before pragmatism: the practical idealism of susan e. blow (1843-1916)

Before Pragmatism: The Practical Idealism of Susan E. Blow (1843-1916)Author(s): Dorothy RogersSource: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall, 2000), pp. 535-548Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320814 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 12:23

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactionsof the Charles S. Peirce Society.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.105.245.150 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 12:23:03 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=iupress

http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320814?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Dorothy Rogers

Before Pragmatism: The Practical Idealism of

Susan E. Blow (1843-1916)*

Sometimes the American pragmatic spirit manifests itself in the most unex- pected of contexts - within early American idealism, for instance. The movement that produced page after enthusiastic page of praise for all things Hegelian in the St. Louis of the 1860s and '70s1 - this very same movement also begat (or perhaps more accurately, birthed) the most practical, systematic, and success- ful educational system in America - and some would say, for its time, in the world. And it did so, not by sharply distinguishing between the "practical" and the "theoretical" aspects of its work, but rather by interweaving the pragmatic and the ideal, yielding a whole which was "American Idealism."

Movements, of course, do not exist apart from their members. And this paper recognizes one member of the St. Louis movement who has been all-but- thoroughly overlooked by historians of philosophy for a century: Susan Eliza- beth Blow (1843-1916). Blow was an educator whose pedagogical theory was by necessity a hands-on endeavor and was as enthusiastic as any in the St. Louis circle, not only to interpret and expound on Hegel's thought, but to apply it to the American context.2 As I will show below, Blow helped transform HegePs idealism in ways that make it practical, even pre-pragmatic.

Blow's Work and Role in the St. Louis Movement Susan Blow easily qualifies as the most prominent of the women of the early

American idealist movement, which took place roughly between 1860 and 1900. She is best known for having established the public kindergarten system in St. Louis, and is still a central figure in the educational canon. Because her pedagogical theory grew directly out of her connection with the St. Louis circle, she is mentioned by name by more historians of the movement than any of its other female participants. In fact, Dentón Snider, the group's self-appointed historian, recognizes her as one of the four major figures in the circle. Another historian declares that Blow "may almost be called the heroine of the St. Louis School of Thought."3

Attention to Blow is certainly deserved, on both the practical and theoretical

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society FalL 2000. Vol. XXXVI. No. 4



536 Dorothy Rogers

levels. Her practical contribution to the movement was her founding of the first free (and continuous) public kindergarten in the country (in 1872) and oversee- ing its operations. Blow not only provided a valuable public service to one of the growing cities of the West, she also gave professional status to the care and nur- ture of young children - which had been a private endeavor. Theoretically, Blow's system of early childhood education was tied to her understanding of philosophy, Hegel in particular. Her kindergarten theory is interspersed with discussions of the merits of different schools of thought within philosophy: idealism, atomism, pragmatism, or Eastern philosophy of religion, for example. At times she links these discussions back to their impact on education. At others, however, entire sections discussing philosophy proper stand on their own in Blow's published work. In fact, in her last book, Educational Issues in the Kindergarten, Blow devoted nearly a third of the work to "Three World Views" - i.e., three philosophical systems, the most adequate of which is monistic idealism.

Blow's Pedagogical Theory Blow's main vehicle for developing her rather pragmatic brand of idealism

was the kindergarten methods of the German educator and romantic/idealist contemporary of Hegel, Friedrich Froebel. Froebel outlined a series of "plays" and games that are familiar parent-child activities, such as "Peek-a-Boo" and "Falling-Falling" and gave interpretations of them that were relatively straight- forward. In Froebel's view such games served primarily to develop physical strength and build trust between parent and child. But Blow had a deeper, He- gelian reading of the purpose of the games. According to Blow, both of these games simulate Hegel's idea of estrangement and return with each "absence" of a parent from their child: the child is momentarily "estranged" from, then sud- denly reacquainted with Mom, Dad, or babysitter. She became a pioneer in American pedagogy by teaching Froebel's methods to the literally hundreds of women who went to St. Louis to study under her and encouraging them to read the same significance in them.

