big man infiltration: the cause of failed decentralization
TRANSCRIPT
Big Man Infiltration: The Cause of Failed Decentralization for Rural
Development in Papua New Guinea
by
BARCSON Benjamin Saimbel
DISSERTATION
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
International Development
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
NAGOYA UNIVERSITY
Approved by Dissertation Committee:
Wataru KUSAKA (Chairperson)
Yukiko NISHIKAWA
Yuzuru SHIMADA
Hideo YAMAGATA
Approved by GSID Committee: April 20, 2016
i
Acknowledgement ................................................................................
Table of Contents .................................................................................. i
List of Tables .................................................................................. v
List of Figures .................................................................................. vi
Abbreviations .................................................................................. viii
Chapter One: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1
1.1 - Study Background 1
1.2 - Research Objective 5
1.3 - Research Questions 6
1.4 - Hypothesis 6
1.5 - Methodology 7
1.6 - Scope and Limitations of Research 8
1.7 - Structure of Dissertation 8
Chapter Two: Literature Review ........................................................................... 11
2.1 - Introduction 11
2.2 - Decentralization 12
2.2.1 - Defining Decentralization 12
2.2.2 - Types of Decentralization 13
2.2.3 - Why Decentralization is Pursued 16
2.2.4 - The Link between Decentralization and Rural Development 20
2.2.5 - Prerequisites for Decentralization to Enable
Effective Rural Development 22
2.2.6 - Problems of Implementing Decentralization and
Rural Development 24
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2.2.7 - Theoretical Arguments for These Problems 33
2.3 - Considering Informal Institutions as an Impeding Factor 36
2.3.1 - The formal and the Informal 38
2.3.2 - The Influence of Informal Institutions upon Decentralization 39
2.3.3 - Patron Client Relations 40
2.3.4 - Midgals Weak State Impact 43
2.3.5 - The PNG Bigman System 45
2.4 - Proposed Argument 50
Chapter Three: Hijacking of the Decentralization process at the sub national
level by Bigman infiltration 52
3.1 - Country Background 52
3.1.1 - Geography and Demographics 52
3.1.2 - Brief Colonial History 53
3.1.3 - Culture, Way of Life and Economy 55
3.1.4 - System of Government 57
3.1.5 - Development Challenges in PNG 60
3.2 - Decentralization in PNG 63
3.2.1 – Phase I: Pre Independence Decentralization (1940 - 1977) 64
3.2.2 - The Emergence of Provincial Government System 68
3.2.3 - Objective and Structure of the System 73
3.2.4 - Conflict and Tension in the Provincial Government System 77
3.2.5 - Weakening of the System by Bigman Influence 78
3.3 - Electoral Politics in PNG 80
3.4 - The game, the players and the Bigman Impact on the System 84
3.5 - Removal of the Provincial Government System 91
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3.6 – Phase III : The 1995 Reforms - The Current system 93
3.6.1 - The District Tier 97
3.6.2 - Funding Arrangements 100
3.7 - Decentralization Conclusion 101
Chapter Four: Study Site Findings …........................................................................ 104
4 - Introduction 104
4.1 - Background of Study Site 104
4.2 - District Organization and Operation at Study Site 111
4.3 - Research Procedures in Study Site 114
4.4 - Findings in Study Site 116
4.5 - Problems from the Officials Perspective 126
4.6 - Analyzing the Problems from Decentralizations Perspective 131
4.6.1 - Weak Administrative Decentralization 132
4.6.2 - Weak Fiscal Decentralization 142
4.6.3 - Weak Political Decentralization 148
4.7 - Conclusion of Study Site Findings 156
Chapter Five: The Impact of Bigman infiltration on rural development at
the district level ........................................................................... 157
5.1 – Bigman Impact 157
5.2 - Bigman infiltration in PNGs Decentralization Process 168
5.3 - Conclusion of the Impact of the Bigman Infiltration on
Districts Rural Development 171
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Chapter Six: Conclusion ................................................................................. 172
6.1 - Purpose and Issues 172
6.2 - Key Findings 174
6.3 - Impact on Decentralization by Bigman values 175
6.4 - Policy Implications 176
6.5 - Future Research 178
v
List of Tables
Table 1: Types of Decentralization 14
Table 2: Approaches Undertaken 15
Table 3: Access and Reliability of Services Provided 124
Table 4: Participation and Accountability 125
Table 5: Categorizing the Problems 131
Table 6: Types of Funds Available to the LLG 143
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Local Government Discretion & Accountability Model 22
Figure 2: Patron Client Cluster & Patron Client Pyramid 41
Figure 3: Map of PNG 52
Figure 4: PNG Flag 52
Figure 5: Pre Independence Structure 67
Figure 6: The 1977 Provincial Government System 74
Figure 7: Increasing Number of Candidates Per Seat
from 1977 – 2012 83
Figure 8: 1995 OLPLLG Structure 94
Figure 9: The District Tier 98
Figure 10: Location of East Sepik Province in PNG 106
Figure 11: Location of study site in East Sepik Province 107
Figure 12: District Organization and Operation at Study Site 112
Figure 13: Access to Education Facilities 116
Figure 14: Reliability of Education Facilities 116
Figure 15: problems Identified (Education) 117
Figure 16: Access to State and Faith Based Health Facilities 118
Figure 17: Reliability of State Health Facility 118
Figure 18: Problems in State Health Facility 118
Figure 19: Reliability of Faith Based Facility 119
Figure 20: Problems in Faith Based facility 119
Figure 21: Access to Grid Electricity 120
Figure 22: Access to Piped Water 120
Figure 23: Local Economy Drivers 121
Figure 24: Problems faced in Local Economy 121
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Figure 25: Participation Level 122
Figure 26: Accountability Level 123
Figure 27: LLG & Ward Member Issues 127
Figure 28: District Officials Problems and Issues 128
viii
List of Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
AUSAID Australian Agency for International Development
BMS Bureau of Management Services
CPC Constitutional Planning Committee
DFID Department of International Development
DSIP District Service Improvement Program
FPTP First Past the Post
GOFORDEV Governance for Local Development Index
HEO Health Extension Officer
IIJICA Institute for International Cooperation Japan International Cooperation
Agency
JDPBPC Joint District Planning and Budget Priorities Committee
JPPBPC Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities Committee
LGC Local Government Council
LLG Local Level Government
LLGSIP Local Level Government Service Improvement Program
LPV Limited Preferential Voting
MP Member of Parliament
NCD National Capital District
NDB National Development Bank
OLPG Organic Law on Provincial Governments
OLPLLG Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government
OPV Optional Preferential Voting System
PNG Papua New Guinea
PNGDOE Papua New Guinea Department of Education
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PNGDOH Papua New Guinea Department of Health
PEC Provincial Executive Council
PSIP Provincial Service Improvement Program
SAGDPS Social Audit of Governance of Public Services
UNDP United Nations Development Program
1
Chapter One – Introduction
1.1 Study Background
In the course of this century, decentralization has become one of the most pursued
reforms in developing countries. It is estimated that more than 75 countries have undertaken
this reform process in search of ways to strengthen service delivery to their people (Ahmad et
al, 2005). Despite this, the reason behind decentralization's adoption into each country's
political and administrative machinery varies from political and economic reforms, to the
need for improving service delivery. On the other hand issues such as legitimizing the rule of
emerging revolutionists or a shift to democracy from authoritative states are also catalysts
that have prompted nations to undertake decentralization.
It has been argued that decentralization, through the allocation of levels of authority
to local tiers of government will strengthen good governance, increase local participation,
promote accountability and make local institutions more responsive to local needs and
demands (Rondinnelli and Nellis, 1986; Work, 2002). However, recent indicators in
developing countries that have carried out decentralization reforms, tend to show that the
outcomes hoped for from decentralization have not been forthcoming. Instead, those in rural
areas tend to have the poorest rural development outcomes, an indication that decentralization
2
has failed to deliver benefits to them. But results vary from country to country, which
suggests that there cannot be a one size fits all approach to decentralization. Rather, it must be
country specific, and fashioned to meet the particular problems of individual countries
(Litvack, Ahmad and Bird, 1998).
In the process of trying to understand the failures of decentralization in to address
rural development, numerous studies have been conducted in countries involved with
decentralization. Most studies have found that failures of decentralization are due to weak
institutional mechanisms such as: weak legislation, limited local powers, allocation of
functions without resources and the absence of other essential institutional elements that can
enable the institutional process of decentralization to function and work effectively. Besides
institutional mechanisms, other factors such as the capture of resources, by elites at the local
level and party alignments of sub-national politicians with national politicians have also been
raised as contributing factors to poor results from attempts to decentralize. Hence whilst
institutional mechanisms may prevent the implementation of decentralization, factors such as
political party alignment can also result in weakening implementation efforts. The capture of
resources by elites can take place when the power of local elites is strengthened by the
decentralization process. In the midst of this, weak institutional mechanisms become further
3
weakened by political interference or of local politics becomes dominated by local elites
with strong political links to metropolitan political parties.
Several studies have also suggested how decentralization could be best implemented.
One notable example is Falletti's Sequential Decentralization Theory. According to Falleti
(2004) decentralization is undertaken either from the national level or from the sub-national
or local level. In the former case Falletti stresses that administrative decentralization will
occur first, followed by fiscal and political decentralization. In this scenario, Falleti notes that
power granted to the sub-national level will be limited. In the second scenario, political
decentralization will occur first, followed by fiscal and then administrative decentralization.
In this case, Falletti argues that more power will be given to the sub-national levels. This is
because sub-national level politicians will be free from domination or manipulation as they
are locally elected and not appointed from the centre. As a result sub-national level politicians
are able to bargain more effectively for greater powers, and to demand faster fiscal
decentralization and eventually administrative decentralization. Falletti argues that the second
approach is better in in bringing about effective decentralization. The World Bank (2008) on
the other hand in its Local Governance Framework model says that a number of
preconditions are required to be in place, in order for effective outcomes to be delivered.
4
However the actual implementation and outcomes of decentralization can be very different
and a one size fits all approach will not work.
Most of the focus of studies of decentralization has been upon institutional
mechanisms and power arrangements and there has been a limited number of studies which
explain how informal institutions have influenced decentralization outcomes. A notable study
which does look at informal institutions is that of Migdal (1998) where he asserts that the
competition between formal and informal leaders will weaken a state if strong leaders are
reluctant to give up their powers. Migdal assumes that the position of strong local elites will
weaken formal institutions if tradeoffs have to be made between formal and the informal
leaders. However, Migdals tends to assume that there is an organized social order in every
traditional society. This leaves room to explore cases of those informal or customary groups
that operate outside the formal social order, such as the Bigman ‘system’ of PNG.
This study aims to contribute to studies of decentralization by making and
examination of the ability of informal or traditional forms of social order that operate outside
formal institutions to weaken the institutions involved in decentralization and to results in
poor rural development outcomes..
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1.2 Research Objective
The study looks at the impact of informal institutions upon a formal decentralization
process which is resulting in poor rural development outcomes. It presents a case study
from Papua New Guinea's (PNG).Firstly, it describes how customary leaders who achieve
status locally, who are known as ‘Bigmen’, have infiltrated formal institutions and have
weakened the formal decentralization process. Secondly, it examines how Bigman infiltration
has hindered the implementation of rural development promoted by decentralized institutions
by capturing resources and using them for their own purposes.
It is possible to argue that informal institutions and patron-client relationships are not
new to studies of decentralization. But is argued that PNG's case offers insights into the
infiltration of informal customary institutions into formal institutions. Unlike most informal
institutions in the world, PNG's informal system is very fluid and is different from local
strong man, landed elites, religious groups, dynastical rule or oligarchs. This study looks at
how the fluidity of the big man system has thrived despite the absence of Powerful groups
found elsewhere in the world binding them.
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1.3 Research Questions
Given this objective the study aims to answer three research questions;
1. Why is rural development in PNG stagnating under the current institutional structure
of decentralization?
2. Why has the Bigman politics been able to weaken institutional decentralization
structures at the sub-national level?
3. Why has Bigman politics prevented good rural development outcomes at the district
level in PNG?
It is hoped that through a deeper understanding of the reasons behind the failure of
decentralization in PNG to bring effective development to the rural majority will be brought
to light.
1.4 Hypothesis
The above sections have noted the assumption that weak decentralization outcomes
are due to institutional influences. The argument is put forward that informal institutions may
also be a major contributing factor to the weakening of formal decentralization institutions to
bring about rural development. Against this back ground this research proposes following
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hypothesis; weak rural development outcomes under the decentralization process in PNG are
the result of the influence of informal institutions (the big man system) weakening the formal
decentralization institutions, which has contributed to ineffective rural development outcomes.
Hence, the problems affecting the implementation process are not purely grounded in
institutional processes. Rather they go deeper and are the result of the Bigman system
weakening the formal institutional decentralization system and preventing it from functioning
effectively, as big man values take precedence over rural development outcomes.
1.5 Methodology
The study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative approaches and secondary
sources of data. A quantitative approach was used in a survey which used the Social Audit of
Governance and Delivery of Public Services (SAGDPS) from Pakistan and the Governance
for Local Development Index (GOFORDEV Index) from the Philippines (UNDP, 2009). The
SAGDPS was used because it provides a framework to assess service delivery in rural areas.
The GOFORDEV Index, complements this approach by the provision of key themes to assess
the services themselves. Using the data from these surveys the author creates a PNG Rural
Development Index with which to assess outcomes in the study area. The qualitative
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approach is followed with interviews with officials in the wards, district and provincial
headquarters to examine the problems from their perspective.
1.6 Scope and Limitations of Research
The main objective of this study is to look at how formal institutions have become
weakened by informal institutions leading to a hindering of effective rural development
outcomes. It was constrained by funding and time limitations. It was also handicapped by the
difficulty of obtaining up to date records, as the PNG bureaucracy has a very poor records
system in place. Some officials were also uncooperative. These handicaps are to a large
extent outcomes of the process being studied in which local Bigman and their clients in
formal institutions, kept very poor records and did not want anyone investigating their
activities. Despite these difficulties, the study has managed to achieve its main objectives.
1.7 Structure of Dissertation
Chapter one introduces the topic, and how the study was undertaken. Chapter two
reviews theoretical literature on decentralization and the main challenges facing
decentralization. The failure of many studies to include informal groups infiltrating formal
9
institutions is discussed The chapter ends by presenting the framework to be used in the study.
In this framework the author shall take the view that the informal system of Bigman fluidity
has been able to weaken the formal decentralization process in PNG because of close
interlinking traditional ethnic ties and values operating in a environment with limited
opportunities which political groups have manipulated to serve their own ends, thereby
further weakening the decentralization process and affecting rural development.
Chapter three: Hijacking of Decentralization Process. The purpose of this chapter is
to to explain how Bigman politics weakened sub-national level institutions which led to the
centralization of power in the hands of national Members of Parliament (MPs) which enabled
them to dominate local elites in any political competition. The chapter begins with a general
background of PNG. It then goes on to examine the decentralization process in PNG and how
it has been hijacked and weakened by Bigman. At the same time the fluidity of the big man
system and how it has shaped the political atmosphere leading to political competition is
discussed here. Finally the chapter notes how this led to disintegration of the sub-national
level and how national MPs roles have become more dominant over local elites with the
emergence of political organizational reforms carried out in 1995 by national politicians.
Chapter Four: Study Findings and Analyses. The focus of this chapter is the
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outcomes of the case study surveys, the problems found and how they come about. .
Chapter Five describes how this situation impacts rural development at the district
level based on a case study of Dreikikir-Ambunti district. Falleti's theory is used to shows
that decentralization does not strengthen local elites like other cases, but has reinforced
national politicians’ roles over local elites due to the influence of Bigman influences in
politics. This has led to bad rural development outcomes Chapters four and five both aim to
answer the third research question.
Finally Chapter six concludes with a review of purpose, findings, policy implications
and room for further study and room for further study.
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Chapter Two - Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Most studies of decentralization have taken the view that decentralizations failures
are largely the result of institutional mechanisms. But this study takes the view that informal
institutions are also a significant factor in the weakening of formal decentralized institutions
and a contributing factor affecting rural development at the sub-national levels. Against this
backdrop the study seeks further to establish why informal institutions are able to do so in the
absence of strong ordered informal practices, such as strong man politics, religious affiliation
or landed elites which are often informal guidelines guiding informal system. Hence the study
looks at this perspective from the PNG case of the Bigman system. It is hoped that a better
understanding of the reasons behind poor rural development in PNG may be achieved which
could possibly lead to better policies being developed. Apart from this the study attempts to
contribute to the literature on how informal institutions can affect decentralization processes
in the absence of strong informal order. The literature review is therefore structured into three
sections; decentralization, informal institutions as impeding factors and the proposed
argument.
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2.2 Decentralization
2.2.1 Defining Decentralization
Decentralization is interpreted differently by different people and organizations.
According to Rondinelli (Conyers,1983:102) it is a transfer of "authority to plan, make
decisions and manage public functions" from the national level to any organization or agency
at the sub-national level. Turner and Hulme (1997:152) also define decentralization as "a
transfer of authority to perform some service to the public from an individual or an agency in
the central government to some other individual or an agency which is closer to public to be
served." Robertson Work (2002) on the other hand sees it as the transfer of responsibility for
planning, management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and
its agencies to lower levels of government. For the UNDP, (Work, 2002) decentralizing
governance is the restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility
between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels. Finally the World
Bank sees decentralization as the transfer of political, fiscal, and administrative powers to sub
national units of government (World Bank, 2000).
The common feature in all these definitions is the transfer of power; political, fiscal
or administrative, to lower levels of government. For this dissertation the definition offered
13
by Work (2002), the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising
and allocation to the lower levels of government seems to be the most appropriate because of
the nature of PNGs decentralization process.
2.2.2 Types of Decentralization
Decentralization as a process is not precise and clear cut, but involves many different
shades of differentiation depending on the regime and purpose of implementation. However
Work (2002) notes that there are three main forms; Political, Fiscal and Administrative.
Decentralization is usually undertaken or implemented via four approaches; deconcentration,
devolution, delegation and divestment, also known as privatization. Each differs in varying
degrees of autonomy dispersed, with devolution being very high. For instance; high degree of
fiscal devolution implies that there is a significant degree of autonomy (possibly, political and
administrative as well) to the lowers levels of government.
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Table1: Types of Decentralization
TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION
Political
Decentralization
The transfer of political power and authority from the central
government to the lower levels of government (sub-national). Obvious
examples of these are lower levels of representatives who are elected
and empowered. This may range from village councilors to regional
government officials.
Fiscal
Decentralization
The allocation and distribution of powers and functions over fiscal
matters to the lower levels of government from the central government.
This usually involves what revenue is retained or by the lower levels,
and may also enable them certain authority to raise loans. The most
significant element is the ability to raise their own revenue from taxes
and to make decisions on how to use it.
Administrative
Decentralization
The transfer of decision-making authority, resources and functions from
the central to lower levels of government (such as agencies and line
department offices) for the provision of certain services.
Deconcentration and Delegation are two notable forms of this.
Source: Created by Author from Robertson Work,20021
1Robertson Work,2002,Overview of Decentralization Worldwide: A Stepping Stone to improved Governance and
Human Development, 2nd International Conference on Decentralization, Federalism: The Future of
Decentralizing States? 25 - 27 July, Manila, Philippines
15
Table 2: Approaches Undertaken
APPROACHES UNDERTAKEN
Devolution
The transfer of authority, decision making, resources and revenue
generation to lower governments who be given considerable autonomy
from the central government except for matters of national interest.
Jurisdictions that elect their own representatives raise their own
revenue and possess considerable decision making autonomy, are
examples of devolved powers.
Deconcentration
The dispersal of responsibilities for certain services to sub-national
offices, while hierarchical authority and accountability of the central
government is maintained. No form of authority is actually transferred
to the lower levels.
Delegation
The distribution of authority and responsibility to local units of
government or semi-autonomous organizations which may not be
branches of the delegating authority. Some transfer of accountability
takes place but such bodies are still mostly accountable to the
delegating central authority
Divestment
The transfer of planning, administrative and other public functions
over to the private, non-governmental or voluntary institutions with
clear benefits to the public. Sometimes known as privatization. The
transfer of public sewage/electricity services from the state to the
corporate sector is an example of divestment.
Source: Created by Author from Robertson Work, 20022,
2Robertson Work, 2002,Overview of Decentralization Worldwide: A Stepping Stone to improved Governance
16
2.2.3 Why Decentralization is Pursued
Historically decentralization has undergone several phases and began as early as the
late 1800's (Arun Agrawal and Jesse C.Ribot,2002). During the mid-1900s there was an
upsurge in decentralization as the French and British colonial administrators began to prepare
their colonies for independence by slowly devolving responsibilities of certain programs over
to local authorities (Arun Agrawal and Jesse C. Ribot, 2002; Conyers,1983 and Futardo,2001).
The end of the post-colonial era gave rise to a lot of newly independent nations in the
developing world. These new nations were ambitious to demonstrate their new found
responsibilities and envisioned that they could deliver services more effectively to regional
areas which their colonizers had neglected (Conyers,1983 and Futardo,2001).
Decentralization was thus seen as a tool with which these objectives could be achieved.
In recent times decentralization has had different reasons for implementation..
Dominating issues such as good governance, increasing poverty and corruption began to
trouble the developing world, as the developing countries, most of which were former
and Human Development and Jenny Litvack, Junaid Ahmed and Richard Bird, 1998, Rethinking
Decentralization in Developing Countries, The World Bank Sector Study Series 2149
17
colonies, failed to achieve their post-colonial goals. Decentralization began to be seen as an
alternative mechanism with which such issues could be better addressed. The arguments put
forward by pro-decentralization advocates were several. Firstly, it was assumed that
decentralization would bring about increased efficiency. Secondly, it would make local
institutions more accountable. Thirdly, it would enable more participation by the citizenry at
the local level and fourthly, it would maintain national unity.
The decline of service delivery in many developing countries began to be viewed as
the inability of the central government to effectively deliver to its populace in remote
outlying rural areas.. Centrally planned efforts came to be seen as ineffective in the delivery
of services to regional and remote localities (Rondinnnelli and Ellis, 1986). This was the case
for Chile, Cote d' Ivoire, Bolivia and India where decentralization was aimed at addressing
the decline of basic social services(Ahmad et al, 2005; Faguet, 2006; Shubham Chauri,2006).
As a result decentralization of powers to local level tiers of government was envisioned to
increase its efficiency by bringing the authority closer to the people which would increase
government responsiveness and make it more efficient (Arun and Ribot, 2002; Omar ,
Kähkönen and Meagher, 2001;Treisman, 2000).This would also enable local governments to
accommodate to local needs and to customize services to local situations, unlike the central
18
government which was far from the scene and ignorant of such things (Brenton,1999).
