bin laden and the balkans: the politics of anti … · 2016. 10. 10. · bin laden and the balkans:...

BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS:THE POLITICS OF ANTI-TERRORISM

9 November 2001

ICG Balkans Report N° 119Belgrade/Podgorica/Pristina/Sarajevo/Skopje/Tirana/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................3

II. ALBANIA ...........................................................................................................................................3A. POLICY RESPONSES..................................................................................................................................4B. ISLAMIC INVOLVEMENT IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA........................................................................4C. BIN LADEN IN ALBANIA?.........................................................................................................................5D. SKOPJE STIRS THE POT ............................................................................................................................6E. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................7

III. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA .....................................................................................................9A. THE VIEW FROM THE FEDERATION .........................................................................................................9B. IZETBEGOVIC, THE WAR AND ISLAM ....................................................................................................11C. THE VIEW FROM THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA............................................................................................13D. ASSESSING AND MEETING THE THREAT ...............................................................................................13E. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................16

IV. CROATIA.........................................................................................................................................16A. FEAR OF EXCLUSION..............................................................................................................................16B. INTO THE COALITION.............................................................................................................................17C. AN UNLIKELY TARGET ..........................................................................................................................17

V. KOSOVO ..........................................................................................................................................18A. KOSOVO ALBANIAN RESPONSE .............................................................................................................18B. MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................................18C. THE CONFUSING SEMANTICS OF �TERRORISM� .....................................................................................19D. �RECONSTRUCTION� AS ISLAMISATION .................................................................................................19E. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................20

VI. MACEDONIA ..................................................................................................................................21A. GOVERNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM.....................................................................................................21B. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................22C. MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................................23D. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................23

VII. MONTENEGRO ..............................................................................................................................24A. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSES ............................................................................................................24B. MEDIA COVERAGE .................................................................................................................................25

VIII. SERBIA.............................................................................................................................................26A. MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................................26B. POLITICIANS ...........................................................................................................................................27C. BACK TO THE PRESENT .........................................................................................................................28D. THE SANDZAK ........................................................................................................................................29E. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................29

APPENDICESA. MAP OF THE BALKANS...........................................................................................................................30B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .........................................................................................31C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS....................................................................................................32D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ..........................................................................................................................36

ICG Balkans Report N° 119 9 November 2001

BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS:

THE POLITICS OF ANTI-TERRORISM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The global focus on Islamist extremist-inspiredterrorism resulting from the 11 Septemberatrocities has raised the question of the potentialfor such terrorist activity in, or emanating from, theBalkans.

Given the presence of ex-mujahidin in Bosnia, thetens of thousands of former military andparamilitary fighters in Bosnia, Kosovo andMacedonia who are Muslims by tradition, if notfor the most part by observance, and the largedeployments of U.S. and other troops in the region,some (though by no means all) senior Westernsources describe the potential terrorist threat assignificant. In this context, international officialsand organisations in parts of the region, as well ascertain governments, have taken extra securityprecautions, and clamped down on individuals andgroups suspected of possible links to terroristnetworks.

Although heightened security precautions areobviously appropriate at this time, it is importantthat the issue of Islamist extremism in the Balkans,and the risk of terrorism associated with it, not bepainted as a larger problem than it is. WhileOsama bin Laden himself may have visitedAlbania several years ago, and individuals withlinks to his organisation have passed through theBalkans, it appears that only Bosnia has significantnumbers of potential Islamist extremists.Elsewhere the potential for Islamist-inspiredviolence seems slight, and to hinge on theweakness of institutions rather than ideologicalsympathies with the enemies of the West.

From this perspective, and in the absence of furtherevidence demanding a more robust response, thebest way to prevent deadly violence in oremanating from the Balkans may simply becontinued engagement by the internationalcommunity across the spectrum of peace keepingand peace building tasks.

There is no doubt that, in the Balkans as elsewhere,the new and overwhelming Western foreign policypriority has triggered some energetic attempts toborrow or co-opt the anti-terrorist agenda. Manypoliticians and propagandists in Serbia, Bosnia andMacedonia have been given the opportunity to pufffresh air into stereotypes of fanatical beardedmujahidin, myths of Muslim �backwardness�, andtheories about the �civilisational� abyss separatingIslam from the West that served sinister purposesin the 1990s.

In this context, it is important that the internationalcommunity should not be distracted by the wave ofanti-Muslim opinion and propaganda that haswashed through Serbia, Macedonia, and the Serb-controlled parts of Bosnia. In these countries, andalso in Albania, Western capitals must rewardgovernments� overall democratic performance, notthe volume of their denunciations of terrorism.

Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-TerrorismICG Balkans Report N° 119, 9 November 2001 Page ii

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

1. Closely monitor in Bosnia and Kosovo theactivities of Islamist organisations which mayhave links to terrorist networks and which, ifthey entrench themselves, could present apermanent potential security threat.

2. Follow through on Washington�s warning toethnic Albanian leaders in Pristina on 15October 2001 that �any provocative acts byarmed Albanian groups would be seen assupport for terrorism�.

3. Examine carefully the allegations emanatingfrom Serbia and Macedonia about continuingAlbanian links to bin Laden, but in the absence

of credible supporting evidence be prepared topublicly discount them.

4. Do not be distracted by, or accept, the wave ofanti-Muslim opinion and propaganda that haswashed through Serbia, Macedonia, and theSerb-controlled parts of Bosnia.

5. In the absence of specific evidence demandinga more robust response, recognise that the mainBalkans dimension of the war on terrorism isthe long term work of peace building �institutional reform and development being thebest way to close in the spaces where terroristnetworks can potentially operate.

Belgrade/Podgorica/Pristina/Sarajevo/Skopje/Tirana/Brussels, 9 November 2001

ICG Balkans Report N° 119 9 November 2001

BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS:

THE POLITICS OF ANTI-TERRORISM

I. INTRODUCTION

The global focus on Islamist terrorism that resultedfrom the 11 September atrocities has raised thequestion of the potential for terrorist activity in theBalkans. Terrorist cells and networks can operatewithout a broad base of popular support; and anycountry or province with a majority Muslimpopulation and a large U.S. military presence is defacto a potential target for al-Qaida. Given thepresence of former mujahidin in Bosnia, and thetens of thousands of former military andparamilitary fighters in Bosnia, Kosovo andMacedonia who are Muslims by tradition if not, forthe most part, by observance, some (though by nomeans all) senior international community sourcesdescribe the potential terrorist threat as significant.

Accordingly, international officials andorganisations in parts of the region, as well ascertain governments, have taken extra securityprecautions, and clamped down on individuals andgroups suspected of possible links to terroristnetworks, in ways that have not given a highpriority to civil liberties. In Bosnia, SFOR claimsthat its vigilance has averted specific terroristactions.

Less noticed, but of real significance to politicaldevelopments within the region, was the decisionby the United States � leader of both the �war onterrorism� and the international community in theBalkans � to send a strong message to ethnicAlbanian leaders. Henceforth, the demarche said,�any provocative acts by armed Albanian groupswould be seen by the U.S. as support for terrorist

forces�.1 If it is implemented, this fundamentalclarification could assist the peace process inMacedonia and normalisation in Kosovo.

At the same time, in the Balkans as elsewhere, thenew and overwhelming Western foreign policypriority has triggered some energetic attempts toborrow or co-opt the anti-terrorist agenda. The factthat most leaders in the region genuinely supportthis agenda does not prevent them from exploitingit, too.

Standing aside from U.S.-led coalitions is not anoption for the region�s governments. The BushAdministration�s interest in these countries isperceived as being too contingent, too uncertain,for them to risk affronting the only superpower,and inclusion in the �anti-terrorist coalition� hasbecome the latest yardstick of status as a friend ofthe Western world. The only leader who hasventured to trample publicly on U.S. sensitivitieson this issue has been Yugoslav president VojislavKostunica (see below).

Hence, presidents and prime ministers haveexpressed their support, and media around theregion have been saturated with claims andallegations about Osama bin Laden, terrorism, andIslamist extremism. However, declarations byBalkan politicians that they stand foursquare withthe Americans against the terrorist threat generallyhave a subtext of opportunism. The new U.S.priority has provided many politicians andpropagandists in Serbia, Bosnia and Macedoniawith an opportunity to puff fresh air intostereotypes of fanatical bearded mujahidin, myths

1 From statement released on 15 October 2001 by the U.S.mission in Kosovo.

Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-TerrorismICG Balkans Report N° 119, 9 November 2001 Page 2

of Muslim �backwardness�, and theories about the�civilisational� abyss separating Islam from theWest that served sinister purposes in the 1990s.

In short, although the world may have changed on11 September 2001, Balkan politicians andpropagandists are still trying to make the newworld fit the old. If, suddenly, the only stories theforeign media wish to hear concern threats fromformer, potential or imaginary Islamist terrorists,the Balkan markets of Albania, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia havebeen quick to oblige � for reasons of their own.These reports are analysed and assessed below.

Ironically, the two groups that most benefited fromU.S. and Western European engagement in theregion during the 1990s � Bosniaks and ethnicAlbanians � have now been portrayed within theregion, and even beyond it, as potential supportersof bin Laden and al-Qaida. Poorly researched orsensationally written stories in Westernnewspapers about terrorist hotbeds in the Balkansprobably have no ulterior motive.2 The samecannot be said when the local media run suchstories. There, the intention is to justify a tougherstance towards ethnic Albanians in southernSerbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, and to increaseinternational suspicion of � and pressure on �Bosniak and other Muslim leaders.

This wave of anti-Islamist propaganda isdiversionary, intended in part to persuade localgovernments as well as Western policy makers torelax their efforts to address some perhaps morecompelling sources of Balkans instability. Thosesources include such political considerations as theunresolved nature of Serbian state identity andMontenegrin national identity; Kosovo�s need forfinal status; the contradictions of the Dayton PeaceAgreement for Bosnia; and the bitterness felt byethnic Albanians about their traditional secondclass status in Macedonia and by ethnicMacedonians about the political settlementbrokered at Ohrid on 13 August 2001.

2 See, for example, �Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base andSanctuary for Terrorists�, Los Angeles Times, 7 October2001, �School of Hate in the Balkans: How bin Laden�s al-Qaida got a foothold in the Balkans�, Die Zeit, 31 October2001, and �Al Qaeda�s Balkan Links�, Wall Street JournalEurope, 1 November 2001.

There are, moreover, the common factors of ineptgovernance, poor public security, weak rule of law,pervasive economic backwardness, institutionalcorruption and organised crime. These combine toproduce an environment where internationalterrorist networks can hide personnel and money.From this perspective, the most important Balkansdimension of the war on terrorism is the long-termwork of peace-building � institutional reform anddevelopment.

This is not to deny that Islamist extremists did playa minor part in the conflict in Bosnia in the firsthalf of the 1990s, or that others similarly inspiredmay � despite denials � have fought with ethnicAlbanian forces in Kosovo and Macedonia morerecently.3 Such extremism, to the extent that itexisted, was a consequence rather than a cause ofviolence in Bosnia, let alone in Kosovo orMacedonia. It continues to enjoy only verymarginal support in those places. There is no riskthat significant numbers of Muslims in the Balkansmight support Islamist extremists; such adevelopment would contradict their religioustraditions, their political views, and their life styles,which are emphatically Western.4

The great majority of Muslims in the region wouldagree with Germany�s Chancellor Schroeder thatthe war on terrorism �is not a clash of civilisationsbut a war for civilisation�. Indeed, surveying thewars of Yugoslav succession since 1991, Serb andCroat nationalists have been notably more effectivein using Orthodox and Catholic versions ofChristian extremism as mobilising agents orproxy-causes of violence against innocent civiliantargets.

Nor is it to dismiss the sincerity of the widespreadanger in Serbia and Macedonia at the political

3 According to a British daily newspaper, Interpol officialshave stated that bin Laden �supplied one of his top militarycommanders for an elite KLA unit during the Kosovoconflict�. The Independent, 21 October 2001.4 Nevertheless, the activities of some Islamistorganisations in Bosnia and Kosovo may present a securitythreat. Wahhabi practices have little support among theMuslim communities of the Balkans, where they generatemore resentment than enthusiasm. However, populationsimpoverished and traumatised by conflict may be highlyvulnerable to penetration by well-resourced radicalorganisations, some of which are considered to have linksto terrorist networks.


successes scored by ethnic Albanians in the regionsince 1999, and also at the internationalcommunity�s perceived double standards. For, inboth Kosovo and Macedonia, political groupsassociated with acts which almost all ethnic Serbsand Macedonians view as terrorism � and cannotbe expected to view as anything else � have closeties to, or are active within, political parties that areaccepted by the international community aslegitimate actors. This fact creates resentment atperceived double standards. To the extent that theinternational community is unable to address thisresentment, its objectives in the region maybecome harder to achieve.

II. ALBANIA

Following the 11 September attacks, Albania wentinto a form of mourning. Church bells pealed,flags stood at half-mast, and all conferences,concerts and sports matches were cancelled.Politicians from all sides condemned the attacksand expressed full support to the U.S. Parliamentpassed a resolution condemning �these barbaricacts against innocent civilians and against thevalues of freedom and democracy in the world.�The Democratic Party (DP)-led oppositioncoalition, �Union for Victory� (UfV), expressedsupport for the resolution, despite missing the votebecause of its current boycott of Parliament.5

Albanians were stunned by the scale and audacityof the attacks. They were also visibly shocked bytelevision images of the backwardness ofAfghanistan, the misery of its people, and thefanaticism and hatred expressed by Talibansupporters in Pakistan. But they were also � andremain - deeply angered by media allegations,emanating from Albania�s Balkan neighbours,which claim that Albania is harbouring Islamistterrorists and allowing its territory to be used fortheir training camps. This in turn has opened avicious internal debate centred around whichpolitical party may have had the more relaxedpolicy towards Islamist fundamentalists: the right-wing DP, which governed from 1992 until 1997, orthe Socialist-led government which then came topower.

Almost everyone has at least one relative oracquaintance in the U.S., where there are anestimated 400,000 citizens of Albanian origin.Within hours of the attacks, phone lines to the U.S.were jammed with anxious callers. The dailyShekulli commented that the Albanian people arevery close to Americans, despite the fact that theyare predominantly Muslims. Despite intensiveefforts at Muslim and Christian indoctrination overthe past decade, Albanians in general remainlargely secular.6

5 It sees Parliament as an �illegitimate� institution after theparty�s defeat in the recent elections: see ICG BalkansBriefing, Albania’s Parliamentary Elections, 23 August2001.6 The estimated breakdown of religious affiliation is asfollows: 65 per cent Muslim, 25 per cent Orthodox, and 10per cent Catholic.


