Binghamton Journal of

Philosophy, Politics, and Law2009-2010 Archive

I. The Decline of Party Politics.......................3 Brian Abrams

II. AffirmativeAction:TimeforaChange.......7 Sophie Rosenbaum

III. An Ethical Way to Eat Meat........................11 Obi Anumonwo

IV. Michel Foucalt’s Take on Power................14 Brian Abrams

V. ObligationRights.......................................17 MichaelWong

VI. DerivationofPhilosophy............................19 William Obilisundar

TableofContents

Binghamton Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Law

2009-2010 Archive

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Mission Statement

The Binghamton Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Law (JPPL)welcomes theappreciationof thought. JPPLis an academic journal that focuses on law, political science, and opinion – generally speaking, collectiveinsight regarding life/society and their aspects.Wedevote to writing about concepts such as jurisprudence,philosophy, political theory, also, devote to personalreflection and outlook as we wish to enter an everlast-ing journey of enlightenment.Wewelcome all forms ofthought that encompass humanities and reach towarddefininghumanities.

Letter from theEditor

Upon matriculation as a student at BU, I ran across many opportunitiestoimmersemyselfinastrongcommunityshield-ed underneath theStudentAssociation.While Iwas neverthemostoutgoingandtalkativeguy,Iwasfortunateenoughtobeabletomeetsomeofthemostdevotedandhands-onpeopleoveratBinghamton Review and a few others who col-laboratedandgenerallygotalongoveratthenext-doorofficeof Pipe Dream.WorkingwiththecrewofBR Adam, Yadin, Nick,andRandal,Iwaswitnessingaglimpseofagoldeneraof reform for not only campus publications, but also reform atthestudentlevelofgovernment.WhileIbeganatBR with hopesoflearningmoreaboutjournalism,politics,andopen-ingmyvoice,Iwasadditionallygiventhechancetoworkto-wardrefiningthisJournal,whichRandalhadleftinmyhands.Inturn,Iwasintroducedtoothersinvolvedincollegiatelev-el politics, such as Sophie at PDandSam,afirmDemocrat.

Sadly, the Journal did not become manifested as ex-pected (only two copies were released to the PPL depart-ment in thepast), but here stands a grandiose archive andimage of student thought for all students nationwide.

AlthoughthefieldofPPLhasawiderangeoftopics,thisarchiveisacollectionofundergraduateworksthatisperhapsatypicaltothecommonpoliticaljargoningandjurisprudenceexpected inmostPPLliterature.Thisseriespertains to thehumanities--whatexactlyitis,howitisexpressed,andhowweashumanbeingsrelatetoit.Thethoughthereisastimelyasever.Youcantellthatthecontributorsmaketheefforttoestablishtheirpersonalattemptsinidealstheyhavefelt,sopleaserespecteachpieceforitsuniquenessindesign,effort,andcontemplation. Iamin thehopes that thearchivemayprovideinspirationtothemanyliberalartsundergraduatesorthoseenteringthecollegiatelevel,iftheyaresoconcernedoverwhatcanactuallycomprisean‘essay.’Astheopeningforthearchive,wehaveadiscussionofAmericanpolitics:

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The Decline of Party PoliticsBrian Abrams

2007

Democrats? Republicans? Televi-sion pundits, satirists, and authors perpetually throw about these

terms. Every four years they transformthemselves into colors and place them-selves on a map. They embolden them-selvesadjacent toemptyboxesuponreg-istrationformsandpetitions,justbeggingto be checked off, the American way. One would assume that these terms, firmlyembedded in political commentary and jargon, would wield asmuch strength astheir titles intend. The power that political partiespossess isnotnearlyasprevailingas it appears. These major political or-ganizations that we entrust our vote andideology to, are on the decline.Don’t letthis be a surprise. The United States po-litical system has experienced a cycle ofparty strength decline and party strengthaugmentation since the end of the eigh-teenth century. Prior to the establishment of parties, George Washington, amongothers includingAlexanderHamilton andJamesMadison,warnedcitizensaboutthepotential danger of political factions. Inhis farewell address, Washington stated:

[Factions] are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potentengines, by which cunning, ambi-tious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the Power of thePeople, and to usurp for themselvesthe reins of Government; destroyingafterwards the very engines,which have lifted them to unjust do-minion.1

Since 1800, the United States has goneunder a series of party declinations, which led to the elimination of former parties and emergenceofnewerparties.Therehasnotbeen any major party realignment since1932 (the Democrats became a majorityparty). It is unknown whether there could beapartyrevitalizationinthefuture.Pastrealignments were accompanied by sig-nificant events that triggered the end ofdeclinesuchasthedebateonslaveryandthe Great Depression. Perhaps, the lack of suchanevent since theemergenceof thetwo current major parties is the reason for decline. Regardless, America is amid itslongestpoliticaldroughtof itsshortexis-tence. Party politics are as weak as they haveeverbeen.Thereareseveralcircum-stances that identify that United States po-liticalpartiesareonasteady,relativelyun-

1.Washington,George.“Washington’sFarewellAddress.”(Congress:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2000)17.Web.

interrupteddecline.Theunderlyingthemein the decline of political partisanship is the lack of voters supporting the majorparties.Historyhasyettoproveotherwise;therefore,itisinexorablethattherewillbesomesortofpartyre-shapinginthefuture.There is a sense of disenchantment in the dual party system. It is unknown as to what road the government is headed toward inthefutureregardingpoliticalpartisanship,butitwouldberighttoassessthecurrentinclinationstogenerateaplausibleforecastas to where the political system is headed.

In the past, political parties were seen as the primary source of political trust and responsibility for the citizens who sup-ported them. During Andrew Jackson’sPresidency,herevolutionizedthepowerofparty support.Uponwinning Presidentialofficein1828,hefilledhiscabinetwithallofhissupportersduringtheelection,thuscreating thespoils system.At that time itoffered a politician a great deal of lever-ageif theypatronizedanothermemberoftheirparty,allowingthemselvestoadvancemuchhigherinthegovernmentalranksbybeing loyal.The political partywas vitalinassessingtheneedsandinterestsofthepublic.DuringtheageofthePoliticalMa-chine in the United States, party politics mayhavebeenattheirhighestpoint.Therewas a great sense of patronage betweenmembers of parties and they were able to providesupporterswithfavorsinexchange

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for votes. Eventually, the Progressivesstopped the Political Machine because it attractedagreatdealofgovernmentalcor-ruption. First they enacted ballot reforms. During the era of the Political Machine,voterswerehandedballotsmadebythepar-tyanddroppedintoabox(therebyvotingfor all party members listed on the ballot) or ballots that listed the candidates in col-umnsconglomeratedbyparty.Thevoter’sonly responsibility was to simply check off theentirecolumnandplaceit in thebox.When voting machines were introduced,thevotermerelyhadtopulltheleveranditwould cast all their votes formembersofaparticularparty.TheProgressivesper-suadedstatestoadoptanoffice-blocballotinstead of party-column ballots. The of-fice-blocballotliststhecandidatesbytheirintendedoffice;astraightpartyticketwasnolongerpossiblebymakingonemarkonthe ballot.2 Prior to the twentieth century, thepartyhad the jurisdictionof selectingtheparty’srepresentativeinelection.Dur-ingtheriseoftheReformEraintheearlytwentiethcentury,thenationbegantoim-plement a direct primary election to select the party’s candidate as a means to lessen thestrengthofthePoliticalMachine.3 Due to the direct primary as a means to elect a candidate for election, parties lost control 2.Dilulio,JohnJ.,andJamesQ.Wilson,Ameri-can Government: the Essentials, 10th ed. (Boston, NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,2006)207.3.DilulioandWilson204.

ofprovidingtheelectoratewiththeirselec-tion as the party’s candidate. Progressivereformwasabletodeferalloftheexploita-tionthatthepoliticalmachinesutilizedinthesystem.Also,“Morerecently,themostimportant nomination, that of the presiden-tialcandidate,hasescapedthegripofpar-ties as a consequence of the reforms of the late1960’s.”4Thishasprovenan ineffec-tivemethodofpoliticsbecause if apartyisbitterlydividedoncandidates,theywilllosesupportforwhichevercandidatewinsthe primary election and will result in a landslide loss in the presidential election. The presidential election is meant to be themost significant to theconstituentsofapoliticalpartybecauseithasthehighestvoterturnout;lately,partiescannotgarnerefficientsupportbecauseofsplitticketvot-ing, an indirect effect of primary voting.

In the national scope, political parties have certainly been weakened over thepast century. At the same time, though,major political organizations external totheelectoratehaveactuallybeenstrength-ened.DavidH.Everson says, “Neverthe-less, a case can be made that national party organizationshavebeenstrengthened.TheRepublican National Committee (RNC)hasworked to reinvigorate stateRepubli-can parties.”5Thatprovesthatthepartyis4.Everson,DavidH,“TheDeclineofPoliticalParties.” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science34(1982):49-60.Web.Seep.53.5.Everson,52.

notyetdiminishedandhassomevitalsignsremaining. Political Action Committees(PAC’s) have become key in stabilizingAmerican politics and strengthening po-liticalcampaigns.Theyareverynecessaryin supporting the current parties duringtheir fall from supremacy. Also, with local politicsbeingthetoppriorityintheUnitedStates, local political organizations havenot lost strength.With sucha largenum-berofpartiesatthelocallevel,thestrengthof their parties does not matter as much as the actual elected officials themselves.Regarding the aforementioned recent po-litical enhancements, Everson says that,“despitesomegains,thepartiesareweakerthanpreviously,especiallyintheirholdonvoters.”6Althoughpartieshaveseendevel-opmentsintheirexteriororganizationsandinlocalpolitics,thereisn’tenoughsignifi-cantgrowthtosuppressthemajordeclinein the strength of political partisanship.

The decrease in power of political par-ties is also paralleled by the resurgenceof interest groups. These political actioncommitteesoftenhavemorefocusedpub-lic interests that appeal tovoters. Interestgroups and other political action com-mittees have gained influence in elec-tions. Regarding the contemporary pro-gressionof interestgroups,Eversonsays:

6.Everson,52.

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Thecostsofpoliticalcampaigninghaveskyrocketed, even when inflation istaken into account, because of the can-didates’relianceonexpensivepoliticaltechnology.Asecondfactoristhatpub-licfinancingofpresidentialelections…has driven interest group dollars intocongressionalelections.Finally, in thewake of the landmark SupremeCourtcasedecisionofBuckleyv.Valeo,therehasbeenan increase in“independent”expendituresinsupportofcandidates.7

Candidates are now capable of receiv-ing an unlimited amount of financial aidfrom sources external to their party, pro-vided theymakenocontactwith theout-side source. Parties are not able to com-petewith the investments of independentinstitutions because they have a limitedamountofresourcestoprovideforacan-didate’s campaign, consequently lessen-ing their bearing in the election process.

