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USAWC PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH
THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT:AN
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
By
LTC FRED L. HART JR.
Professor Doug JohnsonProject Advisor
The views expressed in this paper are those Of the author and do not necessarily reflect The views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.
U.S. Army War CollegeCARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT
Author: Fred L. Hart Jr. (LTC) USA
TITLE: The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account
FORMAT: Personal Experience Monograph
DATE: 1 May 1998 PAGES:56 CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
This personal experience monograph (PEM) is based on the author's personal experience, first hand knowledge, and witnessing of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Assigned to Kuwait as an advisor to the Kuwaiti Land Forces on 1 August 1989, the author was involved in the events leading up, during, and after the invasion by Iraqi forces. This PEM provides an historical account of the experiences and actions taken by the United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK), which was based out the American Embassy Kuwait. It also documents our beleaguered status in Kuwait and Baghdad, Iraq, from August 1990 to 10 December 1990. The photograph of Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 on the title page was taken from Chief Dave Forties apartment which was located along Gulf Road in Kuwait City, Kuwait, note the date on the photograph: Aug 4 1990.
1
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This purpose of this Personal Experience Monograph (PEM) is to provide an account of events leading up to the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent ordeal that eleven military members and their families endured from 2 August 1990 to 10 December 1990. The account is based on my personal experience, notes, and diary that I maintained through the crisis. I want to acknowledge all the members of the United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK). They displayed the highest degree of courage, ingenuity, initiative, and dedication to duty. In my opinion USLOK was a major factor in the ability of U.S. embassies in Kuwait and Iraq to function smoothly and remain capable of executing their diplomatic mission throughout the crisis. I want to recognize Chief Warrant Officer 4 Dave Forties for his skill and courage in operating on the streets, alleyways and back roads of Kuwait and Baghdad searching for foodstocks. Chief Forties more than any other coordinated, procured, and arranged for all the foodstocks that allowed Ambassador Nathaniel Howell and his staff the capability to thwart the Iraqi siege on the embassy compound. He repeated this performance while detained in Baghdad. His cunning, initiative, and ingenuity ensured both embassy compounds had ample foodstocks in order to sustain themselves during the entire crisis. I would like to thank the members of the Individual Terrorist Awareness Course (INTAC) at Ft. Bragg, NC for their outstanding instruction that contributed significantly to my ability to deal with the hostage situation my family and I found ourselves in. The USLOK organization received two meritorious unit citations; one Army and one Joint for performance during the invasion and while detained in Kuwait and Iraq. This account will endeavor to tell the USLOK story and shed new insights on the events that occurred in Kuwait and Baghdad.
2
BACKGROUNDOn 1 August 1989, my family and I arrived in Kuwait City. It
was over 104 degrees outside at 2100hrs. Leaving the modern air-
conditioned international terminal and walking outside was
literally like walking into a blast furnace. I had arrived to
begin serving a two year accompanied tour. My job was to be an
advisor (logistics, maintenance, and training) to the Kuwait Land
Forces and manage foreign military sales (FMS) cases.
I was assigned to a joint organization called United States
Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK) which was based out of the U.S.
Embassy in Kuwait City. I worked Sunday through Thursday from an
office at the Kuwait Land Forces, Director of Technical Affairs.
Technical Affairs was essentially the Supply and Maintenance
Directorate for the Kuwait Army. Our joint office at the embassy
provided central management for all FMS cases, and International
Military Education and Training (IMET). The total organization
consisted of approximately 22 personnel, Army, Air Force, Navy,
Marine Corps, and a few DoD civilians. The Army members made up a
technical assistance field team (TAFT), and our Chief of USLOK
was an Army O-6.
The entire organization worked for U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) based at MacDill AFB, FL. The Chief was part of the
embassy Country Team and worked for both CENTCOM and Ambassador
Nathaniel Howell. The USLOK office interfaced almost daily with
the CENTCOM J4/7 on matters concerning our mission of providing
security assistance and FMS management to the Government of
Kuwait.
The U.S. Army’s security assistance program was focused on
logistical support to the Kuwaiti Land Forces through several FMS
3
cases, mainly for support of U.S. purchased equipment. We also
worked several active International Military Education Training
(IMET) cases. These programs were small in comparison to Saudi
Arabia, primarily because Kuwait maintained only three active
brigades, a small Air Force, and Navy. The Kuwaiti’s were
comfortable with this small force and felt they had no real cause
to have a large or modernized Armed Forces. Many of us had often
heard from Kuwaiti Army officers that the ruling family (Sabahs)
realized that a small poorly trained and equipped force was less
of a threat. Land Force officers also felt that the Air Force got
more defense dollars because you can’t occupy a palace with a
fighter jet. I speculate that there might have been some truth in
all this. The Kuwait Army also had a manpower problem and no true
Kuwaiti would ever be a NCO or worst yet an enlisted man. Without
exception all officers were genuine Kuwaiti’s and almost all
Colonels and above had ties to the royal family or members of
prominent families. The Warrant officer and Non Commissioned
Officer corps was non-full citizen Kuwaiti's or Bedouins.1
Enlisted personnel were a mixed bag of Bedouins, and third world
nationals. Interesting to note that many in the NCOs and enlisted
ranks were also of Iraqi origin and assisted the Iraqi Army as it
invaded Kuwait.
Prior to 2 August 1990, Kuwait was an obscure oil rich Gulf-
Arab state about the size of New Jersey. They were uncomfortably
sandwiched between Iraq and Iran. Prior to the Iraqi invasion,
most Americans had only a passing knowledge of Kuwait. Perhaps
their only frame of reference was in regards to the reflagging of
Kuwaiti Tankers under the US operation called “Earnest Will”
(1987-1988) during the Iran/Iraq War (1980-1988). Once that ended
both Kuwait and the U.S. had little interest in binding political
relationships with each other. Unfolding events in the former
4
Soviet Union and the former Warsaw pact was overshadowing most
events occurring in the region (1989). After all, the Iran/Iraq
war had ended and the region was ready for peace.
Our observations in the region indicated in early 1990 that
storm clouds were gathering, but most in DoD and State Department
had little interest in the ensuing inter-Arab dispute between
Kuwait and Iraq. Even the CENTCOM J-2 threat update was focused
on Iran as the major regional threat. The embassy was focused on
monitoring the Russians in country and the extent of their
military programs with Kuwait. There was interest in the internal
Kuwaiti problems regarding a popular move to bring back the
National Assembly. The Amir had dissolved the assembly a few
years earlier when too much dissension was occurring. However, on
the surface everything appeared to be peaceful.
Prior to the Gulf War, Kuwaiti Armed Forces were generally
equipped and trained by the British. This was due to the long
historical ties between Kuwait and the British. By the late
eighties, the Kuwaitis had begun a modest program to upgrade
their three Land Force brigades. The United States and western
European nations had lost out when the Kuwaiti's decided, in
early 1988, to buy Russian BMP IIs and Yugoslavian M-84s, (T-72
variant). This was attributed to the inexpensive deals both
countries were offering in comparison to buying the more
expensive and sophisticated U.S. and Western European armaments.
Kuwait also had a tendency to engage several countries for arms
deals, their way of spreading the wealth around. Their Army
consisted of equipment from the U.S., Great Britain, France,
Russia, Yugoslavia, and many others. It was a strategy to
maintain friendship ties with many and show no favoritism towards
one particular country2. The result for their military was an
absolute nightmare for interoperability. The Kuwait Government
5
also required that U.S. military personnel wear no uniforms or
openly acknowledge their presence, an arrangement that would pay
dividends for us during the Iraqi invasion.
In the months proceeding the invasion, USLOK team members began
monitoring the situation between Kuwait and Iraq. While working
out in the field with the various units and at the Land Forces
Headquarters, we began getting indicators as early as March 1990
that the relationship Kuwait shared with its neighbor to the
north (Iraq) was taking a turn for the worst. However, in most
diplomatic and military circles, it was felt that it was nothing
more than bellicose chest pounding and posturing by Saddam
Hussein. Many in the diplomatic circles felt the problem would
eventually go away by the Kuwaiti's throwing millions of dollars
at the disgruntled Iraqi leader, who had bankrupted his country
after eight years of war with the Iranians and had nothing to
show for it. At our Headquarters, CENTCOM J-2 and J-3 remained
focused on Iran, and felt Iraq was too disorganized after the war
with Iran to pose any near term threat in the region. Iranian
radical fundamentalism and support of terrorism was believed to
be far more threatening to the region. The Iran/Iraq war had cost
Saddam Hussein dearly and he felt he had done the Gulf oil
sheikdoms a favor by fighting the Iranians and stopping the
spread radical Shia Islam.3 In hindsight, it’s easy to see that
the war did nothing to improve Iraqi operational military
prowess. His country was broke, his oil production was too low to
get the economy back on its feet, and the Iraqi people had
suffered tremendously.
In early 1990, the Arab League held a summit in Baghdad and
Saddam initiated his political attacks against Kuwait and to a
lesser degree on other Gulf nations. Kuwait specifically was
accused of waging economic war against Iraq and slant drilling to
6
steal oil from Iraqi fields along the border. When the summit
ended most Arab nations felt Kuwait and Iraq would reach some
type of monetary settlement. However, the problems continued to
fester in the coming months as Iraq stepped up its propaganda war
and launched significant personal attacks on the Kuwaitis and the
ruling family.
By early June 1990, several senior Kuwaiti officers told us of
the outlandish propaganda broadcast from Baghdad. They were
extremely concerned and agitated because the language used in the
broadcast was Arabic that one only uses when compromise is
unattainable and the only recourse is to fight. They openly
acknowledged that they were unprepared for any confrontation and
the Kuwait government seemed to be unwilling to take any
preparatory actions. Many also informed us that the Iraqi Army
was conducting an unusually high number of exercises in southern
Iraq. In mid-July 1990, the Kuwaiti military went on their first
and only alert status, but after one week and evidence of Iraqi
troop movements became clearer, the Kuwaiti's quickly called off
their haphazard alert for fear of provoking Saddam Hussein. On a
regional level President Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) and King Hussein
(Jordan) attempted to persuade Iraq to at least meet with the
Kuwaitis to discuss their problems. Both heads of state received
assurances from Iraq that a peaceful solution could be found. At
our embassy, there was interest in monitoring the situation, but
with President Mubarak, and King Hussein's assurances most felt
the problem would be settled, and Kuwait would reach a monetary
settlement with Iraq. The Kuwaitis genuinely felt they had a
chance to reach an agreement, but were bound and determine not to
give up territory or completely forgive the war debt Saddam owed
them. That essentially sealed their fate and made the meeting in
Jeddah an Iraqi ploy to demonstrate they had left no stone
7
unturned in trying to settle a dispute in a Arab brotherly
fashion. Also, now known, was the fact that the U.S. Ambassador
to Iraq, April Glaspie had met with Saddam in mid-July and
essentially conveyed to him that the U.S. had no interest in his
dispute with Kuwait and no defense treaties. Department of State
(DOS) also conveyed this same message just weeks before the
invasion in congressional testimony.
