ben-ami - so close yet so far - lessons from the i-p peace process

8/7/2019 Ben-Ami - So Close Yet So Far - Lessons From the I-P Peace Process

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So Close and Yet So Far Lessons from the Israeli-Palestinian

Peace Process

Ben-Ami, Shlomo.

Israel Studies, Volume 10, Number 2, Summer 2005, pp. 72-90 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

For additional information about this article

Access Provided by University of California @ Irvine at 01/21/11 12:59AM GMT

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/is/summary/v010/10.2ben-ami.html
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72

S B-A

S C Y S FL I-P P P

I stead of repeatedly rejecting the I , k , US P B C w P C D. T P , R M, - w H A, k: I, P ,from the beginning of the Camp David Summit onward, they were unable A fi w.

w , , P .I P M E Bk w . F x, w

w J -, w - wrequired, and his condescending attitude toward the Palestinian leader was .

Yet, it would be incorrect to dwell excessively on the tactical shortcom- x the Oslo process. It would also be wrong to address Camp David separately ; ,

that preceded the summit and that followed it up to the presentation of the

C P 23 D 2000 k.T I-P w

, w w . I w , so far irreconcilable, clash of ethos and an impossible political environment .

O , , C D , w . W

Sk w A A . B x destroyed any possibility for further progress. Te channel stopped because


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S C Y S F 73

w . F Y A w I .

I , w, A A CD w w , C, flx w w , . I Bk, w - , w

A A w z k , w w

P . W w P , w .

I k w Bk A w . I ffi x w I P , -, , , always convinced that he possessed the powerful Cartesian logic that would w ,

, A, w, , w , w, , x , , fl . H w k , w,I ; w , w w k, w w . A O, w A

w Yz R , w w A , friendship and cooperation with the co-signatories of the Oslo accords. He P A- , , P .

I , q, modern Salah-A-Din or Umar-el-Qutab who would liberate Jerusalem fi. I I w N 25 J

2000, which was a fortnight before Camp David, he was careful to remind, w w J, U 638 ce w K U -Q, q J, Bz S, w


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74 israel studies, volume 10, number 2

C Jw J.

T x ad nauseam A, R A w . Nw , q . I w R w Jwanatic motivate y a most angerous Jewis po itica t eo ogyt e

.I w P

N. A x I. T w , w, w q ff . T w O .

T k .O I w w w P- -W , w w , fl, fl-

. F , w w z w, through a reasonable compromise between two political entities, both .

Te creation of the PA, however, did not eliminate or dilute the P -, w , , wagain resort to armed struggle and a policy of regional instability. Te neo-

co onia ist a acy t at economic eve opment can e a su stitute or po iti- w P wk. I w of Jean Monnet on Arafats desk. I did, however, see pictures of the al-Aqsaq J .

N, C D . Ahimself, notwithstanding the complaints about the humiliating Israeli pro- B, w PC C D fi w : A, w, , I

trust you and I accept your judgment; you decide. Arafat later reversed hisposition, but this moment at the summit clearly reflected Arafats view that w .


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S C Y S F 75

Te process fell victim to Israels understanding that Oslo did not mean w w ww 1967 , J P . C-structive ambiguity facilitated an agreement in Oslo at the price of creating w fi .

P w A k . I , w P is an attempt to break the genetic code of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and per-

Jw -M ,

historical certificates of ownership. Arafat clearly refused to be the first and A z q the bond Jews had to their millenarian homeland and to their holy shrines.R- I , , w C D .

Troughout, Arafat perceived himself as a warrior engaged in a mytho-logical campaign of moral decision against a state born in sin, which had kw P w ww P .

Hw k ? NShaath was asked by President Clinton during the negotiations on refugees C D. S w w, Bw w . D x I w 400 800,000 ? I x ?

w P . W , w A H . H, E

of al-Ayyam the Palestinian Authoritys offi cial newspaper, later pub-

w P C D w I : A C D w k I H, , [w] . I w w al-Naqba.

S ; w - . I I -

A w w w- , R M H A w x Jw .


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76 isra el studies, volume 10, number 2

T O q C D . T fi w , I, w w, , , S I k B w P .

Az , O

accords that prevents the creation of settlements. Te blame should be put, k P , P , w kw, , . L , w , w .

Loyal to the old archaic Zionist philosophy according to which the lastkindergarten also defines the political border, the Israelis tried to influencethe nature of the final agreement by a hectic policy of settlement expansion.

T P w .A L , C w Bk

that the summit, if it failed, will kill Oslo. But the truth of the matter wasthat Israelis and Palestinians had already jointly killed Oslo. Oslo was built , . C- , w I .Te agreement on Hebron was Netanyahus version of Rabins Oslo-B, and

S -S w B W R M . A w w .T Bk w A

I k, w A fi P - . Bk, , S-fi . A, w w

with the Palestinians we had already withdrawn from Lebanon. Tese are ; w w fi . T w A

referred to Lebanons Shiite militia Hizbullah in a conversation with me inNablus on the morning of our pullout from Southern Lebanon. I could not w, w .


