ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. and EDUARDO B. OLAGUER vs.BANGKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD"Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It was incorporated on July 9, 2010,and a month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder and president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKS POWER TO FIX MAX INTEREST RATES

1.R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank on June 15, 1948, empowered the CB-MB toset themaximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations.2.The Usury Law was amended byP.D.1684, giving the CB-MB authority toprescribe different maximum rates of interestwhich may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or theforbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected gradually and announced in advance. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655 now reads:3.In its Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982,the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, effective on January 1, 1983. Itremoved the ceilings on interest rateson loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits:Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or forbearance ofanymoney, goods, or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected byany person, whether natural or juridical,shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended.4.R.A. No. 7653 establishing the BSP replaced the CB:Sec. 135. Repealing Clause. Except as may be provided for in Sections 46 and 132 of this Act, Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the provisions of any other law, special charters, rule or regulation issued pursuant to said Republic Act No. 265, as amended, or parts thereof, which may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Presidential Decree No. 1792 is likewise repealed.Note: R.A. 7653 the law that created BSP to replace CB Note: this law did not retain the same provision as that of Section 109 in RA 265.PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS

To justify their skipping the hierarchy of courts petitioners contend thetranscendental importanceof their Petition:a)CB-MB statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond the limits prescribed in the Usury Law;b)If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest rates;c)Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular No. 905.Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB wasauthorized only to prescribe or set the maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal thereof or for the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to change such rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social conditions, the changes to be effected gradually and on scheduled dates; thatnothing in P.D. No. 1684 authorized the CB-MB to lift or suspend the limits of interest on all credit transactions, when it issued CB Circular No. 905. They further insist that under Section 109 of R.A. No. 265, the authority of the CB-MB was clearlyonly to fix the banks maximum rates of interest, but always within the limits prescribed by the Usury Law.CB Circular No. 905, which was promulgated without the benefit of any prior public hearing, is void because it violated NCC 5 which provides that "Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity."weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the benchmark 91-day Treasury bills shot up to 40% PA, as a result. The banks followed suit and re-priced their loans to rates which were even higher than those of the "Jobo" bills.CB Circular No. 905 is also unconstitutional in light of the Bill of Rights, which commands that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Section 109 of RA 265, and therefore, in view of therepealing clausein Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP-MB has beenstripped of the power either to prescribe the maximum rates of interest which banks may charge for different kinds of loans and credit transactions, or to suspend Act No. 2655 and continue enforcing CB Circular No. 905.Ruling

CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued CB Circular No. 905.

In Medel v. CA, it was said that the circular did not repeal nor amend the Usury Law but simply suspended its effectivity; that a Circular cannot repeal a low; that by virtue of CB the Usury Law has been rendered ineffective; that the Usury has been legally non-existent in our jurisdiction and interest can now be charged as lender and borrow may agree upon.Circular upheld the parties freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of interest citing Art. 1306 under which the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905.

RA 265 covered only banks while Section 1-a of the Usury Law, empowers the Monetary Board, BSP for that matter, to prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money, good or credits The Usury Law is broader in scope than RA 265, now RA 7653, the later merely supplemented the former as it provided regulation for loans by banks and other financial institutions. RA 7653 was not unequivocally repealed by RA 765.CB Circular 905 is essentially based on Section 1-a of the Usury Law and the Usury Law being broader in scope than the law that created the Central Bank was not deemed repealed when the law replacing CB with the Bangko Sentral was enacted despite the non-reenactment in the BSP Law of a provision in the CB Law which the petitioners purports to be the basis of Circular 905. Magulo ba? Hahaha. Basta the present set up is: The power of the BSP Monetary Board to determine interest rates emanates from the Usury Law [which was further specified by Circular 905].Granting that the CB had power to "suspend" the Usury Law, the new BSP-MB did not retain this power of its predecessor, in view of Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, which expressly repealed R.A. No. 265. The petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not reenact a provision similar to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265.A closer perusal shows thatSection 109 of R.A. No. 265 covered only loans extended by banks, whereas under Section 1-a of the Usury Law, as amended, the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.Act No. 2655, an earlier law, is much broader in scope, whereas R.A. No. 265, now R.A. No. 7653, merely supplemented it as it concerns loans by banks and other financial institutions. Had R.A. No. 7653 been intended to repeal Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms.Moreover, the rule is settled thatrepeals by implication are not favored, because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing pertaining to the subject.An implied repeal is predicated upon the condition that a substantial conflict or repugnancy is found between the new and prior laws. Thus, in the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.We find no such conflict between the provisions of Act 2655 and R.A. No. 7653.#generalia specialibus non derogantThe lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipulations charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest.

