black knights and mass uprisings in authoritarian regimes · authoritarian survival rates. in...
TRANSCRIPT
Black Knights and Mass Uprisings in Authoritarian Regimes
Michael Aagaard Seeberg
Assistant professor, PhD
Department of Political Science and Public Management
University of Southern Denmark
Campusvej 55
5230 Odense M, Denmark
E-mail: [email protected]
Jakob Tolstrup
Assistant professor, PhD
Department of Political Science
Aarhus University
Bartholins Allé 7
8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
E-mail: [email protected]
Note to the reader:
This is very preliminary work, and we welcome all kinds of comments. In the current manuscript,
we make a descriptive analysis, but we are planning to do time series analysis also. We wish to get
a better understanding of what conditions black knight support in time series analysis and also
when black knight support has an effect on regime outcome. We primarily seek to understand
determinants of black knight support in this paper. Also, we are planning to supplement the
descriptive analysis with illustrative cases. We are particular curious to discuss other conditioning
factors of black knight support that we should look into as well. The manuscript has been written
quite recently, and there might be cosmetic errors in the text. Apologizes for that! We look forward
to see you in a week. Michael & Jakob
Please do not cite without author permission
2
Abstract
During the latest decades, works on autocratic survival and failure has proliferated. While for long
only internal determinants of authoritarian stability and breakdown were addressed, scholars now
increasingly pay attention to the international dimension as well. One aspect, in particular, has been
emphasized: the role played by the so-called ‘black knights’ (external actors that bolster autocracies
and/or undermine democratization processes). While these black knight effects have been
thoroughly dealt with in case-studies, no systematic longitudinal large-N analysis of the
phenomenon exists. In this paper, we attempt to rectify this imbalance through a statistical analysis
of black knight support to authoritarian regimes during periods of mass uprisings, making use of a
new dataset on ‘Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes’ (NAVCO 2.0). Initially, we
explain why black knight assistance is likely to matter for autocratic survival in the context of mass
uprisings, and we spell out the relevant factors that induce external actors to provide such
assistance. Second, we map out sender and target characteristics of black knight support across a
period of 50 years (1946-2006).
3
Introduction
Since the late 1990s, works on autocratic survival and failure has proliferated (for an overview, see
Art 2012). A host of factors such as authoritarian regime type (Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell
2007; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010), coercive capacity (Bellin 2004; Way 2005),
institutional factors like elections, parties, and parliaments (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008; Gandhi
2008) and incumbent economic control (Smith 2004; McMann 2006) have shown to be decisive for
authoritarian survival rates.
In addition to disentangling domestic determinants, scholars now also increasingly work on
the external dimension of authoritarian persistence and breakdown. While for long this literature
emphasized only the external factors that weaken authoritarian rule such as economic sanctions
(Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010), Western democracy promotion (Magen, Risse-Kappen, and
McFaul 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010) or diffusion effects (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Ambrosio
2010), scholarly interest for the external factors that strengthen authoritarianism now seem to be on
the rise.
One key aspect in this subfield is the so-called ‘black knights’ – that is, external actors, be
they democratic or authoritarian, great powers or regional powers, states or international
organizations, that act as guardians of autocracy or challengers of democracy in specific contexts. In
particular, scholars have emphasized how authoritarian great powers hinder democratization and
stabilize authoritarianism in their respective neighborhoods (Ambrosio 2009; Tolstrup 2009;
Levitsky and Way 2010; Vanderhill 2013; Tolstrup 2014). But also, democratic external actors may
behave as black knights, evident from, for example, US support to military dictatorships in Latin
America in the 1960s and 1970s (Muller 1985) or its long-time support for autocratic Egypt
(Brownlee 2012). While these black knight effects have been thoroughly dealt with in case-studies,
no systematic longitudinal large N-analysis of the phenomenon currently exists.
4
In this paper, we zoom in on one particular aspect of black knight support – the assistance
provided to authoritarian governments whose internal stability is threatened by violent or non-
violent mass uprisings.1 Making use of privileged access to a new dataset on ‘Nonviolent and
Violent Campaigns and Outcomes’ (NAVCO 2.0), we map out the senders and targets of black
knight support across a period of 50 years (1946-2006) in an attempt to broaden our understanding
of who the black knights are, which types of regimes they tend to support, and why they act the way
they do.
The paper proceeds as follows: first, the literature on black knights is briefly reviewed.
Second, we tease out four mechanisms through which black knights can bolster authoritarian
regimes threatened by mass uprisings (strengthening the coercive apparatus of the incumbent,
deterring defection, dampening popular discontent and deterring further mobilization, and
counterbalancing pressure from other external actors), and we highlight four types of conditional
factors that are thought to induce external actors to provide assistance to dictators in need (regime
type congruence, geographical proximity, density of linkages and the perceived geopolitical and
economic value of the incumbent regime, and contextual factors). Finally, we dig into the empirical
data, mapping the frequency of black knight assistance and the dominant characteristics of both the
external actors providing it and the states receiving it.
What do we really know about black knights?
Since the late 1990s, research on authoritarianism has proliferated. Scholarly works have spawned
from conceptual considerations of differences between various regime types (Geddes 1999;
Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) and theoretical contributions on
the dynamics of autocracies in general (Wintrobe 1998; Haber 2006; Gerschewski 2013) to
1 We use uprising, demonstration, mobilization and campaign interchangeably.
5
thorough case-studies of particular regimes (see, e.g., Magaloni 2006; Sassoon 2012) and large-N
studies of factors contributing to autocratic stability and breakdown (examples include Smith 2004;
Ulfelder 2005; Gandhi 2008; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Powell 2012).
In addition to the above-mentioned publications that primarily focus on internal determinants
of autocratic persistence and collapse, focus on the international dimension of authoritarianism has
lately also come under scrutiny. Studies have investigated the effects of economic aid (Wright
2009), sanctions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010), democracy promotion (Adesnik and McFaul
2006; Seligson and Finkel 2009; Magen, Risse-Kappen, and McFaul 2009; Levitsky and Way
2010), and diffusion (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Ambrosio 2010).
However, external factors need not only play into the hands of those challenging the autocrat
in power. In fact, some of the impulses coming from the outside may help authoritarian regimes
stabilize and strengthen power on the longer term or bolster their capacity to defend themselves
during times of crisis. This is exactly what the literature on the so-called negative external actors or
black knights emphasizes. We understand black knights as external actors, be they democratic or
authoritarian, great powers or regional powers, states or international organizations, that act as
guardians of autocracy or challengers of democracy in specific contexts. Acting as a black knight is
not something that is intrinsic to particular international actors, but must rather be understood as a
specific role that any actor might resort to towards a particular target state at a particular point in
time (cf., Tolstrup 2009).
