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BIRLA MUN’15

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASEEMBLY (DISEC)

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Delegates,

It is an honor to be serving as the Executive Board of the

General Assembly at BIRLA MUN’15.Please consider that

the following guide, as the name suggests, is merely to

provide you with the background of the agenda and enable

you to understand the basic structure of this committee. Your

real research lies beyond this guide and we hope to see some

strong content and debate coming our way. The agenda at

hand is both vast and complex, and a successful discussion on

it would entail the collective participation of all of you. It

shall be your prerogative to decide the direction in which you

want to take this committee. If you are doing an MUN for the

very first time, we expect you to read the UNA USA rules of

procedure. Do not feel taken aback on the research, foreign

policy and other details of the allotted country and feel free to

contact any of the executive board members at all times for

any help with regard to the issue at hand. This document has

a basic outline of the agenda to help you analyze our

expectations from you as a delegate.We hope that by working

together and putting our best foot forward,we are able to make

these three days of conference intellectually stimulating for

all.

Happy researching!

Executive board

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ABOUT THE COMMITTEE

The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and

threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out

solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.

It considers all disarmament and international security matters within

the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any

other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of

cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as

well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of

armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures

aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.

The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations

Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on

Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly

entitled to verbatim records coverage.

The First Committee sessions are structured into three distinctive

stages:

1. General debate

2. Thematic discussions

3. Action on drafts

It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to

verbatim records coverage pursuant to Rule 58 (a) of the rules of

procedure of the General Assembly.

Working Methods

Over the years, efforts have been made to rationalize the work of the

Committee, concentrating on rearranging its agenda and improving its

organization of work (see resolution 42/42 [N] of 30 November

1987).

During the 48th session of the Assembly, in 1993, the item entitled

“Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First

Committee” was included in the agenda of the Assembly.

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Thereafter, the Assembly has focused on improving the

effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee (see

resolutions 48/87 of 16 December 1993, 49/85 of 15 December

1994, 57/300 of 20 December 2002, 58/41 of 8 December 2003,

58/126 of 19 December 2003, 58/316 of 1 July 2004 and 59/95 of 3

December 2004).

During the 59th session, in response to a request of the Secretary-

General to seek the views of Member States on improving the

effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee, a

report compiling those views was submitted by the Secretariat (see

A/59/132 and addenda 1 to 6).

Since the 60th session, under the item “Revitalization of the work

of the General Assembly”, the Committee has adopted its

programme of work and timetable for the forthcoming session.

Please also see the note by the Secretariat (A/C.1/68/INF/4).

Landmark Documents

Resolution 1 (I): The very first General Assembly resolution,

entitled “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the

Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy”, was

adopted on recommendation by the First Committee on 24 January

1946, in London.

Resolution 1378 (XIV): The very first General Assembly

resolution that was co-sponsored by all Member States at that time.

Special sessions on disarmament (resolutions and decisions

adopted at the 10th, 12th and 15th special sessions of the General

Assembly)

A/S-10/4 (23 May – 30 June 1978)

A/S-12/6 (7 June – 10 July 1982)

A/S-15/6 (31 May – 25 June 1988)

INTRODUCTION

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Space-based technologies play an increasingly critical

role in the maintenance and development of national

and international infrastructures. With the benefits of

the widespread application of peaceful outer space

technology, comes the urgent need for the international

community to understand, communicate and

cooperatively regulate activities in the outer space.

Potential dangers such as the dissemination of dual-use

technologies, the shift from the militarization of space

to the weaponization of space, and the growing problem

of space debris are threatening to undermine security in

outer space as well as prospects for its peaceful use by

humanity as a whole.

More than 130 States have interests at stake either as

space-faring nations or indirectly benefiting from the

use of commercial satellites. There is an international

consensus on the general principle of 'the importance

and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space',

as shown by the regular adoption by the UN General

Assembly, without any negative vote, of a number of

resolutions since 1990. However, there has been a lack

of political and diplomatic action, whereas existing

frameworks such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and

the 1979 Moon Agreement are insufficient for dealing

with the challenges that we now foresee.

The costs and harm associated with an ill-regulated

environment for space activities were exemplified in an

analysis of the 'qualitative changes' in conditions in near

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space. The increasing volume of objects launched for

military purposes - such as small satellites and new

super-small assets - are threatening to over-populate

near space orbits and lead to reduced visibility. The

development and dissemination of small size and cheap

strike systems, capable of creating small pockets of

orbital debris that would deny other parties access to

space, if unmonitored, could lead to a new arms race. It

could also make space activities more costly by

requiring the enhanced protection of satellites. Concern

over the 'technical littering' of space and the problem

posed by space debris was expressed. In order to

meaningfully address these matters, the international

community needs to develop a legal regime that builds

upon initiatives such as the declaration by the Russian

Federation of non-first placement of weapons in space

and the joint Chinese-Russian proposal to the

Conference on Disarmament (CD 1679) of possible

future international legal agreement.

