berg, maxine - hudson, pat, rehabilitating the industrial revolution in the economic history review,...

8/10/2019 Berg, Maxine - Hudson, Pat, Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 45, No. 1 pp. 24-50, Feb. 1992.pdf

1/28

Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution

Author(s): Maxine Berg and Pat HudsonReviewed work(s):Source: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 24-50Published by: Wiley-Blackwellon behalf of the Economic History SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2598327.

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2/28

Economic

History

eview,XLV,

I(I992),

pp.

24-50

Rehabilitating

he

ndustrial

revolution'

By MAXINE

BERG and PAT HUDSON

T

he

historiography

f the

ndustrial

evolutionn

Englandhas moved

away

rom

iewing

he ate

ighteenth

nd

early

ineteenthenturiess

a

unique urningoint

n economic

nd social

development.2

he notion f

radical hange

n

industryndsociety ccurringver specific

eriodwas

effectivelyhallengednthe

920s

and

I930s

by Claphamnd otherswho

stressed he

long taproots

f

development

nd the

incomplete

ature

f

economic nd social ransformation.'fter his

t was nolonger ossible

o

claim hat ndustrial

ocietymerged

e

novo t

any

timebetween

.

I750

and

i85o,

but the

dea

of

ndustrialevolutionurvivednto he

960s

and

I970s.

In

i968

Hobsbawm ould state

unequivocallyhat

the

British

industrial

evolution as themost

undamentalransformation

n

the

history

of

heworld

ecorded

n

writtenocuments.4

ostow'sworkwasstill

widely

influentialnd

the social

history

f what

was seen as a new

type

f class

society

was

only tarting

o be written. he

idea that he ate

eighteenth

and earlynineteenthenturieswitnessed significantocioeconomic

discontinuity

emained ellentrenched.'

In the astdecade he

gradualisterspective

as

appeared

o

triumph.

n

economic

istory

t

has done

so

largely

ecause

of

a

preoccupation

ith

growthccounting

t the

xpense

f more

roadly

ased

conceptualizations

ofeconomic

hange.

New statistics

avebeen

produced

hich llustratehe

slow

growth

f ndustrial

utput

nd

gross

omestic

roduct.

roductivity

grew lowly;

ixed

apital

roportions,avings,

nd nvestment

hanged nly

gradually;

orkers'

iving

tandards

nd

heir

ersonalonsumption

mained

I

Some of the arguments

n

this

article

ppear

n

Berg, Revisions

nd

revolutions';

nd

in

Hudson,

ed., Regions

nd ndustries.

e are

very rateful

o N. F. R. Crafts or etailed iscussion f the ubstance

of an

earlier

ersion,

nd

to

seminar

roups

t

the nstitute f HistoricalResearch, ondon, theNorthern

Economic HistoriansGroup, University

f Manchester, he University f Glasgow, the University f

Paris

viii

at

St

Denis,

and the

Universities

f

Oslo

and

Bergen.Althoughmany

f the

arguments

n

the

paper apply as much to Scotland and Wales

as to England,we confine iscussion n this paperto the

industrial evolution

n

England

n orderto

avoid confusion

wherethe

existing

iteratures discussed.

2

For a broad survey

f this and othertrends

n

the

historiography

f the industrial evolution ee

Cannadine, The past and the present'.

3Clapham

is most

often ssociatedwith nitiatinghe

trend

way

frommore

ataclysmicnterpretations

in Economic istoryf

modern

ritain, ut

the shift n emphasis s obvious

n

otherworks f the nterwar

periodand earlier, e.g. Mantoux, The industrial evolution; eaton, 'Industrialrevolution';Redford,

Economic istoryfEngland; Knowles, ndustrialnd commercialevolutions;eorge, ngland

n transition.

4

Hobsbawm, ndustrynd empire, .

I3.

5Thompson in

his Making of

the

English

workinglass dentified he industrial evolution

eriod as

the great urning oint

n

class formation. ostow's Stages of economic rowth, hough hallenged ver

the

precise

fit

between

he model and British

xperience,

was

a

powerful

oice

in

favour f

significant

and unprecedented

conomic

discontinuity.

andes in Unbound rometheusrew a convincing icture

of the transformationsnitiated

y

technical

nnovation.

24


3/28

REHABILITATING

THE

INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION

25

largely unaffected efore I830 and

were certainlynot squeezed. The

macroeconomicndicators

f

industrial nd social transformationere not

present nd so the notion f ndustrial evolution as

been dethroned lmost

entirelyeaving

nstead

nly longprocess

f tructural

hange

n

employment

from grarian o non-agrarianccupations.6

At the same time,and often aking

strong

ead

from he gradualism f

economic

historynterpretations,

he social

history

f

the periodhas shifted

away from nalysis f new

class

formationsnd

consciousness.7 he post-

Marxian

perspective

tresses he

continuity

etween

ighteenth-nd

nine-

teenth-century

ocial

protest

nd radicalism.

Chartism,

or

example,

s

seen

as a

chronological

xtension

f

the

eighteenth-century

onstitutionalttack

on

Old Corruption.8

ate

eighteenth-centuryepressions nd

the

Napoleonic

Wars

are seen as the

majorprecipitators

f social tensions

which re

viewed

as arising

rom

emporary

nd selective conomic

hardship

ather

han

from

anynew radical ritique r alternativeolitical conomy.9The ancienregime

of he onfessionaltate' urvived he

ighteenth

nd

early ineteenthenturies

substantially nchanged.'0

n

demography,

he

dominantexplanation

of

the ate eighteenth-centuryopulation

xplosion tresses

ts

continuity ith

a much earlier-established

emographic

egime

which

remained

ntactuntil

at least

the

I840s.11

And an

influential

endency

n the socio-cultural

historiography

f the last few

years has

argued

that the

English

ndustrial

revolutionwas very ncomplete if it existed at all) because the industrial

bourgeoisie

ailed o

gainpolitical

nd

economic

scendancy.'2

hus

England

never xperienced period fcommitmento ndustrialrowth:he ndustrial

revolutionwas a brief

nterruption

n

a

great

arch of

continuity

whose

economic and

political

base

remained

firmly

n the

hands

of

the

landed

aristocracy

nd its offshoots

n

metropolitan

inance.

Gentlemanlyapitalism

prevailed

nd the

power

and influence f

industry

nd industrialists

n the

Englisheconomy

nd

society

were

ephemeral

nd

limited.'3

6

Crafts, ritish conomic rowth. ee also Harley, British ndustrialization'; cCloskey, Industrial

revolution'; einstein, Capital formation

n

Great Britain'; Lindert nd Williamson, English workers'

living standards'.More radical social and cultural hange s implied

n

some of the recent iterature

discussing ncreases n internal onsumption. ee Brewer,McKendrick, nd Plumb, Birthof consumer

society.ut we concentrate ereon the gradualism f supply ide approaches n economichistory ecause

supply ide changes re vital n underpinningny change n aggregate emand. The so-called onsumer

revolution f these years can only be understood s part of a dynamic nterplay etween changing

consumption atterns nd the transformationf employmentnd production.

7

Characterized y Thompson,Makingof theEnglishworkinglass, and emphasizedby Foster,Class

struggle.

8 StedmanJones, Rethinking hartism'.

9 Williams, Morals'; Stevenson,Popular disturbances,p. ii8, I52; Thomis, Luddites,

h. 2. For

critiques f this iteratureee CharlesworthndRandall, Comment';Randall, Philosophy f Luddism'.

For a balanced survey f the debate on the moral economy', ee Stevenson, Moral economy'.

10

The

phrase

s from

Clark, English ociety

hich s

heavily

ritical f the social

history

f the

970S

and i98os. For a

critique

f his

position,

ee

Innes, Jonathan lark'.

11

Wrigley nd Schofield, opulationhistory.he arguments summarizedn Wrigley,Growthof

population' nd in Smith, Fertility nd economy'.