A. POLICY RESPONSES

The government�s response to 11 September wasswift and comprehensive. Prime Minister Ilir Metaannounced that Albania �is ready to put everythingat the disposal� of the U.S. and Western nations toassist their fight against international terrorism.Interior Minister Ilir Gjoni ordered a nation-wideoperation to check the identification documents ofall foreigners, especially those from Arabcountries.7

The police, the General Prosecution Office, and theintelligence service (SHIK) are working closelywith the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) to uncover terrorists suspected ofinvolvement in the attacks. Police have also beenordered to check and investigate the identities ofall citizens of Arab origin living in the country.Information gathered will be analysed by an expertgroup. Six leading members of Islamicorganisations were expelled during October, andfurther expulsions are expected. Strict controls arebeing imposed on prominent Muslim organisationssuch as the Red Crescent, the CoordinationCouncil of Islamic Associations, the Islamic WorldCommittee and the Koran Foundation. Police havedemanded full lists of people leading theseassociations, their activities, their country of originand the exact mission of their association.

The Bank of Albania has ordered a check on thecountry�s private banks, such as the Arab-IslamicBank and the Malaysian Inter-commercial Bank, touncover any possible terrorist funds. Security at thecountry�s only airport and all border crossings hasbeen stepped up to prevent Islamist extremistsfrom entering the country. The National SecurityCouncil held a meeting on 1 October 2001 headedby President Rexhep Meidani, with theparticipation of most of the cabinet, as well as theGovernor of the Bank of Albania. The meetingfocused on measures to be taken by the stateinstitutions.

President Meidani said that the armed forcesshould define a new strategy to prevent terroristattacks in Albania. Meidani, who was addressingsoldiers engaged in an exercise in Koplik, said that

7 There are a number of Egyptians living in Albania,together with a smaller number of people from the MiddleEast.

the challenge against terrorism was imminent evenin Albania: �Any country is threatened by this,including Albania. This demands a review of basicprinciples of defence, listing terrorism as a newtype of warfare�.8

Most recently, on 15 October, parliamentunanimously adopted a nine-point anti-terrorismPlan of Action to coordinate a �united anti-terroristfront� including political, military and economicelements.

B. ISLAMIC INVOLVEMENT IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA

Following the collapse of the staunchly atheistone-party state in 1991, delegations came toAlbania from around the Muslim world. WithIslamic aid, work began on restoring damaged andneglected mosques, and classes were set up insidethe mosques to teach children to read basic Arabicscript. In the chaotic and crime-ridden conditionsof this immediate transition period, Muslim leadersargued that the state should consider introducingIslamic laws if it could not restore order. By thewinter of 1992, international aid was flowing intothe country. Alongside the many Christiancharities, the Islamic Relief Agency (IRA) playedan important role in the distribution of medical andrelief supplies. A spokesman for the IRA said thathe found Albania�s Muslims ignorant of their faith,aware that they were Muslims but not knowingwhat this actually meant. The country�s Muslims,he said, were like a dry sponge, ready to soak upanything given to them.9

Unlike the other religious groups that sentassistance, the Islamic representatives were intenton fostering an economic, as well as a spiritual andcultural base in the country. In October 1992,representatives from the Islamic DevelopmentBank (IDB) visited Tirana. The IDB delegationoffered to invest in all sectors of the economy,promote exports and grant much needed credit.This was what the new DP government wanted tohear. After the failure of American and Europeancapital investment in Albania, the alternative-

8 Albania Daily News, 2 October 2001.9 Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania - FromAnarchy to a Balkan Identity, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., secondedition, 1999, p. 104.


identifying slogan �Towards Europe or Islam�began to appear in media discussions.

However, even though many Albanians believedthe West had turned its back, they were alarmed bythe government�s decision in 1992 to become a fullmember of the Organisation of the IslamicConference (OIC). The decision had been madehurriedly and without consulting parliament.Albanians worried that it would align Albaniacloser to the Islamic world. A sharp debatefollowed, with the Socialist Party voicing thegeneral unease at what was widely interpreted as abackward step. However, the decision to join theOIC was mainly in response to the West�s failureto invest, to provide jobs, and to convince thegovernment that, if the conflict then raging inBosnia spread to Kosovo, it could expectprotection.

C. BIN LADEN IN ALBANIA?

According to a number of unsubstantiated reports,bin Laden is said to have visited Albania in 1994as a wealthy Saudi Arabian businessman, offeringsupport to charities rebuilding mosques andschools as a cover to infiltrate his operatives. TheLondon Independent has quoted Interpolallegations that bin Laden �was known� to havevisited Albania.10

The spotlight fell on possible bin Laden activitiesin Albania with the arrest in 1998 of a Frenchpassport holder, Claude Kader, believed to be ofMiddle Eastern origin. He confessed tomembership in a bin Laden group and toldinvestigators he had been sent to give weapons tothe guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army, thenbeginning their war against the Serbs. Kader saidthe KLA had turned him down and that he hadreturned to Albania with his weapons. A fewweeks later, after a row in his flat in Tirana, heshot his Albanian interpreter and was tried formurder. He told prosecutors that four other binLaden operatives remained at large.11

Police suspect that bin Laden, working withorganised crime networks, may have takenadvantage of the theft of 100,000 Albanian

10 Colin Brown, �Bin Laden linked to Albanian druggangs�, The Independent, 21 October 2001.11 The Scotsman, 21 September 2001.

passports during the chaos that swept the countryin 1997. In the early post-Communist period ofclose ties with Islamic nations, a prominent Islamicintellectual, Bashkim Gazidede, was appointed bythe DP government to head the intelligenceservice. This raised concern that suspectedterrorists may have acquired citizenship at thetime. Gazidede fled Albania after the 1997 uprisingand is currently thought to reside in Libya.12

Several high-ranking Americans cancelled visits toAlbania in summer 1999, believing there was arisk from terrorist groups linked to bin Laden.13 Anumber of Islamist terrorists were arrested anddeported in 1998-99 for plotting to attack the U.S.embassy in Tirana. Since then U.S. intelligence hasbeen given a free hand to obtain the detention andexpulsion of foreigners suspected of planning touse Albania as a springboard for terrorism inWestern Europe.

After the events of 11 September 2001, politicalfactions and the media under their influencequickly made capital out of the situation. Bitterpolemics erupted between the Socialists and theDemocrats, each side accusing the other of laxitytowards terrorism, allowing individuals such as binLaden to operate in the country. This has beentermed by one newspaper �a crazy competition� totry and prove when Osama bin Laden was inAlbania � whether under the Democratic Party-ledgovernment (1992-1997) or the Socialist-ledadministration which came to power in 1997.14

Another daily joined in the criticism: �Thegovernment is busy trying to present Democratleader Sali Berisha as a friend of Islamic terrorists,while the opposition Union for Victory has beentouring Europe to denounce the �terrorism� of itsown state against the opposition.�15

12 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan CrisisReports, 26 September 2001.13 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright decided not tostop in Albania in June 1999 following her visit toMacedonia due to security concerns. Defence SecretaryWilliam Cohen cancelled a trip to Tirana the followingmonth due to an alleged threat related to Islamic militantsaffiliated to Osama bin Laden. Ambassador to the UnitedNations Richard Holbrooke cancelled his visit to Tiranaplanned for August 1999; and President Clinton avoidedthe country in his subsequent visit to the region.14 Korrieri, 25 September 2001.15 Shekulli, 26 September 2001.


This was a reference to the right-wing daily Tema,which had claimed that the Socialist-ledgovernment was using �terror� tactics against theopposition. Tema accused the government ofhypocrisy by professing �pro-U.S. national unity�,while simultaneously attacking the opposition:

Since the day of the tragedy, Premier IlirMeta has made two provocative gestures:first, by threatening to bring formerPresident Sali Berisha to court by force tosatisfy the whims of a declared killer andsecondly, by ordering the closure of thefirst television station in the country notunder his control [the pro-oppositionShijak TV], as is the case with newspapersand the other TV stations. He probablythinks that by supporting the U.S. in itsanti-terrorism fight, we have to endureeven his state terrorism against theopposition and free press in Albania.16

The Socialist Party�s allegations enraged theopposition. The former deputy chairman of theintelligence service, Bujar Rama, responded thatthere were no terrorist bases in Albania when theDemocratic Party was in power but with thebreakdown of state control in 1997, organisedcrime and links with foreign criminal groups haveflourished.

Rama flatly rejected the allegations that bin Ladenwas received in Albania in 1994 �as a businessman� by the former chief of SHIK, BashkimGazidede. In no way could such a wealthy personhave visited Albania without the relevant officialprotocol: such a person could never have comewithout having provided his identity and,moreover, Gazidede was not permitted to receivesuch people�.17

Foreign Minister, Arta Dade, claims that somepeople with terrorist links were living in Albaniaprior to her Socialist Party�s return to power in1997. However, she says that the Albaniangovernment � in cooperation with the intelligenceservices of the U.S., Italy and other Europeancountries � expelled them. She insists that Albaniais now �a safe place with full security�.18

16 Tema, 18 September 2001.17 Albania Daily News, 26 September 2001.18 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan CrisisReports, 23 September 2001.

The daily Gazeta Shqiptare noted that thegeographical, political, social and economicaspects of such a �monstrous attack� as the U.S.had suffered could divert attention from smallcountries like Albania, leaving them �outside thepriorities of the international community�.19 Thepaper argued that the only way to avoidabandonment was for Albanians themselves to setaside their political animosities and present theworld with a picture of internal stability in thehope of accelerating accession to the EuropeanUnion:

In these times, we Albanians mustdemonstrate that we are capable ofbuilding a really democratic environment,far from primitivism and excessiveconflicts combined with a more rationalforeign policy. This might encourage anaccelerated pace in Albania�s integrationprocess and help consolidate Albania�s rolein resolving the main concerns the civilisedworld presently is going through.20

This commentary is perhaps the most interesting todate, because it looks beyond the immediate angerat regional efforts to discredit Albania and pointsout that internal disputes are also damaging thecountry�s image.

D. SKOPJE STIRS THE POT

After he visited Tirana on 19 September 2001,Macedonian Defence Minister Vlado Buckovskiwas said by his hosts to have claimed that �Thereare camps in Tropoja and Kukes for trainingterrorists who have terrorised Macedonia.� Thiswas rejected by Defence Minister Pandeli Majkoand Interior Minister Ilir Gjoni as �baseless anduntrue�.21 Tirana insists it has done its utmost bothto apprehend suspected Islamist extremists and tocurtail the activities of ethnic Albanian fightersfrom Kosovo and Macedonia who try to useAlbania as a base.

19 Gazeta Sqiptare, 24 September 2001.20 Gazeta Sqiptare, 24 September 2001.21 Interviewed by ICG in Skopje on 19 October, MinisterBuckovski denied having made any such claim. Rather, hesaid, he had merely inquired about certain rumours incirculation. If so, the ensuing scandal testifies to Tirana�sextreme sensitivity on this issue.


Tirana�s police chief, Bilbil Mema, told a pressconference: �There is no Islamic threat in Albania.This country is no longer a refuge for Islamicterrorists.� Gjoni echoed Mema by emphaticallydenying the Macedonian accusations: �I want toassure all Albanian citizens that we have noinformation on any terrorist organisation inAlbania�.22 His statement was corroborated by U.S.Ambassador Joseph Limprecht, who commendedthe Meta administration for its collaboration withanti-terrorist efforts. The ambassador also saidWashington had neither identified nor located anyterrorist cells in Albania.23

Defence Minister Pandeli Majko stated that�Albania and its armed forces are ready to acceptany investigation into the so-called training campsfor terrorists.� He noted that NATO troops arestationed in Albania, and the OSCE mission is�free to move around�.24 The Chief of the GeneralStaff of the Albanian Armed Forces, PellumbQazimi, said that Buckovski�s statement wasintended to shift attention away from the source ofthe crisis, in Macedonia. �These statements areuntrue, baseless,� said Qazimi, adding that �therehas been a NATO team monitoring the bordersince the beginning of the crisis in Macedonia.�25

Deputy Foreign Minister Pellumb Xhufi expressedirritation at �statements by neighbouring politiciansand media which linked Albania to bin Laden�sterrorist cells�, simply on the ground that it is apredominantly Muslim country. �There is always atendency to classify Albanians as thetroublemakers of the region�, he said.

Official Tirana was particularly incensed by aWashington Times article on 18 September 2001,which appeared after several reports of linksbetween Albania and bin Laden in the Serbian andMacedonian press. It alleged that Albania mightwell have served as the springboard for theWashington and New York attacks.26 The LondonTimes has alerted readers to the dangers of travel to

22 Albania Daily News, 21 September 2001.23 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan CrisisReports, 26 September 2001.24 Albania Daily News, 1 October 2001.25 Albania Daily News, 3 October 2001.26 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan CrisisReports, 26 September 2001.

Albania, citing a Foreign Office list naming thecountry as a possible base for Islamic terrorists.27

Macedonian media allegations that Albaniaharbours and trains ethnic Albanian �terrorists�from the National Liberation Army (KLA) inMacedonia and nurtures their links with Islamiststructures, in particular Osama bin Laden and theal-Qaida, drew particularly heavy criticism. Acommentary in the daily Koha Jone noted thatonce again Albania�s neighbours weredemonstrating hostility: �Immediately ourneighbours hurried to imply terrorist links withthose Albanian factors [KLA] that cause troublefor them.�28 The daily Shekulli also lashed out atAlbania�s Balkan neighbours for attempting toreinforce the �dangerous Islamic image ofAlbania�.29

E. CONCLUSION

The response in Albania to the events of 11September and their aftermath has been fourfold.First, there is keen sympathy for the victims.Secondly, there has been a profusion of officialstatements asserting that Albania is a terrorist-freezone and detailing immediate measures to ensurethat Islamist terrorists cannot operate fromAlbanian soil. Thirdly, there is widespread angerand indignation towards Balkan neighbours fortheir accusations that Albania offers a sanctuaryfor terrorists. Fourthly, elements on both the rightand left have attempted to wring politicaladvantage from the horrors.

Albanians are as a rule pro-American. In general,they look down on their Balkan neighbours (thesame neighbours who look down on them). Likemost Serbs, Croats and Macedonians, as well asmany Bosniaks, they regard Islam and the East asbackward. Unlike their neighbours, however, theyinstinctively distrust the big Western Europeanpowers that divided Albanians among severalstates at the beginning of the last century. TheU.S., on the other hand, is Western and democraticwithout being responsible for historic injustices toAlbania; it is the home of the largest Albanian

27 The Times, 9 October 2001. The warning is no longercarried on the official Foreign Office website.28 Koha Jone, 25 September 2001.29 Shekulli, 26 September 2001.