Once it was realized that a compromise would not be reached,
and the Iraqi leader's demands were unyielding, (this timeframe
was the week prior to the invasion), Kuwaiti's began talking of
the Iraqi's seizing the contested northern (Rumaylla) oilfields
and the two tiny islands (Warba/Bubiyan) near the mouth of the
Shatt al Arab, entrance way into the Arabian Gulf. There had been
a historical precedent for this during a 1961 Kuwait/Iraq border
dispute that was quickly resolved when the British committed a
small force to stymie the Iraqi incursion. Now the situation was
different, Iraq at last had a sizable force, and Kuwait no longer
had any western defense pacts or treaties. In fact, the one
defense treaty that Kuwait participated in was the GCC (Gulf
Cooperation Council). However, the GCC would take virtually no
action to dissuade Saddam from his intentions. The purpose of the
GCC was to protect one another from precisely happening before
their very eyes. The United Arab Emirates acted on their own and
requested United States assistance’s in late July 1990 when
Saddam began including the U.A.E. in his threats. Nevertheless,
the GCC proved to be virtually paralyzed, unwilling, and unable
to deal with Saddam. During the weeks proceeding the invasion,
the GCC did not even meet in session. Even the Peninsular Shield
force, a GCC reaction force of roughly brigade size, was not
utilized or alerted during the entire crisis. The value of the
GCC as a defense pact proved to be worthless.
8
We watched knowing that something would happen and hoping
Kuwait would pay off Saddam Hussein. A week before the invasion a
former Kuwaiti officer and friend who worked at a Kuwaiti bank
informed me that the Kuwait government had to put a stop on all
overseas electronic fund transfers. The problem was as the crisis
unfolded; many Kuwaitis began transferring all their accounts to
banks in the U.S. and Great Britain out of fear of an Iraq
invasion. In addition, by the last week of July, all
international and regional domestic flights were sold out. The
panic within the populace had begun, but the government would not
acknowledge there was a growing problem. At our last official
embassy country team meeting, 29 July 1990, we were all cautioned
to stay close to home and insure our Motorola radios were working
properly. Our state department diplomats also assured us that
they would see to our hasty evacuation well before any
hostilities started. Our Chief had suggested that the women and
children go on to Saudi Arabia as a precaution, but the
Ambassador ruled that out, stating he felt the Kuwaiti’s would
resolve the problem at the Jeddah meeting scheduled for 1 August
1990. Before the meeting adjourned the Ambassador assured
everyone that this was typical Arab bluff and talk, he really
doubted the Iraqis would invade Kuwait.
CW4 Dave Forties and I managed to conducted one last check of
each Kuwaiti brigade the week preceding the invasion and found
them in their normal summertime routine (majority of the
leadership on summer leave) and little to no activity. In fact,
it was difficult to find anyone above the rank of major around.4
Since the stand down from alert status in mid July all units had
authorized personnel to continue with their normal summer leave
program.
9
Now the stage was set. By the last week of July 1990, the
Iraqi's had placed their lead Republican Guard division along
Kuwait's northern frontier. Forties and I made our last trip to
the Land Forces Sixth brigade on 28 July 1990. The brigade
officers that were present reported that Iraqi formations were
within sight of the border. We were being told that well over
100,000 troops had massed in the southern region of Iraq and were
within minutes of the border.5 Still the Kuwait government was
unwilling to request U.S. Assistance and the U.S. had already
sent signals in late July 90 that we had no defense agreements
with Kuwait.
The bottomline was if Kuwait wanted assistance, they would have
to ask for it. CENTCOM did dispatch a courier with satellite
Intel photos to provide the Ambassador and the Kuwait government
with further proof that the Iraqi forces posed along their border
were ready to strike, noting the only missing piece of the puzzle
was that Iraqi Artillery had not been brought forward. The
Kuwaitis reviewed the data but made no commitment or request for
assistance.
INVASION Now Kuwait was completely on her own and a meeting was
scheduled with the Iraqis in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 31 July
1990. The evening of 1 August, we all watched the local English
news broadcast which showed the Kuwaiti Crown Prince return from
Jeddah with the news that Iraq walked out of the talks when
Kuwait was unwilling to meet Saddam Hussein's demands. The
Kuwaitis were hopeful that another meeting would be scheduled.
The Kuwaiti newspaper delivered to our villa 2 August had this
headline: Jeddah Talks end…more needed - US concerned but hopeful
of efforts to defuse crisis through diplomacy. 6
10
We all knew that this was the turning point and short of a
miracle the Iraqi hordes would invade, an as a minimum capture
the northern oil fields, Warba and Bubiyan island.
By 2300 hours 1 August 1990, the Chief of USLOK Col. John
Mooneyham began receiving telephonic reports from U.S.
Westinghouse technicians manning a radar observation balloon
position just north of Mutla ridge. Their reports were very
pointed in that they described the radar paint as a mass armor
formation resembling an iron pipe several kilometers long and
rolling down hill. They were advised to cut the tether and move
out smartly. By 0100, 2 August 1990 the Iraqi formation was
rapidly moving south along the Abdaly highway totally unopposed.
I went up to the roof of our villa around 0030hrs and could see a
few flares on the northern horizon, but heard no distant sounds
of artillery. The royal families had received their advance
notification and were executing their plans for a hasty
departure. The sad note here is the fact that the ruling family
and top officials in the ministries never bothered to send out
any kind of notification or instructions to the armed forces. To
make matters worst, 2 August was on the Islamic equivalent of the
New Year and one the hottest days of the year. So most good
Kuwaitis that were still around during the sweltering heat of
August had no plans of going to work. By 0500hrs, 2 August the
Iraqi formation was on the outskirts of Doha and word had spread
quickly of the invasion. The Amir and his entourage were well on
their way to Saudi Arabia. A few officers from the western
brigade, 35th Bde about 10-15 kms from Ali Salem air base managed
to get a battalion (+/-) out the gate and headed towards Jahra.
From the vicinity of Jahra, Kuwaiti 35th Bde led by Col. Salem Al
Srour led his units in a futile delaying action along Jahra road
to just outside the gates of the Kuwait Armed Forces
11
Headquarters, some 10 kms.7 His assembled battalion of old
British Chieftain tanks, engaged the Iraqis for several hours
until out of ammunition, and almost encircled. The Kuwaiti Air
Force did not fare much better, but they did manage to launch A-4
sorties out of Al Jaber Airbase. Once the airfield became
untenable, they generated sorties from the roadway near the
airbase. They too were eventually overwhelmed by the Iraqi
juggernaut and flew to Saudi Arabia.
Much has been said about the performance of the Kuwait
military. One thing is certain, the Kuwait government failed to
alert the military or take any preparatory actions. The
government instead chose to accept the fact that their tiny Armed
Forces were no match for the Iraqi Republican Guards. Instead,
they believed a diplomatic solution would be found and their
friends and allies would come quickly to their aid. They were
wrong about the diplomatic solution and unprepared to realize
that help would take many months of coalition building and
diplomatic wrangling.
1 Kuwaiti citizenship was based on a family's lineage; full citizenship was based on ancestry prior to Kuwait's independence. All others received citizenship in varying degrees. Bedouins or stateless nomadic peoples had the lowest form of citizenship and state sponsored amenities.
2 The Arabs have a saying,"Enemy of my enemy is my friend", and we often thought this drove much of their diplomacy.
3 All the oil rich Gulf states had growing minority Shiite populations that were influenced by radical Shia Fundamentalism which was often linked to Iran.
4 August is normally the hottest month of the year and the traditional vacation time for Kuwaitis, something the Iraqis were well attuned to.
5 Embassy and CENTCOM message traffic the week prior to the invasion provided estimates of the Iraqi troop build-up along the border area.
6 Arab Times (Kuwait City), 2-3 August 19907 Reuters news service, 12 January 1995, interview with Col.
Srour
12
By 0500hrs we had all been notified telephonically or awakened
by low flying fighter bombers and the distinct sound of artillery
fire. At 0515hrs I went outside and immediately recognized the
smell of cordite in the air and could hear the sounds of war
getting closer. Looking to the southwest from my two-story villa
rooftop, I could see Kuwait international airport 5-7kms away
under bombardment by Iraqi fighter bombers. Strangely enough, the
main highway just to the rear of my quarters appeared normal,
complete with Kuwaiti bus service still operating. Now the whole
family was up and LTC Tom Funk had telephoned us and confirmed
our worst fears, Iraq had invaded. We closed all the curtains and
our maid came into our villa. I told my wife and children to
remain downstairs close to center of the villa near a interior
storage room for safety in the event of shelling, which was
growing louder and closer as each hour went by. LTC Funk had
informed me that he had been in touch with the embassy and they
were instructing all of us to remain put in our quarters and
monitor the embassy radio net. I could tell by monitoring my
radio that the embassy was in total panic and it was not the
place to be. At 0600hrs I called CW4 Dave Forties, to check out
his status, he informed me that the lead elements of the
Republican Guard invasion force were already streaming down the
Gulf road highway in direct view from his quarters along Gulf
road. CW4 Forties also told me his neighbors (foreigners) had
remarked to him they were really impressed how quickly the
Kuwaitis had mobilized, so he had to convince them that the
forces they were seeing were not Kuwaiti, but Iraqis.8 They
8 Kuwait had an extremely large expatriate work population; several hundred thousand would attempt to flee during the first week of the invasion. Unfortunately most were turned back at the Iraq and Saudi borders because their passports were retain by their Kuwaiti sponsors. This became a problematic for many Americans who were in Kuwait on work visas.
13
quickly gathered their belongings and took off for the border to
Saudi.
We also considered loading up the families and making a dash
for the border. However, after checking with LTC Funk and
monitoring COL Mooneyham's request to the embassy for us to
convoy out, we learned that the Ambassador had denied his
request. Since all the military and their families held
diplomatic passports, the Ambassador informed COL Mooneyham that
we had to follow his orders. This became an area of contention
throughout the crisis. We went ahead and made plans and began pre
packing necessities and foodstuffs, just in case the order was
reversed and we were allowed to leave. In hindsight, we all know
now that the border along Kuwait/Saudi remained porous until 11
August and we probably could have made it out. On the morning of
12 August, the Iraqis sealed the border. They also shot and kill
a British citizen attempting to cross that day. The embassy's
decision was final and we followed the Ambassadors orders.
Apparently, when the Iraqi armor/mechanized forces made it to
Kuwait City, they decided to push their tanks and tracked
vehicles through the city, only to become bogged down and often
lost. This operational error of not bypassing Kuwait city
permitted the bulk of the Kuwaiti 15th Bde, located south of the
city near the Al Ahmadi oil fields to escape to Saudi Arabia. It
also bought time for the southern air base Ahmed al Jaber to
partially mobilize and actually launch sorties throughout the
day. By nightfall, all organized Kuwaiti military resistance had
come almost to a stand still.
Throughout the first day of the invasion, we stayed in
telephonic contact with each other. CW4 Dave Forties and I spoke
with disillusioned, confused and frustrated Kuwaiti officers who
were calling our homes and requesting help, advice and
14
assistance. There wasn't much we could tell them, other than
destroy what they could, and get the hell out there. Even the
remnants of the Kuwait government contacted the US Embassy in the
early hours of the invasion and finally requested U.S. help; by
then it was far too late.
There was no doubt the pre dawn invasion of 2 August 1990 had
been calculated and coordinated well in advance. Nevertheless, by
no means was it a precision operation as suggested by some
analyst, Iraqi forces did have the advantage of surprise, only
because the Kuwait Government chose to ignore all the indicators.
From our perspective, it appeared as though they took the high-
speed avenue of approach, namely the Abdaly highway and rapidly
advanced south, completely bypassing and cutting off the northern
Kuwait 6th Brigade. Meeting only light resistance from the few
sparse elements of the Kuwait 35th Brigade and the Commando unit
located near Doha, they pressed the attack into Kuwait City only
to become bogged down. We figured they were in downtown Kuwait
City at approximately 0600hrs. They quickly became entangled for
several hours, before pushing south and consolidating their hold
on Kuwait. This gave the Kuwait airbases time to launch aircraft
and the southern 15th Brigade time to head for the Saudi border.
