1

Beyond ‘political passivity’:

Diversity, latency, and change in youths’ political behaviour

Erik Amnå, Yunhwan Kim, and Marta Miklikowska

Örebro University, Youth & Society (YeS), Sweden (oru.se/yes)

Corresponding author: erik.amna@oru.se

Paper prepared for ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013.

Abstract

Discussions on the future of European democracies are often informed by the supposed growth

in young people’s political passivity. Furthermore, young citizens are often blamed for

participatory weaknesses in established democracies. More precisely, in the literature on youth

civic engagement, three implicit assumptions seem to be pervasive: youth civic engagement is

monolithic, is manifest, and is stable. The current study aims to revisit and challenge these

assumptions by exploring the alternatives: diversity, latency, and change. The results of an

analysis of a longitudinal sample of about 500 Swedish adolescents (Mage=16), with

measurements on three occasions at yearly intervals, show that: (1) youths are diverse and form

four distinct subgroups; (2) a latent aspect of youth engagement (political interest) is valuable in

identifying an important subgroup of youths who are “seemingly passive” but exhibit

characteristics that place them closer to the active than passive subgroups; and (3) around half of

youths change their civic engagement orientations over a two-year period. Altogether, our results

indicate that the currently held assumptions about youth engagement need to be revised in order

to get a more realistic understanding of the citizens of the contemporary democracies.

2

Introduction

Youth political engagement has been considered an important asset for the well-being and

stability of contemporary democracies (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1995; Holmberg, 1999; Putnam

2000; Stoker, 2010). Not surprisingly then, it has received much scholarly attention. Debates

revolving around youth engagement typically focus on its three aspects: quantity, quality, and

development. They also tend to reflect three inherent assumptions, each of which respectively

corresponds to the aforementioned problems, namely that youth engagement is monolithic,

manifest, and stable. Given that these premises seriously affect the direction of the debate, and

also practice in the arena of youth political engagement, their validity merits examination. In the

current study, we question and challenge these assumptions, by exploring the diversity, latency,

and changeability of youth civic engagement.

Contemporary perspectives on youth civic engagement

In inquiries into youth civic engagement, some of the most relevant questions include the

following: How active are youth in politics (the issue of quantity)? What constitutes youth civic

engagement (the issue of quality)? How does youth civic engagement develops over time (the

issue of change)? In the following sections, we provide a brief overview of current understanding

in these three areas, and thereby identify gaps in the existing literature.

Quantity of youth engagement. Regarding the level of youth civic engagement, two

contrasting views prevail: a pessimistic view, according to which contemporary youth are

portrayed as civically passive; and a optimistic view, which describes an abundance of

alternative forms of youth engagement. Arguments underlying the pessimistic view tend to be

based on observations concerning conventional modes of civic engagement. The supposedly ever

3

increasing disengagement of youths has been exemplified by low turnout in general elections

(Dalton, 2008; Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 2004), low membership of political parties (Mycock &

Tonge, 2012), and weak activism in associational life (Putnam, 2000). In this light, youth is

characterized by political apathy/alienation (Marsh, O'Toole, & Jones, 2007), ‘partisan

dealignment’ (Phelps, 2012), or ‘dissenting citizenship’ (O'Loughlin & Gillespie, 2012).

By contrast, the optimistic perspective posits a far less dark evaluation of youth

(Quintelier, 2007). Here, researchers claim that youths are not passive; rather, their engagement

has changed its forms (Fisher, 2012; Sloam, 2012; Zuckin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli-

Carpini, 2006). More young people have become involved in “emerging forms of civic

engagement that take place outside the institutionalized sphere of politics” (Stolle & Hooghe,

2011, p. 119). These forms are particularly apparent in voluntary work (Flanagan, 2013), patterns

of consumption at markets (Micheletti, 2003), food preferences (Micheletti & Stolle, 2009), and

activities on the web (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011; Loader 2007). Thus, researchers holding

the optimistic view argue that although young people are less involved in conventional forms of

civic activities than middle-aged citizens, they cannot be described as passive.

Although the two views provide us with two quite distinct angles on youth political

engagement, they both suffer from portraying youths as monolithic (Bennett, 2007). Both place

young people at one end of the passive-active continuum, and tend to lose sight of the possible

diversity in-between. Accordingly, a more balanced view that would capture the diversity of

youth engagement has been called for (Harris, Wyn, & Younes, 2010; Marsh, O'Toole, & Jones,

2007; Vromen & Collin, 2010).

Quality of youth engagement. One way of capturing the diversity of youth engagement

is to reflect on its quality and desirable aspects. Although arguments about the changed modes of

4

engagement have expanded the repertoire of youth involvement, they still have a narrow focus,

i.e., on manifest aspects of youth civic engagement. However, it has been claimed that

engagement patterns have evolved over time as a consequence of structural transformations

within political systems (Almond & Verba, 1963; cf. Gamson, 2004). Thus, certain types of

engagement have been regarded as constituting an ideal of “good citizenship”, which depends on

the developmental phase of the political system (Schudson, 1999). Contemporary Western

democracies are largely treated as representing a postmodern stage of systems development

(Inglehart & Welzel, 2010), which encourages not only alternative (manifest) forms of

engagement but also non-manifest ones (e.g., political interest, or adherence to basic democratic

values). Recent theoretical advances (Ekman and Amnå, 2012), suggest that manifest

engagement can no longer be treated as the only indicator of political integration; rather, account

must also be taken of latent forms of engagement. In this vein, Berger (2009) has called for the

inclusion of “moral” and “social” involvement as indicators of political participation of equal

desirability.

