before a board of inquiry ruakura development plan ... - epa...border, the border and continues...
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Before a Board of Inquiry Ruakura Development Plan Change
IN THE MATTER of the Resource Management Act 1991
AND
IN THE MATTER of a Board of Inquiry appointed under section 149J of the Resource Management Act 1991 to consider a Plan Change requested by Tainui Group Holdings Limited and Chedworth Properties Limited
Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
25 February 2014
Summary
1. Biosecurity in New Zealand is not a single line of defence at the border;
rather it is a multi–layer system that begins offshore and incorporates
pre-border, the border and continues post-border. Within this system,
the Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits as part of New Zealand's layer of
border interventions; specifically it would form part of a network of
transitional facilities, the purpose of which is to hold uncleared risk
goods for inspection, secure storage or treatment until they receive
biosecurity clearance or are re-shipped or destroyed. The Ruakura
Inland Port would deal specifically with clearance of sea containers and
associated cargo within transitional facilities.
2. This evidence addresses points raised in submissions on biosecurity
matters relating to the inland port provided for by the Plan Change.
3. There are currently approximately 6500 approved transitional facilities
widely distributed across New Zealand, with 205 of these already
located in Hamilton. All transitional facilities are not equal. Among
these, there is significant variation in terms of quality of facilities,
systems and capability of facility operators. So the border is already
'diffuse', and increased spread, variability and number of transitional
facilities weakens New Zealand’s border biosecurity arrangements.
4. In my opinion a better outcome for NZ's biosecurity system would be
consolidation and aggregation of transitional facilities that operate to a
higher standard.
5. The Ruakura Inland Port as proposed will achieve consolidation and
aggregation at a scale that represents a significant opportunity to more
tightly control biosecurity risk. The integrated nature of the proposal
(i.e. where sea containers, once they arrive, are handled and cleared
within a single and secure biosecurity facility) creates further
opportunity for such tightening. This represents a strategic opportunity
to strengthen border biosecurity that is of both regional and national
significance in my opinion.
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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Introduction
6. My name is Andrew Harrison. I am an independent expert on
biosecurity, with experience working as a biosecurity specialist for
approximately 13 years.
7. Between 2002 and 2004 I was senior technical support officer
(biosecurity) for the Department of Conservation (DOC); responsible for
its biosecurity surveillance and response activities, as well as
representing DOC in the development of Tiakina Aotearoa Protect New
Zealand: The Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand 2003 (hereafter
referred to as The Biosecurity Strategy for NZ).
8. From 2004-2012 I held various roles in the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAF) Biosecurity New Zealand including: as a senior policy
analyst within the MAF Biosecurity Strategic Unit, as part of the team
that lead implementation of The Biosecurity Strategy for NZ; as group
manager responsible for leading national pest management; and as
acting (for a significant period) group manager for biosecurity and
animal welfare policy. My experience included leading MAF Biosecurity
New Zealand's biosecurity law reform programme (directly resulting in
the Biosecurity Law Reform Act 2012), participation in developing its
strategic direction and change programmes for border and post-border
biosecurity, managing biosecurity policy and operations functions, and
serving as a national biosecurity regulator (as ‘deputy chief technical
officer’ and ‘chief technical officer’ under the Biosecurity Act 1993;
hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
9. In mid-2012 I established AHC Limited, a consultancy specialising in
biosecurity strategy, policy, planning and technical advice. I currently
contract to Kiwifruit Vine Health for which I have been its biosecurity
programmes manager since mid-2012. In this role I developed the
National Psa-V Pest Management Plan and lead wider biosecurity
programmes on behalf of the kiwifruit industry; the latter includes
working closely with port communities and biosecurity agencies to
strengthen New Zealand's pre-border and border biosecurity
arrangements. I also contract to the Nursery and Garden Industry New
Zealand, for which I am independent chair of its board and lead its 16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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engagement on Government Industry Agreements on Biosecurity
Readiness and Response.
10. My qualifications include a Bachelor of Science in Ecology and
Environmental Science (Massey University) and a Master of Science in
Resource Management (Lincoln University), and I am a member of the
New Zealand Biosecurity Institute.
11. In this report I provide background on NZ's biosecurity system and how
the Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits in relation to this. I then set out a
strategic view of the proposal and its biosecurity impact from local,
regional and national perspectives, and provide evidence in relation to
biosecurity matters raised during the submissions process and
directions from the Board for information to be provided.
12. Specifically, this submission addresses the Board’s direction 17 dated 3
February 2014 for the Applicants to discuss ‘the appropriateness of the
activity in the proposed location from a biosecurity perspective’ (which
is the overall focus of this evidence), and ‘if the proposal proceeds,
what risks this creates for residents both from direct biosecurity
impacts, and from the management of biosecurity risks’ (which is
addressed in paragraphs 51-56 of this evidence).
