beneath symbols: convention as a semiotic phenomenon

Uncorrected draft: in press inEvolution & Contextual Behavioral Science: A Reuni7ication.StevenC.Hayes&DavidSloanWilson(eds.),NewHarbingerPublications

Beneathsymbols:ConventionasasemioticphenomenonTerrenceW.Deacon

Introduction: Symbolicreferenceisadistinguishingfeatureofhumanlanguage.Inthisrespectlanguagecontrastswithotherspecies-typicalvocalizationsandmostcommunicativegestures,whichonlyprovidereferenceiconicallyorindexically.Becauseofitsarbitraryandconventionalnature,symbolicreferencemustbeacquiredbylearning,andlacksboththenaturalassociationsandtrans-generationalreproductiveconsequencesthatcharacterizeotherinnatelyevolvedcommunicativeadaptations,likelaughterandsobbing.Thisiswhytherearenoinnatewordsandwhyitissoextensivelyreliantonsocial(asopposedtogenetic)transmission. Iconicandindexicalformsofcommunicationareubiquitousintheanimalworldaswellasinhumancommunication.Theyprovidereferencebyvirtueofformalandphysicalfeaturessharedbythesignvehicleandthattowhichitrefers.Incontrast,itistheirrelevanceofanysharedpropertiesbetweensignvehicles(e.g.wordsounds)andwhattheyreferto—oftenreferredtoasarbitrarity—thatfacilitatesthecapacitytocombinesymbolicformsintovastlymanycomplexstructures(e.g.sentencesandnarratives)abletospecifyhighlydiverseandprecisecommunicativecontents. Tosaythatsymbolicreferenceisarbitraryistosaythatitisdeterminedbyconvention,ratherthanbyanyintrinsicsignvehicleproperties.Butwhatisentailedintheconceptofconventionwhenusedinthisway?TheMerriam-Websterdictionaryliststhreerelatedmeaningsthatarerelevanttothisissue:aconventioncanbeausageorcustomespeciallyinsocialmatters,aruleofconductorbehavior,oranestablishedtechnique,practice,ordevice. Probablythetwomostcommonsocialphenomenaattributedtosocialconventioninthecourseofintellectualhistoryaremoneyandlanguage.Theclaimthatlanguageistheexpressionofsocialconventionisancient.InAristotle’sworkOnInterpretationhedescribesaname asaconventionbecauseitisnotanaturalfeatureofwhatitrefersto.He1

explicitlynotesthatthisiswhatmakesanameasymbol.Theconceptofconventionhasalsobeenassociatedwiththenotionofasocialcontract(e.g.byRousseauandHobbes)understoodintermsofanagreement,mostlywithrespecttoitsoppositiontonaturaltendenciesortheso-called“stateofnature”imaginedtopredatecivilization.WhileJohnLockerecognizedthattherecanbetacitconventionsthatarise,thoughnoexplicitagreementwasnegotiated. TheconceptofconventionwasamajorfocusofDavidHume’sanalysisofmanyregularpracticesfoundinhumansocieties.Hearguedthatsocialconventionsarenecessaryforestablishingsuchsocialphenomenaasproperty,agreements,laws,andsoforth,inwhichindividualselecttoallconformtocertainlimitstoorhabitsofbehavioroutofanexpectationofmutualbeneYit.Healsoexplicitlycritiquesthenotionthatconventionsneedtobetheresultofexplicitagreements.Heillustratesthiswithamemorableexample:two

�1

By‘name’Aristotleappearstomeananygeneralterm,notmerelyapropername.1


meninarowboat,eachwithonoar,whoneedtocoordinateandsynchronizetheirrowinginordertoreachanyparticulardestination.Humeproposesaconventionaltheoryoflanguageregularitiesthatneednotarisefromnegotiatedagreementswhenhestatesthat:“…languages[are]graduallyestablish’dbyhumanconventionswithoutanyexplicitpromise.”(TreatiseofHumanNature,p.490) TwentiethCenturyphilosophersrevisitedtheissueoftheconventionalityoflanguageinahalfcenturyofdebatesaboutthenatureofsemanticsandtruth,especiallyasitimpactedthefoundationsoflogic.SuchintellectualgiantsoftheYieldasCarnapandQuinebattledoverthecoherenceofconventionaltheoriesofmeaning,truth,andmathematics.Atmidcenturythisledtoaparticularintensedebateinlinguistics,particularlyfueledbyNoamChomsky’sstridentdenialofitsrelevancetogrammarandsyntax;adebatethatstillrages,andwhichwillbeaddressedbelow. AninterestingreassessmentofthelogicalstructureofconventionalitywasprovidedbythephilosopherDavidLewisinhis1969bookappropriatelytitledConvention.Lewisarguedthatconventionshouldbeconsideredasolutiontoacoordinationproblemandthatitneedn’tinvolveexplicitorimplicitagreement.BeginningbyrecountingHume’smetaphoroftherowersandframingtheproblemintermsofgametheoryhedevelopedprogressivelymorecomplexmodelsofhowgroupsofindividualsmightspontaneouslyarriveatwhatmightotherwiseappearasthoughagreed-uponcollectivebehaviors,withnothingresemblingagreement,tacitorotherwise.

