best eeworkshop 21 june 2011
TRANSCRIPT
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Evaluation and Financial Incentives
for Utility DSM (Energy Efficiency) Programs
Carmen Best
California Public Utilities Commission
June 21, 2011
Asia-Pacific Dialogue on Clean Energy Governance and Regulation
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U.S. Energy Use Grows While
California Usage Remains Flat
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1 9 6 0
1 9 6 2
1 9 6 4
1 9 6 6
1 9 6 8
1 9 7 0
1 9 7 2
1 9 7 4
1 9 7 6
1 9 7 8
1 9 8 0
1 9 8 2
1 9 8 4
1 9 8 6
1 9 8 8
1 9 9 0
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 4
1 9 9 6
1 9 9 8
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 2
k W h / p e r s o n
Per Capita Electricity Sales (not including self-generation)(kWh/person)
United States
California w/out stds
United States
California
California w/out stds
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Energy Efficiency as a ResourceCalifornia’s Energy Action Plan establishes
energy efficiency and other demand sideresources as first priority resources
• Regulatory tools to maximize this resource
• Decoupling
• Policy direction and setting goals
• Funding
• Incentives for performance (EE only)• Quantifying the resource
• Evaluation Measurement and Verification
• Quantify in integrated resource planning
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California Energy Efficiency Regulation
California Energy
Commission (CEC)
Establishes mandatory standards
- Building Codes
- Appliance Standards
Administers Research
Development and Deployment
funds through Public Interest
Energy Research (PIER) program
California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC)
Regulates utility investment
in voluntary energy
efficiency programs (i.e.,
above code minimum)
- Four investor owned
utilities
- About 80% of the electric
consumption in the state.
State of CaliforniaGovernor and Legislature
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Funding Sources for Mainstream
Utility Energy Efficiency Programs
• CPUC pools all
funding sources intoone overall (cost-effective) portfolio
• Gas PPP funds lost tobudget transfer for FY11-12
- 200 400 600 800
Energy
Procurement
Electric PGC
Gas PPP
$ Millions
$175
$256
$576
17%
25%
57%
Average Annual EE Budget by Funding Source
(Total ~ $1 billion)
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CPUC Oversight of Energy Efficiency Programs
• Investor Owned Utilities administer energyefficiency programs with CPUC approval andoversight
• CPUC roles: – Establishes policy guidance specific to:
• Energy efficiency savings goals
• California Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan
• Risk Reward Incentive Mechanism (RRIM)
– Approve portfolio budget applications (currently on a3-year cycle);
– Oversee Evaluation, Measurement & Verification
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Types of Value Added from Evaluation
• Evaluate progress against savings goals adopted by theCommission
• Assessing cost effectiveness of investments
• Updating savings estimates for future program cycles
• Improving accuracy of demand forecast
Assessing
program
impacts
• Improving program processes and implementation
• Developing feedback on new programs or measures
Improvingprogram
efficacy
• Assessing the potential for remaining energy savings
• Monitoring changing market conditions
Providing
marketfeedback
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Energy Efficiency Savings Goals (GWh)
• Savings accrued by 2008 were estimated at~ 3% of electricity sales
• Reducing forecast energy need by ~ 6%
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Historically the IOUs have not exceeded goals
on an evaluated basis
9
0
50
100
150
200
2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2008
% G
o a l
Reported v. Evaluated GWh
Savings
Reported Evaluated
Source: 2006-2008 Energy Efficiency Evaluation Report, July 2010; table 3
Possible Reasons:
• Goals andpotential have notbeen updated
• Challenges toupdating pre-eval.assumptions
• Evaluation resultsreflect newinformation
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Impact Evaluation is a key tool for
Quantifying the Resource
Evaluated savings represent updates toplanning assumptions based on field
assessment including: – Verification of claimed measure installations.
– In situ savings based on field conditions of
measures compared to the baseline.
– Influence of the program in leading to themeasure installation or action taken(program attribution).
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Risk Reward Incentive Mechanism (RRIM) –Rationale
• Authorized in late 2007 for post-2005 programs – After decoupling, incentives can address
disincentives to energy efficiency (EE) under cost-of-service regulation of IOUs
– Enables the IOUs to earn rewards on EE investmentsin amounts comparable to what they would otherwiseearn for their shareholders on “steel-in-the-ground”supply-side investments
– Balances utility bias towards supply-side since utilities
can generate earnings when they invest in supply-side resources, but not when procuring more cost-effective EE
– Incentives are potentially large enough to ensure thatutility managers and investors view EE as part of
utility operations that can generate meaningfulearnings
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Risk Reward Incentive Mechanism (RRIM) –
2006-2008 Original Structure
Reward(% ofPEB)
(perunitbelowCPUC
goal)Penalty
65%
85% 100% % of CPUCgoals
ER = 9%
ER = 12%
Earnings cappedat $450 million
0%
5¢/kWh, $25/kW, 45 ¢/thermbelow goals, or payback ofnegative net benefits (cost-effectiveness guarantee),
Penalty capped
at $450 million.
Earnings = ER x PEB
PEB= Performance Earnings BasisER= Earnings Rate (or Shared- Savings Rate)
Tiered Earning Rate based on progress
toward goal
Minimum
Performance
Annual Earnings -Verify Installation - Verify Cost - 35% hold back
Final True Up -Full Evaluation Results
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Incentives and Evaluation - Lessons Learned
• Large incentives created extreme focus on the precision ofquantifying the energy savings, taking resources and focusfrom other valuable evaluation.
• The strict boundaries of the incentive structure did not allow
for uncertainties in savings estimates from before and afterfield evaluation.
• Staff produced reliable results following Commission directionbut the results were ultimately not used for determining theincentive payments.
• The Commission has encouraged the development of energyefficiency programs that reach long term strategic objectivesand judging performance on the basis of energy savingsalone does not reflect this policy change.
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Risk Reward Incentives Awarded To Date
• 2006-2008 Portfolio – Earned 47% of the
maximum possible
• 2009 Bridge Year – Utilities are currently filing applications for 2009
incentives
– Earnings are to be based on the logic for awards in
2006-2008.
• 2010-2012- Proposed Decision (PD) addressing RRIM reformshas been suspended pending further review
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
PG&E SCE SDG&E SCG
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Incentive Strategy Proposed in
(Withdrawn) 2010-2012 RRIM Reform PDContinue to .. .
• Relate incentive earnings to performance, and
• Measure performance in terms of avoided cost
savings from EE measures
But change the RRIM significantly by . . .
• Basing savings on CPUC-approved ex ante(forecast) values applied to installed measures, whichde-links the ex post evaluation of savings from theincentive earnings determination, and
• Eliminating penalty component and reducingearnings potential to reflect the lack of risk.
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