big pharma uncertain future

ONLINE NOVEMBER 23, 2011

strategy+business

Big Pharma’sUncertain FutureThe business model that drove the major drugmakers’ successisn’t working anymore, and their very future is in doubt. Thesurvivors will be those that make smart strategic bets supportedby winning capabilities.

BY ALEX KANDYBIN AND VESSELA GENOVA

www.strategy-business.com

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In the pharmaceutical industry, nothing is quite asexciting as a new molecule in the pipeline — espe-cially one that has a chance of solving some major

human health problem. In the last few decades, pharmacompanies have consistently developed and launchednew proprietary drugs, bringing hope to sick or at-riskpatients, and providing enviable financial returns for thecompanies’ shareholders. Indeed, global pharmaceuticalcompanies have been built around the idea of discover-ing blockbuster drugs that solve medical problems com-mon to tens of millions of people. They have supportedthat approach with huge investments in their innova-tion programs and marketing and sales operations.

But the era of the blockbuster drug is nearing anend. In the U.S. alone, branded pharmaceuticalsaccounting for some US$120 billion in annual revenues(including Lipitor, Zyprexa, Plavix, and Seroquel) willbe coming off patent in the next few years, opening theway to generics and eroding a major source of the indus-try’s profits. To be sure, there is still plenty of room forimprovement in the medications people take, and noshortage of human suffering to alleviate. But it is doubt-ful whether big pharmaceutical companies will be ableto pursue these goals within the old model of develop-ing exclusive new pills that they can sell under patentprotection. For one thing, pharma companies in thepast were able to develop drugs for health problems that

had never before been addressed. When anti-cholesteroldrugs were first launched, for example, they createdentirely new, multibillion-dollar markets. Today, in con-trast, few such unaddressed categories remain, meaningmost newly developed drugs will be competing withexisting ones.

In addition, the pharma companies are feeling pres-sure from every direction — from regulators setting therules for drug effectiveness and safety, from managedcare organizations and employers pushing back on pre-scription-drug costs and reimbursement, from competi-tors coming to market with alternative brands orgenerics, and from disgruntled shareholders. Internally,the number of molecules in pharmaceutical companypipelines is shrinking, and the risk/reward ratio forresearch and development outlays is worsening. Overall,these trends have resulted in lower revenue, reducedprofitability, and declining P/E valuation ratios for mostmajor pharmaceutical companies.

The question, however, is more fundamental thanwhat pharma companies will do for an encore in thepost-blockbuster era: The question is whether they cansurvive at all in their present form. There is no consen-sus about what comes next, as evidenced by the differ-ent strategic moves the major companies have madewith mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures in recentyears. A few have chosen to double down on branded

Big Pharma’s Uncertain FutureThe business model that drove the major drugmakers’ success isn’t workinganymore, and their very future is in doubt. The survivors will be those thatmake smart strategic bets supported by winning capabilities.

by Alex Kandybin and Vessela Genova

pharmaceuticals, betting that the bad times won’tlast and that by adding new therapeutic areas or becom-ing more adept at using technology they can continueto generate large profits from formulations they ownexclusively. Many others are looking elsewhere, andhave expanded into such sectors as diagnostics, con-sumer health, generic drugs, biosimilars, nutrition, andwellness.

“I don’t think there’s been a time in recent historywhere the industry has had a more divergent approachto the future,” says Cavan Redmond, group president ofcorporate strategy at Pfizer Inc. “It means that we’ll havedifferent ways of dealing with healthcare, especially onthe pharmaceutical side, and less homogeneity.”

The next decade for the pharmaceutical industry isshaping up to be not only a period in which the leadingcompanies don’t know what’s going to happen, but onein which they can’t know what’s going to happen,because so many of the conditions under which theyoperate are in such an unusual state of flux.

None of the new businesses into which the phar-maceutical companies are expanding have the samemargins as branded drugs, and that raises doubts aboutwhether pharmaceutical companies will be able tomaintain their past levels of profitability. (See Exhibit1.) “Some will, some won’t, because there won’t be as biga proprietary market to go around in the near term,”says Miles D. White, the chief executive of AbbottLaboratories, which is in the process of separating intotwo companies, one focused on diagnostics and medicaldevices, the other on prescription drugs.

