bloch, m zafimanry debt and credit

7/27/2019 Bloch, M Zafimanry Debt and Credit

1/8

ZAFIMANIRY DEBT AND CREDIT'

Maurice BLOCH

On e of the most widely accepted notions in anthropology and sociologyis often traced back to Henry Maine's famous Ancient Law (1861). It isthe contrast between status and contract. Similar dichotomies used toserve different purposes reappear in different forms in the work of suchwriters as T6nnies, Durkheim and Morgan.According to Maine people in primitive societies find their placeaccording to statuses that are ascribed for them as a simple resultof their birth to particular parents. An obvious example of such astatus for Maine is kinship, more particularly membership of descentgroups. By contrast, according to him, in modern society, social tiesare mainly due to contracts, implicit or explicit, entered freely by indi-viduals and regulated by law rather than nature; such contracts areintended to achieve specific purposes. Typical examples of contracts inMaine's sense are membership of associations and commercial contractsinvolving debts and loans.

In this chapter, I want to argue that this universal evolutionaryscenario is no t only wrong bu t is in fact merely a reformulation of aculturally specific theo ry of the West based on the dichotomy betweenthe fixed nature of man and the arbitrary order of society or culture, acontrast which has caused as much difficulty for the theorising of socialscientists as the fi-uicless distinction between nature and nurture hascaused for natural scientists (Strathern 1992a) . The specific and histori-cally determined character of this representation is well illustrated bySchneider (1968) in his discussion of folk representations of American

ur arricle a ere soumi s il y a plusieurs annees ; I'aurew s'esr rourne depuis lors vers unerecherche difference. (NDE)


2/8

236 lA COHERENCE DE S SOClETES

Kinship, where he points ou t how it rests on the f u n d a m e n t ~ l contrast between blood and law. Such thinking insidiously underpms ourthinking even though it has recently been argued by such writers asMarilyn Strathern that this dichotomy is now disappearing, or at leastchanging, in its very heartlands (Strathern 1992b). .

In a slightly different form, this duality reappears in the economiCfield where production is seen as an extension of the nature of man,somerhing that is given and, at a basic level, par t of the necessary huo:ancondition, while exchange and contract are artificial supplements, w h ~ c hare therefore external. Then rhe contrast often takes on an evaluativemoral form, going back to Aristotle an d emphasised in certain Christianformulations, which represent the basis of society as a fixed and absolutemoral order relying on domestic subsistence production, while c?ntractual relationships, especially those involving trade, debt and credit, constitute a dangerous relativist alternative, a potential acid which attacksabsolute natural moral relations (Hirshman 1977)'Although in rhe nineteenrh century such writers as Maine o t h ~ r s ,influenced by liberal economics, sometimes reversed rhe A n s t o t e l ~ a nvalue judgement since they tended to be on the side of contract, w h ~ c hseemed to underpin trade, rather than on the side of autarchy, whiChrhey saw as limiting to progress, they nevertheless did not challenge theexplanatory value of the opposition as such.

In Money and the Morality ofExchange (1989) Jonathan Parry andI argued how misleading such a position was, at least when a?optedseveral non-western cultures, and how it could never be a suItable baSISfor a more general analysis precisely because it implied a culturally highlyspecific representation of the person and indeed of the place of rhe personin time and history (Bloch 1992a). .

In this paper, I am returning to the same point, focusing on the sIg-nificance of debt in a number of Austronesian societies of Sourh-EastAsia and Madagascar. In many of these societies, far from credit beingconsidered as antisocial, it is seen as the very basis of the social and rhemoral. I argue that such an evaluation of debt c ~ e d i t , so d i ~ e r e n tfrom the received Western view, is linked to theIr dIfferent notlon ofthe person, kinship, procreation and of rhe place of people in history.This means, once again, that there cannot be a straightforward, merelytechnical, theory of the significance of debt or credit in general, i r r ~ s ~ e c -tive of a consideration of the specificity of the cultural context. ThIS IS ofcourse a familiar anthropological point, but it is not merely of c a d e m i ~interest as the theme of freeing people from rhe grasp of money lenders

ZAFIMANIRY DEBT AND CREDIT

and rhe 'shackles of credit', an idea much coloured by the ideology justdiscussed, animate s strongly many development organisations and policymakers operating in the third world in the present day.