Another reason for the decline in po-litical partisanship is the disbelief in party differences. In a 1976 national electionstudy, 52.8% of voters saw absolutelyno differences between the Republican and Democratic parties.8 It is very pos-sible that parties have lost their strength7.Everson,54.8.Wattenberg,MartinP,“TheDeclineofPoliticalPartisanshipintheUnitedStates:NegativityorNeutrality?” American Political Science Review75(1981):941-950.Web.Seep.943.

because they are really too similar to dif-ferentiate. One party cannot carry any clout against another if they are actuallysosimilar in ideology.Thebelief that theparties bear no differences is likely the reason for a rise in independence from po-liticalpartisanshipandsplit ticketvoting.

Split ticketvotingcanspelloutabal-anced government for the United States.Dilulio andWilson say, “Ticket splittingcreates divided government--the WhiteHouseandCongressarecontrolledbydif-ferent parties. Ticket splitting helped theDemocrats keep control of the House ofRepresentativesfrom1954to1994.”9 I be-lievethatitisgoodforthebranchestobedividedonlegislationandideology.IftheDemocrats had not maintained control of theHouseandCongressforthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,theywouldhavelostevenmoregroundontheRepublicans,especially in the 1980s during Reagan’sstronglyconservativeeconomicandpoliti-calstronghold.ARepublicanWhiteHouseandRepublicanCongresswouldengageinfar too many conservative bills, and justtheoppositeforaDemocraticWhiteHouseandDemocraticCongress.Ticketsplittingpreventssinglepartydominationandpro-motes a balance of power and ideology.

Perhaps, the climb of the independent party will cause the United States elector-ate to become a three-party system com-

9.DilulioandWilson,207.

prised of moderates, liberals, and con-servatives representing each of the three.Inevitably, in a three-party system, theindependent moderate party would likely emergethedominantpartyover theothertwo because of its ability to compromise ideosynchracies. Thus, there may be-come a triple-tiered party system for some time, with the Independents on top, Re-publicans and Democrats in the middle, andallotherpartiesfilling in thebottom.

There still may be hope for the current two-party system. Dilulio and Wilson point outthat,“Inmostelections--national,state,and local--voters registeredasDemocratsstill vote for Democratic candidates, andvotersregisteredasRepublicansstillvotefor Republican candidates.”10InCongressand localgovernmentsorcouncils,mem-bersstilltypicallyvotealongpartylines.11 Although the general public is still cyni-calregardingpartypolitics,thosewhostillembrace a similar ideology to the partythey are affiliated with will agree withtheir party members on common issues. There will always be an opportunity in any given national election for one partytogainafootingovertheother.Ifonepar-tywere to control both theWhiteHouseandCongress, thatwould greatly revital-izesaidpartyandcouldcause theoppos-ing party to either rejuvenate itself out

10.DilulioandWilson,208.11.DilulioandWilson,208.

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of dire need or to reform itself as a new party. Political apathy and a decrease in voter turnout may allow the establishedmajor parties to retain their power because the general lack of political interest willleave them by-and-large uninterrupted.

The current American dual party po-liticalsystemisapproachingsomesortofchange,probablybytheyear2020.Thein-creaseintheeconomicmightofChinaandIndiaisaloomingfigureinthefutureoftheUnitedStates.TheUSwillneedtofindawaytopreventitselffromplayingthethirdwheel in international relations.Thegov-ernment needs some sort of reform or re-vitalizationtopreventforeigncapitalfromdominating theworldmarket.That beingestablished, the United States will reach a point in which they will head in one of two directions. The first direction, ideally themost potent, is to allow Independent and moderate politics to take control of the US government.TheIndependentpartyistheonly party in the United States that is show-ingdefinitesignsoflifeandistheonlyse-rious threat to the Republicans and Demo-crats. The Independent party is the most prevalent party that shares the ideologiesandagendasofboththeDemocratsandRe-publicans.Thenationalgovernmentcouldput bills into law much faster if it were un-der control of an unbiased party. The US could stabilize itself economically as amethodtocompetewiththerisingpowers

of the world. The other option foreseen for the future of American political parties is a totalcollapseofworthandideology.Theyhave become money making campaignmachines, lacking in significant produc-tioninrecentyearsasidefromprovidingacounteractivebalanceinnationalandstatepolitics. Aside from the rise of the Inde-pendentparty,theUSgovernmenthasyetto see any party apart from the Democrats or Republicans be the chief operator of a national branch since early in the twentieth century. The Democrats and Republicans willcontinuetomaintainprominenceovertherestoftheparties,eventhoughtheywillbe merely dwindled down to just labels and not the powerful political machines of the past.Theywilljustsubmitthemselvesintothe monotony of political decay and wait forsomesortofcriticalrealignmenttogetthemselves out of it.The parties are cur-rently in a lull of decline and there is no way to tell what could happen other than throughtrends,therehasyettobeenoughactiontosubstantiateaconfidentforecast.

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Affirmative Action: Time for a Change

Sophie Rosenbaum2009

The affirmative action that has beenestablished in the United States is asetofpublicpoliciesthatactively

workstobenefitunderrepresentedminori-ties and eliminate any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or nationalorigin.1Affirmative action argues for theequality of these underrepresented minori-ties by reversing the so-called unfair ad-vantagesof“privilegedpeople.”However,Iwillarguethatifunderrepresentedminor-ities truly want equality, the current notion ofaffirmativeactionneedstobeeliminat-ed.Ifnot,itwillcontrarilycontinuetoserveas a means of discrimination. You cannot correct an inequality by creating anotherinequality. While there was a time when race-based affirmative action was war-ranted,Idonotbelievethisisthecaseanylongerduetoaplethoraofinfluences:ourcountry’s election of an African American president, the successfulness of underrepre-sentedminoritiesinhigh-rankingpositionsacross the country, the continued efforts for equality by our legal system, among

1.Sykes,Marquita,“TheOriginsofAffirmativeAction.” NationalOrganizationforWomen. 01 Aug.1995.Web.

others.Throughacombinationoftwoma-jor SupremeCourt cases, JamesRachels’opinions,andmyviewsonaffirmativeac-tion,Iwillarguethataffirmativeactionisno longereffectiveat itsoriginalmissionand that if the policy continues to be imple-mented,itneedstobechangeddrastically.

According to the American Associa-tion forAffirmativeAction (AAAA), af-firmative action is a way to “open doorsto education, employment, and business development toqualified individualswhohappentobemembersofgroupsthathaveexperienced long-standing and persistentdiscrimination.”2TheAAAAstronglybe-lievesthatthepoliciesofaffirmativeactionmustremainintacttoensurethatprogressis made by women and other underrepre-sented minorities.3 However, I stronglydisagreewiththisAAAAbelief.Ibelievethatournationhasbeenactivelystrayingaway from discriminatory thoughts andheadingtowardsamorediversifiednation.I believe that our society has progressedtoadegree thatunderrepresentedminori-ties no longer rely upon affirmative ac-tion to assist their entry into professional fields or universities. When is enough,enough?—Have we not made tremen-dous headway in the fields of equality?2.“AffirmativeAction.”American Association forAffirmativeAction.24Mar.2009.Web.3.Thislanguageistakenfrommyearlierpaper,“TimesTheyAreaChanging”submittedforWRT111spring2009.

Questions surrounding affirmative ac-tionmadetheirwaytotheSupremeCourtwhere theyhaveheard twocases that in-volve the University of Michigan’s LawSchool admission process and practic-es. In the first case,Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), theCourt questionedwhether theuse of race is unlawful as race is a factor instudentadmissionsbytheUniversityofMichigan’s Law School. The law schoolclaimed that diversity is essential to itseducational mission. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the SupremeCourt’sopinion; the Court ruled that the UnitedStates Constitution “does not prohibitthe law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the edu-cational benefits thatflow fromadiversestudentbody.”Therulingaddedthatwhenrace based action is used to further urgegovernmentinterests,suchactiondoesnotviolate constitutional guarantees of equalprotection.4 I found the dissenting opin-ions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas tonotonlybedemandingofattention,butpersuasive and ingeniously developed.JusticeThomasbelievesthat,aswithFred-erickDouglass,blackscanbesuccessfulinAmerican life without assistance. Thomas explains that a university cannot lower4.Arthur,John,andStevenScalet,Morality and Moral Controversies: Reading in Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy,8thed.(NewJersey:PearsonPrenticeHall,2009)636.

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their admission standards and simultane-ously enforce higher expectations fromblacks just as they cannot have high ad-missionstandardsthatfavorcertainraces.

TheLawSchool,of itsownchoosing,and for its own purposes, maintains an exclusionaryadmissionssystemthat itknows produces racially disproportion-ate results. Racial discrimination is not a permissiblesolutiontotheself-inflictedwounds of this elitist admissions policy.5

Law schools, as well as other profession-alschools,useastandardizedmeasureoflogic and intelligence tohelp“weedout”applicants and therefore must be able to ac-ceptthe“constitutionalburden”thatcomeswith their decision. I stand with Justice Thomas in that you cannot use the LSAT and then make exceptions for blacks, orany race for that matter. White applicants are rejected for scores between 163-167;however, blacks are almost guaranteedadmissionwithascoreof155.Neverthe-less,others likeJamesRachelsargue thatunderrepresentedminorities deserve pref-erential treatment due to past injustices and that the specific qualifications of the20-point difference (discussed in Gratz v. Bollinger) between the applicants are what makes the policies unjust. Let’s as-sume that a white student and a black stu-

5.ArthurandScalet,639.

denteachapplytoMichigan’slawschoolandbothhaveequivalentnaturaltalentandequalworkethics.However,theblackap-plicant grewup inHarlem and thewhiteapplicantgrewupinBeverlyHills.Rach-elsandcurrentaffirmativeactionpolicieswouldarguethatduetopreviousinjusticesand the fact that the black applicant went through more obstacles like poor educa-tion,uneducatedparents,andfinancialdif-ficulties;hedeservestobeaccepted.Let’simaginethesamesituation,butviceversa(black applicant is from Beverly Hills,whiteapplicantisfromHarlem).Inthisre-versesituation,duetothewaythecurrentaffirmativeactionissetup,theblackstu-dentwouldstillbeacceptedoverthewhite.At this time, there are little to no policies thatadvocateforpoorwhitemalesor thepoor, in general. We should look to ourpast mistakes and injustices and be sure thatweareproactiveinavoidingheadingdownthesamepath.WhileIwouldagreewithRachelsthatinthefirstsituation,theblackapplicantdiddeservetobeaccepted;Idisagreethatblackapplicantsshouldal-wayshave the advantage.There are poorwhiteswholiveinanenvironmentthatisnotconducivetogrowthoreducation,andthey need assistance too. Underrepresent-edminoritiesarenolongerthe“neediest”group, low socioeconomic status peoplehave now taken over that role. Affirma-tive action policies should be altered to

assist these people by becoming socio-economic based instead of race-based.

