bill of rights cases.doc

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEWERSAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

Bill of Rights

DUE PROCESS

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORSASSOCIATION V. CITY OF MANILA

20 SCRA 849

Fact! The principal question in this appeal from ajudgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition iswhether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is iolating ofdue process clause. !t was alleged that "ec. # of thechallenged ordinance is unconstitutional and oid for beingunreasonable and iolate of due process insofar as itwould impose $%T fee per annum for first class motels and$&'()) for second class motels' that "ec. *' prohibiting aperson less than #+ years from being accepted in such

hotels' motels' lodging houses' taern or common innunless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian andma,ing it unlawful for the owner' manager' ,eeper or dulyauthori-ed representatie of such establishments to leaseany room or portion thereof more than twice eery *&hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lac, ofcertainty and for its unreasonable' arbitrary andoppressie character.

I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t t$# &%()'a'c# ) *)&+at)*# &, t$#("# %&c# c+a"#

H#+(! Manila ordinance regulating the operation ofhotels' motels and lodging houses is a police measurespecifically aimed to safeguards public morals. s such it

is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely onconjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. Tohold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow thescope of police power which has been properlycharacteri-ed as the most essential' insistent and the lesslimitable of powers e/tending as it does to all great publicneeds.

Mush discretion is gien to municipalcorporations in determining the amount of license fees tobe imposed for reenue. The mere fact that someindiiduals in the community may be depried of theirpresent business or a particular mode of earning a liingcannot preent the e/ercise of police power.

There is no controlling and precise definition ofdue process. !t furnishes though a standard to whichgoernmental action should conform in order thatdepriation of life' liberty or property' in each appropriatecase' be alid. The standard of due process which muste/ist both as a procedural and as substantie requisite tofree the challenged ordinance' or any goernmental actionfor that matter' from imputation of legal infirmity isresponsieness to the supremacy of reason' obedience tothe dictates of justice. !t would be an affront to reason tostigmati-e an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what amunicipal lawma,ing body considers an eil of ratherserious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious e/erciseof authority. 0hat should be deemed unreasonable andwhat would amount to an abduction of the power to goernis inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the

state of public morals.The proision in Ordinance No. &1%) of the Cityof Manila' ma,ing it unlawful for the owner' manager',eeper or duly authori-ed representatie of any hotel

there appears a correspondence between the undeniablee/istence of an undesirable situation and the legislatieattempt at correction. Moreoer' eery regulation oconduct amounts to curtailment of liberty' which cannot beabsolute.

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERETILI/ER CORP. VS TORRES21 SCRA

Fact! $hilphos Moement for $rogress' !nc 2$M$!3 filedwith the 4O56 a petition for certification election amongthe superisory employees of $7!5$7O". The saidpetition was not opposed by $7!5$7O". !n fact isubmitted a position paper with the Mediator8rbiter. 5ater$M$! filed an amended petition with the Mediator8rbitewherein it sought to represent not only the superisoryemployees of $7!5$7O" but also itsprofessional9technical and confidential employees. Theparties therein agreed to submit their respectie positionpapers and to consider the amended petition submitted fo

decision on the basis thereof and related documents. TheMediator8rbiter issued an order granting the petition anddirecting the holding of a certification election. $7!5$7O"appealed said order to the "ec. Of 5abor' which appeawas denied.

$7!5$7O" alleged that it was denied dueprocess in the proceedings before the Mediator8rbiter.I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t PHILPHOS 3a (#')#( ("#%&c#

H#+(! The essence of due process is simply anopportunity to be heard or' as applied to administratieproceedings' an opportunity to e/plain one:s side or anopportunity to see, a reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of. 0here' as in the instant case' $7!5$7O"agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator8rbiteand to consider the case submitted for decision on thebasis of the position papers filed by the parties' there wassufficient compliance with the requirement of due processas $7!5$7O" was afforded reasonable opportunity topresent its side. Moreoer' $7!5$7O" could hae' if it sodesired' insisted on a hearing to confront and e/amine thewitnesses of the other party. But it did not' instead' it optedto submit its position paper with the Mediator8rbiterBesides' $7!5$7O" had all opportunity to entilate itsarguments in its appeal to the "ec. Of 5abor.

AVIER VS COMELEC

144 SCRA 194Fact! The petitioner and priate were candidates inntique for the Batasang $ambamnsa in the May #;+&elections. On the ee of the elections seeral followers othe petitioner were ambushed and ,illed allegedly by thepriate respondent:s men. This heightened the tension inthe proince. !t was in this atmosphere that the oting washeld.

$etitioner went to the Comelec to question thecanass of the election returns. 7is complaint wasdismissed and priate respondent was proclaimed winnerby the "econd 4iision of the body. "aid decision wassigned by among others. Commissioner Opinion who waspreiously as,ed to inhibit himself on the ground that hewas a former law partner of priate responden

$acificador. Opinion had refused. The decision of saiddiision is being contested by petitioner.