Despite these theoretical advances, however, latent engagement has not received much

empirical research attention. Consequently, adolescents who are attracted to less conspicuous

political activities may simply have been equated with completely passive youth. Notably, by

adding latent aspects, studies by Amnå and Ekman (2013) have identified this traditionally

neglected subgroup of youth, and shown that its members are meaningfully different from

completely passive individuals on citizenship competence measures, such as political trust and

efficacy. Hence, latent aspects should be considered when exploring youth civic engagement.

Development of youth engagement. It has been assumed that young citizens relate to

politics in a pretty stable manner. This assumption seems to stem from two sources: a traditional

5

assumption about the persistency of childhood behavioral patterns into adulthood, and long-

lasting research practice in the field of civic engagement. In particular, it has been believed that

the residues of pre-adult learning persist through life, as is posited in the so-called “persistence

model” or “impressionable years model” (Sears & Levy, 2003). Studies have pointed to the high

stability of, inter alia, partisanship, ideology, and attitudes. Further, long-lasting research

attention to conventional and manifest participation, such as voting, has contributed to the

impression that political behavior is discontinuous, which leaves adolescence as an empty, or at

best latent, period in relation to political development (Jennings, Stoker & Bowers, 2009).

However, there are reasons to believe that the development of youth civic engagement is

not stable. First, stability has been challenged by models of “lifelong openness” or “life cycle

effects” (Sears & Levy, 2003; Jennings, 2007). Studies present evidence against the

conservatizing effect of time by showing changes in political engagement and attitudes using

samples of adults. Second, when the focus is on adolescents’ engagement, changes are only to be

expected. Adolescence is a sensitive period in the development of identity, morality, and

cognition, all of which are bases for civic development (Metzger & Smetana, 2010). Since

identity undergoes change in adolescence, it is reasonable to expect that so does civic

development. Third, given contemporary trends towards discontinuity and the fragmentation of

every aspect of our lives there should be a presumption in favor of changes in political

engagement. In line with these trends, it has been claimed that contemporary citizenship is a

new type of “postmodern (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010) or “liquid” (Bauman, 2000) citizenship that

is characterized by self-expression and no longer guided by routine (Bennett, 2007). Therefore,

systematic longitudinal studies are called for. Fourth, studies into the development of youth

civic engagement in general also have departed from a basic understanding that focuses on the

6

role of adults and particularly parents, while ignoring the political agency of the young person

and his or her peer network (Amnå, Ekman, Kerr, and Stattin, 2009).

Hence, shortcomings of the research into youth civic engagement in contemporary

Western democracies may give a distorted view on its extension, forms and changes. There

seems to be a lack of theories as well as empirical studies capable of capturing the diversity, the

latency, and the developmental processes that may characterize current youth civic engagement.

The current study

In this study, we go beyond the frequently used (but simplistic and dichotomous) active-passive

notions of political participation described above. It is aimed to examine the validity of three

assumptions prevailing in research on youth political engagement, namely that it is monolithic,

manifest, and stable. For this purpose, we expanded our conceptualization of engagement to

include an indicator of a latent aspect of engagement (political interest). We expected that this

would aid the identification of more diverse forms of youth engagement than when conventional

measures, focusing only on manifest aspects, are used. To validate the legitimacy of the

inclusion of the latent aspect, and of the meaningfulness of the identified groups, we compared

them on various citizenship competencies. We expected that a “seemingly passive group” would

differ from a “completely passive group” in that they would share more of the characteristics of

an “active” group (e.g., a high sense of efficacy). Further, we explored possible changes in group

membership over a two-year period. We had no a priori expectations concerning the degree of

changes we would observe.

7

Method

Sample

The sample consisted of students in mid-adolescence from a major Swedish city that is close to

the national average on factors such as population density, income level, and unemployment

(Statistics Sweden, 2010). It was selected from three high schools with the purposes of including

participants of both genders and varying social and ethnic backgrounds, and on both vocational

and theoretical programs.

The data are based on three consecutive annual assessments.i The data collections took

place during school hours in surveys that were administered by trained research assistants.

Participants were informed about the types of items in the survey questionnaire and the

approximate amount of time required, and were assured that their participation was voluntary.

They were also assured that neither parents, teachers nor anyone else would see their responses.

Each class received a payment of approximately €100 for participation. Parents were informed

about the study ahead of time, and were able to refuse their children’s participation by returning

a note in a prepaid envelope.

For the purpose of the analyses, we chose adolescents who participated at all three time

points (N = 489; T1 Mage = 16.57; SD = .66). To test whether participants with responses at all

three time points differed from those who participated only once or twice (N = 493), on gender,

national background, socioeconomic status (SES), and on the study variables (i.e., political

participation, political interest, and citizenship competence), either chi-square tests or

independent-samples t-tests were performed. Out of the 15 study variables compared, significant

differences were found only for one, namely social trust (t = 3.30, p = .001). The two subsamples

did not differ on any of the background variable except national background (x2= 5.17, p = .023).

8

Measures

All measures are self-report measures and are described in greater detail in Amnå and Ekman

(2013).

Political participation. Political Participation was measured using 11 items, i.e., “I

attended a meeting dealing with political or societal issues,” rated on 3-point scale ranging from

1 (no, never) to 3 (yes, several times). Alpha reliability was .89, .90, and .76 at Time 1, Time 2,

and Time 3, respectively.