To survive — and perhaps thrive — in this unpre-dictable future, pharmaceutical companies need tomake some bets about the way the future of the indus-

try will unfold, and design their diversification strategiesto position them for success in one or more of the sce-narios they envision. We think these need to be strategicbets, which mesh with the companies’ key capabilitiessystems — the things each company does with distinc-tion that provide its competitive advantage. We recom-mend that companies begin that journey with afive-step process for identifying the best opportunities.

Multiple UnknownsJust how uncertain a time has Big Pharma entered?Consider a balloon in different weather conditions.Release the balloon into a light sea breeze, and it may

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Alex [email protected] a partner with Booz &Company in New York whoworks with clients in theconsumer healthcare and lifesciences industries to developstrategies and capabilities thathelp them achieve competitiveadvantage.

Vessela [email protected] a senior associate with Booz& Company in New York. Sheworks with clients in theconsumer healthcare, lifesciences, and media industriesto help them developcapabilities-driven strategiesto grow competitively and enterglobal markets.

Also contributing to this articlewas consulting editor RobertHertzberg.


Exhibit 1: Less Attractive Margins

Pharmaceuticals

Biologics

Devices/Diagnostics

Consumer Healthcare/OTC

Animal Health

Generics

Services

Drug Wholesalers

29%

25%

22%

20%

17%

12%

8%

2%

Average Operating Margin

Source: “Mapping the Healthcare Landscape: Bringing Pharmaceuticals into Focus,”Datamonitor, November 2009

Pharmaceutical firms looking to move into adjacent businesses will needto accept lower levels of profitability.


bounce a little from side to side, but it will inevitablyand predictably fly in the direction of the wind. Repeatthis experiment and the results will be almost identicalto those of the first try. This is an example of a deter-ministic process, meaning you can predict the balloon’sbehavior and ultimate location with a high degree ofaccuracy by knowing its aerodynamics and the speedand direction of the wind.

Now try to predict what will happen with a balloonin an unstable weather condition like a tornado, withthe wind gusting in different directions. Even if you lettwo balloons go at the same time, they will end up intotally different places. You can’t predict the outcome ofthis experiment any more than you could predict thatDorothy and Toto would end up in a brilliantly colorfulplace called Oz. A balloon in a tornado is an example ofa stochastic process — the outcome is inherently unpre-dictable.

Most industries go through periods of both deter-ministic and stochastic development. For instance, thecomputer industry in the 1960s and ’70s had all thecharacteristics of a deterministic process. IBM,Burroughs, Cray, and others pursued similar strategies,selling giant data processing machines known as main-frames. The personal computer changed the dynamicsof the industry, triggering a turbulent stochastic period.It became impossible to predict where the computerindustry was going, and in the early 1980s the incum-bent players’ strategies diverged significantly. Some bet

that the old mainframe paradigm would prevail; othersexpanded to new product and service areas. The out-come was stark: Many companies didn’t survive (case inpoint: Cray), and others (such as IBM) survived only bymaking significant changes to their business models andproduct portfolios.

After years of steady and predictable growth, thepharmaceutical industry is entering a stochastic periodof its own. That pharmaceutical companies have diver-gent views of how the future will evolve is evident inwhat they’ve done in the area of mergers and acquisi-tions. On an aggregate basis, M&A activity involvingthe 10 largest pharmaceutical companies looks prettychaotic — no clear pattern is visible in their behaviorfrom 2004 through 2010. (See Exhibits 2 and 3.)Capital transactions in animal health, consumer health,devices, generic drugs, and branded pharmaceuticals allaccounted for tens of billions of dollars in acquisitions,divestitures, or both. The one exception is biologics, atype of medicine that everyone seems to agree will beimportant in the future.

When you look at M&A activity on an individualcompany basis, however, the pharma companies’ behav-ior looks considerably less chaotic. Most of them haveused deals to narrow their focus to two or three areasbesides core pharmaceuticals and biologics. (See Exhibit4). The other focuses they’ve selected are the result of anassessment by each company of where it might succeed,and the amount of diversification it can support.