Code of Conduct
13. I confirm that I have read the ‘Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses’
as contained in the Environment Court Practice Note 2011. I agree to
comply with this Code of Conduct. In particular, unless I state
otherwise, this evidence is within my sphere of expertise and I have not
omitted to consider material facts known to me that might alter or
detract from the opinions I express.
Scope of Evidence
14. The scope of my evidence covers all aspects of biosecurity associated
with the Ruakura Inland Port proposal. It briefly covers the connection
between biosecurity and other New Zealand border services (e.g.,
Customs), and the nature of collaboration between border agencies,
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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however, the operation of border services other than biosecurity is
beyond the scope of my evidence and outside my area of expertise.
15. In relation to operational aspects of the proposal (e.g., how Ruakura
Inland Port will develop over time and operate, including the predicted
nature and scale of logistics activities over time and space), I rely on
the Evidence in Chief of Tony Boyle. Where this is the case I have
clearly identified this in my evidence.
Methodology and Limitations
16. In preparing this evidence I have:
i. Undertaken a site visit to understand layout and characteristics of
the Ruakura site (i.e. the plan change area) and immediately
surrounding areas;
ii. Reviewed the relevant MPI standards and guidelines that are
applicable to the Ruakura Proposal (e.g., relevant Import Health
Standards, Transitional Facilities standards and supporting
guidelines or reference documents);
iii. Considered findings of relevant government reviews, including:
the Auditor General’s performance reports on ‘Ministry for
Primary Industries: Preparing for and responding to biosecurity
incursions’, and ‘Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry:
Management of Biosecurity Risks’ and ‘Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry: Managing biosecurity risks associated with high-risk sea
containers’; and the Sea Container Review: MAF Discussion
Paper No:35; and Biosecurity Risk Management of Entry
Pathways for Pasture Pests: MPI Technical Paper 2013/58;
iv. Sourced relevant data from MPI relating to New Zealand’s
transitional facilities; and
v. Discussed the proposal with MPI personnel (from parts of MPI
responsible for standard setting, border operations and
surveillance and investigation), to understand any issues or
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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opportunities associated with the Ruakura Inland Port proposal
from a regulatory perspective.
17. Where quoting documents that refer to MAF, MAF Biosecurity
Authority, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand or MAFBNZ, I have altered
such references to instead refer to the ‘Ministry of Primary Industries’ or
‘MPI’, which is the successor to these agencies, for simplicity.
How New Zealand's biosecurity system operates – high level overview
18. The NZ Biosecurity Strategy defines biosecurity as the exclusion,
eradication or effective management of risks posed by pests and
diseases to the economy, environment and human health. All New
Zealanders benefit from a biosecurity system that functions effectively.
19. Biosecurity in New Zealand is not a single line of defence at the border;
rather it is a multi–layer system that begins offshore, incorporates pre-
border, the border and continues post-border into New Zealand where
it becomes a joint effort between central government, regional councils,
industry, community groups, and all New Zealanders.
20. MPI is the agency tasked with the lead role for biosecurity in New
Zealand. MPI describes the system as consisting of a number of layers
as follows (also refer to Figure 1):
• International Plant and Animal Health Standard Development -
New Zealand actively influences international standards to
protect human plant and animal health without unnecessarily
restricting trade.
• Trade and Bilateral Arrangements - MPI provides technical
expertise in the negotiation of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
chapters in free trade agreements (i.e. Chapters relating to the
application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in
accordance with The WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) and implements these
chapters once the agreements are in place.
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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• Risk Assessment and Import Health Standard Development -
Risk assessment is the process used to determine likelihood an
organism or disease could enter, establish, or spread in New
Zealand, potential impacts if this were to occur, and risk
management options. Import Health Standards (IHSs) then
specify requirements that importers must meet to manage these
risks (e.g., requirement for heat treatment of some imported
foods). Exporting countries must then verify the requirements in
New Zealand's IHSs have been met and give an official
assurance of this to MPI.
• Border Interventions - border activity is targeted at ensuring risk
goods comply with requirements of IHSs, and preventing the
entry of pests and diseases. Once they arrive in New Zealand
craft, cargo, passengers and mail must receive biosecurity
clearance either at their ‘place of first arrival’ (e.g., a sea port in
the case of sea containers) or at one of approximately 6500
approved transitional facilities across New Zealand. A more
detailed description of New Zealand's border biosecurity
arrangements is provided in paragraphs 24-30 below.
• Surveillance - Surveillance involves looking for unwanted pests
and diseases to detect any new incursions early, to support pest
management activities (e.g., to determine distribution or
abundance), and to provide trading partners with official
assurance that NZ or parts of NZ are free of specified pests or
diseases. It includes programmes targeting both ‘high risk pests’
(e.g., Asian gypsy moth, exotic ants, fruit flies, mosquitoes) and
‘high risk sites’ (i.e. surveying for a range of potential pests or
diseases within or in close proximity to international airports,
commercial seaports, transitional facilities and first-night tourist
campsites).
