black (2000) - dreams of pure sociology

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Dreams of Pure SociologyAuthor(s): Donald Black

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Nov., 2000), pp. 343-367Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223323Accessed: 07-05-2015 14:55 UTC

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Dreams of Pure

Sociology*

DONALD BLACK

University

of Virginia

Unlike

older

sciences

such as

physics

and

biology,

sociology

has never had

a

revolu-

tion.

Modern

sociology

is still

classical-largely psychological,

teleological,

and

individualistic-and even less

scientific

than

classical

sociology.

But

pure sociology

is

different:

It

predicts

and

explains

the

behavior

of

social

life

with its location and

direc-

tion in social

space-its geometry.

Here I illustrate

pure

sociology

with

formulations

about the behavior

of

ideas,

including

a

theory

of

scienticity

that

predicts

and

explains

the

degree

to which an idea

is

likely

to

be

scientific

(testable,

general, simple,

valid,

and

original).

For

example:

Scienticity

is a curvilinear

unction

of

social

distance

from the

subject.

This

formulation

explains

numerous

acts

about

the

history

and

practice of

science,

such

as

why

some sciences evolved earlier and

faster

than

others

and

why

so

much

sociology

is

so

unscientific.

Because

scientific

theory

is the most

scientific

sci-

ence,

the

theory

of scienticity

also

implies

a

theory of theory

and a

methodology

or

the

development

of

theory.

The

history

of science is

partly

a

history

of revolutions

(see,

e.g.,

Kuhn

1962;

Hacking

1981;

Cohen

1985).l

Historian

Thomas Kuhn

suggests

that a

scientific revolution

over-

throws andreplacesthe prevailing "paradigm"n a field of science-its strategyof expla-

nation

(1962:

10-11;

see also

generally

Chapters

2,

10).

A

new

paradigm mplies

a

new

conception

of

reality

and

a new

logic by

which

reality

is understood

(idem:

110;

see

also

Black

1995:

864-867).

Examples

are

the

Copernican

revolution that overthrew the

earth-

centered

universe,

the Darwinian

revolution that

overthrew

the

immutability

of

plants

and

animals,

and the Einsteinian

revolution that

overthrew the

absolute

nature

of

space

and

time.2 The

period

before

a

scientific

revolution

is

sometimes

known as the

classical era

of

a science.

Classical

physics,

for

example,

refers

to

physics

before

relativity

theory

*Prepared

or a

session entitled

"Where Do

Theories Come

From?"

at

the

annual

meeting

of the

American

Sociological Association, San Francisco,California,August 24, 1998. The session was partof a TheorySection

Miniconference

on

"Methods

of

Theoretical Work."I

presented

other versions

to

the

Department

of

Sociology,

Texas

A

&

M

University, College

Station, Texas,

March

26,

1998;

the Justice

Studies

Program, University

of

New

Hampshire,

Durham,

New

Hampshire,

May

7, 1998;

the

Department

of

Sociology, RutgersUniversity,

New

Brunswick,

New

Jersey,

October

14,

1998;

the International

Sociological

Association

Research

Committee on

the

Sociology

of

Law,

World

Congress

of

the

Sociology

of

Law,

Warsaw

University,

Warsaw,

Poland,

July

16,

1999,

and

Jagiellonian University,

Krakow,Poland,

July

17,

1999. For

comments on earlier

drafts

I

thank

M. P.

Baumgartner,

Albert

Bergesen,

Thomas J.

Bernard,

Mark

Cooney, Murray

S.

Davis,

Ellis

Godard,

Marcus

Mah-

mood,

Calvin

Morrill,

Roberta

Senechal de la

Roche,

Christopher

Stevens,

FrankJ.

Sulloway,

James

Tucker,

and

Jonathan

Turner.Please

address

correspondence

to

the author at

the

Department

of

Sociology,

Cabell

Hall,

University

of

Virginia,

Charlottesville,

VA

22903.

[email protected]

'Philosopher

Karl

Popper

comments

that

new theories

ideally

"overthrow"

past

theories of the

same

subject:

"In this

sense,

progress

in science-or at

least

striking

progress-is always

revolutionary"

1975:

93-94).

2

Kuhn

proposes

that

a scientific

revolution becomes a

possibility

when

an

old

paradigm-"normal

science"-

encountersfacts it cannotexplain. Such "anomalies"pose a "crisis"thatmay ultimatelybe resolved by a revo-

lutionary

paradigm

(1962;

see

also McAllister

1996:

Chapter

8).

But Kuhn's

model

is

wrong:

Revolutionary

theories

such as those

of

Copernicus,

Darwin,

and

Einstein did not

explain

facts

their fellow

scientists

were

trying

to

explain.

No

crisis existed

(see

Lightman

and

Gingerich

1992;

Kelly

1994:

455-457).

Revolutionary

scientists

typically

answer

questions

virtually

no one

else is

asking

and initiate

revolutions

virtually

no one

else

wants.

Scientific

revolutions

thereby

differ

considerably

from

political

revolutions

(see

Feuer

1982:

252-268;

see

also

269-311;

Kubler 1962:

109).

Sociological

Theory

18:3

November 2000

?

American

Sociological

Association.

1307 New

York

Avenue

NW,

Washington,

DC

20005-4701






SOCIOLOGICAL

THEORY

(developed by

Albert

Einstein)

and

quantum theory

(developed by

Max

Planck,

Niels

Bohr,

Werner

Heisenberg,

and

others)

early

in the twentieth

century.

A revolution funda-

mentally changes

science,

and classical science becomes

obsolete.3

CLASSICAL

SOCIOLOGY

Sociology

has never had

a revolution. Classical

sociology

merely

refers

to

early sociology,

and

it has never been

overthrown or abandoned.

On the

contrary:

Modern

sociologists

widely

agree

that

the fundamentals

of

sociology

outlined

by

the classical

sociologists-

Max

Weber,

Emile

Durkheim,

Georg

Simmel,

and the

rest4-still

prevail.

Classical soci-

ology

is the

model of

sociology

itself.

Moreover,

the classical

conception

of social

reality

is

largely

psychological

(a

matter of

subjectivity),

the classical

logic

of

explanation

is

largely teleological (a

matter of means and

ends),

and the

classical

subject

is

largely

the

person

(including

a

numberor

group

of

persons).

Social

action is individual

action.

Max

Weber-possibly

the

most celebrated classical

sociologist-is

explicitly

and

mil-

itantly psychological,

teleological,

and

individualistic.

He

asserts,

for

example,

that soci-

ology

is the

"interpretive

nderstanding

f social

action"and

that

"subjective

understanding

is the

specific

characteristic

of

sociological

knowledge"

([1922]

1978,

Volume

1:

4,

15;

see

also

8;

Ringer

1997:

1,

92).

Human behavior

is "action"

only

if it has

"subjective

meaning"

or the

actor,

and action

is "social"

only

if

"its

subjective

meaning

takes

account

of the

behavior

of others"

(idem:

4;

see also

26;

Volume 2:

1375-1376).

Furthermore,

nly

"individual

human

beings"

engage

in social action

(Volume

1:

13,

italics

in

original);

collectivities

do not.5

His most

respected

ideas of

a substantive

nature,

such

as his con-

ception

of

the

"legitimacy"

of

authority

idem:

212-216;

see also

Volume

2:

901-910)

and

his

theory

of

the rise

of

capitalism

([1904-05]

1958),

are

explicitly

psychological,

teleo-

logical,

and individualistic

as

well.

The

classical

sociologist

most

famous

for

insisting

that

sociology

is different

from

psychology-Emile

Durkheim

[1895]

1964)-also

continually

addresses

the

subjectivity

of

the

goal-seeking

individual.

He

psychologizes

virtually

every

subject,

even

society:

"Because

society

can exist

only

in

and

by

means

of individual

minds,

it must enter

into us

and

become

organized

within us.

...

Society

is a

synthesis

of human

consciousnesses"

([1912]

1995:

211,

432;

see also

445).

He

claims

that

"everything

n social

life rests

on

opinion"

and that

sociology

is

primarily

the

study

of

opinion:

"We

can

make

opinion

an

object

of

study

and

create a

science of

it;

that

is what

sociology

principally

consists

in"

(439).

Everywhere

he

discusses

the contents

of the

human

mind,

whether

a

feeling

of

solidarity

with

others

([1893]

1964),

a

predisposition

to

suicide

([1897]

1951),

or a rev-

erence

for

society

([1912]

1995).

If Durkheimian

sociology

is not

psychological,

then

Durkheim

s not

Durkheimian.

But

Weber and

Durkheim

are

not

uniquely

psychological,

teleological,

and

individualistic.

They

exemplify

classical

sociology.6

And

they

exemplify

modern

sociology

as

well.

3Classical

science

may

survive

in a limited

capacity,

however.

Although

Einstein's

general

theory

of

relativity

is more

powerful

than

Newton's law

of

gravity,

for

example,

Newton's

law

is still

used to

predict

gravitation

on

or nearthe surface of earth(see Weinberg1998;Greene 1999:380-381).

41

particularly

efer

to the

generation

of

sociologists

whose work

spanned

he

turnof

the twentieth

century.

See

any

textbook

on

the

history

of

sociological

theory

for

a more

complete

list.

5Weber

acknowledges

that a

concern

with

subjectivity

limits the

scope

of

sociology,

such as

its

capacity

to

understand

human

behavior

in tribal

societies:

"Our

ability

to

share the

feelings

of

primitive

men

is not

very

much

greater"

han our

ability

to share

"the

subjective

state

of an animal"-which

is "at

best

very

unsatisfactory"

([1922]

1978. Volume

1:

16).

<'So

does

Georg

Simmel:

Everywhere

he addresses

the

subjectivity

of

individuals,

such

as the

psychological

dynamics

of

friendship, coquetry,

sex,

and

love

([1908]

1950:

50-51,

324-329;

see also

Poggi

1993).

344






DREAMS OF

PURE SOCIOLOGY

Modern

sociology

remains classical.7

It is modern

only

in a

chronological

sense

(but

see,

e.g.,

Luhmann

1984]

1995:

xlv-xlvii;

quotation

n Sciulli 1994:

66).

Modern

sociol-

ogists

commonly regard

classical

sociology

as the most

important

sociology

ever

written

(see, e.g., Collins 1986:xi, 5; Poggi 1996:39, 46). They invoke it as the supremeauthority

(see,

e.g.,

Alexander 1987:

28).

They

read it for

inspiration,

and

teach it to their

students.

Many spend

their entire careers

reading

and

writing

about classical

sociology. They

assume

that

every

modern

sociologist

stands

on the shoulders of classical

sociologists

and

that

every sociological theory

is a version of classical

sociology-Weberian,

Durkheimian,

Simmelian,

and so on. And

they

are

right:

Modern

sociology

still has the

psychological

conception

of social

reality

found in the classical texts. It still has a

teleological strategy

of

explanation.

It

still

places

the

person

at the center of social life.

Understandably,

herefore,

no one

challenges

classical

sociology

(see,

e.g.,

Alexander 1987:

28).

It has never become

obsolete.

If

the classical

works were to

appear today-such

as

Weber's

Economy

and

Society ([1922] 1978) and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ([1904-05]

1958)

or Durkheim's The Division

of

Labor in

Society

([1893]

1964)

and The

Elementary

Forms

of

Religious

Life

([1912]

1995)-they

would still be acclaimed as

major

contribu-

tions. The stature of classical

sociology

could

hardly

be

greater

(see,

e.g.,

Parsons 1968:

xiii;

Alexander

1987:

31-32 and title of

essay;

Turner

1996:

15).

It has never been

ques-

tioned,

much less overthrown.

Pure

sociology,

however,

is not classical

sociology.

It has a new

conception

of social

reality

and a new

strategy

of

explanation.