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Exhibit 2: Pharma Acquisitions, 2004–2010

Source: Capital IQ Database

Animal Health

Biologics

Biosimilars


Devices

Diagonostics

Generics

Nutrition/Wellness

Pharmaceuticals

Services

1

31

1

10

10

3

11

1

39

2

Number of Acquisitions

4,000

1,085

350

7,663

1,049

1,456

5,019

320

8,704

70

Average Size of Acquisition(US$ Millions)

4,000

33,620

350

76,629

10,493

4,367

55,210

320

339,442

140

Value of Acquisitions (US$ Millions)

Overall, the acquisition activity of pharmaceutical firms in recent years seems chaotic.

Value of Strategic BetsThe diversification moves that pharmaceutical compa-nies have made may look like they meet our definitionof strategic bets: Bets designed to position the companyfor success in one or more specific business scenarios,that are either aligned with the company’s existing keycapabilities systems or that include a plan for developingor acquiring other capabilities that will be needed forsuccess. Instead, in many cases, pharma companies seemto be merely adding new lines of business designed tobroaden their portfolios and reduce the volatility of rev-enue and earnings. “The baseline is they have to standalone,” says one pharmaceutical company CEO,describing his company’s diverse businesses, which hehas fine-tuned with the help of almost a dozen acquisi-tions in recent years. “I expect them to actually be ableto succeed independently of that extra opportunityafforded by some linkage” with other units, he says.

This is still the common mind-set in the industry,and the underlying assumption — that business unitsshould be managed separately, and their individual prof-its maximized — makes perfect sense in a deterministicenvironment. But in a stochastic environment, in whichno company can know how the future will evolve, webelieve this stand-alone pieces-of-a-portfolio approach isinsufficient to position a company to adapt successfully.This does not imply that diversification in a stand-alonebusiness cannot be successful. Often pharmaceuticalcompanies build successful businesses and create signif-

icant value by entering adjacent spaces. However, ifthese businesses are not linked with the core pharma-ceutical business, they won’t help the company prepare,or reposition itself, for the future. In such cases, it maymake sense to split the successful independent businessfrom the core pharmaceutical operation to realize thecreated value, as Abbott recently decided to do, splittingits drugs and medical products businesses into separatepublicly traded companies.

This is where the approach of strategic bets comesin. As we’re defining them, strategic bets give pharma-ceutical companies — or any company that finds itselfin a stochastic environment — flexibility in terms of thedirections in which they can move, and have implica-tions for the companies’ market positions, their operat-ing models, and the evolution of their capabilities.Without question, strategic bets should have the poten-tial to enhance the core drug business, the source ofevery pharmaceutical company’s greatest potential prof-its. However, implicit in the idea of a bet is that it maynot be a winner. This explains both why it is essential tomake several bets as opposed to banking on one, andwhy the company must be willing to move quickly,doubling down or lightening up, after it sees how thebet is faring.

A strategic bet begins with some hypotheses aboutthe future and an attempt by a pharmaceutical compa-ny to position itself to take advantage of that future.(See “Scenarios for Success.”) The hypothesis might be

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Exhibit 3: Pharma Divestitures, 2004–2010

Source: Capital IQ Database

Animal Health

Biologics


Devices

Diagonostics

Generics

Nutrition/Wellness

Pharmaceuticals

Services

Number of Divestitures

Companies have also been selectively divesting businesses as they reposition themselves for changing markets.

1

5

2

4

2

3

9

2

2

Value of Divestitures(US$ Millions)

13,250

590

3,614

1,128

713

485

8,245

3,025

2,300

Average Size of Divestitures(US$ Millions)

6,625

590

723

336

1,150

564

178

243

2,748

that disease management will gradually have less to dowith prescription drugs and physician oversight, insteadbecoming more the responsibility of the patient. In thatscenario, the company may want to have a consumerhealthcare business — not necessarily for the stand-alone profits the business can generate, but in the beliefthat a consumer healthcare unit will become an essentialpartner with pharmaceuticals in a changing disease-management landscape. If the scenario it has built about

the future comes true, the company will already havethe platform in place to make its overall business moresuccessful. If the scenario doesn’t materialize, the com-pany making the strategic bet can alter its treatment ofthe unit — managing it for profit or selling it off.