It is our belief that the perceived threat to Saudi Arabia was
largely due to Iraqi forces pursuing fleeing Kuwait army elements
into the neutral zone. We are lucky that Saddam Hussein and his
generals never realized the fact that the Saudi western province
was virtually defenseless. It would have been easy for him to
press the attack right into Dhahran since the Saudi Army only
lightly defended the area. Although he had probably reached his
culminating point at the Kuwait/Saudi border, several other facts
became apparent that indicated the lack of coordination required
to conduct an operation on this scale. First, radio and
15
television remained operational until late evening 2 August.
Telephone communications, to include international calling also
remained operational and was never totally brought under Iraqi
control until late August. I placed several phone calls home on 2
August and received several international calls. Operationally,
attacks on the Amir's Bayan palace, Kuwaiti airfields, and other
key installations appeared to be uncoordinated and haphazard. We
were to find out later while detained in Baghdad that the
operation to seize the Amir of Kuwait had failed because Iraqi
planners failed to coordinate the one hour time difference
between Kuwait City and Baghdad, resulting in an uncoordinated
attack by Iraqi Special Forces units and Republican Guard ground
forces.
LTC Funk, Chief Forties, and I collectively had enough military
experience to make some observations of the vaunted Republican
Guard during the first week of the invasion. They by no means
reflected the discipline of a well-trained combat hardened army;
in fact during the first week they reflected the characteristics
of a motley force without orders and a total lack of basic
tactical tenants and discipline. For the most part Iraqi soldiers
milled around, scavenged for food and water, and seemed to be
generally at a loss for what to do next, often looting and
stealing bedding items for their hastily constructed fighting
position, complete with beach umbrellas for overhead protection
from the searing summer sun. Without a doubt, Saddam forces had
reached their logistics culminating point and his units would
have to live off the land. Fuel was not a problem, but food and
water would be scavenged from the locals. Within days of the
invasion, Iraqi forces occupied all the major supermarkets in
order to procure foodstocks. Kuwaitis where permitted entry, but
16
for males this could mean being taken into custody. This was
often true for westerners.
The first day of the invasion 2 August, our neighborhood
remained quiet until around 1300hrs when the Iraqis launched
their final assault on the Bayan palace just a few kilometers
from our quarters. Their artillery was positioned along Gulf road
and was now firing directly over our neighborhood. The Amiri
Guards at the Bayan palace put up a fight all morning. Their
return fire often landed in and around our neighborhood resulting
in many of our Kuwaiti neighbors fleeing the area. By 1400hrs,
Bayan Palace was captured, and I could see from my rooftop that
Iraqi armored forces had occupied the palace grounds. I spoke by
phone to COL Mooneyham several times while the assault on the
Palace was taking place. He had moved his family to the nearby
Japanese embassy to ensure their safehaven since his neighborhood
was being overrun with Iraqi forces. He was also instructed to go
to the Japanese embassy, but chose to remain in his quarters to
continue assisting other U.S. citizens via the telephone.
The day now seemed to creep by and we stayed glued to the radio
trying to listen to BBC and VOA. Both were broadcasting all the
Iraqi propaganda about turning Kuwait into a mass graveyard if
anyone intervened.
Meanwhile things at the embassy seemed to settle down a little,
but still an eerie tension was felt over the airwaves when
communicating or listening to the embassy. Everyone on the
outside began telephone networking with other Americans, trying
to calm fears, pass along factual information and compile
listings of Americans who were present in Kuwait.9
By the end of the day things began to quite down, but from my
rooftop I could observe that many of the Kuwaiti governmental
buildings were burning or smoldering. The highway (Fahaheel
17
expressway) was littered with wrecked or shot up cars. Occasional
gunfire could be heard and Iraqi mounted patrols were now
enforcing dusk to dawn curfew that had been broadcast both on
radio and television. The first TV broadcast the Iraqis began to
run was that the invasion was the result of a Kuwaiti coup that
had overthrown the ruling family for being corrupt and the new
government had requested the assistance of the Iraqi government.
Needless to say, the story did not wash.
By late afternoon, many Kuwait officers whom I had worked with
were still calling and asking for help. They were desperate and
at the national level, no command and control structure existed
any longer. Their hope was for members of USLOK to arrange for
U.S. military support. The Kuwait Land Force were by now gone or
nonfunctional as a coherent organization. If any resistance was
to be forthcoming, it was going to depend solely on individual
actions and initiatives.
The Iraqis slowly tighten their grip and continued the
propaganda campaign. As stated earlier, Chief Forties and LTC
Funk lived along Gulf road just south of the embassy and were
able to monitor the flow of troops and equipment as they headed
out of Kuwait City. On the third day of the invasion, Chief
Forties ventured out to the local Sultan center (a large western
style supermarket) which had been taken over by Iraqi soldiers.
He had heard from neighbors that the Iraqis were still allowing
controlled civilian access. The shoppers were in pandemonium and
staples were going fast. Chief returned to his quarters without
9 The US embassy maintained a Warden roster, similar to a military Non combatant evacuation (NEO) plan and had conducted a meeting with some of the Wardens the week prior to the invasion. Unfortunately in the rush to shred documents during the invasion the emergency evacuation plan was destroyed. In addition, the loss of the embassy phone lines by late evening 2 August complicated the situation.
18
incident but saw that the Iraqis were establishing check points
at all major road junctions. By this time the Kuwaitis and
westerners were all in a state of shock after seeing the country
fall so quickly and the international community at a stand off
with Saddam Hussein.
The embassy finally started responding to our radio calls. We
initiated procedures for daily call in checks and monitoring
windows. Through our monitoring of the embassy net we learned
that the Iraqi's had started systemic round up of westerners from
the major hotels and complexes that housed westerners. We also
learned that our British military counterparts had been rounded
up, specifically the ones that lived on a compound south of the
city near Fahaheel along the coast. Their senior officers
immediately went into hiding with Kuwaitis and managed to stay
hidden for four months. Two British Officers were seized by Iraqi
Secret Police; both were severely beaten, tortured, and interned
for several months. With this news, our situation, also being
military, became even more complicated. We all took measures to
hide our identities by destroying our identification cards,
military clothing, papers, or anything else that may link us to
the U.S. military. We felt we could rely on our diplomatic
passports and status to preclude us from arrest. This worked
initially because of several measures implemented for all
military personnel being assigned to high threat areas. We wore
civilian clothes on a daily basis, relaxed grooming standards and
we all lived scattered throughout Kuwait City (not lumped
together on a compound), and we were all assigned with diplomatic
passports and status. We also had a back-up means of
communications (portable radios) with the embassy. All this
contributed to our safety and the Iraqis inability to locate and
apprehended us.
19
My contact with a former Kuwaiti officer was a great help in
determining what was going on in and around the city. He would
come by our quarter's everyday bringing milk and diapers for our
children. Then he would tell me of the efforts underway within
Kuwaiti resistance. They had already begun to organize resistance
groups within neighborhoods. By 4 August, the Resistance had
started taking down street signs and house numbers to further
confuse the Iraqi special units that were canvassing
neighborhoods for westerners, high-ranking Kuwaiti officials, and
military officers. The Kuwaiti resistance groups were first
organized by groups of Shiite Kuwaitis. Since these Shiites
already had a somewhat underground bond and the Iraqis had
inadvertently freed the leading Shiite radicals from Kuwaiti
prison, they naturally banded together and immediately began
resisting the Iraqi invaders. The movement quickly caught on and
by mid-August, the Kuwaiti resistance was doing daily damage to
the Iraqi war machine. An interesting side note to this was the
fact that when the Iraqis deployed around the city, they were in
a perimeter facing outward toward the sea as if to thwart an
amphibious attack. However, after the resistance began their
drive by shooting and fire bombing campaign on the positions
facing outward, the Iraqis quickly reversed all the position so
that they now were facing inward towards the city with their
backs to the sea for self-protection.
By 5 August, we all realized we were stuck and no political
solution was going to change the current situation anytime soon.
Saddam Hussein was employing all the classic bluffs we have
become all too familiar with, and the world community was taken
in by the Iraqi smoke screen.
Telephone lines were either out or being monitored by the
Iraqis, so communications were becoming much more difficult and
20
risky. The U.S. embassy established a radio net by providing the
other embassies around town with spare radios it had on hand.
These established a somewhat secure means to exchange information
on the situation around town and maintain contact with us.
The flow of refugees and westerners to Saudi Arabia, either
through the border crossing or across the desert had all but
ceased by 11 August. The Iraqis began sealing the border,
trapping those who had not taken advantage of the early confusion
following the invasion. All embassies, Voice of America and BBC
radio broadcast were now advising all western nationals to stay
put in their homes. We all knew now that we were in for the long
haul. Being part of a military organization gave us the edge in
dealing with this situation; even our family members seemed
better prepared to deal the uncertainty and fear. They had now
experienced the horrors of war first hand, and had their baptism
of fire. I guess we all knew from tours in places like Germany
and Korea that war was a distinct possibility and you always had
that hidden thought process on what to do if the proverbial
balloon went up. Our challenge now was to help calm the fears of
the many American civilians we were now communicating with.
The USLOK organization kept a tight telephone network going
during that first week, but our contacts with each other dwindled
when the embassy staff ordered several of our members into the
Japanese embassy for safehaven. Our Chief of USLOK was ordered
there also but refused to go, opting to send his family, while he
remained home to continue the network with the trapped U.S.
citizens. Most of the embassy staff lived in close proximity to
the embassy and therefore the majority of the staff and their
families had relocated into the embassy compound for safehaven by
3 August. In addition, on 3 August we monitored via VOA radio
broadcast that Saddam Hussein had declared he would make the
21
Arabian Gulf "a graveyard for all those who think of committing
aggression, starting with these cowardly American navies." The
broadcast also applauded the "glorious national uprising in
Kuwait." I also noted in my diary a broadcast from 5 August
"Provisional Government of Kuwait warns outside countries to
remember that they have interest and nationals in Kuwait and if
they resort to punitive measures their nationals would suffer
gravely." This type of radio broadcast became particularly
troublesome for all the foreign nationals trapped in Kuwait. LTC
Tom Funk and I would spend many hours conversing with American
citizens on the phone trying to calm their fears and reassure
them that the U.S. would eventually come to our aid.
As word continued to spread of Iraqi soldiers looting and
rounding up westerners, we continued our escape planning and
actions should Iraqi officials show up at our door. A real morale
booster occurred when we heard on the short wave radio that the
Saudis had asked for U.S. help and an USAF Fighter Squadron and
the 82nd Airborne were now on the way.
Meanwhile we heard on Iraqi radio that Saddam had told the
U.S.Charge' in Baghdad that the occupation of Kuwait is
irreversible. Then we hear of UN Security Council Resolution 661
imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. This becomes
the "tic for tat" diplomacy that evolves in the upcoming months.
Usually good news followed by more bad news.