12

See Wiener, English culture;Anderson, Figures of descent'; Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly

capitalism'; ngham,Capitalism ivided?; eys, Formation f British apital'. For theargumenthat he

landed

aristocracy

as an elite closed to new

wealth ee

Stone and

Stone, Open elite?;Rubinstein,New

men'.

13

Ibid. The term great arch' is fromCorrigan nd Sayer, The great rch although his work tself

does not

place

exclusive tress n

continuity.


4/28

26 MAXINE BERG and

PAT

HUDSON

Though

current

onsensus

strongly

avours

ontinuity

nd gradualism,

contemporaries

ppear to have had littledoubt

about the magnitude nd

importance

f

change

n

the period,particularlyndustrial hange.

n

i8I4

PatrickColquhoun

wrote:

It is impossibleo contemplatehe progress fmanufacturesn GreatBritain

within he last thirty ears

withoutwonder nd astonishment.

ts rapidity,

particularlyince hecommencement

f theFrench evolutionary

ar, xceeds

all credibility.

he

improvement

f steam ngines, ut above all

the facilities

afforded

o the

great

branches

f

the woollen nd cotton

manufactoriesy

ingenious

achinery,nvigoratedy capital

nd skill, re beyondll calculation

.

. .

these

machines re renderedpplicable o

silk, inen,hosiery

nd various

other ranches.14

RobertOwen

in i820

identified

key turning oint:

It is wellknown hat, uringhe asthalf enturyn particular,reat ritain,

beyond ny

other

ation,

as

progressivelyncreased

ts

powers

f production,

by rapid

dvancement

n

scientificmprovements

nd arrangements,ntroduced

moreor less,

intoall

the

departments

f

productive

ndustryhroughouthe

empire.

5

And

in

i833

Peter Gaskell wrote

f

the social and

political epercussions

f

economic

hange, eeing

working-classrganizationsorming

n imperiumum

in

imperio

f

the mostobnoxiousdescription'.'6n

i85I

the

OweniteJames

Hole wrote hat:

Classstands pposed oclass, nd so accustomed avemenbecome opursue

their

wn

solated nterestspart

rom nd

regardless

f that f others, hat

t

has become

n

acknowledged axim,

hatwhen man

pursues

is

own nterest

alone he

is

most

benefitting

ociety-a

maxim

. .

whichwould ustifyvery

crimeandfolly.... The principlef supply

nd

demand

as

been extended

from ommodities

o men.These haveobtained hereby ore

iberty,ut ess

bread.

They

find hat

n

parting

ith he

hraldom

fFeudalism

hey

ave aken

on that f

Capital;

hat

lavery

as

ceased

n namebut survived

n

fact.17

Radical

change

was obvious to

contemporaries

ut it has been obscured

in

recent

historiography,

nd industrial

erformance

n

particular

as

been

viewed as an extension f a pre-industrialraditional ast. We arguehere

that

he ndustrial

evolution hould be rehabilitated.

he national ccounts

approach

to economic

growth

and

productivity

hange

is

not a

good

starting oint

for the

analysis

f fundamental

conomic

discontinuity.

he

measurement

f

growth sing

this

approach

s

prone

to

significant

rrors f

estimation

which arise

from

he

restricted

efinition

f

economic

activity,

fromthe

incomplete

nature of

the

available

data,

and

from

ssumptions

embodied

n the

analysis.

We

argue

that

growth

nd

productivityhange

n

the

period

are

currently

nderestimated.

ut,

much more

mportantly,

e

stress hatgrowth ates n their wnare nadequate othetaskof dentifying

and

comprehending

he industrial

revolution. The current

orthodoxy

14

Colquhoun, Treatise

n wealth, . 68.

15

Owen,

Report o

the

ounty f

Lanark, pp. 246-7.

16

Gaskell,Manufacturing

opulation

f England,pp. 6-7.

17

Hole,

J.,

Lectures n social science, uoted

in Briggs,Victorianities, .

I40.


5/28

REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 27

underplays conomic nd social transformationecause such developments

not amenable

to

studywithin he frame f reference f national ccounts

and

aggregate

tatistics.We examinefour reas in which

fundamentalnd

unique change occurred during the industrialrevolution: echnical and

organizationalnnovationutside hefactoryector, hedeploymentffemale

and

child

abour,regional pecialization,nddemographic evelopment. or

each area

we

identifyboth problems of underestimation nd of the

measurement f fundamental hange. We conclude by considering he

importance

or ocial and

politicalhistory

f our reassessment f

the extent

and nature

of transformation

n

these

years.

Unlikethe earliernational ccounts stimates fDeane and Cole, recent

calculations

how

very

low

growth ates

before he

i83os and particularly

in

the ast

four

decades

of the

eighteenthentury. xplanations

or his

low

growth aryconsiderably

ut the work of

Craftshas been the most widely

influential

n current

ssumptions

bout the

industrial

evolution.'8

rafts

calculated hatchange

n

investmentroportions as verygradualuntilthe

early

nineteenth

entury

and that

total factor productivity rowth n

manufacturing

as

only around

.2

per cent per annum between 760 and

i8oi

and

0.4 per

cent

between 8oi and i83I. Even totalfactor roductivity

growth across

the

entire economy, nflated n Crafts's opinion by the

performancefagriculture, rewvery lowly:

.2

per centper annum

760-

i8oi, 0.7 per

cent

80i-3I, reaching

.o

per

cent

only

n the

period 83I-

I86o.19

Several

points

bout these

growth

atescould be made.

Perhaps

the most

important

s

that, lthough roductivityrowth ppearsgradual,

t was

high

enough

o

sustain

much ncreased

opulation

whichunder arlier conomic

circumstances

ould have

perished.Crafts, owever,

hooses to

emphasize

the poor showing

of

manufacturing,rguing

that one small and

atypical

sector, otton,

n which

growth

ccelerated

harply,

ccountedfor s much

as halfof all productivity ainsin manufacturing.t was a modern ector

floating

n a sea

of

tradition,

oo small to

have

a

significant

verall

mpact.

For mostof

ndustry,

e

concluded,

not

only

was

the

triumph

f

ngenuity

slow

to come

to fruitionbut it does not seem

appropriate

o

regard

innovativeness

s

pervasive'.

0

We believe

that

this

opinion

rests

on

two

false

assumptions.First,

it

is

assumed that the innovative

actory

ector

functioned

ndependentlyf,

and owed little

o, changes

n

the rest

of the

manufacturing

nd service

economy. Secondly,

nnovation

s

assumed

to

18.

Deane

and Cole, British conomic rowth;

rafts, ritish conomic rowth;

Williamson, Why

was

British conomicgrowth o slow?'; McCloskey,The industrial evolution'.WhereasCrafts tresses he

lowproductivity

f the conomy ecauseof shortage

f

high eturn

nvestmentpportunities,

illiamson

argues

hat he ndustrial evolution

as

crowded ut by

the effect f war debts

on civilian ccumulation.

For recent ebate

between hese woviews ee Crafts,British

conomic

rowth';

Williamson,Debating';

Mokyr, Has the ndustrial evolution

een crowded ut?'. See also

Williamson,

Englishfactormarkets';

Heim

and Morowski, Interest ates'.

19

Crafts,

ritish conomic rowth,

p.

3I,

8i, 84.

20 Ibid., p. 87.


6/28

28 MAXINE

BERG and PAT HUDSON

concern nly

he ntroductionfcapital-intensivelant

nd equipmentwhich

has an immediatemeasurable

mpact

on

productivity.

We return o these

important oints about economicdualism and productivity

elow but first

briefly

eal withmeasurementroblems

f

the national ccounts pproach

duringhe ndustrial evolutioneriodwhich lone re sufficiento undermine

confidencen the current

radualist rthodoxy.