Interestingly, Blow did not indicate when she was speaking as a Froebelian, as opposed to an Hegelian. This, I believe, is because she did not see the need to distinguish between the two. She did not try to choose one theorist over the other at any point, because they were completely compatible in her view. And in some ways, this makes sense. It is unclear whether Froebel and Hegel knew each other personally. In fact, from 1799, when Froebel began attending classes at the university in Jena, until 1818, when Hegel accepted a faculty position in Ber- lin, the comings and goings of the two consisted of a series of near misses.4 Yet Froebel and Hegel certainly were influenced by the same forces and associated with the same people, even if they had never met. But Froebel was by no means the philosopher that Hegel was. In fact, he was influenced more by romanticism than by idealism. Even so, Froebel was adept at putting together a method with which to teach, even if he did not present it as a system. Blow could espouse both



The Practical Idealism of Susan E. Blow 537

Hegel and Froebel simultaneously because for her theory and praxis were inter- twined. Froebel provided the practical methods and Hegel the theory that shed light on and justified the use of that method. Metaphorically speaking, Blow uses Hegel's theory as the city plan, and FroebePs methods as the buildings within that city. So well do the two complement each other in Blow's understanding that they barely need to be distinguished.

With only a cursory glance at the history of the kindergarten in St. Louis, one could be led to believe that the recognized leader of the St. Louis movement, William Torrey Harris (1835-1909), was solely responsible for both its conception and implementation. Harris' biographer and other St. Louis historians credit him solely with kindergarten innovations that Blow was responsible for.5 While it is true that Blow was greatly assisted by Harris, particularly in the kindergarten's very early stages (Harris himself had taken an interest in pre- primary education before Blow met with him to discuss the idea in 1871), it is also the case that Blow herself was an adept organizer and leader, not to mention theoretician, who got the project up and running and conveyed kindergarten theory to others.6

Blow's objectives in providing kindergarten education were distinct from those of Harris. For Harris, education's purpose was almost wholly practical. It served as a civilizing force, bringing harmony to society. In the first year of the kindergarten program, he coached the school board not to expect an advance in intelligence as much as the formation of good habits in kindergarten children - in itself a valuable function. Prior to the founding of the kindergarten, most children attended school only in mid-childhood, roughly from ages 6-10. In large measure, Harris' goal in pushing for education to begin at a younger age was to extend the period of time they spent in school. He had little hope that parents would extend children's education at the upper age levels when children actually became useful to their parents, particularly in working class and agricultural households that needed additional wage-earners or field workers. Instead, he believed that the kindergarten could be an equalizing force in society, bringing culture, discipline, and good moral and mental habits to the masses at an earlier age.7

For Blow, on the other hand, formal education played a more pragmatic- idealist role. It aided in personal intellectual and moral development, thereby forming productive individuals. It also awakened a young mind to the ideal - to universal truths that await discovery. Froebel's system did not simply acquaint children with the material world, it drew the child's attention to properties in the objects around them. The child then grew to see the relations between objects, and finally to the reality that lay behind those objects. This was not all go- ing to occur in the first year of a child's introduction to formal education, of course, but kindergarten was a crucial step in the initiation of this process. The use of games in kindergarten classes were not merely forms of recreation, but were instead exercises that fostered intellectual and moral growth. Kindergarten



538 Dorothy Rogers

education might indeed have a civilizing and equalizing power as well, as Harris believed, but this was not its most important function for Blow.

However, neither Blow nor Harris explicitly acknowledged their different emphases. Perhaps this is because in practice the two views had both pragmatic and idealist value, and also were so very complementary. Blow could implement her kindergarten programs in such a way as to facilitate exactly the kind of growth she thought necessary. All the while, Harris would congratulate her for producing such fine, well-mannered children who would, no doubt, grow to be even finer citizens. The two views by no means mutually exclude each other. In fact, if they were consciously aware of their respective foci, it is unlikely either would have objected to the other's view. Harris' concern was with education's influence on social harmony. Blow's concern was with personal development and intellectual discovery. In the end, however, they are just two sides of the same proverbial coin, because a harmonious society is made of thriving, self-realized individuals and vice versa.

Some Pedagogical Errors: Blow's Critique Blow had strong opinions about what constituted good and bad kindergar-

ten practices and their effects on children. Many teachers, in her view, began in- terpreting Froebel too freely. And she identifies three such interpretations that she considers detrimental to children. She was very critical of these kindergarten methods, including the methods championed by pragmatist John Dewey.