Thesemioticsofconventionality Conventionalityisnotthecriticaldeterminerofsymbolicreference,eventhoughsymbolsmustinvolveconventionalizesignvehicles.Therecanbeconventionalizediconsandconventionalizedindices.ConventionalizediconsincludethestickYiguresonrestroomdoors,theskullandcrossedbonesonbottlescontainingpoison,andthecigarettedrawingwithasuperimposedcross-outslashacrossit.Ofcourseallthreealsoareusedindexically.Theplacementofamaleorfemaleicononarestroomdoorindicatesthatitopenstoasex-speciYicrestroom,theskullandcrossedbonesinsigniaindicatessomethingaboutthesubstanceinthemarkedcontainer;andthecrossed-outsmokingcigaretteindicatesanosmokingzone.Soboththeformallikenessesandthefactualcorrelationsofthesesignsarerelevantconventions.Aconventionalindexthatisminimallyiconicisthewhitelinedownthemiddleofatwo-wayroad.Thoughitmightbeiconicallycomparedtoa“propertyline”ornationalborder,oreventheoutlineofacoloringbookYigure,itdoesnotphysicallypreventdriversfromcrossingit.ButdespiteitsconventionalnatureanddependenceontrafYiclaws,thelineitselfisnotsymbolicandcanonlymetaphoricallybesaidtohaveameaningordeYinition. Thisdistinctionisimportant,becauseithelpstountangleatroublesometendencytosimplyequatesymbolswithconvention.AsCharlesPeirceclearlydemonstrated,beingaconventionalsignvehicleandreferringconventionallyarenotthesame.Thushedesignatedconventionalsignvehicles“legisigns”andnonconventionalsignvehicles“sinsigns”or“qualisigns”andarguedthattherecouldbeiconic,indexical,andsymboliclegisigns,butnotsymbolicsinsignsorsymbolicqualisigns.Inotherwords,symbolicreferencecanonlybebornbyconventionalsignvehicles.Thussymbolsaredoubly

�2


conventionalinthattheyinvolveconventionalsignvehiclesthatreferconventionallyaswell.Sotoexplainthedevelopmentofsymbolicreferentialcapacitieseitherinchildhoodlanguageacquisitionorinthecaseoftheevolutionofthiscapacityinhumansitisnecessarytoaccountforbothformsofconventionality. Thismeanswemustansweranumberofrelatedquestions:Iflinguisticconventionsareshareddispositionsthatwerenotestablishedviaexplicitsocialagreementorsocialconformityhowelsecouldtheyhavebeenachievedinevolutionandchilddevelopment?Doesthisinevitablyleadustoacceptaninnatesource?Andwhatmightthismeanwithrespecttolanguagestructureaswellasotherconventionalformsofsemiosis? ThisiswhereinsightsprovidedbyHume’sandLewis’sanalysisprovidesanimportantclue.CoordinationisdeYinedwithrespecttoachievingacommonend,whetherornottheagentsinvolvedknowaboutoneanother’sgoals.ThisisexempliYiedinLewis’sframingofcoordinationingametheoryterms.Games,asgeneralizedinthisabstractsense,areactivitieswithexplicitpayoffsorgoals.Evenifthereisnoexplicitcommunicationbetweentheagentstheystillmaygaininformationabouteachother’sgoalsbyobservingtheconsequencesofeachother’sbehaviors.Thusinthecaseoftherowers,eveniftheyareinsomewayunabletointeractinanyotherwaythanbyrowingtheycanstillconvergeonacoordinatedpatternthatleadstoreachingaspeciYicdestination. 2 Whatisoftenoverlookedwhendescribingthissortofthoughtexperimentisthatthereisstillinformation(akasemiosis)involved.Thesolutionisachievedsemiotically,justnotwithexplicituseoflanguageorpointing,orotherexplicitmeansforsharingtheirseparateintentions,butbyinterpretingthedispositionsexhibitedinbehavioralresponses.Indeed,thiscouldbethecaseevenifthereisonlyonehumanagentinvolvedandanautomaticrowingmachinecontrollingtheotheroar.Thepointisthatonceweexpandouranalysisbeyondlanguage-likecommunicationandevenbeyondintentionallyproducedcommunicationtoconsidersemiosisinthebroadestsense,itbecomesclearthatthedevelopmentofconventionalityrequiresextensivesemioticactivity.MorespeciYically,toacquireorevolvethecapacitytodeterminereferenceviaconvention—i.e.symbolicreference—priornon-conventionalcommunicationisrequiredatsomepointtoestablishthisconventionality.Torestatethishypothesisinsemioticterms:inordertodevelopasymboliccommunicationsystemsuchasalanguageitsconventionalpropertiesmustbeestablishedusingiconicandindexicalmeans. ButIwanttomakeafarstrongerclaim.IwillarguethattheconventionalityoflanguageisitselfareYlectionoftheseiconicandindexicalrelationsre-emergingintheformofrelationsbetweensymbols.Theseinter-symbolicrelationsgobymorefamiliarlinguisticterms:grammarandsyntax.MygoalistorecasttheconceptoflinguisticconventioninsemiotictermsinordertodisentangleitfromtheconceptionoflinguisticconventionasmerearbitrarymappingbetweensigniYiersandsigniYieds.Iwillarguethatthispresumedarbitrarityintherelationbetweensignvehicleandreferentpropertiesisenabledbythenon-arbitraryiconicandindexicalstructureofbetween-symbolrelations.Toputthisanotherway,communicatingwithsignvehicles(e.g.words,etc.)thatreferbyconvention

�3

Ofcourse,iftheagentsinvolvedhaveconYlictinggoals,whethertheyareawareofthisornot,2

coordinationbecomesfarmoredifYicult,andmayresultinsuboptimalresultsforboth.


aloneismadepossiblebycombiningthemvianon-conventionaliconicandindexicalproperties.Sonotonlyarethecoordinatingconditionsforlanguageachievedbysocialconvention,butthestructurethatresultsreYlectsthesemioticstructureofconventionitself.