II

Industrial

output

and GDP are

aggregate

stimatesderived from the

weighted verages

of

their componentswhich, as Craftshimself dmits,

involves a

classic

index numberproblem'.2'

The

difficultiesf assigning

weights

o industrial nd other ectors f the

economy,

llowing or hanges

in weightsover time and for the effects f differentialrice changes and

value-added

hanges

n

the

final

roduct,

re nsurmountablend will always

involve

wide

margins

f

potential

rror.Errors n turn

become magnified

n

residualcalculations ike thatof productivityrowth.22

At the root

of

problems

oncerning

he

composition

f

the economyby

sector

in the national

accounting

framework re the new social and

occupational

ables

of

Lindert nd Williamson pon

whichCrafts

nd

others

rely.23

hese

give

a

higher

profile

o the industrial ectorthan the earlier

social

structure stimates

f

King, Massie,

and

Colquhoun

and fitwell with

current

work on the

importance

f

proto-industrialization.

ut

the

latitude

forpotential rror n these tablesis great.Linderthimselfhas cautioned

that

for the

large occupational

groupings

of

industry, griculture,

nd

commerce

rror

margins

ould be as

high

s

6o

per

cent whileestimates or

shoemakers, arpenters,

nd

others re little

more

than

guesses'.24

indert

and Williamson

ely

n the

burial

records f adult

males

as

theirmainsource

of

occupational

nformation. et

women and children

were a

vital

and

growing illar

of themanufacturing

orkforce

uring

he

proto-industrial

and

early

ndustrial

eriods.

The further ifficulties

f

allowing

ordual and

tripleoccupations,

nd

of

dealing

with

descriptions

ike

'labourer',

which

giveno indication fsector, uggest hatno reliable ectoral reakdown or

labour

nputs

an be made. Before he

1831 census,

and

without he benefit

of much more

research,

not

only

are sectoral distributions

ikely

to be

erroneous,

but

they

are

particularlyikely

to underestimate he role

of

growing

ections

of

the labour

force and

of

the

vitally mportant,

ften

innovative, verlaps

between

grarian

nd industrial

ccupations.

Nor

are the industrialmacrodata

particularly

obust.

Many

of Crafts's

estimates f sector

utputs

nd

inputs ely

n

usingmultipliers

erived

rom

a handful

f

examples

nd

only

a

sample

of industries

s

used. This omits

21

Ibid., p. I7.

22

Jackson,Government xpenditure';

Mokyr,

Has the industrial

evolution

een

crowded out?',

p. 306.

23

Lindert nd Williamson,RevisingEngland's

social tables'; Lindert,

Englishoccupations'.

24

Ibid.,

p.

70I;

Wrigley lso

uses these stimates,nd distinguishes

uralnon-agricultural

rom ural

agricultural opulation. Note,

however, hat he emphasizes he fallibility

f estimates

or agricultural

population

before

8oo.

See Wrigley, Urban growth

nd

agricultural

hange', p. i69.


7/28

REHABILITATING

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 29

potentially ital ources

of output nd productivityncrease

n the economy:

for example,

food processing,

metal

wares,

distilling,

ead, furniture,

coachmaking,

nd

new

industries

ike chemicals and

engineering.25

he

sectors

which are included

should be

representative

f

industry s a whole

but in fact the sampleis heavilybiased in favourof finished ather han

intermediate

oods. Change n thenature nd

uses ofrawandsemi-processed

material nputs

probably esults

n

bias because major

sourcesof nnovation

in theeconomy

re

neglected.26

In

attempting

o measure the

size

and nature

of

the service

sectorthe

macroaccounting

rameworkncounters virtuallympossible

ask.

Crafts

is forced o

rely

on the

assumption

hat

productivity

n the service

ector

increased

no more than

in

industry.

Behind this lies the even more

problematic ssumption

hat he service ector xpanded t

the same

rateas

population efore

8oi

andthereaftern line withwhat ittleweknow about

rents, (central) government

xpenditure,

nd the growth of the legal

profession.

rafts's reatment

f the service ector xcludesdirect

vidence

of what was

happening

n

transport,

inancial ervices, etail

nd

wholesale

trades,professions

ther

han

the

aw

(iin

other

words,

whatwas happening

to transactionsosts),

to

say nothing

f

personal

nd

leisure ervices.27

nd

further

ontroversy

urrounds Crafts's estimates

of

agricultural

utput

because

he relies on inferences rom

questionable

stimates

f

population

growth, gricultural

ncomes,

prices, nd incomeelasticities.28

Large

areas of economic

ctivity

ave

of

course eft

no

available

ourceof

quantitative ata at all. Even in the twentieth enturynationalincome

accounting,

henused as an

indicator f

national

conomic

ctivity,

nvolves

major problems

of

underestimation, ut

these are

magnified

n

earlier

applications

ecause so mucheconomic ctivity as embedded

n

unquantifi-

able and unrecorded

on-market

elationships.29

he

problems

fthe

national

accounting

pproach

are

further

ompounded

for

periods

of

fundamental

economic

hange

because the

proportion

f total ndustrial nd commercial

activity

howing p

in the

estimates

s

likely

o changeradically ver

time.

If,

as seems

ikely, ntry

hresholds

n

most

ndustrieswere

ow,

industrial

expansionmight akeplace first nd foremostmonga myriad mall firms

whichhave

left ewrecords nd whose contribution

s lost to historians

ho

confine

hemselves

o

easily

available indices.

Finally, price

data

for the

25

Crafts, ritish conomicrowth,

p.

I7-27;

Hoppit,

Counting',p.

i82.

26

Hudson, Genesis,

ch.

6; Berg,

Age of

manufactures,hs. II, I2; Rowlands,

Masters nd men;

Sigsworth, lack Dyke

Mills, ch.

I.

27

Hoppit,

Counting', p. I82-3;

Price, What

do merchants o?'; Jackson,

Governmentxpenditure';

idem,

Structure

f pay'.

28

Crafts,

British conomic rowth, p. 38-44;

Mokyr, Has the industrial

evolution een

crowded

out?'.,

p.

305-I2;

Jackson,Growth

nd deceleration'; oppit,

Counting', . i83.

Crafts, owever,

was

certain noughof these nd of his other stimates owrite n

i989

'The dimensions f economic hange

in Britainduring he

IndustrialRevolution re

now reliablymeasured.

A number f features .

. are

likely

o be subject o onlyminor evision

s

a

result f furtheresearch';

Crafts,

British ndustrialization

in an internationalontext',

.

4i6.

29

For discussions f the problems

f national ncome accounting

ee Hawke, Economics,p. 27-36;

Usher,Measurementf

growth, assim.

For discussionof the

embeddedness f economic

activity ee

Polanyi, ed.,

Trade and

market, p. 239-306;

Douglas

and Isherwood,

World

of goods;

Beneria,

'Conceptualising

he abour

force'.


8/28

30 MAXINE BERG and PAT

HUDSON

eighteenth entury

re sparse and highlypartial. This creates a problem

because

the national ccountsframework

equires

price nformationcross

the board

to calculatevalue added

in

each sector.

These

considerationsogether recludedrawing

irm

onclusions rom

he

estimates urrentlyvailableand suggest hatthe bias they ontain s likely

to

result n

underestimation

f

production

nd

productivity

n

the secondary

and tertiary

ectors

f

the

economy.

In thisconnection

t is worth

oting

hatCrafts's ecent

tatisticalnalysis

of industrial utput series

for

Britain, taly,

Hungary,Germany, rance,

Russia, and Austria howsthat

Britain nd

Hungarywerethe only ountries

to exhibit

prolonged

eriod

of ncrease

f

trend ateof growthn industrial

productionduring the

process of industrialization.30n the light of

the

qualitative

vidence

of the extent

nd speed

of change in Germany nd

Russia

in

particular,

his finding uggests ither hat the macro estimates

are farfrom ccurate nd/or hatpayingundue attention o changes n the

trend ates

of

growth

t the national evel s not

a helpful tarting ointfor

identifying

r

understanding

conomic ransformation.

III

Aggregativetudies

re

dogged by

an

inbuilt

problem f identification

n

posing questions

bout the existence

f an

industrial evolution.

