bickel & brewer seeks attorney fees from irving isd

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MANUEL A. BENAVIDEZ, JUANA DELEON, and DANIELA DELEON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT and STEVEN CRAIG JONES, MARILYN GAIL CONDER WOODS WELLS, LARRY M. STIPES, VALERIE D. JONES, GWENDOLYN GALE CRAIG, JERRY D. CHRISTIAN, and RONDA LEE HUFFSTETLER, in their official capacities,

Defendants.

§§§§§§§§§§§§§§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:07 CV 1850-P

PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

BICKEL & BREWER STOREFRONT, PLLC

William A. Brewer III Shain A Khoshbin Gregory A. Brassfield 4800 Comerica Bank Tower 1717 Main Street Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 653-4000 Facsimile: (214) 653-1015

Case 3:13-cv-00087-D Document 103 Filed 11/12/14 of 16 PageID 1761

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................1

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.............................................1

A. Plaintiffs Commence Suit To Reform The Electoral System, Which Illegally Diluted The Electoral Power Of Irving’s Hispanic Voters. ..........................................................................................................1

B. The Court Rules In Favor Of Plaintiff And Awards The Relief Sought In The Complaint. ............................................................................2

III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................3

IV. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ................................................................................4

A. Standards For Determining Entitlement To Fees And Costs .......................4

B. Standards For Determining The Amount Of A Fee Award .........................5

V. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ......................................................................6

A. Plaintiff Is The Prevailing Party. .................................................................6

B. As The Prevailing Parties, Plaintiffs Seek An Award Of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees And Litigation Expenses. ...............................7

C. Plaintiff Should Be Awarded The Requested Attorneys’ Fees And Litigation Expenses. .....................................................................................7

1. Attorneys’ fees .................................................................................7

a. Plaintiff’s request is a reasonable “lodestar.” ......................8

b. The Johnson factors suggest that an upward adjustment is warranted. ......................................................8

2. Litigation expenses ........................................................................10

VI. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF ..................................................10


ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)CASES

Arbor Hills Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. County of Albany,369 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004).........................................................................................................5

Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. v. Orleans Parish School Bd.,919 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1990) ...........................................................................................5, 7, 10

Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine,524 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................................5

City of Burlington v. Dague,505 U.S. 557 (1992) ...............................................................................................................6, 8

Davis v. Perry,991 F. Supp. 2d 809 (W.D. Tex. 2014) ......................................................................................9

DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp.,240 F.R.D. 269 (W.D. Tex. 2007) .............................................................................................9

Emerson Elec. Co. v. Am. Permanent Ware Co.,201 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) ..................................................................7

Giles v. General Elec. Co.,245 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................6, 8

Houston Chronicle Publ. Co. v. City of League City, Tex.,488 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2007) .....................................................................................................7

In re Texans CUSO Ins. Grp., LLC,426 B.R. 194 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) ......................................................................................7

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) .............................................................................................5, 6, 8

Jordan v. Allain,619 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Miss. 1985) ............................................................................................5

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,Civ. No. 2:03-CV-354, 2007 WL 951684 (E.D. Tex. March 28, 2007) ....................................4

Leroy v. City of Houston,831 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................................4, 7


iii

Lopez v. Monterey County,525 U.S. 266 (1999) ...................................................................................................................4

Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom,50 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................................5

McClain v. Lufkin Indus.,519 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................6, 8

Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd.,499 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007) .....................................................................................................4

S.E.C. v. EFS L.L.C.,Civ. No. 3:06-CV-793-M, 2007 WL 548762 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2007) ..................................5

Watkins v. Fordice,7 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................3, 5, 6

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1920 ..............................................................................................................................4

42 U.S.C. § 10301 .............................................................................................1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ..........................................................................................................................4, 5

FED. R. CIV. P. 54 .........................................................................................................................4, 10


PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM Page 1

Plaintiffs Manuel A. Benavidez (“Benavidez”), Juana De Leon (“Juana”), and Daniela De

Leon (“Daniela”) (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs”) submit this Application for Attorneys’

Fees and Costs and Supporting Brief (the “Application”), as follows:

I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiffs prevailed in this action because they obtained the relief they sought—namely, a

final judgment from the Court: (1) declaring that Irving Independent School District’s prior 5-2

system for electing its School Board Trustees illegally denied Hispanic voters an equal

opportunity to participate in the electoral process in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act; and (2) ordering the Defendants to adopt an appropriate plan for single-member districts. In

light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses

for successfully prosecuting this important case.