Diaspora, and it is the world�s most powerfulcountry.

Serbian and Macedonian media allegations thatTirana is secretly supporting terrorists operatingout of Albania appear to have been promoted bythose countries� intelligence services.30 These andother such reports remain unsubstantiated. Hencethe authorities� growing concern that they appearto be accepted at face value in the West, whereinfluential media echo the allegations that Albaniaposes an Islamic threat to Europe.31

This in turn has led to Tirana�s perhapsoverzealous effort to eradicate all fundamentalistIslamic influences from the country. Theinternational community should examine theallegations emanating from Serbia and Macedoniaabout continuing Albanian links to bin Laden, andif no evidence comes to light be prepared topublicly discount them. Otherwise, pro-reformparties in Tirana may lose ground to hard-lineopposition parties. If this happens, the presentgovernment�s efforts to avoid entanglement inMacedonia and Kosovo would be jeopardised.

Until 1999 � the end of the Kosovo war andrestoration of law and order in most of the country� such allegations had some foundation. During thelawless and anarchic period of the mid-1990s, itwas easy for anyone to operate illicitly andundetected in Albania. However, Albania�scitizenship laws were tightened after the 1998bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa, andthorough checks were made on applicants, incollaboration with international agencies.Nevertheless, some Islamist terrorists may havereceived citizenship during the mid 1990s.

While weapons and other forms of logisticalsupport have been smuggled from Albania toethnic Albanian guerrillas in southern Serbia and

30 The same reports omit to mention that Greece has hadno success in destroying its domestic terroristorganisations, 17 November and MAVI, even though theformer ranks as one of Europe�s most successful suchgroups. The omission, in Albanian eyes, is easilyexplained: the groups in question are neither Muslim norAlbanian.31 Examples include �School of Hate in the Balkans: Howbin Laden�s al-Qaida got a foothold in the Balkans�, DieZeit, 31 October 2001, and �Al Qaeda�s Balkan Links�,Wall Street Journal Europe, 1 November 2001.

western Macedonia, the present government has �unlike its predecessor � tried to secure thecountry�s borders and to halt arms smuggling andother illegal activity. That this effort has not metwith more success is due above all to the lack offunds to train and equip an effective border police.


III. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In post-Dayton Bosnia, a state of two �entities� (theFederation and the Republika Srpska) and three�constituent peoples� (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats),unified responses to significant domestic or foreignevents are almost unheard of. Inevitably, the �waron terrorism� has drawn very different reactionsamong Bosnia�s different political elites, rangingfrom panic to smug satisfaction. The response ofthe international community has been equallymixed, as damage limitation and force protectionhave yielded to expressions of confidence in theBosnian authorities� sincere willingness � if notfull capacity � to cope.

What all the local and international reactions havehad in common, however, is an acceptance of thefact that the agenda has changed. Events in theoutside world have intruded into what had becomean increasingly self-reflective and arcane set ofpolitical issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thepast has come back to haunt Bosnians; but the newpost-11 September priorities also offer someopportunities to overcome longstanding deadlocksin the peace-implementation process.

A. THE VIEW FROM THE FEDERATION

The Alliance for Democratic Change, which bothcomprises the state-level Council of Ministers asone set of cross-entity coalition partners andgoverns Bosnia�s more populous entity (theFederation) in another grouping of parties, hasbeen embarrassed and energised in equal measuresince 11 September. It has been embarrassedbecause there are wartime and early post-warskeletons in the closets of some of its memberparties about which most Bosniak politiciansdoubtless know a good deal, but for which thecurrent leadership needs to deny responsibility.32

It has been energised by the necessity andopportunity to put its own house in order.

Bosniak leaders want to be included amongterrorism�s enemies. Yet thanks to the legacy ofthe 1992-95 war; to fragile and dysfunctional

32 Senad Avdic, �Ukoliko Bin Laden ne posjeduje pasosBiH, sam je kriv: Trebao ga je traziti na vrijeme i dobio biga!�, Slobodna Bosna, 20 September 2001, pp 5-6.

government structures; to a geographical positionthat makes Bosnia a bridge between East andWest; and to a national make-up that distinguishesBosnia from its neighbours (44 per cent ofBosnia�s 3.7 million citizens are Muslims, and theynow constitute at least two-thirds of the populationof the Federation), Bosnia is the Balkan countryfirst on the international community�s list ofsuspects as a possible facilitator, witting or not, forterrorism.

The commander of NATO-led peace keepingforces in Bosnia, Lt. Gen. John Sylvester, hasstated there is no threat to the country fromMuslim radicals.33 However, since neither localnor international officials can prove that there areno real or potential terrorists operating, plotting orsheltering within its borders, politically drivenallegations to the contrary have been rife. Hence,the �war on terrorism� has made Sarajevo jumpyfor much the same reasons that affect Tirana.When the international community is directlyinvolved � as it is in Bosnia - disquiet becomesacute anxiety.

On 17 October 2001, the U.S. and UK closed theirSarajevo embassies for three days in response to a�credible threat� of imminent terrorist attack. Thefollowing week, NATO officials claimed to haveprevented an attack on U.S. SFOR bases innortheastern Bosnia. However, they deniedfinding any evidence of terrorist training camps inthe country. Then, on 25 October, SFOR claimedto have �disrupted� the putative Bosnian links ofthe al-Qaida network. The following day, NATOSecretary-General Lord Robertson stated that �atleast one� of the dozen or so suspects detained bylocal police or SFOR since 1 October had �directlinks to al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden�. �Thethreat�, Robertson added, as if in direct reproof toGen. Sylvester, �has not gone�.34 On 5 November,Time Magazine reported that SFOR and localpolice were scouring the mountains of centralBosnia in search of five suspected terrorists.35

33 BBC News, �Analysis: Bosnian stability at stake�, 15October 2001, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news.34 Wall Street Journal Europe, 24 October 2001.35 �Petorica terorists kriju se u brdima centralne Bosne�,Dnevni avaz, 6 November 2001. The Time article alsomade it plain that the putative terrorist to whom Robertsonreferred was Bensajeh Belkacem, an Algerian arrested inZenica on 8 October 2001.


The world in general and the U.S. in particular arenowadays disinclined to recall the circumstancesthat made the internationally recognised Republicof Bosnia and Herzegovina dependent on Arablargesse and Iranian arms during the war, let alonecaused it to welcome some 3,000 Islamicvolunteers into its armed forces.36 There is thuslittle public awareness abroad of how and whyBosnia finds itself with a mujahidin legacy today.

The Federation and state governments have deniedcategorically that Osama bin Laden was ever inBosnia or received one of its passports. They havealso talked up their recent record of extraditingsuspected terrorists to those countries in whichthey have been charged, their determination tocomplete a stringent review of all wartime andpost-war naturalisation decisions, and promised�hell� to any of the 70 would-be terrorists fromAfghanistan whom unspecified intelligencesources alleged in late September were en route toBosnia in expectation of a quiet life of rest andrecreation.37

But Bosnian leaders have been at pains, too, toplay down the number of post-1992 naturalisationdecisions relating to persons of North African andMiddle Eastern origin (some 420), to point out thatall but 70 were settled, pre-war residents of therepublic, to emphasise that they have been far fromalone in receiving American requests forinformation about individuals with terrorist

36 The Clinton Administration and other Western statesturned a blind eye to the shipment of Iranian arms toCroatia and Bosnia in defiance of a UN embargo. For anaccount of Bosnia�s retired mujahidin, see SeadNumanovic, �Bosnia: Mujahidin Revival Fears�, IWPRBalkan Crisis Report, No 286, 5 October 2001.37 �BiH ocekuje ubacivanje 70 Osaminih fanatika�, JutarnjiList, 29 September 2001. The Federation interior ministerwho threatened to make Bosnia hell for anyone arrivingfrom Afghanistan, Muhamed Besic, however, resignedwhen the party that had nominated him (the Bosniak Partyfor BiH) denounced his alarmist statement and withdrewits support of him. �Kamenica umjesto Besica?�,Nezavisne novine, 13-14 October 2001. The exact causesof Besic�s resignation (or removal) remain mysterious.The Americans were reportedly extremely annoyed at thedeparture of a man whom they trusted. Yet both localjournalistic and SFOR sources have told ICG that he wasnot up to the job: by virtue of his age, health and personalcircumstances. It has also been suggested, however, thathis moves to crack down on corruption cost him his job.See Vildana Selimbegovic, �Zasto sam smijenjen�, BHDani, 2 November 2001, pp 8-11.

connections, and to note that Bosnia shares verydistinguished company on the lists of countrieswhich may provide unintended hospitality to activeor sleeping terrorists.

On the other hand, energetic declarations byBosnian politicians that they stand foursquare withthe Americans against the terrorist threat haveoften had a subtext. Bosniaks, in particular, pointto the weak state structures bequeathed by Daytonto excuse their inability to confirm that there are noterrorists in the country and to plead their case fora more integrated and competent Bosnian state thatcan control its own borders, air space, armies,intelligence agencies, police, customs services, andairwaves. Latterly, they have been moved � eitherby the new circumstances or by internationalpressure � to begin to remedy some of their ownstructural deficiencies.

Bosniaks have also found it appropriate, however,to note that the death toll following the fall ofSrebrenica in 1995 was higher than that at theWorld Trade Center, and to ask when Bosnia�sNATO-led guardians will get around to capturingthe two arch-war crimes suspects who plotted thatand other atrocities, Ratko Mladic and RadovanKaradzic.38 This feeling on the part of Bosniaksthat a double standard is being applied has recentlyled the High Representative to declare that �thestruggle against terrorism also means the arrest ofKaradzic�.39 SFOR, too, has sought of late toapply balm to Bosniak wounds: emphasising itscooperation with the Federation authorities andseeking to appear less high-handed in its hunt forterrorists.

Meanwhile, those sections of the Sarajevo pressthat always disliked the pro-Islamic tendency inBosniak politics have joined the international huntto unmask potential terrorists and their connectionswith the previous government, while other mediaoutlets have sought to play down the warmed-overallegations of terrorist links and bases. The formerhave condemned the old regime of the Party forDemocratic Action (SDA) under Alija Izetbegovic

38 See, for example, Zija Dizdarevic, �Teror i prividi�,Oslobodjenje, 27 September 2001, and Haris Silajdzic andDavid L Phillips, �Bosnians Know What�s to Be Done�,International Herald Tribune, 2 October 2001.39 This was Oslobodjenje�s front page headline on 6November 2001, paraphrasing what Wolfgang Petritschhad said in Banja Luka the previous day.


for casually dispensing some 12,000 Bosnianpassports and cultivating Islamic favour - andfervour - during and after the war, while the latterhave deprecated the impact of such reporting onBosnia�s reputation and prospects for securingforeign investment.40

B. IZETBEGOVIC, THE WAR AND ISLAM

The Bosnian Muslims� century-long journeytowards identifying themselves as a nation in theirown right � rather than as a religious communitywhich might be Croat or Serb or Yugoslav bynationality � ended in secular and socialistnationhood in the late 1960s. There were,however, always some Muslims after the SecondWorld War who aimed to integrate Islam andnation rather than socialism and nation.Izetbegovic was one of these.41

Although the government he led during the 1992-1995 war proclaimed its devotion to amultinational, multiconfessional and integralBosnian state, he and other prominent members ofthe SDA were also keen to propagate an Islamicreawakening and a specifically Islamic version of

40 Among the weeklies, Hrvatska rijec has occupied thesensationalist bottom end of the terrorist-hunting market,while Slobodna Bosna has claimed the middle ground andBH Dani the lofty heights, focusing more on the damagedone to civil society by the SDA�s use of the war toradicalise Muslims than on the supposed risk frommujahidin. (See, especially, the powerful article byVildana Selimbegovic, �Putovnica za gori zivot�, BH Dani,21 September 2001, pp 29-31.) The principal dailies havealso been stratified. Oslobodjenje has sought consistentlyto downplay or deny Bosnia�s connections with terrorism,while Dnevni avaz has both run with the hares and huntedwith the hounds. On 7 October, it devoted nearly a page toa Los Angeles Times story (see also fn. 2 above) about asecret State Department report alleging that Bosniaremains a base for terrorism (�hard-core terrorists, somewith ties to Osama bin Laden, protected by militantelements of the former Sarajevo government�), but thenext day gave equal space and prominence to officials�denials and deprecations of the story. Banja Luka�sNezavisne novine � the most respectable newspaper in theRS � has not printed the wilder allegations aboutmujahidin, but has otherwise enjoyed the terrorist hunt.41 For a convenient summary of Bosnian Muslims�national development, see Ivo Banac, �Bosnian Muslims:From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood andPost-Communist Statehood, 1918-1992�, in Mark Pinson(ed), The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp 129-53.

bosanstvo (Bosnianism). The nature of the warlaunched by Serb forces fuelled these aims byhighlighting their apparent necessity for a peoplewho were, from the outset, the conflict�s principalvictims.

Inevitably, links with Islamic countries werestrengthened during the war. Saudi Arabia, Iranand Libya were among those that responded toIzetbegovic�s appeals for financial assistance andhelped subvert the UN embargo that preventedBosnia from arming itself legally. The funnellingof funds and the doing of deals to purchase armswere centred in Bosnia�s embassy in Vienna.Connections, obligations and personal fortuneswere forged in the process. These remainimportant as ties that bind former and current SDAleaders together, and which inhibit anythoroughgoing examination of the penumbra ofshady dealings that were required to defendBosnia.

Some 3,000 Islamic fighters came to Bosnia.42

Many of them formed a unit, called El Mudzahid,that was formally part of the Seventh MuslimBrigade within the Third Corps of the Army ofBosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). Izetbegovic wasthe brigade�s honorary commander. His view ofthese fighters remains simple, perhaps implausiblyso: nobody invited them to Bosnia, but they couldnot be asked to leave, �for most of them had nobleintentions: to help people who were endangeredand attacked�.43

Speculation that tolerance of their presence wastied to Arab states� financial handouts has not beenconfirmed. The presidency ordered in 1993 that allvolunteers in the Bosnian army should have theright to citizenship. According to official figures,of the approximately 12,000 Bosnian passportsdistributed to foreigners during and immediatelyafter the war, only 70 went to the self-styledmujahidin.44

42 Janez Kovac, �Sarajevo hit by bin Laden panic�, IWPRBalkan Crisis Report, No 289, 19 October 2001.43 Izetbegovic interview in Panorama (Bijeljina), 20October 2000.44 Emir Habul, �Bauk terorizma ujedinjuje politicare�,AIM Sarajevo, 28 September 2001. Most of the�foreigners� who received Bosnian citizenship werebearers of Yugoslav passports resident abroad or natives ofother ex-Yugoslav republics who lived or came to live inBosnia.