Another scenario might be that diagnostics will beamong the essential pieces of the pharmaceutical tool kitin the future, a way of identifying patients who can behelped by particular drugs (and patients who cannot)


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Scenarios forSuccessThe positioning needed for pharma-ceutical firms to succeed will evolvein ways that are still unknown. Somepossibilities:

Pharma + diagnostics. In thisscenario, the success of a company’spatented pharmaceutical businessdepends on its diagnostics business.The idea stems from the likelihoodthat payers and customers will even-tually reward proprietary and differ-entiated clinically effective diag-nostic services rather than simplypaying for readily available com-

modity services. In such a world, theability to stratify patient populationsvia diagnostics — to match the rightpatient with the right treatment atthe right dose — would create sig-nificant value and essentially enablea personalized approach to patientcare. In this case, pharma businesseswill derive significant advantagesfrom offering both diagnostics andmedicines. The diagnostics will alsogive drug companies better insightsabout what molecules to pursue.Human Genome Sciences Inc.’slupus medication Benlysta has bene-fited from patient stratification; earlytrials suggest Benlysta works wellwith certain patient populations, but

not with African-Americans, whohave a high incidence of the disease.

Pharma + consumer. This sce-nario assumes that a more holisticapproach to health — embracingsuch approaches as preventive medi-cine, wellness services, and nonpre-scription drugs to treat mildsymptoms or side effects — is hereto stay, and could both strengthen acompany’s prescription drug busi-ness and leverage that business’sresearch breakthroughs. The shifttoward consumer-centric healthcareis already reflected in some pharma-ceutical companies’ moves, such asSanofi’s effort to extend the life ofAllegra, an antihistamine, by selling

Exhibit 4: Investment Focus Areas

Source: Capital IQ Database, Booz & Company analysis

Abbott

AstraZeneca

Bayer

GlaxoSmithKline

Johnson & Johnson

Merck

Novartis

Pfizer

Roche

Sanofi

Animal Health Biologics Biosimilars

ConsumerHealthcare/

OTC Devices Diagnostics GenericsNutrition/Wellness

Pharma-ceuticals Services

Investment Focus Areas for Individual Companies, 2004–2010

When M&A is viewed on a per-company basis, the pharmaceutical companies’ strategies become more clear.

and helping scientists aggregate data much more quick-ly. If this scenario develops in such a way that diagnos-tics services become proprietary, highly differentiated,and profitable, it will be essential for major pharmaceu-tical companies to develop advanced diagnostics capa-bilities. In that scenario, the combination of thediagnostics and pharma businesses would become anessential way to improve R&D effectiveness and clinicaloutcomes of disease treatment, and could become aprofitable area of activity for the company. If, however,diagnostics becomes a commodity service offering thatis readily available from multiple third parties, it will notbe necessary to have these capabilities in-house, andexpansion in diagnostics may not be necessary.

To date, most of the shuffling of parts in the phar-maceutical industry has involved portfolio diversifica-tion, not strategic bets. Consider Johnson & Johnson.This company, which has more than $60 billion in rev-enue and more than 250 global subsidiaries, has tradi-tionally operated under the philosophy that businessunit autonomy is the best way to ensure good decisionmaking and accountability, and to drive financialresults. That philosophy has served it well in a deter-ministic environment. Recently, however, closer collab-oration between J&J’s diagnostics and pharmaceuticalbusinesses, as well as between its pharmaceutical andconsumers businesses, suggests that J&J may be reex-amining the strategic bets it is making to succeed in astochastic environment.

A few companies’ M&A moves certainly comeclose to meeting our definition of strategic bets. One isthe development of a generics business by Novartis AG,to coexist alongside a branded pharmaceutical businessthat has developed leading drugs in areas like heart dis-ease and cancer. “Fundamentally, we are pro-patent,”says Joseph Jimenez, chief executive of Novartis. “Butwe believe that when those patents expire, it is our obli-gation to offer low-cost, high-quality generics to helplower total healthcare costs.”

Another move that has the look of a strategic bet isthe focus on diagnostics at Roche Holding Ltd. In addi-tion to now representing more than a fifth of Roche’srevenue, Roche says, its diagnostics technology hasmade its core pharmaceutical business more successfulby identifying new therapeutic targets and screening outpoor drug candidates.

How Pharma Can Move ForwardStrategic bets in pharmaceuticals, as in any other indus-try, must take into account what a company alreadydoes well. In other words, the bets should leverage thecompany’s capabilities system, made up of the three to sixactivities that truly differentiate the company and allowit to compete effectively both in the market position ithas staked out and with the products and services in itsportfolio. In our experience, companies that exhibit ahigh degree of coherence in these three elements (theircapabilities system, market positioning, and product/

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it over the counter, and Pfizer Inc.’sreported interest in doing the samewith its cholesterol drug Lipitor.