I"#! Wa t$#%# a ("# %&c# &5#%*#( 56 t$#

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decision of the body would be aderse to petitioner.Opinion:s refusal to inhibit himself cannot be justified byany criterion of propriety.

This court has repeatedly demanded =the coldneutrality of an impartial judge> as the indispensableimperatie of due process. To bolster that requirement' we

hae held that the judge must not only be impartial butmust also appear to be impartial as an added assurance tothe parties that his decision will be just. They must trustthe judge' otherwise they will not go to him at all.

The relationship of the judge at one of the partiesmay color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a

just decision. 0here this is probable or een possible' dueprocess demands that the judge inhibit himself' if only outof a sense of delicade-a. ?or refusing to do so' hediested the second diision of the necessary ote for thequestioned decision' assuming it could act and renderedproceeding null and oid.

EUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

DUMLAO VS COMELEC9= SCRA 92

Fact! B$ (* was enacted in connection with @anuary A)'#;+) 5ocal 6lections. The petitioners question "ec. & ofthe said law on the ground that it iolates the equalprotection clause and the constitutional presumption ofinnocence. The first paragraph of "ec. & reads = anyretired electie proincial city' municipal official' who hasreceied payment of the retirement benefits to which he isentitled under the law and who shall hae been %( yrs. ofage at the commencement of the term of office to which hesee,s to be elected' shall not be qualified to run for thesame electie office to which he see,s to be elected' shallnot be qualified to run for the same electie office fromwhich he retired.> On the other hand' par. * of "ec. &proides

=ny person who has committed any act ofdisloyalty to the "tate' including acts amounting tosubersion' insureccion' rebellion or other similar crimes'shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of theoffices coered by this ct' or to participate in any partisanpolitical actiity therein and the filing of charges for thecommission of such crimes before a ciil court of militarytribunal after preliminary inestigation shall be prima facieeidence of such facts.>

I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t t$# a,&%#c)t#( %&*))&' &, S#c.4 &, BP 2 a%# *)&+at)*# &, t$# c&'t)t"t)&'a+ %)'c)+#

&, #>"a+ %&t#ct)&' a'( %#"7t)&' &, )''&c#'c#.H#+(! $ar. #' "ec & of B$ (* does not transgress theconstitutional guarantee mentioned the first par. Of "ec &is D5!4. s aderted to in many decisions' the equalprotection clauses does not prohibit classification'proided it complies with the requisites what is prohibitedis a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. Thedistinction here is substantial. The *nd par. of "ec &howeer' iolates the constitutional guaranty ofpresumption of innocence. This is so' since a candidate isdisqualified from running for a public office on the groundalone that charges hae been filed against him. !n thiswise' it is as if he is placed in the same category as aperson who has already been conicted of a crime whosepenalty carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension

of the right to hold public office.

ALMONTE VS VASUE/

!ntelligence and !nestigation Bureau 26!!B3 to produce =aldocuments relating to $ersonal "erices ?unds for theyear #;++ and all eidence' such as ouchers for thewhole plantilla of 6!!N for #;++> and to enjoin him fromenforcing his orders. The subpoena duces tecum wasissued by the Ombudsman in connection with his

inestigation of an anonymous letter alleging that fundsrepresenting saings from unfilled positions in the 6!!B hasbeen illegally disbursed' petitioners moe to quash thesubpoena duces tecum on the following issues#. whether petitioners can be ordered to produce

documents relating to personal serices and salaryouchers of 6!!B employees on the plea that suchdocuments are =classified>'

*. whether petitioner:s right to the equal protection olaws hae been iolated. $etitioners complain that inall forum and tribunal the aggrieed parties can onlyhale respondents ia their erified complaints andsworn statements with their identities fully disclosedwhile in proceedings before the Office of theOmbudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an

inestigationEA. that the subpoena duces tecum is iolatie of the

petitioners right against self8incrimination.

I"#! W#%# #t)t)&'#% c&%%#ct )' ,&%3a%()' t$#a,&%#7#'t)&'#( )"#

H#+(! 0here the claim of confidentiality does not est onthe need to protect military' diplomatic or other nationasecurity secrets but on a general public interest in theconfidentiality of his conersation' courts hae declined tofind it in the constitution an absolute priilege of the$resident against a subpoena considered essential to theenforcement of criminal laws.

!n the case at bar' there is no claim that themilitary or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by theproduction of records pertaining to the personnel of the6!!B. !ndeed' 6!!B:s function is the gathering andealuation of intelligence reports and information regardingillegal actiities affecting the national economyConsequently' while in cases which inole state secretsit may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances othe case that there is reasonable danger that compulsionof the eidence will e/pose military matters withoucompelling production' no similar e/cuse can be made forpriilege resting on other consideration. 5i,ewise' no lawor regulation was shown which considers personnerecords of 6!!B as classified information.