That d ebt and credit are differently morally evaluated in rhese culturesrhan the way they have traditionally been in the West is highlighted by anumber of ethnographic points amongst which are two common featuresof Sourh-East Asian societies. The first is the significance attribute d torhe often-discussed credit rings of many rural areas, which take in themajority of local people. These, it turns out, are less a matter of organising savings or raising capital, than a way of giving moral expression tothe cohesion of the community; especially amongst women (e.g. Carsten1997= 155-157).

The other is the common situation in, for example, ChristianPhilippine society, where one finds new migrants to an area desperatelyseeking patrons from whom rhey can borrow, not because they need rhemoney, but because this is how rhey can integrate into rhe social relations, which in fact are represented as almost nothing else than webs ofdebts (Gibson 1986).In order to understand the kind of factors rhat are linked to rhis rypeof moral economy, I turn for more detail to an example of a social groupfrom central Madagascar, another part of rhe Austronesian-speakingworld, where the same positive evaluation of credit and debt is found aswould be in the South-East Asian cultures just alluded to.

The ZafimaniryThe Zafimaniry are a small group of approximately 20 ,000 people wholive in rhe eastern forest of Madagascar (Verin 1964, Coulaud 1973,Bloch 1995). They traditionally obtained their subsistence throughslash and burn agriculture, growing principally maize, sweet potatoesand beans, complemente d by forest products such as honey which theysometimes sold to outsiders. Nowadays, as a result of deforestation theyare becoming more dependent on irrigated rice agriculture.

The environment which rhey exploit is highly specific, situated on along, yet narrow step, of rhe eastern escarpment of rhe island. To theirwest, and higher up, live the Betsileo, who rely on irrigated rice agriculturewhich rhey carry ou t in a colder and dryer environment and where treecover is scarce. To rheir east, and at a lower altitude, live orher forestdwelling slash and burn cultivators who traditionally grow dry rice and

237


3/8

238 lA COHERENCE DES SOClETES

sugar cane for rum, twO crops that do not thrive in the colder forest ofthe Zafimaniry. Their type of montane forest is not, however, withoutadvantages in that it contains a number of highly valued hardwoods, eventhough these are now becoming scarcer and scarcer as a result of over-exploitation. These rare woods have been sold by the Zafimaniry to otherMalagasy peoples who, in their turn have sold them abroad, at least sincethe nineteenth century, and they have always sold the skills that comefrom the close association with hardwoods by taking on wage labouras woodcutters, carpenters a nd carvers.The other economic benefit theZafimaniry draw from their geographical position derives from the factthat they are ideally situated for the trading in which they indulge in to avery large extent. This is because they can carry goods from the lower andhotter regions to their east to the markets of he higher and colder centralplateau to their west and vice versa. Such tradeseems very ancient. In thepast it consisted mainly of rice which, because it ripened at different times,could be bought cheaply after harvest on the coast when it was scarce onthe plateau while the reverse operation was possible at other times. Morerecently, the possibility of moving rice by lorry has made this c ommodityless profitable but this has been replaced by the carrying of rum , a tradewhich, because it is illegal, is better suited to forest path than road. Thus,even though the Zafimaniry might appear a remote group of people livingfrom a simple form of agriculture, we should not forget that they are andhave for a very long time been involved in complex commercial networkswhere trade was largely facilitated by the use of different forms of money.

In spite of this, however, the best place to start our understanding ofthe role of debt in their society is to look at a debt that is not principallythought of in monetary terms, the debt owed to previous generations.

The debt to the ancestorsFor the Zafimaniry, life is dominated by an all pervading, even oppressivesense ofdebt to one's dead ancestOrs. This takes twO forms. Firstly, they havepassed on life, skills and land to their descendants. Secondly, through themystical process of blessing, they enable their children to produce, multiplyand fructifY. They are therefore the 'root' or the 'cause'Jototra ofone's wholeexistence. Because of heir goodness one owes an immense debt to them.

