be 2010 final report

Bantay Eleksyon 2010 Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________

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Successful Automated Election System

Leads to an Essentially Fair and Free

2010 Philippine Elections

( A Bantay Eleksyon 2010 Final Report )


I. Introduction All election monitoring efforts seek to assess the credibility of the conduct of an election, based on the international human rights standards of its being fair and free. The Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council in Paris has described such standard, thus: “In any State the authority of the government can only derive from the will of the people as expressed in genuine, free, and fair elections held at regular intervals on the basis of universal, equal and free suffrage.” “A free election upholds freedom of speech, assembly, association and integrity. A fair election depends on a transparent electoral process, equitable electoral legislation and systems, equal opportunities for all participants, and independent and impartial election commission, lack of intimidation, proper procedures, and acceptance of the electoral results.” Determining the freeness and fairness of the 2010 Philippine Elections The implementation of an Automated Election System (AES) for the 2010 Philippine national and local elections changes and complicates the scope, parameters and indicators in determining a free and fair 2010 election. The standards set by the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council in Paris remain the same but indicators for determining the transparency of the entire process, integrity of the system and accuracy of the count should also be given equal importance. The implementation of the new system could only earn the trust and confidence of the public if the entire process is transparent and participatory. Domestic Election Monitoring Mission

Bantay Eleksyon 2010 is a domestic election monitoring mission. As such, it is an independent election observer mission whose objectives are to determine if the 2010 national and local elections are free and fair by international standards and to help enhance the transparency of and increase the public’s confidence in the electoral process.

It implemented its mandate by organizing a nationwide network of observers, especially around the election day itself, conducting the monitoring for one year from July 2009 to June 2010—actually the entire electoral process, and inquiring into the relevant components of the entire exercise. Bantay Eleksyon 2010 focused on the pioneering automation of the election process, election management, voter registration, the presidential contest, and the party-list system. It periodically issued monitoring reports based on major milestones of the electoral process. Bantay Eleksyon 2010 is not a citizen’s arm of the COMELEC because of the danger that it might compromise its independent observer status. It also differs from international observers in its comprehensive approach to the process, taking advantage of local knowledge and expertise.

II. Election Preparations

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A. Implementation of the AES PCOS Technology Republic Act 9369, the new law on the automated election system, was passed to automate the Philippine elections, to provide for a partial automation of the May 2007 elections to fully automate the May 2010 elections. However, the concern over the readiness of Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the lack of time to set up the system and to prepare the voting public, prompted the COMELEC Advisory Council (CAC) not to recommend the automation of the May 2007 elections. The need for a pilot testing of the AES led to the automation of the 2008 Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elections. This successful automation of the 2008 ARMM elections provided the primary input to the selection of the technology for the May 2010 elections because the said political exercise showcased the two major types of technologies: (1) direct recording electronic (DRE) technology and optical mark reader (OMR) technology. Some of the activities that contributed to the selection of technology for the May 2010 include the following: the Election Technology Conference and Vendor Exhibition organized by the COMELEC, CAC and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the Focus Group Discussion on user acceptability of various technologies conducted by the Parish Pastoral Council of the Philippines for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) during the IFES event, individual AES vendor presentation of the various solutions provider to the COMELEC and CAC, and the issuance of request for information (RFI) facilitated by the CAC. The results of all the aforementioned activities assisted the COMELEC Advisory Council in formulating its recommendations to the COMELEC on the type of the technology to be adopted for the May 2010 elections. The CAC were able to summarize the available AES technologies into three main categories plus two locally developed versions:

1. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) is a technology wherein a vote is cast

directly on a machine by the use of a touchscreen, touchpad, keypad or other device and the machine records the individual votes and calculates the vote totals electronically.

2. Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) is a technology wherein an optical

ballot scanner, into which paper ballots marked by hand by the voter are inserted to be counted, is located in every precinct.

3. Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS) is a technology wherein an optical

ballot scanner, into which paper ballots marked by hand by the voter are inserted to be counted, is located in every voting center.

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4. Open Election System (OES) is a technology that uses the traditional handwritten ballot, counts vote totals manually, and manually enters the results into a machine for consolidation.