The first error Blow calls the "concentric" approach. This is a method in which an idea or symbol is chosen at random and lessons and activities centered around it. One example of the concentric kindergarten that Blow found especially dreadful was a series of lessons on Abraham Lincoln in which the ever important element of play was entirely missing. Rather the teacher lectured and gave them paper chains to break, as Lincoln broke the chains of slavery. In Blow's words, they were "litde victims of the concentric program" forced to re- enact a "dreary drama" while their moralizing teacher implored them to emulate Lincoln's example.8 Not only was play - children's natural element - entirely absent from this exercise, but the ideas conveyed were too far removed from the children's everyday experience and therefore were too abstract for them to grasp.

The second kindergarten method to which Blow objected is the complete converse of the concentric program: the "free-play" kindergarten, the name of which belies its focus. Its biggest error is that, while it provides some structure, it does so with virtually no system within this structure. All the children may count buttons simultaneously, for example, or all get a chance to write on the board, but each activity is detached from the other. The practical activities have no connection to the ideals those activities point to - at the very least improvements in moral and/or physical abilities.9

A third flawed early childhood educational method is really a type of concentric approach, the "industrial" kindergarten, as Blow refers to it, favored by John




Dewey. We are now familiar with Dewey's belief that education should be linked to social goals and that it can be meaningful to familiarize children with the world of work. Children can help dig, clean, peel, and cook a potato, for instance. They then learn how to make starch and even use the starch they make on doll clothes. To a pure pragmatist, this is useful enough as a series of educational exercises. Yet in Blow's pragmatic-idealist view, it is misguided in that it misunderstands the role of the school and thus the purpose of education. The school is a social institution, but one that acts as an intermediary between family and civil society. Its goals are not identical with that of civil society. Along with Hegel, Blow saw civil society as the realm in which individuals perform actual du- ties and engage in work relations with each other for mutual gain.10 The school on the other hand is its own reason for being. Education is its only aim. Stu- dents should not be encouraged to look for reward or other external incentives, but should be taught to seek growth and achievement for its own sake.

These objections to alternative kindergarten methods make a very strong statement about Blow's perspective on education, its relation to idealism, and the limits of the pragmatic edge in her thought. Blow does believe children's experience is important, and is even a valuable tool for teaching them and helping them develop as individuals. Nature, manufactured objects, and family and social relationships all have a legitimate role to play in sharpening children's skills and opening their minds. Furthermore, a teacher should be sure to keep big-picture goals in mind: the relations between objects prepare children for more abstract thinking; lessons about self and other prepare them for adult responsibilities and relationships. The first "concentric" kindergarten erred by skipping almost entirely over the practical and experiential to high and lofty ideals that have no grounding in children's reality. In this sense, Blow has pragmatic leanings. But experiences and projects that draw on objects of experience mustn't go too far. The "free play" kindergarten allowed for a free-floating indulgence in only sense experience without building toward any goals. Dewey's favored method com- bined both errors in Blow's view: the lesson was bound to experience and it fo- cused on a goal that is too far removed from children's current context to be useful or educational.

In a sense, then, Blow's educational theory is pragmatic in the short-term and idealist in the long-term. Children should be encouraged to experience and explore their immediate context and surroundings, but without making that context/surrounding ends in themselves. The end of education is the development of the mind, and thus the development of the self (an immortal self, in Blow's view).

Beyond Pedagogy: from Philosophical Critique to Construction While Blow disapproved of Dewey's educational theories on several points,

she directed a much harsher critique toward James' pragmatism, particularly in regard to his theory of truth. At one point, Blow had expressed the belief that



540 Dorothy Rogers

James might become the next great Hegelian, should he continue on the path he was on. The next great Hegelian he did not become, of course. In fact, in time he became quite critical of the St. Louis movement. Blow, in return, was critical of the way in which James strayed from the Idealist path.