It was also thought that decentralization would strengthen accountability because if
officials were closer to the citizens they would be more able to be held accountable for their
actions. The assumption was that since the duties and functions were with local officials, the
citizens could judge for themselves who was performing or where the problems lay
(Ahmad,et al , 2005; Zoe Scott, 2009). This would then force local officials to be more
accountable towards the citizens in their locality, as the people could identify who was the at
fault.
Since the centrally planned initiatives were deemed ineffective and unresponsive to
local needs, decentralization would also strengthen local participation. As the authorities
responsible were now closer to the people they would involve them in the decision making
process via local participation approaches (Brenton,1999; Arun and Ribot, 2002; Paul Smoke,
2003).
Maintaining national unity was also another factor for decentralization in states
where issues of secession and disunity persisted. This was the case in South Africa, Sri Lanka
and Indonesia where decentralization sought to address regional tensions and conflict
(Ahmad et al, 2005).The possibility of giving a certain degree of autonomy to control their
19
own affairs to people in such situations, was seen as a possible option to maintain national
unity. By devolving certain powers and functions to areas with high ethnic tensions and
enabling them to determine their own affairs, it was hoped to maintain harmony and political
unity(Pranab Bardhan, 2002; KatsiaouniOlympios,2003; Ahmad,et al,2005).
Finally the shift in political and economic systems were also motivating factors to
pursue decentralization. Evidence of these reasons can be seen in Eastern Europe, where the
countries emerging from the collapse of the former Soviet Union pursued decentralization as
part of the process to strengthen political institutions and economic reforms (Ahmad et al,
2005). China's decentralization was an attempt to strengthen the free market economy (Yifu,
Tao and Liu, 2006). Vietnam, Bolivia and Latin America offer further examples of shifts from
highly controlled, authoritarian regimes, to more democratic systems (Institute of Social
Studies, 2007; Baiocchi, 2006; Faguet, 2006). The Ugandan example on the other hand was
mostly an attempt to legitimize a military takeover by a revolutionary group; the National
Resistance Movement (Omar, Living stone and Meager, 2006).
Decentralization is thus driven by all sorts of including political and economic
transformation, transition to democracy, maintenance of national unity, improvement of
service delivery and legitimization of authoritarian rule. The World Bank argues that the real
20
reasons behinds decentralization reforms are most often politically motivated movements,
hidden under the guise of slogans like service delivery, national unity and local autonomy.
(The World Bank, 2008).
2.2.4 The Link Between Decentralization and Rural Development
Most developing countries implementing decentralization tend to have a large rural
based population. What then does rural development mean for such people. The Institute for
International Cooperation Japan International Cooperation Agency (IIJICA) notes that rural
development applies to more than developing the agriculture sector targets. It is the
development of "rural areas that includes health care, sanitation, social infrastructure
improvements and empowerment of community members"(IICJICA, 2004:5). To Chambers
(1983) "Rural development is a strategy to enable a specific group of people, poor rural
women and men, to gain for themselves and their children more of what they want and need.
It involves helping the poorest among those who seek livelihood in the rural area to demand
and control more of the benefits of development. This group includes small scale farmers,
tenants and the landless." (Chambers,1983:147)
Decentralization therefore very important for rural people because the local public
21
service is given direct responsibilities to look address their plight. of the way in which
decision making via public participation occurs, as well as the strengthening of local service
delivery and economic activity, now depends on the effectiveness of the local authorities. The
three elements of good governance noted by DFID (2006); Responsiveness, Capability and
Accountability are amplified in these setting and when applied correctly, the link between
decentralization and rural development becomes effective.
The challenge for the local government now becomes to effectively bring about rural
development. However, the Economic Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2000)
note that, simply establishing decentralization legislation is not enough. In order for the link
between decentralization and rural development to be strengthened, the rural people
themselves must be brought into the process. The link between decentralization and rural
development therefore can be seen in two of the main functions of local governments that
Kimura (2011) points out. These are, "local system/network for building local economic
development; and participation mechanism of citizens"(Kimura, 2011:220). The link between
decentralization and rural development is therefore unavoidable. Since decentralization is a
tool of the state to implement and rural development the end goal, both are strongly linked
together in the attempt to provide better services to the rural populace.
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2.2.5 Prerequisites for Decentralization to Enable Effective Rural Development
In order to achieve good rural development outcomes, numerous arguments have
been put forward as to how best decentralization is to be implemented. One of such notable
arguments offered, has been done so by the World Bank in their Local Government
Discretion and Accountability Model.
Figure 1: Local Government Discretion and Accountability Model
Source: The World Bank, 2007b3
3The World Bank, 2007b:5, Local Governance and Accountability: A Local Governance Framework, pp: 5
23
The Local Government Discretion and Accountability Model first of all, argues that
certain prerequisites need to be in place; political, administrative and fiscal, in order for
effective decentralization to be effective. Secondly, it notes that there are two sides involved;
officials (supply side) and citizens (demand side). Each side has to play their part, in order for
good local governance outcomes to be achieved under decentralization.
For this to be achieved, decentralization must have good political processes
(elections, party systems etc.,) and politics must be clearly separated from administration.
Administrative decentralization must also enable local tiers of government to possess
adequate decision making powers over their local affairs. This involves powers of
procurement, regulatory decision making and hiring and firing powers for staffing issues.
Finally, fiscal decentralization should enable local governments to have control over
expenditure, to have local revenue independence and for there to be reliable efficient
intergovernmental transfers.
From the officials side a high degree of accountability towards the people is required.
The people must actively participate in monitoring and evaluation processes of the local tiers
of government. The World Bank argues that if all these criteria are met, the outcome will be
good for decentralized institutions at the local tier in their pursuit of successful rural
24
development..
2.2.6 Problems of Implementing Decentralization and Rural Development
The prerequisites needed for effective outcomes from decentralization are well
known and widely accepted. But decentralization has faced numerous limitations to its
delivery of effective rural development. Many critics have noted that decentralization has
failed to produce satisfactory results in the developing world, such as in Africa, Colombia,
Brazil and West Bengal (Wunsch,2008;Craig , 2001; Katsiaouni,2003). The failures have
been blamed on a range of reasons from corruption to poor capacity. The most common
reasons cited are, weak local capacity, weak legislation, poor central-local relations,
geographic location (remoteness), weak accountability, information barriers, the capture of
resources by local elites, politicization of service delivery, limited local participation and
unsynchronized decentralization. The factors involve both controllable and uncontrollable
factors. For instance it has been noted that geographic factors of remoteness have been a
major issues and create barriers to effectively reaching out via the decentralization process to
the remote rural populace (Wunsch, 2008). The majority of the developing world possesses
very rough geographic terrain and populations are dispersed unevenly in often inaccessible
25
locations.
On the controllable side of things, key legislation is required to put into place that
define the essential parameters and ceilings to guide operations, to define power and fiscal
sharing arrangements, intergovernmental transfers and so forth. As noted by the World Bank
(2001) the success of decentralization depends upon the quality and effectiveness of the rules
and regulations under which decentralization is implemented. Unclear legislation or
regulations have been attributed to creating chaos, disharmony and duplication of tasks and
functions (Smoke, 2003).This has often led to the lower levels of government possessing
limited authority, and gives them no clear sense of direction. Secondly, poorly defined
legislation on departmental parameters and functions have resulted in creating administrative
dysfunction at the local level, rather than enhancing service delivery (Wunsch, 2008; Owusu,
2004). Fford's (2003) Analysis of Long An and Quang provinces in Vietnam offers a good
example. There weak legislation has not established a good legal framework for
decentralization. Hence when the lines are blurry for power separation, functions, duties and
responsibilities as well as linkage between local and national tiers, chaos sets in which can be
manipulated by elites. Given such circumstances Work (2002) argues that decentralization
should be undertaken with very clear guidelines which define precise roles for each
26
respective tier of government and the operational links between them. The case of Burkina
Faso offers an example of this where each level is clearly defined with clear linkages to all
tiers (Work, 2002).
Clear legislation also affects the nature of relations between the central government
and local levels as it defines how the institutions will operate at each level. The way
institutions operate together can either deter or promote decentralization efforts. When
decentralization efforts are based upon heavy centralized authority from a central government,
local tiers of government are constrained. Secondly, the type of relationship, if politicized or
poor, may result in local tiers being neglected. This is often the case and has been a major
factor behind weak decentralization in developing countries (Arun and Ribot, 2002; Pranab
2002; Oyugi,2000).
Effective decentralization requires resources; fiscal, administrative and infrastructure
to be adequately provided at each level of government. Most decentralization efforts make
the resources provided to lower levels dependent upon the central government (Awal,
2000).A World Bank report provides many examples in which intergovernmental transfer of
grants and funds to lower level governments are unreliable and controlled by central
governments (The World Bank, 2001).A specific example is Mexico where rural development
27
initiatives faced great obstacles due unreliability of funding from the higher tiers of authority
(Cabellero, 2006). Vietnam's case offers another example of where lower levels of
government were politically and fiscally reliant on the central government. Local council
candidates have to be approved by the provincial authority and not locally. Furthermore they
are also fiscally dependent on the central government and the fiscal allocation is largely
dictated from the province to the local level with no room for locals to maneuver in(Institute
of Social Studies, 2007).
On the other hand, a capacity (fiscal, human resource and equipment)is required by
local governments to implement things, as more powers, functions, duties and responsibilities.
The question of whether or not they are capable to effectively implement all their new duties
and functions is now drawn into light. Numerous commentators have noted that in most cases
the lower tiers, such as provincial, district and local governments do not possess the required
capacity and are in fact unable to perform their new functions and duties. This often results
from an unsynchronized devolution of powers where training does not precede the granting of
powers (Awal, 2000, Litvack et al, 1998; Smoke, 2003; The World Bank, 2008; George
Owusu, 2004; World Bank, 2001). Administrative functions may be diverged but without the
fiscal component, or political function diverged without administrative functions. This results
28
in poor implementation capacity. In the end projects, service delivery and other functions.
become difficult to implement and coordinate (Smoke, 2003).
Examples of these challenges can be seen in several countries. Pakistan's efforts
were hindered by weak local control over decision making and a high dependency on central
government funding (Keefer, Narayan and Vishwath, 2006). China also had problems with
high central control, compounded with unequal intergovernmental transfers, lack of local
accountability to local citizens by officials and corruption that accompanied the lack of local
accountability. South Africa faced the issue of unclear legislation over designated functions
and responsibilities, resulting in confusion of who was responsible for what. Political
appointees were also a significant problem that affected the process. Furthermore the unclear
formula of intergovernmental fiscal transfers based on legislation which was to promote an
"equitable share" was not properly clarified and led to underfunded functions and revenue
shortfalls (Writtenberg, 2006: 349). Citizen participation was also limited. Finally, functions
were devolved with not enough capacity to implement them
In Latin America, Brazil faced problems related to unequal funding arrangements
which put large municipalities at an advantage over smaller ones, in relation to taxable
revenue (Baiocchi, 2006). Given their plight the smaller municipalities tended to be more
29
dependent on central government. Likewise the case of unclear legislation was also noted
here in relation to health and other social services. In Bolivia setbacks were faced in capacity
and local revenue at the local level. A comparative study involving two towns in Bolivia
(ibid) also noted that geographic location may also matter when developing local economic
activity (Faquet, 2006). In Africa, Uganda faced the challenges of unclear separation of
powers, unreliable funding, politicization of personal positions, limited capacity to implement
functions and weak accountability at the local level. Education services were also greatly
affected in Uganda (Kayabe, Asiime and Nakanda, 2014).
Coming to Asia, a study looking at forest management and decentralization in India,
Nepal and Senegal (Arun and Ribot, 1999) noted several common features. Firstly, there
seemed to be a limits to the performance of duties and functions in Kuman, India and Terari,
Nepal. Secondly all three countries faced the prospect of limited accountability at the local
level. Thirdly, all three countries also had a high dependency on central government funding.
Finally, was the absence of local level participation and involvement at the local level which
was largely absent. These were seen as major impediments to the process.
Amidst these challenges local government units often are handicapped fiscally and
lack human resources in a number of areas. Firstly, is the fact that the lower levels of
30
government possess few sources of revenue. Their tax base is usually low and as a result they
are heavily reliant upon central government funding (Wunsch, 2008). Secondly, the lower
levels of government have very few qualified staff. This is largely due to things like poor
remuneration packages, poor service delivery at local levels, hostility of geographic
environment and other factors that make it unattractive for qualified officials (Owusu, 2004).
Finally there is the lack of effective physical and material resources such as good
infrastructure (roads and buildings) and equipment to support the lower tiers of government
in their functions (Work, 2002). South Africa offers an example into this aspect where the
educational sectors in the lower level governments faced immense problems to meet certain
targets due to limited capacity to implement programs (Litvack, et al, 1998).
Poorly skilled workers are also a major challenges at the lower tiers of government
and administration, as there is generally a poor understanding of the systems and process of
government by people in general, as well as by elected representatives and public officials
(Joop de Wit, 2007). As a result it is not understood how public officials and elected
representatives should operate or function. This tends to create distrust by the people towards
local leaders and public officials. Due to weak accountability structures in these lower tiers,
as most of them possess. Accountability mechanisms and practices are very weak. Distrust of
31
officials and local leaders comes about when coupled with the limited understanding of roles
and functions, poor service delivery results, conditions decline and people become aware that
local officials are ineffective service providers. This occurs partly because the effective
development of accountability structures is not achieved. This includes the failure to
disseminate information to local /leaders on their functions, duties and responsibilities,
especially on how money should be managed and accounted for. Negligence like this has
created an ignorant populace who often view the local officials as corrupt, thus the distrust
them and refuse to support government sponsored development activities (Litvack, et al,
1998; Oyugi,2000; Ruben and Zhuravskaya, 2006; Devas, 2005).
Another issue raised in these studies is the ability of local elites to capture state
resources for their own benefits when those powers and resources are devolved to the local
level (World Bank 2008).As result, local institutions and resources become avenues for
political manipulation and theft of funds, rather than effective method of service delivery
(Hossain, 2000). Yasin (2014) notes that in most developing countries it is the norm for local
institutions to become controlled and manipulated by a minority in power, at the expense of
the mass of the people. Yasin (2014) indicates this dilemma to be very much the case of most
African decentralization efforts.
32
Resource capture by elites however may be associated with class systems, caste,
social-economic inequalities such as educational differences, other traditional factors, or
simply pure greed (Johnson, 2001; Kwame Badu Antwi-Boasiako, 2010; Rondineli,
1990).Capture of resources often takes place in an environment where local participation is
limited. Hence despite the purpose of decentralization to bring about more participation and
accountability of the local citizens, capture of resources severely constrains popular
participation and local accountability (Joop de Wit, 2007; Awal, 2000; Smoke, 2003; Fforde,
2003). There is therefore a need to develop avenues for this at the local level to strengthen the
local institutions effectiveness (Yasin, 2014). The case of Luawaka, in Poland, offers an
insight into how effective participation can be. In the Luawaka case a committee consisting of
public, private and other interested persons was established. This committee managed to
work effectively with the people to develop initiatives which saw improvement in living
conditions and increased economic development (Work, 2002). Other examples of effective
participation come from Brazil and Colombia, where it has developed more effective
responses towards local problems. In Colombia the local people provide labor and some
materials for designated projects whilst the local authorities meet other parts of the cost
(Litvack, et al, 1998). In Brazil’s Porto Algere municipality, the concept of Participatory
33
Budgeting, is a case where local participation via meetings between citizens and local
authorities was able to swing funding towards socially needed amenities that the communities
needed rather than non-essential projects (Baiocchi, 2006).Other examples from Nicaragua,
Argentina and El Salvador illustrate how involvement from the community was able to
increase the test scores for students as participatory approaches were developed within the
education sector at the local level (The World Bank, 2008). Public participation and local
accountability can therefore produce effective results if they are properly integrated into the
decentralization process.
2.2.7 Theoretical Arguments for these Problems
Numerous theories have been put forward as to the most likely causes behind the
challenges encountered in the implementation of decentralization. Parker (Sutiyo 2014) offers
what he calls Soufleés theory (based on the idea that soufleés often fail to rise when exactly
the right combination of eggs, milk and heat are not present) asserts that decentralization
requires an exact combination of inputs to meet each individual country's situation. The
soufflé' theory emphasizes that each country should design the decentralization process to
cater for its particular social, political and informal-formal practices. From the soufflé theory
34
perspective decentralization cannot be implemented under a one size is fit for all approach,
but requires careful consideration tailored to each country's needs due to differences in
characteristics such as culture, environment and other elements.
Falleti's (2004) Sequential Theory of Decentralization on the other hand argues that
decentralization is undertaken via a set of sequential processes. According to Falletti's view
the sequences are the stages of administrative, fiscal and political decentralization. His
Sequential Theory of Decentralization argues that, there are two ways in which
decentralization can proceed. If political decentralization takes place first, and is followed by
fiscal decentralization and then administrative decentralization. Falletti argues that
administrative decentralization should be initiated first, to be followed by fiscal
decentralization and finally by political decentralization. Falletti argues that if sub-national
levels of government are given political decentralization first, they will use this power to
bargain for more powers, which although it will eventually lead to fiscal and administrative
decentralization, it will also strengthen the political positions of sub-national leaders. In
scenario two if sub-national political power is not granted in the initial stages, and central
governments try to reduce national public spending by transferring some of it to sub-national
levels, this will mean that power will be retained by the central government rather than
35
devolved to sub-national levels. As a result Falletti argues that decentralization can take two
sequences, which she justifies from the cases four Latin American countries (Mexico,
Colombia, Argentina and Brazil) whereby Colombia followed the first approach whilst
Argentina followed the second one.
Majocci’s theory of Fiscal Federalism (Majocchi, 2008) emphasizes that economic
responsibilities should be allocated to different tiers of government in two main ways. The
central government should focus primarily on the delivery of public goods and services
whilst the sub-national governments would focus on those goods and services used by their
citizens within their local boundaries (Oates, 1999; Majocchi, 2008). In this scenario the
central government will be concerned with things like such the military and national
highways, which involve all citizens, whilst sub-national tiers will focus on local health
facilities, schools and local roads in their localities.
Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (Greco, 2003) asks if the central government
retains national fiscal responsibilities, what happens to groups that share common facilities,
while belonging to different jurisdictions at the sub-national level. Oates’ Decentralization
Theorem argues that local provision of public goods and services should be predetermined by
the central government for local governments to implement at a generally uniform level.
36
Oates bases his argument on the notion that since both the central and local governments are
working for the same purpose there is no reason why they should get into conflict. This
approach will reduce wastage and ensure uniformity in service delivery.
Finally Riker's Party Base Theory (Gordin, 2004) takes a different approach.
According to Riker, the outcome of decentralization is very much influenced by political
party alignments. In this instance officials as well as lower tiers of government are influenced
by which political parties they are aligned to at the national level. This in turn affects such
elements as funding allocations and decision making over certain issues which can determine
whether decentralization reforms work or not.
2.3 Considering Informal Institutions as an Impeding Factor
In the attempt to assess the challenges to effectively deliver rural development under
conditions of decentralization most studies have focused on the formal institutional
mechanisms issues. Weak legislation, fiscal transfers, power sharing arrangements and others
have been noted as the main reasons for poor implementation of rural development. The
theoretical arguments have provided an analysis of the processes of decentralization, like
Falleti’s arguments about the sequence of decentralization processes, or Riker’s arguments
37
about party politics.
But the possibility that informal institutions can be an impending factor is often
overlooked. As noted by Midgal (1988) most inquiries tend to focus on the formal
institutional aspects more than the informal rules that govern a society. In this aspect Midgal
emphasis that the manner in which informal societies influence or weaken states is
overlooked as "the operative rules [of informal institutions/societies] for people’s behavior in
these societies have not been established in state legislation or bureaucratic decrees"(Midgal
1988:266). In other words they are not governed by laws and regulations There is a
possibility that informal institutions are an important influencing factor that weakens formal
institutions, such as local decentralized institutions. This leads to poor rural development
outcomes.
What then are informal institutions? Informal institutions are for example social
norms, customs, families, landowning groups, and clans that operate in non-official settings
and are largely linked to social or customary rules with their own means of enforcing
compliance. Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff add further to this by saying that informal institutions
are largely grounded in "implicit and unwritten rules of understanding"(2002:1). As a result
they are influenced by social culture, locality and way of life in the shaping these rules that
38
govern the interactions between different members, of the group in the everyday life (Brie
and Stolting, 2012). As such they are less recognizable formal institutions with formal (legal)
sets of rules.
2.3.1 The Formal and the Informal
Informal institutions differ from formal institutions as their set of rules and
regulations generally consist of socially shared rules, which are largely undocumented
(unwritten) “that are communicated outside and enforced outside of officially sanctions
channels" (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). However governance in many developing
countries consists a duality, in which formal and informal institutions operate side by side
often with deep interlinking ties between them (Goldsmith, 2002). When there is a break
down in the nation building process, in the formal institutions, to the question should be
explored of whether the informal institutions are causing the breakdown by being resistant to
the formal rules(Dittmer, 2012). There may be a contradiction between the formal and
informal rules which cause conflicts between the formal and formal institutions. According to
Goldsmith the bedrock of traditional informal rules was in the social relationships "between
the ruler and the ruled" (2002:2) which has not been maintained with the emergence of the
39
formal institutions. As a result, practices now deemed as bad or corrupt in the formal sector
may not be seen in the same light in the informal institutions. This situation may be related to
expectations that emerge from hoped for services from formal institutions but are still trapped
in informal institutions. For example, a traditional society wants modern day developments
but cannot achieve their delivery effectively, because the institutions that have to bring about
the desired development remain bogged down by informal practices that people value and
continue to use. Helmke and Levitsky note that informal institutions "do in fact shape formal
institutional outcomes in significant and systematic ways" (2003:11).
2.3.2The Influence of Informal Institutions upon Decentralization
The influence of informal institutions on formal institutions may be either interactive,
substituting, accommodating or competing. They can either assist to solve problems in the
formal arena or create problems there (Helmke and Livitsky, 2003). I wish to focus on how
formal institutions are affected, I shall examine how informal institutions can create problems.
Migdal takes the view that states are not able to develop into strong states, in other words
create and maintain strong institutions because they have failed to take control over their
local societies. He appears to be suggesting that local societies have a greater influence on
40
formal state institutions than the other way around.
This is in contradiction to the assumption that the introduction of formal institutions
would be the solution to all problems (Lambach, 2004). Lambach goes on to note that this
approach, fails to realize that the State is part of a group of organizations (large and small,
formal and informal) that exist within its boundaries, rather than being the sole organization.