BELEAGUEREDNow the U.S. and British embassies were reporting over the
radio net that westerners were being rounded up and transported
to Baghdad, Iraq. Ambassador Howell made the decision for all of
us to prepare to relocate into the U.S. embassy compound for
diplomatic safehaven. On the evening of 6 August, LTC Funk
22
telephoned about how to handle breaking off the telephone network
with the U.S. citizens who have come to depend on us for
information and guidance. One US citizen whom I had been working
with decided to come to my villa, obtain one of the spare
Motorola radios I had so he could monitor the embassy, and keep
his American network informed. Once he arrives the next morning 7
August, I told him how to use the radio and briefed him on some
possible escape routes. LTC Funk also coordinates for another
citizen to send an itemized list of Americans over to me since
the family and I will be heading into the embassy ahead of him. I
had received a radio transmission the evening of 6 August and was
told to prepare to relocate into the embassy, and to bring all
the foodstuffs we could get into the car. My family and I
prepared for the potentially hazardous trip into the embassy,
which was some 12 kms from our quarters, right through downtown
Kuwait. We all knew there would be Iraqi roadblocks to traverse
and the embassy was encircled by Iraqi troops. We had also
monitored over the radio several other families drive into the
embassy and so far, they had all made it without incident. When
early morning 7 August came we received no instructions to leave,
so we continued our routine of inventorying our property. We
would only be allowed two pieces of luggage, so we had to decide
what we could carry out and what had to be left behind. This was
a difficult task and still impacts our lives today. We also heard
from VOA that Saddam vows to "pluck out the eyes" of anyone who
attacks Iraq, he went on to argue that the invasion was designed
to correct the flawed borders drawn by imperialist powers.
At approximately 1130hrs a civilian man, westerner in
appearance showed up at our villa gate, announced he is from the
U.S. Embassy, and had come to escort us in. I had been assigned
at the embassy for a year and I knew all the personnel assigned
23
to the post, and I did not recognize this individual. I
immediately radioed the embassy and they verified his identity. I
then recognized the foreign national driver who was with him, so
once we got that straighten out I called CW3 Gene Lord, a close
neighbor to coordinate a link-up with him and his family so that
we all could convoy in together. The USLOK administrative NCO,
who was a neighbor of ours, also joined in the trek into the
embassy. We began our journey into the embassy with great
trepidation of what was waiting for us. Our plan was to use the
foodstuffs, cigarettes, and alcohol as bribes to get through the
roadblock. I had also taken the precaution to hide the American
citizen listing that had been brought to me. The list contained
over 500 names and addresses of U.S. citizens living and working
in Kuwait. As we pulled out of the Salwa neighborhood, my wife
and children were shocked at the destruction that was so close to
our house, now they could understand all the shelling, booming
and rattling of windows for two days and most importantly why
they had to remain away from windows. As we rode in, almost every
official Kuwait government building along the route had been
shelled, torched, or destroyed. Wrecked and smoldering vehicles
littered the highway some with the charred remains present. The
once well manicured and green medians were now brown, dried up
and trashed. As we came to First ring road Iraqi soldiers and
tracked vehicles formed a checkpoint but our lead vehicle, with
the Palestinian foreign national who worked for the embassy,
spoke with what appeared to be an Iraqi officer. After the brief
stop and exchange, the Iraqi road guards waved us through. We
turned off First ring just short of the Kuwait International
hotel and down a back street to the embassy's rear entrance.
Iraqi soldiers and combat vehicles had the entire compound
surrounded. Strangely, the Iraqis were now manning the guard post
24
the Kuwaiti National Guard troops had previously occupied. Our
embassy foreign nationals told me that the Kuwaiti guards
literally stripped off their uniforms and fled when they spotted
the Iraqis on the morning of 2 August. We were allowed to proceed
and the anxiety did not subside until we crossed over the steel
barrier gate and into the enclosed parking lot. The embassy
security officer informed us that we would be billeted in the
Marine house. This was the small complex used as the living
compound for the five Marine guards stationed at the embassy.
They were now living and working full-time in the Chancellery
building, since some twenty families now occupied their quarters.
After unloading the car, we carried our bags to an athletic
storage room we had been assigned. I then proceeded to the
Chancellery building, specifically, the USLOK administrative
offices. The place was in a shambles, in the Chief's office an
U.S. CENTCOM messenger was asleep on the couch and the USLOK
administrative NCO was sitting behind the Chief’s desk eating a
MRE. I asked SFC Vellekoop who was in charge, and what was the
current situation. He started to answer, when a Navy LT.CDR
Schwarz, who was a TDY officer, came in and stated he was in
charge. Since he was not an actual member of USLOK, I challenged
his authority. He promptly went to the Deputy Charge of Mission
(DCM), second in charge after the ambassador. She immediately
summoned me to her office where she proceeded to tell me that the
military chain of command was no longer valid and I now worked
for the State Department and the USLOK organization was defunct.
I returned to the USLOK office where the CENTCOM courier and
the USN TDY officer informed me that the communications link with
CENTCOM was compartmentalized classification and no one from
USLOK would be permitted access. I have since learned from books
by Gen. Schwarzkopf's, "It Doesn't Take A Hero" and US News and
25
World Report, "Triumph Without Victory" that Maj. John Feeley
(CENTCOM courier) had used the communication link as a means to
report information in the context of first hand knowledge. They
were using the communications link to CENTCOM to send
intelligence reports that were collected by the USLOK team and
others. Interestingly enough, Maj. Feeley had never left the
embassy Chancellery building once he ran across the street from
the Kuwait International hotel in the early morning hours of 2
August 90. Nevertheless, he is quoted in the two referenced books
as being the sole source from inside Kuwait and was recognized by
Gen. Schwarzkopf as a hero and received an Army Legion of Merit
for his actions. This was unsettling to the members of USLOK who
knew that Maj. Feeley's actions were highly questionable and
based almost solely on the actions, information and risk taken by
the USLOK members and other embassy staff. We all recognize the
fact that Maj. Feeley did the right thing by contacting U.S.
CENTCOM, but what we object to, is he alone took credit or was
given credit for all intelligence gathering, when in fact he took
little to no risks and never ventured outside the compound during
our beleaguered status in Kuwaiti. The two referenced books give
a false picture of how the actual collecting of HUMINT was taking
place and leads the reader to believe that Feeley alone was the
sole source for vital intelligence.
Since we never saw the reports that Feeley and Schwarz sent,
there seems to be some question as to just what they reported and
who they attributed the collected information.10 Since we had
become disgusted with the actions of Feeley, we used an
alternative source to pass HUMINT, the embassy chief of station
(COS), who was much more receptive and knowledgeable of the real
situation. His office had begun continuous operations just prior
to the invasion and maintained this until ordered to leave the
26
embassy on 23 August. Moreover, we felt he would ensure vital
information was accurate and reached the appropriate intelligence
levels.
I briefed LTC Funk when he arrived on what was going on with
the situation in the USLOK office and with the DCM. He ran into
the same story that I did in his meeting with the DCM and Maj.
Feeley.
We still had half of our USLOK member's safehavened at the
Japanese embassy, to include our USLOK Chief. LTC Funk decided to
organize the group that was present. Using the offices not
occupied by Feeley, we began to assess the situation. The first
thing we noticed was that the USLOK Assistance Administrative NCO
had failed to destroy and shred all the USLOK classified files.
It was disturbing to find that all the personnel files complete
with strip maps to our quarters were still intact. If the embassy
had been taken, the Iraqis would have had a wealth of information
on our organization and the location of all USLOK personnel. We
immediately shredded all classified files contained in four
filing cabinets.
The evening of 8 August we got an ugly reminder that the Iraqis
had the compound surrounded. At 2045hrs automatic weapons fire
began arching over the embassy compound. The Marine guards
10 The intent is not self-serving, but merely an attempt to set the record straight. As stated, Feeley did the right thing in getting the intelligence to CENTCOM. However, in both books, he is identified as the sole source and this is a misrepresentation of the facts. Feeley merely reported the intelligence with his personal spin on it. This would also be the case once when we got to Baghdad. From our point of view Feeley and Schwatz had taken very little risk when compared to the USLOK team members. Another troubling piece of information cited in Triump without Victory, is the assertion that Feeley is the sole Middle Eastern expert at the embassy. The truth was Chief Forties had the most expertise, he spoke Arabic, and had been in Kuwait for over three years and had previous military tours to Morocco and Lebanon. In reality, Feeley had practically no Middle Eastern experience or expertise.
27
immediately alerted everyone to head for the Chancellery vault.
Apparently, the embassy was being caught in a crossfire between
Iraqis and Kuwaiti resistance fighters. However now the feeling
was the Iraqis were attempting to take the compound. Once in the
vault Chief Forties and I realized that there were no embassy or
USLOK personnel at the Marine house in which most of the women
and children were being housed. We asked the Ambassador for
permission to leave the vault and go to the Marine House. He
approved and we headed out of the Chancellery building. The
weapons firing had slacken but tracers were still criss-crossing
over the compound. We raced across the compound, once inside the
Marine house we noticed the wives had followed the instruction we
had given to them, turn off all lights and assemble everyone in
the game room for safety. Most had settled down; but several
Filipino maids were in a state of hysteria and it took several
minutes to calm them down, their fear was particularly unsettling
for the children.
Immediately following this event, the Ambassador ordered the
Marine Guards out of uniform and instructed the embassy security
officer Chip Bender to destroy all weapons and the USLOK secure
communications. The COS refused to destroy his secure
communications links, as was his right to do so, since secure
communications remain under the agency and not DOS. We were never
given a reason for this action, but speculated that the
Ambassador did not want to give the Iraqis any reason to take the
compound. As for the USLOK communications equipment, we suspected
the Ambassador was not pleased with information being sent out of
the embassy without his approval. It was also believed that if
the Iraqis were to enter the compound by force the Ambassador was
going to surrender, instead of making a futile attempt to defend
the embassy.
28
By 13 August the remainder of the USLOK team had made it to the
compound. We thought finally, COL Mooneyham would square away
Feeley and Schwarz and then get things in order again. I never
knew the whole story, but for some reason after COL Mooneyham
arrived the Ambassador would not permit him to do anything. So,
we continued at the task at hand to at least organize things
around the compound and continue our efforts to find and collect
food. USLOK followed the old military standards of continuously
improving on your defensive posture.
LOGISTICS Since we were now faced a potential food crisis within the
compound, we took it upon ourselves (USLOK) to get things
organized, since guidance was not forthcoming. This was not an
easy task since most of the DOS staff and family members had no
training or background experiences for dealing with crisis
situations, most of the male DOS staff did not even have prior
military experiences. This also carried over to the spouses; many
DOS spouse felt the military spouse would know what to do and how
to handle the situation. The embassy Security officer Chip Binder
was the most organized and experience DOS staff member but even
he was having a difficult time dealing with the Ambassador’s
immediate staff. Binder had done an exemplary job at controlling
the Marine guards and organizing the Chancellery for the worst
case scenario. However, outside the Chancellery the compound had
turned into a lose organization with no structure or plan for
surviving a potential assault or siege.
The initial compound occupants (2-7 August) had all but
exhausted what food was available from the embassy snack bar and
Marine MREs. LTC Funk, Chief Forties, and I met to discuss the
situation within the embassy compound on 8 August. LTC Funk,
29
Chief, and I first determined that we needed a structured
organization. LTC Funk would man the USLOK office and coordinate
actions with the embassy staff, Chief who had the most experience
in Kuwait and over three years knowledge of the city and country
would handle class I (food) supplies, I would assist Dave and do
operations and plans. We had three priorities right off:
First was to get the food stocks built. We were down to
virtually nothing and personnel were continuing to come into the
embassy grounds.
Second the buildings housing the families and children needed
to be fortified.
Third, we had to develop contingency plans for possible
rescue operations, evacuation, or exfiltration.