Pragmatism, Blow claims, "has awakened from the nightmare of naturalism [and] restore[d] to man the dignity of freedom."11 Yet it errs by focusing too

sharply on humanity's agency in the world. Pragmatism limits itself primarily to an understanding of the notion of truth. And truth, it claims, is contingent, something that is worked out by human beings in everyday experience. Blow notes that, to pragmatism's credit, human beings are not the sole creators of truth, however. Instead they are only "one of the participant agencies in its continuous creation." She adds that "this limitation of man's creative function re- deems the pragmatic doctrine from the reproach that it destroys all objective standards."12

But Blow makes the criticism so commonly leveled against pragmatism that its method for testing truth is flawed, because no criteria are given for deciding what "works" and for whom. What pragmatism lacks is a theory of reality to

ground its truth claims. Pragmatism's truth is said to be that which corresponds with reality, yet James and his followers fail to establish what constitutes or is constituted by this reality. The problem in Blow's view is that the "truth" of which pragmatism speaks "is nonexistent, and ... for the excellent reason that [within pragmatism] there is no eternal reality with which to correspond."13 Of course, many a pragmatist would likely object to Blow's insistence that the reality of which she speaks must be of the "eternal" sort, and Blow simultaneously rec-

ognizes and dismisses this objection. The eternal is organic yet determinate; it is not merely in flux. If we understand reality to be eternal, we are able to clearly perceive the truths which that reality reveals to us. However, James' theory of truth as open and contingent points to his view of reality, out of which this con-

tingent truth springs. James' world, in which truth is not given but made, is by implication a world in which reality is also not given, but to some degree also "made" by those discerning it via their self-made truths. Blow in contrast insists that in such a world, reality "has alternative possibilities, ... its future is not as- sured. It has no will of its own."14 Given Blow's strong conviction that the world is and must be imbued, not only with life, but also with purpose (and thus will) and even personality, a view such as James' is tantamount to nihilism in her view. In addition, his overt support of a shift to pluralism is nonsensical to Blow, and she asks rhetorically, "is his world of plural truths, plural wills, and plural possibility the world in which we actually live? I think not."15

Blow recognizes that to pragmatista idealism posits "a kind of Brahma in whom all distinctions, even those of good and evil, are transcended."16 Further, both of these schools of thought are a sort of reaction against idealism. They have excised a personal and an all-knowing God, respectively, from their systems and have replaced it with a morally neutral One and a "plural and insecure uni-




verse with 'a fighting chance'"17 rather than work through the difficult questions that theodicy poses. Yet in Blow's view, the "cumulative evidence of all facts . . . points to idealism for their adequate interpretation."18

But what is idealism as Blow understands it? At the most basic level, it is the belief that "the only realities in the world are God and the souls in whom he pro- gressively creates his image."19 This takes place in a process of evolution that is not deterministic and mechanical, as Spencer and his followers would have us believe, but is instead spiritual. It is an evolution in which a "procession of souls" takes place and in which no soul perishes. Yet how can any individual witness this procession and what is the nature of its "choreographer" - that is, God? Blow's answer is very Hegelian: "the final explanation of the universe [is] in a completely realized self-consciousness."20 That is, God is the ultimate source of this universe, and knowledge of God the only means through which we can understand the universe. And idealism is the philosophy most adequate to lead us to an understanding of God as this "completely realized self-consciousness."

Yet not all those who consider themselves idealists give an appropriate ac- count of the relationship of God to the world. Blow criticizes those who put forth what is a barren form of monism, in which the universe is constituted by a divine self-knowledge which overtakes human individuality.21 Spinoza's system is guilty of making this error, for instance, and many "idealists" would do better to recognize the resemblance between his thought and their's. The outcome of monism is that human intention, freedom, and responsibility are utterly lost. Fur- thermore, immortality exits from the picture as well, because only a completely free being can receive the gift of eternal life. Unfortunately, Blow doesn't explain in depth why an un-free being (an angel, for example) could not be granted immortality as well. Perhaps she means to indicate here that, because after death each individual becomes a part of the whole in monism, he or she as an individual does not truly live eternally because he or she as a distinct being no longer exists.

Another misguided understanding of idealism that Blow discusses is in fact a version of pluralism in which reality consists of a collective of eternal souls. Pro- ponents of this view may attempt to correct their error by granting God a super- lative-soul status, but in fact, the outcome is the same as with pure pluralism. Human beings do maintain a separate and independent status from God, but the system overall degenerates into a process of becoming in which no soul is truly distinct, nor any soul genuinely realized. Pluralists claim to posit the universe as whole, but fail to establish a One who wills this wholeness into being. Although at one time a member of the St. Louis circle, George Howison is one whom Blow identifies as having committed this error.22 Whereas the first misguided idealism errs on the side of establishing God's supremacy too boldly, this false idealism errs by not establishing God's power - and it seems, again, as a personal force in the world - boldly enough.