In the same month that the Supreme Court heard Grutter v. Bollinger, they heard another case involving affirmativeaction and the University of Michigan’sLaw School. In the case, Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), the Court had to decide whetherthe University’s policy of automaticallyawarding20of150pointstoguaranteead-mission to all underrepresented minorities solely due to race is not narrowly tailored enough to achieve the school’s interestin diversity. Chief Justice Rehnquist de-livered theCourt’sopinion inwhich theydecidedthattheadmissionpolicyviolatesthe Equal Protection Clause of the Four-teenth Amendment. This time, Justice O’Connor’sopinionswereinconcurrencewiththeCourt’sdecision.Shesaidthattheadmissions program atMichigan did notreview each applicant individuallywhichcontradicts the plan for their admission. However,JusticeSoutherandJusticeGins-burgopposedtheCourt’sdecision.Intheirdissent, theyargued that the lawschool’sadmissions plan should not be used as an “Achilles’heel”orberuledunconstitution-al because it does not use a quota system.

If honesty is the best policy, Michi-gan’s accurately described affir-mative action program is prefer-able to achieving similar numbers

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through winks, nods and disguises.6

The dissenters pointed out that applicants have theopportunity towriteanessayorhave a letter of recommendation speakfortheirmembershiptoaminoritygroup.

Asstatedpreviously,anothersupporterofaffirmativeactionisJamesRachels. Inhis essay entitled “Reverse Discrimina-tion,”Rachels specifically focuses on thedifferencesbetweenreversediscriminationanddiscrimination.Heargues that, in thelongrun,“lawschooladmissionsfavoringblack applicants will help reduce racism throughoutsociety.”7Idonotbelievethatlawyers are going to change racial senti-ment throughout our entire nation, espe-cially in the South. It is also not the sole dutyofaffirmativeaction,orlawschool,toeliminate racist sentiments in our society. Weneedtobeactiveinourdutyascitizensto create equality to the best of our abil-ity and it is therefore our duty to eliminate thesesentiments.However,thefactthattheUnited States, as a nation, elected an Afri-canAmerican to be our president provesthatourcountryismovinginthedirectionofdiversityandnottowardsracism.WhileBarack Obama is only one person, it took the majority of a nation to elect him. This shows that we have collectively chosentomovepastpreviousinjusticesandhave

6.ArthurandScalet,648.7.InArthurandScalet,654.

triedtomendthesewrongdoingsbymovingtoward notions of equality, diversity, andacceptance.Toaddtohisargument,Rach-els said that the mere fact that a law school applicant is black is not what matters.

What is important is that as a result of past discriminatory practices, he has beenunfairlyhandicappedintryingtoachievethesortofacademicstandingre-quired for admission. If he has a claim to ‘preferential’ treatment now, it isfor that reason. The effect of the pol-icy is only to neutralize an advantagethat has had because he is white.8

Whenhas therebeenenough“neutraliza-tion,” as Rachels calls it? When are we going to say that we, as a society, haveprogressed to a point where we no lon-ger need an affirmative action policy forunderrepresented minorities? In Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Michiganclaims that they are hopeful that the need foraffirmativeactionwilldecrease in thenext twenty five years. Judge Scalia ar-guesthatthisisjustalicensetodiscrimi-nate for thenext twentyfiveyears, asdoI. Underrepresented minorities continue to fill high ranking positions in our society,includingSupremeCourtjustice,Presidentof theUnitedStates, leadingentertainers,lawyers and more. While this may be due,

8.ArthurandScalet,655

inpart,toaffirmativeactionpolicies,itisalso due to the fact that they are persistent, hardworking,andwillingtomakesacrific-estogetintothesehighrankingpositions.Thesedecisionsandethicsare somethingthat all people in high ranking positionshavetodo.Inaddition,Rachelsaddsinhisargumentsomeofthepossibleviewpointsofthewhiteapplicantinregardtoreversediscrimination. He mentions the appli-cant’slackofparticipationindeterminingthe race factor within the mistreatment of underrepresented minorities and the un-fairnessofbeingpunishedfor that inabil-ity to voice an opinion.These objectionstoreverseracismarevalidandjoinalistofother factors that should be included when decidingtheadmissionofapplicants.Dueto the fact that theSupremeCourtdecid-ed to hear the two court cases mentioned aboveinthesamemonthofthesameyeardemonstrates that they were discontent withtheiroriginalruling,eventhoughthetwo cases dealt with different aspects of Michigan’slawschoolapplicationprocess.

It seems as though the University ofMichiganclaimstheywantonethingandthen practice another. For example, theyclaimthattheirmissionistohaveadiverseeducational environment but then usequantitativemeasuresintheiradmission’splan.How is that promoting diversity? Itiscombiningagroupofpeoplewhohavea similarandsaying that theyalldeserve

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the same treatment. Does a black person whoworkedhardby studyingfivenightsaweekfor theLSATandactivelystrivedfor a highGPAdeserve to be grouped inthe samecategoryasablackpersonwhohardly studied for the LSAT and barely did any work in college because they knewtheywere going to benefit from affirma-tiveaction-likepolicies?Thisexemplifiessome of the issueswith the current affir-mative action policies and demonstratesthat it is notnecessarilyhelpingasmanypeopleasitwaswhenitwasfirstinitiated.

Whatisneededisacallforachangeintheaffirmativeactionpoliciessothattheywillencompassandassistabroaderrangeof people. The current affirmative actionpoliciesarelikeadeontologicalapproachtohelp the“worseoff”(underrepresentedminorities). It is similar to John Rawl’s dif-ference principle, which states that the ar-rangementofinequalitiesshouldbethatwepick the system where the worse off people havethehighestlevelofhappiness.How-ever,iftheaffirmativeactionreallywantedto benefit the people in our society, theyshouldbe looking towardpeople’s socio-economicstatusandhelpingthosewiththeloweststatus.Anaffirmativeactionbasedon socioeconomic status would assist all different groups of people, not just theunderrepresented minorities, therefore, a meansforunbiasedaid.Howisitfairtosaythatonegroup’shardshipsare“less”than

anothergroup?Inclass,Iarguedthatyoucould lookat justaboutanyethnicgroupintheworldandfindsometimeinhistorywheretheirgroupwaspersecutedandhadto deal with unnecessary hardships. Yet, the affirmativeactionthatiscurrentlyinplacepicksandchooseswhatgroupsaredeserv-ing enough to be given the benefits thatcomewithaffirmativeaction.Ifwearego-ingtohaveanaffirmativeactionpolicyinplaceatall,Ibelievethatitshouldbebasedonsocioeconomicstatus.Itwouldbenefitalargegroupofpeople that trulyneedsas-sistance and are in the most need of this assistance.Thisiswhereaprogramlikeaf-firmativeactioncouldreallyhavethemostpositiveeffectsonsociety.DanFroomkin,a reporter for theWashington Post said:

While many minorities and women support Affirmative Action, a grow-ing number say its benefits are nolonger worth its side effect: the per-ception that their success is unearned. Angry white men blame affirmativeaction for robbing them of their pro-motions and other opportunities.9

Shifting the focus of affirmative actionfrom race to socioeconomic status would givepeoplewhocurrentlyhavevery fewopportunitiesthechancetohavemanyop-

9.Froomkin,Dan,“AffirmativeActionUnderAt-tack.” TheWashingtonPost.01Oct.1998.Web.

portunities, just like it has for countless underrepresented minorities. A socioeco-nomicbasedaffirmativeactionwouldnotexclude the underrepresented minoritiesthat it would contemporaneously help. If thoseminoritieshavealowsocioeconomicstatus, which is probable (based on poor education, lack of resources, etc.), they wouldstillbenefitfromaffirmativeaction.However, instead of the policies just as-sistingafewminorities,itwouldbeinclu-siveofall races, ethnicities, andgenders.

Wearenolongeratatimeinourhistorywheresegregation,JimCrowlaws,lynch-ing,orslaveryareapartofoursociety.In-stead, we are at a time where there is an EqualProtectionClauseinourconstitutionthat is there to ensure that all Americans are equal. We are at a time where under-represented minorities have power andtop-notch jobs. While I think it is impossi-ble to reach a state of one hundred percent equality,thingshavechangedforthebetterin terms of equality of underrepresented minorities. It is impossible to deny that affirmative action policies have assistedhundreds of millions of underrepresented minorities in all different aspects of their lives includingprovidingopportunities inthe field of education and the job force.However,asasociety,wehavereachedapoint where these policies are no longernecessary. Underrepresented minorities haveadvancedandcontinuetoadvancein

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our society. Meanwhile, millions of people whohavealowsocioeconomicstatuscon-tinue to need assistance in these areas. Our nationwascaughtupinPresidentObama’snotionforchange.This“change”needstobebroughttoaffirmativeactiontoalterthefoundation from race-based to socioeco-nomic based. A socioeconomic based af-firmativeactionwouldbe inclusiveofalldifferentraces,ethnicitiesandgendersandwould therefore assist a broader rangeofpeople.Michigan’slawschoolsaidthatithoped for a timewhen affirmative actionfor underrepresented minorities would no longer be needed. Justice Scalia echoedthese sentiments and projected that in the next twenty five years, this would cometo fruition. That time frame was an esti-matebasedon theprogresswehadmadeas a nation for equality. In the past few years,ournationhasprovedourdesireforchange, changeof alldifferent aspectsofoursociety.Itistimeforaffirmativeactiontocontinueitsmissionin“openingdoors”forpeople,howeverthistime,itshouldbefor those with low socioeconomic stature.