Thesymbolun-groundingprocess: Inanowfamouspaperpublishedin1990thecognitivescientistStevenHarnadarticulatedaworrythathadlongpuzzledphilosophersoflanguageandcognitivescientistsingeneral.Hecalleditthe“symbolgroundingproblem.”Themysterywashowarbitrarymarks,suchasthesoundsofspeechorthestatesofabrain,couldreliablybecomecorrelatedwithspeciYicreferentssothatsymboliccommunicationispossible.Inotherwords,withoutdeterminingthismappingextrinsically,i.e.byusingsymboliccommunicationtonegotiatetheestablishmentandsharingofthesecorrespondences,howcouldthesemappingseverbeestablishedintheYirstplace.Ifittakescommunicationwithsymbolstoestablishthissharedmappingconventionbetweensymbolsandtheirreferentsthenwearefacedwithaviciousregress.Toclarifyapotentiallyconfusingdifferenceofterminology,inthatcontextthedistinctionbetweenconventionalityofsignvehicleandconventionalityofreferencearenotdistinguished,andyetinthatpaperhespeculatesthatsymbolgroundingmustthereforebeachievedusingnonsymbolicmeans. InrecentlecturesandforthcomingpapersJoannaRaczaszek-LeonardiandIinvertthisframingoftheproblem.Wepointoutthattheproblemisactuallytoexplainhowiconicandindexicalformsofcommunication—whichareintrinsically“grounded”duetothesignvehiclessharingfeatureswiththeirreferents—canbeusedtodevelopcommunicationusingungroundedsignvehicles(akawords/symbols).Thisisofcoursethechallengefacedbyeveryhumantoddler.Thereasonthatthechallengeisseldomframedthiswayisbecausetheinfant-caretakerinteractionsarenotgenerallyunderstoodinsemiotictermseitherinpsychologyordevelopmentlinguistics)andbecausethedevelopmentoflanguagecompetencyisnotseenasatransitionfromanearliertoalatermoredevelopedsemioticprocess.Fromasemioticperspective,however,thereisarichandcomplexsetofsocialsemioticskillsbeingacquiredduringtheYirstyearoflifeandsigniYicantlypriortotheearlystagesofexplicitlanguageacquisition.Seenfromthissemioticperspective,then,theexplosivegrowthoflanguageduringthesecondandthirdyearsoflifeisaprocessinwhich

�4


theseearliericonicandindexicalcapabilitiesaidthechild’sdiscoveryofhowtousewordsandwordcombinationssymbolically. Thisisanungroundingprocesstotheextentthatthetoddlerhastodiscoverhowtotransferfromusingintrinsicallygroundedtousingungroundedsignvehicles,allthewhilemaintainingreferentialgrounding.Thiscanonlybemaintainediftheseiconicandindexicalrelationsareinsomewaypreservedinthetransitiontosymboliccommunication.Sincepropertiesthatcouldprovidereferentialgroundingareabsentfromlinguisticsignvehiclesgroundingcanonlybepreservedbymeansextrinsictothem,i.e.intherelationsbetweenthem.ThelogicofsymbolungroundinginlanguageisdepictedinYigures1and2.

Figure2.

Universalgrammarfromsemioticconstraints:Thisbegsanimportantquestion:Canthepropertiesthatlinguistsunderstandas

grammaticalbeexplainedintermsoficonicandindexicalproperties?InthissectionIwillexplorethepossibilityofexplainingthesomeofthemostubiquitousgrammaticalprinciples—so-calledgrammaticaluniversals—intermsofsemioticconstraints.SpeciYically,Iwillarguethatthemostnearlyuniversalfeaturesofgrammararetheleastarbitraryaspectsoflanguagebecausetheyareconstrainedbytherequirementsforiconicandindexicalreference.

Grammaticalrelationshipsdon’tautomaticallycometotheforewithallformsofsymboliccommunication.ThisisbecausegrammarisapropertyofsymbolicreferencethatemergeswhensymbolicreferenceisampliYiedbycombinatorialoperations.Onceitisrecognizedthatsymbolicreferenceisnotasimplemappingrelation,butemergesfroma

�5


baseoficonicandindexicalrelationstransferredtosymbol-symbolrelations,themanycontributionsoftheseunderlyingsemioticconstraintstothestructureoflanguagewillbecomeobvious.

Iconicandindexicalrelationshipsareconstitutedbysharingexplicitpropertiesthatwiththeirreferents.Theseareimplicitineluctableconstraintsthatareinheritedbyfeaturesofgrammarandsyntax.Thesebecomere-expressedinoperationsinvolvingsymbolcombinations,suchasphrases,sentences,arguments,andnarratives.Theseconstraintsemergefrombelow,sotospeak,fromthesemioticinfrastructurethatconstitutessymbolicrepresentationratherthanneedingtobeimposedfromanextrinsicsourceofgrammaticalprinciples(e.g.innateuniversalgrammar).Althoughthisinfrastructureislargelyinvisible—hiddeninthedetailsofaninternalizedsystemandlargelyautomatedduringearlychildhood—usingsymbolsincombinationincommunicativecontextsnecessarilyexposestheseconstraintsthatdetermineiconicandindexicalgrounding. Thesesemioticconstraintshavethemostubiquitouseffectontheregularizationoflanguagestructure,butinadditiontherearesourcesofweakerlessubiquitousconstraintsalsocontributingtocross-linguisticregularities.Theseincludeprocessingconstraintsduetoneurologicallimitations,requirementsofcommunication,andcognitivebiasesspeciYictoourprimate/hominidevolutionaryheritage.AlthoughnoneofthesesourcesofconstraintplayadirectroleingeneratingspeciYiclinguisticstructures,theirpersistentinYluenceoverthecourseofcountlessthousandsofyearsoflanguagetransmissiontendstoweedoutlanguageformsthatarelesseffectiveatdisambiguatingreference,hardertoacquireatanearlyage,demandsigniYicantcognitiveeffortandprocessingtime,andareinconsistentwiththedistinctivewaysthatprimatebrainstendtointerprettheworld. Thislistofsourcesofconstraintonlanguagestructurecanbebrokendownintofourmaincategories:semioticconstraints,neuralprocessingconstraints,evolvedsensorimotorschemasandcognitivebiases,andpragmaticsocialcommunicationconstraints.ThesecategoriesandspeciYicconstraintswithineachcategoryarelistedinTable1(modiYiedfromDeacon2012)inanorderthatroughlycorrespondstotheirrelativestrengthofinYluenceonlanguagestructure.ThecombinedeffectofthesemultipleconstraintssigniYicantlyreducesthe“phasespace”ofprobablelanguageforms(shownasacomplexVenndiagraminFigure3).Differentlinguisticparadigmsmayprioritizeoneoneortheotherofthesemajorcategoriesofconstrainttoexplaincertainhighlyregularstructuralfeaturesoflanguage.Forexample,cognitivegrammarsoftenhighlighttheinYluencesofsensorimotorschemas&cognitivebiases,whereassystemicfunctionallinguisticapproachesplaceconsiderableemphasisonthepragmaticsofsocialcommunication.Inthefollowingdiscussion,however,Iwillfocusonlyonsomeofthemostubiquitoussemioticconstraints.