5. Botong Pinoy is a technology similar to DRE, except it uses generic PCs

with customized software as the voting machine. Comparing all these available AES technologies on the basis of accuracy, speed, cost, vulnerability, transparency, proven technology, auditability, ballot security, and end-to-end solution, the CAC issued a resolution on November 28, 2008 (Annex 1) recommending to COMELEC a nationwide automation of the 2010 elections using DRE technology or PCOS technology for all areas, subject to the election automation budget of COMELEC, and CCOS technology for all areas not covered by DRE or PCOS technology. On January 26, 2009, the COMELEC issued a Resolution No. 8576 (Annex 2) which resolves to do a nationwide automation of the May 2010 elections using the PCOS technology. Aside from the financial consideration of implementing a nationwide automation, COMELEC’s decision favouring the PCOS technology, could be attributed to its being the most auditable technology among other technologies available. The use of one technology nationwide would mean a more secure system since there would be no systems integration required. Bidding and Awarding of Contract The final version of the Terms of Reference (TOR) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the automation of the May 2010 elections which was posted in an Invitation to Bid on March 11, 2009 contained the following components:

Component 1: Paper-Based Automated Election System (AES) 1-A. Election Management System (EMS) 1-B. Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) System 1-C. Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS)

Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of Election Results using Public Telecommunications Network

Component 3: Overall Project Management The entire 2010 election automation project has a total ceiling amount of P 11.3 billion as stipulated in the TOR. But while the initial preparations for the procurement of the automated election system have already been started, the said amount has yet to be requested and approved by Congress and the President in a form of a supplemental budget because the COMELEC did not include it in its 2008 budget request. There were ten (10) solution providers who bought the bid documents, but after the pre-bid conference on March 27, only seven (7) vendors/consortiums submitted their bids. These are:

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1. Avante International Technology/Canon Marketing Philippines/DB Wizards/Netnode Technologies/Creative Point

2. Indra Sistemas/Strategic Alliance Holdings/Hart InterCivic 3. Sequoia Voting Systems/Universal Storefront Services/USSC-

Sequoia Voting Solutions 4. Smartmatic/Total Information Management 5. Syrex/Amalgamated Motor Philippines/Avision 6. AMA Group Holdings/Election Systems and Software 7. Gilat Satellite Network/F.F. Cruz and Co./Filipinas Systems

Notably all of the bidders formed a consortium of both local and foreign solution providers since no sole Filipino company had proven its capability for a nationwide automation, for the implementing rules and regulation of the RA 9184 or Government Procurement Act required that all the prospective bidders must be at least 60% Filipino owned. The bidding process starting from the submission of bids to the issuance of notice of awards was conducted from May 4 to June 10, 2009. In the first round of the evaluation of the eligibility requirements by the Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC), headed by Dir. Ferdinand Rafanan, when stringently applying the procurement guidelines, all the seven (7) bidders were declared ineligible. With COMELEC En Banc and CAC’s intervention in giving the benefit of the doubt in cases of ambiguities, four (4) bidders were considered to qualify for further evaluation of their eligibility requirements subject to post qualification process (Indra/SAHI/Hart, Smartmatic/TIM, AMA/ES&S, and Gilat/F.F. Cruz/ Filipinas System). After the eligibility process, the qualified bidders were down to two (2), the Indra/SAHI/HART and the Smartmatic/TIM consortiums. Both complied with the technical proposals requirements, but in the end, the Smartmatic/TIM consortium won the bid with a Php7.2 Billion financial proposal. The entire process was very transparent that even the losing bidders attested to its credibility. The COMELEC Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC) sometimes went beyond the procedure of RA 9184 (Procurement Law) and RA 9369 just to keep the process transparent and credible. The video documentation of the entire process displayed through a wide screen for better public view and the constant consultations made by SBAC with the procurement observers on matters arising in the proceedings were unprecedented in the history of government procurements. The presence of the various election stakeholders, government agencies and media added to the credibility of the process. The CAC resolution dated October 1, 2009 (Annex 3), recommending various measures in promoting transparency in the conduct of the bidding for the automation of the 2010 elections, was instrumental to COMELEC’s commitment to make the entire procurement process of the automated election system transparent. The contract signing between COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM was delayed when TIM threatened to withdraw from its partnership with Smartmatic. Upon the intervention of the COMELEC, both parties came into an agreement and signed the contract with COMELEC on July 10, 2009. The contract was drafted on a milestone basis, which means payment to Smartmatic-TIM will depend on the delivery of each milestone identified by both parties. And, any changes in the contract will only be applicable if agreed to by both parties.