As

Mokyr

has pointedout

in

the English

case:

Some ndustries

hich

rew lowly eremechanising

nd

switching

o factories

(e.g.paper

fter

8oi,

wool nd hemicalsike

oap

nd

andles)

hile onstruction

and coal

mining

n whichmanual

echniques

uled

upreme

ith ew

xceptions

until

eep

n

thenineteenth

entury,rew

t

respectable

ates.31

Clearly

echnical

rogress

s not

growth

nd

rapid

growth

oes not

verywhere

imply

the revolutionizing

f

production

unctions.

Can

we

justify

sing

high aggregate

nvestment

atios, high

factor

productivitymanufacturing

techniques,

nd their mmediate nfluence

n

the

formalGDP

indicators

s

ouryardstickf ndustrialnnovation nd transformation?n answeringhis

question,

we need to look

more

closely

at the

model

of

industrialization

which

underpins

much current

nalysis.

The new

interpretations

f the ndustrial

evolution

ely

on an

analytical

divide between

the traditional

nd

modern

sectors: mechanized

factory

industry

ith

highproductivity

n

theone

hand,

nd a

widespread

raditional

industrial

nd service ectorbackwater

n the other. t is

argued

that the

large

size

of the

traditional

ector,

combined with

primitive

echnology,

made

it

a

drag

on

productivityrowth

n

the

economy

s a whole.32

ut it

is

notclearhow

helpful

his

divide

s

in

understanding

he

economic

tructure

30

This analysisemploys the Kalman

filter o eliminate he

problem of false periodization nd to

distinguish

etween

rend hanges

nd the effect f cycles f activity. ee Crafts, eybourne,

nd Mills,

'Britain';

dem,

Trends

and cycles'.

31

Mokyr, Has

the ndustrial evolution

een crowded ut?', p.

3I4.

32

Crafts, ritish conomicrowth,h. 2;

Mokyr, conomics f

the ndustrialevolution,p. 5-6; Crafts,

'British

ndustrialization'.


9/28

REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION

3I

or the dynamism

f

eighteenth-

nd earlynineteenth-centuryngland.33

n

reality, t is impossible o make clear-cut

ivisionsbetween he traditional

and the modern

as

there were

rarely separate organizationalforms,

technologies, ocations,or

firms o be ascribed to either.Eighteenth- nd

nineteenth-centuryottonmanufacturers,erving omestic s well as foreign

markets, ypically

ombined

team-powered

pinning n factories ith arge-

scale employment

f

domestichandloomweavers nd oftenkept a mix of

powered

and domestic hand weaving ong after he powered technology

became vailable.

This

patternwas a function f

risk

preading, heproblems

ofearly echnology,nd

the

cheaplabour supply

of

women nd children

n

particular.34hus

for

decades the modern' ectorwas actually olstered y,

and derivedfrom

he

traditional' ector,

nd not the reverse.

Artisans

n

the

metal-working

ectors of

Birmingham

nd Sheffield

frequently

ombined

occupations

r

changed them over their ife cycle

n

such a way thattheytoo could be classifiedn both the traditional nd

modern sectors.35Artisan woollen workers n West Yorkshire clubbed

together

o build

mills

for ertain

rocesses

nd thus had a foot

n

both the

modern

nd traditional amps.

These so-called companymills' underpinned

the success

of

the artisan tructure.36

hus the

traditional nd the modern

were

most

often nseparable

and

mutuallyreinforcing.

irms

primarily

concerned

with

metalworking

iversifiednto metal

processing

entures s

a

way

of

generating teady

raw material

upplies.

This and other

cases

of

vertical

ntegration rovide

more examples

f

the

tail

of tradition'wagging

thedog of modernity'.37

The

non-factory,upposedly tagnantector,

ften

working rimarily

or

domestic

markets, ioneered

xtensivend radical

echnical nd

organizational

change

not

recognizedby

the revisionists.

he classic textile nnovations

were all

developed

within rural and

artisan

ndustry;

he artisanmetal

trades

eveloped

kill-intensiveand

processes,

and

tools,

nd newmalleable

alloys.

The

wool

textile

sector moved

to new

products

which

reduced

finishing

imes and revolutionized

marketing.

New forms

f

putting-out,

wholesaling, etailing,

redit nd

debt,

and

artisan

o-operation

eredevised

as

ways

of

retaining

he essentials

f

older structures

n

the face

of the new

morecompetitivend innovative nvironment.ustomary ractices volved

to match

he

needs

of

dynamic

nd market-orientated

roduction.

he result

33

The use of a two-sectorraditional/modern

odelof ndustrial

hange s reminiscentf development

economics

during the

I950s

and

i96os

which looked to a policy of accelerated

and

large-scale

industrializationhrough romotion

f the modern ector

s

a spearhead

for the rest of the economy.

This

division

was

abandoned

n

the

970S

with ecognition

f thediverse nd

dependent

inkages etween

the

formal' nd 'informal' nd between he traditional' nd modern' ectors, et

t has

gained

renewed

prominencen economichistory.

ee Moser, Informal ector',p.

I052;

Toye,

Dilemmas n development.

For fuller iscussion

f

parallel

deas

in

developmentconomics, ee Berg,

Revisions nd

revolutions',

pp.

5i-6.

For a particularnterpretation

f the dynamism

f the smallfirm ector ee Sabel and Zeitlin,

'Historical lternatives', p.

I42-56;

also Berg, On theorigins'.

34

See,

for xample, Lyons, Lancashirecotton ndustry'.

35

Berg,

Revisions and revolutions',

p. 56, 59;

idem,

Age of manufactures,

hs.

II I2;

Sabel and

Zeitlin, 'Historical

alternatives',pp. I46-50; Lyons, 'Vertical

integration';Berg, 'Commerce

and

creativity',p. 90-5.

36

Hudson,

Genesis f ndustrialapital,pp. 70-80;

idem,

From manor o mill'.

37

Heaton, Yorkshire

oollen nd

worsted

ndustry;

adsworth nd Mann,

Cotton rade;

Hamilton,

English

brass

nd

copper ndustries;ohn, ndustrial evelopment

f southWales.


10/28

32 MAXINE BERG

and

PAT HUDSON

was considerable ransformationven within he frameworkf the so-called

traditional ector.

The

revisionistsrgue hatmost ndustrialabourwas to be found n those

occupations

which

experienced

ittle

change.38But the food and drink

trades, hoemaking, ailoring, lacksmithing,nd trades atering or uxury

consumption uccessfully xpanded and adapted to provide the essential

urban services

n whichtown

ife, nd hence

much of

centralizedndustry,

was dependent. urthermore,arly ndustrialapital ormationnd enterprise

typically ombined ctivity

n

the food and drink r agricultural rocessing

tradeswithmore

bviously

ndustrial

ctivities,reating

nnumerable

xternal

economies.39

This was true in

metal manufacture

n

Birmingham nd

Sheffield

here

nnkeepers

nd victuallerswere

commonlymortgagees

nd

joint

owners of

metal

working nterprises.40

n the

south Lancashiretool

trades PeterStubs

was not

untypicalwhen he

first

ppeared n I788 as a

tenant f theWhiteBear Inn inWarrington. erehe combined heactivity

of

innkeeper,maltster,

nd brewer

withthatof

filemaker

sing

the carbon

in

barm bottoms

barrel dregs)

to

strengthen

he files.41

There are

many

examples f this

kind of

overlap

between

ervices, griculture,nd industry.

These were the

norm n business

practice

t

a time when

entrepreneurs'

riskswere difficult

o

spreadthrough

iversification

f

portfolios

nd where

so much could be

gained

fromthe external conomies created

by these

overlaps.

We do not

suggest

here

that

productivityrowth

t the

rate

experienced

in cotton extileswas achieved lsewhere, utthat he success ofcotton nd

other

major xports

was

ntimately

elated o and

dependent pon

nnovations

and radical transformations

n

other branches

of the

primary, econdary,

and

tertiary

ectors.

Dividing

off he

modern

from he traditional ectors s

an

analytical

device

which

hides more than

it reveals

in

attempting

o

understand

he

dynamics

f

change

n the

ndustrial

evolution.