Normally, this debt is merely acknowledged by small offerings thatact as token repayments, as occurs before one drinks a bottle of rum andone pours a little ou t for the ancestors either at the foot of the central

ZAFMANIRY DEBT AND CREDIT

post or in the North East corner, which throughout Madagascar is asso-ciated with them. In return for such small gifts, the ancestOrs continuethe normal flow of their blessing, which is essential for life to continue.S?metimes, however, the ancestors make it felt t hat they want more sig-mficant returns. They make these imperious demands by appearing indreams or more often by sending disease or other misfortunes to theirdescendants: these misfortunes act as warnings and reminders of whatwill happen if they were to withdraw their benevolence. Most often thisoccurs when it is acknowledged that the living have committed a grossoffence against the ancestors for which punishment is required, or whenthe continual acknowledgement of debt is no t being observed. Thesemore pressing demands are made especially of those who have succeededwell in life and who therefore owe most.

What the ancestors seek in these demands for more significantacknowledgements of debt is sometimes directly revealed, or merelyinferred. These important, though never total repayments, are occasionswhen all the beneficiaries of blessing should gather and share with theancestors the good things in life, especially those things that money canbuy: meat drink, cloth and rum.

The reason why the ancestorswant such things is linked to an uncom-fortable feeling one has about the ancestors' desires, an uncomfortablefeeling that seems to be found in many parts of Madagascar (Graeber1995, Astuti 1994, Cole 2001) . The problem is that the ancestors whoshould love you are actually sending harm. To accept this is no t easy, atleast in terms of the emotions this realisation arouses. The only motiva-tion one can attribute openly to theancestors is their continual stern, but

l o v ~ n g ~ r e , which for their descendants involves their highly justifiedaction ID reminding the living of the debt they owe them and in theirgentle rebuke for some gross immorality. However, there is also the darker,

rarely formulated suspicion t hat the ancestors are actually acting outof Jealousy towards the living: something that has been subtly describedby the three authors cited above for Madagascar, and long ago, by Fortes(196 I) for the Tallensi. The basis of the suspicion is the obvious fact tha twhat the dead have lost are thesensual pleasures of ife and that thereforethey probably desire these things. Such desires areinappropriate for ances-tors, who should ideally have abandone d earthly cravings; however, it is

s ~ s p e c t e d that their renunciation may not have been complete and so theystill seek sex, food, alcoholic drinks, fine clothes and luxury. This is whatexplains the nature ofwhat is offered to them: fatty meat, rum , money,cloth, sociability and, in so me partsof Ma,dagascar, sex (Astuti 1994).

239


4/8


The feeling of ambiguity among the living concerning the motivation ofthe dead when they send such things as diseases, whether it is greed ormorality, is reflected in the nature of the feasts that are offered to themin answer to the demands they make when they remind their descendants of the debt they incur by their enjoyment of ife. Feasts, lanonana inthe Zafimaniry version of Malagasy, are occasions for large numbers ofpeople to be invited, who will rejoice together through eating, drinking,dancing, singing, etc. The ancestors are invited to participate, to comeback into the midst of the living and there assuage their desires. However,what takes place in such communions between the dead and the livingseems to go well beyond simple enjoyment and indulgence: such feastsare occasions for gross excess in which the ancestors are invited to participate. Eating and drinking at such a feast is so excessive that it willusually make you sick, and, in some cases, quite literally actually kill youas a result of over-indulgence. Feasts are the cause of significant mortality,and the satiety that they should cause is thus well known to be also dangerous. The invitation to participate in such a feast is double-edged forthe living and this seems to me to be so for the ancestors as well. I wouldargue, therefore, that such an occasion is both a matter of repaying theancestors but also of over-feeding them, over-indulging them, so that, inthe words of Shakespeare, through excess 'the appetite may sicken andso die'. Feasts are surreptitiously intended to give the dead indigestion, sothat, for a while at least, they will go away and stop bothering you.

The debt to the ancestors becomes a debt to the eldersIt might well be thought that the de bt th at exists between ancestors andtheir descendants is quite another matter from plain monetary debt. Infact, however, this mystical debt imperceptibly becomes part of a networkof debt that includes the most familiar type of monetary contract.

The promise to hold a feast is made by the elders of he village since theyoung cannot come into direct contact with the dead. Offering a feast to theancestors, in order to repay their blessing or compensate them for offenceswhich have been committed, is, and should be, exorbitantly expensive.As aresult the promise to hold such a feast is just tha t, and it can only be fulfilleda long time into the future, when the difficult and inevitably lengthy processof accumulating the vast amount of money required can be completed.Such a promise, often made at first in secret by the elders to the ancestors,transforms a vague indebtedness into a clear commitment to repay, which,


ifit is delayed too long, will increase, quite literally through the interes t theancestors will demand for having been made to wait, something which theZafimaniry call 'the child of the money'.