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The delay in contract-signing and later, the challenge before the Supreme Court, ate up much of the time reserve of the project. The Hardware: Manufacturing, Shipping and Testing Based on the Contract between COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM, a total of 82,200 units of PCOS machines will have to be produced and delivered for the May 2010 automated elections. The Smartmatic-TIM timetable shows that 40,000 machines will have to be delivered by the end of December 2009. However, they could not commit on this because the transfer of the assembly plant from Taiwan to China due to a typhoon affecting Taiwan incurred a delay in the production of the machines, and the holiday season prevented them from shipping the entire volume of PCOS on time due to the high cost of shipping and the traffic. The non-arrival of the PCOS machines on a per batch target schedules was not only a concern of COMELEC. It also stirred up the anxiety of the voting public in relation to the schedule of the machine configuration and testing. Election stakeholders were relieved when all the 82,200 PCOS machines were finally delivered at the Cabuyao, Laguna Warehouse on February 21, 2010, which was the actual deadline stipulated in the contract. All the PCOS machines at the Cabuyao Warehouse underwent hardware tests before being accepted by COMELEC. The Software: Source Code Programming, Certification and Review The Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) describes the 2010 Automated Election System (AES) as a full life cycle system which enables a user to do the following:

• Create election definitions • Create multiple ballot styles • Assign voting jurisdictions to individual PCOS devices • Open polls • Allow voters to cast ballots • Close polls under the consensus of the pertinent BEI contingent • Accumulate vote totals • Print election results at the local level • Transmit results to the appropriate municipal canvass and consolidation

system • Transmit results to the Central Server system • Accumulate vote totals at each reporting level • Perform Auditing throughout the voting system

In compliance with the requirement of the RA 9369 on the AES certification, the COMELEC and the TEC with the assistance from the CAC conducted bidding for a

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systems certifier to do the AES Testing and Certification for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. The SysTest Lab won the contract over iBeta Quality Assurance, Wyle and CIBER. SysTest conducted physical tests to the PCOS and audited the source of the PCOS firmware, Election Management System (EMS) and other miscellaneous utilities of the system. SysTest discovered some minor, major and critical discrepancies in the system. The Smartmatic was advised to immediately correct the said discrepancies especially the critical ones. Based on the SysTest Lab’s final certification test report, the TEC reviewed and revised the COMELEC’s Continuity Plan and prepared the validation and verification procedures as well as the compensating controls in the implementation of the AES to plug the holes in the system. Sec. 12 of R.A. 9369 mandates the opening of the source code and making it available for review of any interested parties or groups as part of the transparency measures of the AES implementation. However, some election stakeholders questioned the timing of the opening of the source code and the guidelines for reviewers alleging both to be restrictive for those who want to do a true review of the code. Consequently, only the Liberal Party and one IT organization submitted their intent to conduct a review of the source code and in the end none of them actually did. Board of Election Inspectors’ Training RA 9369 specifically commissioned the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) to certify the BEIs on the use of the automated election systems. The DOST conducted the certification/training program for the BEIs from March 1-31, 2010. Out of the 151,061 BEIs who took the certification examination across the country, including ARMM, Singapore and Hong Kong, a total 137,200 BEIs have been certified, which is an average of 91% passing rate. On May 4, 2010, the DOST conducted another certification process for Region X to new BEIs to replace those who have begged off from rendering service on Election Day. A total of 242 BEIs were certified out the 270 who took the examination for this round of certification process. The relatively high passing rate of the BEIs increased the level of confidence of the voting public that the BEIs would be able to properly manage the automated election system at precinct level come election day. Ballot Printing The COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM printed 51,800,000 ballots. 50,850,940 million will be used for official ballot on the Election Day. The remaining sheets will be used for the

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trainings and for PCOS testings. The ballot security feature is composed of bar codes, UV mark/ink and micro-inscription. Finishing the printing of all the ballots on time was really a challenge to COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM. Ten (10) days after the start of the printing of the ballots, they were confronted with printing inconsistencies and cosmetic defects on a number of ballots. Such problems may result to the rejection of quite a significant number of ballots when fed into the PCOS machines during the ballot acceptance test. Reprinting all the affected ballots may cause a delay to the printing deadline. Upon the recommendation of the COMELEC Advisory Council, affected ballots were accepted as long as they pass the PCOS machine test and do not affect the ovals. Ballots that have extreme cases of defects were reprinted. In relation to the printing inconsistency, the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM were put on a tight rope when the problem on the inconsistency of ultraviolet (UV) mark printing on the ballot occurred. Because of the substandard UV ink used for this purpose, a large number of the printed ballots failed in the acceptance test. Given the time constraint, COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM decided to turn off the UV ink verifier feature of the PCOS machine to do away with ballot reprinting. After four weeks of ballot printing, the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM realized that they could not reach the 600,000 ballots per day target because their maximum output is only 580,000 a day with four printers running simultaneously. Because of this, COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM had to rent one more printer unit to cope up with the target and finish all the printing jobs by April 23. As a result, they were able to print all of the 50,850,940 ballots a day earlier than the deadline. Transmission In the implementation of the AES, the transmission of results had been the most crucial yet the most problematic part of the process because of the limitations in the availability of the telecommunication infrastructure to cover the transmission requirements of all the precincts. The results of the site survey conducted by Smartmatic-TIM on the actual transmission capability status of all the polling centers using a general pocket radio service (GPRS) show that of the 36,000 plus polling centers surveyed, 63% has coverage and 37% has no coverage. The correlation between the transmission coverage with the number of voters show that 76% of the voters will have access to transmission via GPRS and 24% will have no access to it. To augment the transmission capabilities of other polling centers, Smartmatic-TIM bought a number of Inmarsat’s Broadband Global Access Network (BGAN) units and very small aperture terminal (VSAT) systems, devices that access satellite signals for data transmission. Despite all of these, some of the precincts were still expected to manually transport the election results contained in a Compact Flash cards to the municipal