IV

More questionable hantheir ssumption ftheseparatenessnd depen-

dence

of the traditional ector s the revisionists'

valuation f

productivity

change

n the

economy

t

this time.

Throughout

he

historiography

f the

industrial evolution

roductivity

easures

ave

seldom

been

clearly efined,

the imitations f

measureshave

rarely

een

explained,

nd

figures

f imited

meaningfulness

ave

been

produced

and

widely accepted

on

trust. Total

factor

productivityTFP)

is

the measuremost

used

by

Crafts nd others

and its

use

has

led themto

concludethat

productivity

as slow to

grow

n

the

period.

TFP

is

usually

calculated s a residual

fter he rate of

growth

of factor

nputs

has been

subtracted rom

he rate of

growth

f GDP.

38

Crafts, ritish conomicrowth,

. 69; Wrigley, eople,cities

nd wealth, p.

I33-57;

idem, ontinuity,

chance nd change, . 84.

39

Jones, Environment'; urley,

Essex clothier'; hapman, Industrial apital'; Mathias, Agriculture

and brewing'.

40

Berg, Commerce

nd

creativity', . i83.

41

Ashton,Eighteenthenturyndustrialist,

p.

4-5.


11/28


There are several

major problemswiththe TFP measure.First, TFP as

a residualcalculation

s

heavily ffected y any mistakes n the estimation

of

sectoral

utputs

nd factor

nputs.

f

the

original ectorweightings ere

wrong,TFP estimates

may

be

highly

istorted.

ig

differences

n

TFP

may

also arise fromvariationsn the estimatedgrowth f GDP. Secondly, f

factor eallocation rom ectorswith ow

marginalproductivitieso those

with

high

ones was an

important

eature

f

the

period,

t

will

not be

possible

to derive

reliable

economy-wide

ates of

TFP

growth

implyby taking

weighted verage

across sectors.The

effects

f

factor eallocation

must be

incorporated.42

hirdly,

TFP

embodies number f restrictivessumptions

rarelyacknowledged

by

those who use

the

measure.

These

are perfect

mobility

f

factors, erfect ompetition,

eutral

echnical rogress, onstant

returns

o

scale,

and

parametric rices.43

he

eighteenth-centuryconomy

did not match

these

assumptions.

or

example,

the

assumption

f neutral

technicalprogress s suspect n view of the evidenceof long-termabour-

saving

echnical

hange.

So too are

assumptions

f

constant eturns

o scale

when

set

against

evidence of

increasing

eturns;

TFP

calculations hould

allow

for

mperfect

ompetition

nd

changing

lasticities f

product

demand

and factor

nputs.44Assumptions

f full

employment

f

labour

and

capital

and

of

perfect

mobility

re

also

inappropriate.

ovement

f

population

was

often not a

response

to

shortages

of labour in

industry;

ndeed

many

industrial ectors

came to be

characterized

y

flooded labour

markets,

particularly

or

the less

skilled tasks. These were

paralleled by

massive

immobile oolsof griculturalabour nmany outhernndmidland ounties.

Structural

nemployment

as endemic nd chronic

nder-utilizationf both

labour and

capital

was

aggravated y

seasonal

and

cyclical wings.45

Furthermore,

FP

takesno account f nnovationn

thenature f outputs

or of

change

n

the

quality

of

inputs,yet

we know that

both

were

marked

features

f the

period. On

the

input side,

labour needs to be

adjusted

n

TFP

calculations or

changes

n

age, sex,

education, kill,

and

intensity

f

work.

Output per

worker

s

also affected

y changes

n

the

relative

ower

of

employers

o

extractwork effort nd in the

power

of

employees

to

withhold t.46

imilarly,

material

nputs

were

changing onstantly

s

product

innovation ffected he natureof raw materials nd intermediateoods as

well as final

roducts.

The

smallmetal radeswere

case

in

point:

nnovation

entailednot

powered

mechanization

ut

the

introduction

f

niew

products

and the substitution

f

cheap alloys

for

precious

metals as raw material.47

42

Williamson,Debating',

p.

270;

Mokyr,

Has

the

ndustrial evolution een crowded

ut?',

pp.

305-

I2.

43 Link, Technologicalhange, p. I5-20.

44

Eichengreen,What have we learned?',pp. 29-30; Link, Technologicalhange, . I4. For discussion

of evidenceof labour-saving echnical hange, ee Rosenberg, erspectivesn technology,h.

6; David,

Technical hoice, h.

I;

Field, Land abundance, nterest/profitates',p.

4I

I;

Stoneman, conomic nalysis

oftechnologicalhange, p. I 56-67.

For evidence nd discussion f

ncreasing eturns,

ee

David, Technical

choice, hs.

2,

6.

45

Eichengreen,Causes of British usiness ycles'; Allen, Enclosure, h.

I2;

Hunt, Industrialisation

and regional nequality'.

46 Link, Technologicalhange, .

24;

Eichengreen,What have we learned?',pp.

29-30;

Elbaum and

Lazonick,

Decline

of

theBritish

conomy,p.

I-I7;

Lazonick, Social organisation',

.

74.

47

Berg, Age of manufactures,hs.

II,

I2;

Rowlands,Masters nd men.


12/28

34 MAXINE BERG and PAT HUDSON

Product nnovation uelled revolution

n

consumption atterns nd habits.48

But because

the national

accounts

framework

measures

the

replication f

goods

and

services,

t cannot

easily incorporate

itherthe

appearance of

entirely ew goods not present

t the

start

f

a

time eriesor improvements

overtime n the quality f goods or services.New products urther rustrate

efforts

t productivity

stimation ecause the initial prices of new goods

wereusuallyveryhigh

but

declined apidly

s

innovation roceeded,making

the calculation f both

weights

nd value-added major problem.49

Finally,

the national accounts framework nd

productivityalculations

cannotmeasure

that

qualitative mprovement

n the

means

of

production

which an yield

horter

working

oursor

less

arduousor monotonouswork

routines.50 Clearly, a broader concept of technological

hange and of

innovation

s

required than

can be

accommodated

by national income

accounting. f the most sensibleway

to

view

the

course

of

economic hange

is through he timing nd impactofinnovation,t is arguable hatthe use

of national

ccounting

as frustrated

rogress. mphasis

has been placed on

saving nd capitalformationt the xpense

f

cience, conomic rganization,

new products nd processes,

market

reativity,kills,dexterity,

he knacks

and

work

practices

f

manufacture,

nd

other

spects

of

economic

ife

which

may

be

innovative ut have

no

place

in

the

accounting ategories.5'

The

problems

nvolved

n

measuring conomy-wide

roductivityrowth,

and

in

regarding

t

as a reflection

f the extent f

fundamental conomic

change,

are

compounded

when one considers he natureboth of industrial

capital and of industrial abour in the period. Redeployment f labour

from

grarian-based

nd

domestic

ectorsto urban and more centralized

manufacturingctivitymay

well have been

accompaniedby diminishing

labour productivity

n the short

run. Green abour

had to learn ndustrial

skills as well as new forms f disciplinewhile,

within ectors, abour often

shifted nto processeswhich

were more rather

han

less labour-intensive.

The same

tendency

o low returns

n

the short erm an be seen

in

capital

investment

n the

period. Early

team

ngines

nd

machinery

ere

mperfect

and

subject

o breakdowns nd

rapid

obsolescence.Gross

capital

nvestment

figureswhich

ncludefunds

pent

on renewals nd

replacements),

henfed

into productivity easures, re not a good reflectionf the mportance nd

potential

f

technological hange

n

the

period.

Rapid technological hange

is

capitalhungry

s

new

equipment

oon

becomes

bsolescent

nd s

replaced.

Shifts

n the

aggregate

measuresof

productivity rowth

re thus

actually

less

likely

o show

up

as

significanturing eriods

f

rapidand fundamental

economic ransitionhan

n

periods

f

lower nd more

piecemeal djustment.