Formal and informal rules and regulations both determine the manner in which things are
done. Migdal (1988) comes to the conclusion that most developing countries constitute
networks between small, fragmented informal societies with their own particular sense of
order, led by someone who is usually a "local strong man, chiefs, landlords, rich peasants [or]
clan leader"(Lambach, 2004:6). Migdal sees the central basis of this relationship is structured
on a sense of reciprocal relations between the small informal groups and the formal State
institutions which occur through the informal group leader and so results in development of a
patron client relationship between the members of the informal groups and their leader.
2.3.3 Patron Client relations
Scott (1972a: 92, 1972b:8) defines a patron-client relationship as a type of
relationship between those that have some type of power or resources and the client who
41
wants to receive a share of resources from the patron. The main feature of this relationship is
the interlinking relations that demands reciprocity by both parties. Hence in return for the
benefits in the form of services and goods from the patron, political and other support for the
patron, is expected from the client. This establishes the fundamental nature of the
relationships between informal and formal institutions..
In a patron-client relationship that the patron’s power is sourced from the State and
its formal institutions (Scott, 1972a:92a, Scott, 1972b:767). But the manner that this power is
distributed is not uniform at one level at government. It may involve, a number of levels of
government in the decentralizing State. Scott says that there can be a Patron Client Cluster or
a Patron Client Pyramid. The diagram below showcases this point of view
Figure 2: Patron Client Cluster & the Patron Client Pyramid
(Source: Scott, 1972a: 97)
42
It is ultimately the sources of power of the patron that determines how the
relationship functions and how it issues rewards and punishments. The activity that takes
place around the patron’s source of power eventually determines the manner in which the
informal institutions behave. I have identified five main sources of power in patron-client
relations that influence the form taken by informal institutions and the social order in local
societies. These are: local strong man; land;, political party; religion; and state resources
(Barcson 2015).
In the Local Strong Man case, patronage is based on protection by the strong man of
his/her client. Examples of such cases are; the Cacique in Mexico (Villareal, 2002: 479), local
bosses in Philippines an Mafiosi (Sidel, 1989: 24;Sidel, 1997: 947). The local strong man
may inflict varying levels of coercive or force to extort client support. Those who have
control over land, particularly landlords, are most able to use power this to obtain political or
other support from their clients. A notable example of this situation is Brazil’s landed elites
who own large commercial farms (Valenca, 1999:8). Political parties have the support of
intermediaries who become clients but who in turn are themselves patrons of those at a lower
level of society. Examples of this can be seen in Bangladesh with certain dominant political
parties (Kochanek, 2000: 548), and in certain parts of Senegal (Schaffer, 1998:127). The
43
prime benefits here are the advantages that a political party can deliver based on its affiliation
and linkages.
In the case of religion it is primarily those who are religious leaders, who play the
role of patron via a patron-client pyramid structure. Religious leaders in these instances are
able to garner the support of their followers and play the role of the intermediary with those
higher up in formal state institutions. A good example of this can be seen in Marabouts where
an Islamic sect in Senegal was able to exert great influence to control peanut production for
its followers (Fatton, 1986: 64).
Finally, State Resources are a very large source of wealth that clients and patrons
attempt to gain access to. Access may take the form of grants, projects that are up for tender,
essential infrastructure or direct personal gains. Whatever the reason the objective is to get
access to those with best access to state resources. Patrons in most instances in these cases are
politicians and high ranking government officials.
2.3.4 Migdals Weak State Impact
What happens when informal institutions meet with formal state institutions. In most
cases they do not work well together when they come into contact. Certain values that may be
44
seen as essential in the informal institution may be seen as unacceptable in the formal
institutions. Hence when these two institutions meet one may erode the other. For instance, in
the local strong man case, elite capture of formal state benefits may take place at the cost of
the people served by a lower level government. On the other hand, as clan groups try to take
care of their own, the traditional concepts of communal needs and sharing and caring may
now be seen as corruption within formal state institutions. Hence the clash of these two
systems maybe be producing a negative effect on formal state institutions.
Against this backdrop Migdal (1988) argues that states are not able to become strong
if there is competition by local strong men, who are also leaders of their own customary
groups, which have evolved patron-client relationships. When traditional or other local
leaders resist state led formal institutions they weaken them through enclaves of local
dominance (Migdal, 1988). The leaders of formal institutions may realize the importance of
leaders of informal local institutions, leading to possible tradeoffs being made between
formal and informal leaders, in what Migdal refers to as the politics of survival. However, in
this instance it is important to bear in mind that Migdal assumes that all order is based on a
strong man type approach or a sense of established social order. In the instance where there is
no form of local hegemonic leader Migdal assumes that the clients will have to choose
45
between potential patrons with a varying degree of repercussions or benefits, hence the
choice in this instance will be a difficult one (Lambach, 2004: 4).
2.3.5 The PNG Big Man System
Migdal's arguments imply that informal societies are based upon traditional
guidelines, with organized forms of social order. However, the Bigman system in PNG
demonstrates that, that may not be always true, as informal leaders such as local strong man,
a person who has inherited chieftaincy or certain oligarchic leaders can operate in an absence
of rigid informal guidelines. In this case also there will be no difficulties in choosing a patron
as suggested by Lambach, given the fluidity of the system. Finally, the weakening of the state
in the Bigman instance, is not made because of tradeoffs between formal leaders and informal
leaders (local strong man). Rather it is the result of an informal infiltration into the formal
institution.
Traditionally very few societies of the Melanesian group of islands in the Pacific had
inherited chieftaincies. They had no formal order structures within their traditional societies,
except for small group social organizations which comprised moieties and descent groups
which were associated with exchange and the occupation of land (May, 2004). The traditional
46
Melanesian societies were largely egalitarian and communalistic based. In the midst of this it
was the Bigman system that offered a type of ad hoc order to the traditional Melanesian
communities of which PNG is part of. So what then is the Bigman system?
The Big Man System is a general unstructured order in society practiced amongst the
Melanesian group of islands in the Pacific Islands. In this system the Bigman’s status is
achieved via “personal achievements, and personal attributes such as bravery and strength,
persuasive and excellent oratory” (Peash, 1994: 3). A Bigman possessed these attributes as
well as knowledge of the genealogical descent of the families in his group and the oral history
of the group’s occupation of land and of conflicts with neighboring groups. Bigman did not
amass wealth for their personal use but organized the accumulation of wealth in the form of
food, pigs and shells, which were exchanged with ritual opponent groups in an on-going
struggle for status in the local area. Bigman assisted supporters and followers with their needs
or in times of emergencies. Sometimes Bigman achieved their status through being a strong
warrior or possessing significant powers such as sorcery (Salins, 1963: 489). This could also
be used to assist or protect followers. Using these set of attributes it was up to the aspiring
Bigman to utilize the other values based on his own pasin4. Charisma can then be generated
4 There is no actual English word that actually describes the Tok-Pisin word Pasin. However,
it basically means ones, attitude, ability to share, care, hate, protect, defend, and other traits
that form a person’s persona. In the Bigman scenario, charisma is generated from developing
47
through this approach when potential Bigman exercised good pasin. This was then used to
rally and mobilize supporters and followers who usually came through kinship ties and
families relations.
The system however was fluid as it was not inherited, and was a loose structured
social order in the society. Rather it was a system that utilized the Wantok System nature of
most traditional societies in PNG. Wantok System was basically a system where by people
from certain clans, tribes or, villages.. looked after each other. In the traditional PNG context,
it was a type of social safety net whereby caring for family members in times of need,
supporting them in daily activities, and other traditional social activities were enshrined in
this Wantok System5. Traditionally this approach proved very useful as it took care of widows,
orphans, the needy, and supported every member of a group, whether it be in their everyday
activities or to meet traditional obligations. This practice was of great value in the
communalistic oriented society in PNG. Amidst this setting the Bigman was expected to do
more than the average citizen.
However since the Bigman status was not firmly fixed as an organized form of order,
it could be acquired based on a range of different values, such as the ability to distribute
a good pasin towards fellow members towards tribal/clan/supporters. 5 Source:
http://www.infobarrel.com/Wantok_System:_A_Traditional_Social_Security_System_in_Papua_New_Guinea
accessed on 26/01/2016 at 5.41pm
48
wealth equally to supporters. Secondly, is the ability to contribute to traditional obligations
and ceremonies. There is an understanding that Bigman are supposed to contribute a bigger
share in such events than their supporters, clans men and family and so forth. Thirdly,
Bigman systems are largely based upon family and clan loyalties (Koim, 2013). As a result
possession of such a status is merely dependent upon one's ability to deliver benefits to
supporters. As a result it had no strong binding links to the Bigman and was very fluid.
Furthermore, no formal office actually was occupied by the big man and the only powers he
possessed depend on his personal attributes of leadership and personality.
The ability to maintain support was largely grounded in personal attributes and
character and included a wide range of unspoken values that were able to generate charisma.
For example, Ketan notes that, "only a true Bigman can demonstrate master craftsmanship in
cutting pork for distribution - without counting the number of people - [but still] ensure that
everyone receives a fair share" (Ketan 2013: 5). Such skills enable the Bigman to become
successful in ceremonial activities and to develop a support base, which demanded recurring
investments in good social relations to maintain. On the other hand the neglect of such
essential relations and activities can result in a loss of the Bigman status.
The PNG informal system of Bigman is therefore, unlike most countries in world,
49
very fluid and is based upon the benefits provided by the Bigman, such as protection, support
and traditional currencies that he accumulated because of his personal skills. Because there is
no established order each individual affiliates with those who can assist him the best and his
support is given in return. Affiliations are mostly concentrated via clan and tribal affiliations
(Salins, 1963; Brown, 1987). However, because of the fluidity there is also no guarantee or
hold over the client by the patron/ Bigman. Hence, while the fixed forms of patron-client
relations contain a degree of control over by the patron over the client such is not so in the
Bigman system. Instead it is a constant struggle to keep supporters loyal but without the
binding control as another Bigman may emerge within the group or near the group and attract
supporters away from the current Bigman. As Bigman age and become incapable of
continuing vigorous leadership, they lose their status, although they may maintain great
respect within the group.
Therefore, unlike the other forms of patron-client relations the Bigman system was
not grounded in a firm basis of order, such as local strongman's use of force, the ownership of
land by, religious affiliation and so on...This made the shifting of Bigman alliances a constant,
ongoing thing, as each Bigman strove to maintain his status. Secondly, the status never really
gave any form of actual power to the holder but was only something he could use to influence
50
things within his given society. Given this aspect consistent reliance on the support base was
essential. This would come to influence the formal system with the introduction of
decentralization when politics was played out whilst using the Bigman system to solicit
support. Therefore Migdal's assumption that there is a local strong man at the local level is
not so in the PNG case. Instead it has been how politicians have used the Bigman system to
mobilize and maintain support which has been a major factor behind the weakening of formal
state institutions in the absence of the local strong man and oligarchic rule.
2.4 -Proposed Argument
It is possible therefore that in PNG informal institutions can weaken formal
decentralization processes leading to poor rural development outcomes. This study attempts
to fill a gap in existing theoretical studies of decentralization to argue that even highly
unstable and fluid informal institutions without rigid control or offices of power, are still able
to weaken the formal decentralization process. The proposed argument is that , the informal
system of Bigman has been able to weaken the formal decentralization process in PNG
because of close interlinking traditional ethnic ties and values operating in an environment
with limited opportunities in which politics has been manipulated to serve the Bigman,
51
thereby further weakening the decentralization process and affecting rural development.
This assumption is therefore based on a simple premise that whilst the Bigman
system has been good for the traditional society it is now moved into in an environment
where other values, including cash values, are placing a huge strain on it. In the midst of this
the current socio economic environment lacking the basic opportunities to support the people
effectively has made them see the politicians as anew sort of Bigman. The politicians
therefore use this aspect of traditional societies to maintain personal support and to enrich
themselves, which has led to the weakening of the system hence poor rural development
outcomes.
52
Chapter Three: Hijacking of the Decentralization Process at the Subnational Level by
Bigman Infiltration
3.1 Country Background
3.1.1 Geography and Demographics
Papua New Guinea is the largest of the Pacific island countries located just below
the equator and several miles above Australia (UNDP, 2007).
Figure 3 : Map of Papua New Guinea Figure 4: PNG Flag
Source: vidiani.com6 Source: wikimedia7
PNG has a total land area of approximately 460 000 square kilometers (UNDP,
2007). This consists of mountainous terrain largely concentrated in the middle of the island
6 Source: http://www.vidiani.com/full-political-map-of-papua-new-guinea/ accessed on 06.08. 2015 at 1:36 pm
7 Source : https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Papua_New_Guinea.svg accessed on 07.08. 2015
at 10: 47am
53
nation, with other ranges in the northern part of the country. In relation to this the their big
islands; New Britain, New Ireland, Manus and Bougainville, that make up the country as well
several thousand smaller islands and atolls. Being a tropical country it has only two main
seasons; wet and dry seasons.
The population of PNG according to the 2011 census8 7, 059, 653 this however may
be more as there is no reliable sources of data to attest to this, hence an approximate estimate
by the UNDP (2007a) estimates it to reach 8 million in 2015. The population is largely
concentrated in the highlands regions, in the center of the island, with smaller dispersal of
concentrated areas thought the coastal regions (UNDP, 2007b). The UNDP (2007a) also notes
that amongst this composition 85% of the population are located in the rural areas. With the
remaining 15% spread out in the urban townships and cities.
3.1.2 Brief Colonial History
Colonization of PNG was initially under two colonial powers, British and Germany.
The southern part of the country which was known as Papua, was under the control of the
British since 1884 (United Nations, 2007b). The northern part of the country was known as
German New Guinea as it was under German influence. The area was purely strategic due to
8 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papua_New_Guinea accessed on 07.08. 2015 at 11: 35am
54
the game of power being played out in the European theater of political supremacy. As a
result not much development and investment was made into the area except for a handful of
agriculture plantations. This was later to change as findings in gold in the Wau area of current
day Morobe Province, saw a significant influx of foreigners arriving into the area in the
1920s9. All this however was basically confined to this activity with little investments or
development into the hinterlands and other areas. The loss of Germany in World War One
saw the entry of Australia into the German New Guinea as it had become a nation in 1906
(ibid). This however was short lived with the arrival of World War Two, which saw the
Japanese control over mostly the northern areas of the country. It was not until the end of
World War Two that Australia was able to reclaim back the area.
The area was then made a protectorate under the United Nations control. Australia
was then tasked to look after this protectorate. This period of time from the 1960s upwards
was also a great time for the world as influential movements demanding more equality,
independence and sovereignty of small colonized countries began to take sway. As result
colonies where beginning to be shunned upon. At that time also independence and self
government, free from colonial domination was seen as the pathway towards development.
9 Source:
http://www.mra.gov.pg/Portals/2/Publications/mining%20history%20in%20png%20final.pdf
accessed on 10.08. 2015 at 12: 30 pm
55
In the light of these new social movements the United Nations tasked Australia to begin
preparing the country for self government. This was eventually undertaken but at a time
where there was very limited infrastructure in place and educated elite. Most of the country
was still getting used to the idea of seeing a white man while this change was being
undertaken. Despite this independence was finally obtained from Australian control on the
16th of September 1975. However, Australian support would continue for years to come as a
major partner in PNGs development efforts.
3.1.3 Culture, Way of Life and Economy
PNG is multicultural society with numerous ethnic groups and hundreds of tribes
which are further broken down into numerous clans in villages and hamlets. Within these
communities communalism is very much preferred over individualism, hence communal
(tribal/clan/extended family) needs are emphasized rather than individual needs and desires.
Therefore protecting and caring for each other forms the basis of most villages throughout
PNG. A strong link to this is closely associated with the land tenure system in which land is
owned via customary land tenure alongside tribal/ clan group affiliation. This has been
closely linked to the Big Man system in most parts of PNG.
56
The language composition is also varied, with a total of 848 local languages10
spoken by these numerous tribes, which is also considered to be the largest number in any
country throughout the world. Despite this English, Tok-Pisin, Hiri Motu and Sign Language
are used as the four official languages. English however, is the language used in education,
government and business activities. Tok-Pisin, a mixture of pidgin English has become the
largest spoken language by the majority of the population, whilst Hiri Motu is confined
mostly to the southern region.
The PNG economy is composed to two parts; the formal economy and the informal
economy (ADB, 2012a: 6). The formal economy basically involves three main elements; the
resource extraction activities (minerals, fishing, forestry etc...), the public service and a small
industrial based activities. This however, whilst contributing to most of the state revenue
involves only a small percentage of the population. The informal economy on other hand
involves the majority of the population. Its contribution to the state revenue however is much
lesser than the formal economy. Since the majority of the people are located in the rural areas.
they tend to rely on "forest exploitation, fishing, hunting and subsistence agriculture" (UNDP,
2007a: 2). The main source of income for these people is derived from the production of
cash crops; cocoa, vanilla, copra, coffee, selling of fresh food and small scale poultry and
10 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papua_New_Guinea accessed on 07.08. 2015 at 11: 35am
57
piggery activities (Allen, Bourke and Macgregor, 2009: 285). There are two reasons as to
why this has a lower level of contribution to state coffers. Firstly, there is a lot of unregulated
activities going on here hence no tax revenue, a good example is the betel nut trade which
generates millions for those involved but is not regulated thus no tax revenue. Secondly, the
activities in which these people are involved is not supported with proper infrastructure and
support services, the good example of this is agriculture investment for rural people.
As a result of this the PNG economy continues to be supported by the mineral
resource sector and caters to 77% of all the exports leaving the country (ADB, 2012b: 9). The
remaining 24% is divided between the agriculture sector :17%, forestry products : 5% and
other areas 1%.
3.1.4 System of Government
PNG system of government is based upon the Westminster system of government. It
comprises of three parts; the legislature: which is elected via democratic elections, the
executive and the judiciary (Gelu, 2010: 162). The national parliament consists of a
unicameral national parliament (single house system) made up of 111 seats. Twenty one
of these seats are held by provincial Members of Parliament (MPs) with one being held by
58
the National Capital District (NCD) Regional MP as NCD is allocated a separate status. The
remaining 89 seats are held by MPs elected from smaller electorates within the provinces. To
better understand this a brief description is made of the electoral representation. PNG has a
total of 21 Provinces. A province in this case is similar to a state in the United States of
America or prefecture in Japan. Within each of these provinces are several smaller electorates,
who also elect their own MP. For example, let's say X is a province, within X province are
five smaller electorates. Therefore X province will have five electoral MPs (from the smaller
electorates) and one provincial MP. The provincial MP is also known as the Governor and is
elected by citizens from the whole province whilst the electoral MPs are only elected the
citizens in the electorate concerned. So in this case X province will have a total of six MPs in
parliament (One provincial MP/ Governor and five electoral MPs).
The Prime Minister is the head of government, whilst the head of state is the
Governor General as PNG is part of the Commonwealth. The Governor General is nominated
by the parliament, which is undertaken via a voting process as stipulated in Section 88 of the
constitution of PNG (Independent State of Papua New Guinea, 2000). The Prime Minister on
the other hand usually comes from the party with the largest number after elections.
PNG's electoral system is based on the Limited Preferential Voting System (LPV)
59
which was launched in the 2007 elections, prior to that, the first past the post system was
used (May, Wheen and Haley 2011: 193). After elections the party with the most winning
candidates is asked to form the government by the Governor General. As a result, the party
leader of the winning party often becomes the prime minister. In most cases governments in
PNG have consisted of coalitions between the numerous parties. Intense lobbying for
coalition partners usually follows elections in the lead up to government formation, as given
the multiparty nature there has been hardly an instance where one party has emerged
dominant from elections to fill over half the seats. As a result constant lobbying between
parties takes place. The government however can be removed via a vote of confidence. The
constitution of PNG in Section 145 however only allows this to take place only 18 months
after a government is formed and does not allow it 12 months before writs are open for next
elections (Independent State of Papua New Guinea, 2000).
The tiers of government are structured into three tiers of government, at the top is the
National Government, in the middle there is the provincial government and finally at bottom
are the Local Level Governments (LLGs). However only the National Government and LLG
are comprised of elected representatives whilst the provincial government is made up of the
same MPs, LLG Presidents/Mayors and other representatives. On the administrative front
60
there is also three tiers; national departments at the top, provincial departments in the middle
and numerous department officials in the district headquarters of each electorate in the
provinces.
3.1.5 Development Challenges in PNG
As a young nation the road to progress and change has not been easy. Numerous
challenges have greatly affected PNGs development efforts. Issues such as health delivery
issues continually plague the country and have declined in recent years (AUSAID, 2009;
World Bank, 2000: World Bank, 2004:33). Indicators by numerous development agencies
point out that PNG has the worst record in Asia Pacific Region (Asante and Hall, 2011;
PNGDOH, 2010). Access to medical doctors remains low, and is largely concentrated in
urban centers (Gerawa, M, 2015, Post Courier, 25th May, Doctors Needed).
In the education sector results are mixed and reveal a system that struggles to
effectively deliver amidst numerous obstacles. AUSAID (2014) note that the standard of
education in PNG largely falls behind other pacific island countries. The ADB (2012b) and
AUSAID (2009) note that it is difficult to access quality education cheaply. It is also
perceived that half of the older population are largely illiterate (Ravindier, 2011). Recent
61
years have seen further strain added to the struggling system with the introduction of the free
education policy of by Oniel Dion government. As a result more students are forced into
school with fewer resources to cater. On the other side staff issues, such as housing, teaching
materials continue to be a constant problem, especially in the rural areas (PNGDOE, 2004;
Howes et al; 2014).
In the midst of these challenges there has been a significant decline and deterioration
of roads in the bridges in PNG, as a result most of such infrastructure are in a very bad
condition (Word Bank, 2013; ADB, 2012b; Cammack, 2008). The ADB (2012b) note that
only 33% of roads are in a usable condition, however the ratio of provincial and feeder
roads in even in a more worsened condition. It was also noted that 85% of feeder roads are
also unusable during rainy seasons. The challenge to develop good roads has been made more
challenging by the terrain and population dispersal. Apart from this such utilities such as
electricity and piped water are nonexistent in most rural areas (ADB, 2012a; ADB, 2012b).
The ADB (2012b) places those with access to electricity as 1/10, even in the urban setting
only 70% are said to be able to access electricity with the remaining 30% missing out on,
whilst in the rural areas it is largely nonexistent apart from the use of portable generators and
solar panel kits. Piped water also faces similar predicament in the rural areas also and has
62
been the blamed for many water related illnesses related to poor quality drinking water.