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canvassing centers because the BGANs and VSATs were not enough to support all the precincts that had no GPRS coverage. There was a concern over signal jamming device (SJD) that might affect the election process by interfering the transmission of election results. Contingencies on failure of transmission were already in place to respond to this. SJD could potentially cause a delay in the process but it could not directly alter the results. The COMELEC Advisory Council have recommended to the COMELEC to make the possession, use, and selling of the signal jamming device as election offense. Security There are several security features built in the automated election system that deal with the protection of the hardware, software, the ballots, ballot box and even accountable forms. Security features are in the form of data encryptions, digital signatures, codes, ultraviolet (UV) mark, and even padlocks and plastic seals. One of the key security features of the AES was the ultraviolet (UV) mark that ensures the authenticity of the ballots. But in the course of ballot printing, the said security feature was breached by the COMELEC after the PCOS machines failed to recognize the UV marks on the ballots due to the inconsistency in UV ink printing. Instead of solving the UV ink printing concern, COMELEC exacerbated the problem when it decided to turn off the PCOS machines UV ink reader to do away with UV mark verification on the ballots and changed the current UV mark design to a National Printing Office (NPO) logo, consequently leaving bar codes as the major security feature of the ballot authenticity. However, bar codes could be photocopied. The COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM are banking on the unusual size and weight of the ballot as deterrent for ballot reproduction. As a contingency to the shutting down of UV mark reader of the PCOS machines, COMELEC resorted to purchasing 80,000 units of UV lamp amounting to P30 million to manually verify the UV mark on the ballots. This move by COMELEC was potentially dangerous because it basically added human intervention to the process. Organization As an organization, COMELEC tried to maximize its capacities in the implementation of the AES given the limitations it has in terms of manpower, IT capability, and management skills. The decision of COMLEC to get IT consultants for the Office of COMELEC Chairman was welcomed considering that none in the COMELEC En Banc has expertise on information technology. The designation of the COMELEC Commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal as Commissioner in charge of the automation project was reasonable considering that he is the most IT-capable among the Commissioners. The creation of Project Management Team (PMT) replicating the structure of the Smartmatic-TIM’s project management officers was strategic for better and faster coordination and implementation of project components.

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However, in most cases the decision makings are done on the PMT level directly consulting the opinion of the En Banc and setting aside a key structure in the organization, the Steering Committee which is supposed to direct the progress of the project implementation. More often than not, it was the Steering Committee that was the last one to know of the current developments of the project and the adjustments made in their implementation. Public Acceptance and Voter Education During the early part of the implementation of the AES for the 2010 elections, there was battle of public perception on the advantages and disadvantages of an automated election system using the Precinct Count Optical Scanner technology. Many groups, election stakeholders and IT organizations tried to discredit the AES. Some of these groups even tried to feed information to Congress during the automation budget deliberation to pin down the project. But many of the lawmakers supported the AES causing the approval of the budget for implementation. The case filed against the COMELEC at the Supreme Court and the accusations alleged by the group of Atty. Harry Roque on the automated election system have put to test the public acceptability of the AES. People were made to believe that AES will just automate the cheating in the elections. But the Supreme Court ruled in favour of COMELEC and the implementation of the AES for 2010. The various efforts to educate the public on the AES by the different non-government organizations like Bantay Eleksyon and the media networks prepared their constituencies and instilled “critical acceptance” to the new automated election system. Way before the COMELEC started its formal voters education campaign, media networks have already come up with effective TV ads promoting the AES and teaching the people how to vote. The most popular example of this media campaign was GMA 7’s music video on “Bilog na Hugis Itlog” (“Egg-shaped Oval), highlighting the new voting process. Some election stakeholders developed their own voters’ education modules not only in visual aid form but also in videos for the general public as well as for specific sectors and ethnic groups like persons with disabilities, women, indigenous peoples, youth, Muslims, etc. Other organizations who were against the implementation of the AES for 2010 also developed their own voter education module but with emphasis on the possible election fraud under the new system and how to guard the votes. The COMELEC started its formal voters’ education campaign only around March 2010, a couple of months before the elections. COMELEC made use of the TV networks, radio stations, websites and posters to promote the AES and teach the people about the new voting system. The COMELEC also deployed one PCOS machine in every province for public demonstration. However, the public demonstration of the PCOS machine was not a proactive campaign, local COMELEC had to depend on the invitations/requests of the different institutions and organization in the areas for the demonstration because there was no budget available to organize their own event. When local COMLEC ran out of PCOS