This

point

was stressed

y

Hicks

who noted hat he

onggestation

eriod

of

technological

nnovation

might yield

Ricardo's

machinery

ffect:

he

returns

rom

major

shifts n

technology ould

not be

apparent

for several

decades nd, n the hort erm,nnovation ouldonly ncrease nemployment

48

Brewer,McKendrick, nd Plumb, Birth f

a

consumerociety; reen, Baubles

of

Britain'.

49

Usher, Measurement,p. 8-io.

50

Ibid., p. 9.

51Ibid., p. io.


13/28


and put downward pressure

on

wages.52There was such a disjuncture

between he

wave of nnovations

urroundinghe electric ynamo n the ate

nineteenth entury nd an acceleration n the growth f GNP. And the

current omputer

evolution hich s

transformingroduction, ervices, nd

working ives across a broad front s not accompaniedby rapidlyrising

income, output,

or

productivity

ithinnational

conomies.Resolving his

apparent productivity aradox'

involves

recognizing he limitednatureof

TFP

as a

measure f economic

performance

nd the

ong time-frameeeded

to connect fundamentalechnological hange

with

productivity rowth.53

Thus, just

as

it is

possible

to

have

growth

with ittle

hange,

t is

possible

to

have radical

change

with imited

growth.

n fact

he more

revolutionary

thechange echnologically,ocially, ndculturally,

he

onger hismay take

to work

out in terms f conventionalmeasures f

economicperformance.

V

Another

triking

eature f the new

orthodoxy

s

its

restricted efinition

of the

workforce;

his

n turnhas

implications

or he

analysis f productivity

change as

well as the standard of

living

debate.

Wrigleyassessed key

productivity rowthonly through

he

IO per

cent of

adult male labour

which,

n

i83I,

worked

n

industries

erving

istant

markets.Williamson's

documentation

f

inequality

nd Lindert and

Williamson's

urvey

of the

standard

of

living

considered

only

adult

male

incomes while Lindert's

estimates or ndustrial ccupations eliedon adult burialrecordswhich re

almost

exclusively

male.

But the role of women

and children

n

both

capital

and labour

intensivemarket-orientated

anufacturingin

both the

'traditional'

nd the 'modern'

sectors) probably

reached a

peak

in

the

industrial evolution,making

t a

unique period

n

this

respect.54

It is

extremely

ifficult

o

quantify

he extent f

female nd child abour

as

both were

largely

xcluded

fromofficial tatistics

nd

even

from

wage

books. But

analyses

based

only

on adult male labour

forces are

clearly

inadequate

nd

peculiarly istorting

or his

period.

On the

supply

ide the

labourof women

nd childrenwas a vital

pillar

of

household

ncomes,

made

more so by thepopulationgrowthnd hence theage structure f the ater

eighteenth entury

which

substantially

educed

the

proportion

f males of

52

Hicks,

Theory f economic

istory,.

I53;

Berg,Machinery

uestion,h. 4. If patenting an

be taken

as a rough

ndication f inventiveness,hen

we have some evidence hatgrowth

f TFP in nineteenth-

century nglandtook place

some

40

years

after he acceleration f inventive

atentable ctivity.

ee

Sullivan,

England's age of invention ',p. 444;

Macleod, Inventing

he

ndustrial

evolution.

53

David,

'The

computer

nd the dynamo'.

54

Wrigley,Continuity,

hance and

change,

pp. 83-7; Williamson,

Did

British

apitalism?,

assim;

Lindert nd

Williamson,

English

workers'

iving tandards';

Crafts, ritish conomic

rowth, p. 4-5. In

the

woollen

ndustry

women's and children's

abour accountedfor

75 per

cent

of

the

workforce, nd

child abourexceeded thatof women nd of men. Womenand children lso predominatedn thecotton

industry;

hildren nder

3

made

up

20

per

cent of the cottonfactory

orkforce

n

i8i6; those

under

i8,

5I.2

per cent.

The

silk,

ace

making,

nd knitting

ndustries

were also

predominantly

emale,

nd

therewere ven higher roportions

f women nd childrenn

metalmanufactures

uch as theBirmingham

trades.

See

Randall, Before

he

Luddites,

. 6o; Nardinelli,

Child

labour';

Berg,

Women's

work', pp.

70-3;

Pinchbeck,

Women

workers,

assim;

Saito,

Other

faces',

p.

i83;

idem,

Labour

supply

behaviour',

pp. 636

and 646. For

a

recent ritical

iscussion

f child abour and

unemployment

ee Cunningham,

'Employment

nd

unemployment',

assim.


14/28

36

MAXINE BERG and

PAT

HUDSON

working ge

in the

population.55

he impactof the high dependency atio

was cushionedby

children arning heirway at an early ge, particularly

n

domestic

manufacturing.56

n the demand side the need for hand skills,

dexterity,

nd work

discipline ncouraged

he

absorption

f more

nd

more

female nd juvenile abourinto commercial roduction.This was further

encouragedby

sex

differentials

n

wages

which may have been increasing

under

the

mpact

of

demographic ressure

n

these

years.57 mployers

were

much attracted y low wages and long hours

at a time when no attention

was

yetpaid

to

the ncentive ffects f

payment y

results

r

shorter ours.58

Thus factorsboth

on

the

supply

and on the demand

side

of the labour

market esulted

n

a labour force tructure

ith

high proportions

f

child

and femaleworkers.They

were the

key

elements n the

labour intensity,

economicdifferentiation,

nd low

production

osts found n late

eighteenth-

century

ndustries.And this in turn influenced nd was influenced y

innovation. ew workdisciplines, ew forms fsubcontractingndputting-

out

networks,

ew

factory rganization, nd

even new

technologies

were

triedout

initially

n women and children.59

The

peculiar mportance

f

youth

abour

in

the industrial evolution

s

highlighted

n several nstances

f

textile

nd other

machinery eingdesigned

and built

to suit the childworker.

he

spinning

enny

was a celebrated ase;

the

original ountry enny

had a horizontal

wheel

requiring posture

most

comfortable

or hildren

ged

nine

to twelve.

ndeed,

for

time,

n the

very

earlyphases

of mechanization

nd

factory rganization

n the woollen

and

silk ndustries s well as incotton,t wasgenerallyelieved hat hild abour

was integral

o

textilemachine

design.60

This associationbetween child

labour and

machinery

as confined o a

fairly

rief

eriod

of

technological

change.

In the north-eastern nited States

t

appears

to have

lasted

from

c. i8I2 until the

i83os,

during

which time the

proportion

f women and

children

n the entire

manufacturing

abour forcerose from

O

to

40

per

cent.

This was associatedwithnew

large-scale

echnologies

nd divisions

f

labour

specifically

esigned

o

dispense

withmore

expensive

nd restrictive

skilled adult

male labour.6'

Similarly,

he

employment

f an

increasing

proportion f female abour in English ndustrieswas also encouragedby

the

ready

reserves

f

cheap

and skilled

female

abour which

had

long

been

a

feature f domestic nd

workshop roduction.

n

addition,

n

England,

many agricultural egions

hed femaleworkers

irst--during

he

process

of

55

Children ged 5-I4 probably ccounted

for between

3

and

25

per cent

of the totalpopulation n

the early nineteenth entury, ompared

with 6

per cent

in

I95I. Wrigley

nd Schofield, opulation

history,ab. A3.I,

PP.

528-9.

56

Berg,Ageofmanufactures,

h.

6; Medick, Proto-industrialamilyconomy';

evine, Industrialisation

and the proletarian amily', . I77.

57

Saito, Other faces', p. i83;

idem,

Labour supplybehaviour', . 634.

58

Hobsbawm, Custom, wages and workload',pp. 353, 355.

59

Berg, Women's work', pp. 76-88; Pinchbeck,Womenworkers. or modern

Third World parallels

see

Elson and

Pearson, Nimblefingers

nd

foreignnvestments', p. 2-3;

Pearson,

Female workers'.

60

Report

. .

on

the tate

f

childrenP.P. i8i6, III),

pp.