The El Mudzahid battalion was disbanded in 1996,under U.S. pressure, and the Seventh MuslimBrigade was disbanded soon afterwards. Someformer mujahidin settled in a central Bosnianvillage, where they sometimes threatened SFORsecurity and may have been responsible for crimesagainst Croat returnees and police. They dispersedin 2001 when the new authorities evicted themfrom properties belonging to returning Serbs.Rumours now circulate that numbers of these(former?) mujahidin have concentrated in�strategic� areas of the Federation, for examplenear the Saraejvo - Mostar railway.45

Bosnia now has many more religiously observantMuslims than it did in 1992. Historic mosques areagain places of worship rather than museums fortourists. Gleaming new mosques � often built in aGulf-kitsch style far removed from local traditions� and Islamic educational centres, often funded bySaudi princes, have sprouted in Sarajevo and othercities whose populations are far less mixed thanbefore the war, whose young women are as likelyto be seen in Islamic dress as in shorts,46 andwhose restaurants no longer serve pork.

In part, this is a natural result of a war in which thecontending forces tended to embrace at least someaspects of their enemies� caricatures of themselves:Muslims as fundamentalists, Serbs as Chetniksand Croats as Ustashe. Propagation of Islamicvalues and practices was much assisted, however,by the SDA regime, which turned over to Islamiccharities such as the Saudi High Commission forRelief the task of assisting war widows, orphansand other victims of the war. Female beneficiarieswere required to cover their heads and theirchildren to attend classes in their faith.

Although only a small minority of Bosniaks hasbecome devout, far more have discovered theirIslamic heritage. They have not ceased to besecular Europeans, but a new or rediscovered layerof identity has been superimposed. Bosniaks maylike Arabs or Albanians no more than do otherSouth Slavs. They may have cringed at thenecessity of welcoming mujahidin during the warand of tolerating their zealotry thereafter. And

45 Zeljko Rogosic, �Al Qaeda prijeti terorom na pruziMostar�Ploce�, Nacional, 23 October 2001.46 Style-conscious and well brought up city girls in theformer Yugoslavia do not wear shorts in public.

they may now resent the embarrassment that thesewartime volunteers continue to cause Bosnia. Butthey cannot disown that part of themselves whichshares something with these people.

The SDA, meanwhile, has become a party ofpatronage, power and money. It is no longer avehicle for Islamic awakening and cultivation ofties with the Middle East, even if secondary figuressuch as Hasan Cengic continue to push suchpolicies.47 But as a party of money and patronageit must also defend those of its stalwarts who madetheir fortunes and established their power duringthe war, when an Islamic orientation was bothuseful and understandable.

In announcing his resignation as party presidentand ostensible withdrawal from politics on 12October 2001, Izetbegovic advised his party tooccupy the centre ground, to build confidenceamong Bosnia�s three constituent nations, and topromote a common Bosnian nationhood.48

As if to substantiate this move to the centre, apublic quarrel promptly broke out between theSDA and the Islamic Community.49 In reverting towhat the SDA claimed were its aims before thewar, Izetbegovic may have been giving notice thathis own long flirtation with the wider Islamicworld has not survived the destruction of theWorld Trade Centre. On the other hand, he mayhave been making his bid to bring Haris Silajdzic�sParty for BiH back into the Bosniak fold and to

47 Hasan Cengic, who organised arms procurement for theABiH during the war, has long been regarded as a leadinghard-liner in the SDA.48 �Zasto odlazi Izetbegovic?�, Nezavisne novine, 13-14October 2001. Izetbegovic himself had probably neverconsciously left the centre ground. His perspective hasreflected his Bosnian self-awareness as a Muslim betweenEast and West. Addressing the Organisation of the IslamicConference in 1997, he said: �The West is neithercorrupted nor degenerate. � It is strong, well educated,and organised. Their schools are better than ours. Theircities are cleaner than ours. � The level of respect forhuman rights in the West is higher, and the care for thepoor and less capable is better organised. � Instead ofhating the West, let us � proclaim cooperation instead ofconfrontation�. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12December 1997.49 �Politicka, a ne vjerska stranka!�, Oslobodjenje, 20October 2001. The Islamic Community�s main complaintagainst the SDA is that it failed while in power to redeempromises to return the Community�s pre-Second WorldWar properties.


scupper the Alliance for Change in the run up tothe 2002 elections.50 The latter is more likely.

C. THE VIEW FROM THE REPUBLIKASRPSKA

The view from Bosnia�s other entity, the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska (RS), is far simpler.Its leaders have insisted that the RS is a terrorist-free zone; while its media have gleefully revivedold allegations that Osama bin Laden used to sipcoffee in Sarajevo with his newly minted Bosnianpassport to hand and seized upon new allegationsthat photographic evidence exists showingIzetbegovic in his company. RS Premier MladenIvanic has �emphasised that the Federation mustaccept that the problem of terrorism was basedsolely in that entity,�and that the [RS] was notlinked to terrorism in any way.�51

There has also been a revival of yellow-journalismstories testifying to the butchery of Serb prisonersof war by knife-wielding mujahidin.52 The UNspokesman in Bosnia has been quoted that certainRS media have run a disinformation campaign:�Some media in RS are publishing more and morereports on the existence of terrorist networks in BHwithout presenting any sort of evidence.� Hesingled out Glas Srpski for special criticism. TheRS news agency, SRNA, had to apologise to theTurkish ambassador in Sarajevo after alleging thatTurkish nationals had been mujahidin.53

50 Hamza Baksic, �SDA: Ako ih ne mozes pobijeti,pridruzi im se�, Oslobodjenje, 24 October 2001.51 SRNA news agency, 16 October 2001.52 See �Glavosjece sa Ozrena�, Glas Srpski, 26 September2001, and �Sjeca glava na Crnom vrhu�, Glas Srpski, 2October 2001.53 Nezavisne novine, 12 October 2001. The publication of arecent ICG report on Republika Srpska provoked a minorexample of how Bosnian Serb leaders have seized uponthe �war on terrorism� for diversionary purposes. Thedeputy president of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS),Dragan Cavic, told local media that �By publishing thisreport, the ICG wanted to completely minimise the currentstruggle against terrorism in Bosnia �. We are witnessesto how more details are revealed every day in theneighbouring entity [the Federation] about people whohave stayed in the Federation, and who have direct orindirect connections with terrorists�. Onasa news agencyreport, 12 October 2001. Press. The report in question isICG Balkans Report No. 118, The Wages of Sin:Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, 8 October 2001.

In fact, it has been the determined resistance of theRS leadership to any and all schemes to endowBosnia with the laws, agencies and competenciesrequired by any real state that has helped makeBosnia so vulnerable to accusations that it is softon terrorism.

D. ASSESSING AND MEETING THE THREAT

Early inclinations on the part of Bosnians andresident foreign officials alike, first, to dismiss theterrorist threat in Bosnia and, then, to exaggerate it,have now passed. Both SFOR and the Americansseem to have felt initially that Bosnian leaders andinstitutions were either asleep at the wheel orcriminally incompetent. The tendency of theOffice of the High Representative (OHR) and otherinternational civilian agencies also at first todeprecate the damage which the media assault onand in Bosnia was doing to the country�s (and theirown) reputations may also have aroused SFOR andU.S. ire. Since early October, however, thereappears to have been a steadying of nerves, acoordination of efforts and a harmonisation ofviews on the relative seriousness of the threat inand to Bosnia.

Although middle-level foreign intelligence sources(whose ranks have reportedly been muchaugmented since 11 September) remain prone bothto alarmism and to talking down Bosnian effortsto fight the war on terror, senior internationalrepresentatives have become more relaxed aboutthe threat and complimentary regarding the degreeand effectiveness of Bosnian cooperation inmeeting it.54 Assessments of the risk thus varyfrom high and imminent (with dates, targets andmeans specified) to low but real (given Bosnia�sunique historical circumstances, vulnerablelocation and ex-mujahidin presence).

Some international sources opine that Bosnia is nomore dangerous than any other Balkan state or anyother place in the world. Others contend that it ismore likely to serve as a transit zone for men,weapons or money intended for use elsewhere thanas a venue for terrorist attacks. Yet the briefclosure of the U.S., British and Dutch embassies inmid-October, and the continuing rumours of foiled

54 Extensive ICG interviews in Sarajevo, October andNovember 2001.


or intended strikes against U.S. SFOR bases,highlight the counter-indicative facts that Bosniaboth offers tempting Western targets and possessesstrong international defences.

What it has patently lacked are strong internaldefences. The SFOR view is that it was compelledin the immediate aftermath of 11 September to takeunilateral action in hunting down and detainingpotential terrorists on the basis of intelligence itcould not share with the Bosnian police. After twoor three weeks, however, as the Bosnians got theiract together, it became possible to share bothinformation and responsibility for apprehendingand deporting dubious individuals, so deflectingmounting press criticism of SFOR for exceedingits legitimate powers.

According to data collected by the Office of theUN High Commissioner for Human Rights(OHCHR), nineteen arrests in connection withsuspected terrorism were made in Bosnia between11 September and 30 October 2001. Nine of thesepersons have been deported. Another seventeenpersons are reportedly being shadowed by thepolice. OHCHR has expressed concern over thelack of transparency in the application of arrest,detention, repatriation, extradition, and judicialprocedures in these cases.55

But it is not just SFOR and, latterly, its helpmatesin the Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs(MUP) that are alleged to have been insufficientlyrespectful of the niceties of civil rights and dueprocess. OHCHR has also been up in arms overthe rush to impose a package of five new oramended counter-terrorist laws on the Council ofMinisters (CoM). Driven by American concernsand drafted by a working party based in the OHRLegal Department and representing both selectedembassies and the �principals� (OSCE, OHR,UNMIBH and UNHCR), the �anti-terroristpackage� was presented to the CoM on 17 October,despite protests from OHCHR and UNHCR. Thelatter agencies have objected that the proposedmeasures fall short of international human rightsstandards, probably violate the international

55 ICG interview with OHCHR, 2 November 2001. For ahighly circumstantial account of the arrests anddeportations to date, see Adnan Buturovic, �Nakon sto jeuhapseno privih pet, otvorene su Americka i Britanskaambasada u Sarajevu!�, Slobodna Bosna, 25 October 2001,pp 5-7.

conventions incorporated in Bosnia�s constitution,and have been hurriedly and incompetently draftedby an ad hoc body that has cut across the work ofthe long-established UN working party on legalreform. The view of the OHCHR head of office isthat such legislation will do significant damage tothe rule of law, to human rights and to thereputation of the international community inBosnia.56

The seriousness with which Bosnians have come totake the war on terrorism � as well as the threats itposes and the opportunities it promises � wasrevealed by an extraordinary but little-remarkedevent on 24 September. For the first time sinceDayton, all Bosnia�s state and entity leaders metofficially round a single table to elaborate a jointanti-terrorist campaign and to nominate a team tolead the struggle. That such a gathering took place- and that both an action plan and an anti-terrorismsupremo emerged from it � were perhaps moresignificant than the rudiments of the plan itself.57

This envisaged a five-part program to extend theState Border Service�s control over the 25 per centof Bosnia�s frontiers not already covered; tocomplete the review of passports issued toforeigners; to adopt the laws necessary toimplement the long-mooted CIPS (CitizenInformation Protection System) project and othermeasures against organised crime; to review thebank accounts of suspect humanitarianorganisations; and to assume control over Bosnianair space.58

The politicians and the press soon reverted topursuing their disparate agendas and playing their

56 ICG interview with OHCHR, 2 November 2001. Inbrief, the OHCHR objects to the use of citizenship,immigration and asylum legislation to combat terrorism. Itlikewise opposes the use of the criminal justice system tounderwrite administrative detention and argues that theproposed state of emergency law is ill written and fallsfoul of both the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights and the European Convention on HumanRights.57 Azhar Kalamujic, �Provjere racuna u bh. bankama ikontrola stranih humanitaraca u BiH�, Oslobodjenje, 25September 2001.58 Emir Habul, �Bauk terorizma ujedinjuje politicare�, AIMSarajevo, 28 September 2001. The establishment of alanding card system for foreigners arriving at Bosnia�sinternational airports and the elaboration of a new visasystem were soon added to the package.


self-interested games; but at a deeper level the waron terrorism appeared to have compelled Bosnianpoliticians to realise that they would sink or swimtogether.

The Coordination Team for the War againstTerrorism was set up under Deputy ForeignMinister Ivica Misic. It has since met weekly andhas been attended by RS and Federation ministers,as well as by senior international communityrepresentatives. According to Misic, the team haswon the confidence of foreign agencies, whichprovide it with �101 per cent� of its intelligence.

The contribution of RS ministers has been loyalbut slight, while that of their entity�s intelligenceservice has been nil. Nor have the Federation�stwo intelligence agencies been of any help. Misic,for example, has requested files on such matters asthe roles of Islamic NGOs and the mujahidin-inspired Active Islamic Youth (AIO) from theBosniak Agency for Research and Documentation(AID), but has been denied.59

This state of affairs reflects the fact that Bosnia�sthree intelligence agencies have long been underthe control of their founding political parties: theSDS in the RS, the HDZ in �Herceg-Bosna� andthe SDA in former ABiH areas. The RSintelligence agency works with and is paid byBelgrade, but does not report to Ivanic, let alone toSarajevo. The Bosnian Croat National SecurityService (SNS) has been in disarray since Croatiacut off funding in 2000 and the Bosnian HDZ wasejected from many of its bastions of power thisyear. Meanwhile, the Bosniak AID has remainedunder SDA control until now, notwithstanding thecoming to power of the Alliance for Changefollowing the November 2000 elections. It is

59 ICG interview with Ivica Misic, 5 November 2001. FiveIslamic NGOs are being investigated by the FederationFinancial Police. Those most often mentioned as past orpresent conduits for money which may be financingwould-be terrorists include the Saudi High Commissionfor Relief, the Islamic Relief Agency and TWRA. AIO,for its part, is widely regarded as propagating Wahabi-style activism among young people. It is particularlyactive in the Zenica and Bugojno areas. Its web site can beaccessed at www.aiobih.org. The Saudi HighCommission�s denials of complicity in terrorism andcomplaints of persecution can be read in Senad Slatina,�Bosnu i Hercegovinu smo pomogli sa 800 milionamaraka�, Slobodna Bosna, 25 October 2001, pp 11, 16-17.

assumed, moreover, that there are many supportersof AIO among AID�s 500-plus employees.