• Readiness and Response - New Zealand maintains a capability
to respond to incursions (e.g., recent Queensland fruit fly
response in Whangarei), and responds to eradicate these
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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where possible and reduce impacts on the NZ economy,
environment and human health.
• Pest Management - New Zealand has a pest management
system in place to contain or reduce the impact of unwanted
pests and diseases that have established here. This includes
managing pests and diseases of national interest (e.g.,
management of Psa-V and bovine Tb under national pest
management plans), of regional interest (e.g., managing old
man’s beard under a regional pest management plan) and of
local or individual interest (e.g., a home owner controlling ants).
It also includes managing pathways of national or regional
interest (e.g., movement of weed seeds on farm machinery and
equipment) to prevent the spread of pests or diseases.
• Export Assurance – New Zealand is a contracting party to
international agreements relating to export certification (e.g., the
International Plant Protection Convention). MPI operates an
export certification system to give assurance to importing
countries that their phytosanitary requirements have been met
by New Zealand exporters. This system operates through the
delegation of authority by MPI to authorised Independent
Verification Agencies and approved Organisations to carry out
certification services and activities on behalf of MPI.
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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Figure 1: Illustration of New Zealand's biosecurity system (prepared by MPI). The Ruakura Inland Port proposal is part of the 'border interventions' layer and relates specifically to the 'cargo' pathway (biosecurity pressure).
How the Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits in relation to New Zealand's biosecurity system
21. With respect to how the Ruakura Inland Port will operate, and how the
operation will develop over time (e.g., in terms of transport patterns and
cargo capacity) I rely on the Evidence in Chief of Tony Boyle. In
summary, the proposal entails sea containers and associated cargo
transported from Ports of Auckland and Port of Tauranga via rail (and
some via road transport at earlier stages of the development) to
Ruakura Inland Port, from where these will be moved to and devanned
within commercial facilities in the warehousing and distribution area.
The Inland Port and warehousing and distribution areas will be located
within a border security boundary (refer to Appendix 1), such that all of
the movements, devanning and further biosecurity clearance activities
(i.e. further to clearance activities carried out at the sea port; also refer
to paragraphs 25-29) occur within the border security boundary.
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Biosecurity pressures on the border
‘Assured’ New Zealand Exports
THE MULTIPLE LAYERS OF NEW ZEALAND’S BIOSECURITY SYSTEM
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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22. The area within the border biosecurity boundary will be established as
a ‘transitional facility’ (an overview of transitional facilities and the
relevant standards and operating requirements these must meet is
provided in paragraph 33). A routine approach would then be that
individual commercial facilities within the warehousing and distribution
area are established as individual transitional facilities (e.g., this
approach is currently used for storage facilities within airport
boundaries and at some sea ports). However, a more integrated
arrangement (e.g., a single or highly rationalised number of transitional
facilities, aligned with equivalent customs arrangements) is likely to be
a better option, in my opinion and based on initial discussions with MPI
personnel (this is discussed further in paragraphs 30 and 68).
23. The Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits within the 'border interventions'
layer of New Zealand's biosecurity system (as described in paragraph
20 and illustrated in Figure 1), forms part of New Zealand’s network of
transitional facilities, and deals specifically with biosecurity clearance at
transitional facilities for sea containers and associated cargo only.
How New Zealand’s biosecurity border operates for sea containers and associated packaging and cargo
24. Borders are diffuse and do not only include the point of entry (e.g., a
marine port or international airport). For example, containers unloaded
at ports may be opened and inspected at one of approximately 6500
transitional facilities around the country.
25. When a sea container arrives at a sea port, the container itself and
associated packaging material must comply with requirements set out
in the Import Health Standard for Sea Containers. A biosecurity
clearance is issued (pursuant to section 26 of the Act) when a container
meets the requirements of this IHS, either by an ‘MPI Inspector’ or a
non-MPI ‘accredited person’ (a person appointed by a MPI chief
technical officer as an ‘accredited person’, pursuant to section 103(7) of
the Act).
26. The cargo inside the container must meet requirements of the relevant
IHS (e.g., imported fresh produce must meet requirements in IHS
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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152.02: Importation and clearance of fresh fruit and vegetables into
New Zealand), and be given a further and separate biosecurity
clearance.
27. MPI Inspectors assess all sea containers at the sea port and designate
which of these are of ‘high’ or ‘low’ regulatory interest; this is based on
risk profiling (including risk associated with country of origin) and
completeness of accompanying documentation. MPI Inspectors then
give directions as to inspection requirements, including: whether sea
containers of high regulatory interest are to be inspected by or in the
presence of either an MPI inspector or a non-MPI accredited person;
the level of inspection; and whether this is to occur at the sea port or at
an approved transitional facility.