An Ethical Way to Eat MeatObi Anumonwo

2009

FollowingtheatrocitiesofthesecondWorld War and the Declaration of theUniversalRightsofMan,ensur-

ingtheprotectionofhumanrightshasbeenattheforefrontofcivilandmoralsocieties.Yetdespite thegreat stridesmade towardaneliminationofpainandsufferingaroundtheglobeandpromotingageneralbeliefinthe importance of ethics since the 1950s,manywouldargue thatnotenough isbe-ing done as genocides continue to claimlives. The Merriam-Webster’s Dictionarydefinesethicssimplyas“whatisgoodwithmoral duty and obligation.” However, isthetermsostatic?Couldethicsnothaveabroaderdefinition?—onethatalsoinvolvesan aspect of choice? This would then mean that the final decision of what an ethicalactionwith“dutyandobligation” isor isnotislargelybasedontheindividual’sper-sonal beliefs. When discussing moralityand obligation between human and non-human animals, Peter Singer and thoseof thesamemindbelieve thatphilosophywitnesses one of its most tragic ethicalfailures. Our human species prides itself on just moralistic modes of thinking butsomehowjustifiesthegenocideofmillionsofanimalseachday.Howcanthatbeethi-

III. cal?Andmorepragmatically,what is leftfortheindividualinaworldwhereethicscan fail? In response, Iwill explorewhyanimal rights philosophers believe thatethics fails for animals, refute their claims, and argue that this supposed “traditionalethical failure” is not a reason for total elimination of meat from the human diet.

Animalrightsscholarswhofindafail-ure of traditional ethics in human con-sumptionofmeatarguearoundanumberof points which are typically argumentsconcerningotherspecies.Specifically,Pe-ter Singer asks, “Can they (animals) suf-fer?”Assumingthatifa“being”isabletofeelpainorsuffer,itisethicallywrongtoinflictpainonthatcreature.1 For him and others, empathy is conspicuously absent asanimalsaresentencedtodeathviasuchcrude means as wired electrical fences and hormone injections, simply to satisfy the human palette. In addition, the deplorable conditions that animals endure prior to beingkilled for food,and thepreparationpractices involved in cooking theirmeat,seem to give animal rights activists allthe justification needed to challenge oth-erswhoadhere toacarnivorousdiet.Forexample, David Foster Wallace’s famedpiece, Consider the Lobster, exposes theunderbelly of the Maine Lobster Festi-val,notasafamilyevent,butasmoreof

1.Singer,PeterandTomRegan,Animal Rights and Human Obligations.(NewJersey:1989)n.p.

11

ment, are also morally unjust. Also, both theconsumptionoftheirfleshandcontin-ued denial of freedom are most certainly unethical. For all these reasons animal rightsactivistsandscholarsciteafailureoftraditionalethicalandrationallogicamongthose who prefer non-vegetarian diets.

Onthecontrary,however,theremaybean ethical way to eat meat. First, one must adopt theunderstanding that ethics isnotstagnant and is constantly evolving. Theinnatehandicapofhumanerror(“toerrishuman”)3helpstoshapeandredefinewhatisethicalandwhatisnotovertime.Inoth-er words, what was ethical yesterday may not be ethical tomorrow. As such, one then begins tounderstandhowethics involvesaspectsofindividualchoice.Ifchangeandredefinition are possible, there must alsobe the ability to shift one’s own morals as the situation evolves. For example, mur-dermayatfirst seemcompletelymorallywrong,untilonelearnsthattheactionwasin self-defense. The belief that murder is wrong now has an additional stipulation:‘murder is wrong unless this and that.’Thus,withthechangingtimes,ethicsmustalso adapt andas such include some lev-els of individual interpretation. In otherwords, ethics is not solely based on social pressures,buthasalargeemphasisonwhatone deems to be correct at that time. The

3.FromafamoussayingofAlexanderPopein“EssayonCriticism”

reality, then, is that a failure of ethics, in re-specttoanimalrights,isnotanythinguni-versallyproblematic.Whenpeoplechooseto eat meat there is not a failure of ethics, ratherjustadifferentethicalpointofview.

Animmediatecritiqueofthatargumentmay be that one cannot simply justify all actions on the claim that an action is ethi-cal if isconsidered‘right’for thespecificpersoncommittingtheaction,evenifoth-ersfinditoffensive.AtthispointIwouldhavetoagree,butIpresent thefollowingas the ‘impossible alternative’: If the in-dividualwerenotallowedcertaindegreesof individuality with their perceptions ofright and wrong, the doors are open foran army of the oppressive and overbear-ing,whatevertheirbelief, toimposetheirviewsonall.Thisnotionisobviouslymoreethically problematic than simply givingthe individual freedom to a personalizedmoral code. Then what is left in a world where ethics fails? A world where tradi-tionalethicsfailsistheworldthatwelivein. One can reasonably assume that those who eat meat are aware of the barbarous practices involved in mass meat produc-tion, but the fact that they still eat meat is not then synonymous with a larger fail-ure tonormativeethics.Ethicsoperateasa guide, continually directing each of usdownapathmostsuitedfortheindividual.Some of these people simply do not feel thateatingacowthathassufferedisethi-

a subversively dark killing fest, wherethousands of pounds of lobster are boiled alive while onlookers cheer and line upfor the consumption the carcasses. In his piece,Wallacealignshimselfwiththepro-animal rights position and uses his workasawayofchallengingthecontemporarymeat-eatingsociety.Healludestotheab-sence of discomfort and the failure of eth-ics among the attendees; no one seemsto be disturbed by the mass genocide ofsorts that has just occurred. The pain, the torture, the death of the lobster...lost in arrays of butter sauces and beers, its life and meaning insignificant without them.

Similarly, in JMCoetzee’s articleThe Lives of Animals we are presented with the moral issue of mass killing as rea-son to adopt vegetarian diets.2 ElizabethCostello’s speech in this piece, scriptedby Coetzee, compares the waymeat andpoultry products are produced to a type of genocide, specifically the Holocaust. Shearguesthatperhapsthesamementalitythatled to the near extermination of the Jew-ishpeopleinthemid-20thcenturyisalsopresent among those who participate inthefactoryfarmingpracticesusedtomakemostofthemeatavailableatUnitedStatesgrocery stores. Moreover, those forciblyimprisoninganimalsagainsttheirwill,thatis in zoosandcircuses, forour entertain-

2.J.M.Coetzee,The Lives of Animals. (Princ-eton:PrincetonUP,2001)

12

callywrong; for those people ethicsmaynot apply to animals, or their conception of ethics allows for eating of animals.

Anotherexplanationforhowethicscanallow for the consumption of meat is to ar-guethatethicsisanadvanced,psychologi-cal characteristic that is typically accepted byalltohavedevelopedlaterthanthebio-logicallyengrainedtasteformeat.Thiscanprovidethosewhoeatmeatwithananswerto the Plutarchian accusatory remarks, whichwouldresultinadiscourselikethis:“Whydoyoueatmeat?” “Because I likesteak.I’msupposedtolikesteak;itisnatu-ral for man, like many other animals, to eat meat.”Simple,buthonestofmanylevels;it follows therefore if one is truly unable to turn his diet away from meat and formulate a morally acceptable way to eat meat, he mustcombinebothparts,thepersonaldefi-nitionofethicsandthebiologicalinclina-tiontowardeatingmeat.Onecouldrespondthat“Ethics is a self-created, singular in-terpretation of what is right and wrong; the meat I eat comes from ‘friendly farms’ with practice I agree with; therefore I find no fault or misstep in my eating this steak.”

The most obvious objection to thatargumentwillofcoursebe:Howcanhu-mans justify cooking certain animals butnot others? Why should a domesticated animal, whose elevated position in soci-ety seems arbitrary, escape these notions of a biological predisposition to meat?

TobeginansweringthisquestiononecanlooktoNietzsche.InHuman, All Too Hu-man he articulates his issues with human historyanditstendencytoerase,orover-emphasizeeventsandcreateastorymov-ing toward some climatic phenomena.He calls this “monumental history,” andargues that the way in which historicaleventsarechronicledasgreatmomentsinmankind allows for the deception of some non-specificgoal.4However,andmostim-portantly,Nietzschethenconcedesthatthisoccurrenceisunavoidablesimplybecauseonecannotfeasiblygiveeverythingequalimportance. Some things will naturallyhave to fall by the wayside. In KennanFerguson’sarticle,I <3 My Dog,Fergusonsharessomeofthesameideology.Hefo-cusesontheimportantpositionofdogsinpeople’slives,andwhy,despiteraisingandcaringforananimal,theyarestillabletoeat other ones.5Fergusonultimatelycon-cludesthatsomeanimals,asdogs,willjustnaturally possess more of an emotional connection and pose more of an ethical re-sponsibility to their owner than some ran-dom cow who happens to become dinner.

For the mere reason that there is no all-knowing guide to ethics, ethics remainslargelyopentoreinterpretationorredefini-tion,andfindsitsgroundingsfirmlyplant-4.Nietzsche,Friedrich,Human all too Human. (Standford:StanfordUP,1995)5.KennanFerguson,“I<3myDog”Political Theory32.3(Jun.2004):373-395.Web.

edintheindividual’sownontologicalun-derstandingofrightandwrong.Thereisnodoubt that the way in which cows, chick-ens, lobsters, etc., are treated today is mor-ally questionable. However, to make theleap that those who eat meat are somehow similar to the German people who stood by asmillionsofpeoplewereexecutedisfar-fetched.Asfarastheclaimthatconsumingmeat is unethical, the fact is that each person hasanautonomousperceptionofrightandwrong,justandunjust,andwillactinthatmanner.Forus,themeat-eatingsegmentofsociety could then ask this famed question oftheanimalactivistsoftheworld:“Wheredoes one draw the line?” If humans are to treat all animals equally, will we not then findourselvesparalyzedinplace,forfearof discomforting the worms at our feet?

13

of information is dependant. The contextinwhichanotionisdiscussedisveryim-portanttohowthenotionisperceivedandhowitrelatestootherknowledge.Foucaltentirelyredefineshowpoweriscommonlyperceived in society. Foucalt’s perceptionofpowerregardsitasomnipresent—mani-festedinallhumanexchangesandprovid-ing direction toward the transmission ofknowledgetoourpersonalcomprehensionandtheconfigurationofoursenseofself.