The Alliance had drafted a law providing for aunified Federation security service, but had notdared to take over either AID or SNS before 11September. Opposition by former SDA leaders inthe Party for BiH (SzBiH) is usually cited as themain reason. Well-informed sources also reportthat the SDA had instructed AID to take noconstructive action in the fight against terrorism.Given that one of the agency�s main purposes hasbeen to cover up or play down the SDA�s wartimelinks and financial dealings with volatile Islamicgroups or countries, this prohibition is hardlysurprising.

In the continuing absence of new legislation, thetwo Federation agencies remain separatelyresponsible to the Bosniak (Beriz Belkic) andCroat (Jozo Krizanovic) members of the statepresidency. SzBiH control not only of the Bosniakseat on the presidency, but also of the FederationMUP and senior police posts appears to havestymied action to bring AID to heel. Intense U.S.pressure on CoM chair Zlatko Lagumdzijafollowing 11 September proved necessary to breakthis deadlock. Only on 2 November did Belkic andKrizanovic announce the appointment of newheads of the two agencies, their commonassignment being to purge and unify their servicesin as short order as possible.60

The new AID and SNS chiefs, Munir Alibabic andIvan Vukasic, will confront enormous difficultiesremaking their agencies as professional, competentand law-abiding servants of the Federation, ratherthan defenders of their founder-parties� divergentinterests. In fact, AID and SNS have heretoforeregarded the other as their principal enemy. Thewell-advertised appointment of Alibabic will, inany case, have afforded AID operatives more thanample opportunity to shred, burn and doctor files.Although promises of adequate funding have been

60 �Alibabic i Vukasic najavili zajednicki rad AID-a i SNS-a�, Oslobodjenje, 3 November 2001. Their unification issupposed to take place within six months, but this isunlikely to prove possible. Because SzBiH leaders share awartime past, secrets and sense of Bosniak solidarity withtheir former colleagues in the SDA, they have beeninclined to let the AID dog lie peacefully.


made to the two new directors, this, too, will behard to deliver.61

E. CONCLUSION

Two months into the war on terror, a measure ofconcord has broken out in Bosnia. Senior Bosnianand international functionaries agree that thecountry has real problems, but also that the risk ofoutrages occurring there is low. Local media andpoliticians are no longer in denial; but neither arethey hyping the terrorism threat � unlike theinternational media.

Cooperation between domestic and foreign leadersis good at the political level, if not at theoperational level. Republika Srpska remains aloofand self-interested, but it was ever thus. TheCouncil of Ministers will likely move to enact thepackage of counter-terrorist legislation preparedfor it by the �principals�, but may now haveestablished its anti-terrorist credentials to an extentsufficient to permit it to reject or modify some ofthe more problematic provisions of these drafts. Ifso, Bosnia will have assumed its appropriatelymodest place in the anti-terror coalition.

61 Ibid. See also, Sead Avdic, �Jos uvijek vladaju AlijaIzetbegovic i Mujo Kalosa!�, Slobodna Bosna, 25 October2001, pp 20-21, and �Munir Alibabbic�, BH Dani, 2November 2001, p 13.

IV. CROATIA

The day after the attacks on New York andWashington, President Stipe Mesic addressed thenation, saying �it was not only the U.S. that wasattacked, but the whole democratic and civilisedworld�.62 Prime Minister Ivica Racan and membersof his government signed a book of condolence atthe Croatian�U.S. Friendship Society. ExpressingCroatia�s solidarity with the American people,Racan said: �We in Croatia know all too well howdifficult it is to be exposed to terrorism,aggression, and what it looks like to be faced withthe difficult consequences.�63 Following theexample of the European Union, 14 September wasdeclared a day of mourning.

In the immediate aftermath, it was announced thatthe police were securing all embassies andconsulates and that border controls had beenintensified.64 A government crisis headquarterswas established under First Deputy Prime MinisterGoran Granic.65

A. FEAR OF EXCLUSION

As the international response to the attacks tookshape, Croatian officials and media commentatorsturned their attention to the longer-termimplications. As usual, their chief anxiety was thatCroatia might be lumped back with its Balkanneighbours and removed even farther fromWestern Europe. Racan himself warned of the riskthat toughened border regimes within the EUwould amount to a protective �cordon sanitaire�that risked isolating Croatia from the West.

Commentators and officials alike cast around formeasures that would help ensure that Croatiawould not end up on the �wrong side� of any newbarrier.66 One newspaper noted that �Croatia doesnot want to find itself aligned with countrieswhere, for example, Islamic fanatics and terroristsmove around more or less freely. Bosnia andHerzegovina is, in practice, just such a country�.67

62 Croatian television, 12 September 2001.63 Croatian television, 13 September 2001.64 Croatian television, 12 September 2001.65 Jutarnji list, 20 September 2001.66 Jutarnji list, 16 and 17 September 2001.67 Vjesnik, 17 September 2001.


Some newspaper opinion polls have indicated arising level of intolerance among Croats towardsMuslims since 11 September.68

The Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign PolicyCommittee, Zdravko Tomac, a senior partycolleague of Racan�s noted for nationalist leanings,said that the danger of being consigned to a�Western Balkan� sphere had suddenly becomemore serious because of the rising internationaltensions. He added that �we are facing a greatchallenge. This is our �to be or not to be�. Wemust do everything we can to tie ourselves toCentral Europe and to minimise our Balkansdimension�.

B. INTO THE COALITION

Concerns were also expressed that Croatia�saspirations for integration into the EU might be setback.69 Others argued that fears of increasedisolation were exaggerated, and Croatia shouldconcentrate on increasing security in the region,including through active participation in thedeveloping international coalition againstterrorism. Concretely, Racan said Croatia shouldcontribute in two ways: by cooperating with theinternational community and by fighting domesticintolerance and violence.70 The fears of deepeningisolation were soothed when the U.S. ambassadorto Croatia welcomed Zagreb�s promise tocontribute to the international coalition.

A specific suggestion was that Croatia shouldshare intelligence information about the activitiesof terrorist groups in the Balkans, notably inBosnia, which hosted foreign Islamic fightersduring the war, some of whom stayed in thecountry.71 Croatia�s ability to contribute in thisway stems from its involvement in the conflict inBosnia, but also because of the suspectedinvolvement of Croatian citizens in arming terroristorganisations including the Irish Republican Army(IRA).72 Foreign Minister Tonino Picula said that atask force had been established to follow the

68 Vecernji list, 21 October 2001.69 Jutarnji list, 18 September 2001.70 Croatian television, 17 September 2001.71 Commentary in Vjesnik, 20 September 2001.72 Jutarnji list, 18 September 2001.

reactions of the international community so thatappropriate help could be offered.73

C. AN UNLIKELY TARGET

Another recurrent concern has been Croatia�s ownvulnerability. While generally deeming itself tooinsignificant to be an attractive target, the countryhas experienced sporadic terrorist violence. Bosniarecently extradited Abdal Isendar to Croatia, amidreports that he is actually Hassan Al SharifMohammad Sejjid, who was charged with plantinga car bomb in Rijeka in 1995 and is wanted onterrorism charges also in Egypt. Al Sharif isallegedly a member of Gamaa Al Islamia, anEgyptian terrorist organisation blamed for thebombing of the New York World Trade Centre in1993. Gamaa Al Islamia apparently considersCroatia responsible for the disappearance of one ofits prominent figures. Fresh threats against thecountry were reportedly made in October 2000.74

There have also been allegations that associates ofOsama bin Laden may have been active in Croatiaduring the war in Bosnia, at a time when severalIslamic charitable organisations were operating inthe country and weapons from Islamic countrieswere smuggled through Croatia to Bosnia.75 Whileit is highly likely that arms were smuggled throughCroatia in this way, the involvement of agents ofOsama bin Laden is unproven.

73 Jutarnji list, 23 September 2001.74 Vjesnik, 22 September 2001.75 Vjesnik, 27 September 2001 and Jutarnji list, 28September 2001.


V. KOSOVO

Immediately following the attacks on 11September, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)increased its force-protection measures. Thesewere subsequently relaxed, presumably whenKFOR and the United Nations InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo failed toidentify any �clear and present� danger or threat tothe international community from Islamistterrorism in Kosovo.

A. KOSOVO ALBANIAN RESPONSE

The 11 September atrocities produced spontaneousexpressions of sympathy from Kosovo Albanians,who believe that U.S. support is the main factor intheir escape from Serbian domination andapproach towards self-determination. Newspapersand television stations urged citizens to attendrallies across Kosovo on 12 September. Silentthrongs bearing candles were addressed by localleaders, representatives of the United Nations andthe United States.76

The Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC)denounced the terrorist attack and invited allKosovo residents to express their solidarity withthe American people. The KTC described theattacks as �against the values of civilisation�.77

Discussion at the weekly KTC meeting on 12September was dedicated entirely to events in theU.S. Kole Berisha, a member from IbrahimRugova�s Democratic League of Kosova (LDK),stated: �The attack against the U.S.A. is an attackagainst democracy, as well as against the values ofinternational civilisation. Experience has shown

76 The relevant international administrators all releasedstatements condemning terror and thanking the people ofKosovo for their support in the fight against anti-democratic forces. On 25 September, an article byAmbassador John Menzies, who heads the U.S. mission inKosovo, was published in all Albanian-languagenewspapers. Menzies concluded: �To all our friends andsupporters in Kosovo, I thank you again from the bottomof my heart for the incredible support you have shown forAmerica and the thousands of innocent victims murderedin the carnage of 11 September. Just as we stood with youduring your darkest hour, so have you stood with us duringours. Now we must all stand together for the struggleahead, for this will be the ultimate test�.77 KosovaLive 12 September 2001

thus far that those who use violence are the biggestlosers�. Hajredin Kuci, representing theDemocratic Party of Kosova (PDK), called on allethnic Albanians to show solidarity with theAmerican people especially in view of theirobligation: �Neither the KTC nor the people ofKosova would be in the situation we are withoutU.S. policy�. Lastly, Ramush Haradinaj, leader ofthe Alliance for the Future of Kosova, was quotedas saying �an official day of mourning has beencalled to share the feelings of the Americanpeople�. 78

The Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK), led by AgimCeku, organised a drive to send blood to America.Within a day of the attacks, it was delivered toKFOR�s Camp Bondsteel. The Kosova Lotterydonated 10 per cent of the total proceeds for theweek of 23-30 September to the victims of theterrorist attacks.

B. MEDIA

A report originating from a Bosnian news agencyquoted Rada Trajkovic, a Serb representative onthe KTC, as follows: �After the terrorist attacks inNew York and Washington, only those who areagainst terrorism, violence and attacks againstOrthodox believers in Kosova have remained withthe Americans.� She allegedly added that �binLaden�s people have infiltrated to the top of theKosovo Protection Corps�.79

UNMIK spokesperson Susan Manuel denied thatTrajkovic had uttered these words in the KTC.The Albanian-language media did not pursue thisstory. Nor, on the whole, have they shown keeninterest in reprinting and reacting to Serbian andMacedonian media allegations about ethnicAlbanian ties to bin Laden. When an ITAR-TASSbulletin quoted LDK leader Rugova as claimingthat KLA forces �are ready to organise acts ofterrorism for the purpose of supporting Osama binLaden�, Rugova denounced the story as afabrication,80 and the allegation faded away.

78 All statements from KosovaLive 12 September 200179 KosovaLive 20 September 2001.80 RFE/RL Newsline Southeastern Europe, 26 September2001.


C. THE CONFUSING SEMANTICS OF‘TERRORISM’

The meaning of terrorism in Kosovo is bitterlycontested. During the Milosevic era, �separatist-terrorist� was a term applied routinely by Serbianmedia and politicians to all ethnic Albanians whodid not accept Serbian rule in its totality. Inpractice, this meant the entire ethnic Albaniancommunity. The fact that relatively few acts ofviolence were perpetrated by Kosovo Albaniansuntil the late 1990s did nothing to dent theconviction among Serbs that �terrorism� was anappropriate term.

When NATO bombed Yugoslavia in 1999 in thename of upholding the rights of ethnic Albanians,many Serbs � influenced by their own propagandaand nationalist myths -- believed that terroristmeans were now being used to protect terrorists.Yet it was Kosovo Serbs who suffered what wasprobably the closest example in the region to binLaden-style terrorism: the carefully planned,remote control explosion of a bus carryingcivilians near Podujevo on 16 February 2001. Themurder and abduction of up to 1,300 Serbs sinceJune 1999 has confirmed, in Serb eyes, thatterrorism is intrinsic to ethnic Albanian ambitionsin Kosovo.

For Kosovo Albanians, on the other hand,terrorism was a fair description of what theMilosevic regime was doing to them, before andespecially after the removal of Kosovo�s provincialautonomy in 1989. While local Kosovo leadersroundly condemned the atrocity of 16 February2001 , the murders and abductions of ethnic Serbsare, in most Albanians� eyes, understandable actsof revenge which in no way discredit the politicalproject of independence from Serbia.

For the international community, sitting betweenthe two communities, the nature of local terrorismhas altered over time. U.S. senior envoy RobertGelbard echoed official Belgrade by using the term�terrorists� to describe the Kosovo LiberationArmy in 1998. The following year, however, whenthe Western powers refused to accept Milosevic�srejection of a settlement for Kosovo, the NLAbecame NATO�s ally and beneficiary. Fromsummer 1999 until 11 September 2001,Washington and its allies were locally perceived �not only by Serbs � as dangerously tolerant ofethnic Albanian extremism. Of course, this

tolerance was not doctrinal; it was the result ofreluctance to risk NATO forces to prevent andpunish interethnic crimes in Kosovo.

At the same time, the replacement of the Milosevicregime in autumn 2000 helped to distract Serbsfrom dwelling on the memory of KLA or evenNATO �terrorism�. Two developments in particularneed to be mentioned. Belgrade�s partnership withNATO and the European Union to peacefullyresolve the uprising in southern Serbia in spring2001 was welcomed as proof that the internationalcommunity was not invariably �pro-Albanian�.Secondly, widespread reporting of mass graves ofethnic Albanians murdered by Serbian forces hasmade it more difficult for Serbian society to ignorethe atrocities perpetrated by the Milosevic regime.