28. The biosecurity requirements relevant to clearance for sea containers
and associated packaging (but not the cargo inside these), as these
progress through the port and are transported to transitional facilities
for further clearance as follows (from the Import Health Standard for
Sea Containers):
Ports: A container must not be removed from the first port of
discharge - including movement to transitional facilities, inland
depots or for transhipment by road or rail - until all container
information is received and assessed by MPI and directions
actioned by MPI or relevant parties. Containers for transshipment
by sea must be inspected or checked at the first port of discharge
where they will remain on that port for longer than 12 hours.
Transportation: For all uncleared containers being transported
from a port to a transitional facility or between transitional
facilities for devanning, treatment or other action, the importer or
importer’s agent must provide all relevant information and MPI
directions about the container to the transport operator and the
transitional facility.
Transitional Facilities: No person is permitted to open or devan a
container until notification of MPI requirements has been received
at the transitional facility. Containers must be devanned at the
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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transitional facility in the presence of a MPI Inspector or an
accredited person (as directed by MPI).
29. The overall ‘system’ approach to cargo clearance entails use of
intelligence-based risk profiling, with cargo of highest biosecurity risk
cleared under directly control of MPI and typically at the ‘place of first
arrival’, and with cargo of lowest biosecurity risk cleared in the
presence of non-MPI accredited person within transitional facilities.
30. Border biosecurity forms part of New Zealand's border services, where
the main border agencies (MPI, New Zealand Customs Service and
Immigration New Zealand) are increasingly collaborating, including
development of shared processes, common infrastructure, joint
technology investments and coordinated delivery of frontline services.
This operates under a significant whole-of-government programme to
change the way New Zealand's border services are delivered in order
to achieve the Governments 'Future Directions for the Border Sector'
[EDC (12) 020 refers]. This is relevant as a number of border agencies,
including the Ministry of Primary Industries and New Zealand Customs
Service, will have roles in relation to the Ruakura Inland Port and are
likely to consider a whole-of-government approach to delivery of border
services at the Ruakura Inland Port.
The role of transitional facilities and requirements that apply to them
31. Transitional facilities hold uncleared risk goods for inspection, secure
storage or treatment until they receive biosecurity clearance or are re-
shipped or destroyed.
32. Transitional facilities must be approved pursuant to section 39(3) of the
Act, and are approved for a specific purpose, scope and activities (e.g.,
approved for specified types of goods that will be held and activities
that will be conducted). They must either meet requirements set out in
the MPI Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared
Goods (the standard likely to apply to most if not all transitional facilities
in the Ruakura Inland Port), or must meet requirements of a specific
MPI standard for transitional facilities if importing specified plants, plant
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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products, animal products or animals (e.g., Standard for Cat and Dog
Transitional Facilities).
33. The general requirements a transitional facility must meet include:
• having an approved Operator (pursuant to section 40(6) of the
Act;
• having an accredited person available at all times for the
unpacking of imported risk goods;
• meeting training requirements for transitional facility Operators
and accredited persons;
• having an Operating Manual approved by MPI, which is readily
accessible to TF staff and a MPI Inspector at all times;
• being in a suitable location (e.g., with access to public sewer
and mains power);
• having signage (that meets MPI specifications);
• having a system for controlling access to ensure the security of
uncleared goods;
• meeting hygiene requirements;
• controlling pests, vermin and weeds;
• maintaining contingency plans’
• providing inspection facilities;
• having an auditable system for tracking uncleared risk goods ‘in’
and ‘out’, and ensuring correct documentation is in place’;
• keeping auditable records (that meet MPI information
requirements); and
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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• carrying out regular internal assessments, and reviewing the
Operational Plan on an annual basis.
34. MPI Inspectors carry out external assessments of all transitional
facilities, with frequency of such assessments varying between 6-18
months depending upon the compliance history and risk status of any
given transitional facility.
Strategic view of the proposal (national and regional interest)
35. Of the approximately 6500 approved transitional facilities widely
distributed across New Zealand, approximately 5740 process imported
cargo. Approximately 268 of these are located in the Waikato region,
205 of which are in Hamilton (based on data from MPI's Quancargo
database as at September 2013; refer to Table 1).
36. All transitional facilities are not equal. Among these there is significant
variation in terms of the scale of operation (e.g., from processing
several containers per annum to many thousands). Table 1 highlights
this scale variation in relation to volume of consignments devanned
within transitional facilities, and shows that a large percentage of
transitional facilities (approximately 65%) are processing 'very low' or
'low' levels of consignments.