Political interest. Youth interest in politics was measured using 2 items (reversely

coded), including “How interested are you in politics?”, rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1

(very interested) to 5 (not at all interested). Alpha reliability was .70, .75, and .84 at Time 1,

Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Political efficacy. The youths responded to 10 statements, such as: “If I really tried I

could be an active member of a political organization”, rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (I

could definitely not manage that) to 4 (I could definitely manage that). Alpha reliability

was .93, .94, and .93 at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Political trust. The youths responded to 7 items regarding their trust in institutions, such

as the government, political parties, etc. Responses were given on a 4-point scale ranging from 1

(no trust at all) to 4 (a lot of trust). Alpha reliability was .80, .88, and .89 at Time 1, Time 2, and

Time 3, respectively.

Social trust. Youths responded to 2 statements, such as “Most people are trustworthy”,

rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (don’t agree at all) to 4 (completely agree). Alpha

reliability was .81, .82, and .85 at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

9

Feelings about politics. Adolescents responded to the question: “People differ in what

they feel about politics. What are your feelings?” on a response scale ranging from 1 (extremely

boring) to 6 (really fun).

Satisfaction with democracy. Adolescents responded to 2 statements (reversely coded),

including “On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Sweden?”

Response options ranged from 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not at all satisfied). Alpha reliability

was .68, .66, and .67 at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

News Consumption. Adolescents responded to 4 questions (reversely coded) about how

often they acquainted themselves with the news in different media. The response scale ranged

from 1 (at least 5 days a week) to 5 (never). Alpha reliability was .59, .57, and .59 at Time 1,

Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Discussions with parents. Adolescents responded to 2 statements (reversely coded)

about whether they tried to influence parents, including “Do you try to encourage your parents to

become more aware of what happens in the world?” Responses were given on a 5-point scale

ranging from 1 (almost always) to 5 (never). Alpha reliability was .79, .70, and .74 at Time 1,

Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Discussions with peers. Adolescents responded to 2 statements (reversely coded) about

whether they tried to influence friends, including “Do you try to encourage your friends to

become more aware of what happens in the world?” Responses were given on a 5-point scale

ranging from 1 (almost always) to 5 (never). Alpha reliability was .71, .68, and .74 at Time 1,

Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

School activism. Adolescents responded to 4 statements regarding how active they were

in a school setting, including “Have you brought up a political issue during class?” Responses

10

ranged from 1 (has never happened) to 5 (very often). Alpha reliability was .86, .89, and .89 at

Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Online activism. 20 items (reversely coded) were administered to the adolescents

concerning their political engagement on the Internet during the last two months, including

“Discussing societal or political issues with friends on the net”. The response scale ranged from

1 (yes, several times) to 3 (no). Alpha reliability was .90, .90, and .88 at Time 1, Time 2, and

Time 3, respectively.

Norms of good citizenship. Adolescents were asked 6 questions concerning their

opinions on how important it is that people are active with regard to political issues. The

response scale ranged from 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). Alpha reliability

was .89, .89, and .79 at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Perceptions of future participation. Adolescents were asked about the probability of

their future political engagement, i.e., voting in elections as adults, with a 4-point response scale

ranging from 1 (I will not do it) to 4 (I will definitely do it). Alpha reliability was .62, .64, and .62

at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Humanistic values. Adolescents rated the importance of 6 issues, e.g., equality, on a

scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very important). Alpha reliability was .83, .84,

and .83 at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, respectively.

Analyses

In order to provide an overview of sample scores on the study variables, the means, standard

deviations, and correlations of all the variables were computed. The main analyses had three

parts: (1) a cluster analysis; (2) a comparison between the clusters on measures of citizenship

11

competences (i.e., efficacy, political and social trust, feelings about politics, satisfaction with

democracy, news consumption, political discussions with parents and peers, school activism,

online activism, perceptions about future engagement, humanistic values, and norms of good

citizenship) and on the background information (SES); and (3) an analysis of changes in cluster

membership between three time points.

For the purpose of the cluster analysis, interest and participation measures were entered

as clustering variables. First, both measures were standardized, and scores more than 2 SD from

the mean were transformed into 2.0-SD values. Then, a hierarchical cluster analysis was

performed using Ward’s method. All three time points were analyzed separately. The clusters

obtained were subsequently compared on the measures of citizenship competences at all three

time points separately, using ANOVAs for continuous variables and x2 tests for discontinuous

variables. To analyze changes in cluster membership across the three time points, we employed

Exacon, which analyzes whether a specific cell frequency is larger or smaller than expected on

the basis of a contingency table (Bergman, Magnusson, & El-Khouri, 2002). A cell frequency

that is significantly larger than expected is denoted as a Type, whereas a cell frequency that is

significantly smaller than expected is denoted as an Antitype.ii

Results

Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all the variables are presented in Table 1, while

the results of the cluster analysis are shown in Table 2. A four-cluster solution (Active, Standby,

Disengaged, and Disillusioned) fitted the data best, explaining around 70% of the error sum of

squares at each time point. Overall, youths in the Active group were characterized by the highest

level of participation and a medium level of interest. Adolescents in the Standby cluster were

characterized by the highest level of interest and a medium level of participation. Unengaged

12

youths were characterized by a low level of participation and a low level of interest.

Disillusioned youths were characterized by the lowest level of both participation and interest. It

should be noted that the pattern with regard to political interest between the Active and Standby

groups was reversed at Time Point 3; Active youth scored higher on interest at this time point

than Standbyers, whereas Standbyers had scored higher at time points 1 and 2.

The results of comparing all four clusters on the measures of citizenship competences

(efficacy, political and social trust, feelings about politics, etc.) and background information

(SES) are presented in Table 3. Overall, the clusters differed significantly on all variables except

social trust and SES. There were few differences between the Active and the Standby groups.