In the literature on black knights, scholars have mainly focused on the support of authoritarian
great powers like Russia (Ambrosio 2009; Tolstrup 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010; Vanderhill
2013; Tolstrup 2014) and China (Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner 2010; Bader 2013) in their
respective neighborhoods. But also autocracies like Venezuela (Vanderhill 2013) and South Africa
during Apartheid (Onslow 2009) as well as international organizations like the Shanghai
6
Cooperation Organization (Ambrosio 2008) and ASEAN (Diamond 2008, 151–152) have been
brought forward as examples of black knights. In addition to authoritarian regimes and international
organizations dominated by such states, democratic external actors also behave as black knights,
evident from, for example, US support to military dictatorships in Latin America in the 1960s and
1970s (Muller 1985) or its long-time support for autocratic Egypt (Brownlee 2012), and from
French support to former colonies like Cameroon and Gabon (Levitsky and Way 2010, 258–265).
Thus, so far black knight effects have been thoroughly dealt with in case-studies, but apart from
works on sanctions-busters (Early 2011),2 no systematic longitudinal large N-analysis of the
phenomenon currently exists.
Hence, our knowledge of black knights and their effects on authoritarian regimes seems to be
very much a product of a specific time-period, the post-Cold War period, and a few dominant cases.
But if we are to better understand who the black knights are, why black knight support materializes,
and not least how it affects regime developments in autocracies we need to broaden the perspective
considerably. In this paper we do just this. Making use of privileged access to a new dataset on
‘Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes’ (NAVCO 2.0) that covers a period of 50 years
(1946-2006), we can, capture one important aspect of black knight support: the political assistance
provided to authoritarian rulers challenged by violent and non-violent mass uprisings. Albeit based
on a crude measure, this data allows us to do two things. First, we can map out the senders and
targets of black knight support in both the pre- and the post-Cold War period. This provides us with
a first overview of the dominant black knights throughout the past 50 years, and it help us establish
a ‘candidate’ dataset to which additional information and cases can be added. Second, it allows us
to take the first step to investigate the factors that induce and constrain external actors to engage in
black knight activities.
2 Originally, the term black knight was coined to describe foreign patrons that undermine the effectiveness of sanctions
by undergirding the target state (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 12).
7
How can black knight support make a difference?
Mass anti-regime uprisings constitute a significant challenge to authoritarian stability – a challenge
that incumbents must necessarily respond to. However, authoritarian regimes are not equally
successful in doing so. Sometimes rulers are strong enough to quell demonstrations with violence,
sometimes conflict is dampened through cooptation means, and at times all efforts to withstand
opposition simply fail and rulers are subsequently forced from power. A number of factors such as
regime type and resource dependency (Ulfelder 2005), the loyalty of the coercive apparatus (Bellin
2012), the size and the approach of protestors (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) and the degree to
which the regime controls regional and local authorities (Lorentzen 2013) account for such
differences.
In the following we explain how one additional determinant, black knight assistance, may
work to strengthen authoritarian incumbents vis-à-vis their internal challengers. It is argued that in
case of massive popular upheavals, black knights can improve the odds of authoritarian survival in
four ways: it can strengthen the coercive apparatus of the incumbent, help deter state and military
defection, help dampen popular discontent and deter further mobilization, and not least
counterbalance the effect of political and economic sanctions from other external actors.
First, black knights can strengthen the coercive capacity of the regime facing popular
upheavals. The most obvious way is through the provision of outright military assistance, be it in
the form of deployment of troops and military specialists or through the provision of weapons and
surveillance technologies. Both foreign troop deployment (Peksen 2012) and arms-import (Blanton
1999) have been documented to increase state repression levels. Thus, it seems fair to assume that
governments receiving military assistance from abroad are better equipped to face the challenge of
8
popular upheavals, allowing for more determined and effective responses in the form of violent
crackdowns.
Second, a more indirect approach is to help the incumbent minimize the risk of disloyalty
spreading among the elites and the rank and file of both the coercive and the state apparatus. When
mass uprisings erupt, political elites may be tempted to defect to the opposition (Reuter and Gandhi
2011), military elites to reestablish order through a coup d’état (Powell 2012), and the rank and file
in the military or the police may refuse to follow orders (Bellin 2012). Black knights can reduce
such risks in two ways: they can provide additional financial resources to the regime, allowing it to
buy off elite supporters and raise salaries to police officers and soldiers; and through political,
economic and perhaps military support the external actor can signal that it stands shoulder to
shoulder with the incumbent regime, reducing the fear among regime supporters that the incumbent
will not be able to withstand pressure.
Third, black knights can help dampen popular discontent. Just like state and military elites
and rank and file personnel can be bought off, popular frustration can be dampened if social
spending is boosted. Even though this may not quell discontent with flawed elections, economic
mismanagement, or other triggering events, it does help to reduce socio-economic grievances,
which in itself is often a strong impetus for protesters (Goldstone 2001). In addition, black knights
can reduce the risk that more people join the rebellion through the aforementioned bolstering of the
security apparatus and by reproducing the regime’s framing of events; discrediting the unruly
demonstrators and supporting the firm hand that effectively disperses the crowds. By raising the
costs associated with anti-regime activities and by helping the regime shape popular perception of
events, the risk that more people join protesters is reduced.
Finally, black knights can counterbalance mounting pressure from other external actors. During
mass uprisings, Western nations and organizations often increase the pressure on the incumbent
9
regime, demanding democratic concessions or that its leaders relinquish power. Black knights can
counterbalance external criticism, dismissing it as non-objective and illegitimate interferences in
domestic affairs, potentially cancelling out, or at least taking some of the bite off condemnations
(see, e.g., Fawn 2006). In case Western powers, or any other external actors for that matter,
introduce sanctions or withhold benefits, a black knight can criticize (and perhaps even veto) the
decision and reduce the economic and political costs by offering financial compensation or by
increasing political cooperation to re-boost regime legitimacy (Early 2011).