The Constitution e/pressly enjoins the

Ombudsman to act on any complaint file in any form ormanner concerning official acts or omissions 2"ec. #*' rtF!3. Rather than referring to the form of complaints' thephrase = in an appropriate case in rt F! "ec #* meansany case concerning official act or omission which isalleged to be illegal' unjust' improper or inefficient>. Thephrase =subject to such limitations as may be proided bylaw> refers to such limitations as may be proided byCongress or in the absence thereof to such limitations asmay be imposed by the courts. There is a iolation ofpetitioners right to equal protection of laws since in the firsplace the procedure for the proceedings before the Officeof the Ombudsman is proided for in the Constitution itself"econd' it is apparent that in permitting the filing ocomplaints =in any form and in any manner> the framers o

the Constitution too, into account the well ,nown reticenceof the people which ,eep them from complaining againsofficial wrongdoing. The Office of the Ombudsman isdifferent from the other inestigatory and prosecutory

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enough to state that the documents required to beproduced in this case are public records and those towhom the subpoena duces tecum is directed aregoernment officials in whose possession or custody thedocuments are.

ART.III: SEC. 2SEARCHES AND SEI/URES

TAMBASEN VS PEOPLE

Fact! On ugust A#' #;++ $ "gt. Natal applied for theissuance of a search warrant from the MTCC' alleging thathe receied information that petitioner had in hispossession at his course =M8#% armalite rifle' handgrenades' .&( pistol' dynamite stic,s and subersiedocuments>' which articles were used or intended to beused for illegal purposes. On the same day' the applicationwas granted by the MTCC which allowed the sei-ure ofthe items specified in the application.

t around %A)pm of "eptember ;' #;++' a policeteam searched the house of petitioner and sei-ed thefollowing articles a3 * enelopes containing cash in thetotal amount of $#&')))E b3 # hand set c3 handset withantenna $etitioners prays that the search warrant andthe sei-ure of his personal effects be declared illegal.

I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t t$# #a%c$ 3a%%a't 3a +#a+.

H#+(!The search warrant iolates "ection A' Rule #*% ofthe Reised Rules of Court' which prohibits the issuanceof a search warrant for more than one specific offense.Moreoer' by their sei-ure of articles not described in thesearch warrant' the police acted beyond the parameters oftheir authority under the search warrant. "ection *' rt. !!!requires that a search warrant should particularly describethe thing to be sei-ed. The eident purpose and intent ofthe requirement is to limit the things to be sei-ed to thoseand only those' particularly described in the searchwarrant to leae the officers of the law no discretionregarding what articles they should sei-e to the end thatunreasonable searches and sei-ures may not be madeand abuses may not be committed. Clearly then' themoney which was not indicated in the search warrant' hasbeen illegally sei-ed from petitioners. The fact that themembers of the police team were doing their tas, ofpursuing subersies is not a alid e/cuse for the illegalsei-ure. The same constitutional proision is also aimed atpreenting iolations of security in person and property

and unlawful inasions of the sanctity of the home' andgiing remedy against such usurpation when attempted.

VEROY VS LAYA. sa consequence of which' the Deeroy spouses werecharged under $4 #+%%.

I"#! I t$# #a%c$ *a+)( W$#t$#% &% '&t t$#

7at#%)a+ ta@#' a%# a(7))5+# )' #*)(#'c#.

H#+(!No. The search is not alid. The permission gien byMrs. Deroy to brea, open the door of their residence wasmerely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat thepresence of the alleged rebel soldiers. The permission didnot include any authority to conduct a room to roomsearch once inside the house. The items ta,en' weretherefore products of an illegal search' iolatie of theiconstitutional rights. s such' they are inadmissible ineidence.

PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO24 SCRA 24=

Fact! $riate respondent was charged and conicted ofthe !llegal $ossession of ?irearm and mmunitions andillegal sale of regulated 4rugs in * separate criminal casesfiled against him with the RTC of Caite.

There appears to be certain irregularities in theprocedure of the buy8bust operations and in theimplementation of the search warrant. s to the buy8busoperations' the alleged poseur8buyer had to return to thepolice station and inform the raiding team that he hadalready bought the shabu from the accused to implementhe search warrant. Thereupon' the raiding teamproceeded to the house of the accused to implement thesearch warrant. The usual procedure in a buy8busoperation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher ofdrugs at the ery moment he hands oer the dangerousdrug to the poseur8buyer. s to the implementation of thesearch warrant' the search warrant specifically authori-edonly the search and sei-ure of Methamphetamine7ydrochloride commonly ,nown as shabu and itsparaphernalia but the raiding team also sei-ed certainfirearms.