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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Region Very low (0-5)
Low (6-20)
Mid (21-50)
High (51+)
Total
Auckland 1139 950 541 635 3265 Canterbury 318 255 153 140 866 Wellington 113 107 58 75 353 Bay of Plenty 101 87 41 39 268 Waikato 110 84 39 29 262 Hawkes Bay 49 47 25 22 143 Otago 44 30 27 12 113 Manawatu 34 36 16 16 102 Taranaki 43 19 14 8 84 Nelson 22 26 13 8 69 Southland 24 19 6 4 53 Northland 11 9 7 4 31 Marlborough 11 10 3 1 25 East Cape 13 6 1 0 20 Wanganui 1 7 4 4 16 Horowhenua 7 6 1 2 16 Wairarapa 9 3 2 2 16 Kapiti Coast 4 6 1 1 12 Thames 4 4 0 1 9 West Coast 4 1 0 0 5 Rangitikei 2 1 0 1 4 Tasman 4 0 0 0 4 Central Otago 1 0 1 1 3 Counties
Manukau 2 0 0 0 2
Total 2070 1713 953 1005 5741
Table 1. Number of transitional facilities, and the profile in relation to scale of imported cargo. This information is based on numbers of consignments from the Quancargo database for the period 1st October 2010 to the 30th September 2013 for those facilities that are approved to the MPI Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Goods
37. In my opinion there is also significant variation in quality of facilities,
systems and capability of operators. In large part this relates to ‘scale’;
for smaller transitional facilities biosecurity is a minor activity and the
‘Operator’ or ‘accredited person’ roles are a minor proportion of a staff
member’s total responsibilities, while for larger transitional facilities
biosecurity is a major activity and the ‘Operator’ or ‘accredited person’
roles are the dominant or sole responsibility for staff. Within 200 metres
of where I work in Tauranga in one direction there is a very small
transitional facility where ‘controlled access’ constitutes a sign, open 16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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access, and personnel keep an eye out for visitors during the course of
their work; while in the other direction is the Port of Tauranga (with
multiple transitional facilities) where the boundary is security fenced
and patrolled, and access is tightly controlled at gated entry points
operated 24/7 by dedicated personnel.
38. New Zealand’s imports and exports are growing over time and
containerised trade volumes are increasing (NZIER 2010). I refer to the
Evidence in Chief of Tony Boyle, which explains that the container
volume in New Zealand is projected to increase by 5% per annum and
will result in increased pressure on capacity of existing New Zealand
port infrastructure.
39. This same growth will also increase pressure on New Zealand’s
transitional facility arrangements. Any further spread of transitional
facilities will mean the border becomes even more diffuse. In my
opinion increased spread, variability and number of transitional facilities
weakens New Zealand’s border biosecurity arrangements, and the
current regulatory approach and associated standards for transitional
facilities will not be sustainable in light of future projected growth in
trade volumes. This is a strategic issue in my view that needs to be
addressed, and my understanding is that MPI is already carefully
considering this issue.
40. A better outcome for NZ's biosecurity system in my opinion would be
consolidation and aggregation of transitional facilities that operate to a
higher standard.
41. In my opinion the Ruakura Inland Port as proposed will achieve
consolidation and aggregation at a scale (i.e. capacity up to 1 million
Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units or 'TEUs' – refer to Evidence in Chief of
Tony Boyle) that represents a significant opportunity to more tightly
control biosecurity risk. The scale and integrated nature of the proposal
- i.e. where the transport of sea containers from the intermodal terminal
to the warehousing and distribution area and biosecurity clearance
activities all occur within a secure biosecurity facility – creates further
opportunity for such tightening.
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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42. A strategic opportunity associated with the Ruakura Inland Port
proposal, as a greenfield development of significant scale, is also to
implement best practice biosecurity from the outset. I cover this further
in paragraphs 65-69 of this evidence.
43. There are secondary ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ benefits associated
with consolidation and aggregation from a biosecurity perspective,
including:
• aggregation lends itself to more targeted, efficient and effective
surveillance activities to detect risk organism early (e.g.,
targeted fruit fly trapping within and surrounding the inland port);
• efficiencies for MPI Inspectors (considerable savings in time
and travel, freeing up more time for frontline inspection and
clearance activities);
• potential economies of scale in terms of investment in security
(system for controlling access) and other biosecurity systems,
and potential opportunities associated with a having pool of
skilled Operators and accredited persons in close proximity
(e.g., opportunities for training and up skilling or operating a
pool of such personnel across facilities).
44. Considering the proposal from a local perspective, consolidation and
aggregation of transitional facilities brings a bigger and more visible
part of New Zealand’s border “into the neighbourhood”. Increased
numbers of containers and biosecurity clearance activities close by
may increase localised biosecurity risk. This level of localised
biosecurity risk is manageable and can be reduced by adopting best
practice (covered in paragraphs 65-69).
45. The fact that there are already approximately 275 transitional facilities
operating in the Waikato region, with 205 of these within Hamilton itself,
all of variable scale and quality and widely distributed, also needs to be
considered here.