Both groups scored highest on almost all the citizenship competence measures. Differences were

more pronounced between the Active and Standby groups, on the one hand, and the Unengaged

group on the other. Unlike Active and Standby youths, youths in the Unengaged and

Disillusioned groups scored lower on efficacy, activism, norms, etc. (although there were a few

exceptions where the Unengaged youths were not significantly different from the Standby

youths). In line with expectations, the Disillusioned group showed the lowest scores on almost

all the citizenship competence measures.

The results of the Exacon analysis are presented in Table 4. Overall, the results indicate

patterns of both stability and change. The results of the analyses of short-term changes, i.e., from

Time Point 1 to 2, and from Time Point 2 to 3, showed that there was significant stability in all

four clusters; 58.7% of youths remained in the same cluster from Time Point 1 to 2, and 51.9%

from Time Point 2 to 3. These proportions also indicate, however, that a substantial number of

youths did change their cluster membership, although the changes did not reach statistical

significance. This pattern was more pronounced in the longer-term analysis (Time Point 1 to 3).

13

Over two years, only less than half of the youths (44.7%) remained in the same cluster.

Specifically, out of the four clusters, two (the Active and the Disengaged) were not stable.

Furthermore, the movement from Standby to Active was significant.

Discussion

The current study aimed to revisit three prevailing assumptions about youth civic engagement:

uniformity (an issue of quantity), manifest nature (an issue of quality), and stability (an issue of

development). For this purpose, by including a latent aspect of youth engagement (political

interest), the current study examined diversity in youth civic engagement over a period of two

years. The findings show that: (1) youth are diverse and form four distinct groups; (2) a latent

aspect of youth engagement (political interest) is valuable in identifying an important subgroup

of youths who are “seemingly passive” but exhibit characteristics that place them closer to active

rather than passive youths; and that (3) around half of youth change their orientations towards

civic engagement over two years. In conclusion, the results show that the assumptions about the

quantity, quality, and development of youth civic engagement merit reconsideration. The

detailed results and their implications are discussed in relation to three questions.

Is youth civic engagement monolithic?

The participants in the study were diverse in terms of how they related to civic engagement.

More precisely, youth were clustered into four distinct subgroups representing different levels of

engagement (from the very Active, through the seemingly passive Standbyers, to the definitely

Passive). This result is in line with a recent study by Amnå and Ekman (2013), which showed the

14

diversity of youth civic engagement, and highlighted a contrast with the earlier studies that have

conceptualized youths as a uniform, homogenous group (either passive or active).

The finding raises questions about the focal points of discussion at the level of youth

civic engagement hitherto. The traditional, monolithic images of youth engagement (pessimistic

and optimistic) seem to originate from comparisons of youths, as a whole, with earlier, now

middle-aged generations. However, the present finding implies that arguments resting on the

uniformity of youth engagement probably oversimplify the picture and limit the scope of

discussion. Instead, focusing on gradation in the level of youth engagement may be more fruitful.

Is youth civic engagement manifest?

The results of this study show that inclusion of an indicator of a latent aspect of engagement

(political interest) is valuable when trying to capture more nuanced aspects of youth civic

engagement. Specifically, this study identified a meaningful subgroup of youths who have been

neglected in previous studies that have focused solely on behavioral participation. This subgroup

of youths, namely Standby, is moderate on the manifest aspect of engagement (participation) but

high on the latent aspect (interest).

Since Standbyers exhibit such an unusual pattern of (moderate) participation and (high)

interest, it raises questions about their evaluation in terms of desirable democratic orientations. If

we focus exclusively on manifest engagement following in the footsteps of previous studies,

most likely, Standbyers would not be classified as youths having desirable democratic

orientation. On the other hand, if the attention is given also to a political interest, i.e. a latent

form of engagement, Standbyers can be viewed as an asset. In particular, their interest could be

conceptualized as the signal of a potentially powerful youth political agency.

15

The comparison of Standbyers with the other groups, i.e. Disillusioned and Unengaged,

on citizenship competencies appears to support the latter evaluation. More specifically,

Standbyers are characterized by high self-efficacy, citizenship norms, and perceptions of future

engagement, which places them closer to members of the active group than those of the passive.

This implies that the “seemingly passive” are just as competent as the active. They constitute a

resource pool that can be mobilised into manifest activity when the need arises, albeit maybe just

for bringing a lasting political conflict to its end. As soon as possible they then may revert to

their standby position (cf. Gamson, 2004, p. 244).

Latent aspects of engagement, such as interest, may well be the real determinants of

manifest participation (Norris, 2002). These results support Schudson’s (1999) argument about

the existence of “monitorial citizens”, who keep themselves informed without any manifest signs

of participation. The results are also in line with Berger’s (2009) argument about “moral and

social engagement” as a so-far neglected resource for democracy. Reactive standbyers clearly

display an “engaged intellectual or emotional orientation” (Ekman & Amnå, 2012), so – in

contrast to the Disillusioned in particular – they can scarcely be regarded as “disconnected” or

“undemocratic” although they surely refuse to act or react as long as their representatives are

able to solve conflicts in satisfactory ways. Overall, these findings call for reflection on the

quality of civic engagement, especially in light of radically expanding technologies and in the

case of youths who are particularly attracted to less conspicuous political activity (Ekström &

Östman, 2013).

16

Is youth civic engagement stable?

Our results show that youths are characterized by both stability and change. Specifically, almost

half of the youth in our sample changed their group membership over the two-year period, which

is incompatible with the, often implicit, assumption of stability in youth political engagement.

Clearly then, engagement is not a sphere of development where early characteristics persist into

adulthood, as has been shown before in a comparative cross-sectional data analysis (Hooghe &

Wilkenfeld, 2008). Given that the current study is so far a rare contemporary longitudinal study

to explore individual changes in youth civic engagement, it is not yet possible to formulate

specific explanations of their direction.