We all set out to accomplish various tasks in a coordinated
manner. The military personnel kept each other informed on the
projects we were working on a day to day basis. Chief Forties was
the only military besides LTC Funk who attended the Ambassador’s
country meetings. These meetings did not offer much in the way of
guidance, information, or comfort to community at large, but
primarily served as a means to let the Ambassador know that
something was being done for everyone. In fact, we all had to
demand that the Ambassador or his DCM tell us as a group what was
going on. On one occasion, the Ambassador told us that we knew as
much as he did because we were still able to watch CNN off the
satellite dish in the embassy compound.
As we began to organize things, the wives (majority military
spouses) took on the task of preparing meals and running the
living quarters. Two principle buildings were used to house all
the people present in the compound, but we literally had people
sleeping everywhere from offices, meeting rooms, and storage
rooms. Some 175 people with children and pets were occupying a
30
compound designed to only to quarter the Ambassador and a 6 man
Marine detachment. The COS wife ran the kitchen and meals for the
residence and personnel working 24-hour shifts in the Chancellery
and several military wives ran the operation in the Marine house.
Chief Forties and I would survey the two kitchens and the stocks
in the snack bar and make a list of what foodstocks we needed to
obtain when we went out on a foraging around the city for food
supplies. Chief knew his way around and I would ride shotgun for
him.
We had over 175 people to feed daily. Each morning Chief
Forties and I would set out in his Chevy Blazer to canvas Kuwait
City for foodstocks. Chief had several Kuwaiti contacts that
helped arrange a clandestine meeting with the Kuwaiti who owned
the largest supermarket chain in Kuwait, know as the Sultan
Center. The Kuwaiti owner had gone underground and was attempting
to get his assets out of Kuwait before the Iraqis could find
them. After several days, we finally managed to link up with him
at a discrete location. We then followed him to an underground
warehouse in the vicinity of the Kuwait International Airport.
Chief Forties struck a deal with him for credit payment via the
State Department, but we had to act quickly since it was only a
matter of a few days or a week at best before the Iraqis would
discover the warehouse. That evening, the Ambassador agreed to
Chief's plan and payment was arranged.11 We returned the next day
and surveyed the warehouse; the primary foodstocks consisted of
canned tuna and frozen turkeys. We also took everything he had in
the way of medical supplies, paper products, canned drinks, and
cereals. Most of the products where near the limit of there shelf
11 During the first day of the invasion, all US currency on hand in the Embassy was shredded. The Ambassador through cable message traffic had DOS transfer funds to Mr.Sultan's stateside banking account.
31
life or had recently expired dates. We spent several days hauling
the food stocks to the Embassy. During one of our last visits an
Iraqi patrol showed up at the underground entranceway, the
Kuwaitis quickly moved us to a back storage area, bribed the
patrol with Pepsi cola, and canned tuna. Shortly after our last
trip to the warehouse, the owner decided to abandon it and make
his way out of Kuwait. We had one day left to get all we could
from the warehouse. Chief Forties briefed the Ambassador on the
situation and we got the approval to make one last run using the
embassy's stake bed truck, which could haul three times the
amount of the Blazer. We rounded up tarps to cover the cargo and
made three trips. During our last trip back we were stopped at an
Iraqi checkpoint, we managed to convince the guards that this was
a relief mission to the Philippine Embassy, and handed them some
cigarettes, they agreed to let us pass. We did in fact make one
additional run for the Philippine embassy, since they had
literally several thousand Philippine nationals camped outside
their embassy compound. By the time of our departure for Baghdad
on 23 August we had sufficiently stocked the embassy with several
months worth of tuna and frozen turkeys. Chief had also managed
to acquire a dozen or so 50 lbs. bags of rice and some beef from
his contacts at various hotels. The wives prepared three meals a
day, light breakfast of cereals, and fruit juices, tuna salad for
lunch, and boiled turkey for evening meal. Children were fed
first and then adults, no food was thrown out. Adults ate all the
children's leftovers or it was used for the next meal. Fresh
vegetables and fruit were the hardest to find and usually only in
small quantities. We managed with what we had and many lost
weight due to the unbalanced meals and stress. I myself had lost
over 10 lbs. since 2 August.
32
With the approaching Iraqi deadline of 23 August to close all
foreign embassies in Kuwait, Chief Forties and I made our last
logistics run on 22 August. During that trip, we noticed the
Iraqis were in the process of withdrawing the Republican Guards
and replacing them with reserve units from Iraq. This swap out
occurred over a three-day period and we observed convoys headed
back to Iraq with the spoils of war. We saw hundreds of cars from
Kuwaiti car dealerships being transported on Iraqi HETs, T-72s
towing boats from the Kuwaiti yacht basin, and military trucks
loaded down with booty. In less than two weeks the Republican
Guards had collected their war booty and were now headed home
with the spoils of the crushing defeat of the Kuwaitis.
We made one last inventory of foodstocks and briefed the DCM on
where and how food was cached on the compound. We felt the stay
behinds; some 20-30 people would have enough food for at least
six months, not much variety, but at least subsistence. Since we
knew that on 23 August the Iraqis would cut off water and power,
the wives pre-cooked as many turkeys as time would permit. The
compound had a generator with a 500-gal tank and we managed to
scrounge a few 55-gal drums of diesel for extra fuel.
Just prior to our departure on 23 August, we also filled every
empty container with water. When the Iraqis eventually cut the
power and water lines, they missed an old water line so the
embassy was able to retain one small line of fresh water that
they could use for drinking. Pool water and stored water would
later be used for cooking, bathing and operating the toilets.
LTC Rhoi Maney and Chief Durmon anticipated the need for
additional refrigeration and went out to various USLOK quarters
and removed freezers and refrigerators, along with whatever food
was left in the homes. Chief Lord and MSGT Allen began working on
fortifying the buildings the families were all housed in. They
33
covered over windows, placed barricading materials near potential
entry ways, organized and designated an area were families could
move to in the event of shelling or gun fire into the compound.
They also began conducting motor stables on all vehicles in the
compound and cross leveling of tires, batteries, tools, and other
vehicle items in the event, we had to make a hasty escape
overland by automobile.
By now, all of the embassy staff and USLOK personnel had made
it to the embassy for safehaven. The compound had grown to some
175 personnel. Small quantities of American citizens were allowed
into the compound, primarily those with skills the embassy
thought were needed to sustain embassy operations. The largest
group permitted in was a number of Americans who had been
stranded at the Kuwait International Airport. All other Americans
who had been living and working in Kuwait were told to stay home
and stay tuned to their radios for information from Voice of
America and BBC broadcast. This was much the same story at the
other western embassy that had large populations living and
working in Kuwait.
On the political and diplomatic side, 8 August turned out to be
a watershed day; President Bush announced that "a line has been
drawn in the sand”, Iraq now has over 200,000 troops in Kuwait
and declares Kuwait is the 19th Providence…”eternal merger…will
be the pride of the Arabs." The UN also passes Resolution 662
null and voiding the Iraqi claim on Kuwait. Iraq also sends
notification to all embassies in Kuwait that the borders are
sealed and all diplomatic missions must close by 24 August 1990.
We now begin to realize that we are all truly beleaguered, so we
shifted our focus to sustaining the compound and protecting
ourselves from possible Iraqi seizure of the compound.
34
During all our foraging we would return each day and debrief
the embassy COS and provided CENTCOM with reports on what we had
seen and located. We also linked into the Kuwaiti underground via
our contacts with several Kuwaiti nationals. One in particular,
named Adel Safar, was brought into the embassy for debriefs.
Through Adel we also shared information and provided him with
techniques for sabotaging Iraqi equipment and positions. Kuwaiti
Resistance grew stronger everyday and by September, they were
well-organized and inflicting daily damage to the Iraqi war
machine. They also were key players in hiding and aiding many of
the trapped foreign nationals. I personally knew several British
Officers who were hidden by Kuwaiti Resistance for four months
and then secretly turned over when all trapped foreign nationals
were allowed to depart Kuwait and Iraq in mid December 1990.
On the lighter side, Chief Forties had been asked by the DCM to
go to her quarters just outside the compound and obtain some
additional clothing for her. While in her quarters he could see
were Iraqi soldiers had entered and attempted to make a meal in
the kitchen. A frying pan was on the stove and next to it was an
empty box of Gaines Burger dog patties. Apparently the Iraqis had
mistaken the Gaines burgers for hamburger patties and fried them
in the skillet for a quick meal.
Ambassador Howell notes in The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait:
American Reflections, "that the Kuwait embassy out lasted the
longest embassy siege on record "55 Days at Peking".12 I would
like to think that the food collection efforts of Dave Forties
and myself was the major contributing factor to sustaining the
Embassy during the Iraqi siege. No small task, after almost three 12 Richard P. Stevens, editor, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait:
American Reflections, International Education and Communications Group, Washington D.C. April 1993, a composite of various stories by Americans that were trapped in Kuwait and Iraq during the crisis.
35
weeks of foraging, scrounging and arranging food pick-ups, we
acquired hundreds of cases of tuna, rice, canned goods, and
medical supplies. Done at daily risk of avoiding Iraqi
checkpoints, roadblocks and roaming bands of Iraqi soldiers and
repeated the same feat while detained in Baghdad, Iraq.
THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD Ambassador Howell informed us that a deal was in the works to
get all nonessential personnel out by 24 August, but we would
have to go to Baghdad to obtain exit visas. We also learned on 20
August that President Bush had declared all trapped U.S. citizens
as "Hostages." He also issued a stern warning to Iraq "that the
U.S. Government will not tolerate any further mistreatment of
American citizens.” We knew from radio news reports that
Americans were being rounded up and the Iraqi Foreign Minister
Aziz stated that these were precautionary measures to prevent
attack on Iraq. At this point, the "Human Shield" episode began
and Iraq began systematically rounding up and placing foreign
nationals at various "strategic" sites throughout Iraq and
Kuwait. We all knew that at some point we would be required to
leave either in our vehicles or taken by the Iraqis. That being
the case USLOK took the lead for developing evacuation and convoy
plans. We immediately organized all the vehicles on the compound,
checked over each vehicle, and began making first aid kits and
food packages for each car. Water was a prime concern and we used
all available receptacles for water bottles and placed several
gallons in each car. We took one other measure by marking all the
roofs of the vehicles with an X made of a reflective type of duct
tape. We transmitted that back to Washington so that overhead
satellites could spot our vehicles along the congested route to
Baghdad. COL Mooneyham called a meeting for all military and we
36
discussed our duties and obligations as military officers in
regards to the Code of Conduct. He also issued guidance to all of
us regarding our status. His words were reassuring, but ominous
in a strange way, because we had no idea of what lay ahead.
By 22 August the British, Japanese, and French begin to
evacuate their nonessential personnel. Baghdad issued another
warning to the US embassy on 23 August stating "that failure to
close embassy will be considered and act of war." We also notice
an increase of Iraqi troops and tanks surrounding our embassy.
The Iraqis then inform the Ambassador that on the morning of 24
August they will cut off all power and water to the embassy.
On the evening of 22 August, LTC Funk and I briefed our plans
and convoy route to the Ambassador, after he approved it we
briefed each driver and arranged the cars for our early morning
departure. Everyone was rounded up around 0230hrs 23 August and
told prepare to leave. We were told an Iraqi official would come
to the embassy and provide escort to Baghdad. Finally around
0300hrs and Iraqi Army officer appeared at the back gate and told
the Ambassador that he had instructions to allow 57 personnel to
depart. That was incorrect and the Ambassador pointed out that it
was to be 57 diplomats and their dependents. The Iraqi official
would have no part of that - his orders said 57 and 57 was all he
would take. At that point, the Ambassador called off the convoy.