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S C Y S F 77

A w . T ,N, x Hz, A

w F Y: W fi w .

I w , w N, w t at any o y, even t e Presi ent o t e Unite States, wou expect im to . I k, , . I , I w .

I have no doubt that Israels withdrawal from Lebanon left a profoundmark on Arafats mind. He felt humiliated and embarrassed that he should fi w w 500 I ww L . H C D, , , z . T Lz I, ,

w k I. T w I L w I w w

w w w fl. S w P I w A w w .

Bk A fi - J P . B

Arafats inability to prevent Palestinian violence on the Naqbas anniversary

-M 2000. B w B fi w S w P k; w x

w , w fi .

I O with the fact that the document lacked internationally agreed mechanisms . I w

- w ff. I w major fallacy to believe that an incremental piecemeal process between the .


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Clintons warning to Barak that the failure of Camp David might lead O A w. I A k A , w . I , A . N , kept saying to the President. And, as Akram Haniyya recalls in his articles,

w I A J w , w w w .

I , R M H A New Yor Review o Boo , B --

w -. I , w A. B,the truth of the matter is that at key moments at Camp David, when it was fi w , I A -k

w P. k C D, w

to grasp the complex relationship between the United States and Israel that A . B w , P-

A I, q -ness of the Palestinians and their genuine desire for a deal. As the President A C D, w x agree with American or Israeli proposals, but he was counting on him to saysomething the President could take back to Barak to get him to move more.I , . S I .

Ultimately, the path of negotiation imagined by the Americansget a

position t at was c ose to Israe s genuine ottom ine, present it to t e Pa es-tinians, get a counterproposal from them, bring it back to the Israelistook w . I w , Bk

w k , w , A w , w .

Having spent a decade building a relationship with Washington,A w w . k w, I , w.

T C D Palestinians could have expected. But, to some among them, Arafats P Z


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S C Y S F 79

movement. Nabil Amr, a minister in Arafats cabinet, was courageous l-Hayat al-Jadida, P A:

D w w w C D k?

D w P C w

w P w fi? W

, , w w k x

w w . . . Hw w ,

w w ? A w w

w w . . . A , w - w w w w

w w . B, w

w w

w . . . W

w .

T w w been improved, although I am aware that the best negotiator is the one that

; M qk, k A.

But the major weakness in our peace enterprise was political and. T Bk x w w case of Rabinis that, however grandiose and enlightened the peace vision , w omestic po itica organization. O course, t e Israe i peacema er is a ways

k w

. C . T I , , w ; , w w . T , . B .

Inspiration alone is not suffi cient for a bold peace enterprise. A sensiblebalance is always needed between inspiration and political maneuvering. A . Bk w wkw . I

realpolitik. A . Bk z , , , w

w .


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80 israel studie s, volume 10, number 2

H w - . T w ff I, w w x P k, . O , w w w F I. T - - w I .

One s ou not, o course, un erestimate t e i emma o Ara at

. F ffi , w I fiin our capacity to solveby democratic means and through the establishedinstitutionsthe inevitable internal earthquake that would follow a deeply . A k , . P , w I q-, w H P I J. H, that would allow him to preserve the unity of the entire Palestinian family.

A H , w, w

I , w I k P x .

Arafat was neither the initiator nor a planner of the Intifada, although k M 2000, w w C D . B A w z -

. A w A fi I S, k k . A w standing, energised vociferous Arab support, and reverse the political tables I. I , q ; A ff k P C w S

k C P 23 D 2000 A .


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S C Y S F 81

Bk A N . Bk k w w ,and Arafat, as a strategist of all people, proved his failure again and again w k w .T, w .

T I w q ,

, x , I w I w w .

Hizbullah in Lebanon had a realistic political strategy: driving Israel out ofL, w I w w. W w I? A-w? B w w ? T O

w , w . W concrete Palestinian demands, the Israeli public was unable to calculate thecomparative costs and benefits of pursuing one course of action or another.T -k w, , w

P . Y I, w I w w fl.

T w A, I w, ,k w Israeli politics and public opinion. In a meeting in Cairo four weeks before I w w - fi w

w . D , Yz S :

T I w

PA Z P,

w fi x Jw

settlement in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (and secondarily Gaza). Te

P . . . w -C W

k , w fi

K. I w , A A 2000 w . A

best, Arafats choices since Autumn 2001 rank beside the two most important


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k , : S

L 1976, w S H 1990. O -

, , w k ,

, w A

P.

B C D w P . . -tinued; more than 50 meetings between the parties and with the American 23 D 2000 C

O Offi , w P C . T w

whim of a lame duck president. Tey represented a brilliantly devised point q w . T k w :

A P 97 W Bk - W Bk, w I

, w k Gz S, w, Israeli settlements, would be part of the Palestinian State. Additionalassets within Israelsuch as docks in the ports of Ashdod andH P w 100 -. N , J V, I w

P .

J w w , J A-Q, . W Jw w I, w A w P.