One of the reasons why it takes so long for the elders to gather themoney for the feast for the ancestors stems from a simple bu t fundamental fact. The promise to spend all this money is made by the elders,but they themselves have little or no access to cash. This is because for theZafimaniry the main method of obtaining money is by going away andworking as wage labourers as wood cutters in remote parts of the country,something which only young and fit males can do. And even if there areother ways of obtaining cash, such as carrying heavy loads which enablestrading to take place or selling wood fou nd in remote parts of the forest,these other means are also, by and large, only open to young men.

The problem involved by a promise to repay a debt by means of a feastto the ancestors is therefore that it requires the elders to somehow get themoney from the young.

Indeed the fact of entering into a specific debt relationship with theancestors through a promise of a feast is preCisely one of the main waysin which the old can obtain money from the young, since, in asking formoney for that purpose, they are making a request, the refusal of whichwould lead to the interruption of the flow of blessing on which all rely.This is so for two reasons. Firstly, blessing comes from the ancestors,and this is why the money is needed. Secondly, the elders themselves arealso a source of blessing and therefore, through that fact, the young arein debt to them for their very life. This debt is incurred by descendantstowards ascendantS but also, and especially, by sons-in-law towards theirparents-in-law, since parents-in-law are considered as quasi parents whohave been offended by the taking away of their daughter but who have,nonetheless, made possible the production of their sons-in-Iaw's children.The specific debt incurred towards th e ancestors by making a promise tohold a feast becomes the occasion for the elders to cristalize and definethe debt of the young towards them in clear monetary terms.

For, like the ancestors, the elders and parents-in-law have difficulty ensuring sufficient repayment for their benefactions. Indeed, inZafimaniry villages there seems to be continual haggling between theyoung and the old over how much is due to the latter. This is particularlyacute, when the young have obtained money, such as through wagedwork, when lengthy negotiations take place over how much will be givento parents, grandparents and parents-in-law in return for their blessing.Nowhere better can the tension of this relationship be seen than when

241


5/8

242 LA COHERENCE DES SOClETES

the young wage labourers return. The first thing they must do on suchoccasions is to ask their parents to bless them, but after that a tense andfrankly very unpleasant negotiation begins, ofte n lasting one or severalnights (one cannot do this sort of thing in the open) when parents andelders try to wheedle or threaten their children so that they hand overmore cash, and these latter resist as best they can.This sort of situation is problematic enough, but it only occurs whenthe young have actually gone to work for wages. Even more difficult .forthe elders is how to force the young to go in the first place, somethingthey are naturally unwilling to do in the light of the extreme hardshipsuch work entails. The surest way to do this is to inform the young ofthe debt that has been contracted towards the ancestors, which becomestheir de bt towards their elders so that these can hold a feast. This is particularly incumbent on the young if the reason why a feast must be heldis that it has become necessary as a result of the ancestors being offendedby the misbehaviour of these young men who will have to supply themoney. They may have committed incest (which because ?f the natureof the kinship system is a danger in almost any sexual relation) or whendrun k behaved in one of the many sacrilegious ways that anger the ancestors and for which they seek retribution through sending misfortune.Now they must pay. Indeed I have suggested elsewhere (BI.och 1996)that the old actually surreptitiously encourage the young to misbehave sothat they might be punished: so that the community represented byelders becomes indebted to the ancestors; this leads to the young bemgindebted to the elders who are thereby able to pressurise them to leave todo wager-earning work so that they will return with money that will beused for a feast, and other purposes.This is a somewhat machiavellian scenario, but it is well understood byeverybody and so the normally unformulated suspicion is that n e e ~ forthe feasts that will be held, ostensibly so that t he ancestors Will continueto send their blessing and will not send diseases, may indeed be mot ivatedby the greed of the elders for the rich food and drink of the feasts evenperhaps through the jealousy they feel t o w ~ d s the young who dispose ofthe cash and are able for various reasons to mdulge themselves.The ambiguous relationship between the living and the d.ead, :vhichwas discussed above, is thus reproduced between the generatIOns, Just asFortes would have expected. .The debt of the guilty young towards the elders, who, for. then part,have committed themselves to supplying the money for a feast IS, however,


much more specific than the d ebt to the ancestors. The sum will be quitespecific as well as the term and, i f it is not repaid on time, interest will bepaid at a rate upon which everyone agrees, and includes both an elementto counter inflation, which the Zanmaniry understand admirably, and alsoto compensate for the delay.