Table1.

A.Semioticconstraints1. Recursiveaffordance(onlysymbolscanprovidenon-destructive[opaque]recursion

acrosslogicaltypes)2. Predicationstructure(symbolsmustbeboundtoindicesinordertorefer)

�6


3. Transitivityandembeddingconstraints(indexicalitydependsonimmediatecorrelationandcontiguity,andistransitive)

4. QuantiYication(symbolizedindicesneedre-speciYication).Semioticconstraintscanbediscoveredpragmaticallyand‘guessed’priorto

languagefeedback(becauseofanalogiestonon-linguisticiconicandindexicalexperiences).

B.Neuralprocessingconstraints6. Chunking-branchingarchitecture(mnemonicconstraint)7. Algorithmicregularization(proceduralautomatization)8. Neuralsubstrateswillvaryonthebasisofprocessinglogic,notlinguisticcategories

(thereshouldbelanguage-speciYiclocalizationdifferences)

C.Evolvedsensorimotorschemasandcognitivebiases9. Standardschema/frameunits(viacognitiveborrowing)10.Vocaltakeover(anoptimalmediumformimicry)

D.Pragmaticcommunicationconstraints11.Pragmaticconstraints(communicationrolesanddiscoursefunctions)12.Culture-speciYicexpectations/prohibitions(e.g.distinctiveconventionsofindication,

waysofmarkingdiscourseperspective,prohibitionsagainstcertainkindsofexpressions,etc.)

�7


Figure3.Venndiagramshowinghowoverlappingconstraintsvastlyreducethe“phasespace”ofpossibleformsoflanguage.

Perhapsthemostradicalimplicationofthisanalysisisthatmostimportantandubiquitoussourceofconstraintsonlanguageorganizationariseneitherfromnaturenorfromnurture.Thatis,theyarenottheresultofbiologicalevolutionproducinginnatepredispositionsandtheyarenotderivedfromthedemandsofdiscourseortheaccidentsofculturalhistory.SemioticconstraintsarethosethatmostdirectlyreYlectthegrammaticalcategories,syntacticlimitations,andphrasalorganizationoflanguage.Theyareinarealsenseaprioriconstraints,thatprecedeallothers.ConsequentlytheyaremostoftenconfusedwithinnateinYluences.

Recursiveaffordance:Inarecentandnowwell-knowntheoreticalreviewofthelanguageoriginsproblem

(Hauser,Chomsky,&Fitch,2002)NoamChomskyappearedtoretreatfromanumberofearlierclaimsabouttheinnate‘faculty’forlanguage.Inhisnewminimalistprogramheinsteadfocusesontheubiquityofthehierarchiccombinatorialstructureoflanguageandtherecursiveapplicationofanoperationdescribedas“merge.”Thisshiftinfocusdoublesdownonhislong-terminsistencethatwhatmakesthehumanminduniqueisaninnatecapacitytohandlerecursiverelationships.Mostlanguagesdoindeedmakeextensiveuseofrecursivecombinatorialoperationsthatarenotfoundinnonhumancommunication.Likemanyrelatedclaimsforaninnategrammaticalfaculty,however,thisonealsofollowsfromareductionisticconceptionofsymbolicreference.Ifinsteadwerecognizethatonlyhumancommunicationissymbolic,whereasnon-humancommunicationislimitedtoiconicandindexicalcommunication,anotherpossibleexplanationforthisuniquelyhumancognitivedifferencebecomesavailable:recursionisonlypossiblesymbolically.

Becausethesignvehiclesusedforsymboliccommunication(e.g.words)requirenointrinsicpropertieslinkingthemtotheirreferents,theycanrefertooneanotherortocombinationsofothersymbolswithoutequivocation.Thisallowssubstitutionsthatcross-logical-type(e.g.partforwhole,memberforclass,wordforphrase)andthusacrosshierarchiclevelsinlinguisticcommunications.Neithericonsnorindicescanreferacrosslogicaltypesbecauseoftheinvolvementofsignvehicleproperties(e.g.similarityofform,correlationinspaceortime)indeterminingreference.Butbecauseoftheindependenceofsignvehiclepropertiesfromtheobjectsofreference,symbolscanrepresentothersymbolicrelationshipsincludingnearlyunlimitedlevelsofcombinationsofsymbols(suchasphrases,wholesentences,andevennarratives).Recursionisnotthereforeanoperationthatmustbe“added”tohumancognitionoverandabovesymboliccapabilities.Itisacombinatorialpossibilitythatcomesforfree,sotospeak,assoonassymbolicreferenceisavailable.Sotheabsenceofrecursioninanimalcommunicationisnomoreofamysterythantheabsenceofsymboliccommunication.Itissimplyduetotheirlackofsymbolicabilities.