T P w M H -S. I w W W k H H.

W , w P whave the right to return to historical Palestine but with no explicit

S I. T I -. T

within the Palestinian state, but also in those areas within Israel that


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S C Y S F 83

w P w wk w. I , w .

In matters of security, the President endorsed the Palestinians rejec- z z , w w w

w I. A w J V IDF. P

z I A F w P w IDF

, , w w w P .

C k . I , . I . I w . H w . H w w D 27.

T I . I w

w coup detatthat the Chief of Staff should have gone public to criticize the governmentsendorsement of the parameters as an existential threat to Israeland ,

w P I, Iw I ff Jw

.B A . H . A , w, w A, . A w Mk, B-A, J, A , z w , P C G Dk Lx P z , . T w. C w w, I w w,

Bk w , A .T , , w w. I, k W . T, W H,


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A , P, I , k ff , w . H , w . C ww O Offi w G W. B W A, W H. T w - w , A , w C .

I ma e c ear to Ara at in our meeting in Cairo, a wee ater, t at Israe

w , P , . T w w w .

Te aba talks were indeed practical and detailed. Maps werex, w w .I w -k Sk k .T w w w , ff . B,

, w , I, q- w , Palestinians treated the parameters as non-committal and insisted on . F I Jw. T w , w A A G S w P w Gz

A w D P k. I w . H, I w , . O w w w . A I Y S,

Y B, A Sk , I , , . I w, , w , I P-

w w w .N, I P .


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S C Y S F 85

Z 1948 w w w w . Z wfunctioned with its back against the wall, which is why it was always w -k. I . T Z , 1948, k , w w .T P , , .

I A w w ? I

w k w w C ? T w , A w B J. w B . A , w, P B R w w M w -. I A, w , w - fl? T , w w w z , , w

, k fl? I P -w w P w wk I I kw t e transition to state an institution ui ing, w ic was exact y t e samekind of accusation made by Nabil Amr and Yezid Sayigh in their previously

?S P -, , , -standable. Peace is about stability not justice, I used to say to my Palestin- . I . B .

S w fl. C w, w

w w , .With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the principle of compromise , w, -


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I -. A , w fl.T A-S w x , k fl. F , w .

e co apse o a t e mec anisms o peacema ing etween Israe an P w I , , I , ,

w -, , w .

A w w x , S I C P. Tlatter do not contradict any of the principles laid down by the Saudi CrownPrince. Clintons failure does not lie in the nature of his peace platform, but fi . H w A ,

ff w E R z .

I B q - . A q W , w -k A - w w t e Sau i strategyin t e wa e o ot 9/11, t e Iraqi war, an t e esta i-z ff P I ff P B

M E .A , w,

. C . W k w w R 242 . A w w fi- .

T . L ; w I the resettlement of Palestinian refugees on the other; a practical solution to C P S


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S C Y S F 87

P , q creation of an international fund for the resettlement and compensation ofthe refugees; two capitals in Jerusalem along ethnic lines; a non-militarizedP ; fl fi .

T w w I P , x. T I, , P - A . B q P

. R w.

Tis should be the essence of the peace process from now on. Te tran- P A fi w I P. P - k.

F A S, x

k ww , . A - w . N I k w D S, w ww w

w . -

x A k

. D w , x , , k - A , PA .

Clearly the Intifada with all the disasters it brought upon the Palestin- w A, w I , ff PA .

A O - w P .

A P I


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88 israel studies, volume 10, number 2

security requirements. But the Palestinian Authority is not only corrupt andffi ; , fl, of security establishments, armed militias, terrorist gangs, and Islamic .

T w - PA , , , . the international mandate that successfully came to its end recently in East, w .

F , wk ww, State of Israel needs to be agreed upon. Te Clinton Parameters provide the w - w w .

T w P , , ,

P .

welve years after the Madrid Peace Conference launched the MiddleE , - delivering speeches about visions of peace, however daring and promisingthese may sound. Tis land of prophets always suffered from an excess of -mentation. All the wheels have already been invented in this peace process.

W , U S, w wk x .

A w Iq, A . Nw clear differences between conditions of the Israeli-Palestinian situation S H , A AS w w , UN S C, I. W Iq, w , A

, A q A w I w P I.


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S C Y S F 89

In a region where the leaders are mostly pro-Western, and the masses-W, w , w,left unchecked, could jeopardize the very survival of the moderate regimes.S w fi A w P . B A w I I-P fl - A M w. P . A q J

I-P S H .

T A Iq w ff M E w, -otic post-war landscape. Peace between Israel and the Palestinians needs to fi .

T A I-P . A

A E k Iq - ff . A - . I w .

S w w w I public. For instance, in a recent poll conducted by the Steinmetz Centre for

P R -A U, 67 I Jw - A ff ff .

If Israelis and Palestinians can be presented with a detailed final status w fl , k w w kw.

Te globalization of efforts in the war against terrorism and in curtail- fl . T z fl .


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ben-ami - so close yet so far - lessons from the i-p peace process

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