This monetary debt often leads to a further network of other debts: torelatives from whom the young person will borrow in order to amass thesum owed to the elders, to traders who will be promised goods bought andcarried from other areas and finally to potential employers, often Indianentrepreneurs and exporters of rare wood and their middlemen, who areeager to lend to these young men in order to make sure of future labour.In this way what originated in a ritual or a religious debt, contained withinthe community, becomes totally mixed up with quite secular trading andinvesunen t relationships, governed by national laws, stretching beyondZafimaniry country and even beyond Madagascar, without the two typesbeing clearly distinguishable, especially since all these promissory relationships are governed by a strict and unsentimental economic rationality.

The debt to the ancestors becomes a debtto relatives and neighboursThe continual expansion of the network of debts originally caused by therelationship of the living to the dead actually goes much beyond this andirrigates the whole local c ommun ity and beyond.

This becomes particularly clear when the kind of ancestral feast referredto above actually takes place. The hosts of the feast will have gathered aconsiderable sum of money through the contributions of he young whomthey have caught up in the system of ancestral debt, from their wife-takerswho, as we saw, are in a kind of permanent debt to their wife-givers, fromother relatives who are associated with the main sponsors and who haveprobably made their contribu tion by mobilising a similar set of relationships, from more distant kin from whom they have borrowed, and finallyby obtaining small contributions from all those who attend.

All guests are expected to contribute a small sum towards the generalexpenses; this they give on arrival. This sum will be noted formally in anotebook. These small contributions added up, in the end, amount toquite a considerable sum so that people often find themselves with moremoney after a ritual than before. This fact, however, does not fundamentally alter the general situation between the generations by constituting

243


6/8


a lateral rather than a vertical link since these contributions from guestswill, themselves, have to be repaid when those who have brought themoney hold feasts and then the money will also most probably comeultimately from the young. No t only will the small sums have to berepaid but they will also have to be repaid with interest at a rate that isagain finely calculated by taking into account both the time elapsed andthe rate of inflation. Every household in a Zafima niry village is thereforein debt to every other, probab ly several times over.

ConclusionIn this way, the relationship with the ancestors in all its religious ambiguity leads and follows a complex network of credit and debt which irrigates throughout the whole community and well beyond. Investigatingdebt and credit in a society such as this is an extraordinarily complextask since every social relation is accompanied by a multitude of minicontracts. I want to argue, however, that putting the matter in this wayobscures the situation.

Wh y this is so becomes clearer when we realise that, in spite of theimpression given above, it is possible, if no t common, for the youngto avoid the demands of the elders and the ancestors, it is possible forinvitees no t to come to feasts, it is possible to leave certain people outof the invitation list and thereby keep them out of the network of debtrelations. What happens however in such cases is that kinship and socialrelations are thereby ended. Or to pu t it the other way round, it is notpossible to have a relationship with someone without becoming involvedin ties of monetary debt and credit. It is no t possible to be a descendantof certain ancestors without having to reimburse them. It is no t possibleto be a legitimate parent without being in debt to parents and parentsin-law. It is no t possible to be a neighbour to someone without owingthem cash. On e is either in a social\religious\kinship and monetary debtrelationship or not.

This of course is exactly the opposite to the situation envisaged byMaine. Contract here is no t an alternative to status, it is the very stuff ofstatus. In such a society debt and credit are not part of an economic antisocial or para social, governed by a different rationality to the world ofkinship and family, they are the social. Leach, quoted recently by Testartfor a related argument (Testart 1993: 109ff.) made the same point forthe Kachin. 'When a Kachin is talking of debts he owes or which will


be reimbursed to him he is talking precisely of what an anthropologistmeans by "social strucrure"'(Leach 1954: 170).That it is possible to say such a thing of the Zafimaniry or the Kachin

raises an interesting question. Wh y this difference between societies suchas the Kachin and the Zafimaniry, on the one hand, and European societies, on the other?