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machine reservation schedules, they made use of the powerpoint presentation of the AES as an alternative method for public demonstration. COMELEC’s voter education on ground greatly depended on the creativity and dedication of the election officer since there was no budget provided for this purpose. On the whole, all the credits for raising the awareness of the general public and building of their trust and confidence on the new automated election system were due to all those who have worked to educate the public in one way or another. Continuity Plan Ra 9369 requires that COMELEC should prepare a Continuity Plan anticipating the possible problems in the implementation of the AES. The COMELEC complied with this provision of the law. It laid the procedures for contingencies in case of PCOS machine failure, transmission media failure, and the like. However, some election stakeholders questioned the timing of the release of the said Continuity Plan. COMELEC’s reason for not releasing it early was to prevent unscrupulous persons from using the vulnerabilities of the system to further their interests. This COMELEC decision may be valid but this same decision also prevented the public from preparing themselves in anticipating the possible failure of the system and know the proper procedure of resolving the problems. B. Voters’ Registration

The extension window for registration yielded a dismal turn-out as only 258,000 voters registered during this period. The number of registrants as per COMELEC record is 57 million.

While the whole registration process was generally uneventful save for a single violent incident in Mindanao, attention focused on reported double registrations in different provinces. As of date, the COMELEC has yet to come out with the list of supposedly purged voters’ list.

C. Party Registration/ Party list groups

The Supreme Court decision nullifying the NP- NPC merger has given the Liberal Party the benefit, and to some extent, the advantage of recognition as dominant minority party which entitles the LP an on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors through the PCOS machines; an immediate access to official election results among other things.

By election time, there were only 152 party list groups accredited by the COMELEC, but 187 groups were listed on the ballot. The difference were party-list groups under question before the Comelec The huge number of those approved by the COMELEC accounted for the extraordinary length of the ballot. Complaints against bogus or administration-backed candidates continue to swamp the COMELEC office.

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D. Clustering of Precincts The clustering scheme of the COMELEC where 3-7 precincts are clustered into one, with a maximum of 1,000 voters for said clustered precinct generated very long queues. As a result, many voters had to wait 3-5 hours for their turn to cast their votes under the blistering heat of the sun. Then come voting time, voters had to endure cramped precincts, a situation which the COMELEC failed to foresee and provide contingency for. There were other factors that contributed to the long lines and longer waiting hours. First, some BEI’s were ill at ease in operating the PCOS machine, a testament to their lack of sufficient training and orientation. The BEI’s also met difficulties in managing irate and bigger crowd. Second, some observed that senior citizen voters took twice or even thrice as much time casting their votes, thus stalling the already long lines. While there were express lane privileges extended to senior citizens, the provision was not fully implemented/ utilized in many polling areas.

F. Deployment of election machines and paraphernalia

While there were initial apprehensions on the safe and complete distribution of PCOS machines, CCS laptops, security keys, and other election paraphernalia to the proper precincts, there was no known or reported incident that prevented the deployment of said machines to their designated precincts. However, there was no detailed inventory of both the deployed and spare PCOS machines and compact flash cards (CFC). To date, the COMELEC has yet to come out with a report of full retrieval of PCOS machines used as well as the CFC’s reportedly found dumped improperly. It was also observed that in most parts of the country, UV lamps were not utilized to verify the validity of ballots. G. Field Tests, Mock Election and Final Testing and Sealing Field Tests Bantay Eleksyon 2010 participated in all the Field Tests scheduled by the COMELEC1. As reported by media, BE 2010 likewise observed several glitches on both testing dates, where most of which involved the signal of SIM cards for the transmission of results. Some quarters believe that there should have been more rigorous field tests in order that the performance of the machines may have been fine-tuned. Mock Elections 1 Full Report of January and February 2010 Field Tests.