279, 343; Report rom

heCommitteen the

bill to regulate he abourof children

n the mills nd factoriesP.P.

i83I-2,

XV),

P.

254. The issue is

explored

n

greater epth

n

Berg,

Women's work'.

61

Goldin and Sokoloff,Women,

children

nd industrialization',

.

747; Goldin,

Economic status f

women'.


15/28

REHABILITATING

THE INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION

37

agricultural

hange,and

much migration

ithin ural reas

and from

ural

to urbanareas

consisted

f youngwomen

n searchof work.62

By

mid

century

emale

and child

labour was declining n importance

through

mixture

f

legislation,

he activities

f male tradeunionists,

nd

the increasinglyervasive deology f themale breadwinnernd offit nd

proper

female activities.63

A

patriarchal

tance

was by this

time also

compatible

with the

economic aims

of a broad

spectrum

of

employers.

According

o Hobsbawm, larger

cale

employers

as

well as male

labour)

were

earning

he rules

of

the

game'

in

which

higher

aymentsby

results),

shorterworking

ours,and

a

negotiated

errain

f common nterests ould

be

substituted

orextensive

ow-wage xploitation

ithbeneficial ffects

n

productivity.

The use of

low-cost hild and

female abour was

not,

of

course,

new: it

had

always been vital

in

the primary

ectorand

had been integral

o the

spreadofmanufacturen the earlymodernperiod.Whatwas new in the

period

of

the classic ndustrial

evolution

as the extent f ts

ncorporation

into rapidly

expanding factory

and workshop

manufacturing

nd its

association

with low wages,

increased

ntensificationf

work,

and labour

discipline.65

he female nd

juvenile

workforce

ndoubtedly

ad an

impact

on the

outputfigures er

unit

of input costs

in

many

ndustries, ut

this

would

not

necessarily

e reflected

n

aggregate

roductivity

ecause

some

female abour

was

a substitute

ormale: it increased t

times nd

in

sectors

where

male

wages

were ow

or male

unemployment

igh.66

he

social

costs

of underutilizedmale labour (felt n hightransferayments hroughpoor

relief)

as well as

the difficulties

f

allowing

for male

unemployment

n

sectoral

weightings re

likely

to

offset

ains

in the

measurable

conomic

indicators

f the

period.

The

potential

conomic

erformance

fthe

economy

as a

whole was further

imited

by

the ack of incentive

o substitute

apital

for abour

when the abour

of women

nd children

was so

abundant,

heap,

and

disciplinedhrough

amily

work

groups

nd

in the absence

of traditions

of

solidarity.67

The

full effects

f this

expanded

role of female nd

juvenile

abour can

62

Pollard,

Labour', p. I33;

Bythell,

weated rades;

erg, Women's

work';

Allen,Enclosure,

h.

I2;

Snell,

Annals,

chs. I and 4; Souden,

East,

west-home's

best?',p. 307;

cf. Williamson,

Coping

with

city

rowth.

63

Lown, Women

nd industrialization,

h.

6;

Seccombe,

Emergenceof male breadwinner';

Rose,

'Gender

ntagonism';

avidoff nd Hall, Family ortunes;

arrison,

Class andgender',pp. I22-38,

I45;

Roberts,

Women's

work.

64

Hobsbawm,

Custom,

wages and workload',

p.

36i.

65

Levine, 'Industrialisation

nd the proletarian

amily',

pp.

I75-9;

Levine,

Reproducingamilies,

pp. II2-5.

The

low wage

character f the

export-orientatedconomies

f

the industrializing

egions

s

highlighted

y Lee, TheBritish

conomy,

p.

I3I,

I36-4I.

See also

Hunt, Industrialisation',

p. 937-45.

Mokyr, choing

Marx, suggests hat

ow wages may

havebeen

a

key

factor ehind he

growth f

modern

industry:Has the ndustrial evolution een crowded ut?', p.

3i8.

See also Bienefeld,Workingours,

p. 4I.

For parallels

with

the Third World

see

Pearson,

Female

workers'.

66

Saito,

Labour supply

ehaviour',

p. 645-6;Goldin

nd Sokoloff,

Relative

roductivity

ypothesis'.

For

a

standard

heoretical

nd

empirical

reatment

f

this

ee Mincer,

Labour force

participation',

nd

Greenhalgh,

A labour

supply

function'.

The male occupational

tatistics

pon

which

productivity

estimates ely,necessarily

ake

no account

of

unemployment.

67

Lewis,

'Economic development',

. 404;

Allen, Enclosure,

h.

I2;

Boyer, Old poor

law';

Lyons,

'The

Lancashire otton ndustry';

erg,

Women's work'.


16/28

38 MAXINE

BERG

and

PAT

HUDSON

only be completely nderstood t

a

disaggregated

evel by analysing ts

impact upon sectors and in regionswhere t

was crucially mportant.A

regionalperspective

s

also uniquely valuable

in assessingthe extent nd

nature

of economic nd social

change

n the

period.

VI

The industrial evolution as

a

period

of

greatdisparity

n

regional

ates

of change and

economic fortunes.

xpanding

ndustrializingegionswere

matchedby regions

of

declining ndustry, nd

chronicunderutilizationf

labour and capital.The story

f

commercializinggriculture as similarly

patchy. low-movingggregatendicators

ail

o capture

hese

developments,

yetthe nteractionsnd self-reinforcingrive reatedby

the

development

f

industry

n marked

regional

oncentrations

ave

rise to

major

nnovations.

For example, n increase n theoutputofthe Britishwool textile ectorby

I50

per

cent

during

the entire

ighteenth entury

eems

very

modest but

this conceals the dramatic elocation

aking

place

in

favour f Yorkshire,

whose share

n

national

production

ose from

round 0

per

cent to around

6o

per

cent

n the course of the

century.

f

the ncreasehad been uniform

in all regions, t could have been achieved imply y the gradualextension

oftraditional

ommercialmethods nd

production

unctions. ut Yorkshire's

intensive

rowth ecessarily

mbodied revolutionn

organizationalatterns,

commercial

inks,

credit

relationships,

he sorts of cloths

produced,

and

production echniques.The external conomies chieved when one region

took

over more than half

of

the

production

f an entire

ectorwere also

of

key mportance.68

All the

expanding

ndustrial

egions

of

the late

eighteenth

nd

early

nineteenth

enturies

were,

like

the

West Riding, dominatedby particular

sectors n

a

way never xperienced

eforenor to be

experienced gain after

the

growth

f ntra-sectoral

patial

hierarchies

uring

he twentieth

entury.

Furthermore,

ectoral

pecialization

nd

regional

ntegrityogether elp

to

explain

the

emergence

f

regionally

istinctive ocial

and

class

relations

which set a

pattern

n

English political

life for over a

century.

These

considerationsrompt he view thatregional tudiesmaybe of more value

in

understanding

he

process

of ndustrializationhan tudies f the national

economy s

a whole.69

The

main

justification

hich

Crafts

uses for

employing

n

aggregative

approach

to

identify

he

nature, auses,

and corollaries f industrialization

in

Britain

s

that the national

conomy epresented,

or

many products,

well

integrated

national

goods

market

by

the

early

nineteenth

entury.

Although

the

spread

of

fashionable

onsumer

goods

was

increasing

nd

nationalmarkets

ormuchbulk

agricultural roduce

wereestablished efore

the mid eighteenth entury,t cannotbe shown before he secondquarter

of the nineteenth

entury

hatthe

economy

had a

'fairly

well

integrated

et

68

The argument ere and

throughout his section s much nfluenced y Pollard, Peaceful onquest,

ch.

.

69

Fuller discussion

of

this

can be

found

n

Hudson, Regions,

h. i. For another xample of this

approach ee Levine

and

Wrightson,

he

making,

n

the earlier

ransformationf Tyneside.