Part of the problem in Blow's view is that some idealists rely on a spatial



542 Dorothy Rogers

metaphor to envision the relationship between the one-ness that is God and each of the individuals that constitute God's universe. In the spatial metaphor, would- be idealists depict the universe (with varying degrees of sophistication) more or less as a big box containing a collection of little boxes. Both monism and pluralism are susceptible to this error, monism placing too much stress on the big box, pluralism overemphasizing the little boxes. However, the relation of God to the world is not one in which each little soul fits like a tiny box into the one big, cos- mic soul; rather, it is a relation of 'member- whole' - Gliedfjanzes.

The term Glicdganzes is used to describe the relationship of the individual to the whole, but it is not bound to commit the same error as the spatial metaphor that Blow criticized. While it would seem that in the final analysis, one or the other - the individual, or the whole - must necessarily predominate, and thus Glieiganzcs fall short of integrating the two, Blow sets herself as having skirted this problem. Gikdganzcs is meant to be understood as a relation in which the individual itself expresses the reality of the whole of which it is also a part. That is, "the individual, on the one hand, [is] a member of this organism, and on the other [it is] the organism itself in its ideal totality." Yet Blow acknowledges that this concept points to a "paradox of mind" which holds that the individual is "free and self-creative ... yet implies relationship."23 The answer, however, is to recognize with Hegel that this paradox itself holds the "key to all the problems of philosophy."24

Blow and her colleagues objected to a Rousseau-style noble savage who is free from all social constraints. For Blow the individual is not and never can be separated from his or her social context. Remaining true to Hegel's system, she declares that, through the concept of GlitAganzts the individual can be whole "only in virtue of the fact that he is also a member [of society]" or to the degree that "he realizes his ideal nature through participation in the life of mankind." This is because for Blow it is only as social beings that humans can "make actual [their] ideal nature."25

Yet what does it mean to make one's ideal nature actual? Blow's answer is more descriptive than prescriptive. She claims that an individual must "become universal," which, based on earlier discussion of her educational theory, is to fully engage oneself in the common experience of humanity. The individual is to endeavor to create that which other human beings have created, and grapple with the concepts that other human beings have grappled with. But the process goes further than merely taking on the outer trappings of human behavior. In fact for Blow, the very process of following in the footsteps of others is also in part a process through which each individual surrenders the particularities of his or her existence, and thus joins in the human endeavor to go beyond the mere contin- gencies of individual existence. This is the first step in entering into universal human nature.

Blow also describes the relation that the individual has to Mind as a universal energy. For the true idealist, as a member of the whole, each individual recog-




nizes mind as a universal and self-creative force in which he or she is engaged at every level. Metaphorically speaking, in its relation to Mind the individual is not only musician, but also instrument and music simultaneously. The individual mind certainly 'composes' and 'plays' the music, to continue with Blow's metaphor, but this is not the whole story. The individual mind does not simply act on the mental data of the world, but is also acted on by that data, broadly defined. Particular minds are also the instrument through which Mind conveys its thoughts, or 'plays its music'; they are also the tangible record of those thoughts, or again, using Blow's metaphor, are the music itself, both written and played. Yet engagement of the individual mind with Mind cannot take place in isolation. In fact, for Blow,

a mind existing apart from and out of relation to other minds is a logical impossibility. Indeed, mind is in no sense a possession of the individual, but a universal energy in which all individuals participate.

^

Now we begin to see the link between educational theory and philosophy proper for Blow. Mind is a powerful and life-changing force, but it cannot imprint its truths on individual minds that exist in isolation. That is why it is essential to initiate children into the process of participating in Mind from a young age. So Blow endeavored to apply idealism, "the only philosophy which adequately inter- prets . . . educational procedure,"27 to educational issues as she saw them. In a sense, the fact that Blow devoted her life to education is especially fitting; after all in her view God's aim is to "educate the human soul."28

NOTES

This article is a hybrid of two paper presentations, at a session of the Society for the Study of Women Philosophers at the annual meeting of the American Phi- losophical Association (Boston, Dec. 1999) and at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (Indianapolis, Mar. 2000).