The negative impact of poor infrastructure has further affected the local economic
activities of the people further contributing to poverty as the majority of the population
struggle to raise K100 (US$ 50) annually (Hayward- Jones and Campbell, 2009).
According to Chandy (2009) it is estimated that 37.5% of the population face extreme
poverty based on the US$1 a day measurement. However, the income indicator maybe
misleading, as poverty in PNG is not about hunger, instead it is about absence of
opportunities to income, education, health care, good water, transport and goods roads (ADB,
2012; Chandy, 2009; Hayward- Jones and Campbell, 2009). It is also noted that poverty
incidences are more concentrated in the rural areas rather than the urban areas which the ADB
(2012a) estimate to be 94% (Chandy, 2009; Rogers, Richard, Wala and CARE, 2011). Hence
poverty to this people involves the challenges in getting effective services, being able to earn
a good source of income, pay for children's school fees, enjoy good health and living
conditions such as piped water and electricity. This however, has not been forthcoming in fact
certain studies reveal that there has been no change to the living conditions of the rural people
since 1975, despite the recent economic growth ( Rogers, Richard, Wala and CARE, 2011;
World Bank, 2007; AUSAID, 2014).
63
Being reliant upon a cash crop economy has made things worse when the required
infrastructure and services needed are not there to support it. Instead the deteriorating
infrastructure, lack of the credit facilities and support extension activities have greatly
hindered those involved in the informal economy, particularly the rural citizens (World Bank,
2007; ADB, 2012a; Cammack, 2008; Allen, Bourke and Macgregor, 2009). This has also
been one of the major factors leading to high poverty rates from the fiscal aspect.
Against this backdrop the question of how effective decentralization has been is
raised. Why has decentralization failed to deliver to the rural populace of PNG? In order to
understand this one has to look at the manner in which decentralization was undertaken in
PNG and the challenges it faced that have shaped it and caused its failures.
3.2 Decentralization in PNG
This section of the thesis looks at the decentralization process in PNG and is
presented in three sections;
a) Phase I: Pre Independence Decentralization (1940s – 1977)
b) Phase II: Post Independence Decentralization: The Provincial Government System
c) Phase III: The 1995 Organic Law Reforms -The Current System
64
3.2.1 Phase I: Pre Independence Decentralization (1940s - 1977)
In early pre independence era, the administration was controlled and dominated by
expatriates. The prime objective was to usher in and develop formal state institutions in the
colony. Hence the main actors during this period were largely Australian expatriates operating
in the colony but, with control and authority being based in Port Moresby, overseen by a
Department of Territories and a Minister of the Australian Government, in Canberra. Since
the actors were expatriates the infiltration of the Bigman system hardly affected the system
during this era. The era was largely a period to establish formal institutions onto a largely
traditional and illiterate based population.
This period began effectively in the aftermath of the two world wars where PNG was
administered by the Australia, under the Trusteeship program of first the League of Nations,
after world war one and the newly formed United Nations after world war two. As a result
of this administrative control was largely centered in Canberra and undertaken with the help
of expatriate officers located in PNG (Peash, 1994). The greatest challenge in the effort to
establish formal institutions of governance was made more challenging with the fact that
there was no form of traditional government in place, as much of PNG practiced the Bigman
65
system. Due to this aspect there was no informal system to incorporate the new system into,
hence the pioneers of modern governance in PNG had to largely set up the system with no
"basis or links to traditional systems"(Peash, 1994: 6). The early colonial rule during this
period was enforced by expatriate officers as officers who manned Patrol Posts in the remote
area, often many days walk from the headquarters. They supervised the work of appointed
government delegates; the Village Constables in Papua and the Luluais, Kukurais and Tultuls
(first appointed by the German administration and adopted with almost no change by the
Australian administration) in New Guinea. This practice was maintained until the early 1950s
when a formal council system was introduced based on a British East African model These
systems of administration maintained law and order and provided basic service delivery in the
form of small local schools and aid posts manned by orderlies with very basic medical
training.
Political development was slowly initiated with the introduction of Local
Government Councils (which were closely supervised by the field officers) and later with the
introduction of the House of Assembly (the first parliament established at the time of
self-government. Control however administratively, politically and fiscally remained largely
centered in Canberra (Reagan, 1997). As a result department officials operating in PNG at
66
that time reported to Canberra regardless of the local structures in place. Administratively the
system of districts was later developed to cater to administrative needs of PNG. At the end of
1960s this amounted to 19 districts and they would become the provinces of independent
PNG all administered by expatriate officers (May, 2005).
In 1964 the Native Village Council Ordinance was replaced with the passing of the
Local Government Ordinance of 1963, No 16 of 1964 (Peash, 1994: 10). This event also saw
the establishment of another level of government in PNG, the House of Assembly (Reilly,
Brown and Flower, 2014: 18). PNG therefore now had two types of government level, the
House of Assembly, located in Port Moresby and the numerous LGCs in the districts in the
country. The composition of the House of Assembly was largely expatriate dominated but
there began to be an emergence of local politicians. This composition of the system would
last up till the late 1970s (after independence) when the system was removed and the
provincial government system introduced.
These initiatives were also to serve as preparation for ultimate independence and
self-government in the coming years. During this phases there were six hierarchical levels;
Canberra, Territorial, Regional, District, Sub District and Local Government Councils/ Ward
levels (Peash, 1994: 69). Figure 4 shows this hierarchical relationship.
67
Figure 5: Pre Independence Structure
(Source: created by author)
Expatriates dominated the administrative and political scene in these early years,
even in the newly established House of Assembly in Port Moresby. It was not until towards
the late 60s that Papua New Guineans, such Pita Simogun, Michael Somare, Albert Maori
Kiki and others began to emerge and compete for political representation. However, during
this period the Bigman infiltration was largely absent both in the public service and political
scenario. This can be attributed to the limited involvement of locals in the both areas.
68
3.2.2 Phase II: The Emergence of the Provincial Government System
The second phase of decentralization is quite important when analyzing the
infiltration of the Bigman on state institutions. This is because this is the period of time when
Bigman values begin to penetrate into formal the decentralization processes in PNG. The
process of decentralization that occurred eventually caused it to unravel in PNG. Important
events on the eve of independence had a profound impact on the process of decentralization
in PNG.
During this period there were also several actors that would come about to be very
much involved in the process. The first were the increasing number of local politicians
elected into the national parliament. The second, group of actors were the emerging educated
elites and local influential people, who would see the proposed provincial government system
as an avenue for accessing more powers and resources (Reagan, 1997). It was this latter
group who would eventually fill the ranks of the provincial government assemblies.
On the 16th of September 1975 PNG became politically independent. Self
government had been granted to the country in December, 1973 (Reilly, Brown and Flower,
2014: 18). The period from self government to political independence between 1973 and
1975 was a period in which the reins of power, administration and autonomy were slowly
69
released by Canberra to Port Moresby. This saw efforts to bring in local citizens to become
more active participants in the political and administrative sectors to prepare the country for
ultimate political independence. In the midst of this a growing group of elite local political
leaders were beginning to participate more actively in the once expatriate dominated House
of Assembly. A committee known as the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) was also
established, to write a constitution for the emerging nation. It was during this time that certain
events happened that greatly influenced the type of government and administrative structure
put into place in the post-independence era.
As this experiment with self government was going on, issues of secession by
several regions and groups begin to emerge. While the reasons behind each region’s or
group’s desire for secession were different, the common demand was for more autonomy for
the region or group. The most notable of these secession threats were from three particular
groups; Bougainville Province and the Gazelle area of East New Britain Province, Papua
Besenain Northern Province in Papua and the Highlands Liberation Front (May, 2004;
Reagan, 1997a; Reilly, Brown and Flower, 2014).). The Bougainville cry unlike the other
areas was grounded in environmental abuse and lack of effective development in the area.
Unlike most of the provinces Bougainville Province was the host to the giant Panguna mine,
70
the income from which the Australians used to fund Independence. First, a whole generation
of younger people were missing out on the payment of royalties from the copper exports and
they became angry and frustrated and tried to sabotage the mine’s operations. Second, the
impact of environmental degradation caused by the mine became a cause of growing concern
on Bougainville.
These two factors prompted the Bougainville threats and calls for the then National
Government (House of Assembly) to conduct a referendum in 1968 allowing Bougainvillians
themselves to decide whether to separate from PNG or not (May, 2004: 71).
The Papua Besena group’s motive was different. They were against the idea of
Australian granting of independence to PNG. They were concerned that PNG was not yet
ready and needed more time. The group claimed to represent the Papua people located in the
southern half of PNG. They formally declared their own independence in March 1975 (May,
2004: 71). Their attempt however was not successful as it was not recognized by Australia or
any other country.
The concerns of the Highlands Liberation Front originated from fears of being
dominated by the coastal people in the political, economic and public service affairs of the
country. Unlike the coastal provinces the highlanders were late comers into the political and
71
administrative developments taking place in the country as a result many parts of the
highlands only being opened up in the 1950s and 1960s. This was due to the fact that
hinterlands of PNG of which the Highlands region makes up, was the last to be discovered
and settled. Even on the eve of independence there were still tribes, villages and hamlets in
isolated regions of the highlands that had never seen foreigners. Given these circumstances,
the highlander saw themselves at a disadvantage to their coastal peers. Their call therefore
was not towards ultimate secession or independence but that more political decentralization
should be given to the highlands region (May, 2004: 73). This would enable them to be in
control over their own affairs without fear of domination. Given these sporadic threats of
secession and demand for more autonomy the Gazelle area of East New Britain demanded
that the government try to establish a uniform policy to address these threats rather than do so
haphazardly by dealing with each case as it arose (Reilly, Brown and Flower, 2014: 22).
To deal with these threats the CPC decided that more powers should be given to the
district (later the province) governments. The CPC argued this should be done via a
decentralized system of government which would allow greater participation and allow room
for local autonomy to calm down secessionist threats. It is important to remember that at this
stage all actors were supportive of increased decentralization. The national politicians greatly
72
supported this early phase of decentralization and saw it as a way to further develop
government institutions close to their home bases in the newly independent country (Reagan,
1997). Secondly, the emerging crop of educated elites also began to realize that such a
venture offered more options for them in their home provinces in terms of jobs and benefits.
This group of people had close connections to their areas at home. Finally, influential local
people who up till this time were largely involved in the local government councils in the
districts saw this as an opportunity to draw more fiscal resources and discretion to them. The
CPC however, wanted that decentralization to grant local autonomy while still maintaining
the unitary nature of the state (May, 2004). This eventually led to the amendment of the
constitution in March 1977 with Constitutional Amendment No 1 (Section 187A - 187)
introducing the Organic Law on Provincial Governments (OLPG) (May, 2005: 205; Peash,
1994: 10).
As a result decentralization was not part of the initial Constitution of PNG but was
promoted through an Organic Law which amended the Constitution. The introduced Organic
Law on Provincial Government (OLPG) enabled the provincial government system to come
into being and detailed their powers, functions, procedures and intergovernmental relations
with the various tiers of government (Peash, 1995:10). Thus began the second phase of
73
decentralization in PNG and as Reagan (1997) observes nobody predicted the future conflict
and struggle for power that would arise from these arrangements.
3.2.3 Objectives and Structure of the System
The decentralization planned for PNG in 1977 had the main objective of provincial
governments to be granted greater autonomy, but under a strong central government (Axeline,
1986: 153). The objective was to establish sub national tiers of government which would be
strong, reliable and able to negotiate effectively with the national government on issues that
needed redress to be effectively delivered to their localities (Reagan, 1997b: 22). The
institutions that emerged in this period were planned to engage greater participation and
involvement of the citizens in the administration. It was hoped that this would enable the
lower tiers of government to develop policies and strategies best suited for their areas. But the
national government would maintain authority over provincial governments so maintaining
the unitary nature of the system. Besides addressing of the secessionist ideas the
decentralization process had the object of addressing several other issues such as assisting
and facilitating the smooth transfer of powers from Canberra to Port Moresby, the
development of sound political institutions, the establishment of good public service
74
machinery, the development of a political culture and greater participation in the overall
political process (Axeline, 1986: 13). The roll out began in 1977 with the establishment of
"interim provincial governments in all provinces in 1977" (May, 2004: 26) with limited
functions and powers, with the further powers to be devolved later to particular provinces,
based on satisfactory performance of their administrations. The provincial government
structure took the form seen in the diagram below.
Figure 6: The 1977 Provincial Government System
Source: Created by author based on information from Reagan. A. J, 199711
This new system saw the emergence of a three tier political and administrative
system. At the top was the national government, with the provincial government in the middle
11 Reagan. A. J, 1997b, (pp: 9 - 55) The Operation of the Provincial Government System, in May. R.J, A.J.
Reagan and Allison Ley (ed), 1997, Political Decentralization in a New State - The Experience of
Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst
STRUCTURE STRUCTURE
75
and local level government councils at the bottom. On the administrative front the national
departments were at the top followed by provincial departments and officials located in the
districts.
The national government representatives were elected from electorates within
provinces also including one provincial member per province elected from provincial seats
from all provinces throughout the country. The provincial government system comprised of a
legislative arm, known as the provincial assembly, as well as an executive arm; the provincial
executive council. All members in the assembly were elected from smaller electorates within
the province. The head of the provincial assembly was the Premier, who was elected by the
assembly members (Reagan, 1997b). The provincial government also came complete with
government ministries for the provincial level (Reilly, Brown and Flower, 2014: 22). At the
Local Government Council level, ward members were to be elected in their wards and formed
the local government councils located in the districts. Each District had between –three or
four local government councils. The Local Government Councils were to be a voice for the
people. These political initiatives were seen as avenues to develop the participation and
involvement of the people in the political process and as well as in the decision making
process.
76
Administratively the provincial departments were to become extensions of national
departments. Hence, their duties were involved their respective departments roles and
functions; which ranged from day to day operations, extension activities, maintenance of their
respective infrastructure and facilities. However, since there was no clear cut guidelines
provincial staff tended to operate alongside national government laws rather than provincial
ones, as they were often times answerable to national departments. This was a loose
arrangement and allowed flexibility to contribute to the decentralization process (Peash,
1994; Reagan, 1997a).
To support these arrangements, numerous fiscal arrangements were made to give
grants to provincial governments to enable them to carry out their functions. Funding came
from the national government to provinces and into provincial departments. From the
provincial level it was allocated to provincial departments who used it to carry out their duties,
to maintain their services and infrastructure and to undertake outreach programs. The local
level government however functioned under each province’s administration.
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3.2.4 Conflict and Tensions in the Provincial Government System (Political
Competition)
As noted earlier, the call for provincial governments was met with open support by
national politicians, emerging educated elites and local influential people. It was these
emerging educated elites and local influential persons who filled these seats in the provincial
assemblies when the provincial government system was unrolled. It was then that problems
began to emerge that would create tensions within the system.
However as time went on very few provinces were eventually given the full powers
that OLPG promised. By 1979 only four provinces had been allocated full fiscal control over
their funds, with a number of recommendations never implemented (Reilly, Brown and
Flower, 2014; May, 2004). May (2004) further notes that this progress did not change very
fast, and by 1986 only one other province had joined the four, with the majority of the
provinces lagging behind. The reasons behind this slow development are many such as, weak
administrations lack of man power, lack of training and poor management. This reluctance to
devolve powers fully to the provincial governments however was rooted in the emerging
political competition that was slowly developing between national and provincial elected
representatives.
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Prior to the establishment of the provincial government system the national
politicians were the only politicians from the electorates with influence, and authority. They
had access to fiscal resources which they controlled and used in their electorates. With the
establishment of the provincial government system, smaller constituencies emerged within
the provinces which were filled by the emerging local elites and influential local people in
within each district. There began to be more than one political leader in a given area. For
example, the Ambunti Dreikikir Open Electorate which had only one national MP eventually
had five provincial members, all from the smaller provincial electorates, in competition with
the national MP who represented this electorate in the national Parliament. This became a
source of confusion and competition as each man claimed to be the instigator of
developments taking place in the electorate.
3.2.5 The Weakening of the System by Bigman Influence
So it emerged that national politicians began to face increasing competitors in
election times. These competitors were often taking advantage of, and the credit for, the
success of projects implemented by national departments, national MPs or even international
donor organizations. Their closeness to the people further reinforced their influence and while
79
they may have been free riding on other provincial MPs or the national MPs, they used this as
a political score card against political opponents. Unlike the previous system where national
MPs could claim all the credit for the things they did, or which resulted from other
development initiatives such as national departments or international organizations, they now
faced competition from their provincial members (Reagan, 1997b: 61).
An important factor that led to the dominance of provincial government members
over national MPs was the reluctance of national MP’s to participate in provincial affairs. For
example, even though they were given the opportunity to attend provincial assembly
meetings, very few of them did so (May, 1997). This would eventually be to the disadvantage
of the national MPs because they spent much of their time in the capital. National MPs also
came to see that this also enabled provincial politicians to use this as a political advantage to
compete against them for the national seat in the national elections. This however was not
how they had envisioned things to be prior to decentralization. They also realized they now
had fewer resources to compete with their provincial rivals emerging from the provincial
governments.
The most affected national MPs were the backbenchers, who had very limited
powers since they were not ministers responsible for any portfolio in the national government.
80
This group of MPs began to realize that they were losing their powers to the provincial
politicians, to the extent that provincial members were yielding greater influence in the
province than them. This was particularly true for the Provincial Premiers12 who had much
more influence than most national MPs at the provincial level (Reagan, 1997b). In this
situation it was also a loss of influence as a Bigman in their area. Provincial politicians were
stepping in to dominate the scene resulting in a loss of Bigman status to national MPs. In
order to understand the impact of this on the decentralization system, we have to understand
the manner in which electoral politics is played in PNG. This will enable an understanding of
how this eventually led to the weakening of the decentralization process in the first phase
(1977 – 1995).
3.3 Electoral Politics in PNG
Part of the institutional development processes and aims had been to develop a
sound electoral party system. It was anticipated that a two or three party system would
develop from the process and dominate PNG’s political future. It therefore was anticipated
that voter support would then be aligned to these two or three dominant parties in the political
scenario. The party system however failed to develop, instead political support is rallied from
12 Provincial Premier is the head of the provincial government.
81
family, kinship ties, ethnic groups and clans (May, 2004). This is where the Bigman values
come into play and created competition between the national politicians and provincial
politicians.
The cultural diversity in the PNG has influenced the way in which PNG people vote.
Political power tends to become a competition between tribes, ethnic groups and regional
groupings (Reilly, 2002:704). Given this situation most MPs often do not see themselves
representing their entire electorate but rather they restrict their benefit distribution to
particular ethnic affiliations from which their votes comes. Great efforts are made to mobilize
clansman, tribal links and ethnic loyalties to garner the political support to elect a candidate
into office (Standish, 2013). Against this background citizens also tend to vote for candidates
whom they associate themselves with and as someone who they can have easy access to, once
he is in political office. It now depends upon the MP’s Pasin13 to secure support. Little
consideration is given to the candidate’s party, policies, personal achievements, or public life
activities. As a result Papua New Guineans have interpreted the practice of elections in their
own way (Fergussion, 2011). This has led to a growing emergence of "cash for votes" where
huge sums of money are given away in an effort to entice potential voters to support a
particular candidate (Ladley and Williams, 2007). This is not limited to money only but also
13 The MPs Pasin plays a very important role here,.
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involves other material goods as well.
The fact that customary groups in PNG had no established form of fixed or ordered
traditional institutions has also had a huge impact upon the electoral process. What has
emerged is the Pasin blo MP14 mentality (the way of the MP). This concept is largely based
on features of the Bigman values of sharing, caring, protecting ones supporters but has
become adapted to the electoral process. Candidates frequently confuse the elections process
of asking people to vote for them via such assistance, or acts which are somewhat bribery or
at least blatant pork barreling as they attempt to distribute wealth, power and other benefits to
their potential voters. This has repercussions as voters tend to view the political office as one
with infinite resources and see politicians as being in possession of abundant wealth. Voters
try to vote to get those with whom they have close customary or ethnic links to, into office to
enable them to access these huge resources from a successful candidate (Strathern, 1993).
Once an MP is in office voters expect to be rewarded by him. Barcson (2015) calls this the
Vote Base dilemma where expectations of the voters on the MP become a serious constraint to
effective electoral development.
But given the nature of the Bigman system in PNG, MPs are forced to behave in this
way or face the possibility of losing potential supporters. As a result MPs are placed in a
14 The MP’s Pasin
83
harsh dilemma, as often unrealistic demands are thrown at them but they also "acknowledge
the fact that they cannot maintain their power base without the support of their kinsman"
(Ketan, 2007:16). A simple realignment of supporters to a potential rival candidate from
within the area, tribe or ethnic group is often enough to see a candidate fail. Over the years
the number of candidates has been steadily increasing as more and more candidates seek
access to the state resources. This growing number of candidates can be clearly seen in Figure
7.
Figure 7: Increasing Number of Candidates Per Seat from 1977 - 2012
Source: Stephen Howes, 201215,
15 PNG’s elections: the most expensive in the world, and getting worse -
http://devpolicy.org/pngs-elections-the-most-expensive-in-the-world-and-getting-worse-20140512/29.08.2015 at
7.53pm
84
The attraction of the wealth that public office brings has attracted increasing
numbers of candidates, further strengthening the claim to maintain Bigman practices to
consolidate the voter base required to win public office. This Bigman mentality to consolidate
votes based on the MP’s Pasin has been a significant factor behind the competition between
national and provincial government politicians.
3.4 The Game, the Players and the Bigman Impact on the System
In order to understand this development, one has to understand the actors that are
involved and how this affected the outcome of the provincial government system in PNG.
There were three main groups of actors. In the first group was the national MPs, in the second
group was the emerging elites (local influential persons, successful businessman etc..) and the
final group was the citizens (Reagan, 1997a). The first group of actors prior to the creation of
the provincial government system had access to considerable monetary resources which they
used this to maintain voter support via the Bigman values noted above.
With the emergence of the provincial government, the second group emerged. This
second group, which was the emerging elites, however had closer links to the voters in the
districts and local places. With the introduction of the provincial government system they saw
85
an opportunity in which they could capitalize on and enhance their local status by drawing on
Bigman values to soliciting support by the Gutpla Pasin approach16. This aspect was further
strengthened by fact that within the provincial government system, most of the rural
development project funds were now allocated and controlled by the provincial governments.
This became a bitter issue amongst the national MPs and the new provincial members.