The 11 September attacks may have had a locallybeneficial effect, by driving Washington to clarifyits position on ethnic Albanian violence in Kosovoand Macedonia. On 15 October 2001, the U.S.head of mission in Kosovo demarched the mainKosovo Albanian leaders, Ibrahim Rugova,Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj. Accordingto subsequent press statements, a crucial portion ofthe message went as follows: �It is important thatthe NLA understands � that any provocative actsby armed Albanian groups would be seen by theU.S. as support for terrorist forces�.81 Seniorinternational sources told ICG that the KosovoAlbanian leaders were left in no uncertainty that�the previous ambiguity in American policy, overthe difference between �extremism� and�terrorism�, is no longer there.�82

D. ‘RECONSTRUCTION’ AS ISLAMISATION

Half a century of officially encouraged atheism,against an historical background of markedlyheterodox Islam, has rendered ethnic Albaniansfairly indifferent to religion. Among KosovoAlbanians, the level of religious observance is

81 This message was in effect a follow-up to the BushAdministration�s executive orders on 27 June 2001,banning 23 ethnic Albanian �extremists� from visiting theU.S. and fundraising or money transfers from the U.S. tothose individuals or to specified organisations includingthe National Liberation Army (NLA) from Macedonia andthe Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovic(UCPMB) from southern Serbia.82 ICG interviews in Pristina, 20-21 October 2001.


lower than among ethnic Albanians in Macedoniaand Montenegro. While there is no more likelihoodhere than in Bosnia of wide support for anti-Western Islamist extremism, some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are activein Kosovo thanks to Saudi, Kuwaiti or other Gulfstate money should be carefully monitored. Morethan 30 Islamic NGOs are present in Kosovo. TheUnited Arab Emirates has pledged millions ofdollars to build some 50 mosques around Kosovo.

A number of these are regarded by KFOR ashaving links to terrorist circles elsewhere and asemploying individuals suspected of havingcriminal records. KFOR military intelligence runsan ongoing investigation into what it calls�suspicious� NGOs. Between 19 and 22 July, U.S.troops arrested four Iranian nationals attached to amedical relief organisation in Pristina on theground that they presented a threat to Kosovo�ssafe and secure environment. Following diplomaticpressure from Teheran, the four were released bymid September.83

Here as in Bosnia, however, local people are moreconcerned about what they consider the religiousradicalism and cultural vandalism practised bysome of these groups, such as the Saudi JointRelief Committee for Kosovo, than about potentialterrorism. Under cover of �reconstruction�, anumber of traditional Islamic architectural featureshave been obliterated.84 One local expert from theInstitution for Protection of Kosova Monumentshas been quoted as follows: �The Saudis sayNATO and the UN will let them do whatever theywant, and that we Albanians have nothing to sayabout it. The Serbs killed us physically, but thesefanatics want to kill our cultural heritage.�85

According to KFOR officials, some of these NGOspay leading members of the community to attendthe mosque, and also reward women for wearingthe veil, for example by offering free courses incomputing, sewing, English and Arabic.

83 ICG interviews in Kosovo, October 2001.84 See Michael A. Sells, �Erasing Culture: Wahhabism,Buddhism, Balkan Mosques�, text dated 2 April 2001,available athttp://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/WahhabismBuddhasBegova.htm85 See Stephen Schwartz, �A certain exhaustion� in TheNew Criterion, October 2000. See also ICG BalkansReport No. 105, Religion in Kosovo, 31 January 2001.

E. CONCLUSION

ICG has argued elsewhere that only local policeare capable of establishing interethnic security inKosovo.86 The same may hold for anti-terroristaction. Although the commander of KFOR hasdismissed the possibility of sharing intelligencewith the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), it isstrongly arguable that such cooperation � whichhas begun in Bosnia � will be a precondition ofkeeping Kosovo safe from terrorist networks.

86 �Only a local police force, with local knowledge, actingunder local political direction � backed by internationalsupport � will stand a chance of protecting the remainingSerbs � over time.� See ICG Balkans Report No. 108,After Milosevic, 26 April 2001, p. 87.


VI. MACEDONIA

As a Balkan country with a significant Muslimpopulation,87 a very recent experience of armedinsurgency, a significant Western military andpolitical presence, and poor internal security,Macedonia might appear highly vulnerable toinfiltration and action by terrorist networks.

According to some Macedonian politicians andMacedonian-language media, this possibility isalready a certainty. Wild and unproven allegationslinking the local ethnic Albanian rebel force, theNLA, with bin Laden and �mujahidin� werepublished and broadcast in the aftermath of the 11September attacks.88 This has reinforced the imageof the NLA as a terrorist organisation andrefreshed resentment at the internationalcommunity for compelling the government topursue compromise rather than confrontation. Inthis way, the �war on terrorism� has had anunfortunate impact on the peace process inMacedonia, aiding those who seek to scuttle thepackage of constitutional reforms and amnestyagreed on 13 August 200189 and return the countryto the verge of conflict.

U.S. officials in Skopje say there is no evidence tolink Macedonian Albanian factions with bin

87 The (predominantly Muslim) ethnic Albanian populationof Macedonia is widely believed to be much higher thanthe 22.5 per cent registered in the 1994 census. However,this statistic will not be reliably established until a newcensus has been held under international supervision, ascalled for by the Framework Agreement of 13 August2001.88 The daily Vest alleged (19 September 2001) thatmujahidin were responsible for the killing of eightMacedonian soldiers in April; the daily Dnevnik alleged(19 September 2001) that a mujahidin had plotted to blowup Skopje�s main police station in 1999, was arrested butreleased due to strong pressure by the main ethnicAlbanian political party, the DPA; Dnevnik then claimed(21 September 2001) that a new Taliban was underconstruction in the Balkans, with the knowledge andsupport of the West. Sitel TV station reported (19September 2001) that bin Laden collaborators wereoperating in Macedonia with the NLA, and (21 September2001) that mujahidin from Saudi Arabia and Egypt weremasterminding NLA operations in Macedonia.89 See ICG Balkans Briefing, Macedonia: War on Hold, 15August 2001.

Laden.90 Overall, the international response toMacedonian attempts to use the terrorism issue forpartisan purposes has been sharp. The allegedlinkage with bin Laden has been dismissed.91 On19 September, U.S. envoy James Pardew and U.S.Ambassador Einik expressed outrage at efforts �totake advantage of America�s tragedy�. EU andNATO officials also have supported this line,cautioning the ethnic Macedonians not to exploitthe events as a reason to hold up passage of theconstitutional amendments agreed on 13 August.

Whatever the lack of evidence of a nexus betweenbin Laden, Islamist terrorism and NLA leader AliAhmeti, the perception remains firmly planted inethnic Macedonian public consciousness that theNLA is a terrorist organisation. And Macedonianleaders continue to reiterate that the world-widewar against terrorism must incorporate their owndomestic struggles.

A. GOVERNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM

On 17 September 2001, parliament passed a�Declaration against Terrorism� not onlyexpressing solidarity with the American people,but proclaiming, in language that is locally loaded,Macedonia�s �special awareness of these tragicevents as it itself is a victim of terrorism for thepast seven months.� Echoing a previously declaredproject of the speaker of parliament, the powerfulStojan Andov, parliament also proposed an �anti-terrorist regional pact�.

Ethnic Albanian parties did not support theproposed �anti-terrorist regional pact�. Overall,ethnic Albanian leaders have been muted on theterrorism allegations � either denying them, orproclaiming their full willingness to consider anyproof brought by the international community.This stance probably reflects confidence that at themoment, international pressure is firmly on the

90 The Ministry of Interior officially shares information onterrorism, but senior international officials say the materialshared has been of little value. One described this materialas comprising �lists of names of men with beards�. ICGinterviews in Skopje, November 2001.91 For example, on 9 October, Janet Bogue, U.S. DeputyAssistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,said publicly that she knew of no evidence that there were�bin Laden training camps in Macedonia�. Seehttp://www.uspolicy.be/Issues/Balkans/mac.101301.htm.


ethnic Macedonian leaders to implement the 13August Framework Agreement.

On 8 October, President Boris Trajkovski made astrong statement of support for the U.S. and itsposition on terrorism. Three days earlier, however,addressing a Euro-Atlantic Security Conference inSofia, Trajkovski had said:

Shortly after the attacks on 11 September,President George Bush said that we musttarget �terrorists with a global reach�. Iwould add that we must � target terroristswherever they are and whatever theirreach. Because even if �local� terroristsdon�t expand their reach to a global level,they must be stopped by the collectiveactions of the international community astheir tactics and methods will be used byothers [and] send a signal to all terroristswherever they are.92

These remarks reflected a deep suspicion amongethnic Macedonians that the �war on terrorism�confirms Western double standards, excluding as itdoes Macedonia�s own �terrorists�, namely theethnic Albanian rebels of the (now officiallydisbanded) National Liberation Army, the NLA.Macedonians remember that Western leadersthemselves called the NLA terrorists during muchof the first half of 2001, until they decided that thegovernment had to negotiate a historic compromisewith them.93

Even before 11 September, the main governingethnic Macedonian party, VMRO-DPMNE,94

92 Quoted in Dnevnik, 6 October 2001.93 Western leaders who, according to media reports,publicly used the word �terrorism� or �terrorist� whencondemning the ethnic Albanian rebels in Macedoniaduring March 2001 included German Chancellor GerhardSchroeder and Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping; FrenchForeign Minister Hubert Vedrine; Javier Solana, HighRepresentative of the EU for the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy; Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary-General; UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, and,collectively, the six nations of the Contact Group (U.S.,Russia, UK, France, Germany and Italy). The BushAdministration used the term as late as 27 June 2001; see�Statement by Press Secretary: Bush Acts to Isolate, CutSupport to Extremists in the Balkans�, available athttp://www.alliedbe/usa/president/s20010627d.html.94 VMRO-DPMNE stands in Macedonian for InternalMacedonian Revolutionary Organisation�DemocraticParty for Macedonian Unity.

invoked the terrorism theme, most notably in ahigh profile attempt to sack the Minister of Justice� an ethnic Albanian � for failing to demand theextradition from Germany of the suspected culpritin a deadly attack on a police station.

B. BACKGROUND

In order to understand the current obsession withterrorism and how politicians and media haveexploited it, the popular understanding of�terrorism� in Macedonia must be clarified.

Reluctant to examine the deeper roots of theconflict in their country, and to acknowledge eitherlegitimate ethnic Albanian grievances or thelargely corrupt way of dealing with them for muchof the past decade, many Macedonians areconvinced that the conflict was wholly �imported�by �outside terrorists�. This conviction isreinforced by the fact that fighting in Macedonia �in contrast to Kosovo � erupted without abackground of lengthy escalation or an obviousgrowth of extremism. Consequently, ethnicMacedonians have looked outside the country toexplain its origin. Many see the Kosovo crisis �and the failure of the UN and KFOR to crack downon Albanian extremism and criminality and tocontrol Kosovo�s borders � as the principal sourceof their conflict with ethnic Albanians.

This means that the ubiquitous label for the NLA� �terrorists� � has great resonance for a publicstunned by the fighting and the swift deteriorationof interethnic relations. And without obviousatrocities against ethnic Albanians, there is nothingto balance the dominant image of the recentconflict for most ethnic Macedonians: the grislypictures, first on television, then available forviewing on the Internet, of Macedonian troopsmutilated (by NLA �terrorists�) following anambush.

Rather than feeling reassured by the FrameworkAgreement signed at Ohrid on 13 August, manyethnic Macedonians retain the conviction that theinternational community is biased and hypocritical.Lord Robertson�s memorable, pre-Ohrid epithet forthe NLA � �thugs� � is too fresh to be forgotten.Ethnic Macedonians frequently cite a decade�sworth of international praise given to Macedonia,and its constitution, as a �model of multiethnicity�.The public thanks by key officials, including


President Clinton, for Macedonia�s support toethnic Albanian refugees in 1999 is alsoremembered.

Thus, most Macedonians believe they have neverdeviated notably from the right path. And they citeas justification that they largely accepted thepolitical and economic prescriptions of theinternational community, until the insurrectionearlier this year drew them into internationaldisfavour.95

Macedonians take a bitter view, therefore, of therole that the international community includingNATO, the EU and the U.S. has played during thecrisis. Not only many members of the public, butsenior officials in government, fantasise thatwithout international pressure for a compromisethe Macedonian army and police would have�taken care� of the ethnic Albanians.

C. MEDIA

From mid September, the Macedonian-languagemedia have been replete with stories linking theNLA with bin Laden and mujahidin. Newspapersand television repeated the same themes: that theNLA was cooperating with bin Laden in trainingand finances; that mujahidin were an activecomponent of the NLA � even responsible foratrocities perpetrated on Macedonian forces in thevillage of Vejce; and that terrorism remains acontinuing danger to the country. Although thefrequency and prominence of the stories hasdiminished, they have not disappeared. On 6October 2001, Macedonian Television suggestedthat an ethnic Albanian sought to assassinate PrimeMinister Georgievski with a car filled withexplosives.

Even more than in Bosnia these allegations arepolitically driven and immune to sober refutation.Experienced observers believe the police andsecurity services are providing material to selectedmedia, such as SITEL television, to make their

95 The main exception was President Trajkovski. In histelevised speech to parliament formally proposing theOhrid constitutional amendments, on 31 August 2001,Trajkovski boldly alluded to the past failures to deal withinterethnic matters in a straightforward way. See ICGBalkans Briefing, Macedonia: Filling the SecurityVacuum, 8 September 2001.

allegations of mujahidin involvement in the NLAlook more plausible.

The emergence of this �participatory� or �patrioticjournalism� is a serious obstacle to reconciliationand stability. While the ultimate aims and backersof these media outlets remain unclear, theemergence of a coalition known as the �MediaFront� suggests a concerted effort to utilise the fullpower of selected media, including as an organiserof public sentiment, to undermine the OhridAgreement and the international community�sefforts.

Albanian-language media � which are certainly nomore professional � have denounced the�irresponsibility� of their Macedonian-languagecounterparts. This stance of superiority reflects,again, the ethnic Albanians� sense that, until theparliament has ratified the Ohrid Agreement, theonus of international pressure will remain firmlyon ethnic Macedonian shoulders.

Interestingly, while the post-11 September mediacampaign might have been expected to alignMacedonia with the international coalition againstterror (albeit at the expense of ethnic Albanians),some prominent media have sought instead tofurther undermine the image of the West. Forexample, Dnevnik and other outlets have soundedthe theme that the West is sponsoring terror groupsin Kosovo.96 This has the effect of weakeningsupport for the West-backed Ohrid accords evenfurther.