The effects of orbital debris on space security and the

urgent need for action were a major focus. Debris are

threatening to degrade the already fragile space

environment and may render space unfit for human

endeavours. The amount of existing debris is considered

to far exceed that currently identified by NASA (at

13,000 large pieces), especially at the most heavily used

Lower Earth Orbit. Debris will cyclically collide with

each other and thus create more remains that effectively

form a lethal shell around the earth. Despite the

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widespread acknowledgement of the danger of orbital

debris, the problem has not deserved sufficient

attention. Efforts such as the proposal to set working

guidelines in dealing with space debris at the United

Nations by June 2007 are considered vital. He further

warned against the placement of non-offensive weapons

around satellites or non-debris producing weapons - as

these weapons themselves could be targeted by parties

using low-cost, low-technology weapons that create

fields of debris and destroying the other more

technologically advanced weapons

SPACE WARFARE

Military competition and conflict in outer space can be

divided into three stages: militarization, weaponization

and the space battlefield.

Space militarization has become a thing of the past.

Now, many countries are researching more advanced

space weaponry technology, which means space

weaponization is becoming a growing reality. The

process of space competition is astonishingly similar to

the process of nuclear competition among big

countries. The peaceful use of nuclear energy and

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peaceful use of space also are comparable to the non-

proliferation of space weapons and the prevention of

weaponization in outer space. At present, there are at

least 50 countries and regions possessing space

capabilities. Some other countries actually have equal

or similar strength and opportunities to develop such

capabilities. If the existing order was broken up, the

countries that used to have a safe lead in space

technology would lose their psychological equilibrium,

which as a consequence, would trigger a collective

panic in the world. Countries that have lost their

advantages would make unfounded assumptions and

undertake irrational activities to develop more

advanced technologies.

Space weaponization first means that countries in the

lead would deploy offensive weapons in space and that

military competition would expand in space via new

methods and advanced technologies. Then more

countries would start studying, creating, and using anti-

offensive weapons and join in the space military

competition club. Due to the progress in developing

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military technology, countries that now are falling

behind would start a new round of competition

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SPACE DEBRIS

NASA estimates that there are currently 500,000

pieces of space junk bigger than a marble and 22,000 as

large as a softball. The number of flecks at least 1

millimeter in diameter probably runs into the hundreds

of millions.

These pieces are moving so fast that even a tiny shard

could knock out one of the 1,000 or so operational

satellites currently orbiting the planet. That's potentially

a big problem in our technological society, which is

increasingly dependent on satellites to provide

communications, Earth observations and other services.

In 2007, an anti-satellite test by China created a vast

cloud of debris that continues to plague spacecraft

operators today. Another major event occurred in

February 2009, when a dead Russian military satellite

slammed into an active U.S. communications satellite to

create two new clouds of space junk.

Red Conjunction

Perhaps the most visible symptoms of the space junk

problem are the regular collision avoidance manoeuvres

being performed by the International Space Station

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(ISS), and the increasingly frequent and alarming need

for its occupants to "shelter-in-place" when a piece of

junk is detected too late for a manoeuvre.

The systems on the ISS that provide vital life support

are also responsible for its unique vulnerability to a

debris impact - a pressurised module in a vacuum might

behave like a balloon if punctured.

The recent "red conjunction" (where a piece of debris

comes close enough to pose a threat to the space

station) involving a fragment from a Russian satellite on

17 July this year was yet another demonstration of the

growing threat from space junk.

SATEITES AND NANOSATELITES

Satellites and Nanosatellites Satellites, as much as their

uses, can be considered as "power-enhancers", which

means that their interest regarding military activity is

the expansion of actions directed towards ground

targets rather than actions themselves. However, the

scientific progress enabled new attack systems raising

the risk of war between satellites. As for now, this issue

is particularly focusing on non-nuclear missiles and

high energy laser weapons. Anti-missile device have to

follow a strict procedure: detection, acknowledgment

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and destruction. However, such electronic systems are

vulnerable. The international law face a crucial lack of

regulation regarding the launching and use of non-

nuclear weapons.

UN resolutions do not provide any rules related to

nanosatellites. The last generation of nanosatellites

weigh less than 10 kilos. These nanosatellites can be

hiding explosive charges and are able to reach and dock

secretly other satellites in order to inspect or damage

them. This technology is basic and available to most of

countries.

Existing legal instruments

1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The

Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water

1967 Outer Space Treaty (formally titled as the Treaty

on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.)

1968 Rescue Agreement (formally titled as the

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of

Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into

Outer Space)

1971 Agreement Relating To The International

Telecommunications Satellite Organization "Intelsat"

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(with annexes and Operating Agreement

1972 Liability Convention (formally titled as the

Convention on International Liability for Damage

Caused by Space Objects)

1975 Registration Convention (formally titled the

Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched

into Outer Space)

1979 Moon Agreement (formally entitled the

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies)

1985 Convention On The International Maritime

Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) with Annex and

Operating Agreement (1976); as amended 1985; with

Protocol (1981)

Although the current international legal instruments

concerning outer space do, to some extent, prohibit and

restrict the deployment of weapons, use of force as well

as military activities in certain parts of space, the related

provisions contained in them are seen by some states to

be limited in scope and therefore inadequate for

preventing weaponization of outer space. The progress

of science and technology could make it necessary to

strengthen the existing international legal system

THE TREATY ON PREVENTION OF THE

PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE

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procedures to assure that space will be a neutral realm

from which all classes of space-based weapons are

banned and from which no hostile action shall be taken

toward beings or objects on Earth or in space from

space.