Summing up, black knights can indeed protect authoritarian regimes against the challenge of
popular upheavals via several channels. But the presence of black knight support does not
necessarily mean that the incumbent regime will be successful in thwarting or dampening
opposition. Just like Western attempts to promote democracy may have unintended consequences or
simply not be strong enough to spur change, so is black knight assistance not a guarantee of regime
survival. Sometimes interference further triggers anger and defiance amongst the people and elites,
making them turn against, not support, the incumbent regime. At other times, intervention does
work according to intentions but is simply crowded out by more powerful domestic or international
drivers of change. But the probabilistic claim still stands: Authoritarian regimes that enjoy strong
black knight backing are better equipped for facing the challenge to stability that arise when people
take up arms or peacefully take to the streets in the hope of removing the dictator.
When is black knight support most likely?
Not all authoritarian regimes facing mass uprisings are privileged with black knight bolstering, and
not all autocrats that are granted external protection will receive the same degree of support. So the
next question is: What determines such differences? What spurs external actors to take on the role
of black knights and come to the rescue of authoritarian regimes in their time of need?
10
The obvious answer is that external actors only offer black knight support to authoritarian
regimes if there is something to gain from it, and if the costs associated with doing so are not too
high. Below we argue that four types of factors in particular shape the cost-benefit analysis of
external actors: regime type congruence, geographical proximity, density of linkages and the
perceived geopolitical and economic value of the incumbent regime, and not least contextual
factors.
As a first and indeed very crude rule, we can expect external actors to want other states to be
mirror images (Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner 2010).3 Ceteris paribus, democracies hold
preferences for democracies, while authoritarian regimes favor authoritarianism. Hence, in
comparison to their democratic counterparts autocratic external actors will simply have greater
incentives to take on the role of black knight and protect other non-democratic regimes.
That said, recent research has shown that authoritarian regimes differ as much between them as
they differ from democracies (Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland 2010). In fact, similar types of authoritarian regimes less frequently fight wars with each
other (Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Weeks 2012) and like-minded regimes more often
grant each other political, economic and military support (Colombo 2012). Hence, we expect that
the higher the congruence between the regime type of the external actor and that of the authoritarian
regime threatened by mass uprisings, the more likely it is that black knight support is offered.
Relatedly, calculations of costs and benefits associated with black knight intervention are likely
to be shaped by geographical factors. As Huntington (1991) originally suggested and as the Arab
Spring confirms, authoritarian breakdowns often spread from one country to another like a wave.
External actors can, rightfully or not, be led to think that the outcome (regime persistence,
3 The argument is that democracies and autocracies work differently. While democracies are committed to generating
public goods in order to win votes, autocracies focus, predominantly, on maximizing private goods, i.e., rents used for
personal enrichment and cooptation-strategies. Given these basic systemic differences cross-cutting cooperation is
simply more difficult than cooperation between more similar regimes. We should therefore expect that regimes
following similar incentive structures, all else equal, will be able to cooperate more smoothly.
11
breakdown or perhaps contracted conflict) of popular upsurge in one authoritarian regime will
affect developments in other countries as well, and for this reason they will be more inclined to
intervene and help the challenged ruler quell the rebellion before it inspires and enflames discontent
elsewhere. Fear of negative spill-over effects will obviously be largest in countries that share
borders with or belong to the same region as the affected autocracy. Consequently, we expect black
knight support to be conditional on geographical proximity. The closer, the external actor is to the
instability unfolding in the challenged authoritarian regime, the more prone it is to intervene and
offer its assistance.
Third, black knight assistance is likely to be conditioned by the density of existing linkages
between the external actor and the challenged authoritarian regime as well as the current state of
bilateral relations between them. According to the leverage-linkage theory, proposed by Levitsky
and Way (Levitsky and Way 2005; 2010), Western external actors are not only more effective but
also more interested in promoting democracy in countries with which a dense set of economic,
political and social links exists. Likewise, we can expect linkages to matter for the propensity of
external actors to offer black knight assistance (Tolstrup 2013; Tolstrup 2014). If sender and target
are highly economic interdependent, share cultural and historical bonds, and have well-developed
political and geostrategic relations we should expect external actors to be more willing to grant
black knight assistance.
Basically, this is about how the external actor perceives the value of the incumbent regime. In
authoritarian regimes, ruling elites often act as powerful veto-players when it comes to deciding
whether bilateral connections with external actors should be extended or constrained. An incumbent
that shows geopolitical abidance and willingly grants privileged access to domestic resources and
markets is of course perceived by the external actor to be of greater value than one that does not
offer such benefits. Consequently, we should expect black knights, be it democracies or
12
authoritarian regimes, to be more likely to offer assistance to incumbents that behave acquiescently
in geopolitical and economic questions.
Finally, we argue that the likelihood of black knight intervention is shaped by contextual factors
such as time period, characteristics of the popular upsurge, and questions of legitimacy related to
international bandwagon effects. As to the time period, we concur with Charles Boix’ (2011)
argument that the structure of the international context affect the propensity of great powers to
intervene in other states to protect either democracy and autocracy from breaking down. In periods
with intense great power rivalry, he argues, democratic great powers will be less inclined to protect
democracies and less troubled by defending authoritarianism if it serves the primary purpose of
balancing other great powers. Consequently, we expect black knight assistance, in particular among
the democratic external actors, to be more widespread during the Cold War period, when bipolarity
and geopolitical competition dominated the foreign policy agenda of most nations, than during the
post-Cold War period of liberal hegemony (Levitsky and Way 2002).
In addition to the broader international context, particular factors concerning the character of the
mass mobilization and the reaction of other states to it is likely to shape the propensity of external
actors to take on the role of black knights. Intervening on behalf of authoritarian incumbents can be
considered a costly endeavor, in particular in terms of international prestige. Just like dictators may
find it difficult to justify why they need to repress their own population, black knights will face the
same problem in relation to explaining their motives to the international community and at home.
However, two factors might diminish such concerns. First, if protesters resort to violence, crack-
down from the side of the government, and also support of such actions from black knights, will
simply be perceived as more legitimate than if protesters peacefully show their discontent with the
current regime (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Likewise, legitimacy costs are likely to be lower if
other external actors also support the authoritarian incumbent, in particular so if international
13
organizations that represent several states are among the supporters (for a similar argument related
to economic sanctions, see Bapat and Clifton Morgan 2009; Bapat et al. 2013).
Recapitulating, an external actor is more likely to engage in black knight support if the regime
affected by popular upsurge is of a similar regime type, is located in the same region, has dense and
beneficial ties with the leadership in power, if the popular upsurge is violent, unfolds during the
Cold War, and not least if other external actors in general, and international organizations in
particular, also support the incumbent authoritarian regime. The more favorable conditional factors
present, the more likely external actors are to offer black knight support, and the more likely
authoritarian incumbents will be able to quell or dampen popular upsurges.