It

answers

questions

unasked

by

classical soci-

ologists

and their modern

counterparts.

t solves a

crisis unknown to either. The crisis is

that

sociology

is

not

really sociological.

NORMAL

SOCIOLOGY

In

our student

days

we hear that

sociology

is

the science of social

life. Its

subject

is

social,

and

its

theory

is social. Our teachers and

textbooks tell us

sociology

is different from

psychology-because

it is not

psychological. They

tell us

sociology

is different from

ide-

ology

and humanism-because it is

scientific.

They

tell

us we should readclassical soci-

ologists

(such

as Weber and

Durkheim)

to see how

sociology

is done.

But

sociology

is

actually

not so different from

psychology,

and it is not so

scientific

either.

Virtually

all

sociology explicitly

or

implicitly

addresseshuman

subjectivity.

Often it

explains humanbehaviorwith the psychological impactof the social environment.Moti-

vations

and

meanings

are central.

This

applies,

for

example,

to the

sociology

of deviant

behavior,

collective

behavior,

political

behavior,

religious

behavior,

legal

behavior,

med-

ical

behavior,

and behavior in

business

organizations,

schools,

professions,

families,

and

other

groups.

It also

applies

to fields

such as social

stratification,

ace andethnic

relations,

and

culture

(including

the

sociology

of

science,

knowledge,

and

art).

All

include

subjec-

tive matterssuch as

prestige, prejudice,

perceptions,

and beliefs.

Even when the

questions

asked

by sociologists

are not

explicitly

psychological-when

they

seek

only

to

explain

particularpatterns

of

human

behavior-their answers

are

psychological,

including

answers

based on

psychological

assumptions

about human

preferences

and

proclivities.

Where

then is the science of social life that is trulydifferentfrom psychology?

And where is

the

science

of

social life

that is

truly

scientific? Much is

ideological-a

critique

of

modern

society.

Much is

humanistic-interpretations

and

arguments

rather

than

predictions

and

explanations.

Much is

scholarship

about

scholarship,

books

about

7Although

sociological theory-the explanation

of humanbehavior-is

still

largely

classical,

sociology

has

otherwise

advanced

considerably

n its

methods of research

(including

statistical

methods)

and its

accumulation

of

empirical

findings (mainly

on modern

societies such

as the United

States).

345






SOCIOLOGICAL

THEORY

books,

words

about words. If

explanatory

at

all,

most is

teleological:

It

explains

human

behavioras a means to

an end. It

assumes or

imputes

ends-goals,

needs,

values,

interests-

and

then

explains

human behavior as

a means to

those ends.

Teleology has a bad reputation n sociology-but only when it attributesa mission or

destiny

to

society

as a whole. A

well-known

example

is

Karl Marx's

theory

that all

soci-

eties

inevitably progress

toward

communism

(see,

e.g.,

Marx

and

Engels

in

Feuer

1959;

see also

Popper

[1961]

1964).

We hear

that

teleology

is

unscientific

because the

goal

or

purpose

of a

society

is unobservableand

unknowable.We

hear t is

metaphysical.

Yet

other

versions of

teleology

still dominate

sociological

theory. Virtually

all

sociology explains

humanbehavior as

a means to an end-a

goal

or

purpose.

Teleology

is the

superparadigm

of

sociology

(Black

1995:

861-863).

But it is bad

science: Like

the

goal

or

purpose

of

society

as a

whole,

the

goal

or

purpose

of human

behaviorof

any

kind is

unobservableand

unknowable

(see

idem:

861-864).

Sociology is unscientific in other respects as well. Research is often independentof

theory,

and

theory

s often

independent

of

research.Because

so much

theory

is

untestable-

unfalsifiable-it is

mostly

irrelevant

to

researchers,

and

research is

mostly

irrelevantto

theorists.

Moreover,

most

sociologists

study only

a

single

subject

in

their own

society:

Americans

study

American

society,

Germans

study

German

society, Japanese study

Japa-

nese

society,

and so on.

Many study only

their own

part

of

society: Many

women

study

only

women,

many

African-Americans

study only

African-Americans,

many

Hispanic-

Americans

study only Hispanic-Americans,

and so on. Their research is

largely practical

and

ideological, designed

to assess the

well-being

of their

society

or

part

of

society.

Some

search

for

inequality, njustice,

or

other conditions

they

wish to

evaluate or

expose.

Others

conductsurveysaboutmodern ife in themanner f politicalpollstersandconsumerresearch-

ers. Who thinks what?

How do

they

feel?

And

theory?

Much so-called

theory

is

merely

a

discussion of other

theorists,

a clarifi-

cation or elaboration

of

past

ideas. Much is

merely conceptual,

a

way

to

classify

and

describe

humanbehavior.Even

explanatory heory

is

mostly

untestable-neither

right

nor

wrong.

What then

is

it?

Many

sociologists

believe

sociology

can

never

meet the

highest

standardsof science-

testability, generality,

and so on.

They

lack a

requirement

of

good

science:

the

faith that

they

can do what seems

impossible

to others.

They accept

their

inferiority

n the world of

science.8 Others

totally

or

partially reject

the standardsof science.

They regard

he nature

of sociology as a matterof personal opinion and claim the rightto do whateverthey like,

scientific or

not. Their

sociology

is

not

even

classical. Classical

sociology

is more scientific.

In

sum,

from the

beginning

I was

disappointed

by

the

psychological,

teleological,

and

ideological

nature of

sociology. Sociology

had not met

its

obligation

to be

sociological,

and

sociologists

lacked

faith in

sociology.

I

became a

sociological

fundamentalist

and

vowed to

say only

what

is

truly sociological

or to

say nothing

at

all. I dreamedof a

genuine

science of social

life.

But what

is

truly sociological?

What is social

life'?These

simple

questions

led to a new

sociology

with a new theoretical

logic: pure sociology.

sHistoric

figures

in

science,

philosophy,

and modern art

virtually always

believe their work

is

extremely

important.A numberof eminent scientistscalled their own work"revolutionary,"orexample, includingCharles

Darwin

and Albert Einstein

(see

Cohen

1985:

46).

PhilosopherLudwig Wittgenstein

evaluated

his first book

in

its

preface:

"The truth of the

thoughts

that are here communicated seems

to me unassailable and definitive.

I

thereforebelieve

myself

to have

found,

on all essential

points,

the final solution

to the

problems"

1921: 5;

italics

omitted).

Philosopher

FriedrichNietzsche called

his work Thus

Spake

Zarathustra"the

most exalted" and "the

profoundest"

book in existence

([1888]

1992:

5.

italics

omitted;

see

also

39.

42-45,

87).

And

Spanish painter

Salvador

Dali entitled his

journal

Diary

of

a

Genius

([1964]

1986).

But how

many sociologists regard

heir own

work as

historically important?

How

many

claim

it is revolution-

ary,

or even that

anyone

else's

is

revolutionary'?

have never

seen or heard such a claim.

346






DREAMS OF

PURE SOCIOLOGY

THE

ELIMINATIONOF PEOPLE

The

subject

of

pure

sociology

is not human behavior

in

the usual sense.

It is not the

behavior

of a

person

or a

group

of

persons.

It is a new

subject

in the

history

of science: the

behavior of social

life. Pure

sociology

thus

violates common sense

by removing

humans

from humanbehavior

and

eliminating

what

has

always

been

central to the visualization

of

the

subject,

scientifically

and

otherwise:

people.

It reverses the direction of

human action

by reconceptualizing

he action

of a

person

or

group

as the action

of a social

entity

such as

law or science

or art. Social action

becomes

truly

social

(compare, e.g.,

Weber

[1922]

1978,

Volume

1:

4, 8, 13-15;

Parsons

[1937]

1968;

Luhmann

1984]

1995:

137,

165-177;

1990:

53-54;

see

also Black

1995:

859-860).

Pure

sociology completely

contradictsthe

viewpoint

known as

methodological

individualism-what

Popper

calls "the

quite

unassail-

able

doctrine that we must

try

to understand

ll collective

phenomena

as due to the

actions,

interactions,aims,

hopes,

and

thoughts

of individual

men,

and as due

to traditionscreated

and

preservedby

individualmen"

([1961]

1964:

155-156;

see also Homans 1967:

61-64).

Because social life such as law or science or art has no

psychology

of

its own-no

mind,

no

thoughts,

no

subjectivity-psychology totally disappears

rom

sociology.

The

conceptual leap

from the behavior of

people

to the

behavior of social life

changes

the

identity

of

everything

once viewed

anthropocentrically-from

the

point

of

view of

a

person.

The

subject

of

legal sociology,

for

example,

now

becomes

the

behaviorof law itself.

A

call to the

police

is an increase of

law,

a movement of law

into

a

conflict.

An

arrest s also

an increase of

law,

and so is a

prosecution,

conviction,

or

punishment.

A severe

punishment

is a

greater

ncrease of law

than a

mild

punishment.

A

civil

lawsuit is an increase

of

law

as

well,

and

so

is a

victory

for the

plaintiff

or an order

to

pay damages. Every

action

of

every

person

in

legal

life becomes an action of

law,

and

everything

s

simpler:

With a

single

con-

cept

the behaviorof law includes

everythingpreviouslyregarded

as the behavior

of

diverse

individuals

such

as

citizens,

police

officers,

lawyers,

and

judges.

It

also led

to

a

new

dis-

covery:

Law behaves

according

to the same

principleseverywhere-across

all

legal

cases,

all

stages

of

the

legal process,

all

societies,

all

times.

Law

obeys

sociological

laws.

Numerous

formulations

predict

and

explain

variation n the

quantity

and

style

of

law-

without

qualifications

of

any

kind

(see

Black

1976).

These formulations

pecify

how law

var-

ies with its

location anddirection

n social

space-its geometry-such

as

its

social

elevation,

whether t

has an

upward

ordownward

direction,

and

the

social distance

t

spans.9

They

pre-

dict,

for

instance,

more law

at

higher

elevations,

more

in

a downward

han

an

upward

direc-

tion,

andmoreacross

greater

distances

n

relational

ndcultural

pace-patterns

actually

ound

in

diverse times and

places

(see,

e.g.,

idem, 1989,

1995:

842-844).

More formulations

per-

tainto other

kindsof conflict

(e.g.,

Baumgartner

988;

Black

1995:

834-837,855,

notes 129-

130; 1998;

Senechal de la Roche

1996)

10

andto other

phenomena

such as

the

behavior

of

art,

medicine,

and

supernatural eings

(see,

e.g.,

Black

1979b,

1995:

855-857).

Sociology

is

a matterof

degree,

and

pure sociology

is

the

most

sociological sociology:

It

is

entirely

scientific and

entirely

uncontaminated

y psychology

or

other

sciences

(compare

Ward

1903;

Simmel

[1908]

1950:

21).

It contains no

assumptions,

assertions,

or

implica-

tions

about he

humanmindor

its

contents.

It

completely gnores

human

subjectivity,

he

con-

9Social space includes vertical, horizontal, cultural, corporate,and normativedimensions. Pure sociology

predicts

and

explains

social life with the

shape

of social

space-social

structure-where

it

occurs

(see

Black

1976;

1979b;

1995:

851-852).

Neither

macroscopic

nor

microscopic,

the

geometry

of social

space

transcends he

usual

units of

sociological analysis

such as

societies,

communities,

and

persons.

'IFor other

applications,

tests,

and

extensions, see,

e.g.,

(in

alphabetical

order)

Baumgartner

(1978, 1985,

1992,

1999:

Chapter

1),

Black and

Baumgartner

(1983),

Borg

(1992),

Cooney

(1994,

1997, 1998),

Griffiths

(1984),

Horwitz

(1982, 1990),

Kruttschnitt

1982),

Morrill

(1992, 1995),

Morrill,

Snyderman

andDawson

(1997),

Mullis

(1995),

Senechal de la Roche

(1997a, 1997b),

Silberman

(1985),

Tucker

(1989,

1999a,

1999b);

see also

the

citations in

Black

(1989:

108,

note

52;

1995:

844-845,

note

88).