�8


Thoughrecursionismadeavailablewithsymboliccommunication,itneednotbetakenadvantageof.Soitspaucityinchildlanguageandpidgins,aswellasitsabsenceinsomelanguages(e.g.Everett,2005)isnotevidenceagainstitsuniversalavailabilityinlanguage.Recursionisanimportantmeansforoptimizinglinguisticcommunicationbecauseitprovidesawaytocondensesymbolstrings.Forexample,repeatedrecursiveoperationsmakeitpossibletouseasingleword(e.g.pronoun)orphrase(e.g.anaphor)torefertoanextensivecorpusofpriordiscourse.Thisnotonlyoptimizescommunicativeeffort,italsoreducesworkingmemoryload.Nevertheless,recursionalsocreatesnew‘record-keeping’demandsthathelptoavoidtheconfusionsmadepossiblebythiscondensation.Thisrequiresincorporatingiconicandindexicalconstraintsintothewayssymbolscanbecombined.Theseinfrasymbolicconstraintsontherelationshipsbetweenwordsconstitutethecorefeaturesofgrammarandsyntax.

Predicationstructure:AnothernearlyubiquitoussemioticconstraintisreYlectedinthecombinatorial

chunkingthatconstitutesphraseandsentencestructures.Combinatorialunitssuchascomplexwords,clauses,andsentencesarecomposedofelementsthatnecessarilycomplementoneanother’ssemioticfunctions.Inotherwordswhatcanbe“merged”inawaythatconstitutesarecursivelyhigherordercombinatorialunitishighlyconstrained.Suchafunctionalunit,mustincludeatleasttwosemioticallydistinctcomponents,oneoperatingontheother.Forexample,alllanguagesrequireatleastadyadicsententialstructure,i.e.somethinglikeasubject-predicateoratopic-commentsententialform.Althoughholophrasticutterances,commands,andexpletives,arenotuncommon,theytypicallyareembeddedinapragmaticcontextinwhichwhattheyrefertoismadesalientbyimmediateembeddinginasemioticcontextthatYixesthereference;typicallysomesalientfeatureoftheimmediatephysicalorsocialcontext.IthasbeensuggestedthatthisubiquitousstructuremightreYlectanaction-object,agent-patient,orwhat-wheredichotomy.Buttheeasewithwhichthesecognitivecategoriescanbeinterchangedintheirgrammaticalrolesindicatesthatthereisamorebasiccommonconstraintbehindall.

Sincelongbeforeeffortstoformalizelogicalinference,scholarsrecognizedthatisolatedtermsexpressasensebutlackspeciYicreferenceunlesstheyareembeddedinacombinatorialconstructionroughlycorrespondingtoaproposition.TheassignmentofaspeciYicreferencetoanexpressionorformulaandthustomakeanassertionaboutsomethingiscalledpredication.Insymboliclogic,forexample,awell-formed(i.e.referring)expressionrequiresbothafunctionandanargument(i.e.thattowhichthefunctionisapplied).Firstorderpredicatelogicisoftenconsideredthesemanticskeletonforpropositionalstructureinlanguage,thoughitsprimaryformisseldomexplicitlyexhibitedinnaturallanguage.Itischaracterizedbya“predicate(argument)”structureoftheformF(x),whereFisafunctionandxisavariableor“argument”operatedonbythatfunction.Suchanexpressionisthebasicatomicunitofpredicatelogic.Suchanexpressionmayrefertoanevent,state,orrelationship,andtherecanbeone-,two-,three-andzero-placepredicatesdeterminedbyhowmanyargumentstheytake.Soforexamplethefunction“lives”typicallyisaone-placepredicate,“likes”isatwoplacepredicate,and“gives”isathree-placepredicate.

�9


Thissuggeststhefollowinghypothesis:Predicate(argument)structureexpressesthedependencyofsymbolicreferenceonindexicalreferenceasinSymbol(index).Oncesourceofevidenceforthissemioticdependencyisimplicitinthewaythatdeicticprocedures(e.g.pointingandotherindicativegestures)areusedtohelpYixthereferenceofanambiguoustermordescription,andcanevenbesubstitutedforthesubjectsandargumentsofasentence.Thusforexample,utteringtheword“smooth”inarandomcontextonlybringsattentiontoanabstractproperty,butwhenutteredwhilerunningone’shandalongatabletoporpointingtothewavelesssurfaceofalake,referenceistherebyestablished.ItcanalsoreferevenifutteredinisolationofanyovertindexinasocialcontextwherethespeakerandlistenerhavetheirjointattentionfocusedonthesameYlawlessaction.Inthiscase,aswithholophrasticutterancesingeneral,thesymbolicreferenceisestablishedbyimplicitindicationpresupposedinthepragmaticsofthecommunicativeinteraction.Indeed,whereexplicitindexingisnotprovided,itisassumedthatthemostsalientagreeingaspecttotheimmediatecontextistobeindicated.Ingeneral,then,anysymbolicexpressionmustbeimmediatelylinkedtoanindexicaloperationinordertorefer.Withoutsuchalinkthereissensebutnoreference.

Thisisauniversalsemioticconstraint(thoughnotauniversalrule)thatismadeexplicitinlogicandisimplicitinthenecessaryrelationalstructureofsentencesandpropositions.Itisaconstraintthatmustbeobeyedinordertoachievetheestablishmentofjointreference,whichiscriticaltocommunication.Wherethisimmediatelinkismissingreferenceisambiguousandwherethisconstraintisviolated(e.g.bycombinationsthatscramblethiscontiguitybetweensymbolicandindexicaloperations;so-calledword-salad)referencetypicallyfails.