One possible explanation could relate the observed changes to the youth maturation

process. A recent study showed that the elevated level of youth engagement is connected to their

identity consolidation (Crocetti et al., 2012). In line with this, one could expect the inter-cluster

movements to mirror general maturation processes, i.e. an age-corresponding increase in political

engagement. However, this explanation does not seem to fully capture the complex picture of

youth engagement given the diverse direction of changes observed in this study.

Therefore, institutional explanations could relate the diversely and dynamically

sharpened profiles of youths’ civic and political behaviour also to more general changes of

modern representative democracies, resulting in new ways of combining commonality with

personality (Bang and Sørensen, 1999). New relationships between the voters and the elected,

decline of cleavage and ideology in nation politics, weakened membership based political parties,

new roles of media, and technological potentials for more intense horizontal political

communication (Blumler and Coleman, 2013), sometimes broadly classified as spectators’ or

“audience democracies” (Manin, 1997) then have to be taken into account.

17

In other words, future research should look deeper into both the psychological and

political processes operating in order to clarify the character of the changes of political behaviour.

Is a standbyer’s movement towards manifest political participation essentially a transient

firefighting-like operation (Gamson, 2004; Hibbing & Theiss.Morse, 2002) or a first step

towards a long term political involvement? However, our preliminary dynamic picture of youth

civic engagement merits caution. Given that about half of the sample hinged upon stability, it is

premature to draw conclusions regarding the development of engagement.

Limitations

A few limitations are also worth noting. First, given that we only had a Swedish sample; caution

should be observed in generalizing our findings to populations where the context of political

engagement differs from the Scandinavian (Andersen & Hoff, 2001; Amnå, 2006, 2007;

Andersen, 2006; Selle & Østerud, 2006). For example, Sweden has been characterized by a high

level of social trust, which may be the reason why there was no significant difference in social

trust between the four groups. Future studies would benefit from testing comparatively the

effects of various cultural civic contexts on youth political participation. Second, our sample

solely comprised mid-adolescents, and a wider age-range of youths and young adults would

provide a more exhaustive picture of a diverse spectrum of political engagement (cf. Flanagan,

2013; Amnå & Zetterberg, 2010; Sherrod, Haggerty & Featherman, 1993).iii Third, although our

study tapped into changes in youth political participation, the possible mechanisms behind and

causes of the changes across the various groups were beyond the scope of the current study, and

thus have not been explored. In addition, from contrasting normative points of view, the

existence of a fairly big group of young citizens who is at least temporarily inactive undoubtedly

18

can be valued either positively or negatively (McBride, 2012; Amnå & Ekman, 2013). We

encourage researchers further to examine these issues in the future.

Conclusion

In sum, the current study expands existing knowledge on youth political participation by

revisiting and challenging the prevailing assumptions about its quantity, quality, and

development. The findings of the study show these assumptions to be dubious, and suggest that

studies reliant upon them are unable to capture the diverse spectrum of youth participation.

Given that the assumptions about the quantity, quality, and development of youth civic

engagement profoundly influence the directions of debate, research, and policy, they merit

substantial reconsideration.

19

References

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture : political attitudes and democracy in five nations.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Amnå, E. (2006). Playing with fire? Swedish mobilization for participatory democracy. Journal of

European Public Policy, 13(4), 587-606.

Amnå, E. (2007). Associational Life, Youth, and Political Capital Formation in Sweden: Historical

Legacies and Contemporary Trends. In L. Trägårdh (Ed.), State and civil society in Northern

Europe: the Swedish model reconsidered (pp. 165-204). New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Amnå, E., Ekström, M., Kerr, M. & Stattin, H. (2009). Political socialization and human agency. The

development of civic engagement from adolescence to adulthood. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift,

111(1), pp. 27-40

Amnå, E. & Ekman, J (2013). Standby citizens: diverse faces of political passivity. European Political

Science Review, available on CJO2013. doi:10.1017/S175577391300009X.

Amnå, E., & Zetterberg, P. (2010). A political science perspective on socialization research: Young

Nordic citizens in a comparative light. In C. Flanagan, L. Sherrod & J. Torney-Purta (Eds.),

Handbook of research on civic engagement in youth (pp. 43-65). Hoboken, N.J.: Wileys.

Andersen, J. G. (2006). Political power and democracy in Denmark: decline of democracy or change in

democracy? Journal of European Public Policy, 13(4), 569-586.

Andersen, J. G., & Hoff, J. (2001). Democracy and Citizenship in Scandinavia. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Bang, H.P. and E. Sørensen (1999). The everyday maker: a new challenge to democratic governance, Administrative Theory & Praxis 21: 325–341.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bennett, W. L. (2007). Changing citizenship in the digital age. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur

Foundation Series on Digital Media and Learning, 1-24.

Bennett, W. L., Wells, C., & Freelon, D. (2011). Communicating civic engagement: contrasting models

of citizenship in the youth web sphere. Journal of Communication, 61(5), 835-856.

20

Berger, B. (2009). Political theory, political science and the end of civic engagement.

Perspectives on Politics, 7(2), 335-350.

Bergman, L. R., Magnusson, D., & El Khouri, B. M. (2002). Studying individual development in an

interindividual context: A person-oriented approach (Vol. 4). Lawrence Erlbaum.

Blumler, J, & Coleman, S. (2013) Paradigms of Civic Communication. International Journal of

Communication, 7, 173-187.

Dalton, R. J. (2008). The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics.

Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Ekman, J., & Amnå, E. (2012). Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology.

Human Affairs, 22(3), 283-300.

Ekström, M., & Östman, J. (2013). Information, Interaction, and Creative Production: The Effects of

Three Forms of Internet Use on Youth Democratic Engagement. Communication Research.