347






348

SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

scious

andunconscious

meanings

and

eelings people

experience, ncluding

heir

perceptions,

cognitions,

and attitudes.

And it has no

teleology-no

conceptions

or

explanations

of human

behavioras a

meansto an

end,

conscious or

unconscious,

individualor collective.

It does not

assume,assert,or imply thatpeople have particularpurposesor preferences, ntentions or

motives,

interestsor

values,

or

that

groups

have

particular

needs or

functionsor

goals.

It does

not attribute easons

or rationales o

people

for

anything

they

do or fail

to do. And

because

it removes

people,

it eliminates

something universally

regarded

as

indispensable

o the un-

derstanding

f humanbehavior.'

All

thatremains s

social life.

In

several

respects,

hen,

pure

sociology

is a radical

departure

rom classical

and modern

sociology.

I

now illustrate

pure sociology

with several formulations

aboutthe behaviorof

ideas,

in-

cluding

the behaviorof science and

sociology-a pure sociology

of

knowledge. Ultimately

I

outline

a

theory

of

theory

with

practical mplications

for the creationof

theory

itself.

THE

THEORYOF

THE

SUBJECT

An

idea

is a

statement

about the natureof

reality

(see

Black

1979b:

157-160).

Every

idea

has a social structure-a multidimensional ocation

in

social

space-known by

the charac-

teristics of its

source, audience,

and

subject.

The source of an idea is its

agent,

the audience

anyone

to whom it

is

directed,

and the

subject anything

it describes or

explains.'2

The

source and audience

may

be more or less intimate with the

subject

(relational

distance),

for

example,

culturally

different

(cultural

distance),

or

engage

in

different

activities

(func-

tional

distance).13

The

source is

relationally

close to the

subject

when someone talks about

a

spouse,

friend, himself,

or

herself,

for

instance,

while a mere

acquaintance

or

stranger

s

more distant.The relationalcloseness of the audience to the subjectis similarlyvariable.14

Note, too,

that the

subject might

be

anything

at

all,

human or nonhuman.'5

It

might

be

dead,

alive,

or

inorganic-an

animal,

plant,

or

part

of the

physical

world.'6 It

might

be a

human

creation-music,

money,

or a machine. It

might

be a

theory, sociology,

or God.'7

I

The

removal of

people

from

sociology

is similar to the removal

of a recognizable

subject (such

as a

person

or

landscape)

from

paintingearly

in

the

twentieth

century-also

viewed

as the removal of

something indispensable

(see

Greenberg

1958]

1961:

208-209).

Art without a

subject

is

pure

art-the most artistic

art-entirely

aesthetic

and

uncontaminated

by practicalutility.

Anything pure

is the most of

itself,

autonomous and free of

everything

else

(see

Bourdieu

[1992]

1996:

223,

241, 248-249,

299:

compare

Latour

1991]

1993:

10-11).

A

purification

s

an essentialization:

Something

becomes the essence

of itself. Russian

painterWassily

Kandinsky

hus

spoke

of

"purepainting"

and a

"higher

evel of

pure

art"concerned

with

"painterly-spiritual

ssences"

([

1911]

1982: 103:

[1913] 1982: 353), and Dutch painterPiet Mondriancalled for a "purificationof art"that preservesonly "the

essence of art"

(respectively,

[1938]

1986: 302-303:

[1936]

1986:

299).

12My

concept

of

the

subject

is short

for

subject

matter-as

in the

"subject

index" of a book

(compare, e.g.,

Bourdieu

[1992]

1996:

206-208;

Luhmann 1995:

xxxviii-xliii).

13

Relational

distance refers

to the

degree

of

participation

n the existence

of someone or

something,

such as the

frequency,

duration, breadth,

and

depth

of

contact,

including

the amount

of informationcommunicated

about

each

(see

Black 1976:

40-41).

Culturaldistance

refers to a difference

in the content

of

culture,

such

as differ-

ences between

religions

or modes of dress

(idem:

74-75).

Functional

distance reters

to a difference

in

activity,

such

as differences between

occupations

or

daily responsibilities

(a

type

of social

distance

separating

men and

women

throughout

human

history

that

is

now

decreasing).

14Art hat

depicts reality,

such as a

painting

or work of

literature,

ikewise has

a social structure

hat

includes

its

subject.

A

painter

is

very

close

to the

subject

of

a

self-portrait,

for

example,

but

more distant

from a less

familiar

or less similar human

subject

or a nonhuman

subject

such as a

bowl of

apples.

The closeness

of the

audience

to the artistic

subject

is variable as well.

15Partly

because

humans have contact

with nonhumanas

well as human

reality,

the

jurisdiction

of

sociology

extends

beyond humanity

(see

generally

KnorrCetina

1997).

It also extendsto the social life of nonhumans see

Black 2000:

114-116).

'IAlthough

humans

may

become

highly

intimate with

a

physical

object

such as an

automobile, house,

or

computer, hey

ordinarily

are

functionally

as well as

relationally

closer

to

living

things-especially

fellow

humans

and other animals

but also

plants

such as

trees and flowers.

In

many ways

humans are

functionally

closer

to

fellow humans

than to

nonhumans, hough

all animals are

somewhat close

merely

because

they

move,

consume,

and

reproduce

n a manner

hat resembles the behavior

of humans.

'7Physicist

Richard P.

Feynman speaks

of

"falling

deeply

in love" with

a

particular heory

when he

was a

young

man and

maintaining

he

relationship

until the

theory

became "an old

lady"

who had

"given

birth to some

very good

children"

(quoted

in Traweek

1988:

102-103).






DREAMS OF PURE SOCIOLOGY

The Two-Directional Nature

of

Social

Distance

Social distance

is two-directional:measurable

rom both

A

to B and

B

to

A. And it

may

be

asymmetrical-unequal

in each

direction,

the distance

from

A

to

B

closer

or farther han

the

distancefrom B to A. Such differencesare obvious inrelationshipsbetweenhumansandnon-

humans:Humans

may

be

intimate with

virtually anything, living

or

not,

while the

reverse

does not

apply.

Human

relationships

areoften

asymmetrical

as well. A

husband

may

be

closer

to

his

wife than

is

she to

him,

for

instance-if he

participates

more in her life than she

par-

ticipates

in his.

The same often

applies

to

friendsand

acquaintances.

Asymmetrical

relation-

ships commonly

involve an

unequal

flow of information

between the

parties,

illustrated

o

an

extreme

degree by

the one-sided closeness

of those

exposed

electronically

on

television

sets or

computers,possibly

celebrities known to

millions,

while their

audience s

entirely

un-

known

to

them.'8

Historical

recordsallow a

one-sided closeness with

those

long

dead.

The

two-directional and

possibly

asymmetrical

nature of social

distance is

radically

unlike physical distance, which is always equal in both directions. Pure sociology thus

introducesa new

geometry

of

reality

unlike

the

geometry

of earlier

sciences such as

phys-

ics and

astronomy.

The

following

pages

feature

the

two-directional nature of

social dis-

tance in the

geometry

of

ideas.

What Is

Important?

The

social structureof

an idea

predicts

and

explains

its

success.

The

success

of

an

idea is

the

degree

to

which

it

is defined as

true and

important-its

magnitude.

One

idea

is

recog-

nized

as useful or

even

brilliant while another

receives

only

mild

approval

or

total indif-

ference. How

does the

former

differ

sociologically

from

the latter?

Hold constant an idea's content,and its success

partly depends

on the social location of

its

source and

audience.19

Who

presents

the idea

to whom?

One

relevantvariable is

the

closeness of the

audience to the

source: The

magnitude

of

an

idea is

an inverse

function of

social

distance

from

the audience

(see

idem:

159).

An

intimate's idea is

more

likely

to

succeed

than a

stranger's.

Social

elevation is

relevant as

well:

Downward

deas are

greater

than

upward

deas

(idem:

158-159).

A

social

superior's

dea

is

more

likely

to succeed than

a social

inferior's.20

The

success of an

idea also

depends

on

the

social

location of the

subject.

One factor is

the

subject's

closeness: The

magnitude

of

an

idea is a

curvilinear

function

of

social dis-

tance

from

the

subject.

The

success of

an

idea

increases with

the social

distance

of

the

source andaudience from the

subject

until a

point

when it decreases.2' A statementabout

8

Other

distances

in social

space

are

two-directional and

possibly asymmetrical

as well. A

might speak

B's

native

language,

for

example,

while

B

cannot

speak

A's-an

asymmetrical

distance

in cultural

space.

Or

A

might

receive

information

about

B's

great

wealth while

B has

little or

no

information

about A's

wealth-an

asymmet-

rical

distance

in

vertical

space.

Formulations

pertaining

to

the

behavior of

social life

in

social

space

should

recognize

the

two-directional

nature

of

social

distance.

For

instance,

law

may

have relational

direction

from a closer

towarda farther

party,

or

vice

versa,

and the

amount

of law

depends

more on

the distance

from

the

complainant

o

the

defendant han from

the

defendant

to the

complainant

(compare

Black

1976:

40-48).

19The

content of

an

idea,

such as

the

degree

to

which

it is

scientific

or

new,

also

predicts

and

explains

its fate.

But here

I

leave aside

the

content of

ideas and

focus

entirely

on their

social structure-the

shape

of social

space

where

they

occur.

2"By

social

superior

I

mean

someone

with a

higher

social

elevation-more

social status.

Social status includes

vertical status

(wealth,

such

as

money

or

livestock),

radial status

(integration,

such as

employment

or

marriage),

relational

status

(a

degree

of

prominence,

resulting

from

social ties

to

others),

functional status

(a

level of

performance,

such as

the

points

scored

by

a

basketball

player),

cultural

status

(conventionality,

such as the

relative

preponderance

of a

religion),

and

normative

status

(respectability,

a condition that

declines with the

application

of

social

control)

(see

Black

1976:

Chapters

2-6).

-

Theoretical

sociologists

do not

always

recognize curvilinearity

n

social life. For

example,

Durkheim

presents

three

majorpropositions

about

egoistic,

altruistic,

and

anomic

suicide and a

fourth

(in

a

footnote)

about

fatalistic

suicide

([1897]

1951:

Chapters

2-5; 276,

note

25),

but

these

can be

reduced to two curvilinear

formulations:

1)

Suicide is

a

U-curvilinear

function of

social

integration (egoistic

and altruistic suicide at

the

extremes),

and

2)

suicide is a

U-curvilinear function

of

social

regulation

(anomic

and

fatalistic suicide at the

extremes).

349






SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

a

stranger

is more

likely

to

succeed than a

statement about someone

closer such as a

colleague,

spouse,

or

oneself. Courtroom

testimony

by

a

stranger

to a

subject

is

more

likely

to

succeed than identical

testimony by

a

subject's

wife or

mother.

Even

less

likely

to

succeed is the subject'sown testimony.The same principleimplies that an idea in a phys-

ical or

biological

science

(such

as

chemistry

or

biology)

is more

likely

to

succeed

than

an

idea in

sociology-because

the human

subjects

of

sociology

are closer

to

humansthan the

nonhuman

ubjects

of

the

natural

ciences.22For the same reason a

sociological

idea about

a

foreign

or

past

society

is more

likely

to

succeed

than

an idea about the

sociologist's

own

society.

Because classical

sociology

was

more

comparative

and historical than modern

sociology,

it was

regarded

as more

important

n its own time than is modern

sociology

today

(see

Elias

[1987]

1994:

94).

The same still

applies

to

comparative

and historical

sociology:

It attractsmore

recognition

and

respect

than the

sociology

of

modern life.