Thisconstraintderivesfromtheunmaskingofindexicalconstraintsimplicitintheinterpretationofsymbolicreference.Becausesymbolicreferenceisindirectand“virtual,”byitselfitcandetermineonlyungroundedreferentialpossibility.Thesubject,topic,orargument(=variable)performsalocativefunctionbysymbolizinganindexicalrelationship;apointingtosomethingelselinkedtoitinsomeactualphysicalcapacity(e.g.contiguouspragmaticortextualcontext).Thisreferencedeterminationcannotbeleftonlyinsymbolicformbecauseisolatedsymbols(e.g.wordsandmorphemes)onlyreferreciprocallytotheir“position”inthesystemornetworkofothersymbols.

TheimportanceofimmediatecontiguityinthisrelationshipreYlectstheprincipaldeYiningconstraintdeterminingindexicalreference.Indexicalreferencemustbemediatedbyphysicalcorrelation,contiguity,containment,causalityetc.,withitsobjectinsomeway.Indexicalityfailswithoutthisimmediacy.Thereare,ofcourse,manywaysthatthisimmediacycanbeachieved,butwithoutitnothingisindicated.Theseconstraintsonindexicalityareinheritedbythegrammaticalcategoriesandsyntacticorganizationofsentences,propositions,andlogicalformulae.

Tostatethishypothesisinsemioticterms:Asymbolmustbecontiguouswiththeindexthatgroundsitsreference(eithertotheworldortotheimmediateagreeingtextualcontext,whichisotherwisegrounded),orelseitsreferencefails.Contiguitythushasadoublyindexicalroletoplay.Itscontiguity(textuallyorpragmatically)withthesymbolizingsignvehiclepointstothissymbolandtheircontiguityinturnpointto

�10


somethingelse.Thisisanexpressionofonefurtherfeatureofindexicality:transitivityofreference.

Simplystated,apointerpointingtoanotherpointerpointingtosomeobjecteffectivelyenablestheYirstpointertoalsopointtothatobject.Thispropertyiscommonlyexploitedoutsideoflanguage.Thustheunevenwearonautomobiletiresindicatesthatthetireshavenotbeenorientedatapreciserightangletothepavement,whichmayindicatethattheyaremisaligned,whichmayinturnindicatethattheownerisnotparticularlyattentivetotheconditionofthevehicle.Similarlytheindexicalgroundingofcontentwordsinasentencecanalsobeindirect,butonlysolongasnonewsymbolicallyfunctioningwordisintroducedtobreakthislinearcontiguity.

Ofcourse,everywordormorphemeinasentencefunctionssymbolicallyandawordorphrasemaytakeonahigherordersymbolicorindexicalroleinitscombinatorialrelationshipstootherlanguageunitsatthesamelevel.ThisYlexibilityprovidesadiversityofsymbolizedindexicalrelations.So,forexample,argumentscanbereplacedbypronouns,andpronounscanpointtootherpredicatesandarguments,ortheycanpointoutsidethediscourse,orifalanguageemploysgendermarkingofnounsagender-speciYiedpronouncanrefertothenextmostcontiguousnounwithagreeinggenderexpressedinthepriorinteraction,evenifseparatedbymanynon-agreeingnounsandnounphrases.Asentencethatlacksinferrableindexicalgroundingofevenonecomponentsymbolicelementwillbejudgedungrammaticalforthisreason.However,thebasisforthisjudgmentbynonlinguistsisnotdeterminedwithrespecttoeitherexplicitrulesorconstraints.Itisdeterminedbythefactthatthesentencedoesn’thaveanunambiguousreference.

Theexceptionthatprovestherule,so-to-speak,isexempliYiedbyhighlyinYlectedand/oragglutinatedlanguageswhereindexicalmarkingisincorporateddirectlyintowordmorphology.IncomparisonwithEnglish,whichmaintainstheindexicalgroundingofmostofitssymbolicfunctionsbystrictwordorderconstraints,theselanguagestendtohaverelativelyfreewordorder.Thisleadstoaprediction:themorecompletelythatindexicalfunctionsareincorporatedintowordmorphologythelessrestrictivethesyntaxandviceversa.

Quanti>icationandtransitivity:RelatedtothisindexicalfunctionistheroleofquantiYicationinnaturallanguageand

symboliclogic.InlanguageonlynounsandtheargumentsofaverbrequirequantiYiers.Inlogicawell-formedexpressionrequiresmorethanjustafunctionanditsargument.Unambiguouspredicationrequires‘quantifying’theargument(unlessitisapropername).Thislatterrequirementandexceptionaretelling.InEnglish,quantiYiersincludesuchtermsas“a,”“the,”“some,”“this”,“these,”and“all.”Theseliterallytermsindicatethenumerosityofwhatisbeingreferredto,evenifjustinrelativeterms(suchas“some”).Propernamesaretheexceptionbecausetheyrefertosingleindividuals,whetheranindividualpersonornamedplace,likeacityorcountry.Referenceinthatcaseisunambiguous.Itcanalsobeunambiguousinthecaseofso-calledmasstermslike“water”orabstractpropertiessuchas“justice”sincetheyhavenoclearindividuality.Thisbasicstructuralconstraintisagainduetothecomplexinfrastructurebehindsymbolicreference.

�11


Wordslike“a”“the”“some”“many”“most”“all”etc.,symbolizethevirtualresultofvariousformsofiteratedindicationsorvirtualostentions(pointings).Theyareeffectivelyvirtualpointingsthattakeadvantageoftransitivecorrelationwithotherindexicalrelationships,suchasproximityinformation(“this”“that”)orpossessioninformation(“his”“your”)todifferentiateindexicality.

