blackmail extortion

7/28/2019 Blackmail Extortion

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Non-disputable Facts:

a) Dianne has a Cognitive Learning Disability believed to be Aspergers a form ofAutism

b)Perry has Perry has never paid Dianne the non-dismissible divorce dissolutionjudgment as tax arrears seized from her earnings amounted to $16k and wasfraudulently kept from addressing.

c)d) She has ADA classified status and accommodations through El Camino Collegee) Perry King has a God-Sister who works a DCSSf) Support and Judgment is non-dismissible by Bradly Amendmentg) Support belongs to the childrenh) Parents cannot are obligated to support their children

The difference between civil/private and criminal/public wrongs is that public

offenses focus on the behavior of the offender while the law of civil wrongs focuses on

making an injured person whole

Specific threats are not required proof of the creation of fear is all that is required

1) The initial email of 9/8/2012 was retaliatory response from the sharing ofinformation addressing the $35K of arrears owed by Perry King to Dianne King.Perry Kings support order is fraudulent and is illegally breaching his fiduciary dutystill owed to his disadvantaged, Americans with Disabilities Act(ADA) qualifiedCognitive Learning Impaired ex-wife.

2) I had not spoken to Perry King My children have nothing to do with the exposure ofhis fraud. His vague but implied threat of using his god-sister who works at theDepartment of Child Services created great fear that he was going to initiate somekind of conspired attack against my children. There are many cases and stories ofrogue DCSS agents who work under qualified immunity for the state and undermany layers of protection where spiteful agents have taken children away and forced

children into the system and through years of legal process and emotional damage. Iwas in great fear as I love my children and do everything in my power to protectthem. except allowing their rights to be abused.

3) I contacted Perry King in a cordial manor requesting that we talk and clarify theinformation forwarded to me. He refused to respond or clarify. In the root case ofthe on-going fraud he threatened that he would never lose to Dianne in court


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because he hired a corrupt lawyer running for judgeship stating she was friends withmost judges in the court. We were told many people the it was not possible andwatched thru 2 lawyers and 3yrs of games as Grainne War defrauded her anyopportunity to collect the Bradley Amendment protected non-dismissible arrearsnow worth +$35K. Financial abuse of a fiduciary abligee is the base of why it isfraud

Two weeks before the establishment of the (under-guideline) support order Perrypressured her to stipulate to $400/mo payments using duress and threats of higher ordersThis too was extortion and in the pattern of abuse promoted in her previous case TheState Guideline support calculation of +$900/mo 9I had a court order for my childrens$430After seeking help with the DCSS, my attorney, the ombudsman in San Diego, andLos Angeles

"It was not necessary for the prosecution to set forth in the indictment the express

manner in which ... damage to property was to be brought about by defendants. It was

held in People v. Sanders, 188 Cal. 744, 749 [207 P. 380], that a distinction is to be drawn

between indictments which directly charge a defendant with a crime and those

indictments which charge extortion through threats. In that case the defendant was

charged with extortion by threatening to accuse the complainant of a crime, and in ruling

that the exact crime threatened need not be set out in the indictment the court said: 'In

the latter class of cases no such technical accusation is required as in the former, for

several obvious reasons, some of which are that the indictment of information cannot go

beyond the terms of the threatened accusations andthe accusations need only be such

as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime.

The [49 Cal. App. 2d 312] more vague and general the terms of the accusation the better

it would subserve the purpose of the accuser in magnifying the fears of his victim, and

the better also it would serve to protect him in the event of the failure to accomplish his

extortion and of a prosecution for his attempted crime.' In People v. Lavine, 115 Cal.App.

289, 292 [1 PaCal. 2d 496], (in which certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the

United States, [52 S. Ct. 500, 76 L.Ed. 1270]), the defendant was charged in the

indictment with the crime of extortion in that he obtained the sum of $75,000 by


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threatening 'to expose certain secrets' concerning four persons named in the indictment.

The indictment was held sufficient." (People v. Peppercorn, , 606 [94 PaCal. 2d 80].)

Schumm v. Berg, 37 Cal. 2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1951). In Schumm, the supreme court ofCalifornia held that the expressed intention of the mother of an illegitimate child toinstitute a paternity proceeding against the putative father if he did not enter into a contractfor the support of the child did not make the contract unenforceable as having beenobtained by a threat to expose the affair and injure the father's reputation. The father, likeJordan, was a wealthy celebrity who would suffer unfavorable publicity if the paternitysuit was brought and the facts of the affair were made public. The Schumm court foundthat the complaint did not allege that the mother would injure his character if he did notenter into the contract. Rather, it alleged that she would commence a suit, a right she

clearly had. "A sufference by him of unfavorable publicity would only be an incidentof the suit." Schumm, 37 Cal. 2d at 185-86, 231 P.2d at 45.