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The COMELEC scheduled simultaneous mock elections in several schools in Metro Manila. It was observed that the 1,000 voters per precinct could hardly be accommodated until 7:00 pm; given that each voter averaged 5-7 minutes in casting his/her vote. This precludes other factors such as BEI’s handling of the machine, senior citizen and PWD voters, and set-up of PCOS machine. Final Testing and Sealing On the first two days of the Testing and Sealing process (May 3-4), problems on ballot reading and discrepancies between the machine count and the manual count mainly on the local contests were reported by our volunteers in the Batangas, Cavite, Rizal. The media reported the same thing in Makati. The problems were attributed to the mismatch in the configuration of the Compact Flash (CF) cards with the ballot design of the local contests. The testing and sealing schedules in all other areas were then postponed until COMELEC and Smartmatic provided the correct CF cards. Out of 1,904 PCOS machines that were monitored during the testing and sealing process (May 8-9), the number of problems encountered concerning the starting up of the PCOS machines, reading of the test ballots, printing of the election returns, and discrepancies in the machine versus manual results only accounts to 0.01% to 0.05%. Transparency of the testing and sealing process in terms of public participation and observers’ access to the process is limited because there was no fix schedule for the said activity. Holding of the testing and sealing process greatly depends on the arrival of the correct Compact Flash (CF) cards to its designated areas. Public participation and observers’ presence also depend on the discretion of the BEI Chairman/person-in-charge and sometimes of the PPCRV volunteers on who would be allowed to observe the proceedings. There are reports that BE volunteers were being prevent by PPCRV to observe the process; and in some cases, even PPCRV volunteers were not allowed by the BEIs. III. Election Administration Performance of the COMELEC In so far as the preparation, implementation, and success of the Automated Election System during the May 10, 2010 elections are concerned, the Commission on Elections had undoubtedly done its job. COMELEC’s determination to pursue and manage the 2010 automated elections despite the size and complexities of project and the Compact Flash (CF) cards glitch that threatened the holding of the 2010 elections, had added credit to COMELEC’s tarnished credibility brought about the by Abalos Administration. While the success of the first automated elections may have been lauded by both local and international election stakeholders, and the credibility of its results have been accepted by

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majority of the voting public, COMELEC’s achievement, however, could be overshadowed by its failings in terms of promoting the transparency of the election process, implementing the election laws, maintaining its independence and non-partisanship, and ensuring efficiency in the implementation of the automated election system. On the issue of transparency, the COMELEC was commended by local and international communities for conducting the bidding of AES with a high level of transparency that even the losing bidders could attest to the credibility of the process. However, during the implementation of the AES, the COMELEC had become less and less transparent in its attempt to protect the new AES against those who might take advantage of the systems vulnerabilities, thus compromising the right to information of the voting public as well as their trust to AES in the process. Later on, transparency and honesty had been set aside by COMELEC in conducting their subsequent procurement processes involving small items but in huge volume like in the case of ballot secrecy folders, indelible ink, padlocks and etc. In relation to the candidates’ application, COMELEC had failed in screening the qualified candidates and deciding on their application speedily and judiciously so that the voting public may choose only from a roster of qualified and competent candidates for every position. One classic example to this is the case of a presidential aspirant Vetellano Acosta who was disqualified only after his name was already printed on the ballot. As a result, a number of people still voted for him not knowing that their vote went into waste. Acosta’s votes were even higher than Gordon’s. In the case of party-list accreditation, COMELEC vowed to strictly abide by the law in qualifying only the groups that truly represent a marginalized sector, and consequently control the size of the ballot for the 2010 elections. In the end, the voting public had to deal with 187 party-list groups to vote in which 55 of them where identified as dubious groups and extending the length of the ballot up to 25 inches. In the area of citizens’ arm and election observers’ accreditations, the COMELEC had been accommodating to the foreign election observers but not to the local election monitors. The COMELEC was right to have accredited the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) as a citizens’ arm but it had been biased to the PPCRV in delegating almost all of the task there is for a citizens’ arm, to the extent of rejecting the accreditation of equally competent election watchdogs such as the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Having the monopoly of the citizens’ arms task, knowingly or unknowingly, PPCRV now has two conflicting identities: as a citizens’ arm and at the same time as a watchdog. The Legal Network for Transparent Election (LENTE) and the Citizens Coalition for the ARMM Electoral Reforms (C-CARE) were also accredited as citizens’ arms on the condition that they do not duplicate the role of PPCRV. And, their accreditations were given to them too close to the Election Day, affecting their preparations for their activities. Having been too focused on the implementation of the AES, COMELEC failed miserably in the enforcement of the election laws. The violations of the common poster area and campaign material size regulations continue to be perennial problems in the 2010 elections.