Plaintiffs now seek $410,232.52 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses.

The sum is comprised of a request for $299,060.00 in attorneys’ fees and $111,172.52 in

litigation expenses. Plaintiffs have calculated their attorneys’ fees using rates the Court has held

to be reasonable rates for civil-rights litigation in the Northern District of Texas. Further,

Plaintiffs seek core litigation expenses customarily recoverable in these actions.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs Commence Suit To Reform The Electoral System, Which Illegally Diluted The Electoral Power Of Irving’s Hispanic Voters.

Plaintiffs filed this action against the Irving Independent School District (“IISD”) and its

Board of Trustees (“Trustees,” which together with IISD are the “Defendants”) alleging that the


PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS AND SUPPORTING BRIEF Page 2

5-2 Electoral Plan for electing the Trustees (the “Electoral System”) illegally diluted Hispanic

electoral power in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the “Act”).1

On June 4, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.2 In the amended complaint,

Plaintiffs sought a declaration that “the 5-2 Electoral Plan is in contravention of Section 2 of the

Voting Rights Act,”3 an injunction preventing IISD from administering, implementing and

conducting future elections for seats on the Board of Trustees using the 5-2 Electoral Plan; an

order requiring the IISD to create a new election plan; and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs

pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e).4

B. The Court Rules In Favor Of Plaintiff And Awards The Relief Sought In The Complaint.

On August 15, 2014, the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order (the

“Order”).5 In the Order, the Court found that IISD’s Electoral System denies Hispanic voters an

equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their

choice,6 and violates the Act.7 Accordingly, the Court ordered Defendants to submit within 60

days of the date of the Order a plan to remedy the violation.8 On October 28, 2014, the Court

entered the Judgment ordering that: (1) the existing election plan of the Irving Independent

1 See Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Concerning Violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, filed January, 8, 2013 (Doc. #2).

2 See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint And Jury Demand for Declaratory and Permanent Injunction Concerning Violations Of Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act, filed June 4, 2013 (“First Amended Complaint”) (Doc. #26).

3 Id. at 5. 4 See id. at 22. 5 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated August 15, 2014 (“Order”) (Doc. #101). 6 See Order at 1. 7 See Order at 53. 8 See Order at 53.



School District consisting of five single-member districts and two at-large positions is found to

violate section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) IISD utilize the plan submitted to the Court on

October 7, 2014;9 (3) the Plaintiffs recover their costs; and (4) that the question of attorneys’ fees

is reserved for consideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2).10

III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs seek to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $299,060.00 and

litigation expenses in the amount of $111,172.52. Having obtained the judgment requested in

their First Amended Complaint,11 Plaintiffs seek recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and

expenses as a prevailing party under 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e).12 Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e),

prevailing parties in Voting Rights Act suits may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,

including out-of-pocket expenses.

The Court should grant the Application because: (1) Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in

this action, having obtained a final judgment that (a) declared the Electoral System to be illegal,

and (b) required the creation of a new election system that complies with the Voting Rights Act;

(2) as the prevailing parties, Plaintiffs may recover fees and expenses pursuant to 52 U.S.C. §

9 See Presentation of Proposed Remedy by Irving Independent School District, dated October 7, 2014 (Doc. #97).

10 See Judgment entered on October 28, 2014 (Doc. #102). 11 See First Amended Complaint at 22. 12 See 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the

fourteenth or fifteenth amendment [of the Constitution], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs.”); Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A plaintiff prevails if the relief obtained, through judgment or settlement, materially alters the defendants’ behavior in a way directly benefit[]ing the plaintiff. To attain prevailing party status, the plaintiff must show (1) the goals of the lawsuit were achieved, and (2) the suit caused the defendants to remedy the discrimination.”).



10310(e); and (3) the fees and litigation expenses requested herein are reasonable, as

demonstrated by the supporting declaration of Shain A. Khoshbin.

IV.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A. Standards For Determining Entitlement To Fees And Costs

Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e), the Court may allow the prevailing party reasonable

attorneys’ fees as part of the costs in any action to enforce the voting rights guarantees of the

Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 In construing 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e),

courts in the Fifth Circuit rely on cases construing the similar provision found at 42 U.S.C. §

1988.14 When a party prevails and obtains a final judgment in a suit under the Voting Rights Act,

an award of fees is a “foregone conclusion.”15 Moreover, a court’s discretion to deny attorneys’

fees to a prevailing party in a civil or voting rights case is very narrow.16

In addition, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, the Court may award a

prevailing party its costs.17 Significantly, “all reasonable out-of pocket expenses, including

13 See 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e). Of course, “Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act under its authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s proscription against voting discrimination.” Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999).