Methods and Data
The main aim of this paper is to transgress the boundaries inherent in case study research and
provide an overview of global incidents of black knights’ interventions across a longer time-period.
The newly released ‘Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes’ (NAVCO 2.0) dataset
(Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) provides such an opportunity. In the following, we describe this
dataset and the main variables examined in the subsequent analysis.
The NAVCO dataset provides detailed and nuanced data on violent and non-violent mass
uprisings (so-called ‘campaigns’) across a period of fifty years (1945-2006). It includes numbers
related to 250 mass demonstrations, which is considered to be the full population of known cases in
this time period. The data includes a total of 1741 country years with mass demonstrations
throughout the period. 150 of these mass demonstrations were violent. In addition to the
violent/non-violent distinction, the data includes dense structured information on the mass
demonstration, such as the composition of the demonstration, the coherence of the group of
demonstrators, the size and diversity of the group, and not least regime responses.
14
But how then are the events defined? When is a demonstration ‘massive’? And how are violent
mass demonstrations distinguished from non-violent ones? To count as an incidence of mass
uprisings at least 1000 citizens contentiously and in a coordinated manner must take it to the streets.
This means that it must be more than ‘just’ spontaneous bursts with no coordination. Mass
demonstrations are coded non-violent if the participating civilians are unarmed and do not directly
threat or physically harm the well-being of the opponent (variable ‘prim_method’). Examples are
strikes, boycotts protests and sit-ins. A violent mass demonstration is defined as violent if it is
armed resistance and civilian or guerrilla challengers deliberately and regularly relies on violent
means, which includes the use of force to physically threaten, harm, and kill the opponent
(Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013: 415-419).
However, not all mass demonstrations included in the NAVCO dataset serves our purpose, as
we are only interested in the kind of mass demonstrations that truly constitute a threat to the
incumbent authoritarian regime (variable ‘camp_goals’). Thus, we include only the mass
demonstrations, in which demonstrators demands ‘regime change’, ‘significant institutional
reform‘, ‘territorial secession’, or ’greater autonomy’. Thus we exclude mass demonstrations calling
for ‘policy change’ (this could be environmental protection, corporate responsibility or labor rights),
because they do not intend to alter the fundamental rules of the regime. Moreover, we do not focus
on mass demonstrations pursuing anti-occupation campaign goals because the threat is towards an
external source and not the dictator. We do touch on campaign ‘success’ and whether black knight
support actually makes a difference in general. The campaign is considered to be successful if it
reaches its goals within one year after its peak of activities. However, in this analysis we do not
disentangle what factors related to black knight support is most important for unsuccessful mass
demonstrations, but only the factors conditioning when a black knight tends to support.
15
Finally, as we exclusively look at black knight support to authoritarian incumbents, we have
excluded all the mass demonstrations that take place in democracies. We rely on the often used
democracy-dictatorship measure constructed by Alvarez et al. (1996) and updated by Cheibub et al.
(2010). We use this measure because it covers the entire period and is constructed as a dichotomous
measure and not out of a re-coding of a continuous measure. It makes for a conservative scoring of
democracies, as it only counts a case as democratic if there has been a successful alternation in
power.4
We have extended the overall regime type coding provided by Cheibub et al. (2010) not to lose
cases of black knight support where the numbers can be added intuitively. A number of regimes
were threatened by mass demonstrations during times, where the regime was officially assigned to
an empire. These regimes did not have full self-governance, and do not qualify for the criteria set by
Cheibub et al. (2009). However, we have assigned an authoritarian regime score during the years
under the rule of an empire.5
To measure black knight involvement we rely on the variable ‘regime support’.6 This raw data
codes ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ external supporters. In a few instances of mass
demonstrations, two or more states are listed together as primary, secondary or tertiary supporters.7
The coding of regime support has primarily focuses on major and regional powers, thus, taking note
of the three most important state supporters. A regime supporter is coded if other regime have
4 This, on the other side, means that it might score a case authoritarian even that it has free and fair elections, but has
seen no alternations (such as Botswana). 5 This goes for the following cases (period in brackets): Belarus (1988-1990), Cyprus (1954-1959), Estonia (1987-
1988), Georgia (1989-1990), Ghana (1949-50), Guinea-Bissau (1971-1972), Kyrgyzstan (1990), Latvia (1989-1990),
Lithuania (1989-1990), Malawi (1958), Nigeria (1945-1950), Oman, 1964-1966, 1969), Palestinian Territories (1945-
1946, 1973-1974, 1976-1986, 1993-1994, 1996-1998, 2006), Russia (1991), Rwanda 1960-1961), Serbia (1996-2000),
Slovakia (1989-1992, Slovenia (1990), Tunisia (1952-1954), Uganda (2009-2011), Vietnam (1958-1975), Yugoslavia
(1989-1990, 1993-1999). 6 We thank Chenoweth and Lewis for giving us access to the country specific data on the regime support dimension.
7 As a rule of thumb we have assigned the support status to the most populous country among the supporters and
dismissed the others. This goes for the following mass demonstrations: In the mass demonstration in El Salvador in
1981, Venezuela was coded secondary supporter and Costa Rica dismissed; Nicaragua in 1980 (United Nations coded
tertiary supporter and The US and Panama dismissed); Nicaragua in 1980 (United Nations coded tertiary supporter and
The US and Panama dismissed). El Salvador in 1981 (Guatemala coded tertiary supporter and Honduras dismissed).
Somalia in 1993-1994 (France coded tertiary supporter and ‘other’ UN affiliated countries dismissed).
16
“voiced their confidence in the target regime, defended it from criticism abroad, vetoed or opposed
resolutions in the UN Security Council” (Chenoweth and Lewis, codebook). This makes for a
conservative test of the propositions stated above. This weak form of support – mostly legitimating
(or morally supporting) the target regime – is a least likely case for our argument. If moral support
is sufficient for the target regime to weather the storm of a mass demonstration, then we would, all
else equal, expect more comprehensive forms of support, such as economic or military support, to
also have an effect when it occurs. We do probably not capture all forms and incidences of support.
Thus, if we find patterns in regime support, we should expect it to be more outspoken if we could
capture all kinds and incidences of external support. But question is if the assigned support is only
moral? In practice the support could as well be combined with military, economic and further
political help. But, it is as a minimum moral support. This questions if the least likely logic holds in
all cases. With these qualifications of mass demonstrations, we end up with a total of 891 country
years with mass demonstrations throughout the period.