1. Via its Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the first periodical in America devoted solely to the discipline.

2. There were over a dozen women in the St. Louis branch of the Amen- can Idealist movement, the majority of whom were educators. Another 15-20 were associated with the Idealist movement in later incarnations, notably as participants in the Con- cord Summer School of Philosophy (Massachusetts), 1879-1888; as leaders in the Chi- cago Literary School and kindergarten movement; and as theorist-activists in the international peace movement.

3. Other major figures include William Torrey Harris, Henry C. Brock- meyer, and Snider himself. See Dentón J. Snider, The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy, (St. Louis: Sigma Publishing Company, 1910), 301. For reference to Blow as "almost



544 Dorothy Rogers

the heroine" of the movement, see Cleon Forbes, "The St. Louis School of Thought," Missouri Historical Review, 25:619.

4. Froebel left Jena in the spring of 1801, just before Hegel went there to teach in the fall. Both were in Bamberg, but again missed each other, although this time by three years; Froebel was there 1803-4, Hegel 1807-8. Then in Berlin, where Froebel was a curator in the museum of minerology from 1812-16, he turned down an offer for a faculty position the same year Hegel also decided on an offer in Heidelberg, rather than Berlin. Hegel would later go to Berlin in 1818, of course, where good friends of FroebePs, Wilhelm Middendorff and Heinrich Langethal, were students, studying under Fichte and Schleiermacher. But even here, the potential for linking Froebel to Hegel himself is unfulfilled. Shortly after meeting them (in 1814), Froebel discovered his love for education and convinced his friends to join him in Greishaim where he established the "Institute for Universal German Education" in 1817. (It was later moved to Kelihau.) This was a school for children aged five to twelve primarily, despite its grandiose name. The next year, Froebel married Henrietta Wilhelmine Hoffmeister, whom he had met through Middendorff and Langenau. See Emilie Michaelis and H. Keatley Moore, trans, and eds., Autobiography of Friedrich Froebel, (Syracuse: C. W. Bardeen, Publisher, 1889), 35-40, 102-104, 120-124.

5. See Kurt F. Leidecker, Yankee Teacher, (New York: Philosophic library, 1946), 270; Cleon Forbes, 25:619; 25:88; 25:295; and Charles M. Perry, "William Torrey Harris and the St. Louis Movement in Philosophy," in William Torrey Harris 1835-1935, Edward L. Schaub, ed. [papers presented in commemoration of Harris at the centennial of his birth at the meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophi- cal Society], (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1936), 39. More distressing by far is the fact that in her history of the kindergarten Blow herself credits Harris completely with its founding. In fact, she does not even hint that she played any part in establishing or imple- menting the kindergarten program, despite the fact that she was the central figure in both. See Susan E. Blow, "Kindergarten Education," Monographs on Education in the United States, Nicholas Murray Butler, ed. (originally presented at the Paris Exposition, 1900), 5- 7.

6. Elizabeth Palmer Peabody had started a public kindergarten a decade earlier in Boston, but with limited success and in 1870 encouraged Harris to establish the kindergarten in St. Louis. Harris seemed genuinely interested in pursuing the kindergarten experiment, recommending that early childhood education methods be incorporated into teaching in the primary grades. After a committee appointed by the school board vis- ited a play school in New Jersey, but found no evidence of bonafide kindergarten methods elsewhere in this country, the decision was made for St. Louis to be the first to introduce the kindergarten to America. See Blow, Kindergarten Education, 3; Hilliker, "The Life and Work of Susan Blow," unpublished manuscript in the collection of the Carondelet Historical Society, 1-4, 13.

7. Hilliker, Life and Work, 3 and 20. Elizabeth Peabody's view seems to have been similar to Blow's.

8. See Blow, Symbolic Education: A Commentary on FroebeVs cMother Play (New York: Appleton, 1894), 245-247; Educational Issues in the Kindergarten (New York: Appleton, 1908), 1-33 (p. 6 for "little victims" quote). She expresses similar ideas in the Introduction to Mottoes and Commentaries of Friedrich Froebel's ̂Mother Flay3 (New York: Appleton, 1894), 22-23 and in Letters to Mothers on the Philosophy of Froebel (New York: Appleton, 1898), 189.