Analogoustothecaseofimplicitpresupposedindexicalityinholophrasticutterances,therearealsocontextualconditionswhereexplicitquantiYicationinlanguagemaybeunnecessary.Thisismostobviousincaseswherethepossibilityofspecifyingindividualsisinappropriate(asinsomemassnouns;e.g.“awater,”“allwaters,”“fewwaters”).Pronominalreferencedoesn’trequirequantiYicationbecauseitissuppliedbythetextthatitindicates(transitivityofindication).Butwhengeneraltermsaresubstitutedforpronounsorotherwordsservingovertindexicalfunctions(e.g.“this”or“that”)theyinevitablyrequiretheadditionofquantiYication.Therearealso,ofcourse,manyotherexceptionstotheneedforquantiYication.PropernamesandnumbersdonotrequirequantiYicationwhentheyareusedtorefertoatypeasasingularclassbecauseindicatingwouldagainberedundant.

Consequencesofasemioticreframingoflanguage Thelongunquestionedassumptionthatsymbolicreferencelacksintrinsicstructurehastrickedlinguistsintopostulatingadhocrulesystemsandalgorithmstoexplainthestructuralconstraintsoflanguage.Failuretopayattentiontotheiconicandindexicalunderpinningsofsymbolicreferencehasadditionallyexaggeratedthecomplexityofthelanguageacquisitionproblem.Thismyopicavoidanceofsemioticanalysishasledtothedoctrineofaninnatelanguagefacultythatincludessomemodicumoflanguage-speciYicknowledgeandthisseeminglogicalnecessityhassupportedanalmostreligiousadherencetothisassumptiondespitethebiologicalimplausibilityofitsevolutionandthelackofneurologicalsupportforanycorrespondingbrainstructuresorfunctions. Unfortunatelycontemporarysemiotictheoryhasnotbeenofmuchassistance,primarilybecauseithasremainedapredominantlystructuraltheorytiedtoastatictaxonomicunderstandingofsemioticrelationships.Butwhensemiosisisunderstoodasaprocessofinterpretivedifferentiationinwhichdifferentmodesofreferenceareunderstoodasdynamicallyandhierarchicallyconstituentofoneanotherthesemanyconundrumsdissolveandtheseonceapparentlyindependentaspectsofthelanguagemysteryturnouttohaveacommonfoundation.

Soapproachinglanguageacquisitionsemioticallyprovidesafunctionalaccountthatcanunifyawiderangeofgrammaticalandsyntacticrelationships.Italsosuggeststhatournaïveintuitionabouttheselinguisticregularitiesmaybemoreaccuratethantheformalrule-governedapproachwouldsuggest.Anaïvespeakerseldomcommentsthatanungrammaticalsentencebreaksarule,andisgenerallyhard-pressedtoarticulatesucharule.Rather,theusualcommentisthatitjustsoundswrongorthatitdoesn’tmakesensesaidthatway.

Inthecaseofungrammaticalsentencesnaïvespeakersknowthereissomethingwrongeveniftheycan’tarticulateit,excepttosaythattheyareawkwardordifYiculttointerpret,andrequiresomeguessworktomakesenseofthem.Moreover,ineveryday

�12


conversationalspeech,theso-calledrulesofgrammarandsyntaxareonlyverylooselyadheredto.Thisisusuallybecausecommoninterestsandjointattentionaswellasculturallyregularizedinteractionframesprovidemuchoftheindexicalgrounding,andsoinsuchcircumstancesadherencetothesestricturestendstobepreferentiallyignored.Notsurprisingly,itwaswiththewidespreadincreaseinliteracythatscholarlyattentionbegantobefocusedongrammarandsyntax,andwitheducationinreadingandwritingthese“rules”begantogetformalized.Withthewrittenwordsharedimmediatecontext,commonpragmaticinterests,andimplicitpresuppositionsareminimally,ifatallavailabletoprovideindexicaldisambiguationandsolanguage-internalmaintenanceoftheseconstraintsbecomesmorecritical.

RichnessofthestimulusFinally,thissemioticfunctionalanalysisalsoprovidesanalternativeunderstanding

oftheso-calledpovertyofthestimulusproblemthatisofteninvokedtoarguethatknowledgeofgrammarmustbelargelyinnate.Consistentwiththefactthatnaïvespeakersaregenerallyunabletoarticulatethe“rules”thatdescribetheirunderstandingofwhatisandisnotawell-formedsentence,youngchildrenlearningtheirYirstlanguageareseldomcorrectedforgrammaticalerrors(incontrasttoregularcorrectionofpronunciation).

Moreover,childrendonotexplorerandomcombinatorialoptionsintheirspeech,testingtoYindtheonesthatareapprovedbyothers.Theymakeremarkablyprescientguesses.Ithasbeenassumed,therefore,thattheymusthavesomeimplicitunderstandingoftheserulesalreadyavailable.Infactchildrendohaveanextensiveandubiquitoussourceofinformationforlearningtoproduceandinterpretthesebasicsemioticconstraintsonpredication,butitisnotintheformofinnateknowledgeofgrammar.Itisintheformofknowledgeabouttheintrinsicconstraintsoficonicandindexicalreferencethatarediscoveredandinternalizedfromsocialinteractionspriorandduringinfancyandearlychildhood.Whenso,wehumanscomeintotheworldwithattentionalbiasesandbehavioraltendenciesthatfascilitatethislearning.

Firstofall,discerningindexicalityisacapacitythatisbasictoallcognition,animalandhuman.Itrequiresnospecialtrainingtobecomeadeptattheuseofcorrelation,contiguity,etc.,tomakepredictionsandthustounderstandindexicalrelationships.Thisisessentialtoallformsoflearning.

Evolvedpredispositionstopointorindicatedesiredobjectsorengagejointattentionhavelongbeenrecognizedasuniversallysharedhumanpredispositionsthatarepoorlydevelopedinotherspecies.Thisuniversalhumanindexicalpredispositionprovidestheidealscaffoldtosupportwhatmustbenegotiatedandmustbeprogressivelyinternalizedwithinlanguagestructure.Theearlyexperienceofcommunicatingwiththeaidofpointingalsoprovidesadditionalbackgroundtraininginunderstandingthenecessaryrelationshipbetweensymbolsandindices.