D. CONCLUSION

The international warnings to the ethnicMacedonian community and expressions ofoutrage at its leaders� attempt to distort the anti-terrorism drive for partisan purposes appear tohave only limited effect. Ethnic Macedonianofficials believe the events of 11 September havedistracted the U.S. in particular from seriousengagement in the region. One senior official toldICG: �the U.S. has other problems right now�.

96 A well-known Macedonian journalist stated to ICG as ifit were a fact that �KLA logistics bases� were stilloperating in a village in southern Kosovo. Repeated toKFOR intelligence official, this allegation drew laughter.ICG interviews in Skopje, 19 October, and Pristina, 2November 2001.


Hence, ethnic Macedonian officials have showngreater confidence since 11 September inconfronting the international community. Theclearest demonstration of this occurred on 19September, when President Trajkovski reportedlyrefused to request a new NATO mission unlessNATO granted permission for Skopje to receive 31Soviet-built tanks. NATO reportedly acceded tothe request under condition that the tanks would bemonitored.97

97 ICG interviews with senior international officials.

VII. MONTENEGRO

A. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSES

On 11 September, Montenegrin PresidentDjukanovic received Yugoslav Federal PresidentVojislav Kostunica in Podgorica. A comparison oftheir reactions to the attacks in New York andWashington gives a measure of the internaldifferences that beset the FRY.

Both men discussed the possibility of terrorismspreading to Serbia and Montenegro from Kosovo.Referring to the danger of ethnic Albanianterrorism, Kostunica noted that �everything thathas happened in our immediate vicinity in recentmonths elicits concern and indicates that there is adanger of terrorism spreading from Kosovo to therest of Yugoslavia�. He continued that �we havecome face to face with a very dangerous ambitionto create a new state in the territory of severalstates, and the danger of terrorism exists becausewe are being targeted�.

Djukanovic, too, recognised the risk of terroristactivities spreading from Kosovo, but stressed thegood inter-ethnic relations that exist withinMontenegro. Stating that Kosovo is �the centralsecurity issue in the Balkans�, he added that �itwould be naive to think we are completely safe andunder no threat of terrorism spreading fromKosovo�. He continued that �practice has shownthat conflagration has spilled over from Kosovo toMacedonia, and as long as it is aflame there is adanger of it spreading to other parts of the region,and so for that reason Montenegro, which bordersKosovo, is very carefully monitoring everythinggoing on there, in southern Serbia, and inMacedonia�.

However, Djukanovic emphasised that�Montenegro has passed the test of multiethnicstability during the recent tumultuous period in theBalkans�. Nevertheless, �despite the high level ofgood relations with the Albanians who live inMontenegro, we cannot deny the possibility thatsome of the extremists in the region, outsideMontenegro, want to ensure that the crisis in theregion continues by drawing Montenegro into it,too�.

Kostunica portrayed the terrorist threat as onemore reason why the Yugoslav federation should


remain intact. He explained that Serbia andMontenegro are bound by �the present-day trendthat favours integration�, as well as (somewhatironically, given that the biggest terrorist attack inhistory had just been inflicted on the world�s mostpowerful country) �by the fact that larger politicalentities are safer and less vulnerable to terroristattacks�. 98

On the day of the attacks, Djukanovic sent atelegram to U.S. President George W. Bush, inwhich he expressed �deepest condolences on behalfof the Montenegrin government, its citizens and onhis own behalf, in the aftermath of today�s graveevents caused by irrational terrorist actions�.99

Following the example of the EU, the MontenegrinGovernment declared 14 September a day ofmourning.100 The contrast between theMontenegrin government�s action in this respectand the lack of a similar gesture by the Yugoslavor Serbian republic governments was noted.101

Djukanovic subsequently expressed �Montenegro�sunquestioning readiness to join, within its means,the U.S.-led forces that have declared war oninternational terrorism�. However, in order tounderline that the West should see Montenegro,rather than Belgrade, as its natural ally,Djukanovic took care to remark that not everyonein Yugoslavia had clearly condemned the outrages,asserting that �messages with openly anti-American overtones� could be heard from somesenior figures in Belgrade. He claimed that suchreactions were further evidence of the continuingpresence of Milosevic�s way of thinking amongsections of the ruling Belgrade elite.102

B. MEDIA COVERAGE

The attacks on the U.S. did not dominate the mediafor long, as the ongoing political crisis overMontenegro�s relationship with Serbia continuedto supply drama. This included an abortive attemptto start negotiations between Belgrade and

98 Tanjug news agency, 11 September 2001.99 TV Montenegro, 11 September 2001.100 Beta news agency, 13 September 2001.101 The Yugoslav foreign minister was asked to commenton this contrast in an interview with the Belgrade dailyDanas, as reported by the V.I.P. Daily News Report, 24September 2001.102 TV Montenegro, 26 September 2001.

Podgorica, and further speculation about theformation of a new, broad coalition(�concentration�) Montenegrin government.

The biggest controversy for Montenegroimmediately arising out of the attacks on the U.S.concerned the decision of an independenttelevision channel, NTV Montena, to inviteviewers to phone in answer to the question �Doesthe U.S. deserve such retribution�? The questionreflects the ambivalence that is still found amongsome Montenegrins, as among Serbs, towards theU.S. and NATO after the 1999 NATO bombingcampaign. The question elicited outraged reactionsfrom many quarters, and the editorial board ofNTV Montena apologised for what it conceded hadbeen a grave editorial mistake.103

In general, such ambivalence can be found mainlyamong some supporters of the pro-Yugoslavparties in Montenegro. The leading pro-Yugoslavparty, the Socialist People�s Party (SNP), wasallied to former Yugoslav President SlobodanMilo�evic until his fall from power.

The anti-Islamic reporting that has characterisedSerbian and Macedonian media coverage of the�war on terrorism� has not been echoed in themainstream Montenegrin media., However, theattacks on the U.S. did provide new grist to themill of pro-Yugoslav media, which have formonths been warning of the alleged danger ofethnic Albanian terrorism spreading toMontenegro. Such scare-mongering was reflectedin a report by the ITAR-TASS Russian newsagency claiming that people close to Osama binLaden had been training �Albanian terrorists� at acamp near the border of Kosovo and SouthernSerbia, and that terrorist actions were planned forMontenegro, in addition to Kosovo.104 This reportsaid as much about ITAR-TASS�s apparent agendain the Balkans as about its purported subject.105

103 Monitor, 14 September 2001 and V.I.P. Daily NewsReport, 17 and 19 September 2001. Out of the very smallnumber of people who responded to the question, amajority replied in the affirmative.104 ITAR-TASS news agency, 2 October 2001.105 The Russian agency�s anti-Islamic coverage from theBalkans since the launch of the �war on terrorism� hasbeen noted by Janusz Bugajski in the Croatian weekly,Nacional, 4 October 2001.


According to the 1991 census, some 14 per cent ofMontenegro's population is Bosniak-Muslim, whilea further 7 per cent is ethnic-Albanian, although asignificant proportion of Montenegro's Albaniansare Roman Catholic rather than Muslim.Religiosity in Montenegro is in general relativelylow. While there are devout Muslims, the type ofIslamist extremism seen in the Middle East is aliento their traditions, as is the case throughout theBalkans. The relative stability of Montenegro andthe fact that it has not been directly affected by warduring the last decade, has meant that the factorsthat might have fomented radical Islam or givenforeign radicals a foothold have not been present.

Overall, there has been relatively little tendency toexplore the direct consequences of internationalevents for Montenegro, apart from some discussionof how U.S. policy towards the Balkans might beaffected. A commentary in Monitor concluded that,despite U.S. assurances of continued commitmentto the region, it was impossible to predict whetherengagement would be stepped up or scaled down.The same article also doubted whether the EUcould fill U.S. shoes.106 On a visit to Montenegroshortly after the attacks, the U.S. ambassador inBelgrade was reported as saying that �the U.S.government would not neglect the interests anddemocratic reforms in Montenegro and theresolution of relations between Montenegro andSerbia�.107

106 For example, Monitor, 28 September 2001, �Strah odsamoće: da li će Amerika smanjiti interesovanje zaBalkan�.107 BBC Monitoring International Reports, 25 September2001.

VIII. SERBIA

For Serbia�s leaders and opinion-makers, the �waron terrorism� was the first opportunity sinceMilosevic�s defeat to update the country�s mythicvocation as �defender of the West�.108 And it hasbeen seized with relish. First the press and thenpoliticians revived aggressively anti-Muslim andanti-Albanian language that had been widely usedduring the wars in Bosnia (1992-95) and Kosovo(1998-99). This language attempted to equateOsama bin Laden with Serbia�s ethnic Albanianand Bosniak �enemies� of the previous decade

A. MEDIA

The first such story appeared in the nationalist-oriented daily Glas Javnosti on 17 September. Itclaimed there were 15,000 mujahidin in theBalkans, and that the U.S. had sponsored Islamagainst the Serbs. It openly linked the terroristactions in New York and Washington to the U.S.sponsorship of Islam in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albaniaand Macedonia, and included claims that Osamabin Laden had secretly visited Kosovo in 1998 and1999 as a guest of the Kosovo Liberation Army(KLA). The article continued on to questionwhether there might be new (self-evidently ethnicAlbanian) terrorist attacks in the Balkans backedby bin Laden. The connotation was clear:terrorism equals ethnic Albanian separatism.109

The newspaper included a large article about therole of Islamist fundamentalists in Bosnia,claiming that Bosniak authorities had issued binLaden a Bosnian passport, that bin Laden mayhave been behind a plan to attack the Pope duringhis 1997 visit to Sarajevo, and that he had alsoplanned an attack on world leaders during the 1999Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo.110 Although aportion of the information in the articles was basedloosely on fact, including the references to thecontinued presence of former mujahidin in Bosnia,it was written in a sensational manner and includedmany unsubstantiated rumours.

108 A point made by Zeljko Cvijanovic, IWPR BalkanCrisis Report, 3 October 2001.109 �Opasno vreme za �svete ratnike��, Glas javnosti, 17September 2001.110 �Strahuju alijini sledbenici�, Glas javnosti, 17September 2001.


Federal Defence Minister, Slobodan Krapovic,stated publicly on 20 September that Belgrade hadno information that there were followers of binLaden in Bosnia, Kosovo or Albania.111 This denialdid little good. The press continued withsensational � and often completely untrue � storiesabout �terrorists�. One of the most prominent wasa false report carried by the pro-governmentBelgrade daily Politika, to the effect that themoderate Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugovahad said the KLA was hiding international terroristbases on territory under its control and was �readyto organise terrorist acts to support Osama binLaden�.112 Rugova�s immediate denunciation ofthe report received no press coverage in Serbia.

On 26 September, Nedeljni Telegraf had a coverphoto of a bearded mujahidin with the headline:�Bin Laden�s soldiers in Serbia�. The inside articlewas directed not only against the ethnic Albanians,but also against the Muslim Slav minority inSerbia�s Sandzak region, adjoining Montenegro.113

Another issue of Nedeljni Telegraf ran the front-page headline �Bin Laden has ordered: Open afront in the Balkans to set Europe ablaze�.114 Thetabloid Eklsuziv ran a front-page headline claiming�Terrorists are entering Belgrade�, while ID carrieda front page photo of bin Laden with the caption�Terrorism continues to threaten Yugoslavia:Balkan footprints of bin Laden�.115

Glas Javnosti printed a front-page story claimingat least 50 mujahidin were training in the U.S.sector of Kosovo under the command of thebrother of Osama bin Laden�s chief of specialoperations. Harking back to the formation of theGerman SS Handzar Division from amongBosnia�s Muslims during the Second World War,the article claimed that bin Laden was preparing anew Handzar Division.116

111 B92, �Krapovic: Nema podataka o bin Ladenu�, 20September 2001.112 �Rugiva: takozvani OVK prikriva teroristicke baze�,Politika, 26 September 2001.113 �Bin ladenovi vojnici u Srbiji�, Nedeljni telegraf, 26September 2001.114 �Bin Laden naredio: otvorite front na Balkanu dapotpalimo Evropu�, Nedeljni Telegraf, 3 October 2001.115 �U Beograd ulaze teroristi�, Ekskluziv, 3 October 2001.�Preti i dalje terorizam Jugoslaviji: Balkanski tragoviOsame bin Ladena�, ID, 26 September 2001.116 �50 mudzahedina u americkoj zoni�, Glas Javnosti, 2October 2001.

B. POLITICIANS

First to weigh in was Serbia�s Interior Minister,Dusan Mihajlovic, a former Milosevic ally, whoclaimed in a television interview that his ministrypossessed information that bin Laden had twobases in Bosnia and others in Kosovo and Albania.He also stated that bin Laden had been in Bosniawhen the Muslims committed war crimes againstSerb civilians in the vicinity of Mount Ozren.117

This was followed the next day by reports in thewidely-read Blic and Glas Javnosti � allegedlybased on BBC sources � that bin Laden�s al-Qaidanetwork had active bases in Bosnia, Kosovo andAlbania.118

These claims reached new dimensions on 20September when Serbian deputy premier NebojsaCovic, who manages the combined YugoslavFederal and Serbian Republic portfolio for Kosovoand southern Serbia, claimed that extremists fromsouthern Serbia were preparing terrorist attacksagainst Belgrade. Covic stated that they hadconnections with ethnic Albanian terrorist groupsoperating out of Kosovo. This assertion � by oneof the international community�s favourites inBelgrade � received prominent front-pagecoverage and was the lead item in several newsbroadcasts.119

Covic then claimed that �there were over 10,000mujahidin in Bosnia and Herzegovina and manystill remain � and there are over 3,000 in Kosovo.They are all little bin Ladens�.120 He connected thealleged impending terrorist attacks on Serbia to thelooming U.S. action against Afghanistan andOsama bin Laden.121 The respected newsweeklyNIN ran a front page photo of Covic with thecaption �Belgrade as the target�.122

117 �Tragovi Bin Ladena na prostoru bivse SFRJ�, Glasjavnosti, 19 September 2001.118 �Al Kaida ima aktivne baze u Bosni, Albaniji, i naKosmetu�, Glas javnosti, 19 September 2001. �Al kaida uBiH, na Kosovu i Albaniji�, Blic, 19 September 2001.119 �Covic: teroristi sremni da napadnu Beograd�, Danas,21 September 2001. �Covic: ekstremisti s juga Srbijespremaju napade u Beogradu�, Blic, 21 September 2001.120 �Vise od 3000 mudzahedina na Kosovu i Metohiji�,Glas javnosti, 22 September 2001.121 �Policija stiti objekte sirom citave republike�, Danas,22-23 September 2001.122 �Beograd na meti�, Nin, 27 September 2001.