Fisher, D. R. (2012). Youth Political Participation: Bridging Activism and Electoral Politics. Annual

Review of Sociology, 38(1), 119-137. doi: doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145439

Flanagan, C. A. (2013). Teenage Citizens: The Political Theories of the Young. Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press.

Fuchs, D., & Klingemann, H. D. (1995). Citizens and the State. Oxford University Press.

Gamson, W.A. 2004. “Bystanders, public opinion, and the media”. In Snow, D.A., Soule, S.A., and Kriesi,

H. (Eds), The Blackwell companion to social movements, , pp. 242–261. Oxford, UK:

Blackwell.

Hansard (2013). Audit of Political Engagement 10. The 2013 Report. London: Hansard Society.

Harris, A., Wyn, J., & Younes, S. (2010). Beyond apathetic or activist youth. 'Ordinary' young people and

contemporary forms of participation. Young, 18(1), 9-32.

Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2002). Stealth democracy: Americans' beliefs about how government

should work: Cambridge Univ Press.

21

Holmberg, S. (1999). Down and down we go: political trust in Sweden. In P. Norris (Ed.), Critical

Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governmance (pp. 103-122). Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Hooghe, M., & Dejaeghere, Y. (2007). Does the ‘monitorial citizen’exist? An empirical investigation into

the occurrence of postmodern forms of citizenship in the Nordic countries. Scandinavian Political

Studies, 30(2), 249-271.

Hooghe, M. & Wilkenfeld (2008). The Stability of Political Attitudes and Behaviors across Adolescence

and Early Adulthood: A Comparison of Survey Data on Adolescents and Young Adults in Eight

Countries. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 37(2), pp 155-167

Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel (2010) "Changing mass priorities: The link between

modernization and democracy." Perspectives on Politics 8(2), 551-567.

Jennings, M. K. (2007). Political socialization. The Oxford handbook of political behavior, 29–

44. democracies: A comparative analysis (pp. 255-279). London: Routhledge.

Jennings, M. K., Stoker, L., & Bowers, J. (2009). Politics across generations: Family

transmission reexamined. Journal of Politics, 71(3), 782-799.

Loader, B. D. (2007). Introduction: Young Citizens in the Digital Age, Disaffected or Displaced? In B. D.

Loader (Ed.), Young Citizens in the Digital Age: Political Engagement, Young People and New

Media (pp. 11-19). London: Routledge.

Manin, B. (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marsh, D., O'Toole, T., & Jones, S. (2007). Young People and Politics in the UK. Apathy or Alienation?

Basingstoke: Palgrave.

McBride, C. (2012). Democratic Participation, Engagement and Freedom. The British Journal of Politics

& International Relations, no-no. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00516.x

22

Metzger, A., & Smetana, J.G. (2010). Social cognitive approaches to civic engagement. In L.

Sherrod, J. Torney-Purta, & C. Flanagan (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Civic

Engagement in Youth. Wiley-Blackwell.

Micheletti, M. (2003). Political virtue and shopping: Individuals, consumerism, and collective action:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Micheletti, M., & Stolle, D. (2009). Vegetarianism as life style politics. In M. Micheletti & A. McFarland

(Eds.), Creative Participation: Responsibility-taking in the Political World (pp. 125-145).

Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Mycock, A., & Tonge, J. (2012). The Party Politics of Youth Citizenship and Democratic Engagement.

Parliamentary Affairs, 65(1), 138-161.

Norris, P. (2002). Democratic Phoenix : reinventing political activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

O'Loughlin, B., & Gillespie, M. (2012). Dissenting Citizenship? Young People and Political Participation

in the Media-security Nexus. Parliamentary Affairs, 65(1), 115-137.

Pattie, C., Seyd, P., & Whiteley, P. (2004). Citizenship in Britain: Values, participation and democracy:

Cambridge University Press.

Phelps, E. (2012). Understanding Electoral Turnout Among British Young People: A Review of the

Literature. Parliamentary Affairs, 65(1), 281-299.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York:

Simon & Shuster.

Rosanvallon, P. (2008). Counter-democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust: Cambridge University Press.

Schudson, M. (1999). The good citizen: a history of American civic life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press.

23

Sears, D. O. & Levy, S. (2003) Childhood and adult political development, in Sears, O.; Huddy,

L.; Jervis, R. (Eds), Oxford handbook of political psychology, (pp. 60-109). New York,

NY, US: Oxford University Press.

Selle, P., & Østerud, Ø. (2006). The eroding of representative democracy in Norway. Journal of

European Public Policy, 13(4), 551-568.

Sherrod, L. R., Haggerty, R. J., & Featherman, D. L. (1993). Introduction: Late adolescence and the

transition to adulthood. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 3(3), 217-226.

Sloam, J. (2012). New Voice, Less Equal: The Civic and Political Engagement of Young People in the

United States and Europe. Comparative Political Studies. doi: 10.1177/0010414012453441

Stoker, G. (2010). The rise of political disenchantment. In C. Hay (Ed.), New directions in political

science: responding to the challenges of an interdependent world. : (pp. 43-63). Houndsmills:

Palgrave/Macmillan.

Stolle, D., & Hooghe, M. (2011). Shifting Inequalities. Patterns of exclusion and inclusion in emerging

forms of political participation. European Societies, 13(1), 119-142.

Vromen, A., & Collin, P. (2010). Everyday youth participation? Contrasting views from Australian

policymakers and young people. Young, 18(1), 97-112.

Zukin, C., Keeter, S., Andolina, M., Jenkins, K., & Delli Carpini, M. X. (2006). A New Engagement?