In the beginning of the fourth part ofThe History of Sexuality, Foucault intro-duceshis term, juridico-discursivepower.The juridico-discursive power constrainsone’s desires, which only makes those de-siresstronger.Thatapplies tohowsexualdesiresincreasedwhilethebourgeoisiere-pressed them for three centuries. Foucault breaks the juridico-discursive conceptionofpowerintofivecharacteristics.Thefirstcharacteristic is described as, “The nega-tiverelation.Itneverestablishesanycon-nectionbetweenpowerandsexthatisnotnegative: rejection, exclusion, refusal,blockage, concealment, or mask”1 He issayingthatpowerneveraccordstosexual-ityinapositivemanner.Powerisusedtolimit sexuality and create boundaries andgaps to prevent any positive image of it.The second characteristic is, “The insis-

1. Foucalt, Michel, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction.Vol.1.(NewYork:RandomHouse,1978)83.

tence of the rule. Power is essentially what dictatesitslawtosex.”2Foucaultissayingthatpowerregardssexualityinthesenseofamatteroflegality.Sexualityiseithercon-sidered permitted or prohibited, based on howthelawisappliedtoit,andallsexualdiscourse is maintained by the power of the law. Foucault’s third characteristic reads:

Thecycleofprohibition:thoushaltnotgonear,thoushaltnottouch,thoushaltnotconsume,thoushaltnotexperiencepleasure, thou shalt not speak, thou shalt notshowthyself;ultimatelythoushaltnotexist,exceptindarknessandsecrecy.3

Ultimately,powerisattemptingtoprohibitsexuality. Itsuppresseseverysinglecom-municable form of it as a means to rid all societalevidenceofit.Thefourthcharac-teristic is, “The logic of censorship.Thisinterdictionisthoughttotakethreeforms:affirmingthatsuchathingisnotpermitted,preventingitfrombeingsaid,denyingthatitexists.”4 Power takes on the form of cen-sorship concerning sexuality. Power cen-sorssexualitybyprohibiting it, thwartinganymentionofsexuality,andrejectingitsexistenceattheendoftheday.Foucault’sfifthcharacteristic reads, “Theuniformityof the apparatus.Powerover sex is exer-

2.p.83.3. p. 84.4. p. 84.

Michel Foucalt’s Take on Power

Brian Abrams2007

Typically,thetermpowerisperceivedasthestrengththatprovidesanen-tity the capability to perform an ac-

tion. In political theory, power is discussed as theamountof clout apersonorgroupcarriesthatmayseparatethemselvesfromtheirpeers;moreover,power is translatedas leadership. Political power has been seen in the hands of dictators or equally boundbetweenallcitizensofanation.InMichel Foucalt’s The History of Sexuality, he offers a very multifaceted unconven-tionaldefinitionofpowerincontemporarysociety. Foucalt does not solely present powerasarepressivemightthatusespro-hibitivelawsasameanstocontrol.Heim-partsitasaproductiveconceptionaswell.Foucalt describes power as a ubiquitous notion,whichconstantlyexhibits itself inmany different aspects at once. Power is a universal, often negatively received ideathat defines and shapes all knowledge inexistence. Foucalt utilizes the term, dis-course, to introduce how power is used to mold our notions and discernments. A dis-course is the manner in which ideas and knowledge are exchanged. The discourseisthebasisuponwhichtheunderstanding

IV.

14

cisedinthesamewayatalllevels.”5 Fou-caultisclaimingthatinalllevelsofsociety,poweroperatesasanunvarying,repressivemechanism over sexuality. Ubiquitously,powerconstrainsthelibertiesofsexuality.Foucault’s theory is particularly associat-edwitha few things involved inThomasHobbes’ Leviathan. Foucault’s juridico-discursive power theory reflects Hobbes’lawsofnature.Hobbes’lawsofnatureweremadetoprotectaperson’slifebylimitingthem from anything that could threatentheir livelihood.That parallels Foucault’sbeliefthatsocietyhinderssexualliberationbecausethebourgeoisiebelievesitisforthegoodof thepeoplenot toexercisesexualfreedom.ThesameappliestoHobbes’be-lief that the subjects should surrender some oftheirfreedominexchangeforprotectionby their sovereign. Hobbes’ sovereign isconcurrent with Foucault’s bourgeoisie.People have repressed sexual freedomsbecause those representing the upper andgoverningclassesdenyitfromtheminex-changeforpoliticalandeconomicfreedom.

Foucault introduces four rules to assist in understanding power relations beyondthose of sexuality. Foucault’s first rule isthe“Ruleofimmanence.”6 The rule of im-manenceisthatpowerandknowledgeal-ways exist concomitantly.One should beawarethatknowledgedoesnotcomeabout

5. p. 84.6.p.98.

withoutaninterestinseekingsaidknowl-edge.Oneonlylearnsaboutandcomestoknowaboutsexbecauseofpower-knowl-edge relations, which influence a personto learn such things. The second are the“Rulesofcontinualvariations.”7 The rules ofcontinualvariationsentailthatpowerex-hibits in dynamic forms of relation. Power relationshipsareeverchanging.Theyshiftover time from childhood to parenthood.Foucault points out that when a child is psychoanalyzed after the child’s parentsarepsychoanalyzed,thepsychiatristoftenpoints out that the child’s problems are be-causeoftheirparent’sbehavior.Thethirdruleisthe,“Ruleofdoubleconditioning.”8 Thisrulemeansthatall“localcenters”ofpower-knowledgeareamicroscopicviewofalargerprojectionofpower-knowledgeofsociety.Itappliesthesameinreverse,asthe“localcenters”areamicrocosmofthelarger scale.9 The components of neither center imitate the other precisely but rath-er mirror similar systems. The final ruleis the, “Rule of the tactical polyvalenceof discourses.”10He reiterates the signifi-cance of discourse in power-knowledgerelations because discourse is the source of power-knowledge relativity. This rulemeans that discourse does not function as one uniform distribution. Discourse does 7.p.998.p.999.p.9810. p. 100

not always necessarily translate to the re-pression of society and the ruler and ruled and relationship. Discourse is similar to powerinthatitisuniversalandconstantlyoccurs amongallbeings.Thispowerdif-fers from juridico-discursive power be-cause it discusses power separate from re-pression. It describes power as a constant exchangeinall localcentersasaformofdiscourse. Power also involves knowl-edge and the two are interrelated. Powercoincides with knowledge just as it doeswith repression because it is omnipresent andconstantlyexchangedindissertations.

Foucaultargues thatsexualitywasnotadomainthatexistedbeforetheeffectsofpowerbecauseofseveralsocietalcircum-stances. Power is the reason that the term, sexuality, has come about. Prior to it be-comingasocietalmatter,sexualitywasjustsex.Itwassimplyanactivityperformedbynatural men and women because of their personal interests. As society was built and power and discourse became prominent, sexuality became a taboo. Elders soughtto censor it from the young because itcould corrupt them. The development oftechnology coexisted with an increase inclothing. People no longer wore next tonothing.Nudity became taboo because itdid not comply with the social norm of be-ing clothed. Sex, the second stage to nu-dity, became a taboo aswell. It involvedprivate parts thatwere not appropriate in

15

society’s eyes. As a taboo, society had to givesexalabel;henceforth,itwassexual-ity. It needed a label so power could com-press it. If it were not such a taboo practice according to the general public, it wouldnotneedalabelorrepressionwhatsoever.

In part five, Foucault introduces the“rightofdeath”andthe“poweroverlife.”11 He describes the ancient power of deathas a Sovereign’s right to take things (in-cludinglife)awayfromtheirsubjects.Hesaysthatpowernolongerexertsitselfasarightofdeath.Warsareno longer foughtasa“deduction”ofaSovereign; theyarefoughton thebehalfof the livelihoodsofa nation’s people.12 The death penalty is no longerusedasamethodofdevastation;ithasbecomeadeterrenttoperformingcrim-inal acts.13Therightofdeathhasmadewayfor thepowerover life.Foucault’spowerover lifewould translatemoredirectly tothe power to foster or disallow life.14 In the seventeenth century the power overlifeevolvedintotwodifferentforms.Thefirstformisthat thehumanbodyistreat-ed like a machine. People have becomeincreasingly more efficient, productive,and disciplined. The second form is the regulationofpopulation. It is a statisticalmeasure of human biological processes,revolving around human reproduction.11. p. 13512.p.13613.p.13714. p. 138

I agreewithFoucault that the rightofdeathhascertainlygivenwaytothepowerover life. Incontemporary society,poweris no longer amatter of aSovereign tak-ingawaytaxexpenditures,property,orlifefromtheirsubjects.Thepoweroflifeex-ists in all discourses in society. People con-stantly act as if they are machines. They work as efficiently as possible tomake agood livelihood for themselves and theirfamilies and use reproduction to regulatethesizeoftheirfamilyandtoextendtheirfamilyanothergeneration.Thepoweroverlifeisconductingaperpetualcycleofworkandreproduction.Perhaps,heissuggestingthatwecanutilizeourpower forgeneralgood.Thisbook’shiddenmessagemaybethat people can ultimately coexist amongeachotherwithoutcollidingwithonean-other.Thoseofuswhoarenotlivingunderthe“poweroflife”frameofmindarelivingunderthe“righttolifeorrighttodeath”.Itis an accurate, uncomplicated macrocosm of power in contemporary society. Con-stant exchanges between people, work-ing fastandoptimizingproduction,whilecreating new lives to replace those lost.

16

haveeitherfavorableorpoorhumanrightprovisions, despite the attempt to imple-ment the same rights detailed under theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights.

Because democratic institutions are ideally elected by the people, it is increas-ingly evident that these governmentsshould have obligations to reserving therightsfor thepeople itgoverns.TheUni-versal Declaration of Human Rights wassignedandratifiedbyforty-eightcountriesof the United Nations on December 10, 1948. If this is the case, onemustwon-der why human rights are not measuredequivalentlyinallofthesecountries.Theanswer lies within the realm of what can beconsideredpositiveandnegativerights,underlined by theCovenant onCivil andPolitical Rights, as well as the CovenantonEconomic,Social,andPoliticalRights.Both conventions are inexorably inter-twined, and as such bounce ideas and prac-tices off one another. Underlying manycriticismsofeconomicandsocialrightsisthe distinctionbetween “negative” rights,which require only forbearance on the part ofothers,and“positive”rights,whichre-quireotherstoprovidegoods,services,oropportunities.1 This distinction between negativeandpositiverightsmayexist,butbecause of their reliance upon one another

1. Donelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice.2nded.(NewYork:CornellUP,2003)30.

it would be impossible to claim that they areseparable.Forexample,lifeandlibertyareconsiderednegativerightsbecause,aslongasthereisnointerference,therightsareinplace.Conversely,workandprotec-tionagainsttortureareconsideredpositiverightsbecausethegovernmentmustbeac-tiveinensuringthoserightsaremetprop-erly.Lifeand liberty, though,areguaran-teed through the government’s protectionagainst torture.Thegovernmentmusten-sureanegativerightthroughenforcementofapositiveright,whichinessencemeansthatthegovernmentmustalwaysbeproac-tive in order to ensure our rights.This isthe chief obligation right of the govern-ment—toalwaysbeproactiveandupholdtherightsof itscitizens, to thebestof itsability. This condition must be met to the best of the government’s ability, to showthat it has given its best effort even if itcannotphysicallyfulfill therequirements.