A holistic consumer focus cantake forms other than over-the-counter versions of prescriptiondrugs. Consumer businesses bring aunique capability for understandingconsumers and their behavior, andthis understanding can significantlyimprove patient compliance. Forinstance, Novartis AG, in collabora-tion with several regional payors inEurope, is using new technologies toremotely monitor hypertensionpatients’ key health indicators. Byimproving compliance, Novartissays, it hopes to help improve

patient outcomes and drive downcosts.

Pure pharma + a focus on thera-

peutic areas. In this scenario, successis a matter of slowing the last fewyears’ decline in R&D productivity,and potentially reversing it.Companies looking to do this wouldconcentrate their capital on thera-peutic areas that offer the greatestchance for technical and commercialsuccess. That is what Novartis hasbeen doing in eye care; it purchasedAlcon, an eye care company for$51.6 billion in April 2011 and isnow a global leader. As the world’spopulation ages, Novartis sees eyedisease as an increasingly widespread

problem and therefore a lucrativearea of focus.

In general, Novartis has buckedthe trend toward declining R&Dproductivity. That has enabled it tocontinue to invest heavily in newdrug development. “We have a high-ly competitive and robust pipelinewith 63 NMEs [new molecular enti-ties], and higher success rates atevery stage of development than ourcompetitors,” says Chief ExecutiveJoseph Jimenez.

—A.K. and V.G

Pharma’sCommonCommitment toEmergingMarketsFor all the things that are unclearabout pharmaceutical companies,one thing is certain: More of theirfuture profits will come from emerg-ing markets.

To be sure, drug markets out-side North America and Europehave very different characteristics.For instance, in potentially hugepharmaceutical markets such asIndia and China, consumers aregravitating toward so-called brandedgenerics — generic versions of drugsthat are no longer patent protected

but that carry the imprimatur of atrusted manufacturer, such asGlaxoSmithKline PLC or AbbottLaboratories.

“It’s important for us to be inthe top five in branded generics insome emerging markets,” says MilesWhite, CEO of Abbott, who spear-headed the company's 2010 acquisi-tions in this area, of Solvay Phar-maceuticals and Piramal Healthcareof India, and who will cede the man-agement of them to another Abbottexecutive, Richard Gonzalez, whenAbbott's planned split becomeseffective in 2012. White adds thatAbbott’s investment in emergingmarkets is a long-term play, and thatit will take “a decade or two” forthose markets, as a whole, to “reacha scale and size” similar to that of theUnited States.

Novartis AG is building a vac-

cine plant in Brazil and a pharma-ceutical and generics plant in Russia,says its chief executive, JosephJimenez. In addition, the company issetting up a biomedical research cen-ter in China in the belief that localR&D work will give its scientistsbetter insights into local patientneeds.

“The incidence of chronic dis-eases like diabetes, obesity, and car-diovascular disease is rising dra-matically in China,” Jimenez says.“I’ve seen this firsthand from myown travels and talking with govern-ment officials.

“The work we’re doing inChina,” he adds, “is going to give usa strong lead in enabling us toaddress the population’s risingdemand for healthcare and signifi-cant unmet medical needs.”

—A.K. and V.G.

service portfolio) tend to thrive in their industry sector;companies that exhibit lower degrees of coherence tendto have trouble keeping up. Coherence is an especiallyimportant discipline in stochastic times, because with-out it, companies tend to make unrelated investmentsand spread themselves too thin. (See “The Right toWin,” by Cesare Mainardi with Art Kleiner, s+b, Winter2010.)

Hence, companies need to have the judgment tofocus their strategic bets on areas that use capabilitiesthat they already have — or that they could develop. Acompany that has a world-class system for communicat-ing with doctors, for example, would want to make surethat its strategic bets take advantage of that capability(the generic drug business as a strategic bet would ben-efit greatly from this capability). A company that hadworld-class expertise in cancer therapy, with its manychallenges, would want to make sure that its strategicbets took advantage of that expertise (as it might if thestrategic bet were a nutrition line optimized for theneeds of cancer patients). If a strategic bet suggests thatnew capabilities will be needed, they should be devel-oped or acquired in such a way that the company’s over-all capability system remains coherent. If the system is

not coherent, the strategic bet will have a high chanceof failure.

