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Persistence Bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHY: PERSISTENCE

(Including constitution, parthood, personal identity, time, meta-ontology, and other related topics)

Ted Sider, Dean Zimmerman, Rutgers University, January 2004

Selected, topical bibliography Causation and persistence: Johnson 1924, xviii-xxxvi, 66-101, 127-142; Broad 1925, 17-

38; Russell 1925; Swoyer 1984; Shoemaker 1979, 1980; Armstrong 1980; Zimmerman 1997a

Change: Lewis 1986a, pp. 202-204, 1988a; Haslanger 1989a; Lowe 1987, 1988a; Hinchliff 1996

Constitution: Wiggins 1968; Chisholm 1976, chapter 3; Geach 1980, sections 30-35, 106-110; Thomson 1983; Burke 1994b

Criteria of identity: Perry 1975, introduction; Strawson 1976; Hirsch 1982 Fission: Williams 1973b; Parfit 1975; Lewis 1983; Robinson 1985; Johnston 1989 Indeterminacy: Evans 1978; Parsons 1987; Lewis 1993 Meta-ontology: Carnap 1950; Putnam 1987, Lectures I and II; Sosa 1993 Parthood: Leonard and Goodman 1940; Simons 1987; Thomson 1983; van Inwagen

1990b; Lewis 1991, section 3.6 Personal identity: Perry 1975, introduction, and selections from Locke, Butler, Reid;

Williams 1975; Parfit 1984, part 3 Temporal parts: Quine 1963; Lewis 1986a, pp. 202-204; van Inwagen 1990a

Time: McTaggart 1908; Broad 1923, pp. 53-84, 1938, pp. 309-319; Williams 1951; Prior 1959, 1968a, 1970; Smart 1963, chapter VII; Mellor 1981

Full bibliography Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1986. “Time and Thisness”, in P. French, T. Uehling, and H.

Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XI (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 315-329.

Armstrong, D. M. 1980. “Identity Through Time”, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), pp. 67-78.

Baker, Lynne Rudder. 1997a. “Why Constitution is not Identity”, Journal of Philosophy 94: 599-621.

Baker, Lynne Rudder. 1997b. “Persons in Metaphysical Perspective”, in Lewis Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court), pp, 433-53.

Baker, Lynne Rudder. 1999. “What Am I?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 151-159

Baker, Lynne Rudder. 2000. Persons and Bodies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Balashov, Yuri. 1999. “Relativistic Objects”, Noûs 33: 644-662.


Balashov, Yuri. 2000. “Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time”, Philosophical Studies 99: 129-166.

Baxter, Donald. 1988a. “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense”, Mind 97: pp. 575-582. Baxter, Donald. 1988b. “Many-One Identity”, Philosophical Papers 17: 193-216. Belzer, Marvin. 1996. “Notes on Relation R”, Analysis 56: 56-62. Bigelow, John. 1996. “Presentism and Properties”, in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical

Perspectives 10, Metaphysics (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell), pp. 35-52. Braddon-Mitchell, and Kristie Miller. 2004. “How to be a conventional person” The Monist. Broad, C. D. 1923. Scientific Thought. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company). Broad, C. D. 1925. The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Broad, C. D. 1933a. “Independent Discussion of the Notion of Substance”, Examination of

McTaggart’s Philosophy Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 141-166. Broad, C. D. 1933b. Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Volume I. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press). Broad, C. D. 1938. Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Volume II, Part I. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press). Brueckner, Anthony. 1993. “Parfit on What Matters in Survival”, Philosophical Studies, 70: 1-

22. Burgess, John P. 1984. “Basic Tense Logic”, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, eds., Handbook

of Philosophical Logic, Vol II (D. Reidel Publishing Company): 89-133. Burke, Michael. 1992. “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard

Account”, Analysis 52: 12-17. Burke, Michael. 1994a. “Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of

the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 591-624; reprinted in Rea 1997.

Burke, Michael. 1994b. “Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle”, Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 129-139.

Burke, Michael. 1997. “Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 457-467.

Butterfield, J. 1984. “Spatial and Temporal Parts”, Philosophical Quarterly 35: 32-44. Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de

Philosophie 4: 20-40, reprinted in his Meaning and Necessity, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

Carter, William. “On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms”, Philosophical Studies 41: 213-230.

Carter, William. 1983. “In Defense of Undetached Parts”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 126-143.

Carter, William. 1990. “Why Personal Identity Is Animal Identity”, Logos: 71-81. Carter, William. 1997. “Dion’s Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy)”, Philosophy

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Research, 59: 167-171. Carter, William and Mark Heller. 1989. “Metaphysical Boundaries: A Question of

Independence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 263-276. Carter, William, and H. S. Hestevold. 1994. “On Passage and Persistence”, American

Philosophical Quarterly 31: 269-283.


Cartwright, Helen Morris. 1993. “On Two Arguments for the Indeterminacy of Personal Identity”, Synthese 95: 241-273.

Cartwright, Richard. 1975. “Scattered Objects”, in Keith Lehrer, ed., Analysis and Metaphysics (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company), pp. 153-171.

Chisholm, Roderick. 1971. “Problems of Identity”, in Identity and Individuation, ed. by M. Munitz (New York: NYU Press): 3-30.

Chisholm, Roderick. 1973. “Parts as Essential to Their Wholes”, Review of Metaphysics 26: 581-603.

Chisholm, Roderick. 1975. “Mereological Essentialism: Further Considerations”, Review of Metaphysics 28: 477-484.

Chisholm, Roderick. 1976. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.).

Chisholm, Roderick. 1979. “The Indirect Reflexive”, in Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichman, eds., Intention and Intentionality (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Coburn, Robert C. 1967. “Persons and Psychological Concepts”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 4: 208-221.

Copeland, B. J. (ed.) 1996. Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Cortens, Andrew and John O’Leary-Hawthorne. 1995. “Towards Ontological Nihilism”, Philosophical Studies 79: 143-165.

Cover, J. A., and John O’Leary-Hawthorne. 1998. “A World of Universals”, Philosophical Studies 91: 205-219.

Crisp, Thomas. 2003a. “Presentism”, in Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 211-245.

Crisp, Thomas. 2003b. “Reply to Ludlow”, in Dean Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 1.

Dau, Paolo. 1986. “Part-Time Objects”, in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol. XI. (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press): 450-474.

Della Rocca, Michael. 1996. “Essentialists and Essentialism”, Journal of Philosophy 93, 186-202.

Doepke, Frederick. 1982. “Spatially Coinciding Objects”, Ratio 24: 45-60. Dorr, Cian. Forthcoming. “What We Disagree about When We Disagree about Ontology”, in

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