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46. Considering the proposal from regional and national perspectives, in
my opinion the scale of consolidation and aggregation (fewer and larger
facilities in close proximity) envisaged within the Ruakura Inland Port
proposal, along with integration that enables greater control of
biosecurity activities within a relatively small and more secure area,
creates a strategic opportunity to strengthen border biosecurity that is
of both regional and national significance.
Evidence in relation to matters raised in submissions
47. I have reviewed all submissions that raise issues or discuss matters
relating to biosecurity, and I have addressed them in accordance with
general submission points below.
Submission point A: Proximity to vulnerable land uses and areas where pests
and diseases can establish
48. Related matters raised in submissions include:
• the volume of containers travelling across high value
horticultural land and pastoral farmland;
• risk associated with processing containers in close proximity to
susceptible farmland as well as to amenity plantings around the
university and research centre campuses;
• that such large scale container ports should be centred well
within inhospitable industrial areas, preferably at least 2km
away from farmland and housing; and
• that biosecurity risks at inland ports, where incursions can move
in any of 360 degree direction is worse than coastal ports where
terrestrial incursions can only move inland.
49. The land use surrounding the Ruakura Inland Port site is a mix of
commercial, residential and rural (including lifestyle blocks) properties,
and amenity plantings.
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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50. Ideally any place of first arrival or transitional facility would be located in
inhospitable areas (i.e. where if pests arrive they are unlikely to
establish). However, in practice this is extremely difficult if not
impossible to achieve, and is not the case for the approximately 6500
transitional facilities and 15 ‘places of first arrival’ in New Zealand. The
proposed Ruakura Inland Port is not at all unique in this respect. An
illustration of this is provided in Appendix 2, which compares
surrounding land use across Ruakura Inland Port, MetroPort, Port of
Tauranga and Christchurch International Airport, and shows that each
of these is proximate to sensitive land uses including residential, rural,
business, industry and open space (amenity).
Submission point B: Impacts of incursions
51. Issues raised in submissions relating to this matter include:
• Exposure to multiple eradication operations when serious pests
establish; and
• Health effects associated with aerial spray to eradicate pests,
with reference to ‘Tussock moth scare in Hamilton’ (sic. – this is
likely a reference to the 2003 Asian Gypsy Moth incursion in
Hamilton).
52. The Board has also directed (direction 17, 3 February 2014) the
Applicants to discuss what risks the Ruakura Inland Port creates for
residents both from direct biosecurity impacts, and from the
management of biosecurity risks.
53. Biosecurity risks for local residents are the risks associated with an
incursion of an exotic pest or disease, including any direct impacts of
the organism and any impacts of its management. The nature of such
impacts will depend on the organism concerned, and the range of
potential organisms concerned is vast. To give a sense of scale, on
average New Zealand deals with between 30 and 40 incursions a year.
54. Five examples of New Zealand’s highest risk pests (or groups of pests)
that could spread through an imported sea container pathway are
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outlined below, to illustrate the extreme end of potential risks for local
residents:
i. Invasive Ants (e.g., Red Imported Fire Ants, Cray Ants, Yellow
Crazy Ants, Tropical Fire Ants) can be a serious household
nuisance, and some sting or bite. A response to an invasive ant
incursion involves ground baiting, surveillance, and movement
controls (i.e. restricting the movement of high risk materials,
such as green waste). Movement controls are likely to create
moderate business disruption and inconvenience for local
residents (e.g., a 2km movement control boundary around the
incursion site, over a three-year period was used for the 2006
Red Imported Fire Ant eradication programme in Whirinaki,
North of Napier).
ii. Fruit flies lay their eggs in ripening fruit and some vegetables,
which develop into larvae that cause these to ripen prematurely,
rot and drop to the ground. This damage can make affected fruit
and vegetables inedible. Response to a fruit fly find or incursion
typically involves trapping, checking and removal of host
material, and movement controls that apply to fresh fruit and
vegetables (except for leafy vegetables and root vegetables). If
an established population is confirmed response management
can also include targeted spraying of insecticides. Movement
controls are likely to create a low level of inconvenience for local
residents (e.g., a 1.5 km movement control boundary around
the incursion site over a two-week period was used for the 2014
Queensland Fruit Fly response in Whangarei).
iii. Exotic mosquitos can both have nuisance impacts (e.g., biting),
and serious public health impacts (e.g., as a vector of diseases,
such as malaria or dengue), or both. Response to a mosquito
incursion typically involves a combination of larval habitat
surveys, high density trapping, habitat modification (removal of
water and thick vegetation) and/or treatment with S-methoprene
(a growth regulator that is non-toxic to humans).