The

success of an idea likewise

depends

on the social status of its

subject:

The

magni-

tude of an idea is an inverse function of the social elevation of the subject. An idea about

a

lower

subject

(such

as the source's

or

audience's

employee)

is

more

likely

to succeed

than the same idea

about a

higher subject

(such

as

the source's or audience's

employer).

Legal

testimony

about a social inferior

is more

likely

to

succeed than

identical

testimony

about

a social

superior.Testimony

about a

homeless

man,

for

instance,

is more

likely

to

succeed than identical

testimony

about a

prominent politician

(see

Cooney

1994:

848-

851).

The

sociology

of lower

subjects

(such

as

poor

people

or

criminals)

is

more

likely

to

succeed than the

sociology

of

higher

subjects

(such

as monarchsand

states).

What Is

Interesting.?

The social structure

of the

subject

also

predicts

and

explains

what is

interesting-what

attracts deas and

attention

(compare

Davis

1971).

The social

distance from the

source and

audience

is

again

relevant:

The attractiveness

of

a

subject

is an inverse

function

of

social

distance.

Relationally,

culturally,

and

functionally

closer

subjects

attract

both more ideas

and more

attention.

We

can

predict

what

people

talk

about,

what

they

write and read

about,

and what

movies,

television

programs,

and other information

they

consume.

Human

subjects-especially

living

humans-are

more attractive han

nonhuman

ubjects,

or exam-

ple,

and nonhuman

subjects

functionally

close to humans

(such

as fellow

mammals)

are

more

attractive

than other

subjects

(such

as

atomic

particles).

As one

physicist

remarks:

"Wedon't study elementaryparticles because they are intrinsically interesting,like peo-

ple.

They

are not-if

you've

seen one electron

you've

seen

them all"

(Weinberg

1998:

50).

And

one

biologist complains

that

his

subject-ants-never

receives

as much

attention

as

monkeys

and

other

vertebrates

more "familiar"

o humans

(Wilson

1994:

135).

The

more

a

subject

is

studied,

however,

the closer

and more

interesting

t becomes.

Among

human

subjects,

one's own

society,

activities,

intimates,

and

self

are

espe-

cially interesting: They

attract

more

ideas and

attention

than

subjects

farther

away

in

social

space.

More

sociology

therefore

pertains

to the

sociologist's

home

society

than to

foreign

or earlier

societies.

Whether

a

subject

is

interesting

also

depends

on its

social

status: The attractiveness

of

a

subject

is a direct

function

of

its social

elevation.

Higher

subjects

such as

the rich

and

powerful

attractmore

ideas

and attention

than

lower

sub-

jects

such as the

poor

and

weak. The

rich and

powerful

are more

interesting

to

them-

selves

as well.

But

recall that

ideas with closer

and

higher subjects

are less

likely

to

be defined as

true

and

important.

An

implication

is that

ideas with

more

interestingsubjects

(also

closer

and

2-Economist Milton

Friedmanobserves

that the

closeness

of economics to

everyday

life

impedes

the

success of

economic

ideas:

"Familiarity

with

the

subject

matterof economics

breeds

contempt

for

special

knowledge

about

it"

(1953:

40).

350







higher)

are less

likely

to succeed.

For

example,

ideas about human

behavioroccur

at a

very

high

rate and attract

a

great

deal of attention:

Everyone

is an amateur

psychologist

and

sociologist.

Closer and

higher

humans are the most

interesting

of all. Yet

ideas with

closer

andhigher subjectsareless successful. Althoughdomestic sociology (on the sociologist's

own

society)

is

more common and attractsmore attention

han

foreign sociology

(on

other

societies),

then,

domestic

sociology

is

doomed

to be

forever

unimportant-forever

disap-

pointing.

The

same

applies

to

the

sociology

of

higher subjects,

such as the

sociology

of

law and

religion.

Sciences

with

nonhuman

subjects

are different:Natural

scientists

such

as

physicists

and

astronomers

egard

heir ideas as more

important

han those of

sociologists,

and

virtually

everyone agrees-even sociologists.

The formulations

above, however,

logically imply nothing

about

the ultimate

truth

or

value

of

any

ideas

(see

Black

1979b:

159-160).

The

sociology

of

knowledge,

including

the

sociology

of

science,

implies

nothing

about whether

any

idea

deserves

special

credi-

bility or prestige (compare, e.g., Pickering 1984: 413-414; see also Mannheim 1936:

75-87,

286-306).

Nor does

it

imply

epistemological

relativism-the

view

that

no form

of

knowledge

is better than

another.Like moral or

aesthetic

relativism,

epistemological

relativism

is

itself an

evaluation-an

evaluation of

evaluation

(compare, e.g., Woolgar

1983;

Fuchs

1992:

20-34).

Ludwig

Wittgenstein

remarks that neither

a moral nor an

aesthetic evaluation

derives

from

facts

alone,

and

that the two are

logically

indistin-

guishable:

"Ethics and

aesthetics are

one and the same"

([1921]

1961:

147;

see also

Monk

1990:

277).

But

he does not

go

far

enough:

Ethics, aesthetics,

and

epistemology

are one

and the same.

THETHEORYOF SCIENTICITY

Science

is a

matter of

degree-scienticity.

The

scienticity

of an

idea increases with its

testability,

generality,simplicity,

validity,

and

originality.23Testability

is the

capacity

of

an

idea to

predict

facts,24

generality

the

diversity

of

facts it

addresses,

simplicity

its econ-

omy

of

expression,25

validity

its

conformity

with

the

facts,26

and

originality

its newness

(see

generally

Black

1995:

831-847;

see

also,

e.g.,

Friedman

1953;

Jasso

1988).

Super-

23

Another

aspect

of

scienticity

is

facticity-the degree

to which

an idea

pertains

to an observable

aspect

of

reality.

Note that the

scienticity

of an

idea

pertains

to its

content alone

and is

logically independent

of

its

origins,

including

the

psychology

and

sociology

of its

occurrence

(see

Dahrendorf

[1961]

1968:

8-11;

compare

Mann-

heim

1936:286-306).

Some

regard objectivity

as central

to

scienticity

(e.g.,

Popper

[1961]

1964:

152-156;

Polanyi

[1962]

1964:

Chapter

1;

Fuchs

1997).

But if

objectivity

is a

revelation of

the

one and

only reality,

it is

scientifically

unknow-

able.

If it is

mental,

it is

sociologically

irrelevant.If it is an

observablecharacteristicof

an

idea,

it is

an

element

of

validity

and

is

already

included

in

my

concept

of

scienticity.

24A

prediction

is

a

logical

implication

about

quantitative

variation. If an idea

cannot be tested

by counting

something,

its

validity

is

unknowable

(see

Black 1995:

831-833).

Even

so,

testability

is a matterof

degree.

An

idea is

more

testable than

another if

its

implications

are

clearer and more

readily

observable. Ideas

are

merely

suggestive

if

they

do not

imply predictions

of a

quantitative

naturebut

nevertheless

inspire

research.The work of

Karl Marx

(e.g.,

Marx and

Engels

in

Feuer

1959)

is

suggestive

rather han

testable,

for

example,

and the same

applies

to

sociological

theorists such

as

Erving

Goffman

(e.g.,

1959,

1967)

and Pierre

Bourdieu

(e.g.,

[1979]

1984,

[1992]

1996).

Others,

such as

Talcott

Parsons

(e.g.,

1951,

1954)

and

Niklas Luhmann

e.g.,

[1984]

1995,

1990),

are

hardly

even

suggestive:

Their work

inspires

little

research.

25The

simplicity

of

an

idea is

measurable

with its

length,

such as the

number of words or

mathematical

notations it

includes

(Gell-Mann

1994:

30-34;

McAllister 1996:

118-120;

see also

Black

1995:

838-841).

Friedmancommentsthat a scientific

theory

is

simpler

if it

requires

ess "initial

knowledge

... to makea

predic-

tion"

(1953:

10).

26

The

validity

of

a

scientific

theory

is

measurable with

its

precision:

the

degree

to

which the

frequency

and

magnitude

of its

explanatory

variable

match

the

frequency

and

magnitude

of the variable t

seeks to

explain.

The

highest validity

is total

precision.

For

instance,

a

theory

that

variableA

explains

variable B is

highly precise

if all

As are

also Bs

and

all Bs

are also

As,

but less

precise

if

only

a

few As are also Bs

or

only

a few

Bs

arealso As.

An

example

of

a

theory

with low

precision

is

that

later-borns

children

with at least

one

older

sibling)

are more

likely

to be

highly

creative than

firstborns-which is said

to

explain major

nnovations in such fields as

science,

art,

religion,

and

politics

(Sulloway

1996).

Its

precision

is

low because

most

people

are

later-borns-all the more

so in

earlier

societies

with

larger

families-while

very

few

are

highly

creative.

351






SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

natural

and

metaphysical

deas

have

little

or no

scienticity,

for

instance,

whereas

theories

in

physics

and

astronomy

often have a

great

deal. These

differences are

predictable.

The social

location

of

the

subject

is fateful:

Scienticitv

is a

curvilinear

function

of

social

distancefrom the subject.Both very close andvery distantsubjectsattract ess scienticity.

Scienticity

increases with

social distance until the

subject

disappears

or

becomes com-

pletely

alien.27This

principle explains

numerous

differences

across

sciences, scientists,

and nonscientists as

well

as

aspects

of the

evolution of

science,

including

sociology.

First

consider

why

some sciences are more

scientific.

The

Behavior

of

Science

The

history

of

science

is a

history

of

relationships-commonly

a

history

of

contact

with

subjects

once

entirely

unknown. The

greatest scienticity

occurs not where scientists are

very familiar with theirsubjects,but wherethey arenewly acquaintedandlargelydistant.

Science

developed

earliest and fastest where its

subjects

were

extremely

remote. First

came

astronomy,

a science with a

subjectonly barely

observable:The earth-centered stron-

omy

of Claudius

Ptolemy

was

the most scientific

body

of ideas for

nearly

1,500

years,

until

overturned

by

Nicholas

Copernicus

n the

sixteenth

century.Physics,

a

science now

mostly dependent

on

experiments

for contact with its

subject,

advanced

dramatically

n

the seventeenth

century

with Isaac Newton's

revolutionary deas-especially

his

merging

of astronomical and

earthly

science

in the

theory

of gravitation.

Chemistry

had its revo-

lution when Antoine Lavoisier introducedmodernchemical classification

in

the

eighteenth

century

(see

generally

Mason

1962).

Biology,

closer

to

its

subject

than

astronomy,phys-

ics, or chemistry,had no revolution until Charles Darwinchallengedthe Biblical doctrine

of divine creation in the nineteenth

century. Sociology

and

psychology,

the

sciences

with

the closest

subjects

of

all,

came

last-with

the twentieth

century.Astronomy

and

physics

are

still the most scientific

sciences,

while

sociology

and

psychology

are still

the

least.

Why

did the sciences with

nonhuman

subjects

arise earlier and become

more scientific

over

time-more

testable,

general,

and so on? And

why

did the sciences with human

subjects

arise

and advance

at all? An

implication

of

my principle

of

scienticity

is that

science advances

most when

the

subject

is neither too far nor

too close. Sciences with

nonhumanand

remote

subjects

must therefore overcome

their

distance,

while those

with

human and familiar

subjects

must overcome

their closeness.

Both

actually

occurred:

The

physical sciences arose andbecame more scientific as theirsubjectsbecame increasingly

observable,

while the

social sciences

did so as

they

reached

beyond subjects previously

too

close

and

increasingly

made contact

with a more distant

world. The nonhumansciences

advancedfaster

because

they

overcame their

distance

faster than the human sciences

over-

came their

closeness.

Distant sciences such

as

astronomy

and

physics employed

new means

of observation

such

as

telescopes, microscopes,

and electronic

instruments

to become

acquainted

with

subjects

once

completely

invisible.