Other than that, we have added information to the existing data to shed light on the four factors,
which we expect to shape the cost-benefit analysis of external actors support to target regimes:
regime type congruence, geographical proximity, density of linkages and the perceived geopolitical
and economic value of the incumbent regime, and finally contextual factors.
Regime type congruence is first and foremost a question of similar regime type. Are the target
regime and the black knight both autocracies? As explained above we here rely on Cheibub et al.
(2010). We also look at congruence in subtypes of authoritarian regimes. That is, we disentangle
different types of authoritarian regimes using the coding constructed by Geddes et al. (2012). In line
with Geddes, we distinguish between party-dictatorship, military-dictatorships, monarchy-
dictatorships or personal dictatorships. There is a number of subtype coding’s available, but we use
Geddes et al., because it is concerned we types of authoritarian rules and not types of authoritarian
17
elections or other characteristics. Geddes et al.’s types are markedly different, and if regime
subtypes congruence matter, we expect these types to be most important to distinguish between.
Moreover, the coding is extensive covering the entire period from 1946-2006.
Geographical proximity between the target state and Black Knight is measured by two factors,
neighborliness and regions. To measure neighborliness of two states, we use numbers from the
Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data (v. 3.1) provided by Stinnett et al. (2002 + Correlates of
War Project. “Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006). We define neighborliness as two states separated
by a land or river border. The distinction between regions follows Teorell (2010).
The density of linkages and the perceived geopolitical and economic value of the incumbent
regime are measured by four proxies: colonial legacy based on Teorell (2010), alliance partnership
from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance data set (v. 4.1) (Gibler 2009; see also Singer and
Small (1966); Small and Singer (1969)),8 oil reserves and economic wealth of the target regime
(Finally, we use Ross’ data on oil revenue and a country’s GDP as crude measures of economic
interdependence between the sender and target regime [THIS PART IS PENDING AND NOT YET
IN THE ANALYSIS]).
We focus on two contextual factors. To capture variation in the international context we create
a dummy variable, coded 0 if a mass demonstration occurs during the Cold War era (1946-1988)
and 1 if it occurs during the post-Cold War era (1989-2006). We also investigate a spatial
geographic character of the international context, namely whether the black knight is a major/great
power in the world system. We use the Correlates of War State System Membership List (v2008.1.)
8 The Formal Alliance data set distinguished between four types of alliances; Defense of one or more states in the
alliance; neutrality toward one or more states in the alliance; promise of non-aggression; and understanding that the
state would consult with one or more states in the alliance if a crisis occurred. We collapse the four categories into a
dummy measuring whether sender and target have some form of a formal alliance or not.
18
to make this distinction on international status of the Black Knight (reference: Correlates of War
Project. “State System Membership List, v2008.1,” 2008).9
Mapping Black Knight Interferences 1946-2006
So what do the analysis of the data on mass demonstrations in authoritarian regimes show? The
descriptive statistics first and foremost shows, that black knight support matters. Out of 794
reported country years,10
722 mass uprisings were unsuccessful in the sense that the incumbent
authoritarian regime weathered the storm and remained in power (see table 1). Out of the 722
unsuccessful cases, there were 379 unsuccessful mass campaigns where the target regime had
external support. Thus, in a little more than half of the cases where the target stood the pressure
from the masses (52.49 %), it was supported by a black knight. Only 26 target regimes fell, even
that they had at least one external supporter (6.4 %).
Table 1. Number of times target regime weathered the storm of a mass uprising by presence or
absence of external support
Regime support
No support External support Total
Success of mass
uprising
unsuccessfull 343 379 722
88,2 93,6 90,93
successfull 46 26 72
11,8 6,4 9,07
Total 389 405 794
100 100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italic.
9 The following countries are listed as major powers from 1946-2006: USA, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union
(until 1990), Russia (since 1991), China and Germany (since 1991) and Japan (since 1991). 10
Unfortunately, not the entire set of country years (891 in total) are evaluated with regards to the success of the
campaign.
19
Mass uprisings, violence and international context
This overall finding motivates our primary inquiry. Given that black knight support seems to
matter, when is it most likely to occur? We will start by painting the general picture, and then dig
into particularly interesting black knights and try to disentangle what might induce them to take on
this role and provide assistance to dictators in need. The analysis is structured by the four types of
factors hypothesized to shape the likelihood of black knight support: regime type congruence,
geographical proximity, and density of linkages and the perceived geopolitical and economic value
of the incumbent regime. We relate these three factors to the contextual factors (pre-/post-Cold War
and violent/non-violent campaign) throughout the analysis.
As expected, the contextual factors weigh heavy on the calculations of external actors. The
most dominant form of campaigns directed against authoritarian regimes is violent ones. Out of a
total of 891 autocratic country years with mass uprisings 700 (or 79.2 %) were primarily violent.
Likewise, in almost half (47.1 %) of all campaigns was the incumbent regime supported by at least
one state or international organization, and such support was by far most frequent if the campaign
was violent (85 %). 3 out of 5 mass uprisings happened during the Cold war era (1946-1988) – and
the subsequent 2/5 evolved during the post-Cold War era (1989-2006). As hypothesized, external
support was most likely in the former period (64 % of the regimes under pressure by the masses
during the Cold War had external support and 35.95 % had support during the post-Cold War era)
and by far most frequent, if the campaign was violent (87.7 % of the support in the Cold War was
related to violent campaigns and 80.8 % in the post-Cold War era) (see table 2).
20
Table 2. Number of mass uprisings by time period and primary method of the campaign.
Time period
Cold War Cold War Total
Primary method
of campaign
Primary method
of campaign
Violent
Nonviolent
236 122 358
87,7 80,8 85,2
Total
Violent
33 29 62
12,3 19,2 14,8
Nonviolent 269 151 420
100 100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italic.
It is perhaps not so surprising that the Cold War saw most mass uprisings given that it spans
over a longer time period than the post-Cold War era. However, looking into the average number of
conflicts per year, we can check to see if this pattern is more manifest. During the Cold War, the
average number of campaigns per year is close to 12. During the post-Cold War era the number is
13.2 conflicts per year. Thus, the Cold War period saw more mass uprisings in autocracies only in
absolute numbers. As to the frequency of mass uprisings across the two periods, the 1970’s, 1980s
and the 1990s stand out as particularly active decades with on average 17.4, 23.3, and 25 mass
mobilizations per years.11
These decades are also by far the most violent, with on average 15.5,
18.3, 17.7 violent uprisings respectively per decade.12
Thus, it seems that the ‘Third Wave’
(Huntington 1991) that radically expanded the number of democracies across the globe was also a
period in which protesters were also more likely to take up arms to challenge incumbent dictators.