I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t t$# ,)%#a%7 #)#( t$&"$ '&t#c),)ca++6 )'c+"(#( )' t$# #a%c$ 3a%%a't )a(7))5+# a #*)(#'c# aa)'t t$# acc"#(.

H#+(! No. search warrant is not a sweeping authorityempowering a raiding party to underta,e a fishinge/pedition to sei-e and confiscate any and all ,inds of

eidence articles relating to the crime. The Constitutionitself 2sec. *' art.!!!3 and the Rules of Court 2"ec. A' Rule#*%3 specifically mandate that the search warrant musparticularly describe the things to be sei-ed. Thus' thesearch warrant was no authority for the police officers tosei-e the firearm which was not mentioned' much lessdescribed with particularity' in the search warrant. Neithermay it be maintained that the gun was sei-ed in the courseof the arrest' for as earlier obsered' accused:s arrest wasfar from regular and legal. "aid firearm' haing beenillegally sei-ed is not admissible in eidence.

PEOPLE VS TAN


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accede later on when the petitioner identified themseles.?ound inside the bag were marijuana leaes. The accusedwas then ta,en the police headquarters for furtherinestigation.

I"#! Wa t$# 7a%)"a'a )'a(7))5+# )' #*)(#'c# &'

t$# %&"'( t$at )t 3a t$# %&("ct &, a' "'+a3,"+#a%c$ 3)t$&"t a 3a%%a't.

H#+(! No. One of the e/ceptions to the general rulerequiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawfularrest. 2"ec. #* Rule #*%3. ccused was caught inflagrante' since he was carrying a marijuana at the time ofhis arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within thee/ception. The warantless search was incident to a lawfularrest and is consequently alid.

This case also presented urgency. The transcriptof stenographic notes reeals that there was an informerwho pointed to the accused aas carrying marijuana. ?acedwith such on8the8spot information' the police officer had toact quic,ly. There was no enough time to secure a search

warrant.

PEOPLE VS


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interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installationof a deice or arrangement in order to oerhear' interceptor recorded the spo,en words. n e/tension telephonecannot be place in the same category as a 4ictaphone'dictagraph or other deices enumerated in "ec. # of RNo. &*)) as the use thereof cannot be considered as

=tapping> the wire or cable of a telephone line. Thetelephone e/tension in this case was not installed for thatpurpose. !t just happened to be there for ordinary officeuse. !t is a rule in statutory construction that in order todetermine the true intent of the legislatie' the statuteshould not be ta,en as detached and isolated e/pressions'but the whole and eery part thereof must be consideredin fi/ing the meaning of any of its parts.

7ence' the phrase =deice or arrangement> in "ec# of R No. &*))' although not e/clusie to thatenumerated therein' should not b e construed tocomprehend instruments of the same or similar nature'that is' instrument the use of which would be tantamountto tapping the main line of telephone. !t refers toinstrument whose installation or presence cannot be

presumed by the party or parties being oerheard becauseby their ery nature' they are not of common usage andtheir purpose is precisely for tapping intercepting orrecording a telephone conersation.

PEOPLE VS ALBOFERA12 SCRA 12

Fact!lbofera and 5awi8an were conicted in the RTC of4aao del "ur for the murder of a forester and weresentenced to capital punishment. There was no directeidence lin,ing both accused to the crime charged' theiralleged participation therein haing been found by the trialcourt to hae proed by circumstantial eidence adducedby the prosecution. On appeal' the accused assails thetrial court:s decision on the ground of among others' aletter written in the Disayan dialect by accused lbofera'while under detention' to witness Rodrigo 6sma' a friendof lbofera' as,ing 6sma to testify in faor of lbofera.

lbofera contends that the admissibility thereof wasspecifically e/cluded under "ec. &' rt. !D of the #;1AConstitution on the $riacy of Communication andCorrespondence.

I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t t$# a(7))&' &, "c$ +#tt#% a#*)(#'c# 3a *a+)(.

H#+(! Hes' lbofera:s contention is untenable. The

production of the letter by the prosecution was not theresult of an unlawful search and sei-ure nor was it throughunwarranted intrusion or inasion into lbofera:s priacy.

lbofera admitted haing sent the letter to 6sma' and6sma produced such letter in the course of his testimonybefore the trial court. Besides' there was nothing reallyself8incriminatory in the letter. lbofera mainly pleaded that6sma change his declaration in his affidait and testify in

lbofera:s faor. Nothing lbofera stated in this letter wasta,en against him in assiing at a determination of hisculpability.2NOTE! !he Supreme "ourt affirmed the #udgement ofconviction of the trial court based on circumstantialevidence of which $sma%s testimony was much noted forits worthiness, even if &lbofera%s e'tra-#udicial confession

was disregarded as invalid.(

ART III SEC 4

Fact! $etitioner in these cases are questioning thealidity of "ec. ## 2%3 of R %%&% which prohibits theselling or donating space and time for polit icaadertisements e/cept to the COM656C as proidedunder "ec. ;) and ;* of the Omnibus 6lection Code$etitioner:s argue that the proision iolates and inades

the constitutional guarantees comprising ?reedom o6/pressionE that it amounts to censorship' that theprohibition is in derogation of media:s role and function toproide adequate channels of public information andpublic opinion releant to election issues.