He communicated this to State Department and everyone went back
to bed. By 0600 hrs we got word that an U.S. diplomat from the
American embassy in Baghdad would be arriving to provide escort
for us to Baghdad. Around 0900hrs, he showed up and we hastily
gathered women, children and pets for a rapid departure before
the Iraqis change their minds. Ambassador Howell decided to
escort us to the border with Iraq. The Ambassador led the first
serial with his Black Cadillac complete with US flags flying. The
37
U.S. diplomat from Baghdad led the second serial. The others
followed, but the Ambassador had set to fast a pace and the
convoy was strung out. Now on the road to Baghdad, all 23
vehicles with families, food, and pets are headed for Baghdad,
Iraq. I might point that some of the pets did not survive the
ordeal and died from heat exhaustion. Ambassador Howell had
requested we take his dog, unfortunately it succumbed from the
extreme heat. One area we failed to brief everyone on was the
conditions outside the embassy. Most people had been inside the
compound since the first week of August and did see all the
destruction and large concentration of Iraqi soldiers and
equipment, therefore as they drove towards the border many
drivers did not focus on the convoy and attempted to view their
surroundings. This resulted in a terrible rear end collision as
the convoy "yo-yo" effect took hold. Three of our cars collided
with each other when our COS swerved to avoid hitting an Iraqi
soldier who had jump out into the roadway waving an AKM (rifle).
The car behind him immediately braked and was rear-ended by the
trailing car resulting in several injuries, one serious enough to
warrant immediate medical attention. LTC Tom Funk and Marine
Hudson got to the accident scene and treated the victims. Tom
realized that the seriously injured woman required immediate
medical attention. At that point Tom and the Marine made the
decision to load her in their car along with her husband and
headed back to the embassy where a doctor was present. The doctor
at the embassy diagnosed her to have a broken hip and told Tom
she would have to go to a Kuwaiti hospital, (which are now
occupied by Iraqis). They got her there and in to see a doctor,
at that point Tom and the Marine slipped out of the hospital and
drove to catch up with the convoy.
38
The rest of us finally made it to the border crossing at
Safwan, after four grueling hours of stop and go traffic, caused
by military convoys, which had priority on the roads. Once at the
border crossing Ambassador Howell was made to return to the
embassy. Iraqi officials met us and refused to allow us to park
our vehicles in the shaded area along side the customs building,
instead we all had to park on the huge asphalt parking lot with
no cover. Temperature that day was in excess of 120 degrees and
the black asphalt pavement made it soared well above 120 degrees.
Now we began another four-hour ordeal of checking passports,
cars, questions, and phone calls to Baghdad. We sat in the
parking lot with engines idling to keep the car air conditioners
running, but after an hour or so most cars began overheating and
we had to shut off all the cars. Our concern now was for the
women, children, babies, and pets that were with us. The heat was
oppressive and many were beginning to show signs of heat
exhaustion. Using our drinking water, we continuously poured
water on the children and babies to keep them cool. As this
situation began to worsen, we finally appealed to the Iraqis to
allow us to move under the shade area. It was interesting to note
that only Americans and third country nationals (TCN) were being
treated so harshly. While many of the European nationals
particularly the ones that had not yet committed to condemning
Iraq were permit quick passage and no harassment.
Finally, after four hours, we are permitted to depart for
Baghdad. As we left Safwan one embassy official decides to lead
his serial into a gas station a few kilometers from the border
crossing. They ended up getting stuck by Iraqi military vehicles.
The remaining convoy pulled off the road to wait for them. After
thirty minutes columns of Iraqi foot soldiers begin route
stepping by our vehicles parked along side the road and as they
39
passed, they begin banging on our cars. Fearing this situation
could get ugly myself and a few others walk back to the gas
station to tell the DOS person in charge that we are going to
drive further down the road and will wait for them at a
checkpoint we had established on our convoy maps. He reluctantly
agreed and half the convoy departed for a checkpoint just south
of Nasiryah. Nasiryah had been the planned first fuel stop so as
we waited we topped off all our vehicles. Almost two hours passed
and still no sign of the remaining convoy so we decide to press
on to the checkpoint outside of Nasiryah. While waiting outside
Nasiryah, droves of Iraqi citizen's start coming out of their
homes. They came up to our cars and start trying to look in the
cars, and tapping on windows. Finally some four hours later the
remaining convoy caught up with us. We had all now been up since
0300hrs and it is nearing 1800hrs. The traffic had thinned out
and as we passed several Iraqi military camps. It was easy to
tell they were all abandoned. We reached the next major city
Samawah around 2100 hrs and are stopped at the outskirts by Iraqi
military checkpoint. We wait an hour or so for them to get the OK
from Baghdad to allow us to proceed on. They escorted us through
the city and the convoy again got split up due to traffic. We
stopped outside of Samawah and waited another hour to reassemble
the convoy before heading on. We were still several hours from
Baghdad. Most drivers are near exhaustion from no sleep, and many
of us were operating on pure adrenaline. We stopped one more time
at Diwaniyah for fuel and a short rest, at that point I had my
wife take over driving, the children were asleep and I was at the
point to where I could no longer drive safely. Chris agreed and
drove the final 50 kms to Baghdad. As we neared the outskirts of
Baghdad (0130hrs 24 August) the road turned into a four-lane
highway. As we enter the highway, we see the Charge of the U.S.
40
embassy Iraq alongside the road. Charge Joe Wilson escorts us all
into the embassy compound in downtown Baghdad. His remaining
staff of 6-8 personnel help get all the vehicles lined up along
the street and quickly began getting people to the staff resident
quarters for sleep. The Embassy in Baghdad was a small three
story building without a wall or security fence around it, so our
vehicles with our belongings had to be left parked on the street
curb. The foreign nationals that worked for the U.S. embassy
guarded our vehicles until morning. The embassy collected our
passports and we all went to various quarters where everyone
literally crashed.
Around 0900hrs 24 August, we were all awakened and told the
news that there was a glitch and we might not be allowed to
proceed on to Jordan. With that news, everyone went back too
sleep, to exhausted to do anything else. The Charge made no
progress with the Iraqis all that day. Apparently, they informed
him that the US had reneged on the deal and was keeping the
embassy in Kuwait open, therefore we would not be allowed to
leave until the US closed the embassy in Kuwait. We all knew that
would never happen. That evening the Charge organized a get-
together at the empty Marine house. Once everyone was assembled,
there he informed us that DOS was working the problem, but to
hunker down and wait it out. Now everything seemed like deja vu,
except this time we were in Baghdad. Needless to say, we nearly
cleaned out the Marine House liquor locker and everyone let off a
little pressure.
WOMEN AND CHILDREN - FIRSTThe evening of 24 August almost seemed surreal. Families
gathered and discussed all the “what ifs” of the current
situation. We knew we were stuck again, except now we were all
41
trapped right in the heart of enemy territory, downtown Baghdad,
Iraq. We had not heard any news since leaving Kuwait on 23
August. The Charge had told us that so far, Ambassador Howell and
his stay-behind crew were still safe and the Iraqis had made no
overt moves to close the embassy. Several news reporters were
allowed into the Marine house and we all spent time talking with
them about conditions inside Kuwait and requested that they not
reveal that 11 of us were military personnel. We had already been
told that the Iraqis were requesting that all military be turned
over to them. Fortunately we all had diplomatic passports and
were on the accredited list of the Kuwait Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as US Embassy personnel. We did have a couple of military
TDY personnel whom we covered by preparing documentation
attesting to the loss of their diplomatic passports, so far it
had worked. The reporters by and large were very good about
protecting our status and as I recall, they never revealed our
presence in any news reports.
As dawn approached on the 26 August, COL Mooneyham met with
all of us and informed us that arrangements were underway to
allow the women and children to leave, but some of us may have to
drive them to the Iraqi border at Zakhu, Turkey. The Charge had
gotten word that the route to Jordan and the border area there
was a total shambles with thousands of refugees massed in the
border area. Safety being our prime concern, it was decided that
the Zakhu border crossing in Turkey was less threatening and a
safer place for exiting Iraq. We went to work preparing the cars
again and organizing another convoy. By late evening, 26 August,
the Charge informed us that the Iraqis had agreed to release the
women and children, but refused to provide escort or assistance
in getting to the border. They also refused to allow any of the
personnel from Kuwait (males) to accompany them. We had to brief
42
the women on driving and designated pairs to travel together. We
were permitted to have a few embassy foreign nationals lead the
convoy and assist at the border. We also decided to send the
stake bed truck to carry the luggage and some pets.
At 0230 hrs 27 August we all assembled at the embassy
compound to load cars, review the route and say our farewells.
That early morning farewell was the hardest good-bye I had ever
had with my family. To make matters worst it was our wedding
anniversary. Nevertheless, my wife, children, and I hugged and
kissed one another a last time before the signal to leave was
given. I was devastated, but had a sense of well being; knowing
they would make it home safely and I would not have worry about
them being stuck in Baghdad, Iraq. Although we all had tremendous
apprehension over their journey to the Turkish border, we all
felt a certain relief in knowing the women and children were
getting out. What we did not know was the ordeal they would
endure on their 18-hour drive to the border crossing.
Once they were underway, we all went back to raid the Marine
house liquor locker one last time. Their convoy endured an 18-
hour trek complete with Iraqi harassment and stall tactics. My
wife (Chris) related one humorous story from her ordeal. Our
youngest at the time still in diapers had to be changed while
driving, so our oldest daughter Natasha (7yrs) would change her
and then Chris took the soiled diaper and threw it out the window
of the car, Natasha complained to her mother that littering was
bad, Chris quickly retorted “ it was perfectly OK to litter in
this country (Iraq), but nowhere else.” It was remarkable how
these women meet every obstacle and completed their journey with
pride, dignity, and purpose. Three male teenagers who were 18 or
older were not allowed to cross and were returned to Baghdad.
43
Iraqi law considered them adults so they were not allowed to
leave.
We sat on pins and needles until we finally got the word that
they were under US control and on the way to the NATO base at
Diyarbakir, Turkey. They finally made it to the US on 29 August
on a specially chartered 747 out of Incirlick, Turkey and touched
down at Andrews Air Force Base the afternoon of 29 August. We
learned later that when they arrived at the border the Iraqis
detained them for 3 hours. While detained at the border the
Iraqis informed them that all vehicles without diplomatic plates
would not be allowed to cross. They then had to remove all
belongs from those vehicles and reload the cars with diplomatic
plates. They then drew straws among the women who could operate
standard shift to see who would drive the embassy stake bed truck
across the border, a daunting task considering the circumstances.
Once permitted to leave, they started towards the bridge across
no mans land, the Iraqis stop them one more time and made them
get out of the cars and line up along the bridge guardrail, some
women panic, thinking the Iraqis were going to shoot them or beat
them before they would transverse the last 100 meters to freedom.
Their fears were warranted since many Arab men viewed western
women as loose and dirty. Their treatment was appalling
considering they all were carrying diplomatic passports. Finally,
by 0300hrs, they crossed over into Turkey where officials from
the US Embassy Turkey had arranged bus transport to the NATO base
at Diyarbakir. Their ordeal was finally over and they were now
under US control.
After we celebrated their return to freedom, we took on the
task of operating an evacuation center at the embassy for any
other American citizens (women & children only) whom might be
interested in departing Iraq. We usually processed 30-40 women
44
and children a day, most of whom had US passports and were
married to Iraqi citizens. In addition, by this time over 350,000
refugees had fled Kuwait and Iraq, most were Arabs, and Asians
third country nationals.