In Castro v. Tan, the Court held that the imposition of unconscionable interest is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property repulsive to the common sense of man.They are struck down for being contrary to morals, if not against the law, therefore deemed inexistent and void ab initio. However this nullity does not affect the lenders right to recover the principal of the loan nor affect the other terms thereof.PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The Petition is procedurally infirm.

The CB-MB was created to perform executive functions with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions.It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case.Petitioners have no locus standi to file the Petition

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest," who is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a partys standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.Even in public interest cases such as this petition, the Court has generally adopted the"direct injury" testthat the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have"a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."while petitioners assert a public right it is nonetheless required of them to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief.Petitioners also do not claim that public funds were being misused in the enforcement of CB Circular No. 905 which would have made the action a public one, "and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest."The Petition raises no issues of transcendental importance.

InProf. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,the Court summarized the requirements before taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators can be accorded a standing to sue, viz:(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.In CREBA v. ERC, guidelines as determinants on whether a matter is of transcendental importance, namely:1.the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;2.the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and3.the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.Funa v. Agra G.R. No. 191644; Feb. 19, 2013

FACTS: SEC. 13 ART. VII expressly prohibits the President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during the tenures. Petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Devanadera, who was running for representative in Quezon Province. That Further, that Agra was appointed in concurrent capacity. That the concurrent appointment is prohibited under the above stated provision. That during the pendency of this case, PNOY appointed Cadiz as the OSG. Meanwhile, Agra, in his response admitted that he held 2 offices concurrently. He contends that it was only temporary capacity, the effects was to center additional duties to him. Agra was not holding both offices. Under Sec.13, they argue, it must be permanent appointment. And that Agra did not receive any salaries/emoluments from the OSG after becoming acting Secretary of Justice. Petitioner, on the other hand, alleges that Sec.13 does not distinguish between an appointment and designation of a Member in an Acting or Temporary capacity

ISSUE: Did the concurrent designation of Agra violate Sec.13, Art. VII? HELD: The answers to both are in the negative. Pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VII of the Constitution,the President, Vice-President, theMembers of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistantsshall not, unless otherwise provided in thisConstitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.

To claim exception from this prohibition on double or multiple holding of offices involving the executive officials mentioned, one needs to establish that the concurrent designations and assumptions are expressly allowed by the Constitution itself. The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials offices.

However, none of these exceptions as embodied in the Constitution apply to justify the concurrent assumption of one as DOJ Secretary (DOJ) and Solicitor General (OSG). The appointment to the post of Solicitor General cannot not merely be by virtue of ones office(ex-officio)as DOJ Secretary, and vice versa. Similarly, the concurrent designations cannot be justified by arguing that the powers and functions of the OSG are required by the primary functions or included by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. By law and by the nature of their powers and functions, these two offices are independent and distinct from each other. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter, as, in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

The prohibition on double or multiple appointments applies regardless of whether either or both the appointments are merely temporary or in acting capacity.This is so because the constitution does not make a distinction as to the nature of appointment. Secondly, the purpose of the prohibition is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.To construe differently is to open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.-1. Requisites of judicial review not in issue The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to assail the validity of the subject act or issuance, that is, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.18 Here, the OSG does not dispute the justiciability and ripeness for consideration and resolution by the Court of the matter raised by the petitioner. Also, the locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has already been settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he brought.

This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has far-reaching implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.

But, it is next posed, did not the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit render this suit and the issue tendered herein moot and academic? A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.22 Although the controversy could have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two positions by Agra, the Court should still go forward and resolve the issue and not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the well-recognized exceptions established in jurisprudence. Verily, the Court did not desist from resolving an issue that a supervening event meanwhile rendered moot and academic if any of the following recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading review.

It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was an issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by reason of its transcendental importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation further calls for the review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review.24 In other words, many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed to the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)

Summary Cases: Belgica vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr. Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)

Subject: Justiciable Controversy, Ripeness for Adjudication, Political Question, Locus Standi, Res Judicata, Stare Decisis, Pork Barrel, Congressional Pork Barrel, Presidential Pork Barrel, Mandamus, Right to Information, SARO, Operative Fact Doctrine

Facts:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. In the Philippines, the pork barrel has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.