This Treaty invites Nation States to become Signatories

to this Treaty and invites all Nation States, with

recognition to Indigenous Nations, to commit to plan

and assist in the orderly development and

implementation of a framework and procedures that

will assure and verify that space is and will remain to be

a peaceful neutral realm from which all classes of

space-based weapons are banned in

perpetuity. Peaceful international cooperative space

exploration, research and development can continue as

now is the time to replace strategies and technologies of

violence with strategies of Space Age cooperation that

solve problems instead of creating new ones.

The first resolution, Prevention of an arms race in outer

space, "call[s] on all States, in particular those with

major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the

peaceful use of outer space, prevent an arms race there,

and refrain from actions contrary to that

objective."There were 178 countries that voted in favor

to none against, with 2 abstentions (Israel, United

States).

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The second resolution, No first placement of weapons in

outer space, which emphasizes the prevention of an

arms race in space and that "other measures could

contribute to ensuring that weapons were not placed in

outer space." 126 countries voted in favor to 4 against

(Georgia, Israel, Ukraine, United States), with 46

abstentions (EU member States abstained on the

resolution).

CASE STUDIES

USA

The United States of America In 2002, as a counsellor

to G.W. Bush, Condolezza Rice decided to review the

US policy regarding spatial activities. The USA have

indeed always been, since the Cold War, the most

modern and effective in this field, but the gap with

other countries tends to diminish. They indeed possess

in 2001 110 military satellites whereas the Russian

Federation owned 40 of them and the 20 remaining

satellites belonged to other nations. The USA fear the

rise of Indian and Chinese reconnaissance satellites

more and more narrowly-specialized that they could be

a threat to the American supremacy regarding space

devices. In 1999, the budget of the United States

dedicated to militarize space was about 94,8% of the

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total of military spatial budget of all the countries. That

is why it can easily be said that in order to find an

agreement, all member states countries really take the

initiative to open the discussion with the USA before

they implement their own program concerning arms in

space without any international talks.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

People's Republic of China People's Republic China as

much less spatial engines compared to the USA but this

nation has many ambitious projects when it comes to

arms race in outer space. Since the 80's, China tries to

manage to implement an international treaty about non-

armament in space in order to curb the USA's influence

in this area that is why PRC has led the negotiations at

the UN since many years with the purpose of

implementing concrete rules quickly. Their engineers in

fact claim that spatial weapons not only threaten China's

security but also the world's one.

Nevertheless, China remains quite secretive about its

true intentions and about its own spatial development,

using the argument of the American supremacy to

develop its programs. That is why you delegates should

focus your debates on these particular interrogations

regarding China's enrolment and goals in the

weaponization of space.

RUSSIA FEDERATION

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The Russian Federation Russia has been during the

second half of the 20th Century a leader in spatial

armament, but since the dislocation of the USSR and

the end of the Cold War, Russian equipment grew old

and the government did not invested enough money to

keep it from being outdated because funds were not

sufficient. The authorities tried to improve this

precarious situation by combining its commercial

programs as well as all its militarized spatial programs

but it is not yet sufficient to counter dilapidated state of

the missiles, which can become rather worrying for the

international community.

Furthermore, the Russian government has expressed the

same interrogations as China regarding the operations

of the USA in space, that is why Russia highly

developed since the beginning of the 2000's its technical

skills, and the country has now acquired the capacity,

on a long-term approach, to reach the level of the USA.

It then raises many questions concerning

EUROPE

Europe European countries are less involved in the

weaponization of space, contrary to the USA. They

would rather develop programs aiming at favouring

sustainable development, the management of the planet

and its economic and social repercussions.

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France and the United Kingdom are rather focused on

civil development in space than military activities.

France practises diverse activities in space such, from

launching to Earth observation and plays an important

part in the Galileo project. The British are present in

space as well but for civil purposes and its programs are

far from being militarized as the USA's or China's.

Nevertheless, European countries depend on the USA

and would support them if a collation had to be made.

Europe could not lead a military operation in space by

itself, if the region is involved, it would follow the

procedure to develop an International Code of Conduct

for Outer Space Activities (ICoC). The code will not

function as a legally binding treaty, but is intended to

consist of a set of principles and guidelines agreed to on

a voluntary basis amongst states. It is not intended to

have any formal enforcement mechanisms.

FURTHER REFERENCES:

http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gadis3310.doc.htm

http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-

prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/

http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsB

yYear_en)/339C2946631405E9C1257E03005F9CD4?

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