Second,althoughthereislittleifanycorrectionofthegrammarandsyntaxinchildren’searlyspeechthereisextensivepragmaticinformationaboutsuccessorfailuretoreferortointerpretreference.Thisisintheformofpragmaticfeedbackconcerningthecommunicationofunambiguousreference.Andthissourceofinformationattendsalmosteveryuseofwords.SoIwouldarguethatchildrendonot“know”grammarinnately,nordo

�13


theylearnrulesofgrammar,andyettheyneverthelessquickly“discover”thesemioticconstraintsfromwhichgrammarsderive.

Althoughitisnecessarytolearnhowagivenlanguageimplementstheseconstraints,theprocessisnotinductive.Itisnotnecessaryforachildtoderivegeneralrulesfrommanyinstances.Youngchildrenmakegoodguessesaboutsentencestructure—asthoughtheyalreadyknow“rules”ofgrammar—bytappingintomorenaturalanalogiestothenonlinguisticconstraintsandbiasesoficonicityandindexicality,andbygettingpragmaticfeedbackaboutconfusedorambiguousreference.

Universality? Semioticconstraintsshouldbeagent-independent,species-independent,language-independent,anddiscourse-independent.Theyhavebeenmistakenlyassumedtobeeitherinnatestructuresorelsederivedfromcognitiveschemasordeterminedbysensorimotorbiasesand/orsocialcommunicativepragmatics.Thoughtheyarepriortolanguageexperience,andsomeareprerequisitestosuccessfulsymboliccommunication,theyareneitherinnatenorsociallyderived. Theyareemergentfromconstraintsthatareimplicitinthesemioticinfrastructureofsymbolicreferenceandinterpretiveprocesses.Theyareinthiswayanalogoustomathematicaluniversals(e.g.primenumbers)thatare“discovered’(notinvented)asmathematicalrepresentationsystemsbecomemorepowerful.Thougheachformofsymbolmanipulationinmathematicshasbeenaninventionandthusaconventionofculture,wearenotfreetochoosejustanyformifwewanttomaintainconsistencyofquantitativerepresentation.Likewise,aslanguagesbecomemorecomplexandexpressivelypowerfultheyalsobecomemoreconstrained,andasliteraryformshavebecomeremovedfromthepragmaticcontextsofdaytodayspokencommunicationthelossofextralinguisticindexicalityhasdemandedmorerigorousadherencetosemioticconstraintsofgrammarandsyntaxtoavoidreferentialambiguityandequivocation.Itshouldnotbesurprising,then,thatitiswiththeriseofwidespreadliteracythatofYicialeffortstoestablishnormsof”proper”grammarandsyntax. SemioticconstraintsarethemostubiquitousinYluencesonlanguagestructure,andindeedtheyareevenmoreuniversalthanadvocatesofmentalesecouldhaveimagined;becausetheyarenothumanspeciYic.Theyareuniversalinthesensethattheconstraintsofmathematicsareuniversal.Theywouldevenberelevanttotheevolutionofsymboliccommunicationelsewhereintheuniverse.Buttheyarenotlikeexceptionless“rules.”Differentlanguages,everydayspokeninteractions,andartisticformsofexpressioncandivergefromtheseconstraintstovaryingextents,butatthecostofambiguityandconfusionofreference.Ingeneral,theseconstraintswillprobablybethemostconsistentregularitiesacrosstheworld’slanguagesbecausemeanstominimizethisdivergencewillbefavoredbythesocialevolution-likeprocessesoflanguagetransmissionfromgenerationtogeneration. OfcoursereYlectingonthelargerlistoffactorscontributingtothepropertiesmostwidelysharedacrosslanguages(cf.Table1)wemustacknowledgethecontributionsofbothhuman-speciYicneurologicalconstraintsaswellashistoricallycontingentsocialconstraints.Theytoocontributetothemanynearlyuniversalregularitiesthatcharacterize

�14


theWorld’slanguages.AndalthoughmanydoindeedreYlectinnateinYluencesthatmayhaveevolvedspeciYicallyduetotheircontributionstoeasinglanguageacquisitionandperformance,nonedeterminelanguageorganizationinagenerativesense.Rather,alongwiththeubiquitoussemioticconstraintsdiscussedinthisessay,theyaddtothecollectiveinYluencesofthewholeset.

References

Aristotle (~350 BCE) On Interpretation (Translated by E. M. Edghill) http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/interpretation.html (1994-2000, Daniel C. Stevenson, Web Atomics).

Deacon, Terrence (2012) Beyond The Symbolic Species. In T. Schilhab, F. Stjernfeldt, and T. Deacon (eds.) The Symbolic Species Evolved, Springer, pp. 9-38.

Everett, Daniel L. (2005) "Cultural Constraints on Grammar and Cognition in Pirahã: Another Look at the Design Features of Human Language" Current Anthropology 46 (4): 621–646

Harnad, Steven (1990) The symbol grounding problem. Physica D. Hauser, M., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it,

and how did it evolve? Science, 298, 1569-1579.Hume,David(1739-40)ATreatiseofHumanNature:BeinganAttempttoIntroducethe

ExperimentalMethodofReasoningintoMoralSubjects.Lewis, David (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.Peirce, Charles Sanders (1931–1935) The Collected Papers of Chales Sanders Peirce

Vols. I-VI (ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss), Vols. VII-VIII (ed. Arthur W. Burks) (1958), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Raczaszek-Leonardi,JoannaandDeacon,Terrence(inprep.)Thesymbolungroundingproblem.

�15

http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/interpretation.html

beneath symbols: convention as a semiotic phenomenon

Documents