11
In comparison, the 2000s has been remarkable silent with 8 mass mobilizations a year on average. The 1950s saw 4
mass mobilizations per year on average, and the 1960s 10. 12
In contrast, the 1950s saw 2.6 violent uprisings per year on average, the 1960s slightly more – 9.3 on average – and
finally the 2000s had 6.3 violent campaigns on average per year.
21
Table 3. Average number of mass mobilizations by regime support and primary method of the
campaign
No support External support
Decade
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising
Total average
of uprisings
1950s 1,6 1,5 1,6 1,3 4
1960s 4,8 1 4,5 1 9,9
1970s 7,2 1,8 8,3 1,3 17,4
1980s 8,4 2,6 9,9 2,7 23,3
1990s 9,8 6,2 7,9 1,6 25
2000s 3,8 1,3 3,3 2 8
Pinning down the black knights
Now, let us take a closer look at who the black knights actually are. We begin with the international
organizations that throughout the fifty years analyzed have provided assistance to authoritarian
regimes challenged by mass uprisings. Surprisingly, international organizations supported
incumbent regimes in only 3.8 % of all 891 country years with mass uprisings. In by far most cases,
support was granted only if nation states also provided assistance (only 4 times did international
organizations support a target regime alone), if the campaign was violent (80 %), and if it took
place during the Cold War (76.4 %).
Zooming in on the particular international organizations, we see that Western-based
organizations are no less likely black knight supporters than other kind of organizations; in fact, on
the contrary, they are the ones most often providing assistance to dictators in need (see table 4).
Surprisingly, the European Union is the most frequent supporter. It sought to bolster an
authoritarian regime fifteen times, followed by ASEAN (ten times), and NATO (five times).13
Only
two times did the United Nations or the Arab League involve themselves in a conflict of mass
13
In addition, ISAF supported dictators twice.
22
demonstration by supporting the target regime. The EU defended an authoritarian regime under
pressure from violent campaigns seven times in the Cold War era and two in the post-Cold War era.
NATO, the Arab league, UN, and ASEAN only supported autocracies threatened by violent
campaigns and – with the exception of the UN – only during the post-Cold War era. Thus, the
picture of the EU as the perpetual white knight in international politics perhaps needs to be
reconsidered (cf., Tolstrup 2014).
Table 4. Number of times international organization supported target regime, by regime support and
primary method of the campaign.
Cold War post-Cold War
International
organization
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising Total
no support 439 79 239 100 857
EU 7 2 6 15
NATO 5 5
Arab League 2 2
UN 1 1 2
ASEAN 10 10
Turning to the black knight assistance of nation states, we see, contrary to our expectations, that the
most frequent form of support was by a single state – see table 5 (single states account for 19.5 % of
all support to authoritarian regimes under pressure, 12 % received help from two states, and in
another 11.8 % of the cases of black knight support cases three states or more were involved).
However, taking the other contextual factors into account, a pattern more in line with our
hypotheses emerge. Black knight assistance from sole actors is most frequent if mass uprisings were
violent (74 %) or took place during the Cold War (76.4 %). Assistance from sole actors has thus
seen a step drop in numbers from the former to the latter period. Whereas two state support has
23
dropped from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era (from 82 cases to 25 cases), the opposite
seems to characterize support from three states or more. This has gone up from 46 cases in the Cold
War era to 59 cases in the post-Cold War era. Three state support in fact is the most likely form in
the Post-Cold War era vis-à-vis single state or two state support.
Table 5. Number of times one, two or three states supported target regime, by regime support and
primary method of the campaign.
Cold War post-Cold War
International
organization
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising Total
One state 102 31 27 14 174
Two states 82 0 23 2 107
Three states 44 2 52 7 105
Combining the two contextual factors, 58.6 % of all instances of single state support were during
the Cold War related to violent campaigns. In contrast, 50 % of all support from three states was
during the post-Cold War era and related to violent campaigns. Thus, state support is by far most
likely, if the target regime is under pressure from a violent campaign, but the tendency to support
alongside other states is slightly more likely in the post-Cold War period, at least by three or more
states.
But who then are the nation states that have acted as black knights? Taken together, we
have a total of 748 instances of black knight state support, whether that is primary, secondary or
tertiary. The United States stand out as by far the most frequent supporter of authoritarian regimes
under pressure from mass uprisings – see table 6. Out of the 748 instances, it accounts for 186
instances (close to 25 %). The Soviet Union accounts for 99 cases, Japan 54, France 49, China 48,
Cuba 37, the UK 30, Thailand 27, and Russia 13 instances.
24
Table 6. Number of times particular black knights supported a target regime, by regime support and
primary method of the campaign.
In three out of four times of the cases with US support, Washington acted as the primary supporter,
it predominantly supported regimes under pressure from violent campaigns (164 instances or 88.2
%), and mostly so during the Cold War (126 instances, or 76.8 % of the 164 violent campaigns).
France supported 47 target regimes under pressure by violent campaigns, 24 during the Cold War
and 23 during the post-Cold War era, the Soviet Union supported 84 violent campaigns and 15 non-
violent. Out of Japan’s 54 instances of support, 48 were related to violent campaigns. 23 of these
were during the Cold War and 25 during the post-Cold War era. Russia only supported together
with other countries from its region – India, Pakistan, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan and China – with
the exception of Greece.
These numbers indicates that support from states was more frequent if it also was perceived
as a great power. In fact, in 60.70 % (454 instances) of all 748 instances of state support, a major
power was involved – see table 7. Of the cases with support from only one state, 83.3 % involved a
major power.
Cold War post-Cold War
State
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising Total
The US 126 18 38 4 186
Cuba 35 0 2 0 37
United
Kingdom 13 5 7 5 30
France 24 0 23 2 49
The Soviet
Union/Russia 73 9 17 13 112
China 5 1 39 3 48
Japan 23 1 25 5 54
Thailand 12 0 13 2 27
25
Table 7. Number of times a major power supports a target regime by time period and primary
method of the campaign.
Time period
Cold War post-Cold War
Primary method of
campaign
Violent 241 147
88 81,7
Nonviolent 33 33
12 18,3
Total 274 180
100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italics.