14 See Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 579 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1987) (“42 U.S.C. § 1988, governing fees in civil rights cases, is phrased similarly and should be construed consistently with the Voting Rights Act fee provision.”); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, Civ. No. 2:03-CV-354, 2007 WL 951684, at *2 n. 1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2007) (stating that the “Voting Rights Act contains a fee-shifting provision that is nearly identical to section 1988” and “[c]ourts construe these provisions consistently”). Section 1988(b) provides that: “In any action to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 192, 1983, 1985, 1986 of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

15 See Leroy, 837 F.2d at 579 (“The ‘prevailing party’ in a Voting Rights Act lawsuit is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees. If the plaintiff prevails because judgment is rendered in his favor, a successful claim for fees is a foregone conclusion.”) (citation omitted).

16 See Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 499 F.3d 403, 417 (5th Cir. 2007) (“the discretion to deny § 1988 fees is extremely narrow.”) (internal punctuation omitted). For example, defendants’ good faith and lack of culpability is not a bar to a successful civil rights plaintiff’s recovery of attorneys’ fees from defendants. See id.

17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1920.



charges for photocopying, paralegal assistance, travel, and telephone, are plainly recoverable in

section 1988 fee awards because they are part of the costs normally charged to a fee-paying

client.”18 Moreover, the Voting Rights Act was amended in 2006 to permit a prevailing party in a

voting rights suit to recover reasonable experts’ fees.19

B. Standards For Determining The Amount Of A Fee Award

In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees statutorily authorized to be awarded, the

Court first applies the “lodestar” method (the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate).20 Reasonable hourly rates may be determined

by considering counsel’s regular rates and the prevailing rates in the community.21

The Court must then consider whether the lodestar should be adjusted upward or

downward, depending on the circumstances of the case and the factors set forth in Johnson v.

Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).22 The twelve Johnson factors are:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues, (3) the skill required

to perform the legal services properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment, (5) the customary

18 Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1990); Arbor Hills Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. County of Albany, 369 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2004) (party that successfully appealed an order issued in a Voting Rights Act suit and obtained a reversal of that order is entitled to online research costs as part of its fee award if its law firm “normally bills its paying clients for the cost of online research services”); Jordan v. Allain, 619 F. Supp. 98, 115 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (“All reasonable expenses that would customarily be billed to a fee-paying client may, of course, be recovered by plaintiffs as prevailing parties under §§ 1973l (e) and 1988.”).

19 See 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e); see also Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 524 F.3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (“President Bush signed the [Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Corretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (‘VARA’)] into law. Section 6 of the VARA amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to allow a prevailing party to recover ‘reasonable expert fees.’”).

20 See Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d at 457 (stating that, to compute an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a Voting Rights Act suit, “the court must first calculate the ‘lodestar’ by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation times a reasonable hourly billing rate”).

21 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 1995); S.E.C. v. EFS L.L.C., Civ. No. 3:06-CV-793-M, 2007 WL 548762, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2007).

22 Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457.



fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation,

and ability of the attorneys, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.23 The Court “must

explain with a reasonable degree of specificity the findings and reasons upon which the award is

based, including an indication of how each of the Johnson factors was applied.”24

V.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Plaintiff Is The Prevailing Party.

There is no question that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. On August 15,

2014, the Court entered the Order in favor of Plaintiff, based on its determination that the “the 5-

2 system of electing members of Irving ISD’s Board of Trustees violates Section 2 of the Act.”25

Thereafter, Plaintiffs obtained an enforceable judgment that achieved the goals of the suit that

they commenced.26 In addition, the Judgment alters the relationship between the Plaintiffs, as

United States citizens and residents within the boundaries of Irving ISD, and Irving ISD because

the Judgment requires the creation of a non-dilutive electoral system in Irving ISD.27

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties under 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e).

23 See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19; Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 490 n.29 (5th Cir. 2001). Factor six is no longer a valid factor. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992).