So, as explained earlier, credit was not given to where it was due, and credit was
manipulated by those provincial MPs against the national MPs to draw the people to favor
them in elections. Now the real dilemma that gave rise to this was based on the forces "which
influence and reflect the distribution and use of power and the effect of this on resource use
and distribution"(Reagan, 1997a: 57). Now that significant resources were concentrated in the
provincial governments, provincial politicians were now able to use this to develop their own
Bigman status in their smaller provincial electorates, whilst at the same time also claiming
credit for the tasks being undertaken by the national government. This led to the decline of
national MP status, especially those occupying the back benches. Reagan (1997b) observes
that provincial Premiers in particular exhibited this aspect as they now exercised much more
power and influence at the provincial level than the national MPs.
How is this linked to Bigman politics? As noted earlier, the whole nature of securing
16 Maintaining a good Pasin approach
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re-election in PNG requires maintaining support from the clan and is ultimately determined
by an MP’s Pasin (way of the MP). Previously the national MPs were able to establish
support without opposition or resistance. Furthermore they had more resources. As a result
they could cater to a lot of their supporters in this manner. But with the introduction of the
provincial government, factions from within their electorates began to emerge to lure their
supporters away as the nature of the Bigman system primarily depended on who was able to
give them benefits. In this case the new emerging leaders were able to do so much more than
the existing national MPs. Unlike the early system, the Bigman values of securing support via
Gutpla Pasin, was not that much active. However, with the emergence of the provincial
government system it became entrenched especially where strong inter clan/ethnic group
rivalries played out. Hence, the competition to maintain support via these values by both the
national politician against the provincial government politician became a struggle of who
could attract more supporters using the Bigman values of attracting people. On the other hand
the resources needed to attract people now had shifted from traditional valuables of shells,
pigs, women and food to modern day currencies of cash and material goods (often beer and
purchased imported food like rice and tinned fish). This was the main factor behind the desire
of national politicians for more control over fiscal resources which they were losing out on.
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If this situation is examined more intensely it can be seen that the introduced
decentralization system failed to foresee that this would occur. Since the Bigman system was
fluid it had no fixed operating structure. When examining the fluidity of the Bigman system,
it is essential to understand that there was no binding grip by the patron (the MP or the
candidate) on his clients (the voters). In order to understand the fluidity of the Bigman system,
one has to understand three fundamental aspects of it. The author has developed an approach
called the three W’s approach to further explain this. These three Ws are; what, where, and
when the Bigman activity takes place.
Going to the first W; what is the Bigman system? As explained earlier it was a system
based on achievements and not on a fixed order in the society. It was not inherited, but
instead it was achieved. Now going on to the second W, of where does this takes place? To
understand where this takes place one has to look into the fabric of PNG societies. As noted
earlier the PNG society is structured upon communal values where communalism is pursued
over individual needs. Against this backdrop, there is no element that binds the supporters
to the Bigman. Unlike other parts of the world where the patron has a hold over clients
through the control of land, religious affiliation, or the use of force, the Bigman does not
possess these powers. His power depends on how he can continue to provide help and
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resources to his clients. His support will enable him to also achieve the benefits of assistance
in terms of what he needs to maintain the support, but there is no binding element here. As
a result this makes it very fluid from the people’s perspective, as they are free to realign to
another Bigman without fear of repercussions from him, their the patron. Thus the patron
strives to maintain this status quo at all times. This brings us to the final W of when. When
does the patron need to demonstrate this? He needs the support of close followers to help him
meet his basic social obligations so the Bigman struggles to maintain this continuously.
Now since the PNG society is one in which almost every adult male owns the land,
and it was one which was traditionally not controlled by any religion, or by a local strong
man, the most common binding elements of patron-client relations is absent. Where the
Bigman must demonstrate his ability is locally when meeting the needs and social obligations
of his clan and larger affiliated customary group, such as at clan pig exchanges, bride price
ceremonies, gardening and hunting activities, funerals or other issues where his supporters
may require his support and his experience, wealth and oratorical skills. In the current day
scene the obligations are translated to the cost of a vehicle, plane tickets, school fees, funerals
costs, medical costs and other things which are beyond the capacity of the ordinary villager to
afford.
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As a result a new Bigman may emerge to lure away the current supporters with his
own assistance to spend and distribute more than the current one, to win over support. People
will support whichever Bigman can provide them with the most benefits. It is vital to
remember that most times support will also be influenced strongly by ethnic, clan and family
alignments. To a westerner this may seem to be quite limited. But from the PNG perspective
this can extend to cover a significant area and a number of people because family ties are
maintained for many generations from both the paternal and maternal side of families so may
cover a large area, depending on the Bigman’s genealogical connections and his ancestor’s
places of residence.
Therefore when the competition arose between national and provincial MPs, the
provincial government members were able to use the Bigman system of values to their
advantage as they were closer to their supporters, and could constantly assist them. This in
turn developed their Pasin, which was vital to being successful in elections. As noted by Fr.
Dambui the Premier of East Sepik Provincial Government in 1979, “my people believe in
village leadership [and] not party politics’ (May, 1997: 240). Dambui’s notion of village
leadership referred to the manner in which politicians maintained support of his/her people
through the Bigman values based on the agendas described above. They now also had the
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resources to do this. This proved to be a sore element to the national MPs who were at most
times away from their districts which were left to be manipulated by the provincial MPs in
various ways and commonly saw them defeated at election times.
In the fixed ordered systems, there is always a guarantee that the client will be forced
to support the patron because the patron will be able to make conditions for the client very
unpleasant. But the PNG Bigman does not possess this ability. Instead he has a constant
struggle to maintain supporters, especially when he has a rival within a same ethnic group. It
is therefore here that the persons Pasin in the PNG context is of utmost value and importance.
Numerous examples of candidates at election times in PNG attest to this fact when candidates
emerge from the same area or ethnic groups. As a result the provincial MP’s were able to do
so with the resources they had gained from decentralization (provincial governments), much
to the unhappiness of the national MP’s. And since it was fluid with no binding element,
realignment also depended on the candidates Pasin which led to very high turnover in sitting
members at election times (May, 1997).
Therefore the struggle for power depended on Bigman approaches to achieve
political victory in the new modern political system. However, as the system had not
originally been designed to cater for this, citizens would always gravitate towards their ethnic
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kin who was able to demonstrate the attributes of Bigman but with the use of modern forms
of wealth, beer, cars, women and money. As result of this the new system created conflict
between the two groups of leaders (provincial and national MPs), as they attempted to
maintain their Bigman influence with the people in order to secure seats in election times.
3.5 - Removal of the Provincial Government System
Given these circumstances numerous attempts were made by national leaders to
remove the provincial government system, that is to undo what had been done in the name of
decentralization. For example, Prime Minister Michael Somare attempted to remove the
provincial government system on several occasions between 1982 - 1984 (May, 2005). This
was greatly opposed by the Provincial Premiers and as a result of threats of secession, had to
be shelved.
In 1990 however a parliamentary committee named the Hesingu Parliamentary
Committee was tasked to evaluate the system. It recommended that provincial governments
be abolished and Local Government Councils be brought under the control and support of the
national government (May, 2005). This of course did not go down well with the Provincial
Premiers who once again reacted by countering a Premiers Sub Committee to evaluate
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provincial governments.
In 1992 Prime Minister Paias Wingti came into power. Wingti attempted to replace
the provincial government system with the Village Services Program (May, 2005). The aim of
this initiative was to purposely by pass provincial governments and go direct to the district
centers. Wingti also stressed that the membership of provincial assemblies be reduced as it
was a huge drain on finances. This culminated in a proposal to abolish the system in October
1992. Like previous attempts this was met with opposition by the provinces, even to extent of
possible formation of a separate state by the island provinces to be known as the Federated
Melanesia Republic (May, 2005). Wingti therefore reconsidered his approach and
established a Bi-Partisan Committee to undertake a review of the system, which made a
report in August 1993 to restructure the system. The committee proposed a restructured
system comprised of provincial authorities and national MPs. This again was rejected by the
Provincial Premiers with threats of secession. Finally in 1994 Prime Minister Julius Chan got
fed up with this political stalemate and took a hard stance on provincial governments. Chan's
decision was to threaten to charge those who opposed the removal of provincial government
system with treason. This was the final blow which removed the provincial government
system and ushered in the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments
93
(OLPLLG) in (May, 2004: 193).
3.6 Phase III: The 1995 Reforms -The Current System
With the termination of the provincial government system, the main actors became
limited to the national MPs. Through this process the power of the national MP was also
consolidated, strengthened and also become merged with the public service administration.
The 1995 Reforms were justified as a means to bring better service delivery to the
provinces (Kalinoe, 2009). However, the underlying reasons were more politically
motivated and were a way of removing political competition from the national members. This
was to have a profound impact upon the new reforms structure and organization (Reilly,
Brown and Flower, 2014: 23). Under this new system, the MPs sought to remove all potential
rivalries from the provincial government system. The prime objective was to consolidate the
powers of the national MPs and to allow them to maintain their Bigman status in their
electorates without opposition. Two notable changes implemented to address this were, (a)
the termination of provincially elected members in the provincial legislature and (b) the
establishment of joint committees as coordinating bodies. Figure 8 below shows the new
structure.
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Figure 8: The 1995 OLPLLG Structure
Source: modified by author from Edmiston.K.D,200217,.
Upon the establishment of the reforms all elected members of the provincial
assembly were terminated. As a result approximately 300-400 of the provincial electorates
were abolished along with it their members.
The membership of the provincial assembly was to now be comprised of the
17Edmiston.K.D,2002,Fostering Sub national Autonomy and Accountability In Decentralized Developing
Countries: Lessons From The Papua New Guinea Experience, Public Administration and Development.
Vol:22, pp:221–234 and Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments, Consolidated to No 29
of 1998
95
provincial MP (also known as Regional member or Provincial Governor), national MPs, LLG
heads in the province, a certain number of paramount chiefs where chieftaincy system exist,
one female representative and three other members appointed by the assembly when
necessary. The provincial MP is also the chairman of the assembly (OLPLLG, 1998, Section
10 3A).
The removal of the provincial government system also saw the abolishment of the
provincial department system. Permanent working committees were now created to replace
the provincial ministries. Each provincial government could setup as many committees as it
needed to undertake its functions.
The Provincial Executive Council now comprises the Governor (the provincial MP),
Deputy Governor (elected from the LLG heads in the provincial assembly) and the chairman
of each permanent committee, who are also appointed by the Governor. The main function of
the Provincial Executive Council is to implement legislation made by the assembly as well as
national government policies and laws at the provincial level (May, 2005; OLPLLG 1998,
Sect 23). An important role of the Provincial Executive Council is that it is now responsible
for establishing the Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities Committee (JPPBPC),
which had been set up in the reform process (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 25).
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The JPPBPC consisted of the chairman of each Joint District Planning and Budget
Priorities Committee (JDPBPC – hereafter referred to as the District Joint Committee) or
someone they appointed, three representatives where necessary and the chairman who is to be
appointed by the governor. The main purpose of the JPPBPC is to supervise all the planning
and budget processes in the provinces, which also involves submissions to the national
government for fiscal considerations. It is also tasked with allocating spending priorities in
the province, approving government budgets, preparing five year development plans for the
province as well as reviewing it (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 25).
From an administrative aspect, all government departments within the province
reverted back to their respective national departments. They therefore became basically
extension of the national government departments. However their operations at the provincial
level now fell under the supervision of the provincial administrator, who was now the
administrative head of the province, replacing the former provincial secretary (May, 2005).
The provincial administrator is appointed by the National Executive Council (PNG’s cabinet)
based upon three nominees nominated from the PEC. The provincial administrator’s role and
duties, apart from being the administrative head of the province, is to ensure the smooth
delivery of all public service functions within the province via supervision and monitoring
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processes. The provincial administrator is also responsible for planning, implementation and
maintaining strong relations and accountability between the district and LLGs in the province
(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 74).
3. 6.1The District Tier
At the district level certain changes also emerged. A notable change was the change
of name from Local Government Council to Local Level Government (LLG). A new
byproduct of the reforms saw the LLG heads now being elected by the people rather than
elected by their respective council members. Secondly, with the district tier also saw an
inception of the Joint District Planning and Budgeting Committee to be responsible for
district tier for overall planning, monitoring and allocation of fiscal resources in the district,
and to be chaired by the District MP. The new district tier structure is resembled in figure 7.
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Figure 9: The District Tier
Source: created by author.
At the district level there was an average of three to four LLGs. Each LLG is to have
an elected head, elected by the people and local members representing the people from the
council wards. Urban LLGs however are allowed representatives from certain groups such as
PNG trade unions, employers and women's representative OLPLLG 1998, Sect 26).
The District Joint Committee is now responsible for all planning, budget priorities
99
and fiscal estimates to provincial and national government. In relation to this it is responsible
for the approval and allocation of the budgets for LLGs. The membership of the District Joint
Committee consists of the district MP; who is the chairman, all LLG heads in the district, and
three nominated representatives appointed by the MP after consulting with LLG councilors.
The district administrator is the chief executive officer of the District Joint Committee
(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 33A). The District Joint Committee is also given significant role in
maintaining infrastructure, which had previously been a departmental function. As result the
departmental roles have became mostly confined to service delivery and consultation and not
maintenance for service delivery as the JDPBPC are now to look after this.
The district administration is to be under the administrative leadership of the district
administrator. Unlike the provincial administrator, the district administrator is appointed
following appointment procedures relating to appointment of public service officials in PNG.
The precise manner and practice is yet to be formally addressed via an Act of Parliament
(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 73). The role of the district administrator apart from being the
administrative head in the district is to ensure smooth delivery of services in the district,
implement provincial administrations functions when required to do so in the district, lead the
planning, policy formulation, and implementation of LLG policies (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 33A
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&106). In line with this it is the responsibility of the district administrator to implement any
resolutions undertaken and deliberated in JDPBPC meetings. It is the administrator’s duty to
also hold a District Management Team meeting with his/her respective heads of department
heads at the district level and convey their problems to the JDPBPC to deliberate on. On a
general note the administrative structure has basically extended the arms of the national
governments agencies down to the district level. Hence a single structured public service has
been formed but with different supervisors at each level. As a result most operate according
to departmental guidelines and objectives where applicable to their level.
3.6.2 Funding Arrangements
In order to be able to implement the newly developed functions several types of
grants were to be made available to the provincial and district level of governments and
administration18. Most of these grants provide for administrative costs, salaries and daily
operations. Development projects, maintenance of facilities were now to be funded from the
support grants allocated to the provinces, districts and LLGs in the forms of Provincial
18 These main types of grants are;(a) provincial and local level grants, (b) provincial infrastructure development
grants, (c) local level grants and village services grants, formulated according to population and features such as
land and sea area, (d) town and urban services grants, (e) provincial and local level staffing grants, for
administrative and salaries of public service grants were added later officials but controlled in the Port Moresby
(e) derivation grant, based the value of exports produced in a province (e) Provincial/ District Support Grants
and finally(e) supplementary grants, which could be allocated in times of emergency. Provincial, district and
LLG support
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Service Improvement Program (PSIP) and District Service Improvement Program (DSIP)
which are mostly aimed at new projects in each of their respective areas. In 2011 the LLG
Service Improvement Program grant (LLGSIP) was introduced for LLGs in the country.
The development support grants (PSIP/DSIP) for the province and district however
have a somewhat biased allocation format. For instance, it is required that half of these funds
be paid to the JPPBPC/JDPBPC and the other half to the MP responsible for spending at his
discretion within the guidelines of fund usage. May (2005) notes that this has been abused in
most instances by most MPs with only a very few merging it with the general
JPPBPC/JDPBPC allotment for it to be allocated to projects.
3.7 Decentralization Conclusion
The decentralization process in PNG basically underwent three main phases. The
first phase involved an introductory process of setting up these institutions, in the second
phase independence and emergence of social forces threaten to split the newly emerging
country apart resulting in the provincial government system being rapidly unrolled. This
created political competition between national and local politicians for the political
supremacy in local areas, fueled by the infiltration values of the Bigman system into the
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electoral politics of PNG. Given this emergence national MPs began to seek the abolition of
the provincial government system to remove the political rivalries posed by provincial MPs.
Given this situation the system sought to establish the role of national government
MPs, rather than provincial politicians over provincial politicians by placing them in key
positions of power at the district level in their electorates. This approach greatly weakened
the system, enabling the same person to be involved at all three tiers of government in PNG.
At the same time it sought to bring the national MPs into the administration process, thereby
merging politics into administration, and further weakening the fundamentals of effective
service delivery in which politics should be separated from politics.
The impact of the Bigman system onto the decentralization process was therefore
rooted in electoral politics and the need for political support at the local levels in their
electorates. Since the system was fluid and not rooted in any binding forms of patron client
relations, it was easy for the people to realign with emerging potential candidates whom they
could get the most benefits from. This essential factor posed a great threat behind the political
competition and resulted in the abolishment of the provincial government system. The
national governments MPs were successful in reasserting their position in the new system,
which has made them more dominant, influential and powerful at all levels of government,
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but has not put in the necessary powers of participation for local participation, monitoring and
accountability to keep them in check. The new reforms have made the national MPs very
powerful but the election values that brought them into office are still the same and are very
much grounded in Bigman values. This weakened system has produced little results and has
had a profound and negative impact upon rural development across PNG as will be
demonstrated in Chapter four.
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Chapter Four: Study Site Findings
4 Introduction
In Chapter Three an overview was made of the decentralization process. In the
course of doing so, it threw light onto the new system of decentralization that emphasizes the
role of national politicians across all three tiers of government. This is not only in politics but
also in the administrative arena as well. This chapter shows how these changes have played
out in a case study site, Dreikikir sub district. This will lead up to a discussion and analyses in
Chapter Five to demonstrate how the district tier has become affected by Bigman infiltration,
leading to poor rural development outcomes.
This chapter is structured into four sections. Section 4.1 is a background of the study
site, Section 4.2 summarizes the district operations and structure, Section 4.3 explains the
research procedures at the study site; and Section 4.4 describes the problems found during the
research at the study site.
4.1 Background of Study Site
The sub-district of Dreikikir is located in the Ambunti-Dreikikir Open Electorate in
East Sepik Province. The sub-district of Dreikikir was chosen as the case study area as it
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offers a good insight into how the decentralization reforms are not achieving effective rural
development given the plight of the current plight of the people for several reasons. Firstly,
the district is classified as one of the least developed districts in PNG (National Economic
Fiscal and Fiscal Commission, 2004:23). Secondly, the Dreikikir sub-district is a rural district,
and it is not located near any large scale industrial projects, commercial activities, resource
extraction activities (mining, oil, etc ...) or large scale agriculture enterprises such as palm oil
plantations. Finally all the LLGs located in the sub district are rural LLGs and not urban or
located inside metropolitan areas. As result this offers a good test to analyze the reasons why
the 1995 decentralization reforms are failing to deliver effectively to such rural populace. The
sub-district is also where the author was born and went to primary school, which facilitated
access to individuals working in different parts of government.
Geographically the electorate consists of two different types of physical
environment.
106
Figure 10 - Location of East Sepik Province in PNG
Source: Maphill 201519
19 Source: http://www.maphill.com/papua-new-guinea/simple-maps/political-map/political-shades-outside/
accessed on 26.01.2015 at 6:29 pm
107
Figure 11 - Location of Study Site in East Sepik Province
Source: Sjroe, 201520
The Ambunti-Dreikikir Electorate was created in 1995 as part of the Organic Law
reforms. It is symptomatic of the poor administrative outcomes that resulted from the reforms
in many places, and is evidence that the reforms had political rather than administrative
motives. The electorate contains two small administrative centers, Ambunti and Dreikikir
(both formerly Australian patrol posts), which are not connected by road. Ambunti, is a small
administrative centre located on the Sepik River. It is surrounded by a largely swamp area,
and the Sepik River. It is not accessible by road, but by the Sepik River in canoes or motor
20 Source: http://www.sjroep.org/category/mainpage/page/14/ accessed on 26.01.2016 ed on 26.01.2015 at
6:00 pm
108
powered boats. The surrounding population is culturally distinct from those at Dreikikir as a
Sepik River people. Dreikikir on the other hand is located in hill country positioned along the
middle of the Torricelli coastal mountain range (Ambunti Dreikikir District Office, 2008).
The Sepik Highway (a national road) runs from Wewak to Lumi via Maprik, and passes
through the middle of the sub-district. Most people in the sub-district live within an hour’s
walk of a road. The population live in small villages of around 500 people and are shifting
cultivators, depending on yams, bananas and sweet potato as staple foods. To travel from
Dreikikir to Ambunti, a person must take a vehicle to Maprik, then another vehicle to Pagwi
on the Sepik River. Then a canoe or a motor boat to Ambunti. This study is based on the
Dreikikir area and not Ambunti.
The sub district of Dreikikir covers an area of 1200 square kilometers with a
population of approximately 35,000. The average population density is approximately 3.6
persons per square kilometer (ibid). The daily lives of the people rotate around subsistence
agriculture which is their main source of food via shifting cultivation practices, producing the
main staple crops. Like most areas in PNG land is owned via customary land tenure by
patrilineal dominated descent groups. Land is not surveyed and nor is ownership registered.
Access to land is administered within families at the village level via customary means.
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Cash income is earned from the production of cash crops and the sale of fresh food
in small local markets. Cash crops are the export crops of cocoa, Robusta coffee21, vanilla,
betel nut and mustard chewed with betel. The sale of fresh produce in small road side stalls
and small scale livestock activities such as chickens and pigs are important sources of cash
for women.(Hanson et al 2001:213). Dependency on the export crop sector, earnings are not
reliable and are very much dependent on international commodity prices which from the
point –of-view of smallholder growers, vary unpredictably. In the recent past for example,
vanilla prices peaked causing a short lived boom in vanilla production. Prices then fell below
that which most people see as making the labor of producing vanilla worthwhile. As result
most of the people incomes of less than a K150 ($US75) a year (Hanson et al 2001:209). A
small number of people operate small village businesses such as trade stores and less
commonly, public motor vehicles (PMVs) for transporting people. The largest commercial
activity in the area is cocoa drying facilities, usually owned and operated by clan groups, but
sometimes by families or individual business men. The recent introduction of the cocoa pod
borer has seen a decline in cocoa production. As a result income from cocoa has drastically
declined.
21 Robusta coffee is a lowland growing species of coffee. The price of Robusta coffee is
significantly lower than that for Arabica coffee which is grown in the PNG highlands, and for
cocoa. Hence, coffee production at Dreikikir is now moribund. Cocoa production varies,
depending on the international price. Cocoa pod borer has affected production negatively.