H#+(! N& )',%)'#7#'t &, t$# F%##(&7 &, E%#)&'.1. The constitution itself' has e/pressly authori-ed the

COM656C to superise or regulate the enjoymenor utili-ation of franchises or permits for theoperation of media of communication andinformation. 2rt !F8C' &3. The fundamental purposeof that is to ensure equal opportunity' time andspace and the right to reply' as well as uniform andreasonable rates of charges for the used of such

media facilities' in connection with =publicinformation campaigns and forums amongcandidates>.

2. The technical effect of rt !F8C'& of the Constitutionmay be seen to be that no presumption of inalidityarise in respect of e/ercises of superisory oregulatory authority on the part of the COM656C fothe purpose of securing equal opportunity amongcandidates for political office' although suchsuperision or regulation may result in somelimitation of the rights of free speech and freepress. ?or superision or regulation of theoperations of media enterprises is scarcelyinconceiable without accompanying limitationThus' the applicable rule is the general timehonored one8 that a statute is presumed to beconstitutional and that the party asserting itsunconstitutionality must discharge the burden oclearly and conincingly proing that assertion.

. The assailed proision is limited in the duration of itsapplicability and enforceability in time to electionperiod.

4. !t is limited in scope of application. !t applied only tosale and purchase' and donation of print space oairtime for campaign and other report ocommentary or other coerage that' in responsiblemedia: is not paid for by candidates adertisementsof particular candidates.

. !t does not limit the right of free speech and o

access to mass media of the candidatesthemseles. The limitation howeer' bears a cleaand reasonable connection with the constitutionaobjectie. ?or it is precisely in the unlimitedpurchase of print space and radio and teleisiontime that the resources of the financially affluencandidates are li,ely to ma,e a crucial difference.

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. VS CAPULON or any iolation of any right topriacy that priate respondent could lawfully assert.

EASTERN BROADCASTIN< CORP. DYRE VS HON.DANS: R

1? SCRA =28

Fact! The petition was filed to compel the respondents tore8open the radio station 4HR6 which had been summarilyclosed on the ground of national security. The petitionercontends that it was denied due process when the radiostation was closed based on the mere allegation that itwas used to incite people to sedition. No hearing and

action were ta,en on the petitioner:s motion forreconsideration. The petition also raises the issue offreedom of speech. Before the court could promulgate adecision' the petitioner withdraw his petition since theradio station had already been sold.

H#+(!Considering that the case has become moot andacademic' the petitioners motion to withdraw or dismissthe petition is


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H#+(! The $hilippine 5egislature has delegated thee/ercise of police power to the Municipal Board of the Cityof Manila' which according to "ec. *&&& of the

dministratie Code has the following powers' amongothers' is to regulate the use of streets' aenues' par,s'cemeteries and other public places and to enact

ordinances it may deem necessary.The "upreme Court rejected the Mayor:s

argument noting that the condition of Manila at that timedid not justify the mayor:s fears. The power of localofficials is only one of regulation and not prohibition. Thesaid proision odes not confer the Mayor the power torefuse to grant the permit' but only the discretion in issuingthe permit to determine or specify the streets or publicplaces where the parade or procession may pass or themeeting may be held. They cannot bar the use of publicplaces for lawful assemblies.

NON VS DAMES II18 SCRA 2

Fact!$etitioner urge the Court en Banc to reiew andreerse the doctrine laid down in &lcuaz ) *S+& 11S"& ,to the effect that a college student' once admittedby the school' is considered enrolled only for onesemester and hence' may be refused readmission afterthe semester is oer' as the contract between the studentand the school is deemed terminated.

$etitioners' students in priate respondent MabiniColleges' !nc. in 4aet' Camarines Norte' were not allowedto re8enrol by the school for the academic year #;++8#;+;for leading or participating in student mass actions againstthe school in the preceding semester. The subject of theprotest is not' howeer' made clear in the pleadings.

Ipholding the primacy of freedom of e/pressionbecause the students do not shed their constitutionallyprotected right at the schoolgate.

H#+(! The Court in lcua-' anchored its decision on the=termination of contract> theory. But it must be repeatedlyemphasi-ed that the contract between the school and thestudent is not ordinary contract. !t is imbued with publicinterest' considering the high priority gien by theConstitution to educate and the grant to the "tate ofsuperisory and regulatory powers oer all educationalinstitutions 2"ee rt. F!D' "ec. #8*' &2#3

Respondent school cannot justify its actions byrelying on $ar. #A1 of the manual of regulations for priateschools' which proides that =when a student registers in a

school' it is understood that he is enrolling for the entiresemester for collegiate courses'> which the Court in lcua-construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to astudent on the ground that his contract' which has a termof one semester' has already e/pired.