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There were attempts to remove some of the campaign materials brazenly posted everywhere, but no one has ever be convicted nor prosecuted on this violation. Most of the credits for COMELEC in the success of the 2010 automated elections should go to COMELEC election officers and the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs). They were the frontline services for election administration directly addressing challenges of the new automated system, one of which was crowd management. Aside from ensuring that every registered voter of a precinct gets to vote, and the contingency procedures be followed in case of systems failure, the most difficult part was facing and managing an irate crowd of hundreds to a thousand voters waiting in long queues to cast their vote. In an automated or manual election, election administration greatly depends on the local COMELEC officials’ dedication, creativity and management skills. IV. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Campaign Media-based Campaign As the candidates enter the final phase of the campaign period, a marked shift in the presidential and vice presidential standings occurred. In what earlier seemed to be a close match in the presidential race between Benigno Aquino III and Manuel Villar, Jr., consistent frontrunner Aquino pulled away from Villar, as reported in the last significant surveys before the election. There was a point when Villar was able to significantly narrow down the gap between his survey rating and Aquino’s when he bombarded the TV networks with all his campaign ads. But his increase in survey rating was only temporary because this was reversed with the exposition of the “Villarroyo issue” that accused him of being the true candidate of PGMA. Villar’s drop in the survey ratings had put him into a tie in second place with former president Joseph “ERAP” Estrada (Pulse Asia). However, in the SWS survey, Estrada had already eclipsed Villar’s number 2 standing. Notably, Estrada joined in the Aquino versus Villar fray, causing damage more on Villar’s bid as Estrada tagged the former in yet another land controversy. Administration candidate Gilberto Teodoro never budged from his place. Aquino took advantage of free media exposure through news coverage. As proof of the extent of his exposure, foreign media had shown keen interest in his campaign, even posing questions regarding his ability to fight graft and corruption in the country. On the other hand, Villar’s popularity was a result of paid political campaign ads. It is worth noting that media campaigns had already evolved from simple ad campaign to guestings in talkshows, gameshows and even shows like “Maalala Mo Kaya” where the life of a prospective candidate’s family was featured but with a subtle showcasing of the personality of the said would-be candidate. Both Villar and Aquino benefited from this medium. In the Vice Presidential derby, Aquino’s running mate Mar Roxas struggled to keep his lead as his survey ratings steadily declined. He was tied with Estrada’s running mate Jejomar Binay who had surged from the third to the top spot, overtaking Loren Legarda (NP/Villar running mate) who slipped into third spot.

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Mudslinging both in print and television and character assassination among candidates remained a staple, if not the main course, in their respective campaigns. Sorties and public meetings Serious contenders for the top 2 elective posts have scoured the archipelago, striking deals, courting endorsements and forging connections that could translate into considerable votes. The most popular endorsements were those from “influential” religious groups/ leaders who have their own loyal followers, such as the Iglesia ni Cristo, and the Kingdom of Jesus. Likewise, candidates have readily applied the time tested formula in successfully attracting a sizeable crowd by including movie and TV personalities in their campaign sorties. Based on the field report of Pera’t Pulitika, a campaign finance monitoring group, they monitored 21 nationwide public meetings of Aquino, 19 for Villar, 10 for Teodoro and 7 for Erap within the 90-day campaign period. Campaign Expenditures

According to Pera’t Pulitika, the top 3 spenders among the presidential candidates were Villar, Aquino and Estrada. Based on their political ads monitoring from period February 9 – May 8, 2010, Villar was the top spender with P333.9 million indicative worth of unique ads. The second on the list was Aquino with P309.5 million and followed by Estrada with P181 million worth of unique ads. Even if the ads that featured the three presidentiables with their vice presidential candidates and their ally party-list groups would be included in the computation, the ranking would not change based on Pera’t pulitika findings. Among the vice-presidential candidates, Roxas was the top spender with P204.5 million worth of unique ads. Legarda followed second with P180 million unique ads and Binay on the third slot with P167 million ads. The findings of Pera’t-Pulitika on the presidential and vice-presidential candidates’ show that political ads will not and do not guarantee poll victory. The last poll survey and the actual election result prove that political ads spending will not necessarily translate into votes because Aquino who won as president and Binay as vice president, were not the top spenders on political ads. V. Campaign for Other National and Local Positions Pera’t Pulitika data show that the total indicative real cost spent by national candidates, political parties and party-list groups in television, radio and print ads amounts to P4.3 billion. Out of the P4.3 million, P1.5 billion was the indicative expenditures of the