Black knight support from great powers was more frequent during the Cold War era (60.4 %), and
in line with our expectations regarding the impact of the international context, they were most likely
to do it alone during this period (47 % of all support by major powers during the Cold War was
done alone without any coalition partner). During the post-Cold War era, the great powers seem
more inclined to offer support if they are backed by a coalition of states (only 25.8 % of the major
powers stood alone during the post-Cold War era).
Turning to the hypothesis concerning regime type congruence, we find that only in in 47.7
% of the black knight cases was the external actor also autocracy (see table 8). 59.10 % of all
authoritarian support occurred during the Cold War era and 93.84 % of the support during the Cold
War era was related to violent campaigns. Looking at the two dimensions violent/non-violent and
Cold war/post-Cold War together, the most frequent form of support from an authoritarian black
knight to an authoritarian regime, was if the campaign was violent during the Cold War (55.46 % of
the 357 instances) followed by violent campaigns during the post-Cold War era (35.57 % of the 357
26
instances). Somewhat more surprisingly, democratic regimes acted as black knights in 56.6 % of the
cases of support.
Table 8. Black knight support from authoritarian and democratic regimes by time period and
primary method of campaign.
Authoritarian black knight Democratic black knight
Cold War post-Cold War Cold War
post-Cold
War
Primary method
of campaign
Violent 198 127 210 128
93,8 879 89,7 82,1
Nonviolent 13 19 24 28
6,2 13 10,3 17,9
Total 211 146 234 156
100 100 100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italic.
Congruence in subtypes of authoritarian regimes matters in 28 % of the 357 total instances of
authoritarian support – see table 9a and 9b. The kind of dictatorship and the kind of authoritarian
supporter were, thus, the same type in a total of 100 cases of regime support, whether that was
party-dictatorship, military-dictatorships, monarchy-dictatorships or personal dictatorships or had a
primary, secondary or tertiary support status.
27
Table 9a. Overall black knight congruence across subtypes of authoritarian regimes.
Time period
Cold War post-Cold War Total
Primary method
of campaign
Violent 64 31 95
98,5 88,6 95
Nonviolent 1 4 5
1,5 11,4 5
Total 65 35 100
100 100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italic.
Table 9b. Black knight congruence across subtypes of authoritarian regimes, by subtype, time
period and primary method of campaign.
Thus, the data shows mixed results when it comes to the congruence hypothesis. On one hand, we
find that democracies seem to be no less inclined to engage in black knight activities than their
autocratic counterparts. On the other hand, there does seem to be something to it if we disaggregate
the authoritarian category. That is, particular types of autocracies seem more prone to support ‘like-
minded’ regimes.
Cold War post-Cold War
Authoritarian
subtype
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising
Violent
uprising
Nonviolent
uprising Total
party-
dictatorship 33 0 18 0 51
military-
dictatorships, 25 0 2 0 27
monarchy-
dictatorships 3 0 0 0 3
personal
dictatorships 3 1 11 4 19
28
Moving to the geographical proximity hypothesis, the black knights shared land or river
border with the authoritarian regime experiencing mass uprisings in 139 instances (18.6 % of the
total 748 instances of support) – see table 10. Neighbor support was most frequent when the
campaign goal was regime change (109 times), when the campaign was violent (125 times) and
during the post-Cold War era (77 times).
Table 10. Number of black knight interventions from neighbors or external actors located in the
same region
Neighbors Region
Cold War post-Cold War Cold War post-Cold War
Primary method
of campaign
Violent 49 76 77 64
94,23 87,36 88,5 81,0
Nonviolent 3 11 10 15
5,77 12,64 11,5 19
Total 52 87 87 79
100 100 100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italic.
Regional support occurred a total of 174 times out of the total 748 regime support. 23.3 % of all
regime support was by a regional supporter.14
Regional support was slightly more frequent in the
Cold War era than the post-Cold War era, but across time, by far most frequent if the target regime
was under pressure form a violent campaign. In total, geographical proximity does seem to matter
as 32.8 % of all instances of black knight support originate from external actors located close to the
authoritarian regime challenged by mass uprisings. The greatest concern of these types of black
14
68 times, the regional supporter was also a neighbor leaving a total of 106 non-neighbor regional supporters.
29
knights seem to be stability and order as they primarily interfere when the campaign is violent,
clearly fearing that violence will spill over to other countries in the region.
Finally, we turn the linkage-hypothesis, investigating two proxies: colonial legacy and
formal alliances. In general, former colonial powers continue to interfere heavily in the internal
affairs of their former colonies (see table 11). The colonial legacy support is almost equally divided
between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, but in both periods with an overweight on
support to target regimes under pressure from violent campaigns.
Table 11. Black knight support from former colonial powers.
Time period
Cold War post-Cold War Total
Primary method
of campaign
Violent 30 20 50
73,17 52,63 63,29
Nonviolent 11 18 29
26,83 47,37 36,71
Total 41 38 79
100 100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italic.
France, UK, and Belgium stand out as the most frequent supporters of former colonies. Out of a
total of 49 times that France supported a regime under pressure, 38 was a former French colony.
Except for two instances, all French support to a former colony was related to violent campaigns.
France supported a former colony 21 times in the Cold War era and 17 in the post-Cold War era.
Thus, as emphasized by Levitsky and Way (2010), France does stand out as particular prone to
engage in black knight activities vis-à-vis its former colonies. Out of 30 times that UK supported a
30
regime under pressure, 8 was a former British colony (6 during the Cold War and 2 in the Post-Cold
War period). 6 instances were related to violent campaigns and 2 were related to non-violent
campaigns. Finally, Belgium only supported formerly colonies under pressure from violent
campaigns – 6 times – and mostly in the post-Cold War era (5 times).
Turning to alliance partnership, in only 56 instances of black support did the external actor
and the incumbent regime have a formal alliance (7.5 % of the total 748 instances) – see table 12. A
little more than half (30 times) were during the Cold War and among these, 23 were related to
violent campaigns. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the major powers supported a target regime
because of a formal alliance.
Table 12. Black knight support from formal allies
Time period
Cold War post-Cold War Total
Primary method
of campaign
Violent 23 22 45
76,67 84,62 80,36
Nonviolent 7 4 11
23,33 15,38 19,64
Total 30 26 56
100 100 100
Note: numbers are in bold, column percentage in italic.
Summing up
With this paper we have taken a first step towards a more systematic, cross-regional analysis of
black knight interventions in the period since the end of the Second World War. Though we have so
far only produced descriptive statistics in the form of cross-tabulations, several patterns deserve to
be emphasized.