The =termination of contract> theory does not eenfind support in the Manual par. #A1 merely clarifies that acollege student enrolls for the entire semester. !t seres toprotect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paidon a installment basis. Thus' een if a student does notcomplete the semester for which he was enrolled' but hasstayed on for more than two wee,s' he may required topay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he isgien his credentials for transfer.

On the other hand' it does not appear that the

petitioners were afforded due process' in the mannere/pressed in . 0ith those funds' the waitingshed was constructed and the wooden image wasacquired.

The image was temporarily places in the altar ofthe Catholic Church of Barangay Dalencia. controersyarose after the mass when the parish priest refused toreturn the image to the barangay council.

repliin case was filed against the priest. !n hisanswer to the complaint' he assailed the constitutionalityof the said resolutions.

I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t t$# %#&+"t)&' *)&+at#( t$#c&'t)t"t)&'a+ %&*))&' %&$)5)t)' t$# "# &, "5+)c,"'( ,&% %#+))&" "%.

H#+(! No. The questioned resolutions do not directly oindirectly establish any religion' nor abridge religiousliberty nor appropriate public money or property for thebenefit of any religious sect' priest or clergyman. The

image was purchased with priate funds' not with ta/money. The construction of awaiting shed is entirely asecular matter.

The wooden image was purchased in connectionwith the celebration of the barrio first honoring the patronsaint' "an Dicente ?errer' and not for the purpose ofaoring any religion nor interfering with religious mattersor the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of thehighlights of the fiesta was the mass' consequently' theimage of the patron saint had to be placed in the churchwhen the mass celebrated.

The barangay council' as owner of the image hasthe right to determine who should hae custody thereof.

EBRALINA< VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OFSCHOOLS OF CEBU

219 SCRA 2=

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were members of the =@ehoah:s 0itnesses> whichteaches their children not to salute the flag' sing thenational anthem and recite the patriotic pledge for theybeliee that those are acts of worship or religious deotion.

I"#! W$#t$#% &% '&t t$# c$)+(%#' 7a6 5# ##++#(

,%&7 c$&&+ "5+)c a'( %)*at# ,&% %#,")': &'acc&"'t &, t$#)% %#+))&" 5#+)#, t& ta@# a%t )' t$#,+a c#%#7&'6.

H#+(!@ehoah:s 0itnesses are accorded e/emption to theobserance of flag ceremony in deference to their religiousbeliefs but said right not to participate does not gie themthe right to disrupt such patriotic e/ercises.

Their e/pulsion will iolate their right as $hil.Citi-ens under the #;+1 Constitution' to receie education'for it is the duty to protect and promote the right of allciti-ens to quality education and to ma,e such educationaccessible to all. 2"ec. #' rt. F!D3

Compulsion to obsere the flag salute law on painof dismissal from one:s job or e/pulsion from school is

alien to the conscience of present generation of ?ilipinos'being iolatie of their constitutional right to free speechand free e/ercise of religious profession and worship.

PAMIL VS TELERON8= SCRA 41

Fact! $riate Respondent ?ather Margarito R.


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I"#! Ma6 t$# %)$t t& t%a*#+ 5# )7a)%#(

H#+(! H6". rt. !!!' "ec % of the #;+1 Constitution shouldbe interpreted to mean that while the liberty of trael maybe impaired een without Court order the appropriate

e/ecutie officers or administratie authorities are notarmed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. Theycan impose limits only on the basis of =national security'public safety or public health> and =as may be proided bylaw>' a limited phrase which did not appear in the #;1Ate/t.

rticle !!!' sec. % of the #;+1 Constitution should byno means be construed as delimiting the inherent power ofthe courts to use all means necessary to carry their ordersinto effect in criminal cases pending before them.

The conditions of bail imposed upon an accused toma,e himself aailable at all times wheneer the courtrequires his presence operates as a alid restriction of hisright to trael. n accused on bail may be re8arrestedwithout the necessity of the warrants if he attempts to

depart from the $hilippine without prior permission of theCourt where the case is pending.

7olding an accused in a criminal case within thereach of the Courts by preenting his departure from the$hilippine must be considered as a alid restriction on hisright to trael so that he may dealt with in accordance withlaw.

SANTIA. Meanwhile' in aresolution of "andiganbayan issued a hold departure orderagainst petitioner by reason of the announcement madeby petitioner' which was publici-ed in both print andbroadcast media' that she would be leaing for the Inited"tates to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the@ohn ?. ennedy school of goernment at 7arardIniersity' hence' this =Motion to Restrain the"andiganbayan from enforcing its 7old 4eparture Orderwith prayer for the issuance of a TRO and9of $reliminary

!njunction>.