New York: Oxford University Press.

24

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all the study variables.

M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

1. Participation 1.16 (.32) 1.19 (.34) 1.16 (.24)

-

2. Interest 3.05 (.95) 3.22 (.97) 3.22 (1.01)

.23

.25

.43 -

3. Efficacy 2.55 (.73) 2.66 (.78) 2.72 (.74)

.22

.22

.40

.51

.61

.52 -

4. Political trust 2.50 (.63) 2.57 (.60) 2.63 (.61)

.08

.09

.01

.34

.27

.18

.28

.24

.19 -

5. Social trust 3.04 (.84) 3.02 (.85) 2.93 (.96)

.02

.05

.03

.05

.14

.05

.09

.09

.07

.16

.23

.26 -

6. Feeling 3.66 (1.09) 3.81 (1.11) 3.87 (1.09)

.20

.18

.36

.72

.78

.72

.47

.56

.42

.23

.14

.09

.02

.10

.05 -

7. Satisfaction 2.80 (.59) 2.83 (.60) 2.80 (.59)

-.04 -.08 -.11

.17

.06

.01

.11

.06

.13

.50

.51

.57

.16

.12

.20

.02 -.06 .00

-

8. News consumption 2.83 (.79) 2.97 (.78) 2.85 (.80)

.14

.08

.11

.40

.36

.34

.14

.20

.15

.17

.09

.15

.08

.13

.06

.29

.32

.27

.13

.10

.12 -

9. Discussion (parents) 2.47 (1.00) 2.51 (.94) 2.45 (.94)

.20

.24

.30

.42

.45

.40

.28

.30

.24

.23

.17

.18

.05

.05

.05

.33

.32

.27

.06

.01

.06

.25

.29

.26 -

10. Discussion (peers) 2.31 (.95) 2.37 (.93) 2.43 (.90)

.22

.25

.37

.48

.47

.46

.33

.36

.23

.26

.17

.14

-.03 .11 .01

.34

.39

.36

.08 -.01 .00

.30

.33

.26

.68

.70

.66 -

11. School activities 1.88 (.84) 1.98 (.89) 2.04 (.90)

.29

.25

.47

.45

.43

.43

.32

.39

.38

.20

.21

.13

.04

.13 -.01

.39

.44

.37

.14

.03 -.01

.29

.29

.22

.31

.33

.41

.38

.42

.47 -

12. Internet 1.30 (.31) 1.34 (.33) 1.38 (.31)

.42

.46

.58

.45

.44

.52

.31

.36

.42

.10

.06 -.01

-.03 -.04 -.08

.44

.38

.46

.03 -.06 -.09

.27

.28

.24

.28

.41

.26

.32

.47

.39

.41

.39

.44 -

13. Perception 2.26 (.60) 2.34 (.59) 2.32 (.54)

.16

.30

.40

.51

.52

.53

.39

.47

.40

.29

.28

.12

.02

.15

.05

.46

.52

.43

.13

.01

.02

.22

.19

.22

.30

.28

.30

.35

.34

.35

.32

.40

.35

.35

.35

.34 -

14. Humanistic values 4.28 (.59) 4.25 (.61) 4.20 (.63)

.11

.04

.11

.23

.18

.21

.12

.09

.23

.22

.25

.25

.18

.13

.17

.13

.08

.07

.20

.16

.08

.04

.09

.20

.24

.23

.30

.22

.28

.27

.15

.16

.19

.03

.07

.09

.12

.08

.24 -

15. Norms 2.35 (.72) 2.43 (.71) 2.45 (.68)

.26

.30

.42

.57

.58

.60

.46

.52

.48

.35

.35

.19

.03

.13

.09

.47

.50

.45

.17

.08

.02

.20

.20

.24

.44

.45

.39

.45

.47

.43

.35

.37

.40

.36

.43

.38

.50

.51

.49

.31

.29

.35 -

Note. Data on the first row in each cell refer to time point 1, on the second row to time point 2, and on the third row to time point 3. Bold = p < .01; Underline = p < .05.

25

Table 2. Results of one-way ANOVAs examining difference between groups on the measures used in the cluster analysis (z-scores).

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

N Participation Interest N Participation Interest N Participation Interest

Active 35 1.89a .47b 58 1.47a .50b 42 1.71a 1.33a

Standby 133 .047b 1.10a 126 -.12b 1.09a 107 1.46b .69b

Unengaged 159 -.27c .06c 166 -.29c -.02c 200 -.40c .23c

Disillusioned 157 -.43d -1.06d 125 -.48d -1.23d 139 -.50c -1.26d

F-value 464.88 414.78 484.33 508.22 437.84 441.07

p-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

η² 0.74 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.73

Note. Superscripts a, b, c, and d indicate significant differences in descending order of magnitude.

26

Table 3. Results of one-way ANOVAs examining differences between groups on the measures of citizenship competences.