31
Most importantly, the evidence brought forward here suggests that black knights do indeed
matter for authoritarian regime survival. Though the proxy used is quite crude, and though it may
not catch all instances of black knight support, there is good reasons to believe that a more
comprehensive mapping of assistance (including economic and military support), would show even
greater effects with regards to bolstering incumbents against threats to their rule.
Second, we have showed that not only autocracies play the role of black knights. In fact, an
almost equally large part of the registered black knights interventions are carried out by
democracies. Democratic external actors seem to be particular prone to support authoritarian
regimes if the target states are former colonies, if mass uprisings unfold during the Cold War and if
protesters engage in violence. As Boix (2011) argues, there definitely seem to be something about
the international context that affects the behavior of great powers. During the post-Cold War period
we have seen fewer instances of black knight support, in which major powers act alone, and even
the US that is so often criticized for its hard hand in international politics has dramatically reduced
its support to authoritarian regimes across the globe.
Finally, the analyzed data seem to corroborate the authoritarian congruence
hypothesis. Autocracies are simply more prone to offer support to other dictators if these represent
regimes based on the same kind of institutions, be it monarchy, parties, the military or a strongman.
32
References
Adesnik, D., and M. McFaul. 2006. “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy.” The
Washington Quarterly 29 (2): 7–26.
Ambrosio, Thomas. 2008. “Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia.” Europe-Asia Studies 60 (8):
1321–44.
———. 2009. Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former
Soviet Union. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
———. 2010. “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and
Future Research.” International Studies Perspectives 11 (4): 375–92.
Art, David. 2012. “What Do We Know about Authoritarianism after Ten Years?” Comparative
Politics 44 (3): 351–73.
Bader, Julia. 2013. “The Political Economy of External Exploitation. A Comparative Investigation
of China’s Foreign Relations.” Democratization, no. ahead-of-print: 1–21.
Bader, Julia, Jörn Grävingholt, and Antje Kästner. 2010. “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?
A Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in Regional Neighbourhoods.”
Contemporary Politics 16 (1): 81–100.
Bapat, Navin A., and T. Clifton Morgan. 2009. “Multilateral versus Unilateral Sanctions
Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (4): 1075–94.
Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013.
“Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.”
International Interactions 39 (1): 79–98.
Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East.” Comparative Politics
36 (2): 139–57.
———. 2012. “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons
from the Arab Spring.” Comparative Politics 44 (2): 127–49.
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 1999. “Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports
and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries.” Journal of Peace Research 36 (2):
233–44.
Boix, Carles. 2011. “Democracy, Development, and the International System.” International
Political Science Review 105 (4): 809–28.
Brinks, D., and M. Coppedge. 2006. “Diffusion Is No Illusion Neighbor Emulation in the Third
Wave of Democracy.” Comparative Political Studies 39 (4): 463–89.
Brownlee, Jason. 2007. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 2012. Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US-Egyptian Alliance. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, J. A., J. Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.”
Public Choice 143 (1): 67–101.
Chenoweth, Erica, and Orion A. Lewis. 2013. “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns Introducing the
NAVCO 2.0 Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 50 (3): 415–23.
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of
Nonviolent Conflict. Columbia University Press.
33
Colombo, Silvia. 2012. “The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring, Between Outreach, Patronage
and Repression”. 12. IAI Working Papers. Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali.
http://tashbek.net/arabspring/attachments/article/1475/iaiwp1209.pdf.
Diamond, Larry. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout
the World. Times Books.
Early, Bryan R. 2011. “Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the
Success of Economic Sanctions1.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (4): 381–402.
Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. 2010. “Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and
the Survival of Authoritarian rulers1.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (2): 335–59.
Fawn, Rick. 2006. “Battle over the Box: International Election Observation Missions, Political
Competition and Retrenchment in the Post-Soviet Space.” International Affairs 82 (6):
1133–53.
Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual
Review of Political Science 2 (1): 115–44.
Gerschewski, Johannes. 2013. “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-
Optation in Autocratic Regimes.” Democratization 20 (1): 13–38.
Goldstone, Jack. 2001. “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory.” Annual Review of
Political Science 4: 139–87.
Haber, Stephen. 2006. “Authoritarian Government.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political
Economy, edited by Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, 693–707. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 2007. “Pathways from Authoritarisnism.” Journal of Democracy
18 (1): 143–56.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. 1990. Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Washington DC: Peterson Institute for
International Economics.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal
of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65.
———. 2005. “International Linkage and Democratization.” Journal of Democracy 16 (3): 20–34.
———. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Lorentzen, Peter L. 2013. “Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian
Regime.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8 (2): 127–58. doi:10.1561/100.00012051.
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in
Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2008. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico.
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Magen, Amichai A., Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Michael McFaul, ed. 2009. Promoting Democracy
and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies. Houndmills, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
McMann, Kelly M. 2006. Economic Autonomy and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
34
Muller, Edward N. 1985. “Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United
States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World.” International Studies Quarterly 29
(4): 445–69.
Onslow, Sue. 2009. “The South African Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition to Independence.” In
Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, edited by Sue Onslow.
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. 2002. “Dictatorial Peace?” American
Political Science Review 96 (01): 15–26.
Peksen, Dursun. 2012. “Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?” Political
Research Quarterly 65 (3): 558–71.
Powell, Jonathan. 2012. “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D’état.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 56 (6): 1017–40.
Reuter, Ora John, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2011. “Economic Performance and Elite Defection from
Hegemonic Parties.” British Journal of Political Science 41 (01): 83–110.
Sassoon, Joseph. 2012. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Seligson, Mitchell A., and Steven E. Finkel. 2009. “Exporting Democracy Does It Work?” In Is
Democracy Exportable?, edited by Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser, 222–41. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Benjamin. 2004. “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999.”
American Journal of Political Science 48 (2): 232–46.
Tolstrup, Jakob. 2009. “Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia’s Management of Stability and
Instability in the ‘Near Abroad.’” Democratization 16 (5): 922–44.
———. 2013. “When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and
Gatekeeper Elites.” Democratization 20 (4): 716–42.
———. 2014. Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet
States. Boulder, Colorado: First Forum Press, Lynne Rienner.
Ulfelder, Jay. 2005. “Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes.”
International Political Science Review 26 (3): 311–34.
Vanderhill, Rachel. 2013. Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Way, Lucan. 2005. “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the
Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.” World Politics 57 (2):
231–61.
Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of
International Conflict.” American Political Science Review 106 (02): 326–47.
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000111.
Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Wright, Joseph. 2009. “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.”
American Journal of Political Science 53 (3): 552–71.