The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget.

In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks.

In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was dismissed.

In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade.

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.

As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Courts resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114(Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115(LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."122Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123"Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."148The CoA Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC.,Petitioners,vs.SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,Respondents.

Doctrine: When a party challeges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests upon him.Facts:

1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432,3as amended by RA 9257,4and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.2. On February 26, 2004, RA 92578amended certain provisions of RA 7432, to wit:

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

3. The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted.Issue:

Whether the Senior Citizens Discount that can be claimed as Tax Deductions by establishments is invalid and unconstitutionalHeld:

NO, It is Constitutional, and a valid exercise of police power.Ratio:

Petitioners Arguments Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. Petitioners argue that we have previously ruled in Central Luzon Drug Corporation37that the 20% discount is an exercise of the power of eminent domain, thus, requiring the payment of just compensation. Respondents Arguments Respondents, on the other hand, question the filing of the instant Petition directly with the Supreme Court as this disregards the hierarchy of courts.

likewise assert that there is no justiciable controversy as petitioners failed to prove that the tax deduction treatment is not a "fair and full equivalent of the loss sustained" by them. The Petition lacks merit.

There exists an actual case or controversy.

We shall first resolve the procedural issue. When the constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review may be availed of only if the following requisites concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the [question of constitutionality]; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the [question of constitutionality] is the lis mota of the case."32 In this case, petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme provided in RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF. Respondents, however, oppose the Petition on the ground that there is no actual case or controversy. We do not agree with respondents. An actual case or controversy exists when there is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution."33 The Petition must therefore show that "the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it."34 In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot be denied that there exists an actual case or controversy. As to the constitutionality of RA 9257 and its implementing rules and regulations, respondents contend that petitioners failed to overturn its presumption of constitutionality

Court Ruling

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." The petitioners cannot claim that they will be at a loss due to small mark ups and only a 32% recovery of the 20% discount. But they have not substantiated this claim with income statements of their business.

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

It is not an exercise by the state of the power of Eminent Domain

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation. The obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,78however, describes the 20% discount as an exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous law, equivalent to the amount of discount given as the just compensation therefor.The flaw in this reasoning is in its premise. It presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment, automatically amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. If this were so, then all price and rate of return on investment control laws would have to be invalidated. The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the one under consideration, must, thus, be determined on a case-to-case basis. Whether that line between permissible regulation under police power and "taking" under eminent domain has been crossed must, under the specific circumstances of this case, be subject to proof and the one assailing the constitutionality of the regulation carries the heavy burden of proving that the measure is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. We adopted a similar line of reasoning in Carlos Superdrug Corporation85when we ruled that petitioners therein failed to prove that the 20% discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a financial report, to establish the impact of the 20% discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was presented in order to show that they would be operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or that the continued implementation of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business operations of petitioners. On its face, we find that there are at least two conceivable bases to sustain the subject regulations validity absent clear and convincing proof that it is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately concluded that business establishments have the capacity to absorb a decrease in profits or income/gross sales due to the 20% discount without substantially affecting the reasonable rate of return on their investments (1) not all customers of a business establishment are senior citizens (2) the level of its profit margins on goods and services offered to the general public. Hence, the present recourse must, likewise, fail. Because all laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality, courts will uphold a laws validity if any set of facts may be conceived to sustain it. In the case at bar, evidence is indispensable before a determination of a constitutional violation can be made because of the following reasons. First, the assailed law, by imposing the senior citizen discount, does not take any of the properties used by a business establishment like, say, the land on which a manufacturing plant is constructed or the equipment being used to produce goods or services. Second, rather than taking specific properties of a business establishment, the senior citizen discount law merely regulates the prices of the goods or services being sold to senior citizens by mandating a 20% discount. Note that the law does not impose at what specific price the product shall be sold, only that a 20% discount shall be given to senior citizens based on the price set by the business establishment. A business establishment is, thus, free to adjust the prices of the goods or services it provides to the general public. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.FUNA VS MANILA ECON OFFICEThis is a petition formandamus1to compel:1.)the Commission on Audit (COA) to audit and examine the funds of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO),and

2.)the MECO to submit to such audit and examination.

In a 33-page ruling of the SC en banc written by Associate Justice Jose Perez, the SC partially granted the petition for mandamus filed by Atty. Dennis Funa seeking to compel the COA to audit and examine the funds of MECO and the latter to submit to such audit and examination.