17/28

REHABILITATING THE

INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION

39

of

factormarkets'.0 The

really

mportantpatial

unitfor

production actors,

especially apital nd

labour, nd

for

nformation

low,

ommercial

ontacts,

and credit

networks

n

the

pre-railway eriod was

the

economic

region,

which

was often

learly

dentifiable.7'

onstruction f the

improved

iver

andcanalsystemsnwhich conomic rowth ependeddid muchtoendorse

the

existence

f

regional

conomies, or time

ncreasing heir

nsularityin

relation o the national

conomy).72Nor were

the

railways uickto

destroy

regionally rientated

ransport

ystems.

Most

companies

found t in their

best

interests o

structure reight ates so

as to

encourage

he

trade

of

the

regions

they

served,to favour

hort

hauls,

and thus to

cement

regional

73

resource

groupings.

Industrializationccentuated

he

differences

etween

regionsby

making

themmore

functionally

istinct

nd

specialized.

Economic

and

commercial

circumstances ere hus ncreasinglyxperiencedegionallyndsocialprotest

movements ith heir

egional

ragmentationan

onlybe

understood t

that

level

and

in

relation

o

regional

mploymentnd

social

structures.

ssues of

national

political

reform lso came

to be

identified

ithparticular

egions,

for

xamplefactory

eform

ith

Yorkshire,

he

anti-poor

aw

campaign

with

Lancashire

nd

Manchester,

r

currency

eform ith

Birmingham.

egional

identity

was

encouraged

by

the links

created

around the

greatprovincial

cities,

by

the

ntra-regionalature f the

bulk of

migration,

y

the

formation

of

regionally

ased clubs

and

societies,

rade

unions,

mployers'

ssociations,

and

newspapers.74

In

short,

dynamic

ndustrial

egions generated

social

and

economic

interaction hich

would have been

absent f

their

omponent

ndustries ad

not been

spatially

oncentratednd

specialized. ntensive ocal

competition

combined

with

regional

ntelligence nd

information

etworks

helped to

stimulate

region-wide dvances in

industrial

echnology

nd

commercial

organization.

nd

the

growth

f

specialized inancial nd

mercantile ervices

within he dominant

egions

ervedto

increase he external

conomies nd

reduced

both

intra-regionalnd

extra-regional

ransactions osts

signifi-

cantly.75 acroeconomic

ndicators ail o

pick up

this

regional

pecialization

and dynamismwhichwas unique to the periodand revolutionaryn its

impact.

70

Crafts, ritish

conomic

rowth,

.

3.

7I

Hunt,

Industrialisationnd

regional

nequality';

dem,

Wages', pp. 6o-8;

Allen,

Enclosure, h.

I2;

Williamson,

English factor

markets';Clark and

Souden,

eds., Migration nd

society,

hs. 7, io. On

capital and

credit markets ee

Hudson, Genesis.

See also

Pollard, Peaceful

conquest,

.

37; Presnell,

Country anking, p.

284-343;

Anderson,

Attorney

nd

the

early

capital

market';Hoppit, Risk and

failure, h.

I5.

72

Freeman, Transport', p. 86; Langton, Industrialrevolution nd regionalgeography',p.

i62;

Turnbull, Canals', pp.

537-60.

73

Freeman,

Transport',p.

92;

see

also

Hawke,

Railways.

74

Langton

provides

stimulating

urvey

f

the regional

ragmentation

ftradeunions,

of Chartism

and other

movements, nd of

regionaldifferencesn

work practices

nd work

customs, n

'Industrial

revolution', p.

I50-5.

See also

Read,

Englishprovinces;

nd

Southall, Towards a

geography'which

concentratesn the artisan

rades.

75

See

Pollard,

Peacefulconquest, p.

I9,

28-9.


18/28

40

MAXINE BERG

and PAT HUDSON

VII

The

work of Wrigley nd Schofieldrightly ominatesthe

population

history

f this

period

but their

original

ausal

analysis llustrates

ome

of

thedifficultiesfaggregativetudies feconomic nd socialtransformation.

They arguethat,despite

onsiderable

rowth

n numbers nd the

disappear-

ance

of

major

crises of

mortality,

herewas no

significantiscontinuityn

demographicbehaviour

n

England

between the

sixteenth nd the

mid

nineteenth enturies.76

here was no

sexual, social, medical,

or

nutritional

revolution.

The

population regime

was and remained

marriagedriven:

nuptiality

nd

hence

fertilityhroughout

he

three

centuriesvaried as a

delayed response

to

changes

n

living

standards s

indicated

by

real

wage

trends.77

ut the

danger

n

using

national

demographic

ariables o

analyse

patterns

f individualmotivation s that

national estimatesmay conflate

opposingtendencies n differentegions,sectors of industry, nd social

groups.Accurate dentification

f the

mainsprings

f

aggregate emographic

trendswill

only

come

with

regional, ectoral,

nd class

breakdowns ecause

different

ortsof workers

r

social

groups

within ifferent

egional

ultures

probablyexperienced

differenttimuli

or

reacted

differentlyo the

same

economic

rends,

hus

creating range

of

demographic egimes.78

The factthat

demographic

ariables

uch as

illegitimacy

ates nd

age

of

marriage

xhibit

nduring patialpatterns

n

the

face of

changing

conomic

fortunes

s

suggestive.79

arish

reconstitutiontudies

indicatethat local

behaviourdid not parallel the movement f the aggregate eries. Such

diversity

asts doubt

upon

the

use of the

national vital rates for causal

analysis

f

demographic

ehaviour.The most

mportant

ausal variables n

local reconstitutiontudies

appear

to

range

well outside the movement

f

real

wages.

The local economic and social

setting,broadly defined,

was

crucial.

It included such

things

as

proletarianization,rice

movements,

economic

nsecurity,

nd the nature

f

parish dministration,articularly

f

the

poor

laws.80

Despite this,

a

national

culturalnorm

continuesto

be

stressed,

withthe

assumption

hat

regions

nd localities endedtowards t.

The

result,

as with

the

macroeconomic

work

of

Crafts

nd

others,

s an

excessivepreoccupationwith national omparisons 'the Frenchversusthe

Englishpattern')

nd

with

he dea that owerclasses and backward

egions

lag

behind

their

uperiors,

ut

eventually

ollow

hem

on the national oad

to

modernity

nd

progress.8'

76

Wrigley

nd

Schofield, opulationhistory,

hs.

I0,

i

i.

For summaries f their ausal

analysis

ee

Smith, Fertility, conomy

nd householdformation';Wrigley,Growth

f

population'.

77

There has been considerable ebateoverthisview

nd the tatistical ethod nderlying

he nalysis.

See Gaunt,Levine,

and

Moodie, Populationhistory';

nderson,Historical emography';

Mokyr, Three

centuries

f

population

change'; Olney, Fertility';Lindert, English living

tandards';

Lee,

'Inverse

projection'; dem,Populationhomeostatis'.

78

See

Levine,

in

Gaunt,

Levine,

and

Moodie, Population

history', .

I55.

79

See

for example,

Levine and

Wrightson, Social

context of illegitimacy', p. i6o-i;

Wilson,

'Proximate eterminants'.

80

Wrightson

nd

Levine, Poverty

nd

piety.

For the importance

f

the local economic setting ee

Levine, Familyformation;

evine and Wrightson, he making, h. 3; Sharpe, Literally

pinsters'. or

family econstitutionesults ee Wrigley nd Schofield,

English populationhistory'.

81

Seccombe,

Marxism nd demography',

.

35.


19/28

REHABILITATING

THE

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

4I

Recently,

he effects f

proto-industrialization,roletarianization,

nd

the

changing omposition f the workforce ave received ttention n relation

to

demographichange.82

his

opens

thedoorfor more adical

nterpretation

of the structural

auses of

fertilityhange.The need to look more closely

at those structural nd institutionalhangeswhichresulted n the marked

decline

n

age

of

marriage

n the second halfof the

eighteenth entury

as

been

emphasized,

as has the

importance

f a

growinggroup

of

'young

barriers'

n the

population

whose

actions ppear unaffected y the g

berg, maxine - hudson, pat, rehabilitating the industrial revolution in the economic history review,...

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