belief, truth and knowledge by d. m. armstrong

8/10/2019 Belief, Truth and Knowledge by D. M. Armstrong

1/4

Philosophical Review

Belief, Truth and Knowledge by D. M. ArmstrongReview by: Peter D. KleinThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Apr., 1976), pp. 225-227Published by: Duke University Presson behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183733.

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2/4

BOOK REVIEWS

BELIEF, TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE. By D. M.

ARMSTRONG.

Cambridge,

Cambridge niversityress, 1973. Pp. ix,

228. $9.95.

As the title uggests, rofessorArmstrong's ew book is divided nto hree

sections, he

task

being to develop

a

theory

fbelief, ruth, nd knowledge

compatiblewith,

ut not

mplicative

f or mpliedby, materialist ntology.

Since

much of the material ontained

n

the

first

nd second sections

s an

elaboration

nd

refinement

f earlier

writingsespeciallyA

Materialist

heory

of

Mind

[London, 1969]

and

Materialism,Properties

and

Predicates,

Monist, 6 [1972]), willonlybrieflyummarize ome of theirmore nterest-

ing aspects. t

is

the third ection, Knowledge,

which s novel and requires

a

more extensive

review.

Beliefsare divided nto two classes: beliefs oncerningparticularmatters

of

fact and

general

beliefs-that

is,

beliefs

n an

unrestricted niversally

quantified proposition. Beliefs concerningparticular mattersof fact are

held to be states

nonrelational

properties)

of

a

person

which

are

action

guiding

in

ways

n

which other states re

not (for example merely nter-

tained,

but

not believed, propositions).

General beliefs

re

held

to be

dispo-

sitions,which re themselves species of

states uch

that

f

A

has the

general

belief

x) (If

Fx,

then

Gx)

he is so

disposed

hat,

or ll

x,

fA

believes

that

Fx,

then thisbelief-statewill both create (if necessary)and weakly causally

sustain

within

A's

mind

the

belief

that Gx

is

true

(p. 201).

Very briefly tated, elaborationsof the

account are:

(i) Contradictory eliefs re held to be

twonumerically ifferent elief

states, that s,

Bp

and B-

p) and

it

is

claimed

that

a

person may,

therefore, old contradictoryeliefs;

the distinction etween

Bap

and

Baq)

and

Ba

(p&q)

lies

in

their

different

ausal

powers; degree

of belief

s a

degree

of causal

efficacy

f the belief-state ith

regard

to

conduct;

A and B

believe the same

thingp

f

the

structures f

the belief-states re the same.

(ii) Belief-states re composed of representing lements Ideas); con-

cepts re selective apacities orepresent.

Thus

if

one

has

the belief

that

F is

G

and

F

is

H,

there

re twodistinct

deas of

F,

but

ust

one

concept.

In the second section, Truth, Armstrong olds that t s possible belief-

states or bearers ofpropositions ), nd not the propositions,

which

cor-

respond

or fail

to correspond to reality.

He rejects the view that to each

truth-bearer here mustcorrespond a peculiar correspondent because

thereare

predicates pplicable to things

n

virtue f more

than

one proper-

ty.

As

a

result weput ourselves

n

a position o see that he correspondence

or lack of

correspondence

between

belief-states,hought-episodes

nd

as-

sertions,

n

the one

hand,

and the world

on

the

other,

need not be a

simple

invariable relation (p. 130). An analysis

of the correspondence relation-

ship involving disjunctive,negative, existential, nd universal beliefs is

developed; necessary ruth s postponded

for another occasion.

225

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3/4

BOOK REVIEWS

In

the third section, Knowledge, Armstrongdevelops a

reliability

theoryof knowledge; Kap

if

and

only

if

Bap is reliable. Bap is reliable if

either:

I. It is properlyevidenced by other beliefs,or;

II. There is a lawlikeconnectionbetween the state of affairs

ap and

the stateofaffairs

hatmakes p true, uch thatgivenBap, it

must

be the case thatp(p.

166).

I

is nferential nowledge;

I

is noninferential nowledge.A'sbelief

hatp s

properlyevidenced by

another belief q if and only if:

(i)

A

believes thatp.

(ii)

A

knows that q

(noninferentially).

(iii) A's belief hatqactually unctions

nA's

mindas a conclusive

eason

for

believingp.

(iv)

A

knows the truth f the general principleof his

reasoning (pp.

199-200).

There

are

several

noteworthy eaturesof this account.

(a) There is no explicit truth condition included

because,

given

Armstrong's ccount of

conclusive reasoning

and true

general

principles, uch

a

condition would be redundant

(pp.

198-199).

(b)

Condition

(iv) requires

that

some

general principles

of

reasoning

are knownnon-inferentiallyfa viciousregress s to be avoided (p.

200).