Physicist Stephen

Hawking

notes that

cosmologists

could once observe

hardly

any

of their

subject-the

universe as

a whole: "Until

the

1920s

about the

only

important

cosmological

observation

was that

the

sky

at

night

is

dark....

However,

in recent

years

the

range

and

quality

of

cosmological

observations

has

improved

enormously

with

developments

in

technology"

(quoted

in

Hawking

and

Penrose 1996:

75).

Cosmology

is

literally light-years

from

most of

its

subject, yet

close

enough

for

a considerable

degree

of

scienticity.

The

tiny subject

of

particle physics-behavior

in

27

Scienticity

declines when informationabout

a

subject-a

form of relational

closeness-diminishes

to a

point

when the behavior of the

subject

is

invisible.

It also declines when

the

subject

is

so

distant

functionally

or

culturally

that its characteristicsare

completely foreign

and

incomparable

o

anything

else.

352







atoms-was

entirely

unobservable

until the twentieth

century,

but the invention

of

particle

accelerators

(the

largest

scientific instruments

n

history)

made

this

subject

sufficiently

visible for a

high degree

of

scienticity

(see,

e.g.,

Segre

[1976]

1980;

Pickering

1984;

Traweek 1988).28

Closer sciences

such

as

biology

and

sociology

advance

by making

contact

with

previ-

ously

distant

subjects

as well.

Darwin's

revolutionary

heory

might

neverhave occurred

o

him

had

he

known

only

the flora and fauna

of his native

England

and never taken

his

famous

voyage

on the

Beagle

to

South America and its

nearby

slands.

Especially

valuable

was the

"strangeness"

f the

species

in the

Galapagos

Islands

(Desmond

and

Moore

[1991

]

1992:

170;

see also

Darwin

[1859]

1967:

1;

Sulloway

1996:

Chapter

1).

A

close

subject

is

a scientific

handicap.

TheBehavior of Sociology

Sociology

took a

great leap

forward

n

the

late

nineteenth

and

early

twentieth

centuries-

its classical

period-when

sociologists

reached

beyond

their home

societies.

Classical

sociologists

devoured

informationabout

past

and

present

societies

aroundthe

world

pro-

vided

by

historians,

explorers,

missionaries,

and other

observers. But later

sociologists

mostly

studied

only

their

own

societies,

and

comparative

and historical

sociology

came to

be

regarded

as

a

specialty. Scienticity

declined. Some

research

methods-such

as

partici-

pant

observation

and

in-depth

interviewing-brought

modern

sociology

even

closer to its

subject

and

subverted its

scienticity

still

more.

Modern

sociology

became

less

scientific

than

classical

sociology.

The

scienticity

of

each

field and

topic

in

sociology

varies

with its

closeness

to

the

subject

as well.

Close

sociology

is less

scientific.

Domestic

subjects

(located

in the soci-

ologist's

own

society

and

time)

attract

less

scienticity

than

foreign subjects.

Domestic

sociologists

are more

practical

and

ideological,

and

also

more concerned with

unobserv-

ables

such

as

human

meanings,

motives, interests,

and

goals.29

Outsiders

are

more

scien-

tific:

Social

distance

contributed

o

such

respected

works as

French

aristocratAlexis de

Tocqueville's

study

of

American

society

([1835-40] 1969),

Swedish

economist

Gunnar

Myrdal's

study

of

American

race relations

(1944),

and

northern

psychologist

John Dol-

lard's

study

of

race

relations in

the

American

South

(1937).

Yet

modern

sociologists

have

gravitated

increasingly

to

subjects

ever

closer to

their own

lives.

Many

study

only

their

own

race,

ethnicity, gender,

or

locality.30

Once

preoccupied

with distant

subjects

below

their own

social elevation

(slum

dwellers and

poorcriminals),

they

increasingly

shifted to

closer

and

highersubjects

(professionals

and

others like

themselves)

and

undermined heir

scienticity

even

more.

The

sociology

of

white-collar

crime,

for

instance,

is more

critical

and

otherwise

unscientific

than the

sociology

of

blue-collar crime

(Black

1995:

856,

note

137).

The

sociology

of

knowledge-an

especially

close

subject-is

one of

sociology's

28The

particle

accelerator's

detector

drastically

reduces

the social

distance from

physicists

to

particles:

"The

relationship

between the

scientist

and

nature

s

at

its most

intimateand

physical

in the

detectors

....

The con-

summationof the

marriage

between

scientist and

nature

n

the detector

sometimes leads to

progeny

for the

proud

scientist: a discovery"(Traweek 1988: 158-159).

29Some

physicists

are more

scientific

about

human

behavior than

many sociologists:

They

dismiss

anything

"unconscious" as

"unknowable"

and

"assert their

ignorance

of human motives"

and

"everything 'subjective'"

(Traweek

1988:

91).

30The

most

scientific

science is

international-stateless-with a

subject

matter

ndependent

of the

nationality

of its

practitioners:

"Particle

physicists

from

anywhere

n the

world are

fond of

remarking

hat

they

have

more

in

common with

each

other

than with

their next-door

neighbors"

(Traweek

1988:

126).

But

sociology's

largely

domestic

subject

matter

segregates

most

of it in

particular

nations.

International nteractionbetween

sociologists

will

remain

infrequent

and

shallow until

the

subject

matter

escapes

its

national boundaries.

353






SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

least scientific fields. Science itself was one

of

the last

subjects

to

be

studied

scientifically.

The

sociology

of

sociology hardly

exists.3

Closeness to the

subject

is also

an

occupational

hazardof

anthropologists

and historians

who study only a single society and period. Initially separatedfrom their subject by a

considerable distance

in social

space,

their research

brings

them

closer and reduces their

scienticity.

Traditional

anthropologists iterally

live with

their

subject,

a

condition

so inti-

mate that

many explicitly

reject

scientific standardssuch as

generality

and

simplicity

in

social

science

(e.g.,

Geertz

1973;

see also

Cooney

1988:

22;

Fuchs and Marshall

1998:

21).

Scienticity

is

everywhere

lower where the

subject

is

closer. Consider

aw: For centuries

legal scholarship

was

pursued

xclusively

by

those

extremely

close to

law-lawyers, judges,

and law

professors-and

hardly

any

scientific ideas about the

subject

existed.

Many

legal

professionals

continue

to

impute

their own scientific

incapacitation

o

everyone

and insist

that law

is immune to science

(see

Black

1997).

Yet when

legal strangers

such as sociol-

ogists and anthropologistsbegan to study law, especially foreign law in foreign places, a

significant

degree

of

scienticity

occurred

(see

Cooney

1988:

20-27).

Art resists science

for the

same reason:

Most art scholars are too close

to be

scientific.

Nearly

all

participate

in art-whether

as

artists, collectors, critics,

or historians-and

nearly

all insist that art

is

immune to science.

But closeness

to

art,

not

art

itself,

is the

enemy

of science

(see

Bour-

dieu

[1992]

1996:

Preface,

229-231,

296).32

The social status

of the

subject

is also

important.

Ideas about

lower

subjects

are

more

scientific:

Scienticity

is

an

inverse

function of

the social

elevation

of

the

subject.

Down-

ward

science

(directed

at

subjects

below the

scientist)

is more scientific

than lateral

or

upward

science.

In

sociology

the

poor

attractmore

scienticity

than the

rich,

the

marginal

more than the integrated,minorities more than majorities,

criminal behavior

more

than

legal

behavior,

the behavior

of

factory

workers more than

the

behavior

of

corporate

exec-

utives,

and

so

on.

American

sociology

was once

primarily

concernedwith

poor,

disadvan-

taged,

and

unrespectable

people,

and some

of

its

most scientific

work

pertains

to

their

behavior.

The

Chicago

School

of

sociology

of

the 1920s

and

30s,

for

instance,

mainly

studied

those

at lower

elevations,

such as slum

dwellers,

struggling

immigrants,

and

petty

criminals

(e.g.,

Anderson

1923;

Zorbaugh

1929).

The closeness

of the

subject

(in Chicago

itself)

nevertheless

retarded

ts

scienticity

to

some

degree, especially

its

theoreticity.

Anthro-

pology

also

has

the scientific

advantage

of

an inferior

subject

(usually

tribal

people

and

peasants),

though

closeness

to

the

subject

likewise subverts

its

scienticity

to

some

degree.

Still lower are

the

nonhuman

subjects

of fields such

as

physics, chemistry,

and

biology.

Particles,

molecules, bacteria,

and

genes-subjects

highly

attractive

o science-have

no

social

standing

at

all.

Some

science

stratifies

reality by ranking

the

explanatory

power

of its

variables,

while

other

science

treats

ts variables

more

equally.

Eminent

physicist

Ernst

Mach,

for

example,

rejected

"every

methodological

axiom

in

science

that smacked of

privilege

and status

for

any given

body

or

event in nature"

Feuer

1982:

31;

see also

32-34;

Keller

1983b:

154-

157;

1985b:

170-171;

Pickering

1984:

74;

1995:

250;

Hawking

and Penrose

1996:

76).

Pure

sociology

similarly rejects

the

theoretical

dominationof

any sociological

variable,

31

The scienticity of the sociology of science increaseswith the social distance from the science studied:The

sociology

of

the

physical

andbiological

sciences

is more scientific than the

sociology

of

the

social

sciences,

for

instance,

and

the

sociology

of

foreign

and earlier science

is more scientific

than

the

sociology

of domestic

and

contemporary

cience

(for

examples

of

relatively

scientific

sociology

of

science,

see Merton

[1938]

1970,

1973;

Crane 1972;

Latour

and

Woolgar

1979;

Pickering

1984).

-32Bourdieu

omments:

"If

the

science of

works

of

art

is

still

today

in its

infancy,

it

is

probably

because

those

in

charge

of

it,

and

in

particular

art historiansand

theoreticians

of

the

aesthetic,

are

engaged

...

in

the

struggles

which

yield

the

meaning

and value of the work of

art: In

other

words,they

are

caughtup

in the

object

they

would

take

as

their

object" ([1992]

1996: 296:

see also

229-231).

354






DREAMS

OF PURE

SOCIOLOGY

such

as the domination

of

economic

ownership

in the

theory

of Karl Marx

(e.g.,

Marx and

Engels

in

Feuer

1959),

social

solidarity

in the

theory

of

Emile Durkheim

(e.g.,

[1893]

1964),

or culture in

the

theory

of Pierre Bourdieu

(e.g.,

[1979]

1984).

We cannot rank the

explanatorypower of the various dimensionsof social space (see, e.g., Black 1976, 1995:

851-852).

The

reason

is

logical

rather han factual.

A

principle

of

incomparability

undermines

any

hierarchical

heory

that

gives

a

privi-

leged place

to

any

variable or that otherwise

ranks scientific variables

acking

a

common

denominator-a

common

unit of

measurement.

To rank the

explanatory

power

of vari-

ables we must

compare equal

amounts of

each,

measured

by

the same standard.Because

the various distances and directions

in social

space

(such

as relationaldistance

or vertical

direction)

have no such common

denominator,

we

cannot

compare

heir

explanatory

power.

Although

we

can rank hese or other variables or the

practicalpurposes

of a

single study-

where the

comparisons

reflect their

measurement n one

context-we

cannot rankthem in

a theorythatapplies morewidely, such as across societies and history.How can we com-

pare, say,

the

impact

of

intimacy

to the

impact

of

economic

superiority

n

legal

or other

matters?How much

intimacy

equals

how

much

economic

superiority?They

have

no

com-

mon denominator.

We

thereforecannot

compare

the

impact

of

equal

amounts of

each,

and

cannot rank their

explanatory power.33

The

only exception

would be a variable

with

no

explanatory

power

at all. The same

principle

of

incomparability ppliesthroughout

cience-

wherever variables lack a common denominator.