Exercising delegated functions, the MECO is the Philippines representative office at Songjiang Rd., Zhongshan Dist., Taipei City 104, Taiwan (R.O.C.).

The Philippines has no embassy in Taiwan due to the existing "One China Policy".

The MECO was created in 1975 and is organized as a non-profit and non-stock private corporation under Philippine law.

Promoting, trade, investments, tourism, labor, scientific and cultural cooperation with Taiwan, the MECO provides assistance to Filipinos and provides visas, legal and consular services.

It coordinates with the Philippine government agencies and the private sector to fulfill this mandate.

Funa filed in 2009 a leading constitutional test case, the case of Funa vs. Executive Secretary et al.

He was appointed as the National Deputy Director for Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on Sept. 6, 2011.

Funa and several other officers of a news daily were sued by former President and now Manila Mayor Joseph "Erap" Ejercito Estrada for publishing the news series purportedly narrated allegations of money-laundering by some Philippine government officials.

He filed the petition before the SC in his capacities as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and law book author.

Funa impleaded both the COA and the MECO.

He argued that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA is neglecting its duty under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Philippine Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC) or government instrumentality.

It is Funa's adamant claim that the MECO is a GOCC without an original charter or, at least, a government instrumentality, the funds of which partake the nature of public funds.

According to Funa, the MECO possesses all the essential characteristics of a GOCC and an instrumentality under Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987 of the Administrative Code.

Funa stressed that the MECO performs functions that are equivalent to those of an embassy or a consulate of the Philippine government.

He said that a reading of the authorized functions of the MECO, as found in EO No. 15, s. 2001, reveals that they are subtanstially the same functions performed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), through its diplomatic and consular missions, per Administrative Code.

In its ruling, the SC said that "the mandamus petition was able to craft substantial issues presupposing the commission of a grave violation of the Constitution and involving paramount public interest, which need to be resolved nonetheless."

The SC ruled that the petition "raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA. Hence, we hold that the petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the [mandamus petition.]"

It said that the MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality.

The SC added that "government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some special function or jurisdiction they perform or exercise, "are allotted operational autonomy and are not integrated within the department of framework."

However, it stressed that the MECO is a non-profit and non-stock private corporation.

The ruling said that the MECO "is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan with jeopardizing the country's faithful commitment to the One China Policy of the PROC [People's Republic of China.]"

"However, despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the verification fees it collects on behalf of the [Department of Labor and Employment] and the consular fees it collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001," it added.

Hence, the SC said that under existing laws, "the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such verification fees and consular fees should be audited by COA."

"Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is partially granted. The [MECO] is hereby declared a non-governmental entity. However, the accounts of the [MECO] pertaining to: the verification fees contemplated by Section 7 of Executive Order N. 1022 issued on May 1, 1985, that the former collects on behalf of the DOLE, and the fees it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of [E.O.] No. 15 issued 16 May 2001, are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA," the SC ruling said. (PNA)

- See more at: http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/news/86105-SC-declares-MECO-a-non-governmental-entity.html#sthash.sjAEH3Nt.dpuf

OUR RULINGWe grant the petition in part. We declare that the MECO is a nongovernmental entity. However, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to the verification fees it collects on behalf of the DOLEas well asthe fees it was authorized to collect under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Such fees pertain to the government and should be audited by the COA.

IWe begin with the preliminary issues.

Mootness of PetitionThe first preliminary issue relates to the alleged mootness of the instantmandamuspetition, occasioned by the COAs issuance ofOffice Order No. 2011698. The COA claims that by issuingOffice Order No. 2011698, it had already conceded its jurisdiction over the accounts of the MECO and so fulfilled the objective of the instant petition.58The COA thus urges that the instant petition be dismissed for being moot and academic.59We decline to dismiss themandamuspetition on the ground of mootness.

A case is deemed moot and academic when, by reason of the occurrence of a supervening event, it ceases to present any justiciable controversy.60Since they lack an actual controversy otherwise cognizable by courts, moot cases are, as a rule, dismissible.61The rule that requires dismissal of moot cases, however, is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions. InDavid v. MacapagalArroyo,62this Court comprehensively captured these exceptions scattered throughout our jurisprudence:

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;63second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;64third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;65andfourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.66In this case, We find that the issuance by the COA ofOffice Order No. 2011698indeed qualifies as a supervening event that effectively renders moot and academic the main prayer of the instantmandamuspetition. A writ ofmandamusto compel the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO would certainly be a mere superfluity, when the former had already obliged itself to do the same.