(c)

This

analysis

voids some of the difficultiesnherent

n

other

causal

theories

especially

AlvingGoldman's

A

Causal Theory

of Knowl-

edge, Journal f

Philosophy,4, [1967], 357-372)

since

Armstrong

does not

require

that

f

S knowsthatp, 's belief hatp

be caused

by

the stateofaffairs

eferred o by

p. That

is,

the

analysis

an

easily

account for our

knowledge of universal generalizations.

(d) Many

of

the

Gettier-type ounterexamples to the traditional

three-conditionnalysisof knowledge depend upon ustifiablyn-

ferring

a

proposition

from a

false proposition.

These coun-

terexamples are

ruled out by (ii).

(e) Many

other

felicitous

oincidence ounterexamples

re

also ruled

out

by (iii)

and

(iv).'

(J)

In

spite of (d) and

(e), the proposed analysis s too strong.

It is

Armstrong's ccount

of conclusive reasoning coupled with

his

ac-

count

of true

general

principles

of

reasoning

which create

the difficulties

mentioned n

().

He holds that

'q'

is a conclusivereason forbelievingp f

and

only

if

t is

the

case

that

if

q,

then

p' (p. 97). Reasoning

from

q

to

p

would

be

reasoning

ccording

to

a

true

general principle: x) ifFx,

hen

Gx),

where

q

is an

instance of

Fx and p

an

instance of

Gx

(pp. 199-201).

Now, Armstrong oints

out,

the

if

.

..

then

could

not

simply

e the

1

See my paper,

A

Proposed Definition f

PropositionalKnowledge, Journal

f

Philosophy,

8

(1971), 471-482.

226



4/4

BOOK

REVIEWS

logician's

qDp

(p.

97)

for that

would

obviously

produce a

definition f

knowledge which s

too weak.

He

requires that

to be

conclusive,

n

argu-

ment

mustbe

completely

ruth-preserving

p. 97). That

is

the

reason for

a).

Also rejected as an analysisoftruth-preservings to logician'suse of valid.

Valid

arguments

are

simply

one

species

of

conclusive

arguments.

And

they are

not

more

conclusive' than

other

conclusive

arguments)

p. 97).

Not much

more

is

said

of

conclusive

reasoning;

the

following,

owever,

appears to

be the

case:

if

A

must

possess

conclusive

reasonsforp n

order

to

Kap,

and

that,

n

turn,

requires

thatp

be

evidenced

byq

wherep

and q

are

particular

nstancesof a

true

general

principle

which

is

completely

ruth-

preserving

allowing

no

exceptions),

many

obvious

cases

of

knowledgeare

excluded.

RecallJones' Ford and

the

evidenced

has

for

he

belief

hatJones

does own a Ford:Jonesdrives Ford,garages t, nd has a valid-looking itle

with uch a

Ford

described.

According

to

Armstrong,

e would

not

possess

conclusive

vidence

forhis

belief

because

the

general

principle

If

a

person

drives,

garages and

possesses a

valid-looking itle

o

a

Ford,thenthat

person

owns a

Ford

surely

s

not

completely

ruth-preserving.

ut it

does

appear

thatA

could

know that

Jones owned the

Ford on

the basis

of this

vidence.

In

fact, t

seems

difficult

o

construct

ny chain

of

conclusive

reasoning

in

which

the final

tep is

Jones

owns a

Ford

unless

one

includes

a

set of

propositionswhichentails Jones owns a Ford somewhereearlierin the

chain.

If,

on

the

other

hand,

conclusive

reasoning

need

not be

completely

truth-preserving-that

s,

it

could

allow a

few

exceptions-many

of the

counterexamples

o

earlier

proposed

analyses

of

knowledge

will

re-emerge.

That

is,

allowp

and

q to be

true, nd

allowA's

reasoning

based on

the

general

principle to be

conclusive in

this

weakened

sense),

but let

p

be true

not

because

q

is

true

in this

particular

ase),

but

because of

some other fact.A

knows

hatJones

oes

drive,

garage,

and

have a

valid-looking itle o

a

Ford,

and Jones does own one, not thatFord, but some otherFord, All of the

proposed

weakened

conditions

of

knowledge

would

be

fulfilled,

yet

A

would

not

know

that

Jones

owns a

Ford

because all

of his

evidence con-

cerned a

Ford

other than

the

one which

he

does,

in

fact,

own.

What

has

gone

wrong?

I

suggest

that

properly evidenced

cannot

be

understood

either

n

terms

f

conclusive

easons n

the

strong

ense,

or

a

weaker

sense,

but

rathermust

be

explained

in

terms

f the

relative

trength

of

the

evidence

possessed

by

A

compared with

the

total set

of

relevant

evidence.

Most

of our

reasoningaboutempiricalmatters snot completely

truth-preserving

nd

is n

principle

efeasible,-but

n

those

cases

in

which

t

is

nfect

ndefeasible,

we

possess

nferential

nowledge.

The

task

s to

depict

adequately

the

required

subset

of

the total

relevant

evidence.

PETER D.

KLEIN

Livingston

ollege,

Rutgers

University

227


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