By clearly linking ethnic Albanian separatism insouthern Serbia and Kosovo with Osama binLaden, Covic returned to the Milosevic-era policyof labelling all Albanian �separatists�, meaning theentire ethnic Albanian population, as �terrorists�.In response to these latest charges, the InteriorMinistry announced that it was increasing securityat numerous buildings throughout the country toprotect against terrorist attacks.123 Thesesensationalist media reports provoked an outragedresponse from the Kosovo Albanian leadership.124

At the same time, Federal President Kostunica tookthe extraordinary step of publicly blaming the U.S.for the background to the 11 September attacks.Washington�s wish to �play the role of worldpoliceman and � dominate almost all spheres oflife� were, he said, �the true deep roots and the truereasons that triggered the birth of terrorism and itsdevelopment�.125 Kostunica also criticisedAmerican double standards on terrorism � anaccusation that, as mentioned above, resonateswith many Serbs and Macedonians.

Even former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevichas, from his confinement in The Hague, sought tojump aboard the anti-terrorism bandwagon. Afterlistening to charges related to Croatia in 1991 andKosovo in 1999, Milosevic told the bench at theInternational Criminal Tribunal that �I have beenaccused because I defended my nation from thecruel aggression carried out against it and becauseI defended my people from terrorism�.126

On 28 September, the Serbian Helsinki Committeefor Human Rights expressed �deep concern overthe revival of hate speech and intolerance�, in theform of �allegations voiced by prominent officials,politicians and media�. These allegations havefuelled a �dangerous trend �which adds tension toalready precarious relations between the majoritypeople and minorities�.127

123 �Pojacan kontrola u celoj zemlji�, Danas, 24 September2001.124 �Umesto tenkova izmisljotine�, Danas, 24 September2001.125 Politika, 21 September 2001.126 Quoted in The Guardian, 30 October 2001.127 Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, PressRelease, 28 September 2001.

C. BACK TO THE PRESENT

Serbia�s media and political furore over the 11September terrorist attacks in the U.S. is far morethan simple sensationalist journalism. It is nodoubt partly motivated by a desire to sellnewspapers. However, it is strikingly reminiscentof Milosevic�s propaganda campaign in 1990-1991that deliberately stirred up nationalist passions andinter-ethnic distrust.128

One of the clearest effects of this media blitz isanxiety about potential terrorist attacks on Serbia.An opinion poll taken at the beginning of October2001 showed only 43.3 per cent of the populationnow feels safe from terrorist attack.129 Thosepolled indicated their greatest concern was insouthern Serbia, where the government had earlierin the year � with significant EU, U.S. and NATOsupport � negotiated a peaceful settlement to endthe ethnic Albanian insurgency in the Presevoregion.130 Throughout the insurgency, the Serbianmedia had depicted the ethnic Albanian insurgentsas �terrorists�.

This artificially generated anxiety will carry overto relations with Muslim Slavs, be they in Bosnia,Montenegro, or Serbia�s own Sandzak region. Itwill no doubt provide fuel for anti-Islamicsentiment, and could fuel anti-Muslim activities inthe Sandzak. Because all Muslims � ethnicAlbanians and Slavs alike � have been tarred withthe brush of terrorism, it may cause Serbianpoliticians to take less seriously the legitimategrievances of Islamic citizens.

Already this is seen in the Presevo region, whichCovic has virtually ignored since the successfulnegotiation to the end of the insurgency. He hasnot visited for more than two months. Thecoordinating body for the south of Serbia lacksrepresentatives from the ministries of culture,economy, justice, and education, and now appears

128 See Mark Thompson, Forging War. The Media inSerbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina (Article19/University of Luton, 1999), pp.21-109.129 �Gradjani se, uglavnom, osecaju prilicno bezbedno aline kriju da se plase teroristickih provokacija, posebno najugu Srbije i u � prestonici�, Politika, 1 October 2001.130 See ICG Balkans Report No 116, Peace in Presevo:Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?, 10 August 2001.


to be in the hands of the police and army.131 Aspromises go unfulfilled, ethnic Albanian discontentmay once again increase.

D. THE SANDZAK

The Sandzak is a Muslim Slav majority area thatstraddles the border between Montenegro andSerbia, running from Bosnia in the north toKosovo in the south. The 1991 census indicatedthat approximately 54 per cent of Sandzak�sapproximately 420,000 residents were Muslims.They live intermixed with Serbs, Montenegrinsand ethnic Albanians.

However, as many as 80,000 may have fled theregion since 1991.From the beginning of the war inBosnia in March 1992 until late 1993, theMilosevic regime practised an official state policyof persecution against the region�s Muslims.Serbian police and paramilitary forces engaged inlow-level ethnic cleansing of the Sandzak Muslimvillages bordering Bosnia. This included killings,home burnings, and forced expulsions. TheYugoslav Army (VJ) surrounded the region�s maincity, Novi Pazar, with artillery, tanks and infantrypositions. Paramilitary groups and the police(MUP) roamed the Sandzak and committedexcesses, including murder, kidnappings, beatings,theft, extortion, and other acts designed tointimidate the local population.

The repression against Muslims eased after 1993,but continued in milder forms until DOS overthrewMilosevic on 5 October 2000. Like the ethnicAlbanians were in varying degrees in southernSerbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, the SandzakMuslims were to a large extent disenfranchisedfrom public life during the Milosevic era. Manywere fired from their jobs in state-owned (socially-owned) companies, schools, hospitals, police, thejudiciary and public administration. Forced out ofthe state economy, the Muslims have created arelatively thriving local economy basedsubstantially on textiles.

As in parts of Bosnia and Kosovo, organisationspromoting Wahhabi Islam have established apresence in Sandzak. There have been no incidents

131 �Iseljavanje iz ekonomskih razloga�, Danas, 19September 2001.

over the last ten years in the Sandzak that could becharacterised as Islamist violence. Serbianpropaganda claims that the Sandzak is a breedingground of terrorism must therefore be dismissed asfalse.

E. CONCLUSION

The alacrity with which Belgrade leaders �including Kostunica, Covic and Mihajlovic �joined the anti-Muslim harangue following 11September should serve as a reminder that thepost-Milosevic progress in Serbian politics rests onfragile foundations.

The Serbian media war on �terrorism� is likely tohave a negative effect on Kosovo. The nationalistrhetoric will likely strengthen the Socialist Party ofSerbia (SPS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia(DSS) both in Belgrade and northern Kosovo, aswell as increase efforts to expand parallelstructures in Serb-majority regions of Kosovo.

The activities of the UPNKSK � working togetherwith the Yugoslav Coordination Centre for Kosovoand Metohija, run by Nebojsa Covic � havealready prevented the release of the 180 ethnicAlbanian political prisoners held in Serbian jailssince the Kosovo war, all of whom have now beeneffectively redefined as �terrorists�. This furtherdelays the start of a Serb-Albanian dialogue aboutKosovo�s future.

Belgrade/Podgorica/Pristina/Sarajevo/Skopje/Tirana/Brussels, 9 November 2001


APPENDIX A

MAP OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA


APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG�s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the ground incountries at risk of conflict, gather informationfrom a wide range of sources, assess localconditions and produce regular analytical reportscontaining practical recommendations targeted atkey international decision-takers.

ICG�s reports are distributed widely to officials inforeign ministries and international organisationsand made generally available at the same time viathe organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org.ICG works closely with governments and thosewho influence them, including the media, tohighlight its crisis analysis and to generate supportfor its policy prescriptions. The ICG Board -which includes prominent figures from the fields ofpolitics, diplomacy, business and the media - isdirectly involved in helping to bring ICG reportsand recommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired byformer Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; formerAustralian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has beenPresident and Chief Executive since January 2000.

ICG�s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates field projects in nineteen crisis-affectedcountries and regions across four continents:

Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan andZimbabwe in Africa; Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia;Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegroand Serbia in Europe; and Colombia in LatinAmerica.

ICG also undertakes and publishes originalresearch on general issues related to conflictprevention and management. After the attacksagainst the United States on 11 September 2001,ICG launched a major new project on globalterrorism, designed both to bring together ICG�swork in existing program areas and establish a newgeographical focus on the Middle East (with aregional field office planned for Amman) andPakistan/Afghanistan (with a field office plannedfor Islamabad).

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governments currently provide funding:Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the CarnegieCorporation of New York, the Ford Foundation,the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, theCharles Stewart Mott Foundation, the OpenSociety Institute, the Ploughshares Fund and theSasakawa Peace Foundation.

October 2001

Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website: www.crisisweb.org


APPENDIX C

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS∗∗∗∗

∗ Released since January 1999

AFRICA

ALGERIA

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La crise algérienne n�est pas finie, rapport Afrique N°24, 20October 2000The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted, Africa ReportN°31, 9 July 2001La concorde civile: Une initiative de paix manquée, rapportAfrique N°31, 9 juillet 2001Algeria�s Economy: The Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence,Africa Report N°36, 26 October 2001

BURUNDI

The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of thePeace Process in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April2000L�Effet Mandela: évaluation et perspectives du processus depaix Burundais, rapport Afrique N°20, 18 avril 2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom ofthe Press and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N°23, 12July 2000Burundi: les enjeux du débat. Partis politiques, liberté de lapresse et prisonniers politiques, rapport Afrique N°23, 12juillet 2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Neither War, nor Peace, Africa Report N°25, 1December 2000Burundi: Ni guerre, ni paix, rapport Afrique N°25, 1decembre 2000Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for aNew Negotiating Framework, Africa Report N°29, 14 May2001Burundi: Sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadrede négociations, rapport Afrique N°29, 14 mai 2001Burundi: 100 Days to put the Peace Process back on Track,Africa Report N°33, 14 August 2001Burundi: Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix,rapport Afrique N°33, 14 août 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N°26, 20 December 2000Le partage du Congo: anatomie d�une sale guerre, rapportAfrique N°26, 20 decembre 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in ConflictPrevention, Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa ReportN°15, 4 May 2000International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: JusticeDelayed, Africa report N°30, 7 June 2001Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l�urgence dejuger, rapport Afrique N°30, 7 juin 2001�Consensual Democracy� in Post Genocide Rwanda:Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Africa ReportN°34, 9 October 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and PoliticalStrategy, Africa Report N°28, 11 April 2001Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, Africa Report N° 35,24 October 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, AfricaBriefing, 25 September 2000Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa ReportN°32, 13 July 2001Zimbabwe: Time for International Action, Africa Briefing,12 October 2001


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?,Asia Report N°11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

Indonesia�s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Asia Report N°6,31 May 2000Indonesia�s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Asia Briefing, 19July 2000Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N°10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for GrossHuman Rights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21February 2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia,Asia Report N°15, 13 March 2001Indonesia�s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round,Indonesia Briefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won�t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N°17, 12 June 2001Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ICG Asia ReportN°18, 27 June 2001Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons fromKalimantan, ICG Asia Report N°19, 27 June 2001Indonesian-U.S. Military Ties: Asia Briefing, 18 July 2001The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September2001Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya, Asia ReportN°23, 20 September 2001Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, Asia Briefing, 10October 2001Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform, Asia ReportN°24, 11 October 2001

CAMBODIA

Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8,11 August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯАЗИЯ: УСЛОВИЯ КРИЗИСА В ТРЕХ ГОСУДАРСТВАХ,Отчет МГПК по Азии № 7, 7 августа 2000 г

Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia ReportN°14, 1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia�s Localised Povertyand Social Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map, AsiaReport N°20, 4 July 2001Central Asia: Uzbekistan at Ten � Repression andInstability, Asia Report N°21, 21 August 2001Kyrgystan at Ten: Trouble in the �Island of Democrac�y,Asia Report N°22, 28 August 2001Central Asian Perspectives on the 11 September and theAfghan Crisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001Le 11 septembre et la crise afghane vus de l�Asie Centrale,Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001


BALKANS

ALBANIA

Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania�s Local Elections, A test of Stability andDemocracy, Balkans Briefing 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans ReportNº111, 25 May 2001Albania�s Parliamentary Elections 2001, Balkans Briefing, 3August 2001

BOSNIA

Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, BalkansReport N°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia�s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia�s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia�s Republika Srpska, BalkansReport N°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia�s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, BalkansReport N°104, 18 December 2000Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°106,15 March 2001No Early Exit: NATO�s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report N°110, 22 May 2001Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open ForBusiness; Balkans Report N°115, 7 August 2001Nesigurna Bosansk Ohercegova Ka Ekonomija Jo- Uvijeknije Otvorena A Za Biznis, Izvjeýtaj ICG-a za Balkan br.115, 7. avgust 2001. godineThe Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia�s Republika Srpska:Balkans Report N°118, 8 October 2001

CROATIA

Facing Up to War Crimes, Balkans Briefing, 16 October2001

KOSOVO

Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo�s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA? Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo�s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica,Balkans Report N°96, 31 May 2000

Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, Balkans Report, 27 June2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica�s Victory, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Macedonia�s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia Government Expects Setback in Local Elections,Balkans Briefing, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans ReportN°113, 20 June 2001Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing,8 September 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro�s Socialist People�s Party: A Loyal Opposition?Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro�s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro�s Local Elections: More of the Same, BalkansBriefing, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30November 2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, a pre-election Briefing, 18April 2001Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock,Balkans Report N°114, 1 August 2001

SERBIA

Serbia�s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30May 2000Serbia�s Grain Trade: Milosevic�s Hidden Cash Crop,Balkans Report N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)and of Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000


Yugoslavia�s Presidential Election: The Serbian People�sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September2000Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,Balkans Briefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, BalkansBriefing, 20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability,Balkans Report N°112, 15 June 2001Milosevic in The Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia andthe Region, Balkans Briefing, 6 July 2001Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?Balkans Report N°116, 10 August 2001Serbia�s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans ReportN°117, 21 September 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans Report N°108, 26 April 2001Milosevic in The Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia andthe Region, Balkans Briefing, 6 July 2001

ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, Issues Report N°1, 19 June2001EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processesfor Conflict Prevention and Management, Issues ReportN°2, 26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, Issues Briefing Paper, 26 June2001

These reports may be downloaded from the ICG website: www.crisisweb.org


APPENDIX D

ICG BOARD MEMBERS

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador;Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;

Former Chief Prosecutor, International CriminalTribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize,1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UnitedKingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, SierraLeone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; formerEuropean Commissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber ofCommerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs,Canada


Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank

Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for NorthernIreland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace andEconomic Co-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African NationalCongress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, GermanBundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport

bin laden and the balkans: the politics of anti … · 2016. 10. 10. · bin laden and the balkans:...

Documents