24 McClain v. Lufkin Indus., 519 F.3d 264, 284 (5th Cir. 2008).25 Order at 53. 26 Compare Judgment at 1-2 with Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 22. 27 See Judgment at 1-2; Watkins, 7 F.3d at 456 (“A plaintiff prevails if the relief obtained, through

judgment or settlement, materially alters the defendants' behavior in a way directly benefiting the plaintiff. To attain prevailing party status, the plaintiff must show (1) the goals of the lawsuit were achieved, and (2) the suit caused the defendants to remedy the discrimination.”).



B. As The Prevailing Parties, Plaintiffs Seek An Award Of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees And Litigation Expenses.

As stated above, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e), a prevailing party in a Voting Rights

Act suit may obtain an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and other litigation

expenses as part of its costs.28 Here, Plaintiffs obtained a judgment that the IISD’s Electoral

System violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.29 Because Plaintiffs have prevailed in their

claims under the Voting Rights Act, an award of fees to them is a “foregone conclusion.”30

Additionally, Plaintiffs should be awarded the reasonable costs, including expert fees and

litigation expenses, incurred in bring this important case.31

C. Plaintiff Should Be Awarded The Requested Attorneys’ Fees And Litigation Expenses.

1. Attorneys’ fees

In the present matter, Plaintiffs request that the Court award $299,060.00 in fees and

$111,172.52 in expenses. As shown below, that amount is reasonable.32

28 See 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e). 29 See Judgment (Doc. # 58) at 1 (“The City of Irving’s current at-large method of electing members of

City Council violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”). 30 See Leroy, 837 F.2d at 579 (“The ‘prevailing party’ in a Voting Rights Act lawsuit is entitled to recover

his attorney’s fees. If the plaintiff prevails because judgment is rendered in his favor, a successful claim for fees is a foregone conclusion.”) (citation omitted). No special circumstances exist to justify a denial of an award of fees. See Houston Chronicle Publ. Co. v. City of League City, Tex., 488 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Because Congress believed that the incentive of attorney’s fees was critical to the enforcement of the civil rights laws, section 1988 requires an extremely strong showing of special circumstances to justify a denial of fees.”).

31 See Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc., 919 F.2d at 380 (“Further, all reasonable out-of pocket expenses, including charges for photocopying, paralegal assistance, travel, and telephone, are plainly recoverable in section 1988 fee awards because they are part of the costs normally charged to a fee-paying client.”).

32 See also Emerson Elec. Co. v. Am. Permanent Ware Co., 201 S.W.3d 301, 315-17 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (affirming an award of attorneys’ fees based on Bickel & Brewer’s then existing hourly rates); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 42; In re Texans CUSO Ins. Grp., LLC, 426 B.R. 194 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (“[T]he Court is satisfied that [Bickel & Brewer] charged Curley its normal hourly rates and that the rates charged are reasonable, although on the high side.”).



a. Plaintiff’s request is a reasonable “lodestar.”

The first step in determining the amount of fees to be awarded is to calculate a “lodestar”

amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a

reasonable hourly rate.33 As discussed in the declaration of Shain A. Khoshbin, 12 professionals

acting on behalf of Bickel & Brewer Storefront, PLLC, counsel for Plaintiff, performed work

totaling $646,358.00 in fees at their usual rates.34

Nonetheless, as explained more thoroughly in the Khoshbin Declaration, Plaintiffs seek

an award of attorneys’ fees for the work of only five professionals in the amount of

$299,060.00.35 The number of hours worked by those five professionals and the hourly rates

utilized are reasonable.36 Accordingly, the request of $299,060.00 is an appropriate “lodestar”

amount.

b. The Johnson factors suggest that an upward adjustment is warranted.

The second step for determining the amount of an award of fees is to consider whether

the lodestar amount should be adjusted upward or downward, depending on the circumstances of

the case and the Johnson factors.37 Here, the Johnson factors demonstrate that Plaintiff’s request

33 See McClain, 519 F.3d at 284 (“The first step in determining statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees is to calculate a ‘lodestar’ amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”).

34 See Declaration of Shain A. Khoshbin in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses (“Khoshbin Declaration”) at 8, ¶ 9, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Appendix” or “App.”) (App. 0009).