Howcanagovernmentnotbeable tophysically fulfill the requirements of ac-tivelyprotectingtherightsofitscitizens?Considerthisexample:freedomfromhun-gerisahumanrightguaranteedintheCov-enant on Economic Social and CulturalRights. Even if there is not enough foodinthecountrytoensurethateverycitizeniswell-fed,thegovernmentisnotexcusedfrommakingeveryefforttoattempttoful-fillthehumanright.Somerightsaredecep-tivelysimpleanddeceiveoneintobeliev-

Obligation RightsMichael Wong

2010

ItoftencanbesaidthatoneofthefinestadvantagestobeinganAmericanisthehumanrightsthatwerebestowedupon

thenationsincethedaysofthefoundingfa-thers.Ofcourse,suchrightshavebecomebutsecondnaturetothecitizensoftheUnit-edStates—rightsasnaturalandGod-givenas breathing. Most of these rights, how-ever, arenot justnatural toUnitedStatescitizensbutareintrinsichumanrightsthatare bestowed upon many countries upon ratificationoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.ItthenseemsoddthattheUnitedStateswouldbe singledout to bethepinnacleofhumanrightsfortheworldatlarge.Itmustbeconcludedthathumanrightsarenotjustasignatureandratifica-tion, but contain somethingmore ethere-al.Human rights, then,maybebestowedupon us (andGod-given, asThomas Jef-fersonclaimed).Butindividualshaveob-ligation rights as well. Obligation rightsare a form of responsibility that come as aresultofhavinghumanrights.Assuch,agovernmenthascertainobligationrightstoitspeople.Iwillexaminewhatobligationsare owed to the people by governmentinstitutions, as well as the dichotomy be-tweengovernments thatareconsideredto

V.

17

allfollowthe‘same’universalprocedures.Finally,wemustaskourselveswhythe

United States of America has a reputation forholdinghumanrightsinhighregardandpreservingthemassuch.Inarecentstudy,itwasfoundthatIslamicstatesdonothaveasignificantlyworsehumanrights recordthan the United States.3AlthoughIslamicstateshavesimilaritiestotheUnitedStatesinareassuchastorture,extrajudicialkill-ing, disappearances, and political impris-onment, they are generally given a poor reputationforhumanrightspracticesintheUnited States. Is this simply due to bias, or is there a real reason for this belief? The answercanbefoundamongotherhumanrights;perhapsrights thatarelesscontro-versialbutnolessimportant.IslamicstatesdonothavetheexpansionofcertainrightsthatAmericans take for granted, such aswomen’s rights, freedom of movement,freedomofreligion,andfreedomofpoliti-cal participation. This is not to say whether or not the difference in human rights arejustifiedorcorrect:suchisajudgmentcallthat one cannot simply make for centuries ofculturaldifferences.Itistrue,however,that certain privileges that United Statescitizens enjoy are not a constant in cer-tain Islamiccountries.Freedomofmove-ment is restricted, especially where women are concerned. Yes, women play a differ-ent role in Islamic culture than they do in

3. See Amnesty International, Our Priorities.

theUnitedStates. It can be said, though,that many American women would not beabletoexercisenearlythesamerightsthey are accustomed to if they were to be put in one of many Islamic countries. Re-ligion, too, is not a freedomof choice asit is in America. Those in Islamic States donotexercisethesamequalityofpoliti-cal participation that Americans take for granted; at least, not without some formof consequence. Although it cannot besaid which set of human rights are “bet-ter” for lack of insight into each other’sworlds, it can be claimed that this is why Americansbelieve theyhaveaqualityoflife that cannot be found anywhere else in the world, for it is true that the Ameri-can exercise of human rights is uniqueonly to theUnitedStatesand itscitizens.

ing that the government can easily fulfilla requirement and enforce a human rightbydoingnothing.Equalprotectionof thelawisguaranteedbynotonlytheUniver-salDeclarationofHumanRights;butalso,theCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights;andtheCovenantonEconomicSocialandPoliticalRights.2 However, it is a costlyexpenditure for a government to have toenforce such rights. Government offi-cials and enforcers must be trained, prop-erly equipped, and hired in a substantial amount. And if the equal protection of the lawisbroken,thegovernmentmustbeabletohold themselvesaccountable to furtherenforce the human right. It can thereforebe concluded that only wealthy countries canreallyensurecertainrights,becauseallrightsrequiretheproactivityofthegovern-mentaswell as substantial investmentoftime,resources,andimplementation.Eventhough the Universal Declaration of Hu-manRightswassignedbybothHaitiandthe United States, the protection of hu-man rights is higher in theUnited Statesbecause the United States simply has more resources to make this happen. This is the major component in both the assessment of difficultyintheprotectionofhumanrightsandthevaryinglevelsofhumanrightspro-tectioninmanycountrieseventhoughthey

2.Nickel,James,Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-losophy.(California:MetaphysicsResearchLabStanfordU,2006).

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nature imprison the author—obligehim to fulfill the design of his cre-ative work—we habitually dislike anautobiographical figure that violatesthe pattern of a narrated life, and we are depressed by samples of detached imagination.3

The reader tends to distrust a literary work when this work undergoes self-reflectiveinquisition,whichequivalentlyisphiloso-phy, in place of description that contains such trivial qualities as time, setting, andcolor;fictioninevitablybecomesmorefa-vorablethanaesthetics.4 Thus, the reader 3.Reeve59.Emphasisexcluded.ForaninpracticeexampleofthisdescriptionseeespeciallyMigueldeUnamuno, Mist.Theprotagonist,Augusto, arguesthathisfictionaldescriptionallowshimtobe‘real,’perhaps a creation of God, despite the factuality thathisexistenceisabeinginUnamuno’smind—Augusto was a creation of Unamuno. Therefore,Augustoisnolongeranobjectiveentity,ratheranentitycapableofhisownthought.Throughoutthenovel,AugustobreaksfreefromUnamuno’sthird-personnarrative,andpursuesaheavyphilosophicalquestioning to his creation.Another example thatexplains thisquotation isUnamuno’sSan Manuel Bueno, martyr, a short story that masks itself as a quasi-autobiography, yet purposely concludesopen-endedforthereadertophilosophicallyexam-inewhatwastobedigested.Thisinquiryofexis-tence and creation of mankind, which is character-isticofSpanishexistentialthoughtpertainingtotheGenerationof‘98,isperhapsunfavorabletosomereaders and audiences due to its difference of the normofthe“narratedlife.”4. See José Ortega y Gasset, “El hecho de las

isreluctanttoderiveaestheticalvalueandoftentimes overlook the quality of narra-tiveduetothisbias.But,unlikeregularlit-erary works, Notes from Underground un-deniablypartakesintwonarrativemodes:

1) Part I: the aesthetical, which strivesagainstbias

2)Part II: thefiction,whichstruggles forapplicationandmeaning.5aglomeraciones,”Larebelióndelasmasas(1937)in Representative Spanish Authors, eds. Walter T. Pattison andDonaldW.Bleznick, 3rd ed., vol. 2(NewYork:OxfordUP,1971)337.Hediscussesthephilosophicalauthor’sdilemmaamongabiasedau-diencethattranslates:“Whenthewritertakesapentowriteonatopicthathehasstudiedatlength,thereadermustassumethatmeanshehasneverdealtwiththecase;ifonereads,itisnotinordertolearnsomethingfromit,but,unlikeso, it is inorder tosentence the writer when he does not match the sim-plicitythatthisreaderhasinhishead.Iftheindivid-uals who make up the mass [the majority of readers and interpreters, the population itself] would think extraordinarily,wewouldhavenomorethanacaseofpersonalmistake insteadofa sociological sub-version.”Inotherwords,itisadifficulttaskforasinglepersontocriticizeanaspectofsociety.Whilerudelyimplyingthatthemajorityisofasimplisticnature,OrtegayGassetimpliesthatthemajorityisunfamiliarwith themodeofnarrativecommonofphilosophy, inplaceof a simplermode,whateveritmaybe.Therefore, taking theextensive time tocritique,forexample,society,causesthismajorityto backlash, and refuse the philosopher’s critique as authentic. Similarly, John Milton discusses this social tendency. See Areopagitica.5. Note that theUndergroundManstressesover

Derivation of PhilosophyWilliam Obilisundar

2010

Note that the poet in a burst of inspira-tiondivinesGod,hencefulfillsthetaskofphilosophy.Hencepoeticecstasy isthe ecstasy of philosophy.Hence phi-losophy is the same as poetry, only a higherdegreeofit.

―FyodorDostoevsky1

Philosophy evidently influences Dos-toevsky.Thisinfluence,however,interestsme on the process of philosophical deri-vation throughout his novellaNotes from Underground.CriticF.D.Reeveproposesthatanyacquisitionofaestheticvalues,en-lightenment, from any literarywork “hassomething to do with interpretation” of“themodeofnarration,” forbiaspertainstovaryingmodes.2 Forexample,hesug-gestsaparticularbias:

Whetheranauthorinventshisfictionalfigures—liberates them from objec-tiveconditionsbyhisimagination—orwhether the figures by their objective

1. In Robert Louis Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form: A Study of His Philosophy of Art,2nded.(Pittsburgh:PhyssardtPublishers,1978)13.2.FranklinD.Reeve,The White Monk: An Essay on Dostoevsky and Melville (Nashville:VanderbiltUP,1989)59-60.

VI.

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fore, according to Jackson, Dostoevsky’sphilosophy is quintessentially derived bybothmodesinhisliterarywork:aestheticalnarrativeandfictitiousnarrative.However,Jackson’s assumptions are controversial.Amidthis“aestheticconfusion”theques-tioniswhetherthisenlightenmentisreallydue to “omnipotent beauty” or multiplebeauties; whether philosophy is derivedbyoneindependentmodeofnarrativeorisderivedbyvariousmodes.9IwillevaluateenlightenmentofNotes from Underground primarilythroughanAristotelianperspec-tive.

DostoevskyultimatelycoincideswithAristotle’s Metaphysics.10

The nature of the divine thought in-volves certain problems; for whilethoughtisheldtobethemostdivineofthingsobservedbyus, thequestionofhowitmustbesituatedinordertohavethatcharacterinvolvesdifficulties.

―Aristotle

9.Jackson40.10.Brazillerwrites,“Masksandmetaphysics–ul-timately,theyareidentical”(17).Iwillexplainthecorrelationoffiction,oramask,withitstietoaes-theticalnarrationasaunitparadoxicallycomprisedofeachother.GeorgeBraziller,Romanticism: The Culture of the Nineteenth Century, ed. Morse Peck-ham(NewYork:GeorgeBraziller,1965)17.