Why,

then,

does

theory

so often rankone

variable over another?

The

ranking

of variables

in science reflects

ranking

n the social

environment:Hierar-

chical

explanation

is

a direct

function of

hierarchical

space

(see

Durkheim and

Mauss

[1901-02] 1963; Schwartz 1981; Keller 1983b: 154-155). Theoreticaldominationby a

single

variable

expresses

social domination

by

a

single authority.

An

implication

is that

one-dimensional

theory

in science-monotheorism-occurs

in the

same

environment

as

monotheism in

religion:

monolithic

authority

see

Durkheim

1912]

1995;

Swanson

1960:

Chapter

3).

Marxian

theory,

for

example,

is a dictatorial

theory:

One variable

(capital

ownership)

is

said to

explain

and

thereby

dominate

everything

else. Such a

theory

thrives

best

in

dictatorial

settings

such

as

twentieth-century

Russia,

China,

and varioussocieties

in

Latin

America. But

the

egalitarian heory

of

pure sociology-where

no variable

dominates

another-thrives

best

in more

egalitarian

settings

such as modernAmerica and

western

Europe.

Different theories inhabit different locations

in

social

space,

and

theoretical

change reflects social change (compareKuhn 1962;but see Durkheim[1912] 1995:8-18,

440-448).

Scientific

revolutions

commonly

establish

that

something

once

regarded

as constant is

actually

variable,

whether the

position

of

the

earth

(Copernicus),

the characteristics

of

plants

and

animals

(Darwin),

the

nature of

space

and

time

(Einstein),

the

size

of the

universe

(Hubble),

or

the

placement

of

the

continents

(Wegener).

Pure

sociology

similarly

shows

that social

phenomena previously

regarded

as constant are

actually

variable. The

theory

of law

outlined

earlier,

for

instance,

implies

that

the

law

does

not exist.

Law

varies

from

case to

case.

It

is

relative

rather

than universal

(see

Black

1976,

1989).

The same

applies

to

morality,

ideas,

and God

(see

idem 1995:

855-857).

The

discovery

of new

variation

follows

changes

in

the social location

of

subjects

once

too

close or distant for

a

33

Sociological

studiesthat

statistically

rank

the

explanatory

power

of variables

may

have little

or

no theoretical

relevance. On the

one

hand,

for

instance,

because different amounts

of

wealth

have

a common denominator

a

unit of value

such as

dollars),

we can

readily

ranktheir

impact

on

legal

or other behavior.

It

is thus

possible

to

theorize that law

against

economic inferiors

is

greater

han

aw

against

economic

superiors

(Black

1976:

21-24).

On the other

hand,

because

different amounts

of,

say,

wealth,

intimacy,

and cultural closeness

have no such

common

denominator,

we cannot

rank

their

impact

on law or

anything

else.

355






SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

higher

level of

scienticity.

Scientific

revolutions thus reflect transformations n the social

structure

of the

subject

(compare, e.g.,

Kuhn

1962).

The Behavior

of

Common

Sense

The

familiarity

of a

subject

repels

scienticity

and attracts common

sense-the

popular

understanding

of

reality

in

everyday

life

(see

Geertz

[1975]

1983;

Black

1979a).

Rarely

are

we scientific about our

families,

lovers, friends,

or

colleagues.34

Instead we endow

them

with free will and utter an

unending

stream of untestable deas about the unobserv-

able

content of their

minds.35And who is

scientific

about the behavior of God?

Surely

not

those

close

to

God

who

pray

as inferiors

for favors or

forgiveness

(see

Black

1995:

856-

857,

860).

Never are we less

scientific, however,

than

about ourselves. A

similar

lack of

scienticity

applies

to

subjects otally

alien to us. Consider he

explanation

of

humanbehavior.

Common sense ignores science and says that our closest subjects, such as our nearest

associates and

ourselves,

have free will and do as

they

please.

They

are

not mere

products

of their environment.

Nor are those in distant societies and the distant

past.

The reason is

that the

explanation

of human behavior with

free

will-voluntarism-occurs

under con-

ditions

opposite

those of

scienticity:

Voluntarism is a

U-curvilinear

function

of

social

distance

from

the

subject

(compare

Black 1995:

856,

note

137;

Fuchs and Marshall 1998:

18-22).

The same

applies

to

teleology,

the

explanation

of

anything

as a means to an end.

When all

subjects

were either

very

close or

very

distant,

teleology

dominated

all science.

Copernicus,

for

example,

even

had a

teleological theory

of

gravity:

Gravity is nothing else than a naturalappetency,given to the parts by the Divine

Providence

of the Maker

of the

universe,

in orderthat

they

may

establish

their

unity

and wholeness

by combining

in

the

form of

a

sphere.

It is

probable

hat

this

affection

also

belongs

to the

sun, moon,

and

the

planets,

in

order

that

they may

. . . remain in

their roundness

(quoted

in Mason 1962:

130).

But

teleology

in the natural

sciences

steadily

declined

during

the

past

several centuries

(see

Burtt 1954:

18-19;

Feuer

1982:

352;

Black 1995:

861-863).

It survives

mainly

in

the

human sciences

such as

sociology

and

psychology.

The

explanation

of human

behavior

with factors

beyond

the control

of

the

person-

determinism-occurs underthe same conditions as scienticity:Determinism s a curvilin-

ear

function

of

social distance

from

the

subject (compare

idem:

856,

note

137).

Deterministic

explanation implies

that

people

cannot

behave

otherwise

than

they

do.

They

lack the free

will of

our intimates

and ourselves.

Even close nonhumans

are endowed

with

free will.

People

close

to

nonhuman

animals

(such

as

their research

subjects

or domestic

pets)

often

speak

of

them as

if

they

were

humansand

explain

their behavior

as a

free choice

(see,

e.g.,

de

Waal

1989, 1996;

see also

34Simmelnotes an

incompatibility

between

intimacy

and

generality,

most

extreme in

the case of lovers:

"In

the

stage

of first

passion,

erotic relations

strongly

reject any thought

of

generalization:

The

lovers think

that there

has

never

been a love

like

theirs,

that

nothing

can be

compared

either

to the

person

loved

or to the

feelings

for that

person"([1908] 1950:406, punctuation dited). The same applies to every elementof scienticity in every close

relationship:

Scientists

are unscientific

about their

colleagues,

for

instance,

and

sociologists

are

unsociological

about

fellow

sociologists.

35The

heory

of the

subject

includes

the

subject's

subjectivity-psychological

experience.

Although

we cannot

directly

observe

subjectivity,

we can observe its

attribution

by

others

(including

self-attributions).

These

attribu-

tions are

predictable

and

explainable

with their

location and direction

in social

space.

The

goal

or

purpose

attributed o

a

person's

action

depends,

for

example,

on the

social

closeness and elevation

of the

action.

We can

thereby predict

and

explain

attributions

of

subjectivity

in social science

as well

as

everyday

life.

The same

applies

to

the

goals

and

purposes

attributed

o

groups.

356







Fuchs and

Marshall

1998:

21-22).

Tribal

people

and others

close to nature ikewise

attribute

feelings

and choices to the animals

they

hunt, fish,

and

farm,

and to close

insects,

crops,

and trees

(see,

e.g.,

Frazer

[1890]

1981,

Volume 1:

60-108;

Volume 2:

90-147).

The

Ojibwa of southern Canadasay that trees feel pain and wail when cut, for instance, and

some

Indonesiantribes and

Europeanpeasantsbeg

the

pardon

of the

trees

they

fell

(idem,

Volume 1:

58-61).

Modern

people, including

scientists,

may adopt

the same

style

toward

close nonhumans:

"My

Boston

fern looks

unhappy.

It must want some water"

(see

also

Keller

1983a:

198-200).

One

physicist

even

speaks

of

electrons and other

atomic

particles

that

"want to do this or that"

(Christopher

Stevens,

personal

communication).

Social status is also relevant

to the

explanation

of human

behavior:

Voluntarism s a

direct

function of

the social

elevation

of

the

subject

(Black

1995:

856,

note

137).

And

contrariwise: Determinism is an

inverse

function

of

the social elevation

of

the

subject

(idem).

Common sense

says

that social elites

such as

kings

and

generals freely

choose to

act as they do. So does God. But sociology says that the poor and lowly lack free will:

Forces

beyond

their control

determine heir

behavior

(e.g.,

Cohen

1955;

Miller

1958).

The

rich who

exploit

or

otherwise victimize the

poor

have free

will,

then,

but not the

poor

who

victimize the rich.36

THE

THEORYOF

THEORY

Common sense

says

that theories

derive from

facts. But

philosopher

Karl

Popper ong

ago

observed that a

theory

can never

be

logically

deduced from

the

facts

it

explains:

The

so-called

logical

induction of a

theory

is

impossible

([1934]

1968:

27-32;

see

also

Witt-

genstein

[1921]

1961:

143).

He

added more

generally

that

"there is no such

thing

as

a

logical method of having new ideas" (idem: 32). Creativityis always necessary (idem).

Albert Einstein

makes a similar

point

about

scientific

laws: "There

s

no

logical

path eading

to these

laws;

only

intuition,

resting

on

sympathetic

understanding

f

experience,

can reach

them"

([1923]

1934:

22;

see also

Friedman

1953:

42-43).37

Biologist

PeterMedawarnotes

that

because a

theory

contains

more

information han the

facts it

explains,

it

cannot be

de-

duced from

facts alone

(1963:

377).

Philosopher

Paul

Feyerabend

goes

furtherand

argues

that

no rules

or methods of

any

kind

can

assure the advancement

of

science,

theoreticalor

otherwise

(1975;

compare,e.g.,

Glaser and

Strauss

1967;

Stinchcombe

1968).

Yet

scientific

theory

is human

behavior,

and

nothing

excludes the

possibility

of

explain-

ing

scientific

theory scientifically-as

a

natural

phenomenon.

A

theory

of

theory specifies

36

A

sociological

version

of

voluntarism s

phenomenology-the explanation

of

human behavior from within

the

subjective experience

of

a

person. Sociology

is more

phenomenological

when the

subject

is

closer and

higher

in social

space: Phenomenology

is a

joint

function of

the

social

closeness

and

superiority

of

the

subject

(see

Black 1995:

856,

note

137).

A

sociological

version of

determinismis

motivational

theory-the

explana-

tion of

human

behaviorwith

the

psychological mpact

of social

forces.

Sociology

is moremotivationalwhen the

sub-

ject

is farther

away

and

lower in social

space:

Motivational

heory

is a

joint function

of

the social

remotenessand

inferiorityof

the

subject.

These

formulations

predict,

or

example,

a

more

phenomenologicalexplanation

of

closer

and

higher

crimes such as

those of

professionals

and

business

people

("white-collar

crime"),

but a more motiva-

tional

explanation

of

fartherand

lower

crimes such as

those of

poor

minorities

("blue-collarcrime") (idem).

We can

also

explain

the

explanatory

variables n

sociological

theories. For

example,

some motivational heories

explain

human

behavior

with

variables close

to the

behavior in

space

and

time,

such

as

theories that

explain

human

behavior

with

peer pressure-the

direct and

immediate

influence

of one's associates. Other motivational

theories

explain

human

behavior

with

more distant

variables,

such as theories that

explain

humanbehaviorwith

the culturalvalues of a society.More distantsubjectsattractmore distantexplanations:Thespatial and temporal

distance

of

an

explanatory

variable is a

direct

function

of

social

distance

from

the

subject.

We

thus

explain

the

behavior

of our

intimates

with

variables

close to them

in

space

and time

(such

as their own

intentions),

but we

explain

the

behavior

of

strangers

with

more

distant

variables

(such

as the

values of their

society).