35 See Khoshbin Declaration at 9, ¶ 23 (App. 00010). 36 See Khoshbin Declaration at 12, ¶ 32 (App. 00013). 37 See McClain, 519 F.3d at 28; See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19; Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474,

490 n.29 (5th Cir. 2001). Factor six is no longer a valid factor. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992).



for an award of fees should be adjusted upward because:38 (1) the professionals at Bickel &

Brewer spent over 1,691.2 hours on this important civil rights matter;39 (2) Voting Rights cases

are among the most difficult matters in civil litigation and this case presented complex legal

questions coupled with challenging factual patterns;40 (3) the attorneys at the Bickel & Brewer

Storefront spent considerable time and energy on this case to the exclusion of other more

lucrative matters; (4) the attorneys have charged customary and market rates; (5) the fees in this

case were fixed on an hourly rate; (6) the very nature of Voting Rights Act cases imposes

enormous urgency because they concern nothing less than the electoral process which operates

on a fixed schedule; (7) the results obtained in this case were of profound civil importance both

for the plaintiffs and others in the Irving community, (8) the attorneys at the Bickel & Brewer

Storefront have well-earned reputations for being highly skilled litigators, counselors and

advocates, specifically in the area of civil rights litigation; (9) Voting Rights Act cases are

notoriously undesirable because of the expense involved and time consumed in preparing,

planning and seeing a case through to its completion; (10) the attorneys in this case have been

working on this issue with the plaintiff since 2009; and (11) the attorneys’ fees in this case are

consistent with other complex litigation cases in the state of Texas.41 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs do

not seek any upward adjustment above the $356,663.00 requested.

38 Given the important civil rights involved in this matter, only an upward adjustment would be in order. See DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 329 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (“case law supports the proposition that the customary fee in civil rights cases should be enhanced.”).

39 See Khoshbin Declaration at 8, ¶ 22 (App. 0003). 40 Voting rights cases are given a 3.86 Study Weight by the Federal Judicial Center as a measure of the

judicial work required (compared to other civil rights cases which are given a 1.92). See 2003-2004 District Court Case-Weighting Study, Final Report to the Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Committee on Judicial Resources of the Judicial Conference of the United States at 5 (App. 00142).

41 See Davis v. Perry, 991 F. Supp. 2d 809, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (finding attorneys’ rates reasonable in a similar Voting Rights Act case and stating that “highly experienced voting rights attorneys command hourly rates consistent with the prevailing market rates for complex litigation.”)



2. Litigation expenses

As demonstrated above, Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in this action. Thus, Rule

54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that, unless provided otherwise by federal

statute, federal rule, or court order, costs should be allowed to the prevailing party.42 Further, 52

U.S.C. § 10310(e) permits Plaintiffs, as the prevailing party, to recover reasonable litigation

expenses as well as reasonable expert fees.43 Moreover, the Court’s final judgment issued on

October 28, 2014, awarded Plaintiffs their costs.44 Plaintiffs have incurred at least $111,172.52

in reasonable expenses for expert services and other charges.45 Accordingly, Plaintiffs should be

awarded those expenses as part of the award of fees.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: (1) award them a

total of $410,232.52 ($299,060.00 in attorneys’ fees plus $111,172.52 in other litigation

expenses); and (2) grant them such additional relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled and

which the Court deems just and proper.

42 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). 43 See 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e); Associated Builders & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc., 919 F.2d at 380

(“Further, all reasonable out-of pocket expenses, including charges for photocopying, paralegal assistance, travel, and telephone, are plainly recoverable in section 1988 fee awards because they are part of the costs normally charged to a fee-paying client.”).

44 See Judgment entered October 28, 2014 at 2 (“The plaintiffs, Manuel A. Benavidez, Juan De Leon and Daniela De Leon, recover costs from the defendant, Irving Independent School District.”) (Doc. #102).

45 See Khoshbin Declaration at 15, ¶ 37 (App. 00016).



Respectfully submitted,

BICKEL & BREWER STOREFRONT, P.L.L.C.

By:/s/ Greggory A. Brassfield William A. Brewer III State Bar No. 2967035 Shain A. Khoshbin State Bar No. 11375975 Greggory A. Brassfield State Bar No. 24079900

1717 Main Street, Suite 4800 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 653-4000 Facsimile: (214) 653-1015

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 12, 2014, I electronically submitted the following

document to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas

using the electronic case filing system of the Court. The electronic case filing system sent a

“Notice of Electronic Filing” to individuals who have consented in writing to accept this Notice

as service of this document by electronic means.

By:/s/ Greggory A. Brassfield Greggory A. Brassfield

5321329.11 8001-184


bickel & brewer seeks attorney fees from irving isd

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