110
In the Dreikikir villages there is very limited access to services such as piped water,
reliable electricity and roads which can be travelled on in wet weather. Most people fetch
water from springs to which animals also have access with only a limited number using water
catchment tanks. The area has a distinct dry season when the tanks can go dry for some
weeks and springs must be used again. Village electricity is provided by portable generators
for special occasions. Solar kits are becoming more common. A government administered
diesel powered generators operates only at night time when there is fuel to power it.
The road network in the area largely consists of the main Sepik Highway and four
rural feeder roads and. The Sepik Highway maintenance is the responsibility of the national
government, but the feeders roads are supposed to be maintained by the district LLGs. The
feeder roads have deteriorated into mere bush tracks which when wet become muddy bogs.
The Sepik Highway is usually trafficable. Access to roads depends on the location of the
communities in relation to the roads. Most live within an hour’s walk from a rural road but as
most rural roads are impassable after rain their condition is a deterrent to service delivery to
villages (Ambunti Dreikikir District Office, 2008: 27).
The people of the sub district of Dreikikir live lives that are largely traditional. Their
food is produced solely with hand labor, but now with the use of modern tools such as bush
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knives, axes and spades. Some villages operate mobile saw mills to produce sawn timber.
Income obtained from cash crops is seasonal. Access to utilities such electricity and water is
very limited and irregular. Finally, the very poor quality of rural roads severely constrains
access to services and markets.
4.2 District Organization and Operation at Study Site
The administrative splitting of the electorate by the 1995 reforms has been described
above. As a result certain offices, such as the District Treasury and their public service
officers are located in Ambunti while others such District Education Office and the Education
Advisor, is located at Dreikikir.
112
Figure 12: District Organization and Operation at the Study Site
Source: Created by author
The 1995 reforms placed the JDPBPC at the top of the administrative system. Under
the JDPBPC was the district administration. This comprised the district department heads
who oversaw the functions of the national departments at the district level. These departments
113
became extensions of national government departments and as a result they were hired and
paid for by the national departments. But administratively they now came under the control of
the district administrator. The District Joint Committee became responsible for all planning
and budget priorities in the district. This included allocation of funds to LLGs and the
maintenance of essential infrastructure.
The district department heads supervise the numerous public servants positioned
throughout the district. Health and education officials (teachers) make up the greatest number
of public service officials located outside the district headquarters, with teachers being the
largest group. The other department officials are largely located in the district headquarters
and are much fewer in number.
The LLGs are more dependent on the district administration and the District Joint
Committee for funding than the departments, where personal salaries are paid from the
national headquarters. Each LLG has a support staff of about five people22. Each LLG has a
manager who is the administrative head of the LLG
Under this arrangement, the main function of the district departments located in the
districts is to perform the national functions, services and extension activities at the district
22 Source: Rowen Nim, June 24th 2015, email message, Department of Provincial and Local
Level Government, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
114
level. In the study site case this involves four main departments at the district level; Health,
Education, Police, and the Department of Agriculture and Wildlife. This includes of the
delivery of these functions into LLGs where required.
4.3 Research Procedures in Study Site
The first part of research involved a survey to determine the problems with service
delivery. A questionnaire was used, based on the framework explained in the methodology
review section. The survey was based on the PNG Index for Assessing Service Delivery,
Local Economy, Participation and Accountability at the local level in PNG. This was created
by the author by adapting two framework tools; Social Audit of Governance and Delivery of
Public Services from Pakistan and Governance for Local Development Index. The survey
aimed to make an assessment of the four main indices in the index created by the author. The
four main themes in the index are;
a) A rural development index which assessed service delivery of four sectors; health,
electricity, education and good drinking water. This had two indices, (a) accessibility
and (b) reliability;
b) A local economy index which assessed two things (a) the main driver of the local
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economy (b) problems faced;
c) A participation index which assesses the level of involvement (participation)which
citizens have in the district administrative, local level government and ward decision
making processes;
d) Accountability index which assesses the level of accountability towards citizens by
the district administration, local level government and ward officials.
The survey was undertaken in eleven wards23 in Dreikikir LLG and involved 110
participants. This involved ten participants per ward, of 40 % were males, 40% females and
20% local entrepreneurs involved in local business activities. The primary objective of the
survey was to assess service delivery outcomes from the citizens point of view and establish
what the problems in service delivery existed, as well the participation levels and
accountability practices.
From this, interviews were also conducted with eleven ward members from the
wards, as well as officials in the district and the provincial headquarters to establish why the
problems exist and how they came about. The results of this enquiry are presented in the
analytical section of the chapter after the findings from the survey are presented. This will
then go on to reveal how these problems are similar to those found in many parts of PNG
23 Wards 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 28 and 30
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resulting from the current reforms.
4.4 Findings in Study Site
This reveals the general access to services based on the survey undertaken.
Rural Development Index: Education, Health, Roads, Electricity and Piped Water.
Figure 13: Access to Education Facilities
Source: Created by author
Figure 14: Reliability of Education Facilities
Source: Created by author
117
Figure 15: Problems Identified (Education)
Source: Created by author
In the education sector, 100% of those surveyed had access to schools. But only 49%
of those surveyed thought the delivery of services was reliable. The problems identified in the
schools can be categorized into five; teachers do not teach properly, shortage of teachers,
teachers absent for no reason, poor school infrastructure and non- payment of school fees. Of
the five, more informants thought the problem of teachers not teaching properly was the
worst problem,, followed by poor infrastructure, shortage of teachers, high teacher absentee
and finishing with non-payment of fees. While there is reasonably good access to schools
more than half of the people interviewed think they do not perform their educational roles
118
reliably.
Within the health sector there are two agencies offering health services to villagers;
government or State services and faith based or Church health services. Wards 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7 and 28accessed the state operated facility whilst Wards 8, 9, and 30 accessed the faith based
managed facility.
Figure 16: Access to State and Faith Based Health Facilities
Source: Created by author
Figure17: Reliability of State Health Facility Figure18: Problems in State Facility
Source: Created by author Source: Created by author
119
Figure 19: Reliability of Faith Based Health Facility
Source: Created by author
Figure 20: Problems in Faith Based Facility
Source: Created by author
The survey revealed that the faith based operated health facility is more seen to be
more effective in terms of service reliability than the State health facility. The greatest
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problem identified by the survey participants in the state managed health facility was
“unreliable workers” followed by poor infrastructure, not enough staff and shortage of
medicines. In contrast to the State managed health services, the greatest problem identified in
the faith based health facility services was poor infrastructure followed by a lack of support
from district and LLG administrations, not enough staff, unreliable workers, shortage of
medicines and lastly land disputes over the land their facilities are built on.
The performance of workers is ranked third in the faith based health services
problems but is first place in the state health services. But poor infrastructure and not enough
staff are amongst the top three common problems identified in both the faith based and state
operated health services
Figure 21: Access to Grid Electricity Figure 22: Access to Piped Water
Source: Created by author Source: Created by author
The survey predictably, found access to electricity is largely nonexistent with only
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one percent having access to grid electricity which is unreliable as it operates for a limited
period during the night only. As for access to piped water there is no access to piped water in
the survey area apart from water catchment tanks and traditional water wells.
In this part of the index the main driver of the local economy which forms the basis
of those surveyed will be identified as well as the problems they face in their local economic
activities.
Figure 23: Local Economy Drivers Figure 24: Problems faced in Local Economy
Source: Created by author Source: Created by author
122
The main driver of the local economy is the selling of cash crops and fresh food,
with only a very limited involvement in small business activities and livestock rearing. A lack
of regular extension activities was the major problem identified by the participants, followed
by no proper venue to sell export commodities, bad roads, limited credit facilities and no
skills development
Figure 25: Participation Level
Source: Created by author
The survey found that there was a very high level of participation within wards. That
is the citizens and their individual ward representatives on the LLG have a high level of
interaction. Participation in this sense refers to their involvement in the decision making
affairs in the wards. This is to be expected as they live in the same small villages. At the
village level people participate fully in the decision making processes that govern their affairs
123
at the ward level. But there was no participation of the people in the LLG or in district affairs.
In fact most district administration decision and outcomes are hidden from LLG councilors
which results in no participation in district affairs of the ward representatives on the LLG.
Figure 26: Accountability Level
Source: Created by author
The accountability index (the degree of accountability towards the people by their
ward members) reveals similar results to that of the participation index. Accountability in this
context refers to the disclosure of the expenditure of public money in the wards, LLGs and
the district. There is no accountability from the LLG to the people or from the district to the
LLG. LLG Ward members interviewed said that the district administration rarely informs
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them of such matters. But they said they try to inform citizens in their wards about funding
matters discussed at LLG meetings.
The overall results of the survey are summarized below
Table 3: Access and Reliability of Services Provided
Source: Created by author
SERVICES
Accessibility Reliability
Education 100% 49 % Yes / 41 % No
Health 100%* 16 % Yes / 84 % No
Grid Electricity 0% 0%
Piped Water 0% 0%
Good Roads 100% * 37% Yes /63% No
Local Economy: Income
100 %
(Agriculture Based) Seasonal : Low and not steady
* Varied by distance from a road
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Table 4: Participation and Accountability
Source: Created by author
From the above results of the survey it can be seen that there exists a serious
problem in terms of delivering effective services in health, education, electricity and piped
water. High incidences of unreliability of the health workers and teachers highlight a problem
that is affecting service delivery to the people. Secondly, poor infrastructure in these
institutions is also affecting their effective functioning which is compounded by lack of
government support to faith based services are said to be more reliable than the state operated
services.
In the local economy the problem of weak extension activities, absentee staff ,
PARTICIPATION & ACCOUNTABILITY
Participation Accountability
Ward 100% 100%
LLG 0% 0%
District 0% 0%
(a) Only Administrative Accountability no Social Accountability
(b) No real participation in decision making process
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limited market access, poor transport infrastructure and limited credit access are the common
barriers identified. Finally the case of extremely limited accountability towards the citizens
and their lack of participation in the overall decision making processes is a serious cause of
concern.
The situation revealed in the survey from the study site however is not limited only
to the study site and is similar to that in many parts of PNG. As noted in section 3.1.4
(development challenges in PNG) of chapter three, there has been a great challenge in the
implementing good development outcomes to the majority rural citizens of PNG..
4.5 Problems from the Official’s Perspective
In section 4.4 problems in service delivery and accountability and participation were
identified from the peoples’ point of view. These problems have been categorized into five
main categories by the author; staffing, poor infrastructure and supplies, limited
administrative support, no participation and accountability to the people and finally poverty.
These problems are however from the people’s point of view.
In order to understand the impediments that enable these problems to thrive, the
views and opinions of the public service officials involved in the lowers of administration and
127
local level government must be taken into consideration. Hence the interviews conducted
with them sought to establish these. Based on the interviews, the following problems were
seen as the main factors contributing to these problems. Figure 27 shows the most likely
issues that to hinder the LLG and Ward officials.
Figure 27: LLG & Ward Members Issues
Source: Created by author
128
Figure 28: District Officials Problems and Issues
Source: Created by author
Figure 27 and 28 suggest that several problems affect ability of service deliverers to
effectively address problems with service delivery. The Dreikikir LLG Ward Members
identified ten major issues which they see as the problems affecting the five areas noted by
the people. These ten areas are; reliance on the district administration, unreliable LLG
funding from the District Joint Committee, unproductive district officials, a lack powers to
hire and fire local staff, administrative politics, lack of cooperation between wards, , limited
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understanding of formal government practices at LLG, district and District Joint Committee
levels, insufficient staff, misuse of funds by district officials and no skills training of ward
members.
In contrast, the district officials interviewed identified twelve main problems which
they think affect the district performance in these matters. These twelve are; administrative
politics, administrative nepotism, weak operational structures, manipulation and control of
outcomes by the MP, the small revenue base, unreliable grants and dependence on the MP,
District Joint Committee for funds, dependence on provincial and national government grants,
limited staff capacity, diversion of funds by District Joint Committee to unplanned projects,
environmental constraints and no power to hire and fire local staff.
It can be seen that many of these problems are beyond the control local level elected
officials like LLG councilors. Some problems, such as abuse of funds by district officials, is
not only within their control, but is the outcome of their actions. Therefore in order to
understand these problems and the causes, the author developed a table that looks at the
problems from the people to administration and the likely reasons behind these problems.
Refer to Appendix 2 for the full table. In this table several key factors have been noted as
those responsible for the failures identified by ward members and district officials. These
130
factors are categorized into six main categories which are;
1) weak legislation,
2) fiscal dependency on higher tiers of government, administration, JDPBPC
3) corruption and elite capture,
4) weak operational structures,
5) patron client politics; cronyism, manipulation and party politics and,
6) natural environmental constraints
These six categories can be categorized into, two main areas; controllable and
non-controllable. On the non-controllable side there is the fact that natural the environment
(terrain and weather) is a constraint to the decentralization efforts. The former
Ambunti-Dreikikir MP, Judah Akesim explained how this affected his development
attempts24. On the controllable side the problems can be looked at from the three areas of
24In a discussion with former MP Judah Akesim it was revealed that one of the greatest challenges that he faced as
an MP was the challenge of delivering to different geographic areas (the Sepik River and the foothills) with same
funds as other MP's. On a country wide scale natural environment problems has been a great challenge to both
the districts and LLGs to implement projects across the country. Evidence of this can be seen in numerous
literature such as the ADB (2012b), AUSAID (2009),UNDP (2007a) and others noting the challenges to develop
infrastructure , move equipment and logistics across the length and breadth of PNG.
131
decentralization.
4.6 Analyzing the Problems from Decentralizations Perspective
The remaining five factors; weak legislation, weak operational structure, fiscal
dependency on higher tiers of government/administration, corruption and elite capture and
politics; cronyism, manipulation can be categorized as problems within the three areas of
decentralization. That is they are either problems in administrative, fiscal or political
decentralization as noted below in table 5.
Table 5: Categorizing the Problems
Source: Created by author
CATEGORY PROBLEM
Administrative
Decentralization
(a) Weak Legislation
(b) Weak Operational Structure
Fiscal
Decentralization
(c) Fiscal dependency on higher tiers of
government/administration/JDPBPC
Political
Decentralization (d) Corruption and elite capture
(e) Patron client politics; politics, cronyism, manipulation
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4.6.1 Weak Administrative Decentralization
In administrative decentralization, the enabling legislation is the main source of
power that establishes public institutions. This is because the legislation establishes the
parameters in which institutions may operate, details functions and powers, and the financing
arrangements and other essential mechanisms required by institutions to function effectively.
In the case of Dreikikir sub-district several problems of effective administrative
decentralization are related to weak legislation. First is the responsibility over staff engaged
in the district and the manner in which they are appointed. Second, is the process by which
they are to be monitored and what is to happen if they are found to be not performing, for
example can they be replaced by local employees. Third, are the participation and
accountability mechanisms from the district and LLG towards the citizens. This mechanism
will be explained in the section on weak operational structures. Finally, is the limited power
of ward members to influence things at the district level.
In case of staffing the survey identified that there was a significant problem with
unreliable staff who were seen by the people as often times not present at their places of work.
Ward members and district officials explained that they were unable to deal with this issue as
they had no powers to manage staffing. This is because the staff are national government staff,
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employed, hired and paid for by the national government. The 1995 Organic Law on
Provincial and Local Level Government, Section 75 reads, “the staff of a district shall consist
of - (a) the officers of the National Public Service assigned to the Province for the purposes
by the Departmental head of the Department responsible"(Independent State of Papua New
Guinea, 1995:48). The management of these officers within the district is the responsibility of
district and provincial administrators respectively, as set out in Section 74 Section of the 1995
Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government, which states that the provincial and
district administrator are "responsible for the efficient management in the province [and
district]; (d) shall maintain supervision and direction, in accordance with an Act of Parliament,
over officers and employees assigned or otherwise employed to carry out the functions of the
National Government" as well as provincial and local level governments. Because these staff
are part of the National Government they fall under the responsibility of their respective
Departmental Heads. In this case the 1995 Public Service Management Act section 24
makes it clear that the responsibility of the department head shall be to oversee the well-being
of the department which includes the personal well-being of staff. The Provincial
Administrator can move officers around within a province or a district but only after
consultation with the department headquarters in the capital (Section 66, 1995 Public Service
134
Management Act).
Against this back drop it is ironic that Section 59 Clause A of the 1995 Public
Service Management Act reads, “the function of a ... local level administration in a province
(a) [is] to effect the administration required by the Organic Law of Provincial and Local
Level Government". In this case both the 1995 Organic Law of Provincial and Local Level
Government and the 1997 Local Level Government Administration Act stress a certain
amount of duties of which the local level government and local level administrations are
required to perform but none of them relate to how they are to monitor, hire or fire their staff.
Instead the power is placed in the hands of either the district administrator ,who also cannot
hire or fire but recommends to the provincial administrator who after consultation with the
respective departmental heads, can decide whether to hire or fire (Section 76 Clause 2, 1995
Organic Law of Provincial and Local Level Government; Section 66, Public Service
Management Act). In addition to this is fact that several key areas of staffing have not been
clarified. On the contrary they are waiting for an act of Parliament to be made to determine
and clarify matters relating to officers at the district level, which has been not been
undertaken so far. A good example of this is the case of teachers in districts in Section 76
Clause 3 of the 1995 Organic Law of Provincial and Local Level Government.
135
As result the local administration and LLG is quite powerless to deal with staff who
do not perform because there is no enabling legislation detailing the structure and operation i
which will enable them to hire or fire. It instead makes them dependent on higher tiers of
government. The Dreikikir Finance and Administration Officer25 pointed out that the district
administration only makes recommendations for potential appointees to the provincial
administration and it is up to them to deliberate on the recommendations and to confirm them
with the district office. This has made staffing positions vulnerable to cronyism by provincial
level authorities. A good example of this is the current Dreikikir LLG Project Officer who is
poorly educated and lacks the appropriate skills for the position but is the son of a high
ranking provincial officer. The Dreikikir Health Extension Officer26commented that there was
shortage of qualified manpower in the district but the provincial and national departments had
not identified them nor allocated them to the district. As result many of those holding
positions were old timers, past their retirement age who could not be retrenched because their
replacements had not been identified.
Another example of weak administrative decentralization which comes about
25 Dreikikir District Administration Finance and Administration Officer, October 2013,
Dreikikir District Office, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 262626 Dreikikir Health Extension Officer, October 2013, Dreikikir Sub Health Center, East
Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea
136
because of weak legislation is the manner in which the District Administrator is appointed.
The legislation is not clear how appointments to this position are to be made. Section 61 of
the Public Service Management Act notes the Department Head of the Department of
Personal Management is responsible for coordinating this appointment, should there be a
vacancy or the possibility of an upcoming vacancy in the District Administrators position.
The person making the appointment should be guided by the 1995Organic Law. But the
Organic Law is itself not specific about this procedure. It states in Section 75 Clause 3 only
that, the "District Administrator shall be appointed in the manner and following the same
procedures as applicable to appointment of officers of the public service", which in this case
refers back to the 1995 OLPLLG by Section 61 of the Public Service Management Act. This
Act has no clearly defined rules and regulations. Section 75 Clause 5 of the 1995 OLPLLG
states that “... an Act of Parliament shall make provisions for the selection criteria and
procedures of appointment". No such Act has been passed.
Weak operational structures due to weak legislation within administrative
decentralization are another issue. The way in which a administrative level is designed is will
sooner or later affect the operational outcome of an agency or department. In the case of the
Dreikikir sub-district it has been noted by both the Ward Members and district officials the
137
ineffective operating structure, seems to be caused by weak legislation, ineffective
implementation and lack of proper insight into what is needed. Three features can be noted:
first there is a weak operational link between the JDPBPC, the district administration, the
LLGs and their wards where participation and accountability are particularly non-functioning
Secondly, reliable agencies for the delivery of drinking water and electricity services are
non-existent. Also absent is any organization responsible for the promotion of the local
economy.
Section 33A Subsection 3 of the OLPLLG, made the JDPBPC the responsible agency
for overall primary planning and allocation of funds . But this requires effective coordination
between the district, LLGs and their wards, to produce effective plans and proposals that are to
be submitted to the JDBPC for planning approval and implementation. The ward members say
this is not happening. There has been no effective participation or involvement of the ward
members with district officials for formulation of. Although the Dreikikir District Finance and
Administration Officer said that the people were often consulted about projects in the district,
the survey found otherwise and revealed that there was in fact no participation by the people.
The very great majority of ward members said independently that district officials never
consulted them on issues affecting development at the ward level.
138
The origin of this problem is the complete lack of a proper avenue or structure that will
allow the people and the ward member to participate in the planning and development process
because there is no legislation to require this to happen. The only procedure stipulated in the
law relates to Ward Development Committees which are responsible for creating plans at the
ward level. Only one ward of the 11 wards surveyed at Dreikikir had a Ward Development
Committee. Ward members interviewed also indicated only a limited understanding of formal
government procedures, like the role and function of JDPBPC and said they had not received
any form of skills training from the LLG or the district (refer to figure 27). The Ward
Development Committee is the only link between the wards, the LLGs and the District and the
JDPBPC yet it and any form of development plans is absent in most wards. A way for citizens
and their ward representatives to interact with higher tiers of government as partners for
effective participation is missing from the district tier.
Very poor local accountability is also the outcome of poor organizational structures.
Whilst structural and functional accountability are maintained there is no social accountability
towards the ward members and citizens by the district officials.
At the district level a major issue is the absence of electricity and water supply. The
reasons for this is a lack of funding and a lack of qualified people to implement village water
139
and electricity supply projects. It is not even clear which district agency these two public
utilities fall under. The OLPLLG Section 44 Subsection E and F gives power to LLGs to make
laws over these services. Likewise the 1997 Health Administration Act Section 19 subsection
B gives the power provincial government to implement rural water supply projects. So there is
confusion as to who should be the rightful implementer.
Piped water supply requires basic engineering skills as well as significant funds for
implementation. The absence of a designated agency to take on this work has left a gap. In the
case of Dreikikir there has been several initiatives to launch a water supply project by a faith
based agency. But the district been unable to support an initiative by a faith based NGO
working at the LLG level. Such weak linkages are also seen in the case of faith based health
service haus marasin (medicine house) concept. In this case most ward members surveyed said
there was a failure of support between the LLG and district for the NGO, leading to the NGO
giving up on the implementation. A second example of this can be seen in the case of a rice
growing project initiated by IIJICA. In this case the rice a model farmer, Moses Taptehei27, said
that although the project itself was good and had the support of many people , the project died
when IIJICA funds were exhausted and no district or LLG support was offered to pick from
27 Moses Taptehei, Rice Model Farmer Dreikikir, 10th November 2014,Ngawih Village
Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea
140
where IIJICA left off. Smallholders were interested in growing rice but they had no milling
equipment and so were reluctant to grow rice because of the cost to transport their harvests to
mills located in Maprik. This is another example of how weak organizational structure fails to
respond to opportunities for local development. In reality, these projects rely on the MP to
initiate or to support initiatives because of the complete lack of any implementing agency at the
district level. If the MP is not interested or wishes to spend funds available to him elsewhere,
the projects fail.