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Exotic moths can infest trees, stripping them clear of leaves and
exposing them to diseases. Some have hairs that can give rise
to an allergic reaction (e.g., urticating hairs on painted apple
moths). Response to a significant moth incursion involves a
combination of trapping and surveillance, movement controls on
plant material, ground spraying and/or aerial spray application.
The level on impact on businesses and residents can be high,
including restrictions on the movement of green waste and other
plant host material over large areas (e.g., refer to map of the
vegetation control and aerial spray areas for the 2003 Hamilton-
based Asian gypsy moth eradication programme in Figure 2),
and actual or perceived noise and health effects of aerial spray
applications (this is a very complex area relating to public health
and is not my area of expertise). There have been three moth
eradication programmes involving aerial spray applications in
New Zealand in the last twenty years, including the eradication
of Asian gypsy moth in Hamilton in between 2003 - 2005. 1.
Notably, sea containers were considered an unlikely source of
the 2003 Asian gypsy moth incursion; rather, Cabinet concluded
'It is considered highly probably that the [Asian gypsy month]
incursion is the result of an egg mass entering New Zealand on
an imported used vehicle' [EDC (03) 167 refers].
55. The risk of incursions has existed (the 2003 Asian gypsy moth
incursion being an example), and will continue to exist, given New
Zealanders value trade and travel. And an increasing volume of sea
containers will continue to need to be processed at transitional facilities
across New Zealand.
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Figure 2: Asian gypsy moth eradication programme map, showing the boundaries of the vegetation control area and targeted aerial spray operation
56. As explained in paragraphs 44-46, considering the Ruakura Inland Port
proposal from a local perspective, while there are risks these are
manageable and can be reduced by application of best practice, and
should be considered in the context of the wider network of transitional
facilities (and associated risk) already present in the Waikato region
and wider New Zealand. In my opinion the scale of consolidation and
aggregation envisaged within the Ruakura Inland Port proposal, along
with integration that enables greater control of biosecurity activities,
creates a strategic opportunity to reduce biosecurity risk of regional and
national significance.
Submission point C: Who pays for incursions?
57. Issues raised in submissions relating to this matter include:
• Who is going to pay for any remedial work or recovery? The tax
payer should not have to cover this given ‘immensity and extent’
of the inland port.
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58. MPI is the lead agency responsible for biosecurity and administration of
the Act, has an established approach to cost recovery set out in Part 6
of the Act, and is implementing a new approach to cost sharing and
decision with industry in relation to incursions (Government Industry
Agreements on Readiness and Response, as provided for in Part 5A of
the Act).
59. The proposed Ruakura Inland Port would be part of the network of
transitional facilities in New Zealand, and would be treated the same as
any other transitional facility in accordance with MPI cost recovery
approaches referred to in paragraph 58.
Submission point D: Relationship to national and regional biosecurity plans
60. Issues raised in submissions relating to this matter include:
• The role this activity could play in bringing invasive pest species
into the Waikato, then distributing them further afield;
• Other regions will be the source or destination of
goods/containers/equipment being handled at Ruakura, and
different regional pest management planning rules will apply;
and
• Request for recognition of the importance of biosecurity,
considering the Waikato region’s reliance on agriculture and
primary production, and to include provisions in the plan change
that identify biosecurity legislation and the Waikato Regional
Pest Management Plan. [Note: this is a resource management
planning consideration and beyond my area of expertise, and
therefore I will not comment on this matter]
61. Sea containers are already transported into the Waikato Region and
devanned at transitional facilities widely distributed across the Region,
and goods received and cleared in other regions will travel to the
Waikato anyway. The real issue in my opinion is, therefore, how
effective New Zealand’s overall system of border clearance is. Goods
inspected in Ruakura, other parts of Hamilton, or other parts New
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Zealand will all have a residual level of biosecurity risk. In my opinion
the consolidation and aggregation of transitional facilities, and the level
of integration under the Ruakura Inland Port proposal, represents a
better alternative in terms of biosecurity risk management to a growing
number of more widespread transitional facilities that are variable in
terms of quality of facilities, systems and operators.
62. In relation to the issue concerning ‘different regional pest management
planning rules will apply’, the perceived relevance of this is not entirely
clear to me. Once the biosecurity risk associated with cargo is
managed (that is, once it receives biosecurity clearance) the cargo is
then free to be transported to any part of NZ. This will apply to cargo
cleared within the Ruakura Inland Port, and cargo cleared within every
other transitional facility in New Zealand. I am not aware of any
regional planning rules under a regional pest management plan that
would apply to or restrict movement of imported cargo.
63. The land occupiers of the Ruakura Inland Port will be subject to
requirements of the Waikato Regional Pest Management Plan (e.g., the
land occupier requirement to destroy all banana passionfruit plants on
the land they occupy), and this is the case for all land occupiers across
the Waikato Region.