Be that as it may, this Court refrains from dismissing outright the petition. We believe that themandamuspetition was able to craft substantial issues presupposing thecommission of a grave violation of the Constitutionand involvingparamount public interest, which need to be resolved nonetheless:

First.The petition makes a serious allegation that the COA had been remiss in its constitutional or legal duty to audit and examine the accounts of an otherwise auditable entity in the MECO.

Second.There is paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue concerning the failure of the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO. The propriety or impropriety of such a refusal is determinative of whether the COA was able to faithfully fulfill its constitutional role as the guardian of the public treasury, in which any citizen has an interest.

Third.There is also paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue regarding the legal status of the MECO; a novelty insofar as our jurisprudence is concerned. We find that the status of the MECOwhether it may be considered as a government agency or nothas a direct bearing on the countrys commitment to theOne Chinapolicy of the PROC.67An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal duty, coupled with the pressing public interest in the resolution of all related issues, prompts this Court to pursue a definitive ruling thereon, if not for the proper guidance of the government or agency concerned, thenfor the formulation of controlling principles for the education of the bench, bar and the public in general.68For this purpose, the Court invokes itssymbolic function.69If the foregoing reasons are not enough to convince, We still add another:

Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true,Office Order No. 2011698does not offer the strongest certainty that they would not be replicated in the future. In the first place,Office Order No. 2011698did not state any legal justification as to why, after decades of not auditing the accounts of the MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it state any determination regarding the true status of the MECO. The justifications provided by the COA, in fact, only appears in the memorandum70it submitted to this Court for purposes of this case.

Thus, the inclusion of the MECO inOffice Order No. 2011698appears to be entirely dependent upon the judgment of the incumbent chairperson of the COA; susceptible of being undone, with or without reason, by her or even her successor. Hence, the case now before this Court is dangerouslycapable of being repeated yet evading review.

Verily, this Court should not dismiss themandamuspetition on the ground of mootness.

Standing of PetitionerThe second preliminary issue is concerned with the standing of the petitioner to file the instantmandamuspetition. The COA claims that petitioner has none, for the latter was not able to concretely establish that he had been aggrieved or prejudiced by its failure to audit the accounts of the MECO.71Related to the issue of lack of standing is the MECOs contention that petitioner has no cause of action to file the instantmandamuspetition. The MECO faults petitioner for not making any demand for it to submit to an audit by the COA or for the COA to perform such an audit, prior to filing the instant petition.72We sustain petitioners standing, as a concerned citizen, to file the instant petition.

The rules regarding legal standing in bringing public suits, orlocus standi, are already welldefined in our case law. Again, We cite David, which summarizes jurisprudence on this point:73By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) fortaxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) forvoters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) forconcerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are oftranscendental importancewhich must be settled early; and

(5) forlegislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

We rule that the instant petition raises issues oftranscendental importance, involved as they are with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold that the petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the instantmandamuspetition.

To be sure, petitioner does not need to make any prior demand on the MECO or the COA in order to maintain the instant petition. The duty of the COA sought to be compelled bymandamus, emanates from the Constitution and law, which explicitly require, or demand, that it perform the said duty. To the mind of this Court, petitioner already established his cause of action against the COA when he alleged that the COA had neglected its duty in violation of the Constitution and the law.

Principle of Hierarchy of CourtsThe last preliminary issue is concerned with the petitions nonobservance of the principle of hierarchy of courts. The COA assails the filing of the instantmandamuspetition directly with this Court, when such petition could have very well been presented, at the first instance, before the Court of Appeals or any Regional Trial Court.74The COA claims that the petitioner was not able to provide compelling reasons to justify a direct resort to the Supreme Court.75In view of thetranscendental importanceof the issues raised in themandamuspetition, as earlier mentioned, this Court waives this last procedural issue in favor of a resolution on the merits.76DISINI vs SOJ

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The Facts and the Case

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;

3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;

4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

The Issues Presented

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators.Imbong vs OchoaNothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management perogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82(b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Corpuz vs PeopleFACTS: Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.

The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.

When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.

Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.

Corpuz argued as follows:

a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULINGCan the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecutions formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the ownerand that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

The 4thelement is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed on or about the 5thof July 1991, such is not fatal to the prosecutions cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.The specific word demand need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.

May a sole witness be considered credible?Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.

The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.

Araullo vs Aquino

Antecedents

What has precipitated the controversy?

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that s