Another example of a weak operational structure can be seen in the poor local
economy. The study site is rural one and depends on the sale of cash crops But people face
significant problems from the lack of agriculture extension services, marketing facilities, bad
roads and a lack of access to credit facilities. The Department of Land, Agriculture and Wildlife
(DALW) is only partly responsible because their role is restricted to extension activities and
does not apply to provision of credit, or export marketing. Road maintenance falls national
and local roads. At Dreikikir the Sepik Highway runs through the district and is a national
highway so is the responsibility of the national government. However the feeder roads in the
district are the responsibility of the district, but no agency looks after them or funds their repair,
so it falls back to the MP to take care of them. Mr Save Enade, Acting Provincial Transport
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Bureau Plant Manager28, explained, it is up to the MP to use his JDPBPC funds to maintain and
repair feeder roads, and whether they get repaired or not depends on his personal whims. Mr
Enade cited the case of several electorates in his home province of East New Britain which had
been able to implement an excellent road maintenance policy with the enthusiastic support of
MPs.
Coming back to the matter of limited access to capital and market venues, it has been
explained that the local district and LLG has no effective agency responsible for these issues.
The case of marketing lies with the Investment Promotion Authority located in Port Moresby
and not the District. Secondly, the absence of capital facilities at the local level has left MPs
again shouldering the burden. As noted by Mr Rapheal Urugu 29 , Manager of National
Development Bank (NDB), Wewak Branch, rural Papua New Guineans generally lack a
savings culture and as result most of them had very little savings so had very limited access to
capital for agriculture projects. Now the NDBs role was to assist citizens to access funds from
loans but as most had limited savings, they had no equity to contribute towards the loans and so
were often refused credit by the banks.
28 Save Enade, Acting PTB Plant Manager, Works PTB Plant, Wewak, 15th October 2014, Dreikikir
East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 29RaphealUrugu, Manager National Development Bank, Wewak Branch, 14th October 2014, Dreikikir
East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea
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These examples demonstrate that both the LLG and district administration are not
empowered to find markets nor provide credit. The 1995 reforms has not given them the
administrative powers or the responsibility to do so.
4.6.2 Weak Fiscal Decentralization
Effective fiscal decentralization is a key ingredient in the implementation of
effective decentralization outcomes. However from the case study findings it can be seen that
there is weak fiscal decentralization. Instead there a fiscal dependency on the higher tiers of
government, administration and particularly within the District on the JDPBPC, as both the
district and LLG do not have the capacity to generate their own revenue.
When looking at the local revenue base, the 1995 OLPLLG allocates only certain
areas in which LLGs can collect revenue. It is stated in Section 87 of the OLPLLG that LLGs
may collect five main types of taxes and fees; community service taxes and fees, taxes on
entertainment venues, general trading licenses (excluding banks), local animal licenses,
corporation and personal head tax and other taxes allocated to it by the national or provincial
government. In this case districts and LLGs often times do not collect many of these taxes
because the local economy is often weak and unreliable as a source of significant funds. The
143
case of Dreikikir LLG offers a good example where most revenue collected is from trade store
licenses, animal fees and other small scale business activities such as selling of second hand
clothes or fuel30. Evidence of this can be seen in Table 6.
Table 6: Types of Funds Available to the LLG
REVENUE SOURCE 2012 2013 2014
Locally Generated Revenue
(Trade Store Licenses,
Rental of Assets, Village
court fines)
K 23,200.00
(15.88 %)
K 20,100.00
(18.22 %)
K 23,400.00
(21.13 %)
Provincial Grants (PSIP) K 100,000. 00 K 100,000.00 K 100,000.00
National Government
Grants (LLG Grants) K 195,100. 00 K 196,200. 00 K 321,100. 00
District Grant (DSIP) K 50,000. 00 K 50,000. 00 K 50,000. 00
TOTAL K 368,300.00 K 366,300.00 K 494,500. 00
Source: Dreikikir LLG Records, obtained from the Dreikikir LLG Manager, June, 2015
30 Dreikikir LLG Manager, November 2014, Dreikikir LLG Council Chambers, East Sepik
Province, Papua New Guinea
144
This revenue however is not adequate for any large scale projects but only for basic
stationary equipment and assisting with ancillary staff payments from time to time. Another
interesting case noted by also here was the inability to recuperate certain revenues from the
LLGs investments due to local power relations. In this case some buildings owned by the LLG
and its staff houses have been used for some time now by a former council Project Officer.
Request to make payments has not been responded to for two reasons. Firstly, a former Project
Officer attached to the LLG had generated significant debts with the occupants of the LLG
rented facility, so that when the officer left the LLG without repaying the debts, the creditors
moved into the LLG staff house and would not move out. They also stopped paying rent for the
LLG building they were using, citing that they were retrieving the debt owed to them by the
former project officer. The LLG Manager was hesitant to insist on payment because he came
from another area which was weaker in terms of sorcery, whilst the occupants of the LLG
rented facility came from an area which was known for powerful sorcery. As result this local
power relations affected effective collection of the revenue.
Most of Dreikikir LLG revenue comes from government grants and the JDPBPC and
not from locally generated revenue. It comprises less than 22% of the yearly revenue for three
consecutive years, and the grants are three times the value of revenue raised locally.
145
Two of the grants originate from the provincial and the national government whilst the
third comes from the district. In the case of the provincial and national government grants, the
main problem has been the unreliability of the grants, which often arrive late or in reduced
amounts. This was also raised as a problem by both the LLG Ward Members and district
officials interviewed (refer to figure 27 & 28). On the other hand the district funded DSIP
grants follow no fixed formula for allocation to the LLG but it is allocated on an adhoc basis by
the district and the JDPBPC to the LLG and the amount being decided seemingly on the whim
of the MP.. In the case of district allocation to LLG, the Finance Administration Officer for
Dreikikir District31said that it should be based upon resolutions made in LLG meetings and
submitted to the district as planning proposal. But if there is no proposal submitted to the
district there is no grant allocation to the LLG. The case of the JDPBPC allocation on the other
hand is accorded to it by law, Section 33A, Subsection B which gives the JDPBPC the power "
to determine and control budget priorities for Local - level Government" and Subsection D
which is "to approve Local-level Government budgets for presentation to the Local-level
Government and make recommendations concerning them" (Independent state of PNG, 1995:
21).
31 Finance and Administration Officer Dreikikir, November 2014, Dreikikir District Office,
East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea
146
All over PNG the LLGs depend upon higher tiers of government for funding. For
example, nearby Maprik LLG in July complained to a national newspaper that it had yet to
receive its LLGSIP grants for the 2013 (K 500,000.00), 2104 (K 500,000. 00) and 2015 (K 100,
000. 00) totaling to approximately K 1.1 million (The National, Wednesday, July 1st 2015).
The LLG President for Maprik LLG said this affected their l plans and performance in service
delivery. In another case Kutubu LLG President John Kila in Southern Highlands Province,
told a national television news program that the decrease of the LLGSIP funding by the
National Government from K 500,000. 00 to K 100,000. 00 was affecting their performance in
essential areas such as agriculture as they focused on more essential needs (Bridgette
Komatep32, Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby).
The District is entirely dependent on governmental funds. Since it is mainly and
administrative body comprised of extensions of national government departments it depends
entirely on intergovernmental transfer of funds and does not have any form of local revenue
provisions in the law unlike the LLGs. Thus is often subjected to untimely arrival of funds and
32 Bridgette Komatep32, Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby)
http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Kutubu-LLG-President-Increase-LLG-Funds& accessed on
29.09.2015 at 6.45 pm
147
the JDPBPC discretion.
When looking at the general PNG picture it can be seen that the LLGs in general
depend upon higher tiers for funding. For example, Maprik LLG in July noted that it had yet to
receive its LLGSIP grants for the 2013 (K 500,00.00), 2104 (K 500, 000. 00) and 2015 (K 100,
000. 00) totaling to approximately K 1.1 million (The National, Wednesday, July 1st 2015).
The LLG President for Maprik LLG has noted this affected their general plans and
performance in service delivery. In another case Kutubu LLG President John Kila in Southern
Highlands Province, raised the issue that that decrease of the LLGSIP funding by the National
Government from K 500, 000. 00 to K 100, 000. 00 was affecting their performance in essential
areas such as agriculture in LLG as they focused on more essential needs (Bridgette Komatep33,
Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby).
Dependency on the higher tiers of government has created problems of poor
infrastructure, broken down equipment, a shortage of equipment and so forth. Furthermore this
shortfall is largely linked to fiscal issues faced in the LLG and district administration. The
33 Bridgette Komatep33, Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby)
http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Kutubu-LLG-President-Increase-LLG-Funds& accessed on
29.09.2015 at 6.45 pm
148
manner in which the JDPBPC has emerged as an overseer for development planning, and
allocation of the DSIP development funds has further weakened Districts and LLGs. As noted
by Kalinoe (2009) based on survey covering six provinces, the emergence of the JDPBPC has
resulted in a diminished role for the LLGs. Kalinoe also notes that both the Districts and LLGs
suffer from unreliable funding and politicization of funds. As a result most LLG's and District
operate on a hand to mouth basis.
4.6.3 Weak Political Decentralization
The political decentralization undertaken in PNG is paradoxical. It can be seen that
political decentralization has been dominant. It has reinforced the role of national MP's in the
decentralization process, particularly at the District tier. Evidence of this can be seen in several
forms. Firstly is the manner in which the JDPBPC has been structured (refer to figure 12). of
the merging of the political in to the administrative is unclear and open to interpretation.
Secondly, the role of the JDPBPC as main planning and financial controlling body in the
District with the MP's as the designated chair by law give s the MP a great deal of power to
direct benefits within the electorate at his will. Finally the control over the DSIP grants, of
which 50% are MPs discretionary funds, further increases the powers of the MP. Political
149
decentralization has been weakened by this development because the strengthening of power of
MPs has come without the proper checks and balances. National MPs have much greater
powers than any local political figures with a district, such as LLG Chairs..
This dilemma is significant in the voting behavior in PNG where Bigman status is a
key ingredient. MP's have used their new powers to exploit the weaknesses in administrative
and fiscal decentralization to direct resources to their supporters within the electorate.
Evidence of this can be seen in several cases.
Firstly, in order to manipulate outcomes both in the JDPBC and the district tier there
is a need for a District Administrator who is aligned politically with the weaknesses in the
administrative decentralization in regards to legislation over the hiring of staff, particularly
the District Administrator has allowed MP's to appoint a District Administrator of their
choice.
In the case of Dreikikir District there are two examples of this, in the first34 a local
public service official who was linked to a former MP through family ties was appointed as
the District Administrator, on recommendations from political cronies. This man later
misappropriated a significant portion of the district development funds and fled to his home
34 Interviewee confidential, November 2014, Dreikikir, East Sepik Province, Papua New
Guinea
150
province. In the second case, which is currently pending, two District Administrators have
been appointed in Ambunti-Dreikikir, one appointed by the local MP and other appointed by
the provincial administration (The National, Wednesday March 11th, 2015, MP Warns Public
Servants). In this case the District Administrator appointed by the provincial administration
was a former political opponent of the current MP. This man refused to carry out the MPs
allegedly illegal directions leading to the MP to appoint his own District Administrator. The
man appointed by the MP appointed has allegedly been linked to significant abuses of district
funds. The blatant attempts to manipulate the appointment process by the MP can be seen
clearly in this case.
Such incidences are not limited to Dreikikir with examples from other parts of the
country. The appointment of two provincial administrators in Rabaul, East New Britain
Province by two different MPs, the Regional MP and a local MP who was serving as Governor,
as the Governor was serving as the Deputy Prime Minister and hence was ineligible for the
position of Governor (Mapun Pidian, PNG LOOP, 24.07.2012, Bureaucratic Mess in East New
Britain Province). Numerous other situations exist in PNG where MPs have appointed
administrators both district and provincial taking advantage in weaknesses in the legislation.
The politicization of key personal such as district administrators helps MPs to control
151
and use the fiscal resources of the district. Since there is a strong fiscal dependency by LLGs
and the district on the JDPBPC, the funding of individual LLGs becomes prone to
manipulation, politicization and abuse. Evidence of this can be seen in the politicization of
funds affecting the budget allocation to LLG and districts. This has been noted by several
district officers and is one of the highest factors noted by the problems identified by district
officers in figure 25. Such a view is strongly supported by former Dreikikir LLG President35
who notes that the JDPBPC is only good at making resolutions but not at implementing them.
Instead we have cronies receiving funding for proposed projects, he said. The District Finance
Administration Officer36 also said that some projects are allocated funds without discussion by
the JDPBPC and the allocation of funds is based on cronyism and nepotism. Evidence of this
can be seen in allegations that cronies of the MP received JDPBPC funds more than once to
establish a trucking business.
In another example 37; a District Administrator acquired a significant portion of the
district funds, (the exact figure is not known, but it is estimated to be over K 100 000.00
(US$ 30 000.00)). The district administrator had previously been appointed on the basis of
35 Mr Leo Manarip, Former Dreikikir LLG President, October 2014, Dreikikir Station, East Sepik
Province, Papua New Guinea 36 Finance and Administration Officer Dreikikir, November 2014, Dreikikir District Office, East Sepik
Province, Papua New Guinea 37 Interview Confidential, Tumam Village, November 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua
New Guinea
152
cronyism ties. Up acquiring of funds he fled to his home province where he is said to have
started his own private business from the funds obtained. In another example an LLG Manager
stole LLG Funds ranging between K 30 – 40, 000. 00 (US $ 10 – 20, 000.00). In this case an
LLG President intervened and sacked the LLG manager but the funds were never recouped38.
In yet another example another district administrator was also accused of stealing significant
development funds. When he failed to make proper acquittals the former MP had to intervene
to facilitate his removal from office. Finally, we have the case of a local DALW Field officer39
who has misused approximately K 50 – 60, 000.00 (US$ 15 – 20, 000.00) of funds that should
have been spent on district development. The officer later fled the district to the provincial
capital and resides there now for fear of retribution from citizens in the district. In all this cases
significant development funds were stolen, or directed into personal accounts for personal gain,
at the expense of the people. When this happens the district and LLG are unable to deliver their
planned programs. Infrastructure is not maintain, roads become impassable. ,. The crimes can
be linked to poor local accountability and failed participation structures. The lack of proper
legislation on how to recuperate such monies has made it an easy pick for local officials.
38 Ward One Ward Member, Tumam Village, November 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua
New Guinea 39 Interview Confidential, Dreikikir Station, November 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua
New Guinea
153
Such incidences are not isolated to the study district. A good example of such
abuse can be seen in the case of Madang District Project Officer who misappropriated a
significant portion of development funds from two districts; Madang and Kiriwina. The officer
was found to be guilty of 11 charges out of a total of 19 (Sally Pokiton, 14 April, 2015, PNG
Loop). In another instance an LLG President of Albigles Mamblep in Maprik
misappropriated approximately K 500,000.00 of LLG funds for personal gain resulting in his
LLG and Wards being affected greatly40.
Misuse of funds is not restricted to public servants. In a recent case the Governor of
Gulf Province, Havila Kavo was alleged to have misused K130,000.00 (Post Courier,
September 14, 2014, Gulf Governor found guilty of misusing K 130 000. 00 of trust funds).
Examples of abuse by funds MPs are many and can be found throughout the length and breadth
of PNG. However it is the elite capture of benefits that also restricts the much needed funds for
the local tiers of government, particularly the district and LLG sector. In this scenario the
absence of proper local accountability structures and the poor monitoring approaches by
national government agencies have led to wide scavenging of public funds.
Weak operational structures in administrative decentralization has also further opened
40 Rowen Nim, June 24th 2015, email message, Department of Provincial and Local Level
Government, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
154
up opportunities for MPs to pursue Bigman politics instead. Because there is no proper agency
for funding roads, electricity, or water supply at the district tier, it becomes the responsibility of
the MP as the chairman of the JDPBPC to provide funds. This has been the case in East Sepik.
Zaza Zibe41 a Senior Lines Inspector at PNG Power Provincial Headquarters in Wewak says
that rural electrification programs depend upon MPs initiatives. Mr Zibe noted that LLGs and
districts alone could not implement this as they lacked the funds required whilst the MP could
do so as he was in charge of the JDPBPC. This was demonstrated in the Yangoru Sausia
electorate where the former MP Peter Wararu initiated a rural electrification project which was
later carried on by the current MP, Richard Maru. An interesting point in this example is that
because of the absence of local implementing agencies the MPs took charge from initiation to
implementation. The MPs did not call for tenders and accept the lowest tender, but used their
own private contractors which leaves them open to accusations of kickbacks to the MPs from
the contractors.
Another example is credit schemes offered by the District joint Committee in the case
study area. Mr Raphael Ururu42, has described how the District joint Committee stepped in to
41ZazaZibe, Senior Lines Inspector, 14th October 2014, PNG Power Provincial Head Quarters,
Wewak East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 42RaphealUrugu, Manager National Development Bank, Wewak Branch, 14th October 2014, Dreikikir
East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea
155
assist people to access micro credit loans as there was no proper agency to deal with this at the
local level. As a result MPs took steps to use development funds to set up a credit assistance
schemes to provide for this equity to enable people to access loans. When this was done it came
down to drawing up the details between the JDPBPC and the bank. However the bank manager
argued that it was best to leave the overseeing of the loans to the bank and not the politicians
which the MPs resisted.
At Dreikikir the recipients of the credit scheme were mainly from the same ethnic area
as the MP whilst the majority of loan applicants missed out. The majority who missed out
allege did so because they were from areas that were not politically aligned to the MP. They
say the MP was using this loophole to manipulate the District joint Committee to serve his
interests. I label this sort of actions as the maintenance of Bigman status.
Therefore basically the decentralization process had led to the reinforcement of the
role of the national MP at the local level. These weaknesses in administrative decentralization
allow the MP to manipulate the district administration, to access funds via the District joint
Committee and to maintain his status as a Bigman which is essential if the MP is to be
re-elected. But such actions also greatly disadvantage the development outcomes in the district
and LLGs.
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4.7 Conclusion of Study Site Findings
This chapter has revealed a wide array of problems associated with decentralization at
the district, LLG and ward levels. The problems can be categorized into three; political, fiscal
and administrative I have tried to show that that weak legislation has contributed to creating a
weak administration system in terms of administrative organization. Apart from this weak
legislation has also made the district and LLG fiscally dependent on higher tiers of funding,
particularly on the District joint Committee. From the political aspect, it can be seen that the
role of national politicians has become more reinforced at the district level, and given them
more control over key institutions, such as the District joint Committee and the control of fiscal
resources in the District joint Committee. Furthermore this has blurred the line between politics
and administration, with the District joint Committee becoming the head of the district
administrative structure since most of its members are political figures but they have become
responsible for administrative control of, planning and the allocation of funds. This has created
a problem in the electoral process because, given the nature of electoral politics in PNG and its
relationship with Bigman behavior, the use of resources to attract voters will have a drastic
impact upon rural development initiatives at the district tier
157
Chapter Five: The Impact of Bigman Infiltration on Rural Development at the District
Level
5.1 Bigman Impact
The prime objective of this dissertation has been to analyze why rural development is
failing under the current decentralization reforms in Papua New Guinea. The dissertation takes
the view that the reasons behind such weak outcomes cannot be attributed to institutional
failures only, as informal institutions may have contributed to the weak outcomes. So the
dissertation looked at how the system of administration emerged from its early colonial days up
till now to showcase how the Bigman values led to hijacking of the decentralization process.
This hijacking has made national MPs very dominant at the local tier. However, the
reforms also had certain problems from the three sectors of decentralization as noted in Chapter
Four. These have had a profound impact upon desirable rural development outcomes when
Bigman politics has been played at the district level by MPs to maintain on-going political
support.
Since the Bigman system has no binding ties, political alignment to any MP becomes
fluid. Whilst most political localities “revolve around clan, local or ethnic divisions” (May,
158
2004: 46), there is no guarantee that supporters will be still loyal when the next elections come
around, due to the absence of the binding element between MP and supporters. So whether or
not an MP can maintain influence depends on his Pasin, that is how he/she can maintain
Bigman ideals of helping with school fees, funeral costs, and other minor matters which
supporters raise to him/her.
Given the situation that the 1995 Reforms have serious defects in them from the three
aspects of decentralization; political, administrative and fiscally, this has enabled the MPs to
become dominant and manipulative at the district level with much ease. This has led to poor
rural development outcomes in the districts. How have the MPs done this? They have
dominated and controlled the activities of their respective District Joint Committees. The
District Joint Committees were to be the main planning agency, for development affairs in the
district. This meant that such aspects of maintenance of infrastructure, decision making of
projects were to be implemented and the allocation of funds to respective sectors and projects
became the main function of the District Joint Committees, chaired by the MP. The roles of the
public servants in the districts have become largely confined to consultative purposes only.
However, in the absence of proper organizational structure linking all parties in the district
(district, LLG and Wards), weak legislation governing recruitment and termination of public
159
servants, as well as reliance on higher tiers of government for almost all funding, and the fact
that there is very limited participation and involvement by the people and accountability to
them, has allowed the MPs to become controlling of their respective District Joint Committees.
As a result the MPs firstly, frequently utilize the weak legislation on hiring and firing
to hire their own district administrators to enable smooth facilitation and control over fiscal
resources that should be controlled by the District Joint Committee. Evidence of this can be
seen in the following examples, where MPs themselves appointed key positions and district
administrators both from within the study site and other areas in PNG.
In the study district a former MP had a son who served as his secretary defying the
laws disallowing family members to be employed by the MP. In example two, another former
MP appointed certain under-qualified persons to be on his staff. In this case the staff came from
the same region as the MP. The same MP was also noted for appointing two district
administrators who later abused significant portions of the district development funds. The
ongoing situation described above, with two district administrators in the study district offers
yet another example of this politically manipulated administration. Finally in a recent political
move, LLG managers were 43moved within the district, with Dreikikir LLG manager going to
43 Former Ward 30 Ward Member, Dreikikir Station, October 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province,
160
Kawanga LLG whilst the Kawanga LLG manager was moved to Dreikikir LLG. This
happened because the Dreikikir LLG manager was not politically supportive of the current MP
so he wanted the Kawanga manager to be up at Dreikikir to ensure particular projects were
implemented there. In fact as Dreikikir LLG manager was neutral as a public servant should be,
whilst the Kawanga one was aligned with the MP. The MP believed the neutral Dreikikir
LLG manager would work together with the district administrator appointed by the province
rather than follow the directions of the MP. When such key positions as the district
administrator can be appointed by the MP, the District Joint Committee is easily subverted to
the MP’s will.