TIME 1 EFFIC P. TRUST S. TRUST FEEL SATISF NEWS PAR PEERS SCHOOL NET PERC VAL NORM SES ACTIVE 2.92a 2.58ab 3.00 4.13b 2.69 3.06ab 3.00a 2.89a 2.56a 1.71a 2.51a 4.40ab 2.80a -.24 S-BY 2.98a 2.69a 3.13 4.57a 2.88 3.18a 2.92a 2.81a 2.30a 1.44b 2.61a 4.41a 2.79a .07 UNENG 2.52b 2.59a 3.00 3.59c 2.89 2.86b 2.46b 2.26b 1.76b 1.24c 2.25b 4.36a 2.35b -.03 DISILL 2.13c 2.21b 3.04 2.76d 2.68 2.47c 1.99c 1.82c 1.49c 1.14d 1.92c 4.06b 1.85c -.03 F -value 46.22 17.19 .59 119.32 4.80 23.48 28.34 37.59 38.80 60.45 43.29 11.34 63.76 1.60 p-value .000 .000 .624 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .189 η² .23 .10 .00 .45 .03 .13 .15 .19 .20 .27 .21 .07 .29 .01 TIME 2 EFFIC P. TRUST S. TRUST FEEL SATISF NEWS PAR PEERS SCHOOL NET PERC VAL NORM SES

ACTIVE 3.00a 2.58ab 3.03 4.27b 2.62b 3.03b 2.99a 2.88a 2.44a 1.73a 2.67a 4.25ab 2.90a -.07 S-BY 3.15a 2.73a 3.16 4.78a 2.89ab 3.33a 2.92a 2.79a 2.43a 1.42b 2.67a 4.38a 2.84a .06 UNENG 2.62b 2.64a 3.01 3.58c 2.89a 2.92b 2.44b 2.26b 1.81b 1.27c 2.28b 4.24ab 2.32b -.05 DISILL 2.07c 2.31b 2.89 2.61d 2.77ab 1.81c 1.96c 1.81c 1.53c 1.17d 1.92c 4.11b 1.95c .04 F -value 59.78 11.97 2.05 150.05 3.73 19.43 33.19 36.69 34.17 58.76 55.58 4.13 57.75 .718 p-value .000 .000 .106 .000 .011 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .000 .541 η² .28 .07 .01 .51 .02 .11 .18 .19 .18 .27 .26 .03 .27 .00 TIME 3 EFFIC P. TRUST S. TRUST FEEL SATISF NEWS PAR PEERS SCHOOL NET PERC VAL NORM SES ACTIVE 3.52a 2.65ab 3.08 5.20a 2.52b 3.15a 3.05a 3.30a 3.20a 1.89a 2.90a 4.37a 3.28a .14 S-BY 3.07b 2.74a 3.00 4.32b 2.88a 3.16a 2.80ab 2.75b 2.39b 1.55b 2.53b 4.27a 2.74b -.03 UNENG 2.72c 2.70a 2.88 3.93c 2.84ab 2.84b 2.50b 2.45c 1.93c 1.32c 2.32c 4.26a 2.44c -.04 DISILL 2.23d 2.46b 2.92 2.85d 2.75ab 2.54c 1.91c 1.90d 1.58d 1.20d 1.99d 4.02b 1.96d .05 F -value 62.35 5.97 0.75 96.70 4.38 15.13 31.00 41.73 55.55 11.17 49.72 6.00 72.44 .94 p-value .000 .001 .525 .000 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .424 η² .28 .04 .00 .39 .03 .09 .16 .21 .26 .41 .24 .04 .27 .01 Note. EFFIC = Efficacy; P.TRUST = Political Trust; S. TRUST = Social Trust; FEEL = Feelings about Politics; SATISF = Satisfaction with Democracy; NEWS = News

Consumption; PAR = Discussions with Parents; PEERS = Discussions with Peers; SCHOOL = School Activism; NET = Online Participation; PERC = Perceptions about Future

Engagement; VAL = Humanistic Values; NORM = Norms of Good Citizenship; SES = Socioeconomic Status. Superscripts a, b, c, and d indicate significant differences in

descending order of magnitude.

27

Table 4. Results of the Exacon analysis.

Active Standby Unengaged Disillusioned Sum

Active 17 / 4.2 6 / 9.0 6 / 11.9 5 / 8.9 34 19 / 4.9 14 / 12.6 13 / 23.2 11 / 16.2 57 8 / 3.0 11 / 7.7 8 / 14.3 8 / 10.0 35

Standby 24 / 16.1 81 / 34.8 25 / 45.7 1 / 34.3 131 18 / 10.9 54 / 27.9 51 / 51.3 3 / 35.9 126 27 / 11.5 49 / 29.0 50 / 53.8 6 / 37.7 132

Unengaged 11 / 18.9 29 / 40.7 87 / 53.4 26 / 40.0 153 4 / 14.4 32 / 36.8 91 / 67.6 39 / 47.3 166 7 / 13.8 35 / 34.9 76 / 64.9 41 / 45.4 159

Disillusioned 6 / 18.7 9 / 40.4 46 / 53.0 91 / 39.8 152 0 / 10.8 5 / 27.7 38 / 50.9 82 / 35.6 125 0 / 13.7 11 / 34.5 63 / 64.0 83 / 44.9 157

Sum 58 125 164 123 470 41 105 193 135 474 42 106 197 138 483

Note. Bold = Type (significantly more than expected); Underline = Antitype (significantly fewer than expected).

Numbers in the cells indicate observed numbers/expected numbers. First row in each cell indicates change between

time points 1 and 2, second row between time points 2 and 3, and third row between time points 1 and 3. First

column indicates the cluster membership of the prior and the top row of the latter time point.

28

NOTES

i This study was made possible by access to data from the Political Socialization Program, a longitudinal research program at YeS (Youth & Society) at Örebro University, Sweden (Amnå, Ekström, Kerr & Stattin, 2009). Responsible for the planning, implementation, and financing of the collection of data were professors Erik Amnå, Mats Ekström, Margaret Kerr and Håkan Stattin. The data collection was supported by grants from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond. The study has been approved by the regional Ethical Committee at Uppsala, Sweden. ii The authors want to thank Professor Håkan Stattin for valuable methodological support. iii To the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to test the standby concept on an adult citizenry recently has been made in Great Britain. In a national representative study of people aged 18 and above, a group of 39 percent was categorized as standby citizens (Hansard, 2013).