Thieves of Baghdad
On the evening of 30 August, Reverend Jesse Jackson came to
the embassy to meet with the Charge. He also requested a meeting
with all of us to inform us that he was going to meet with Saddam
Hussein in attempt to secure our freedom. We informed the Rev.
Jackson we wanted no part of his release plan if it involve
compromising US principles, position, or any requirements by us
to make statements. Needless to say, no one from Baghdad gained
release under Rev. Jackson's deal with Saddam Hussein. Rev.
Jackson did manage to get a few out from the American Embassy
Kuwait and the woman whom was injured during our convoy to
Baghdad. Prior to Rev. Jackson's departure, he met with us one
last time in an attempt to get us to understand the Iraqi
position vis-a-vis the rich Gulf Arab states. We argued with him
for an hour or so, and his group decided we were a hopeless cause
and they left. This would become a typical drill in the months
ahead as various foreign dignitaries came to Baghdad to get their
nationals released. It became so common place we referred to it
as "Bargaining for Bodies". Generally Saddam would release a few
to each dignitary who would issue a statement prior to his/her
departure condemning the US and UN resolutions.
We were increasingly becoming part of the politics of
diplomacy as the US embassy in Baghdad became the focal point of
both the US and Iraqi government's exchange of demarches,
political barbs, and views on the crisis at hand. We maintained
an open phone with State Department 24 hours a day and
45
established a 24-hour watch officer shift to monitor the phone
line. We used the phone to keep Washington and ourselves
instantly appraised of events as they unfold in Baghdad,
Washington, and the UN. I often spoke with the former US
Ambassador April Glaspie when she would inquire on conditions in
Baghdad. Washington was pressing to obtain information on the
effects of the embargo. Chief Forties again was having good
success with slipping out of the embassy and obtaining food
stocks on the local economy. During his outings it became obvious
that Iraq had done a thorough job of pillaging Kuwait, Dave would
often return with food items clearly marked with Kuwaiti price
tags and marking from Kuwaiti shops. I went with Dave one
afternoon to a local souk (marketplace) where hundreds of vendors
were peddling everything from food to electronics all from
Kuwait. We even saw cars, furniture, and clothes from Kuwait. One
merchant even had a US Navy hat from the USS Reid, a Navy cruiser
which had visited Kuwait a few months early and allowed US
citizens in Kuwait to visit the ship, so without a doubt the hat
had come from an American’s home which had been looted by the
Iraqis. A fate which many of our homes in Kuwait would be
subjected to. We also learned from the foreign nationals that
worked at the embassy that the Iraqi government was issuing
visitation permits to the 19th Province. These were essentially
licenses to steal. On several occasions we saw where local Iraqis
who lived near the embassy would depart in old beat up cars and
return a few days latter with new Chevrolet Caprices with Kuwaiti
tags and loaded down with booty. It had become obvious to us that
it would be a long time coming before the embargo would take
hold. The Iraqis did implement food rationing in early September
with a stern warning that any violators would face capital
punishment. We even stood in a few bread lines and quickly
46
learned the bread they were handing out was not worth the wait.
By mid September food rationing was not the problem; blackmarket
and inflation became the primary concern. We had a limited amount
of Iraqi dinars and dealing on the blackmarket was punishable by
death. This made it extremely dangerous for Chief Forties to
find, purchase, and keep our food supplies adequate. He
nevertheless accomplished the task at great personal risk. We
also had to have him lay low for a few days at a time because the
Iraqi secret police had already attempted to arrest him.
As political and diplomatic barbs continued, the diplomatic
community just as in Kuwait, established a tight circle of
cooperation and met routinely to discuss how to handle the Iraqi
actions aimed at driving wedges in the building coalition. The
Iraqis also set up a protest group that would form outside the
embassy every other day. The same group would assemble and after
10 minutes buses would show up and discharge school children,
university students or factory workers all being led by
government cheerleaders chanting “Death to the US and down with
Bush”. The embassy’s information officer would go out and greet
the protesters, take their petitions and then stand back while
they shouted for 30 minutes.
We also invited the press to attend the morning country team
meetings, this allowed them to see the difficulties we faced in
dealing the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In turn the
press would provide updates to us on the home front. Charge Joe
Wilson was a master at using the press to get our messages out
and he often leveraged them to pressure the Iraqis to allow us to
obtain food or make phone calls home. We learned that once you
are up front with the press, they will reciprocate and actually
become useful in your efforts to tell your story.
47
ARABIAN NIGHTS
As we approached the one-month mark in Baghdad we often
passed the evenings on the roof of our quarters, it offered a
grand view of Baghdad and a small respite from the long hot days.
We tuned the radio to a Iraqi propaganda broadcast called
“Flashes in the Gulf”, we recognized it for what it was, but it
did offer some news of the home front complete with contemporary
music. The rooftop evenings also gave us insights on the local
Iraqis living nearby. We knew the Iraqi secret police had moved
into the house across the street and we often saw them watching
us with binoculars. In the predawn hours, we would observe them
picking up our trash. We began a deception game of placing
crudely drawn maps with military symbols on them in an attempt to
deceive the Iraqis on the nature of the US forces buildup. After
several mornings of the neighbor coming over to pick up our
trash, Dewight Durmon a Hawk Missile Warrant decided to make his
job a little easier and began carrying the trash across the
street and depositing it at his doorstep. We would also
occasionally talk with the Iraqi guards who were young men that
appeared very nervous about their job. Sometimes we would
approached a guard, pause and begin looking up to the sky and
pointing, in our poor Arabic we would say “Shoof-Look” and the
guard would ask what are we looking at? We’d respond “Stealth
Plane”. After a few episodes of this, we would occasionally see
the guards walking their post and pausing every now and then, to
look skyward. We also knew that the phone calls we were permitted
to make were monitored and we all exercised utmost caution and
OPSEC when talking with our families. We knew if they discovered
we were military personnel with diplomatic passports they would
take us into custody.
48
By mid-September, President Bush and Saddam Hussein had
exchanged videotaped addresses to be aired on television. The US
tape arrived via diplomatic pouch courier and the Charge
delivered to the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarqi Aziz. We watched it
the following evening on Iraqi television. They first introduced
the tape with a commentary, and then broadcasted it in its
entirety. They followed up with a closing commentary about how
the tape was not supported by any brotherly Arab nations which
were now being forced by the US to allow infidel soldiers to
enter holy Islamic sites and mosques. The day following the
videotape broadcast, Iraqi demonstrators showed up outside the
embassy compound for our routine demonstration. The situation
appeared to be in complete stalemate. Iraq was determined to stop
any coalition building and began offering free oil to any nation
that would stand with them against the US. King Hussein of Jordan
arrived in Baghdad and attempted to gain freedom for the hostages
as a personal favor to President Bush, his efforts failed. The
King of Jordan, with a huge Palestinian population to contend
with, reluctantly gave weak support to Saddam Hussein and
departed Baghdad. With prospects of release growing dimmer every
day we continued our programs of evacuating American citizens,
tracking the Americans who were brought to Baghdad for movement
to Iraqi Strategic sites, devising plans for escape and
continuous building of our foodstocks. Iraq announced on 18
September that any foreigners caught violating food rationing
would be hung. Our Charge was enraged at this pronouncement and
immediately prepared and delivered a demarche to the Iraqi
Foreign Ministry. Since the Iraqis were not providing their guest
with any food, the only alternative they had was to use the
blackmarket to obtain supplies. For us this meant it would become
much more dangerous to obtain food on the local economy.
49
On 21 September, Iraq declared persona non-gratis all western
Defense attaches. Our COS and COL Richie, the DAO, had two days
to get out of town. We helped them pack out their quarters and
took all their foodstocks. They also carried with them a wealth
of knowledge on our contingency plans and the situation around
Baghdad. We would attempt to fill the gap and continue efforts to
collect HUMINT. CENTCOM was not happy with any plans of escape
and had told us to wait out the situation, for fear that an
escape plan that went wrong would cost lives and impact any
diplomatic efforts. We ceased official plans but continued to
explore options in the event war did break out. Things also got a
little shaky after Iraq had violated the sovereignty of several
western embassies in Kuwait. We prepared for the possibility that
they might attempt to enter the embassy compound in Baghdad.
Again the Iraqis pressed the Charge for another listing with
occupation of all Kuwait embassy personnel whom were now being
housed in the American embassy Baghdad. We quickly devised a plan
to go to other western embassy compounds in Baghdad if they
decided to take us into custody. We still could not understand
why the Iraqis had not figured out that 11 of us were active duty
military, our cover continued to hold but we became increasingly
concerned that they would eventually figure it out and take us
into custody. Our President had already declared us "Hostages"
and the Iraqis called us "guests". All we knew was our situation
was tenuous as best, and we were not being treated like guests,
so our best option was to do our duty and look for a way out
should the inevitable occur.
TAKE THE LONG WAY HOME
By early October 1990, approximately seven UN Resolutions
were in place against Iraq. As always, there are ways around
50
embargoes, and sanctions. The Iraqis were very resourceful and
showing no signs of weakening. As much as we could observe, the
spoils being brought from Kuwait and the open highway with Jordan
were mitigating the effects of the embargo. We could see some
impact on the economy by the rapid rise in inflation and the
quality of food products. For example, fresh beef and poultry was
becoming harder to find but were still available, although the
quality was somewhat questionable. Many shop keepers told us that
Iraqi diary farms were slaughtering off their herds due to lack
grain and poultry farmers were also slaughtering off their laying
hens for the same reason.
We began sensing nervousness throughout the city. The US
buildup to "Desert Shield" was well underway and the GOI knew US
troop strength and the coalition was rapidly growing. Hence the
Iraqis began preparing the populace for air attacks by in placing
antiaircraft guns on many of the city's government buildings and
occasionally sounding the air raid sirens. The GOI efforts were
not new to the populace, they were quick to inform us they had
been through air, and missile attacks during the war with Iran.
The locals that we spoke with just would not believe that attacks
by the US would be far more devastating. They had a real mindset
that they would survive and somehow Saddam would protect them.
The GOI also began publicizing how their "Human Shields"
would help protect key strategic sites and ensure peace. Military
checkpoints already present began showing up randomly throughout
the city. Gasoline rationing went into effect, although there was
no shortage of gas, many felt it was a measure to keep the
populace from traveling very far from Baghdad. Often during the
evening hours, while on our rooftop, we would observe
antiaircraft fire and tracers arching upward in the night skies.
It was becoming more difficult to move about Baghdad and we could
51
tell the Iraqi secret police had doubled their efforts in
surveillance, and stepped up efforts to follow us around.
While performing watch officer duties on 12 October, I took a
call from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). They
requested the Charge immediately come down for a meeting. I
notified the Charge and he proceeded to the Iraqi MFA to inquire
as to why he was being summoned. He was informed by the MFA that
the Government of Iraqi (GOI) took exception to a Voice of
America broadcast which quoted a US diplomatic stating that
Saddam Hussein was insane and they wanted to know what the US
government was going to do about it. The Charge informed them
that he would inquire with DOS to see if the U.S. would issue a
demarche or position on Saddam's sanity. The Charge departed and
we heard nothing else from the GOI or the MFA.