The manipulation of the District Joint Committee becomes much easier when
politically aligned public servants are in place. But why do the MPs want to manipulation the
District Joint Committees? Because the fluid nature of the Bigman system demands constant
support from the MP who will use state resources to ‘buy’ votes in parts of the district. MPs are
seen by the people as in possession of unlimited “state resources and money which they can
distribute to their local political supporters in their electorate. [As a result] Electoral
Development Funds and other forms of slush funds are invested in personal networks to secure
Papua New Guinea
161
support”(Reilly, 2014: 11). All this is done to maintain the MPs Pasin of behaving like a
Bigman and sharing wealth (not his own) and caring for one’s supporters. When this is done
development priorities take a back seat to the maintenance of the Bigman status by the MPs.
Hence it is not uncommon to hear supporters of the MP describe him in such terms as bikplaboi,
bikplamangi44in reference to his ability to help them when they are in need.
Evidence of this manipulation of the District Joint Council by the MP can be seen in
several examples. The Finance and Administration Officer for Dreikikir45says that projects
tend to be allocated in the JDPBPC according to political cronyism, without proper discussion
and consultation of all the members involved. In the study district there are several examples
of this in play. In the first example46 a former MP used his discretion within the District joint
Committee to allocate funds for a credit scheme to supporters from his area. But the credit
was only made available to people who supported the MP, who received startup capital from
the District joint Committee, whilst other areas missed out. As a result a large number of men in
the favored area were able to establish transport businesses known in PNG as Public Motor
44bikplaboi, bikplamangi in tokpisin, basically refers to a person who is greater or has some
kind of great skill, ability, power or wealth. Usually seen as an influential figure in his own
area. 45 Finance and Administration Officer, Dreikikir District Administration Office, Dreikikir
Station, 9th October 2013, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 46 Interviewee confidential, Dreikikir Station, October 2013, Dreikikir East Sepik Province,
Papua New Guinea
162
Vehicles (PMVs). The majority of these businesses failed, and the banks took back the PMV
vehicles when those who received the credit could no longer meet loan repayments. In the
second, example the same former MP allocated a significant portion of funds for a particular
road into his area. But this road was never completed and went only a few kilometers and was
never graveled. What happened to the huge amount of funds spent on this project is not clear
but the contractor was paid even though the road was not built. In another example47some
students were allocated funds from the District Joint Committee for university tuition fees, but
the fees were paid into the account of a political crony of the MP. As a result the student’s fees
were never paid because the crony used the money for his own purposes. Finally in another
case, a local coffee extension officer involved in coffee revitalization projects in the area
48noted that he had consistently requested the District Joint Committee for a water tank but this
request had not been heard, whilst other requests from strong supporters of the MP for
non-essential services were supported by the District joint Committee.
Similar examples are found throughout PNG. One is offered by a happening in
Wewak Open Electorate where the local MP, Moses Manwau, distributed DSIP cheques during
47 Interviewee confidential, Dreikikir Station, October 2013, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua
New Guinea 48 Mobile Extension Officer, Dreikikir District Administration, Dreikikir Station, 11th October 2013,
Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea
163
the 2012 campaign period, which had never been approved by the District joint Committee
(PNG LOOP, 2012). In another incidence in Morobe Province the MP for Kabwum, Bob
Dadae, also allocated cheques ranging from K50 000 - K100 000 to certain groups in his
electorate (Post Courier, 15th June, 2012, ‘MPs should Show five year activity report’). In
another case Gulf Governor Kavilo was charged with using his development funds for a
purpose other than an effective development purposes ( Post Courier, April 16th 2015, Gulf
Probe will continue). Another MP,Bogia MP John Hickey, who has also been arrested in a
similar incidence. In fact it has been noted that 17% of MPs in the current government have
been implicated in corruption cases with misuse of their DSIP grants (17 % of MPs Implicated,
PNG Loop, March 15, 2015). In this case several of them have been jailed, whilst others have
stalled their cases via legal avenues and others have their cases still pending.
This abuse by MPs of funds allocated to the District joint Committee and to them
directly for electoral gains is closely linked to the big man culture. MPs try to maintain their
presence and their Pasin via ceremonies, cash giving, and support of local events to maintain
support. The MPs become responsible for these benefits and not the officers as it is the MPs
Pasin that ultimately determines their support base. Bigman needs to give benefits to
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supporters which are deciding the development objectives of districts, rather than real
development needs..
It has to be understood that the voting culture in PNG places emphasis not on merits,
previous positions held or developments achieved but simply on descent, ethnicity, family ties,
social relations and benefits received. Given these traits, people tend to vote along these lines
rather than along party lines. A good example of this can be seen in the recent by election for
West Sepik Regional Seat. In the early stages of the counting, candidates from the Nuku Lumi
electorates led by a margin of between 4000 - 5000 votes. But the Nuku-Lumi area had a
number of candidates standing for election. The winning candidate did not do well in
Nuku-Lumi because it was not his ethnic area. He was from the Telefomin area. Although he
was initially under the 1000 vote margin in the first few counts, this all shifted when the
counting of the ballot boxes moved towards the Telefomin area, Then the current MP, Amkat
Mai, leapt ahead from 1000 to approximately 30 000, which is almost twice as much as his
nearest competitor. Amkat was the sole candidate in the Telefomin area and had all their votes,
while the Nuku-Lumi candidate’s votes were split among a number of candidates.
In PNG political support also comes mainly from funds made available as
development funding grants through the District joint Committee. One of the most notable
165
studies of this is by Ketan (2007) who explores the complex but interdependent relationship
forged between the MPs and their ethnic vote base. Barcson (2015) calls this as the vote base
dilemma, because the support offered to MPs in election times returns to haunt them. In the
traditional sense this was seen as the big man distributing wealth to maintain a support base but
in the current modern situation this is seen as corruption. The dilemma has become greater with
the decentralization reforms which have reinforced the roles of MPs as chairs of their District
Joint Committees to has resulted in the wide spread abuse of development funds in the districts.
This is unlike other areas of the world where patron-client relations stem from some
form of guarantee which binds the patron to the client such as; land, use of force, or religion.
PNGs Bigman patron-client relations primarily originate from cultural links, familial ties and
ethnic identities. However, since they do not possess any form of binding link they create a
constant need by the MP to plunder state resources to maintain political support.
In this predicament MPs are seen by citizens as a Bigman who is responsible for their
needs. This situation is exacerbated by the low level of district economies, which keeps people
in near poverty. People find it very difficult to pay expenses such as school fees, funeral
expenses, or food during a food shortage, and expect to receive cash hand outs from their MPs
in times of need. To maintain his role as an MP the MP must behave as a new form of Bigman
166
and meet these demands. So the traditional Bigman ideals have been incorporated into the
modern political culture of maintaining political support. It is also important to note that
because there are no local elites or local strong-men the MPs have a direct interaction with the
people. This has developed an expectation from the people towards their local MP for cash
handouts and material benefits, rather than for sound development projects. Hence state
resources are constantly plundered to through manipulation of District Joint Committee.
Evidence of this in play is seen in numerous examples. For example, in the study site a
former MP purchases large amounts of beer, as well as the giving cash to dominant supporters
his area whenever he arrives in the district (he does not reside there). In another example,
former MP Jeffrey Nape "Upon returning home from Mt Hagen in his red, four-wheeled drive
Nissan Patrol station wagon [would give] K5 or K10 to people to purchase cigarettes, beer,
biscuits, kerosene or whatever their needs of the day" (Yegiora, 201449). From the Western
Province, is another example of the Governor, Ati Wobiro, who was found guilty of
misappropriating K 7 million (US$2.5 million) of PSIP funds. The media report of the court
49Source: Yegiora Bernard, 2014, Pork-barrelling Jeffery ‘Santu’ Nape - saviour, giver &Nimai
ninja,inPNGAttidue,asssopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2014/02/pork-barrelling-jeffery-sant
u-nape-saviour-giver-nimai-ninja.html , accessed on 15.01. 2015 at 1:27 pm
167
case stated, "Governor Wobiro gave written instructions to pay Century Hotel with clear
instructions for Century Hotel to pay 100s of his supporters’ cash" (PNG Blogs, 201550).
Finally, the Limus Structure undertaken by a former New Ireland Governor is one of the best
demonstrations of this behavior (Kalinoe, 2010). In this case the Governor involved created a
hausboi (men’s house) system based on the clan system in his electorate. All funding priorities
were made via key local representatives who represented the ethnic political loyalties in the
Governors electorate. This approached bypassed the formal administration processes and cost
the New Ireland Provincial dearly with the wastage of deprivation grants. Sadly, a great
percentage of these funds were used for the material benefits of ethnic supporters rather than
sound development projects.
These examples indicate MPs desire to maintain their Bigman status within his
electorate. As the relationship between the MP and his supporters is a reciprocal one,
demanding a vote cast in return for the benefits paid out, the MP’s Pasin, which is very much a
determining factor in his Bigman status as an MP, must be demonstrated whenever possible, to
50 Source: Png Blogs, 2015, Western Province Governor AtiWobiro& 2 Others Committed To Stand Trial
Over K7 Million in PSIP Funds, http://papua87.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=7046137&item=743,
Accessed on 18.08.2015 at 10:19 pm
168
maintain both his Bigman status and to retain his political support. PNG local does not involve
tradeoffs with local elites but between the MP himself and the people who he needs to support
him. The Bigman system creates a very destructive behavior which requires the constant
plundering of state resources to maintain it.
As a result essential decision making for sound district development becomes
affected. Bigman values are pursued to maintain the 'Bigman Pasin', resources are siphoned off
and allocated to particular supportive groups and away from non-supporting regions. Evidence
from this is firstly apparent in the examples cited above from the Dreikikir study area, as well
as those from other areas of PNG. The consequences are that district development efforts
become difficult to achieve when fiscal resources are misused for unsustainable and irrational
projects or are given away as cash to individuals. As a result infrastructure deteriorates,
extension activities decline, and rural electrification and water supply systems are not built.
5.2 Bigman Infiltration in PNG's Decentralization Process
PNG's road to effective decentralization has become hijacked by this practice. The
essential prerequisites noted by the World Bank (2007b), in chapter two have not been
169
implemented. Instead due to the political competition over the same political space in which
both provincial and national leaders were competing for to establish their Bigman status via the
Bigman Pasin approach needed to secure political victory, a weak decentralization design was
established.
This conflict between national leaders and local leaders that emerged at the local level
brought about a situation unlike other cases of decentralization elsewhere in the world.
Whereas the other cases of decentralization tended to reinforce local elite domination, PNG's
case has been the opposite, and has led to the domination of national leaders who come from
local area, and who use national resources to maintain local control.
So PNG's decentralization process has not led to effective decentralization as defined
by Falleti's Sequential decentralization theory. Despite political decentralization occurring first,
the conflict between national and leaders created by competition between them at the local
level, led to a disruption of the decentralization process. Falletis’s approach therefore does not
take into account informal factors which may affect the political and administrative
institutional arrangements. But this has been the case in PNG's decentralization process.
170
Finally, PNG's Bigman infiltration has created a situation where the politics of
survival involve a tradeoff between the leader and the citizens themselves. The tradeoff diverts
the essential decision making processes for sound development outcomes in the districts. A
culture of plundering state resources via the District Joint Committee has evolved because
there is no strong binding tie between the patron and the client. In the Bigman system the
fluidity of his status leads to the need to constantly maintain support. This is in contrast to
Midgal’s argument that tradeoffs are made between political leaders and local elites or strong
men within a patron-client environment where there exists a strong binding link. In Midgal’s
model, support is always guaranteed, due to the patron-client link and order is established
because it is fixed. In Migdal’s situation, the plundering of state resources would be limited or
less severe, because there the binding link controls the client. The PNG example
demonstrates a different case, where the fluidity of the Bigman system has enabled MPs to
exploit the weaknesses in the processes to maintain their Bigman values to secure and maintain
political support. In combination with conditions of widespread poverty, or relative poorness,
local MPs have used a handout mentality in which the modern day leader can only maintain
Bigman status by diverting the funds from sound development project in the district to
handouts to supporters.
171
5.3 Conclusion of the Impact of Bigman Infiltration on Districts Rural Development
The district problems persist because the MPs see no priority to address them. On the
contrary resources are put to other purposes to maintain Bigman values which are needed for
political survival making local economies even worse. This situation has proliferated due to the
weaknesses within the institutions that were brought into being by the 1995 Reforms. PNG’s
experience in decentralization been different in several ways to those experienced in other parts
of the world. As a result its effectiveness at the district level is lagging behind. This therefore
calls into question its reliability. Perhaps it is time that PNG develops a decentralized structure
that looks at the Bigman issue and incorporates it into its institutional machinery.
172
Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 - Purpose and Issues
This dissertation strives to understand why reforms of the decentralization processes
have failed to deliver effective rural development to the people of PNG. The literature on
decentralizations issues revealed that most studies focused on the formal institutional
mechanisms that affected the decentralizations efforts. The author wondered whether there
was a possibility that informal institutions also contributed to the failure of decentralizations
reforms. As a result the thesis was developed to explore two sub-questions on whether
informal institutions have weakened decentralization in PNG and secondly how informal
institutions themselves have affected effective rural development in the district tier.
Some other scholars have sought to explain the impact of informal institutions upon
formal institutions. The case of Migdal is used in this study to show case this. However
Migdal’s argument assumes that the tradeoff is made between the state and established orders
of informal institutions, such as local strong men, landed elites and others who have an
organized or fixed order in which patronage is underplayed and is grounded in the links that
ultimately bind a patron to his client and ensures compliance or support from the client. It is
against this background that the Bigman system is put forward as being different from other
173
patron-clients systems because it is so loose and fluid because it is based upon kinship values
with no form of stronghold or binding link over the client. Rather the Bigman patron, has to
continuously maintain the support of the clients from his own or some other resources.
When these informal values became the basis on which politicians became elected in
PNG, they brought about a change in the modern political system in PNG Political
competition developed between two levels of politicians (national and provincial) leading to
the eventual weakening of the existing system and the creation of a new one through reforms
enacted by the national politicians, which disadvantaged and disempowered the local
politicians. The new system gave national MPs a great deal of control over budgeting and
planning in the districts, where most of the fiscal resources came from the centre and could
not earn at the local level in the district.
The reforms have had significant unforeseen consequences. The MPs have had to
manipulate the administrative committees set up to plan and budget district development in
order to constantly maintain their Pasin, which is the way, or the fashion, in which a Bigman
is expected to behave. Bigmen politicians are elected on the basis of their Pasin. The outcome
of the diversion of development funds by MPs to maintain their Pasin, has led to the very
poor rural development outcomes in the district tier. Resources are used to satisfy political
174
goals based on the Bigman support system. Because the system is fluid with no ties binding
the Bigman to his followers, there is a constant need to maintain support by the distribution
of resources. This outcome is amplified because the clients or followers are almost all very
low income earners. The Bigman values are expected of the MP, who is seen as a Bigman
by his followers..
The answer to the overall research question is that decentralization is struggling in
PNG because of the political values which have evolved out of the Bigman system. This has
led to an abuse of the system for political ends because the fluidity of the Bigman system
requires the distribution of resources by the MP to supporters at a level which is well beyond
his personal capacity. So he diverts funds out of the district development grants, most of
which are nationally sourced.
6.2 - Key Findings
In the course of trying to understand these reasons, this study has noted two notable
findings. Firstly, Fallettis Sequential Decentralization theory, which assumes that political
decentralization will lead to administrative decentralization and eventually fiscal
decentralization, does not hold in PNG. There, decentralization has created political
175
competition rather than given more power to local elites. Secondly, and this is the most
important finding, is the absence of a binding link in the Bigman system which makes it very
fluid. This, fluidity has been the source of political support and the main cause for political
competition developing between the provincial and national MPs. This in turn has, led to the
empowering of national politicians over local leaders, unlike in other cases of
decentralization elsewhere in the world, where the power of local elites area has been
strengthened at the local level. Furthermore, this fluidity has made the constant plundering of
state resources by MPs, essential if they are to maintain support over the long term. This is
much more destructive than the fixed order of patron-client relations found else wherein the
world, where a binding link exists between patron and clients. The Bigman system is not
based on an established order, as perceived by Migdal, where power eventuates from an
organized form of social order, to weaken the centralized system.
6.3- The Impact on Decentralization by Bigman values
Bigman values have proven to be very persistent in the modern era of PNG
governance. It has largely flourished because of the limited socio economic opportunities
available to the people. As a result effective rural development outcomes have been greatly
176
negatively affected, especially when the system has loopholes or weak legislation which can
be abused.
There is therefore a need to seek ways to address this issue. While it is impossible to
do away with the modern systems and go back to traditional systems, there is still hope that
this informal system can be of use in the formal arena. Hence a system should be developed
to address this.
6.4 - Policy Implications
Given this dilemma the author suggests one major change in policy. It can be seen
that the clan/ kinship ties prove strong here amidst the weak socio economic conditions which
has led to strong mobilization in political elections. In an overall restructure of government
the clan or descent group must be brought into the government process.
The restructure of government levels therefore should go down one more level to
form Ward governments comprised of the clan leaders within the ward. Above them there
should be the LLG, made up of the Ward representatives and above that, a district government,
made up of all the LLGs in the district. The district administration should be the public
177
officials of this district government. Ward governments would have to be allocated funds to
operate with, and they will need help to plan how to develop their localities in their own way.
It can be seen that by giving too much power to the national MPs has had a severe
negative impact. Power therefore, must be taken away from the MP in the restructure and
limit the MPs role to a legislative role. The challenge will be how to do so. Effective
training must also support these ward governments as well as the fiscal and other necessary
resources to enable them to carry out their functions. The District Joint Committee must be
removed and replaced with a more effective organization, which should be a district
government. Politics must not be merged with administration as demonstrated in the District
Joint Committee scenario.
Since a basic cause of the present situation lies in the need for better opportunities
for people, opportunities should be given to those at the ward level to think, plan and allocate
resources for their benefit as decided by them, in the ward government. Since the breakdown
has stemmed from electoral politics deeply embedded in the Bigman system, it must be
addressed via a solution that can give the resources to the people themselves to control and
direct rather than being controlled by one man.
178
6.4 - Future Research
Given this proposal there is therefore a need to conduct further research into how
best to develop a clan based government at the ward level as well as developing a good
district government. Secondly, though the research attempted to identify why Bigman were
affecting the system there is further need to understand why the Bigman system has been able
to survive for so long without any established order. Finally, decentralization in PNG has
proven to be difficult to achieve. Therefore it is worthwhile to study further into ways on how
to develop a good decentralization system that can effectively incorporate all these from the
national level down to the lowest tier.
179
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Appendix 1: New Found Powers of LLGs Based on the 1995 Reforms
a) labour and employment (but not industrial relations)
b) labour or community industries
c) self help and tokples schools, but not curriculum
d) cemeteries
e) provision of water supply
f) provision of electricity
g) improvement of villages, towns, cities and communities
h) maintaining peace, good order and law through consultation, mediation and
arbitration and community forums
i) dispute settlement
j) town, city, village and community planning
k) cottage industries
198
l) social services
m) bride and groom wealth
n) general licensing
o) community sport, recreation, culture and industrial shows
p) local environment
q) local tourist facilities and services
r) housing
s) domestic animals, flora and fauna
t) human settlements
u) census and village community records
v) traditional barter system
w) control on consumption of use of alcohol, betel nuts and betel nut related products
or any other marketable items
x) hygiene and sanitation
y) local trading (not mobile)
z) the protection of traditional sacred sited
aa) community day work or service programs
199
bb) the imposition of fines for breaches of any of its laws
cc) village communities
dd) local aid posts and clinics
(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 44). (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 42).
200
Appendix 2: Table of Problems and Causes at the District Level
PROBLEMS
(Survey)
LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION
REASONS
WHY (Power
Dynamics,
legislation
etc...)
Local Level Government
(Ward Members)
District
Administration
STAFFING
(a)No Power to Hire &
Fire Staff
(b)Administrative Politics
(a) No power to
hire and Fire
(b) Administration
Politics
(c ) Weak
Operational
Structure
(d) Administrative
Nepotism
(a) Weak
Legislation
hire and fire
powers,
operational
structure
(b) Political
cronyism;
appointments
(c ) Nepotism;
hiring in
provincial level
Unreliable workers,
shortage of workers
POOR
INFRASTRUCTUR
E & SUPPLIES
(a) Reliant on JDPBPC,
District, PG and NG for
funding.
(b) Misuse of funds by
officials
(c ) Unreliable Funding
(a) Diversion of
Funds by JDPBPC
(b) High
Manipulation of
JDPBPC
(c ) Small revenue
(a) Fiscal
dependency on
JDPBPC, PG &
NG funds
(b) Patron
client politics
Deteriorating facilities,
staff houses,
201
classrooms etc…
No electricity, piped
water. Shortage
of basic equipment
and medicine.
base
(d) Unreliable
grants
(e) Dependent on
JDPBPC, PG and
NG funds
(f) Weak
operational
Structure
(c ) Weak
Legislation;
Operational
structure for
water/electricity
(d) Political
manipulation of
funds in the
JDPBPC for
patron client
reasons
(e) corruption
(f)
Environmental
constraints
LIMITED
ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPPORT (a) Lack of
involvement(participation
) and cooperation between
ward members, district
officials and JDPBPC
(a) Administrative
Nepotism, politics
(b) Weak
operational
structure
(c ) Unreliable
grants
(d) Small revenue
base
(e) Limited human
(a) Fiscal
dependency on
JDPBPC, PG &
NG funds
(b) Weak
Operational
structure
No reliable support
activities, absence of
credit facilities,
limited market venues.
Lack of District and
LLG support to ward
202
and health based
facilities. Land dispute
resolution.
resource capacity
(f) Environmental
constraints
NO
PARTICIPATION &
ACCOUNTABILITY No participation by the
people or accountability
to the people
Weak operational
structure
(a) Weak
Legislation
-for operational
structure No participation and
accountability to
people
POVERTY
(a) Insufficient human
resource
(b) No power to hire and
fire
(c ) Unreliable Funding
(a) Limited human
resource
(b) Small revenue
base (c )
untimely grants
(d) dependent on
JDPBPC, PG and
NG funds
(a) Fiscal
dependency on
JDPBPC, PG &
NG funds
(b) Weak
Operational
structure
Not enough money for
fees (Weak local
economy)
(Source: created by author)