Identifying the right strategic bets should be thehighest strategic priority for the company, and the effortshould be led by the CEO or a committee that includesthe CEO, because in most cases these steps will lead toa different or substantially modified strategic directionfor the company. We suggest a five-step process:

1. Embrace change as inevitable. The current“blockbuster,” model, defined as relying on traditionalcapabilities, faces extinction. The issue here is changingthe mentality of senior management. For companieswhere this attitude prevails and new capabilities are notdeveloped, survival is a real question mark.

2. Develop a vision for several potential future sce-

narios. The stochastic environment and people’s inabil-ity to predict the future do not mean that everyoutcome is equally possible. A dynamic evaluation ofpotential future states (wargaming) can help companiesdevelop views of, for example, how disease managementwill evolve.

3. Understand the inherent capabilities that the com-

pany possesses. Although turbulent times bringinevitable change, and doing what you have always


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done is unlikely to be effective, it is vital to have a clearsense of what is differentiating about your capabilitiessystem. With this knowledge, a company can determinewhich new capabilities it should be adding.

4. Identify strategic bets that can position the compa-

ny as a winner. No matter which future scenario materi-alizes, companies need to determine the capability setsthat are required to win for each of the strategic betsand, most important, that will support the new strategicdirection.

5. Develop an organizational and businessmodel that

most effectively supports the new strategic direction and

identified coherent capability set. Companies need aplan for evolving their corporate culture, creating a newbusiness model and building new capabilities as futurescenarios unfold and the external environment changes.

Survival Comes FirstIf anything, the challenges that pharmaceutical compa-nies face seem to be mounting, especially in the U.S.,the biggest market for prescription drugs. Generics nowaccount for upward of three-quarters of all prescriptionsin the U.S., versus 56 percent in 2005. Pharmaceuticalcompanies have fewer resources, having shed 150,000jobs, many of them in sales. In the U.S., the Food andDrug Administration has become much more zealousabout safety. And some of the specialized drug treat-ments that are coming to market — priced at $30,000a year and higher — face resistance from insurers whoare questioning their value and refusing to pay.

Ticking off these challenges, Abbott CEO White,who has run the company for the last 12 years, and whowill head up the medical devices company once Abbott’ssplit is complete, says, “My sense is there are severalmodels that will ultimately succeed.”

And therein lies the opportunity. As industriesevolve, stochastic periods such as the one the pharma-ceutical industry is entering don’t last forever; determin-istic periods return, allowing companies to move awayfrom multiple strategic bets and pursue a new strategy.For pharmaceutical companies, the challenge will be tomake strategic bets both to survive today and to positionthemselves for the next period of deterministic growth.

By the time that happens, they’ll be very different com-panies than they are today. +

Resources

Matthew Herper, “Rallying Pharma’s Rebels,” Forbes, August 3, 2011,www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2011/08/03/rallying-pharmas-rebels/: Former executive at Eli Lilly and Company offers a blueprint forfixing the broken system of pharmaceutical industry R&D.

Paul Leinwand and Cesare Mainardi, The Essential Advantage: How to Winwith a Capabilities-Driven Strategy (Harvard Business Review Press, 2011):Why the most successful firms have a coherence premium — a tight matchbetween their strategic direction and the capabilities that make themunique.

Peter Loftus, “Pfizer Looks at Lipitor Over Counter,” Wall Street Journal,August 4, 2011: How the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has stoodin the way of allowing statins to be sold over the counter.

Eva Von Schaper, “Novartis’s Jimenez Has Blockbuster Plans for Diovanafter Patent Expires,” Bloomberg Businessweek, August 5, 2011,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-05/novartis-has-blockbuster-diovan-plans-after-patent-expires-1-.html: A discussion with the CEO ofNovartis on how the company is maneuvering to avoid having its best-sell-ing drug be destroyed by the expiration of its patent.

Duff Wilson, “Drug Firms Face Billions in Losses in ’11 as Patents End,”New York Times, March 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/business/07drug.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=pharmaceutical industry&st=cse:Why the scramble is on for pharmaceutical companies to reinvent them-selves and shed their dependence on blockbuster drugs.

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