The answer lies, it seems to me, in the different concept of the personfound in these two cases. The Zafimaniry, like other Malagasy people andother Sourh-East Asian people, do not think of the body and the personand its social relations as simply determined by birth (Bloch 1992 b).Rather, for them, the body and the person have to be built through life,through negotiations and contacts of which monetary debts are some ofthe most important. In such a case contract creates the person and thebody. It is as a result of whom one interacts with that one is. These arecultures without transcendental subjects for whom interpersonal involvements would be a threat. By contrast the Western, Aristotelian view ofdebt depends on the notion of an essential and unalterable autarcticperson or household who is therefore always potentially compromisedby lasting contacts with others, i.e. through contracts. Such an understanding of the person leads inevitably to evolutionary theories such asthose of Maine or the popular, though misleading, representations ofthose of Mauss (see Parry 1986) where a pristine pre-commercial, precontact state was later corrupted by commerce, credit debt and contract.By contrast, among the Zafimaniry, debt and credit, including mon etarydebt and credit, are the very mechanisms by which one becomes integrated into kinship systems and linked to ancestors, two aspects of lifewhich we normally think of as typical of the non-transactional, the fixed,the interest-free aspects of life in traditional societies.

ReferencesASTUTI, Rita, 1994, 'Invisible Objects: Mortuary Rituals among the Vezo of

Western Madagascar', Res: Anthropology and aesthetics, 25, spring: 111-122.BLOCH, Maurice, 1992a, 'Internal and External Memory: Different Ways ofBeing in History', SuomenAntropologi, 17, I: 3-15.- I992b, 'Zafimaniry Birth and Kinship Theory',SocialAnthropology, I, 2: 119-132.- 1995, 'People into Places: Zafimaniry Concepts of Clarity', in Eric HIRSCH

and Michael O'HANLON (eds.), 1he Anthropology of Landscape, Oxford,Oxford University Press: 63-77.

245


7/8


1996, 'La "consommation" des jeunes hommes chez les Zafimaniry deMadagascar', in Franyoise HERITIER (ed.), De la violence, Paris, Odile Jacob:201-222.

CARSTEN, Janet, 1997, 1he Heart of he Hearth. 1he Process ofKimhip in a MalayFishing Community, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

COLE, Jennifer, 2001, Forget Colonialism. Sacrifice and the Ar t of Memory,Berkeley, University of California Press.

COULAUD, Daniel, 1973, Les Zafimaniry. Un groupe ethnique de Madagascara apoursttite de la foret, Antanarivo, F.B.M.

FORTES, Meyer, 1961, 'Pietas in Ancestor Worship', Journal of the RoyalAnthropologicalInstitute, 91 part 2: 166-191.

GIBSON, Thomas, 1986, Sacrifice and Sharing in the Philippine Highlands,London, Athlone.

GRAEBER, David, 1995, 'Dancing with Corpses Reconsidered: an Interpretarionof"Famadihana" in Ativinimamo', American Ethnologist, 22, 2: 258-278.

HIRSHMAJ.'l, Albert, 1977, 1he Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments forCapitalism before its Triumph, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

LEACH, Edmund, 1954, Political Systems ofHighland Burma. A Study ofKachinSocial Structure, London, The Athlone Press.MAINE, Henry, 1861, Ancient Law, London, John Murray, Albemarle Street.PARRY, Jonathan, 1986, 'The Gift, the Indian Gift and the "Indian Gift''', Man,

21,3 : 453-473PARRY, Jonathan and Maurice BLOCH, 1989, Money and the Morality ofExchange,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.SCHNEIDER, David, 1968 , American Kinship. A Cultural Account, Chicago,

Chicago University Press.STRATHERN, Marilyn, 1992a, 'Parts and Wholes: Refiguring Relationships in a

Post-plural World', in Adam KUPER (ed.), Conceptualizing Society, London,Rourledge (EASA): 75-104.1992b, After Nature, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

TESTART, Alain, 1993, Des dom et des dieux, Paris, Atmand Colin.VERIN, Pierre, 1964, 'Les Zafimaniry et leur an : un groupe continuateur d'une

tradition esthetique malgache meconnue", Revue de Madagascar, 27: 1-16.


8/8

La coherence des societesMelanges en hommage

Cl Daniel de Coppet

sous la direction deAndre ITEANU

Editions de la Maison des sciences de I'homme

2010. Fondation de la Maison des sciences de l'homme. Paris

bloch, m zafimanry debt and credit

Documents