Because

Freudian

psychotherapists

are

somewhat close

to their

patients, they

explain

the

patient's

behavior with close

influences

(in

the

family),

but

because

they

are also

somewhat

distant,

their

explanations pertain

to

family

experiences

in the

distant

past

(in

early

childhood).

37A

scientific

law is

an idea

with an

extremely high degree

of

scienticity-testability, generality, simplicity,

validity,

and

originality.

357






SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

the conditions

that lead to the creation of scientific

theory, including

itself

(see

Black

1995:

856,

note

137).

The

theory

of

scienticity

sketched above

implies

such a

theory.

Scientific

theory

is the most scientific science.

Only theory

can attainall the elements of

thehighestdegreeof scienticity-testability, generality, implicity, alidity,andoriginality-at

once.

The

best

conditions or

scienticity

are herefore he best conditions or scientific

theory.38

The

theory

of

scienticity explains

why

some sciences and scientists aremore theoretical han

others,

and

has

practical

value

as well: It is a

theory

that

implies

how

to

develop theory.

The

theory

of

scienticity implies

that

theory

is a curvilinear unction of social distance

from the

subject.

We can

thereby explain why

the

physical

sciences have

the most

theory

with a

high

degree

of

scienticity

while the

social sciences have

the

least.

The

physical

sciences

have more

theory

because

their

subjects

are

more distant

(while

still close

enough

to

be

observable).

Subjects

in

the social

sciences are often

too close or too far

away.

Within

each science

as

well,

some scientists are

more theoretical because

their

subjects

have

a

better theoretical location in social space. The same theory explains the lack of theory

beyond

formal

science,

such as

the lack of

theory

in

tribal

and other

simple

societies.

Tribal societies

do

not lack

descriptive

science

(such

as

botany

or

zoology)

but

only

theo-

retical

science-explanations

of their observations

(Lingis

1994:

1-2).

The reason is that

tribal

reality

is

polarized:

Virtually

everything

is either

entirely

local or

entirely foreign,

too

close or too

far

away

for

the

development

of

scientific

theory.

Most

scientists never

invent

theory

either,

especially

theory

with

a

high degree

of sci-

enticity.

The reason

s that

most do

research.39Researchers

heoretically ncapacitate

hem-

selves

by

becoming

too intimate

with their

subjects. Many

have

an exclusive

relationship

with a

single subject

and

disregard

almost

everything

else. One

eminent

biologist

(known

for her observationsof genetic mobility) speaks almost maternallyof the corn plants she

studied

for

decades:

"I start with

the

seedling,

and

I

don't

want to leave

it.

I

don't

feel

I

really

know the

story

if

I

don't

watch the

plant

all the

way along.

So

I know

every plant

in

the field.

I know

them

intimately,

and

I find

it a

great pleasure

to

know them"

(Barbara

McClintock,

quoted

in Keller 1983a:

198;

see

also Keller 1985b:

164-165).

Another

biol-

ogist

(who

later

stopped

doing

research

and became

more

theoretical)

notes

that

years

of

experiments

made

his

enzymes

"as familiar

as old

friends"

(Kauffman

1995:

81,

99).

Still

another

speaks

romantically

of cells:

"Here

s a cell.

It has been

going

around

all the

time,

and

nobody

has

taken

any

notice

of it.

Suddenly you

fall

in

love

with it.

Why?

You,

the

scientist,

don't

know

you're

falling

in

love,

but

suddenlyyou

become

attracted

o that cell"

(AnnaBrito, pseudonym, quoted in Goodfield [1981] 1982: 226).

Although

celebrated

theorists

may

do

research

in

their

early years,

their theories

usually appear

only

after

they

become

full-time

theorists.

Many

have

no research

experience

at all.

The

most celebrated

theories

in

physics,

for

instance,

were

largely

de-

veloped

by

full-time

theorists

such

as Albert

Einstein,

Niels

Bohr,

and Werner

Heisen-

berg.40

The

same

applies

to

cosmology,

the most

theoretical

field of

astronomy.

Biolo-

gists

James

Watson

and

Francis Crick

likewise

developed

a theoretical

model

of

the

DNA

molecule

(central

to the

understanding

of

genetic

inheritance)

without

doing

any

of

their

own research

on the

subject

(Crick

1988:

65).

The

revolutionarytheory

of continental

drift

in

geology

was

not even

formulated

by

a

geologist,

but

by

astronomer

and

meteo-

38

"Theory"

hereafter

refers to ideas

with

a

comparatively

high degree

of

scienticity.

Exceptions

are

apparent

n

the text.

39By

"research"

mean

primary

research-the

gathering

of

data and

production

of

findings.

4"'About

ne-half of

all

particlephysicists

are

full-time

theorists;

he rest

are

experimentalists

Traweek

1988:

3).

The

only experiments

some

theorists conduct

are

so-called

thoughtexperiments-by

which

they imagine empir-

ical

reality

under

hypothetical

conditions

never

actually

observed.

Einstein,

for

example,

is famous

for

his

exper-

imental

fantasies

(see,

e.g.,

Miller 1996:

312-320).

358






DREAMS

OF PURE SOCIOLOGY

rologist

Alfred

Wegener

(Cohen

1985:

446-450).

Major

theorists

also

typically

follow

a

nomadic

way

of scientific

life,

moving

from

subject

to

subject,

never

too close

to

any.41

Youth is an

advantage

for the same reason: It

limits

intimacy

with the

subject (sug-

gested by RobertaSenechal de la Roche). Darwin was 29 years old when he formulated

the

theory

of natural

selection,

for

example;

Einstein

was 26 when

he

published

the

spe-

cial

theory

of

relativity;

and

Heisenberg

was

23 when he

initiated the

theory

of

quantum

mechanics

and 25 when he

propounded

his

famous

uncertaintyprinciple

that ended

clas-

sical

causality

in

particle physics

(Pais

1991:

275-276,

304-306;

see

also

Simonton

1984:

Chapter

6).

Watson

and Crick were

newcomers to

molecular

biology

when

they

formulated

the

structureof DNA: Watson

was a

postdoctoral

ellow

only

24

years

old,

while

Crick

was

a

graduate

studentof

36 who had

migrated

o the

field

from

physics

(Watson

[1968]

1969;

Crick

1988:

6,

65).

In

theoretical

science,

too much

experience

may

be

harmful.

Social

isolation s another

ondition

conducive

to the

highest

achievements

n

science-to

originality, for example (also called creativity, imagination, innovation, and inventive-

ness).

Philosopher

Arthur

Schopenhauer

ong ago

observed

that

"The

genius

lives

essen-

tially

alone. He is

too rare to be

easily

capable

of

coming

across his

like,

and too

different

from the

rest to be

their

companion"

([1859]

1969,

Volume 2:

390).

Philosopher

Michel

Serres

similarly

remarks

that

originality

"always

takes

place

in

solitude,

independence,

and

freedom"-relational

isolation

([1990]

1995:

37;

see

also

81-82;

Storr

1988).

Also

important

are

cultural

isolation

(such

as the

marginality

of

migrants

or

minorities)

and

functional

isolation

(exclusive

involvement in a

single

activity): Creativity

is

a

direct

function of

social

isolation. In this

respect,

moreover,

the

social

structureof

theory

differs

considerably

from

the

social

structureof

research.

Scientific researchtypically occurs in social networksof colleagues knownin the soci-

ology

of

science

as

"invisible

colleges"

(see

generally

Crane

1972).

Often

research

is a

team

project

that

includes

a

number of

individuals

working closely

together

in

the same

organization

(see,

e.g.,

Collins

1975:

Chapter

9;

Whitley

1984;

Fuchs

1992:

Chapter

7).

But

such

research

s

relatively

routine-what

Thomas

Kuhn

calls

"normal

cience"

(1962:

Chapters

2-4).

Rarely

does

it lead

to

creativity

of

the

highest

degree,

such

as the

devel-

opment

of

revolutionary

heories.

Far from

it. As

one

fictional

scientist

remarks,

"Highly

organized

research

is

guaranteed

o

produce

nothing

new"

(Herbert

[1965]

1990:

496).

Instead,

the

most

acclaimed

theories

occur

under

opposite

conditions-in

isolated loca-

tions in

social

space.

Consider

the

most

illustrious

thinkers-the

Newtons,

Einsteins,

Nietzsches, andWittgensteins-at the heightof theircreativity.All were lonersdevotedto

their

own

projects.42

n

their

early years

their

new

ideas

isolated

them

all

the

more.

The

theory

of

scienticity-and

the

theory

of

theory

it

implies-pertains

not

only

to

the

creation of

scientific

ideas

but to

their

acceptance

and

application

by

others.

The social

location of

the

most

receptive

audiences,

including

those

most

receptive

to

radically

new

ideas,

is

the

same as

the

social

location of

the

sources:

those

comparatively

distant from

the

subject.

For

this

reason,

young

people

and

other

newcomers

to a

field

(including

stu-

dents)

more

readily

accept

and

apply

its

newest

and

most

scientific

ideas

(suggested

by

Roberta

Senechal

de

la

Roche).

Scientific

revolutions

primarily

attract the

support

of

younger

scientists

while their

senior

colleagues

cling

to older

ideas

about their older

sub-

41

Weber

notes

that

"dilettantes"

without

close

knowledge

of a

subject

often

outperform

"specialists"

in the

development

of

theory:

"Many

of our

very

best

hypotheses

and

insights

are due

precisely

to

dilettantes"

[1919]

1958:

135-136).

42

Although

social

isolation

is

conducive to

creativity,

it is

not

conducive to

the

success of creative

work:

Because

social

isolation

has a

low

elevation

and

distant

location in

social

space,

isolated

ideas are less

likely

to

succeed

than

ideas

in

social

networks

(see

section

above

entitled

"What Is

Important?").

But

sponsorship by

a

more

integrated

person

or

network

may

win

recognition

for

an

isolated

idea that

might

otherwise be

ignored

(see

also

Latour

1987;

compare

Collins

1998).

359






SOCIOLOGICAL

THEORY

jects

(see,

e.g.,

Feuer

1982).

When

the

audience

is

too close

to the

subject,

the

greatest

advances

in

science

meet indifference

if

not resistance and

hostility

(see,

e.g.,

Barber

1961;

see

also

Black

1976:

82).

All the above applies equally to social scientists: Least theoreticalare researchers ong

intimate

with a

single

subject

in

a

particular

ime and

place,

such as

anthropologists

who

study

a

single

tribe or

area,

historians who

study

a

single

period

of

a

single

society

or

region,

and

sociologists

who

study

a

single topic

in their

own

society

and time.

Especially

damaging

to the

creation and

reception

of

theory

is

participant

observation

or

other

close

contact

with the

subject

(see

Cooney

1988:

22;

Fuchs

and

Marshall 1998:

18).

Closeness

to

a human

subject

breeds an

involvement

with the

subject's

mind and undermines the

creation

of ideas with

a

high degree

of

testability,generality,

and other

attributes

of scien-

ticity

(see

Black 1995:

856,

note

137;

see

also Fuchs

and

Marshall

1998:

18-21).

If

you

are

close

enough

to

imagine

the

subjectivity

of a

subject,

you

are

probably

too close to be

theoretical.

Yet most

sociologists

know

their

subject

only

in

their

own

society

and time and

have

little information

about

anything

else.

Those who

study

inequality

or

religion

or violence

in modern

America,

for

example, rarely

know

anything

about

these

subjects

in

tribal,

ancient,

medieval,

or other societies

unlike their

own.

As

noted

earlier,

classical sociolo-

gists

were

more

cosmopolitan:

They exploited

information

rom numerous

societies

across

history. They

were nomadic

as

well,

moving

from

one

topic, place,

and

time

to another

(compare

Brekhus 1998:

47-48).

Most modern

sociologists

are

too close to their

subject

to

develop theory comparable

o

classical

theory.