9. Blow, Educational Issues, 1 56. 10. Blow, Educational Issues, 336-7. 1 1 . Blow, Educational Issues, 360. 12. Blow, Educational Issues* 355. 13. Blow, Educational Issues, 357. 14. Blow, Educational Issues, 358. 15. Blow, Educational Issues, 360. 16. Blow, Educational Issues, 370. 17. Blow, Educational Issues, 367-8. 18. Blow, Letters, 273. 19. Blow, Letters, 273. 20. Blow, Educational Issues, 370. 21 . Blow, Educational Issues, 377. 22. Blow letter to William Torrey Harris, Dec. 20, 1891, in William Tor-

rey Harris Papers, Missouri Historical Society archives, St. Louis, Missouri. 23. Blow, Symbolic, 35-36. 24. Blow, Mottoes, 6. 25. Blow, Symbolic, 35, 37. 26. Blow, Symbolic, 36-7. 27 Blow, Educational Issues, xiv. 28. Blow, Educational Issues, 386.

Susan Elizabeth Blow (1843-1916): A Selected Bibliography

[Works by]

1870s "Experiment of Establishing a Kindergarten," St. Louis Public Schools Annual Report (1874-75), p. 95-102, Aug. 1, 1875.

"The Kindergarten in the Des Peres School," St. Louis Public Schools Annual Report (1875-76), p. 195-199, Aug 1, 1876,

"Claims of the Kindergarten for a Place in the St. Louis School System," St. Louis Public Schools Annual Report (1878-79), p. 192-224, Aug 1, 1879.

"Symbolic Phase of Education," St. Louis Public Schools Annual Report (1878-79), Aug 1,1879, p. 206-211.

1880s The School Workshop, [trans.], by B. von Marenholtz-Bülow, (Syracuse: C.W. Bardeen), 1882.

"Goeschel on the Immortality of the Soul," [trans.] The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 17:154; 17:246, (1883); 18:21 (1884).

"Dante's Inferno," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 18:121 (1884).



546 Dorothy Rogers

"Dante's Purgatorio" The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 19:61 (1885).

"Goeschel on the Immortality of the Soul," [trans.] The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 19:172; 19:299, (1885).

A Study of Dante. (New York: G. P. Putnam), 1886.

"Goeschel on the Immortality of the Soul," [trans.] The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 20:88; 20:310, (1886).

1890s Symbolic Education: A Commentary on FroebeVs "Mother Play* (New York: Appleton), 1894.

Mottoes and Commentaries of Friedrich ProebeVs (Mother Play\ (New York: Appleton), 1895. [Prose commentaries translated and accompanied with an introduction treating of the philosophy of Froebel, by Susan E. Blow.]

Songs and Music of Friedrich FroebeVs 'Mother Play3. (New York: Appleton), 1895. [Prepared and arranged by Susan E. Blow.]

"The History of the Kindergarten in the United States," Outlook 55:932-8; April 3, 1897.

"The Kindergarten Ideal," Outlook 56:890-4, Aug 7, 1897.

Utters to Mothers on the Philosophy of Froebel (New York: Appleton), 1898.

1900s "How Kindergarten Begins the Training of the Will," Kindergarten Magazine, 14:628- 29, Jun 1902.

Kindergarten Education. (Albany: Lyon), 1904. [reprint of essay by the same name in Nicolas Murray Butler, Education in the United States, vol. 1, (Albany: Lyon), 1900].

Educational Issues in the Kindergarten, (New York: Appleton), 1908.

"The Conception of Gliedganzes," The Kindergarten, p. 1-14 (New York: Houghton Mifflin), 1913.

"Definition and Order of Education Values," The Kindergarten, p. 15-62, (New York: Houghton Mifflin), 1913.

[Works About]

Baker, Edna. "The Kindergarten," Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1937.

Belknap, Edna. Review of Educational Issues in the Kindergarten, in Kindergarten Re-




view, 19:175-78, Nov. 1908.