On the diplomatic front pressure was mounting on the GOI to
release all hostages and all diplomats that were brought from
Kuwait and detained in Baghdad. Baghdad's responses was a demand
for all foreigners in Iraq and the 19th Providence (Kuwait) to
immediately come forward and register with the Iraqi MFA. Our
embassy in Baghdad was again requested to provide by diplomatic
note a listing of all personnel being housed in the embassy and
the resident quarters. They claimed a complete listing was needed
to properly process personnel for future release. The Charge
refused to comply, because a note had been previously provided in
September and he knew the Iraqis were attempting to identify
military personnel. Since the crisis began the GOI never really
appeared concern with UN Resolution until the diplomatic
community starting talking about "war crimes". Once word was
leaked to the GOI that UN Resolution 674, "war crimes" was in the
works and would soon be passed, they finally began to talk about
possible release of hostages. This started another round of
52
"Bargaining for Bodies", as former British Prime Minister Heath
came to Baghdad and other notables from Ramsey Clark to Cat
Stevens. We began working a releasable list of diplomats/US
citizens with medical problems or over age sixty. Finally by 23
October, the Charge was successful in obtaining release of 12
people from our group and two from the American citizen's
safehavened at Amb. Glaspie's residence.
As mid-October approached, a decision was made at the
national level to implement a plan to get some members of our
group out before hostilities began. I was told in early October
that I was being considered for participation in an exfiltration
operation out of Baghdad. I was concerned because the plan was
only for a handful of people and I did not want to leave my
comrades. I approached COL Mooneyham and asked him why I was
selected, he side stepped the question, but made it clear to me
that I must volunteer and go along with the plan.
Our Kuwait COS devised and coordinate the operation. The
mission was risky and dangerous but offered the first plan with a
reasonable high chance of success. I learned later that an Escape
Committee formed in Washington to review possible escape plans,
rescues, and other methods for retrieving the trapped diplomats
and key personnel. The committee approved our plan after several
meetings and detail reviews. The decision was finally made to
execute the planned escape.
We conducted hurried training and recons of the pick-up
location. The plan was simple, we would have papers, and
documents that indicated we had valid exit visas and had been
released to return home. This was not too irregular, since exit
visas were being granted on case by case bias.
Everything seemed in place. We would be permitted one small
type gym bag to carry a change of clothes, shaving kit,
53
toothpaste, etc. We also placed in each bag ample cigarettes, and
a few bottles of liquor to be used as pay off to any checkpoint
guards who became too suspicious. After a few trial runs, we
finally got the signal to go. We had setup a system to cover our
absence by staying in the embassy compound for several days
running. I was working a night shift so my absences from our
living quarters would be less obvious to the Iraqi secret police.
The embassy also implemented strict OPSEC and no other members of
our group knew who or when any of us would be leaving. They would
be told a few days after we left. COL Mooneyham had also
prohibited phone calls and DOS messages to be sent until we had
safely made it out of Iraq.
We departed on a cloudy evening with a slight drizzle coming
down. The first leg was our pick-up and trip to a safe house.
Pick-up went without a problem and we headed to a secure area.
Once there we met the people who would assist with our escape.
That night we were given our documents, discussed the route,
possible danger areas, and actions to be taken if we ran into
trouble. About 0500hrs the next morning, we refueled the car from
a 55-gal drum that was stored at secure area. Once out of
Baghdad, we hit our first military checkpoint. Our driver showed
our papers and we were waved through, one down and many more to
go. A lead vehicle had gone ahead of us by several hours to recon
checkpoints and position our refuel point on a barren stretch of
road. We made it to the refuel point by late afternoon and pulled
off the road several kilometers to make our final refuel. While
refueling, an Iraqi Bedouin walked up to our refuel operation. We
quickly began offering him cigarettes and liquor. After a few
minutes of small talk, he wondered off. We had to move quickly
out of fear that he would inform any Iraqi patrols about our
activities or our presence in the area. We headed down the road
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for several more miles when our lead vehicle came back and
signaled us to pull over. He had observed the next checkpoint and
noted that the Iraqis were being very tough on vehicles coming
through the checkpoint. We made the decision that everyone would
pretend to be asleep as we went through the checkpoint and let
our guide do all the talking if question. We took some of the
liquor and poured it on our clothes and around the car’s
interior. Our driver would explain that we had all passed out
from drinking too much in celebration of returning home. When we
reach the checkpoint, the guards took our papers. After five
minutes they returned and instructed our driver to get out of the
car. He broke out some cigarettes and started small talk in
Arabic with the guards, after a few laughs they told him he could
leave, but he should not allow drinking and driving. He thanked
them in the profusely Arabic manner and we quickly departed.
As we closed on the crossing area, our lead vehicle appeared
again. We pulled over and were told that the Iraqi customs agent
were being very thorough and confirming all exit visas with
Baghdad. This was a huge disappointment. Our friends had already
patterned the crossing area, but as always "Murphy" hits when
least expected. We had now gone too far to turn back. We knew our
papers and documentation were good and had worked through many
checkpoints, but this crossing area would be much tougher. We all
discussed the options and decided again to try pretending to have
drunk too much and let our escort do the all the talking. We
would act somewhat intoxicated and not respond if questioned. We
would wait for our escort to intervene and handle the situation.
As we pulled into the checkpoint area, we were instructed to
get out of the car and submit our bags for inspection. Since the
custom officials spoke little English, we pretended not to
understand them when they spoke to us. As expected they
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confiscated what cigarettes and liquor we had left and then moved
us to a building. As suspected, they wanted to confirm with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Baghdad that our exit visas
were still valid. The Iraqis all through this crisis would
sometimes issue exit visa and then revoke them at the last
minute. This perhaps was one of the most dangerous periods of our
journey, had the Iraqis decided to interrogate us we would have
been exposed and imprisoned. Furthermore, traveling under this
cover would probably have gotten us all a death sentence. Our
luck held and we endured the wait with extreme high anxiety. Our
guide handled all the talking and after almost an hour of waiting
they finally agreed to allow us to pass. We would have to walk
across no man's land. Our guide would have to leave and since he
was not allowed to escort us across. We picked up our bags and
headed across. About a fourth of the way into the no man's land,
an Iraqi guard called out for us to halt. We were not sure if
they had changed their minds. We thought about making a dash for
it, but we quickly realized we could not outrun their automatic
weapons. We halted and the Iraqi guard approached me and asked
for a cigarette, I more that willingly handed him a fresh pack
and gestured for him to keep it, he nodded and motioned us on.
We stepped into freedom after some 80 days of detention. Two
more guides linked up with us and would transport us to another
location. We would retain our cover and travel incognito. The
escape would not be publicized or revealed at anytime, so as not
to expose anyone that assisted us, and not spoil any other
planned exfiltrations.
Our next leg would be a journey to link-up with US officials.
After a three-days of travel, we finally left for the United
States aboard an USAF Gulfstream II jetliner. Once in the US we
were taken to Camp Peary near Williamsburg, Va. Upon arrival
56
there, our wives or family members were present to greet us.
After a few days at Camp Peary for debriefings, we were released
to go home.
I finally returned home without fanfare and just glad the
ordeal was done. I still had great apprehension over leaving
behind my friends and comrades. Nevertheless, our test of this
potential pipeline to get folks out had proved viable. Before any
others could be brought out via the same method, the GOI had a
change of heart and allowed all western hostages to begin
departing Iraq and Kuwait in early December. By mid-December, the
embassies in Kuwait, and Baghdad closed and all remaining
hostages were freed by the GOI. The Baghdad embassy remains
closed to this day and the American Embassy Kuwait was reopened
in early March 1991 shortly after the ground war ended.
As a military officer caught up in an invasion and hostage
situation the most difficult task was ensuring my family's safety
while duty bound to perform the task I had been trained to do.
Once family members were allowed to leave that conflict was
resolved. All that I served with during this crisis performed
with dedication, professionalism, and distinction, even when
caught between two masters, DOS, and DoD. It is my belief that
the military group serving at the U.S. Embassy Kuwait and
subsequently at the embassy in Baghdad had a direct and positive
influence in sustaining and maintaining the operations of those
compounds, perhaps more so than any other group detained within
those compounds. Our contributions to morale, welfare, logistics,
and day to day operations help to ensure the national goals and
objectives were meet in regards to operating a diplomatic post
during a time of crisis.
After everyone returned, we all faced the task of putting our
lives back together and dealing the total loss of our household
57
goods. The Army required that we go through the standard claims
procedure to account for our losses, this was a daunting task and
took us nearly a year to complete the paper work, only to realize
that almost everything we had was depreciated on the average of
40%. Most of us got duty stations of our choice and nearly 30
days of administrative leave to get our families and lives back
in order.
By January 1991, some of us were asked to return to Desert
Shield. Of the original group of 11 military 5 of us returned to
help the Kuwaitis reconstitute their Armed Forces, but that’s
another story. Prior to my return, my local hometown paper
interviewed me. During the interview I was asked how long a
ground war with Iraqi would last, I ponder the question for a few
seconds and then respond based on my first hand observations of
the vaunted Republican Guards. I first told the reporter that I
had no respect for the Iraqi Army, then provided this response:
"If war breaks out, I expect it to last about two weeks, I
think our Air power would be decisive enough to turn the Iraqis
around and convince them it's a hopeless cause. His Air Force
would be gone in a day or two…I think after our Air power
finished, they would largely begin to capitulate, to surrender,
or withdraw their forces. Our ground forces would then be in a
mop-up operation, not heavy combat actions. Either now or later
Saddam must be dealt with, I would think he would heed the lesson
for a while, but continue either clandestinely or however
obtaining nuclear, biological and chemical weapons…if he remains
in power… You will see him raise his ugly head again". (6 January
1991).13
This was what all of us had summarized after witnessing the
invasion and conduct of the Republican Guards. When we all 13 Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, interview with Major Fred Hart, 6
January 1990, section D-1.
58
returned no one in the military intelligence community wanted to
hear that or believe that was true. We knew better from direct
observation and interaction with Iraqi military. Lastly, if
anyone had bothered to do any superficial research of the
performance of the Republican Guards during the Iran/Iraq war
they would quickly summarize that they were a large fourth rate
Army that was poorly led and trained.14
I hope that some useful insights can be gained from this
document and serve as a history of a small military organization
caught-up in a world crisis.
USLOK MEMBERS 15
2 August - 10 December 1990
Military
Col John Mooneyham
LTC Tom Funk
14 I read two books about the Iran/Iraq war prior to the invasion. What had prompted me to read up on the Iraqis was a Marine Colonel guest speaker while I was attending Air Command and Staff College, 1988-1989. He had made a few remarks about how the Iraqi Army was the only modern army in the last ten years to maneuver Corps and execute operational campaigns. He assessed correctly that the Iraqis were probably more of a threat than the Iranians. However, his assessment that they were well trained, equipped, and capable of complexed Corps level operations proved untrue. For further insights on the Iraqi Army I recommend the following two books: Dilip Hiro, The Longest War:The Iran-Iraq Conflict, New York: Routledge, 1991 and John Bulloch & Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: It's Orgins, History and Consequences, London: Methuen 1989.
15 The names listed are not inculsive, several USLOK members were out of country. The civilians include some TDYers who happen to be in country when the invasion occurred. I may have overlooked a few civilian names since my list of personnel is incomplete. Also Maj John Feeley was a CENTCOM courier and not a member of USLOK. One other individual was Navy LT CDR Mike Schwartz who was also a TDYer and not part of USLOK.
59
LTC Rhoi Maney
Maj Fred Hart
CPT Bill Schultz
CW4 Dave Forties
CW3 Dwight Durmon
CW3 Gene Lord
MSG Alfred Allen
SFC Laruen Vellekoop
CPO Ray Galles
USMC Embassy Detachment
GYSGT Jim Smith
SGT Gerald Andre
CPL Dan Hudson
CPL Paul Rodriguez
CPL Mark Royer
CPL Mark Ward
Civilians (DoD)
Veron Nored
Wayne Coyne
Bobby Higgins
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ENDNOTES
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