Aristotle states that essence, the deter-minantofsubstance,“iswhatitissaidtobepropter se,”whichis“invirtueofitself.”11 Takeanarrativemode tocorrespondasadeterminantof thought. In thisdefinition,anarrativemodeisthenadeterminantthatdefines itself bynaturallybeing.Though,as he reminds us in Zeta,“being”hastworepresentations: nature and quality. Aes-thetic narration is philosophy,12 so thus assumesnature.Moreover,fictitiousnarra-tion is also a determinant but instead pro-duces quality as a “faculty of thought.”13 However,philosophy“cannotbetakenasa simple mathematical problem” in which the contents of the mind are philosophy, as Dostoevskyremindsus.14 Philosophy is not expressedas‘natureplusquality’becauseenlightenment isaprocess that requiresamanipulationofthetwotowardmaximiz-ingtheother’spotentialtounderstandthe

11. Aristotle,“Metaphysics”inThe Basic Works of Aristotle,trans.W.D.Ross,ed.RichardMcKeon(NewYork:ModernLibrary,2001)786.Aristotle’s“good”isconsiderablydifferentfromwhatcanbeconsidered “good” in the commonEnglish.For abetterunderstandingoftheinterpretationof“good”and “virtue” seeAristotle, “NicomacheanEthics”in The Basic Works of Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross, ed.RichardMcKeon(NewYork:ModernLibrary,2001)935.Goodis“thatatwhichallthingsaim.”12.Ibid.,p.19.13.Aristotle,“Metaphysics”885.Here,Iamrelat-ingfictitiousnarrationtoqualityasintheopeningparagraphoftheessay.14. Jackson 13.

Professor Robert Louis Jackson insists Dostoevskyfocuses“onfreedominartisticcreation” and that Dostoevsky relativelydefendsbothaestheticsandfictionwithinthisspecificwork.6Dostoevskydescribes“to a correspondent” that despite any in-clinations of self-reflection, “there stillremains a whole sea of the unexpressedwhichyouyourself areunable to expressand [he] cannot understand.”7 The process of enlightenment through philosophy en-counters gaps in communication betweenself and other. In regard toNotes, alone, philosophycannotsustainwithoutfiction,yetfiction threatens theveryexistenceofaestheticvalues.8Thisisaparadoxofes-tablishingthought,whereasthewriterde-voted toenabling theother towitnesshisTruthstrugglestobalancethesetwomodes,asseeninthecaseofDostoevsky.There-the term“literature” throughoutPart IIof theno-vella.Inchapter10particularly,hemakesadistinc-tion between his lies and real literature. See Jackson 138; Prof. Jackson outlines Dostoevsky’s generalcomparisonbetweenthe“utilitarianaesthetic”-artforthepurposeofsupplementingandobjectifyingreality of values such as experience, morals, andperception-andcritique,whichDostoevskytreatsseparatelyas“art”andreal“literature.”Forthepur-poseoftheessay,Irefertothesedistinguishableop-positesbothmentionedbyJacksonandDostoevskyas fictitious narrative (art void ofTruth) and aes-theticnarrative(critique;real literature),however,acknowledgebothasliterature.6.Jackson138-39.7.Jackson159.8.SeeJackson139.

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whereasitcannotbe‘eitheror.’Aristotle’slawofnoncontradictionis“thatitisimpos-sibleforanythingatthesametimetobeandnot be.”17 By this law, the ability for phi-losophy tobeboth theaestheticnarrativeandfictitiousnarrative isan impossibilitybecausetheyaretwoopposites:thetruena-ture of philosophy and false representation respectively.Althoughthisisvalid,Aristo-tlediscerns,“tobeanactofthinkingandtobeanobjectofthoughtarenotthesamething…”18 A simple way to put this is that anaction,asindicatedbyaverb,isnotthesame as an object, as indicated by a noun. Takethis inrelationtofictitiousnarrativeandaestheticnarrative,whereastheformerobjectifiesexistenceintotrivialqualitiesofanounandthelatterstrugglestorepresentprocessofthoughtasaverb.19 But in or-der for thewriter to express hismodeofthought to the other, he or shemust findthemeansthrougharelatablesubstance,intheformofanobject,ornoun;ie,writtenscripture suchas abook.Thoughtcannotbe interpreted without its physical form. Therefore, Professor Jackson’s assertion onDostoevsky’sphilosophy regarding itsrelianceuponfictitiousliteratureisindeed possiblebutaparadox.Andtheseeminglyimpossible, “that is, a stonewall” is “thelawsofnature;theconclusionsofthenatu-17.Aristotle,“Metaphysics”737.18.Aristotle,“Metaphysics”885.19.Seetheintroductoryparagraphoftheessayfor a refreshment on this concept.

ral sciences, of mathematics”—philoso-phy as the Underground Man submits.20 Imagineanilliteratepersonwhohasneverbeentoametropolisstaringataskyscraperbillboardmessagewrittenintext; thereisno difference inmeaning between awalland thisbillboardmessagebut theabilityand bias for the literate and educated to in-terpret thismessage.An object or “wall”thatcouldhavevirtuallynomeaningisinactuality needed to portray an action or an existence propelled through thought, butthe two are quite clearly not the same en-tity. Prime examples that I can offer youarethefirst-discoveredcavepaintings,theRosetta Stone, and the estimation of days theEarthtakestorevolvearoundthesun.Theseexamplespresentimmenseamountsof intellect, thought, and information;yethumanbeings only retain some aspect ofthis wisdom from the authors because the concrete existence they have left on theliteralobjectsofEarth.Despite theviola-tion of noncontradiction, Part I and Part II of Notes from Underground represent the Aristoteliancomplexityof thought.Thesetwopartsarethe‘same,’nevertheless,dif-ferent modes of narration.

20.Dostoyevsky,Fyodor.Notes from Under-ground.1864.Trans.AndrewR.MacAndrew.Introduction Ben Marcus. Afterword Andrew R. MacAndrew.NewYork:NewAmericanLibrary-PenguinGroup,2004:92.Tworeferencesofthenovellaareused.Dostoyevskyvs.Dostoevsky.

writer’sself.AristotleprogressesthesamecontroversyasJacksoninconsiderationtothought:“whether[the]substance[ofphi-losophy] is the faculty of thought or theactofthinking,”15forboth,inthemselves,aredeterminantsofsomeperceivablesub-stancepossessedinthought.16Thoughtisnotonlyperceivableas thestateof itself,but also the process one takes to assess information. This is the very paradox ofNotes from Underground—that its philo-sophical narrative or process of thoughtmustbeitselfthroughaestheticrepresenta-tion,yetrequiresfictitiousnarrationinor-der to tap into the other’s ability to connect withthewriter’sself-reflectiveinquisition.SoAristotle’sparadoxof thoughtand theparadoxofNotes from Underground coin-cide.

But,aspreviouslymentioned,philoso-phyhastobedefinedinsomefiniteterm,15.Seeindentationonp.19oftheJournal. Dos-toevskydescribesdivinethoughtinrelationtophi-losophyandfiction.16. Aristotle, “Metaphysics” 885. See also Ki-erkegaard, Fear & Trembling.“There isan interi-oritythatisincommensurablewiththeexterior,aninterior which, it should be stressed, is not identical with thefirst,but isanewinterior.”Asfaras theparadoxisconcerned,thetruthbehinditsexistence,is that the relation of two entities creates an en-tirelynewentityofitsownbeing.Thisnewentity,while similar to one of its components, as the case withthe“interior,”isnotquitethesame,butmustbeconsidered inanew light.Kierkegaard,Søren.Fear & Trembling. 1843.Trans.AlastairHannay.PenguinGroup,2006:81.

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day speech.23Philosophythatexistssolelyinthemind—asexemplifiedbya“pointofhonor,”mustbeexpressedtotheotherinsomerelatableterms,suchasthesymbol.Inthiscase,fic-titious literature is the symbol, “honor,”whereasthebasicmeaning,reasoning,andessence,or“point,”isaestheticnarrative.24 AswithHamlet,Dostoevskysuggests:“hewhoprotestsagainstphilosophyishimselfa philosopher. A pitiful philosophy!”25 The usage of the language of the other, ficti-

23.Dostoevsky49.24. Another intellectualwho best expresses thebasic concept of the contradiction of thought, al-thoughinregardtoadifferent,butsimilarAristo-telianprinciple,isDr.ZakirNaik:“Onesuchlawof mathematics which the whole mathematics is actually based on the lawofAristotle – ‘The ex-cludedmiddle’.Itsaysthateveryproposition,thateverystatementcaneitherbetrueorfalse.Andforyears,everyonefollowedthislaw.Ahundredyearsago,therewasapersonwhoposedthequestionthatifeverystatement,everypropositioncaneitherbetrueorfalse,eventhisisastatement.Eventhiscanbe false. What if this is false? The whole mathemat-icswasgoing tocollapse.All the mathematicians got together and they took out a new consistence, a new theory saying that whenever anyone utilises a word it can be used as either. When you use a word you talk about its meaning, not the word. But when you mention the word you talk about the word, not the meaning....So, when a word is utilised it can be utilised in two ways – either meaning or mention-ing[Emphasisadded.]Naik,Zakir.IsTheQur’anGod’s Word? (New Delhi: Adam Publishers andDistributors,2008)57.25.Jackson14–5.

tious language, against nature incites thislanguagetobecomeaestheticbymeansofcritique. This is because, by means of cri-tique, i.e., an allegory, trivial language isactuallymakingtheefforttomakeanim-plication, whether subliminally or opaque-ly.26Someamountofphilosophythenex-istswithin thepartof thenovellaalreadyclassifiedasfiction(PartII).Notesisthenin harmony in the substance of both aes-theticandfictitiousnarratives.

Other views exist. Aristotle suggests,“[philosophy] and its object will be thesame,” with the object being the quality,which is fictitious narrative in regard toliterature.Thissuggestionisatruecontra-diction. Philosophy cannot be the quality of being false alone, vice versa. Dosto-evskyinsists,“Truthinart…isinseparablefromform,artistry;animageor typethatis artistically unfinished cannot be a fulltype, a total embodiment of truth.”27 En-lightenment is incompletewith aestheticsdetached fromfiction, so a fictitious nar-rative without philosophical truth cannotbe philosophy. Aristotelian implication that fiction rather than aesthetics is true,

26. Notethattheauthorisnotalwayswritinginthis allegorical style. For example, some writingcouldhaveabsolutelynomeaningatall,whichisthedangerregardedintheessay.AfewofDr.Se-uss’poemsareagoodexampleofwritingthathasintentionally served tohavenoexpressiblemean-ing.27.Jackson116.

TheUndergroundMan asserts the re-ciprocalrelationbetweenfictionandself-reflectionintwopassages.