Bridgewater, W. and Sherwood, J. E., eds. "Susan E. Blow," Columbia Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., p. 213, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1950.

Bryan, John A. The Blow Family in St. Louis. (St. Louis: Jefferson National Expansion Memorial), 1948.

Cook, F.E. "William T. Harris and Susan Blow Establish the Kindergarten in St. Louis," William Torrey Harris in St. Louis Schools, by F.E. Cook, 1910.

Cooper, Sarah B. "The Kindergarten and its Relation to Motherhood," Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1889, p. 471.

Critic. Review of Symbolic Education, voi 24:248-9; April 14, 1894.

Cubberly, Ellwood P. "Susan Blow Establishes the First Kindergarten," Public Education in the U.S., rev. ed., (NY: Houghton Mifflin), 1947.

The Dial. Review of Symbolic Education; voi 16:303-4; May 16, 1894.

The Dial. Review of Mottoes and Commentaries ofFroebeVs Mother Play, voi 20:104; Feb. 16, 1896.

Faust, Trudy. The History of the Des Peres School, (St. Louis: Carondelet Historical Soci- ety), 1987.

Firmer, Mildred S. "William Torrey Harris and Susan Elizabeth Blow," Pioneer American Educators, (Washington, DC: National Education Association), 1944.

Fisher, Laura. "Susan Elizabeth Blow and the International Kindergarten Union," Pio- neers of the Kindergarten in America, p. 184-203, (New York: Century, 1924.

Fitts, Alice. "Tribute to Susan Blow," Kindergarten and First Grade 1 :224; May 1916.

Harrison, Elizabeth. Sketches Along Life's Road, Elizabeth Harrison, Sketches Along Life's Road, Carolyn Sherwin Bailey, ed., (Boston: Stratford Company, 1930).

Hill, Patty S. "Personal Reminiscences of Susan Blow," Kindergarten and First Grade l:241-242;Junl916.

Hilliker, Margaret. "The Blow Family," [unpublished manuscript in the collection of the Carondelet Historical Society, originally given as an address to the Carondelet Women's Club], Feb 7, 1955.

Hilliker, Margaret. "The Life and Work of Susan Blow," [unpublished manuscript in the collection of the Carondelet Historical Society], (St. Louis: Parson-Blewett Memorial Fund), 1952.



548 Dorothy Rogers

Hofer, Amalic. "Susan Blow's Translation of Froebel," Kindergarten Magatine 7:763; Jun 1895.

Johnston, Bertha. "Susan Blow's Chicago Lectures," Kindergarten Magazine 13:601; Tun 1901.

Kirk, Lizzie Lee. "Bibliography of Materials by and about Susan Blow," Unpublished manuscript, (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis Public library), 1961.

Laws, Annie. "The Committee of Nineteen and the Influence of Susan Blow," Kinder- garten and Hirst Grade 1:272-73(1916).

Menius, Joseph M. Susan Blow, (St. Clair, MO: Page One Publishing), 1993.

Popular Science. Review of Symbolic Education; vol. 45:275-6; June, 1894.

Soldán, F. Louis. "The Influence of the Kindergarten," Kindergarten Review 9:55; Sep 1898.

Snyder, Agnes. Dauntles Women in Childhood Education (Wash: Association for Child- hood Education, International), 1972.

Van Ausdal, Sarah J. "Case Study in Educational Innovation: The Public Kindergarten in St. Louis, 1870-1900. Doctoral Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, IL, July 1985.

[Manuscript Holdings]

Bentley Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Correspondence in Clara Wheeler Papers.

Carondelet Historical Society, St. Louis, MO. Susan Blow Papers and memorabilia.

Countway Library, Harvard University Medical School, Boston, MA. Correspondence in James Jackson Putnam Papers (1894-1916).

Filson Club Historical Library, Louisville, KY. Correspondence in Patty Smith Hill Pa- pers.

Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, MO. Blow Family Papers.

Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, MO. William Torrey Harris Papers. Correspon- dence from Susan E. Blow to Harris, 1872-1909.

St. Louis Public Library, St. Louis, MO. Susan Blow Papers. Correspondence to Mrs. Henry Hitchcock, 1879-1912.



before pragmatism: the practical idealism of susan e. blow (1843-1916)

Documents