Submission point E: Best practice biosecurity
64. Issues raised in submissions relating to this matter include:
• Provide details of how biosecurity issues will be managed in
relation to the inland port and logistics area;
• We ask for “best practice” in biosecurity management at the
land port site.
65. Requirements for managing biosecurity issues in relation to the inland
port and logistics area are specified in the MPI Standard for General
Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Goods and further explained in an
accompanying guidance document (Guidance document for the
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Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Goods). A
summary of those requirements was provided in paragraph 33.
66. In my opinion best practice biosecurity within an inland port is about
achieving ‘a port community committed to biosecurity excellence’. It
entails:
• A workforce with a high level of awareness, understanding of,
and commitment to biosecurity, including highly trained and
experience personnel undertaking key biosecurity roles (ideally
with dedicated time, and where biosecurity is a primary focus of
such roles);
• Taking a risk-based approach, applying measures based on
best data available and assessment of risk (good
communication between MPI Inspectors and port staff being
essential to strengthen such assessments);
• Carrying out surveillance activities within, and in any high risk
areas surrounding, the port to enable early detection of high risk
pests and diseases;
• Establishing and maintaining a clean port environment and
minimising potential habitat for pests that may arrive (i.e. to
reduce risk of establishment). This includes minimising any
vegetation (e.g., landscape plantings) within and immediately
surrounding the biosecurity security boundary;
• Controlling established pests or vermin;
• Baiting or otherwise treating ‘hot spots’ where there is a history
of interceptions or higher risk of incursions (e.g., toxic baiting for
invasive ants at Ports of Auckland in specific areas that receive
high risk containers from the Pacific);
• Maintaining a high level of security to control access, to ensure
the security of uncleared goods;
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• Operating a high level of contingency planning, and maintaining
access to appropriate facilities to contain any suspect risk
organism or potential spillage or contamination;
• Operating a system of incentives, with tangible reward for
operators, facilities and personnel that consistently achieve high
levels of compliance or excellence, and corresponding
disincentives for those achieving low levels of compliance and
repeat offenders (e.g., tougher and more frequent audit
regimes);
• Maintaining robust systems, including clear policy, plans,
procedures and assignment of responsibilities, and regular
review and assessment (including against performance targets).
[Note this is how Ports typically operate in relation to their
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) requirements, which
may serve as a useful model]
67. The Ruakura Inland Port proposal presents a strategic opportunity to
design and develop systems for best practice biosecurity from the
outset.
68. In my opinion there will be significant opportunity for the government's
border agencies (in particular MPI and the New Zealand Customs
Service) to develop a 'best practice' whole-of-government approach to
border services at the Ruakura Inland Port (e.g., a single or highly
rationalised number of transitional facilities, aligned with equivalent
customs arrangements), aligned with the Government's 'Future
Directions for Border Services'. My initial discussions with senior MPI
personnel suggest that MPI has clearly recognised this opportunity.
The details of any such approach will need to be carefully worked
through with, and be agreed by, the relevant border agencies.
69. In my opinion it is appropriate that such biosecurity arrangements and
systems be developed in accordance with the relevant statutory and
regulatory requirements, working closely with regulatory authorities
and, to the extent possible, with key commercial operators within the
Ruakura Inland Port as it is developed. 16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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Conclusions
70. Biosecurity in New Zealand is not a single line of defence at the border;
rather it is a multi–layer system that begins offshore and incorporates
pre-border, the border and continues post-border. The Ruakura Inland
Port proposal fits as part of New Zealand's layer of border
interventions; specifically it would form part of a network of transitional
facilities, and it would deal specifically with clearance of sea containers
and associated cargo.
71. In my opinion the scale of consolidation and aggregation envisaged
within the Ruakura Inland Port proposal (that is, fewer and larger
facilities operating in close proximity, operating long term to capacity up
to 1 million TEUs ), along with integration that enables greater control
of biosecurity activities (i.e. where the transport of sea containers from
the Inland Port to the warehousing and distribution area all occurs
within a single and secure biosecurity facility) represents a strategic
opportunity to strengthen border biosecurity that is of both regional and
national significance. This is a better alternative to the status quo,
where transitional facilities are widespread and highly variable in terms
of quality of facilities, systems and operators. This sort of development
better positions New Zealand for management of biosecurity risk in light
of increasing containerised trade volumes.
72. A greenfield development of the scale of the Ruakura Inland Port also
presents a strategic opportunity to implement best practice biosecurity,
including a coordinated approach across government border agencies,
and developing ‘a port community committed to biosecurity excellence’
and underpinning systems.
Andrew Harrison
25 February 2014
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Appendix 1: Map of the proposed Ruakura Inland Port showing location of the border security boundary
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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Appendix 2: Maps comparing surrounding land uses across the proposed Ruakura Inland Port, MetroPort, Ports of Tauranga and Christchurch international Airport, illustrating that each of these is proximate to “sensitive” land uses
16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd
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