1)As he complains about liver prob-lems yet refuses to seek medical help and further tells a story (pt.Ich.1).“Iliedoutof sheer spite,” he says.21Hisnarrativeun-dergoes self-contradicting satire,22 which comprisesfictitiousnarrative – the act oflyingandstorytelling.Yetthisfictiontakesplacewithin thepartalreadyclassifiedasaesthetic (as I described as Part I).

2)AstheUndergroundManattemptstoexplaintheimportanceoffictionoverreal-ity(pt.IIch.1):

I protested and spoke to them in literary Russian. Because it’s still impossible in our country to speak about a point of honor—Imean,nothonor itself,butapoint of honor (point d’honneur)—oth-erwisethaninliterarylanguage.“Pointsofhonor”don’texistinordinary,every-

21.Emphasisadded.Dostoevsky,Fyodor.Notes from Underground.1864.Trans.MirraGinsburg.IntroductionDonaldFanger.NewYork:BantamDell,2005:2.22. Critics such as Joseph Frank argue the useof satire in Notes from Underground to reason the seeminglynonsensicalargumentsmadethroughoutmuchofPartI.Scanlan,JamesP.“TheCaseagainstRationalEgoisminDostoevsky’sNotesfromUn-derground.” Journal of the History of Ideas 60.3(1999):549-67.Web.Seep.550.

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lawsofnatureandarithmeticifIhavemyreasonsfordislikingthem, includ-ingtheoneabouttwoandtwomakingfour…ifsuchawallcouldreallyleaveme resigned and bring me peace ofmind because it’s the same as twice two makes four!29

Onecantakethisexcerptassatire,althoughI will confront it in retrospect to the issue of visualizing philosophy through the afore-mentioned“mathematicalproblem.”30 Ar-istotleformulates:“Wemustnotfailtoob-servehowmanyimpossibleorparadoxicalresults confront those who hold different views…neither…is right…for contrariesare not affected by one another.”31 Aris-totledeniesthewall,orparadoxthatany-thingcanexistintwoessences,atallcostsof philosophical truth despite all the proof hehimselfwritesthattheparadoxisphilo-sophical truth. Assume the UndergroundMan reaches the persona ofAristotle: Inthis way Aristotle is both bias and hypo-criticalwhenhesays,“nature…isn’tinter-ested in…whether or not you approve ofher laws,” because he insists in falsehood nonetheless.Theevidenceof theTruth iswithin mathematics, which was empha-sizedbyPythagoreans.Theimportanceof“twoandtwomakefour”and“twicetwo

29.Dostoyevsky93.30. Ibid.31. Aristotle,“Metaphysics”886.

makes four”AristotleshowsashearguesagainstPythagoreans:

[Pythagoreans]…thought that the firstsubjectofwhichagivendefinitionwaspredicable was the substance of the thing defined, as if one supposed that‘double’and‘2’werethesame,because2isthefirstthingofwhich‘double’ispredicable. But surely to be double and tobe2arenotthesame;iftheyare,onethingwillbemany.32

Mathematics proves that double can bethe same as two because double two, or twice two, is four. Two and two is also four. Thus, Aristotle again succeeds inproving another paradox that substancecanbe“many,”notonlyone. Inpractice,the Underground Man later proves thatconclusions of mathematics, which is phi-losophy,donotupholdthemselveswithinfiction, the object of thought. Aristotledescribes, “The formula…in which thetermitselfisnotpresentbutitsmeaningisexpressed…is the formula of the essenceof each [substance].”33 Mathematicalex-pression insists in a formula that equates expressionwithameaning;‘twoandtwo’theexpression,‘four’themeaning.Inthisformula is a relation to substance. The Un-dergroundManmentions,“Iagreethattwotimestwomakesfourisanexcellentthing;

32.Aristotle,“Metaphysics”700.33.Aristotle,“Metaphysics”786.

or that the object of thought rather thanthe action is true, is false. This is what the UndergroundManattemptstorevealfromunderneaththemasksoffiction.The“pointofhonor,”theUndergroundManremindsus,isnottheobjectified“honor”itself,butthe“point.”Thoughdiscreetly,hedirectlysays that philosophy, or the entirety of the two,cannotbetheobjectof thought.Theobjects in fiction rather exist apart fromnaturalmeaning.

Professor Robert Louis Jackson con-tends, “The man from the ‘underground’speaksforawholerangeofDostoevsky’ssocialtypeswhenheobservesthathe‘onlycarried to an extreme’ what others ‘havenot dared to carry through halfway.’”28 The Underground Man is a philosopher,likewise, derives the integrity ofWesternphilosophy, the personas of many, in one narrative.AstheUndergroundManwrites,he transforms himself into other modes or personstoasserttheparadoxofphilosoph-icaltruth.Hediscusses:

two and two make four. That’s arithme-tic. Just tryanddisprove it…Twoandtwo do make four. Nature doesn’t ask for your advice. She isn’t interestedin your preferences or whether or not youapproveofherlaws.Youmustac-cept nature as she is with all the conse-quences that that implies. So a wall is awall…But…whatdoIcareaboutthe

28.p.94.

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formulas that expresses philosophical na-ture in Part I.

Formulas do not derive philosophy inPart II of Notes from Underground. Aris-totle explains: “Regarding the objects ofmathematics…the formulae of the parts[are] not parts of the formulae of the wholes…because these parts are percep-tible things.”38 In Part II the formulas be-come objects of thought, quality, ratherthanthewholeactofthinking.Theformu-las of Part II, the fictitious narrative, areseeninthefollowingexamples:

1)“Iwasonlytwenty-fouratthetime”39

2)“AntonAntonychlived…inahousenear Five Corners Square”40

3)“Itwasstillonlytwenty after five”41

EachexampleofformulasinPartIIdonotexpressmeaningbutratheraquality—1)age; 2) location; 3) time. Through ficti-tiousnarrative,thenovellawithdraws“artto lofty and inaccessible positions.”42 And through Aristotelian perspective, math-ematicalreasoningprovesAristotlewrong.Anotherparadox.

ProfessorJacksonrecommends:38.Aristotle,“Metaphysics”886.39.Emphasisremoved.Dostoevsky41.40.Italicsadded.Dostoyevsky131.41.Italicsadded.Dostoevsky70.42.Jackson138.

Dostoevsky postulates disintegrationand chaos in the aesthetic…thereforemoral—sphere. There can be no vitallife or healthy creation outside con-flict…whenman achieves the [object]of his desires…his aesthetic pleasuresbecome unhealthy inharmonious, and disfigured, a condition reflected in thesimultaneous breakdown of morality and taste.43

The destruction of aesthetics throughfic-tion is not only a philosophical concern, but aconcernofGod.TheUndergroundManinsistsonthisplight:“wehavelosttouchsobadlythatweoftenfeelakindofloathingforgenuine‘livinglife,’andhencecannotendure being reminded of it…andwe allagree inprivate that it’smuchbetter ‘ac-cording tobooks.’”44 Whatever enduringbiastowardfictioninplacementofnatureexiststothepointthatrealitybecomesonlyfiction,“thefiguresby theirobjectivena-ture [then] imprison the author.”45Howev-er,humanssuchasAristotleseemtofavorthisdegradationofsoul.Humansnolongerexistasindividual,“menwithrealbodies,

43. Jackson 138.44.Dostoevsky129.Seetheentiretyofchapter9ofPartIforanotherequivalentoftheUndergroundMan’s epilogue, although in the alternativemodeofnarrative.45. Ibid.,p.19.See footnoteonMigueldeUna-muno’s Mist

but ifwe are dispensing praise, then twotimestwomakesfiveissometimesamostcharming little thing aswell.”34Althoughone can take this as satire, one can take this metaphorically as well. A philosopher such asAristotleistotakemathematicalexpres-sionasperfectionintheobjectofthought,andseeitasnature;butthisexpressionismerely favored through bias.Mathemati-calexpressionisagainstthephilosophicaltruthofimperfectionintheactofthought.35 However,withinthoseformulas,fourandfivearenottheactualtermstoexpressthismeaningofessence:“Fivedoesnotadmitthe formof theEven...”36 The imperfec-tionsof thoughtcannotbeexpressed inaperfectmanner—it isnotpossible for theTruthoftheselftobeobjectifiedinawaythe other can understand. Therefore, if one were to attempt tomathematically derivethought, the imperfection of thoughtwillbe‘mathematically’greaterthanitsrefinedform.37Hence,itisthediscussionofthese

34.Dostoevsky34.35. See Plato, Timaeus for the concept of fallibility inthought.36.Plato’sPhaedo,mostlikelydescribingthethe-orybehindthethoughtofPythagoreans.37.WiththephilosophicalassumptionthatOddisgreaterthanEven,keepinmindthatdichotomyofPart I and Part II. While I do not elaborate on the aspectofPartIIenteringa“yellow”escapefromthenarrativeoftherealityofPartI,Iwouldlikeyou to interest yourself in the number of compo-nentsofeachpart:PartIis11chapters,whereasPart II is 10 chapters.

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meaning that teaches ethics as throughthe assistance of the Underground Man.However, theUndergroundManachievesthis philosophical lesson in accordance to much of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and a col-lectionofotherphilosophicalthoughtper-tainingtothenatureof‘reality.’Perhapsheis more Aristotelian than Aristotle himself.

real blood of our own.”46 The chief point that the UndergroundMan insists is thatphilosophy, Truth, is becoming distortedby fairytales that forget to implement theinquisitive nature of thought.47 The aes-theticnarrativepreservesthelawofrealityso thus preservesmorality: aesthetics ac-knowledgestheselfandindividualism,asseen through expression of mathematics. Andforthisreasonistheaestheticahigherdegreeofnarrationas itmore closely re-sembles philosophy.48

ThephilosophyinDostoevsky’sNotes from Undergroundisderivedasaparadox.His philosophy is that enlightenment iscloselyachievedthroughharmonyofficti-tiousnarrativeandaestheticnarrative.Thisdichotomyisexplainedthroughmetaphys-ical reasoning characterized in a plethoraof philosophical works and is namely dis-cussedbyAristotle.Aristotledisproveshisownbiasedtheory,whichinsistsenlighten-ment is through only fictitious narrative.Although the two narratives correspondin Notes, fiction cannot express the fun-damental elements of reality, such as the meaningandjistofmathematics.Thus,theaesthetic narrative outdoes fiction in tap-pingintotheTruthoftheself.Buttheno-vella’snarrativeharmonyimpliesagreater46.Dostoevsky130.47.Here,IamalltooremindedofPlato’sAllegory of a Cave.48.Ibid.,p.19SeetheopeningquotationofDos-toevsky.

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