I"#!1. 0ON the hold departure order iolates her right to

due process' right to trael and freedom of speech.2. 0ON under the #;+1 Constitution' courts can impair

the right to trael only on grounds of =national security'public safety or public health>.

HELD!#. No. !t is aerred that the hold departure order was

issued without notice and hearing because of the factthat there was no showing that a motion to issue ahold departure order was filed by the "andiganbayan.$etitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers whichmay be said to be implied from a general grant of

jurisdiction' in addition to those e/pressly conferred onthem court has the inherent power to ma,e interlocutory

the hold departure order is but an e/ercise of respondencourt:s inherent power to presere and maintain theeffectieness of its jurisdiction oer the case and theperson of the accused.

*. No. !n the more recent case of Silverio ) ".&' it was

held that rt. !!!' "ec. % of the #;+1 Constitutionshould be interpreted to mean that while the liberty oftrael may be impaired or administratie authoritiesare not armed with arbitrary discretion to imposelimitations. They can impose limits only on the basisof =national security. $ublic safety and public healthand =as may be proided by law>. rt !!!' "ec.% shouldby no means be construed as delimiting the inherentpower of the courts to use all means necessary tocarry their power of the effect in criminal casespending before them. 0hen by law jurisdiction isconferred on a Court or @udicial Officer' all au/iliarywrits' processes and other means necessary to carryit into effect may be employed by such court or officer

ART. III: SEC ?RI


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as the repository of all "tate power. On the issue ofpriacy there can be no doubt that the right to priacybelongs to the indiidual in his priate capacity' and not topublic and goernmental agencies li,e the


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Fact! Ortigas Co.' plaintiff' sold two parcels of land oninstallments to $adilla who later on transferred their rightsand interest to Chae-. The agreements of sale containedstipulation' among others that the parcel of land =shall beused by the buyer e/clusiely for residential purposes>"uch stipulation was annotated in the TCTs. The parcels

of land were eentually sold to ?6T! Ban,' who beganconstructing of the commercial building. The latter refusedto comply with the demand' contending that the buildingwas being constructed in accordance with the MunicipalResolution No. *1' -oning regulations which declared thearea a commercial and industrial -one. $laintiff filedcomplaint see,ing for the issuance of writ of preliminaryinjunction praying' among others' that the defendantobsere and comply with the building restrictionsannotated in the TCT. Trial court dismissed the complaint.

I"#! WON the resolution of the Municipal Council ofMandaluyong declaring the parcels of land' among others'as part of the commercial and industrial -one of themunicipality preailed oer the building restrictions

imposed by the plaintiff on the lots in question

H#+(!0ith regard to the contention that the said resolutioncannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed by thedefendant8 referring to the restriction incorporated in thedeed of sale and later in the corresponding TCT issued todefendant it should be stressed that' while non8impairmentof contracts is constitutionally guaranteed' the rule is notabsolute' since it has to be reconciled with the legitimatee/ercise of police power. "uch power is superior tocontractual stipulations between parties on the use oflands sold by subdiisions een if said conditions areannotated in the Torrens Title.

ART. III: SEC 12CUSTODIAL INVESTI


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after its filing he loses the right to remain counsel and tocounsel. !f we follow the theory of the trial court' then thepolice authorities and other law enforcement agencieswould hae a heyday in e/tracting confessions oradmissions from the accused persons after they had beenarrested but before they are arraigned because at such

stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled tothe enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel.The accused in this case was not een told of any of hisconstitutional rights. The statement was also ta,en in theabsence of counsel. "uch uncounselled "" is whollyinadmissible pursuant to "ec. #* 2A3 rt !!! of theConstitution.

PEOPLE VS A


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AN ACT DEFININ< CERTAIN RI


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spiritual needs' at any hour of the day or' in urgent cases'of the right shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of notless than four 2&3 years nor more than si/ 2%3 years and afine of ?our Thousand pesos 2$&'))).))3

The proisions of the aboe section

notwithstanding' any security officer with custodialresponsibility oer any detainee or prisoner may underta,esuch reasonable measures as may be necessary tosecure his safety and preent his escape.

S#ct)&' . epealing "lauseKRepublic ct No. +(1' asamended' is hereby repealed. Other laws' presidentialdecrees' e/ecutie orders or rules and regulations' orparts thereof inconsistent with the proision of this ct arerepealed or modified accordingly.

S#ct)&' =. $ffectivityKThis ct shall ta,e effect 2#(3 fifteendays following its publication in the fficial 2azette or inany daily newspaper of general circulation in the

$hilippines.

pproed. pril *1'#;;*.