'It is not the abstract meaning of words that constitute an expression [of] a threat, but theirreasonable tendency under the circumstances to place another in fear that the threat-makerwill perform the threatened act. An innocent expression may be threatening because of theominous circumstances in which it is made. Similarly, a statement that is literally adeclaration of intent to do harm to another is not a threat if the context negatives anyreasonable apprehension that the speaker intends what he says he intends.'" People v.Peterson, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1103-04, 715 N.E.2d 1221, 1227-28 (1999), quoting

Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 962 (N.D. Ill. 1968).

several other circuits have concluded that the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes coverfraudulent schemes to deprive victims of their rights to control the disposition of their ownassets. See United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1108 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v.Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283-84 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486,1492 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1990); UnitedStates v. Kerkman, 866 F.2d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d

1002, 1011 n.6 (5th Cir. 1987); cf. United States v. Catalfo, 64 F.3d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir.1995) (concluding that the victim had a property interest in "the right to control its risk ofloss

Although simple nondisclosure generally is not sufficient


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[P]ublic policy prohibits a parent from waiving or limiting, by agreement, a childs

right to support. (Kristine M. v. David P.(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 783, 789 (Kristine M).)


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California law provides that every child has a right to support from both parents.( 3900, 3901.) Both parents are mutually responsible for the support of their children( 4053, subd. (b)) and [a] parents first and principal obligation is to support his orher minor children. (Id., subd. (a).) Child support takes priority over other debts:Payment of child support ordered by the court shall be made by the person owing thesupport payment before payment of any debts owed to creditors. ( 4011.) [P]ublicpolicy prohibits a parent from waiving or limiting, by agreement, a childs right to

support.(Kristine M. v. David P.(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 783, 789 (Kristine M).). . . .

Except by court order for good cause, before or at the time the parties enter into an agreement

for the resolution of property or support issues other than pendente lite support, or, if

the case goes to trial, no later than 45 days before the first assigned trial date, each party, or the

attorney for the party in this matter, shall serve on the other party a final declaration of

disclosure and a current income and expense declaration, executed under penalty of perjury on a

form prescribed by the Judicial Council, unless the parties mutually waive the final declaration of

disclosure.

2105.

(a) The commission of perjury on the final declaration of disclosure by a party may be grounds for

setting aside the judgment, or any part or parts thereof, pursuant to Chapter 10 (commencing

with Section 2120), in addition to any and all other remedies, civil or criminal, that otherwise

are available under law for the commission of perjury.

(b) The final declaration of disclosure shall include all of the following information:

(1) All material facts and information regarding the characterization of all assets and

liabilities.

(2) All material facts and information regarding the valuation of all assets that are contended

to be community property or in which it is contended the community has an interest.

(3) All material facts and information regarding the amounts of all obligations that are

contended to be community obligations or for which it is contended the community has

liability.


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(4) All material facts and information regarding the earnings, accumulations, and expenses of

each party that have been set forth in the income and expense declaration.

(c) In making an order setting aside a judgment for failure to comply with this section, the court

may limit the set aside to those portions of the judgment materially affected by the

nondisclosure.

(d) The parties may stipulate to a mutual waiver of the requirements of subdivision (a) concerning

the final declaration of disclosure, by execution of a waiver under penalty of perjury entered

into in open court or by separate stipulation. The waiver shall include all of the following

representations:

(1) Both parties have complied with Section 2104 and the preliminary declarations of

disclosure have been completed and exchanged.

(2) Both parties have completed and exchanged a current income and expense declaration,

that includes all material facts and information regarding that party's earnings,accumulations, and expenses.

(3) Both parties have fully complied with Section 2102 and have fully augmented the

preliminary declarations of disclosure, including disclosure of all material facts and

information regarding the characterization of all assets and liabilities, the valuation of

all assets that are contended to be community property or in which it is contended the

community has an interest, and the amounts of all obligations that are contended to be

community obligations or for which it is contended the community has liability.

(4) The waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into by each of the

parties.

(5) Each party understands that this waiver does not limit the legal disclosure obligations

of the parties, but rather is a statement under penalty of perjury that those obligations

have been fulfilled. Each party further understands that noncompliance with those

obligations will result in the court setting aside the judgment.

CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH FIDUCIARY DUTIES

The consequences of not complying with the legally-imposed fiduciary dutiescan be severe. If a party to a family law case is found to have violated his/herfiduciary duties, the judge can do any or all of the following:


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blackmail extortion

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