service Pool by Selective Service Classification* July 1* 1953 1 /(In thousands)

: EstimatedSelective Service published sta tistics : ELS adjustments : net yield

: to pool

Total living registrants .......................................................................... ll**l*l*6Under 18-1/2 years ................................................................................... - Ufa3Over 18-3/2 years .....................................................................................11**013

Total classified registrants . ............................................................... 13*919Under 18-1/2 years .......................... ........................................................ - 81*Over 18-3/2 years ................................................................................ 2 / 13*835

Total living registrants over 18-1/2 years (line 3) ................11**013Total classified over 18-1/2 years (line 7) .............................- 13*835Total unclassified over 18-3/2 years ........................................ / 178 Total unclassified over 13-1/2 years ..................................... 180

Less: Men who have already serv e d ............. ...................... -75High school students (e lig ib le for deferment).. -15College students (e lig ib le for deferment) ......... -15Other deferments ............................................................... - 5

Not eligible for deferment ....................................................... 70Less rejections (IV-F) .................................................. -20

Estimated number available .......................................................... 50

Total classified registrants ........................ .I-A and I-A -0 not examined..........................

Less those under 18-1/2 years (line 6) Over 18-1/2 years ..........................................

. . . 13*919 667...( -8U)

2/ ( 583) I-A and I-A -0 not examined over 18-1/2 .................................Less: Students not elsewhere classified (elig ib le for

deferment) ........................................................................Other deferments .............................................. .................

Not eligible for deferment ......................................................Less rejections (IV-F) ..................................................

Estimated number available ......................................................

580

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