Researchers

often

criticize

theorists

for not

doing

research,

and

theorists

often

criticize researchersfor not doing theory. But such criticisms are unsociological. Re-

searchers

and

theorists

have

opposite

locations

in

social

space:

Research

is close

to

its

subject

and

sedentary

while

theory

is more distant

and

nomadic.

It is difficult

to do

both at

once.

But

not all modern

sociologists

are

too

close to

their

subject

to

develop

scientific

theory.

Some are too

far

away.

The

prolific

theorist

Talcott Parsons

did

virtually

no re-

search

and

moved

nomadically

from

subject

to

subject

(see,

e.g.,

1951, 1954).

Even

so,

he

did

not

exploit

or

explain

the

findings

of other

sociologists,

anthropologists,

or

his-

torians.

Distant

enough

from

his

subject

to be

theoretical,

he

was

nonetheless

too

distant

to achieve

a

high

degree

of

scienticity:

He

produced

only general

concepts

and classifi-

cations rather hantestableformulations,and his writingshave little value to researchers.

Another

prolific

theorist,

Niklas

Luhmann,

was

similarly

uninvolved

in factual

reality

and

produced

similarly

unscientific

theory.

Researchers

were useless

to

him,

and his writ-

ings

are

equally

useless to

them

(see,

e.g.,

[1984]

1995,

1990).

Theorists

such

as Parsons

and

Luhmann

promiscuously

publish

thousands

of

theoretical

pages,

a

mode

of scholar-

ship

possible

only

when

the actual

behavior

of the

subject

is irrelevant.

Each

published

a

small

library,

but

neither

owns

a

single

formulation

that

meets

all

the standards

of

scien-

ticity.43

Still less

scientific

are those

who

write

only

about

the

writings

of earlier

sociol-

43

Scientific

productivity

s often

measured

with

publications.

But

scienticity

varies

inversely

with

the number

of

pages published

by

an author.

Albert Einstein's

special

theory

of

relativity appears

n a

paper

only

30

pages

long; CharlesDarwin'sfirst statementof the theoryof naturalselection (with independentco-discovererAlfred

Russel

Wallace)

is

only

17

pages

long;

James

Watson

and Francis

Crick's structural

model

of

DNA

is

only

one

page

long

(with

double

columns);

and

Max

Born's

major

contribution

o

quantum

heory-the

probability

con-

cept

in

quantum

mechanics-appears

in a footnote

(Pais

1991:

285-286).

A better measure

of

scientific

produc-

tivity

is

the

numberof

testable,

general,

simple,

valid,

and

original

ormulations

n

an author's

work-its

scienticity.

By

this

measure Max

Weber,

for

instance,

would do

poorly.

When not

merely

historical,

his

work is

mainly

conceptual

rather han

explanatory.

Emile

Durkheim

does

better,

hough

his

total

number

of

testable and

general

formulations

s

probably

ewer

than

ten. The

Division

of

Labor

([1893]

1964)

has two-both

wrong

(see

Black

1987:

568). Suicide

([1897]

1951)

has

four

(counting

one in a

footnote).

360







ogists

(e.g., Poggi

1972;

Lukes

1973;

Bierstedt

1981;

Alexander

1982-83).

The

history

of

sociology

is not even

sociology.

Every

epistemology

reflects the social structure f its

subject.Many

sociologists

endorse

the pessimistic epistemology of sociology that flowered in Germanyover a centuryago:

Sociology

was

classified as one

of the cultural sciences

(Kulturwissenschaften

or

Geisteswissenschaften)

whose human

subjects

were claimed to differ

fundamentally

rom

the

subjects

of

astronomy,

physics,

and othernatural

ciences

(Naturwissenschaften).

Human

subjects

allegedly

lie

beyond

the reach of

genuine

science and forever

condemn the

cul-

tural sciences to

scientific failure

(see,

e.g., Ringer

1997:

Chapters

1-2).

One

modern

sociologist

declares,

for

example,

that the

pursuit

of

sociology

in the manner

of

natural

science is

"misguided"

and

"utopian"

Alexander

1987:

22-23).

Sociology

cannot

even

establish a

fact,

much less a

theory

about human

behavior:"From he

most

specific

factual

statements

up

to the most

abstract

generalizations,

social

science

is

essentially

contestable.

Everyconclusion is open to argument" idem:25). Social science is ideological as well-

inherently

evaluative: "The

ideological

implications

of

social science redound

to the

very

descriptions

of the

objects

of

investigation

themselves"

(idem: 21).

Another

modern

soci-

ologist

remarks

that "a

century's experience

now

suggests"

a

truly

"scientific

theoretical

sociology"

is

"beyond anyone's

grasp"

(Turner

1996:

15).

These

philosophers

of failure

assume that all

sociology

has a close

subject,

including

human

thoughts

and

feelings.

They

believe it

must address

"eithermental

states or

condi-

tions in

which

mental states are

embedded,"

and

"any

generalization

about the

structureor

causes of

a social

phenomenon

...

depends

on some

conception

of the

motives involved"

(Alexander

1987:

21,

29;

see also

Winch

1958;

Homans

1964,

1967:

Chapters

2-3).

Yet

they themselves commonly contemplatehumanbehavior from afar,without facts about

anything.

Their

scientific

pessimism

reflects

the

unscientific

location of their

subject:

too

close or

too far

away.

* *

*

Now

consider

the

methodological

implications:

Do

you

wish to

develop

sociological

theory

with a

high degree

of

scienticity?

If

so,

my theory

of

scienticity

can

help

you

succeed. It specifies social locations especially attractive to scientific theory: subjects

neither

too close

nor too

far. It

implies

several

rules of

theoretical

method-sociological

rules

that

enhance

your

chances of

being

successful.44

They

tell

you

where

to

go

and

what

to do.

Obey

these

commandments:

1.

Leave

home:

Find

subjects

in

other

times

and

places.

2.

Be a

nomad:

Move from

subject

to

subject.

3. Be

a

parasite:

Subsist

on the

findings

of

others.

4.

Avoid

intimacy:

Do

not

get

too

close to

your

subject.

5.

Avoid

people:

Study

social

life.

44Because

they

specify

a

means

to an

end,

Durkheim

would

classify

these

methodological

rules as

"rules of

technique" [1906]

1953:

42).

Their

violation

reduces the

likelihood of

sociological

theory

with a

high degree

of

scienticity.

Feyerabend

argues

against

all

methodological

rules in

science:

Scientific

progress

requires

creativity,

and

creativity

does

not

obey

rules

(1975:

especially

10,

23,

27-28).

But

he does

not

consider the

possibility

of

a

scientific

theory

that

implies

how to

develop

scientific

theory

or

encourage creativity (compare

Serres

[1990]

1995:

86).

361






SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

THE

THEORY

OF ITSELF

I

dreamed

of

pure sociology,

and

my

dreams came true. Pure

sociology explains

why.45

t

came into

being

where science and

theory

flourish: neither too close nor too far from

the

subject.

FirstI

stoppeddoing

research. left

my society,

and

I

left the

present.

I

began reading

an-

thropology

and

history, wandering

across social

space

from one

place

and

time to another.

Soon

I

discovered

a

strange

and

mysterioussubject:

he behaviorof law.

It was an unfamiliar

form of life that

everywhere obeyed

its own

principles.

It attracted

a

high degree

of scien-

ticity

as well as

a new

sociology-without psychology, teleology,

or

people.

Pure

sociology.

I lost contact with the classical traditionand

became a

stranger

o

my

fellow sociolo-

gists.

I studied the behavior

of science and the behavior of

sociology

itself. Then came a

scientific

theory

of

why

most

sociology

is so unscientific and a

theory

of

why

it has so

little

theory:

Most has an unscientific

and untheoretical ocation-either

too close or too

far from its

subject.

Most

sociologists study only

their own

society

in their own time.

Others

sit in armchairs

and do not

study reality

at all.

Whether too close or too

far,

few

believe

that

sociology

is

really

a science or that

sociological

laws are

possible.

They

blame

the

complexity

of

human

behavior,

they

blame

subjectivity,

and

they

blame free

will. But

the

problem

is the social

structureof their own

sociology: They study

only

themselves,

or

nothing.

The

subject

is

hopeless.

THE GHOST

OF

THE

PERSON

What does

it all mean?

We are

agents

of countless

forms of social

life

fluctuating

across the

social universe.

We

obey principles

we do not know

and cannot

change.

Ouractions

are

social,

chosen no

more

than we

chose to be

born. Our ideas

are social as

well,

attracted

by

the social

structure

of

our lives.

We conform

to the

shape

of social

space. Geometry

is

destiny.

Who, then,

is

speaking?

I am the

voice of

puresociology.

I

speak

a

new

language.

I travel

social

space,

habitat

of social

beings,

a form of

life both human

and unhuman.

I

explore

unknown

locations,

calculate

distances

in uncharted

directions,

measure

quantities

never counted.

My subject

is everything,I go everywhere,and I live in the past, present,andfuture at once.46

I

am

sociology

becoming

itself.

I

study

the behavior

of

social

life,

the

laws of

law,

the

laws of

art,

the

laws of God.

I

am

the science

of

science,

the

theory

of

theory.

I

myself

am

social,

and

I

predict

myself.

I am

post-personal.

Post-human.47

And

I am notorious.

I killed

the

person.

I

am the

end of the

classical

tradition.

The end of Western

thought.48

45Luhmann

egards

a

theory

as "universal"

only

if it "claims

to be able

to describe

every phenomenon

n

its

field," including"itself" (quotedin Sciulli 1994: 54). It must be "self-referential"[1984] 1995: xlvii). Yet he

speaks

only

of what a

theory

can "describe"-not

what

it can

explain.

His own

theory

can

classify

many things,

including

itself,

but it cannot

explain

itself

or

anything

else.

46NormanMailer

on Picasso's Cubist

paintings:

"Onehad

to find a

way

to

paint

works

that

would

embody past,

present,

and

future all

in one"

(1995: 311;

see also

310;

Ball

[1927]

1996:

43;

Mondrian

1938-44]

1986:

362;

Snyder

1974a:

88;

1974b:

114).

Scientific

theory

with the

highest degree

of

generality

is timeless

and

placeless

as well.

47The

concept

of

post-human

derives

from

Douglas Coupland

(1996:

85).

4SSuggested by

Roberta Senechal

de la Roche.

The Western

tradition

of

humanism

places

the

person

at

the

center

of the universe.

Pure

sociology

makes the

person

irrelevant.

362






DREAMS

OF PURE SOCIOLOGY

But

you

said

you

dreamed

of

pure

sociology.

What s a dream? Whatscience

is this?

What

theory?

It

sounds like a

person.

It is

just

common

sense.

Remember the theoryof the subject:I am talking aboutmyself.

The

subject

is

very

close,

and science is

forbidden.

The structure s commonsensical.

The

structureeven dreams.

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Alexander,

Jeffrey

C. 1982-83.

Theoretical

Logic

in

Sociology.

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of

California Press.

Four

volumes.

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1987.

"The

Centrality

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Pp.

11-57

in

Social

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Today,

edited

by Anthony

Giddens

andJonathanH. Turner.Cambridge,U.K.: Polity Press.

Anderson,

Nels. 1923. The Hobo:

The

Sociology

of

the

Homeless Man.

Chicago: University

of

Chicago

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Ball,

Hugo.

[1927]

1996.

Flight

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of

Time:A Dada

Diary.


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California

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Barber,

Bernard.

1961. "Resistance

by

Scientists to Scientific

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Science 134:596-602.

Baumgartner,

M. P. 1978. "Law

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1639-1665."

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153-78

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Law and

Sociology:

An Annual

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1,

edited

by

Rita J. Simon.

Greenwich,

CT:

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New

York:Oxford

University

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Virginia

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