ART. III: SEC 1RI


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I"#! WON t$# )'t#%,#%#'c# a'( %#"%# &, t$#P%#)(#'t *)&+at)*# &, ("# %&c# a'( %#*#'t#( a,a)% a'( )7a%t)a+ t%)a+.

H#+(!The fact of the secrete Malacanang conference of@an. #)' #;+( at which the authoritarian $resident

discussed with the $residing @ustice of the "andiganbayanand the entire prosecution panel the matter of theimminent filing of the criminal charges against all *%accuses 2as admitted by respondent @ustice ?ernande- tohae been confirmed by him to the then $resident:s=Coordinator> Manuel 5a-aro on the proceeding day3 is notdenied. This illegality itiated from the ery beginning allproceedings in the "andiganbayan court healed by theery $residing @ustice who attended. s the commissionnoted =The ery acts of being summoned to Malacanangand their ready acquiescence thereto under thecircumstances then obtaining' are in themseles pressuredramati-ed and e/emplified.> Derily' it can be said that anyaowal of independent action or resistance to presidentialpressure became illusory from the ery moment they

stepped inside Malacanang $alace on @an. #)' #;+(.

No court whose presiding justice has receied=orders or suggestions> from the $resident who by anamendatory decree made it possible to refer the cases tothe "andiganbayan can be an impartial court' which is theery essence of due process of law. @urisdiction oercases should be determined by law' and not bypreselection of the e/ecutie' which could be much tooeasily transformed into a means of predetermining theoutcome of indiidual cases. This criminal collusion as tothe handling and treatment of the cases by publicrespoindents at the secret Malacanang conference 2andreealed only after #( months by @ustice 7errera3

completely disqualified respondent "andiganbayan andoided ab initio its erdict.

1


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PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

PEOPLE VS DRAMAYO42 SCRA 9

Fact! The accused8appellants' 4ramayo andCarbin were charged and conicted by the crimeof murder. !n their appeal' accused appellantsclaim that there is an absence of eidencesufficient to conict and that there is a reasonabledoubt to be implied from the fact that whileconspiracy was alleged' only two of the seenaccused were held culpable.

I"#! WON %&&, 5#6&'( %#a&'a5+# (&"5t )'##(#( t& &*#%c&7# %#"7t)&' &,)''&c#'c#.

H#+(! ccusation is not' according to thefundamental law' synonymous with guilt. !t isincumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate theculpability lies. ppellants were not een calledupon then to offer eidence on their behalf. Theirfreedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum ofproof necessary for coniction be in e/istence.Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonabledoubt. To such a standard this court has alwaysbeen committed. There is need' therefore' for themost careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state'both oral and documentary independently ofwhateer defense is offered by the accused. Onlyif the judge below and the appellate tribunal could

arrie at a conclusion that the crime had beencommitted precisely by the person on trial undersuch an e/acting test should be sentence be oneof coniction. The conscience must be satisfiedthat on the defendant could be laid theresponsibility for the offense charged' that notonly did he perpetrate the act but that it mountedto a crime. 0hat is required then is moralcertainly. !n the case at bar' the presumption ofinnocence could not come to their rescue as itwas more than sufficiently oercome by the proofthat was by the prosecution.

RI


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I"#! Wa t$#%# a *)&+at)&' &, #t)t)&'#%a5&*# 7#'t)&'#( %)$t

H#+(! !t is obious that the inestigationconducted by the petitioner was not a contract.Neither was if a transaction because this term is

analogous to the former term. transaction' li,e acontract' is one which inoles someconsideration' li,e a credit transaction' and thiselement is absent in the inestigation conductedby the petitioner' thus he cannot be liable foriolation of the nti8


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and suspended all proceedings until the return ofthe accused.

I"#! Wa t$# &%(#% &, t$# "(# %%

H#+(!No. The old case of $eople D ancena

has been modified by "ec. #; of rt. !D of the#;1A Constitution which now allows trial inabsentia. Now' the prisoner cannot by simplyescaping thwart his continued prosecution andpossibly eentual proided only that a3 he hasbeen arraigned b3 he has been duly modified ofthe trial' and c3 his failure to appear is unjustified.The purpose of this rule is to speed up thedisposition of criminal cases' trial of which in thepast be indefinitely deferred' and many timescompletely abandoned' because of defendant:sescape. The old case of $eople D ancena hasbeen modified. The right to present at one:s trialmay now be waied e/cept only at that stagewhere the prosecution intends to presentwitnesses who will identify the accused. Thedefendant:s escape will be considered as awaier of his right about the inability of the courtto notify him of the subsequent hearings will notpreent it from continuing with his trial he will bedeemed to hae receied due notice. The samefact of his escape will ma,e his failure to appearunjustified.

$repared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION ChiefMARILOU LINDA ssistant ChiefCATHY AUINO MembersMAY

AUINO: ERRI/A BUCU: MARICAR DELA CRU/: ;ATHREEN

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