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senatorial candidates, P597 million for the party-list and P277 million for the political party or omnibus ads. In the case of the senatorial candidates, it was not surprising to see incumbent senators and ex-senators having the most ads and exposures because of their access to the resources. Political affiliation or alignment was not the key to wining in the senatorial race but name recall and political ads. This was true in the case of Revilla, Estrada, Defensor, Enrile, Drilon, Osmena, Sotto, Lapid, and Recto. The P597 million expenditures of the party-list, which is 14% of the P4.3 billion total indicative expenditures of national candidates on ads was actually a spending of only sixty-six (66) party-list groups. Out of these, 16 groups spent P367 million or 62% of the total party-list expenditures. The large campaign spending of the party-list groups runs counter to their claim as representatives of the “marginalized sector”. According to Pera’t Pulitika, party-list groups’ campaign should be rooted to constituencies that are supposed to deliver the votes. Political ads are not guarantee for poll victory for the party-list. There are many party-list groups who won without political ads because they concentrated on building their mass base by organizing their constituents. On the other hand, the total local candidates’ indicative expenditures for TV, radio and print ads amounted to P161.6 million. VI. Conduct of the May 10, 2010 Elections A. Holding of elections/ failure of elections The preparation and implementation of the new automated election system (AES) for 2010 was never easy for COMELEC after it had set a record of an unusually transparent bidding process for the automated election system using the Precinct Count Optical Scanner (PCOS) machine. Later on, questions regarding the credibility of the system were raised because COMELEC was not able to keep the level of transparency it had started in the process of implementing the AES. The general public’s trust and confidence for the AES was threatened when problems concerning the delivery of PCOS machines to the country, printing of the ballots at the National Printing Office (NPO), controversy over the bidding of secrecy folders, and configuration of the main Compact Flash (CF) cards during the testing and sealing process arose. The COMELEC was still able to implement the necessary preparations and managed to hold the automated national and local elections as scheduled despite the many problems they encountered. The local and national elections were held as scheduled in more than 80% of the country, with minor glitches and incidents that were negligible. There was however a failure of elections declared in 4 municipalities and 7 towns of Lanao del Sur, particularly in the municipalities of Sultan Dumalondong and Masiu. There was no election in Sultan Dumalondong because all of the BEIs were challenged by rival parties

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alleging conflict of interest because of family relations to the candidates. In Masiu, no election was held due to the absence of BEIs to conduct the election. In Guimbal (IloIlo) and in Alicia (Isabela) the elections had been rescheduled because the former received the wrong ballots and the latter which had PCOS machines that failed to function. Based on reports from the field, the most common problems in the precincts were the long queue, very slow voting process, and the malfunctioning of some PCOS machines. These tested the patience of the voters, which was made even worse by the heat of the day. Surprisingly, most of the voters stayed on queue and waited for their turn to cast their votes. Some may have gone impatient, gone out of the line and even quarrelled with others in the line, but they returned to cast their votes as well. The long queue and slow pacing of the voting process have made COMELEC extend the voting period from 6 pm to 7 pm so that those in long queues could still vote. As expected, a significant number of voters that were disenfranchised because they could not find their names on the list or that they could find their precincts. Based on the reported data, there were cases of disenfranchised voters in four areas such as Agusan de Sur, Bukidnon, Laguna and Quezon City. In San Antonio National High School, Makati, 50% of the voters were excluded because of their registration has been deactivated last year. B. Adherence to the General Instructions In so far as the General Instructions to the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs), COMELEC Resolution No. 8786, several violations had been committed by either the voter or the BEI. The following were some of the violations to the General Instructions: Despite the priority treatment given to senior citizens and persons with disability, they still experienced difficulty in getting into their precincts because their precincts were not located on the ground floor as Sec. 32 of the GI for BEIs required. The problem was attributed to the clustering of precincts where Sec. 32 had been overlooked vis-à-vis the need to cluster the precincts for PCOS deployment. The ballot secrecy folder protects the sanctity of our votes by keeping it secret to those who might see it. There were reports that in Sta. Irene, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, and in Socorro, Surigao del Norte no ballot secrecy folders were used during the elections.

In relation to this, someone had uploaded in a social networking site (Facebook) a video of Former President Joseph Erap Estrada casting his vote inside the precinct and not using the ballot secrecy folder. When the camera zoomed in on Erap’s ballot, viewers could see in the video that Erap has abstained in voting for the vice-presidential position. Such act of videoing Erap’s ballot is a clear violation of the secrecy of vote that could have been protected by the folder.

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The problems on the use of the indelible ink were experienced in two ways: the indelibility of the ink and the application of the ink. There were reports that the ink applied to some of the voters could easily be removed. This was probably caused by not shaking the ink bottle properly before using the ink as per COMELEC instruction. In some areas however, the ink was applied to the finger of the voters before the voter cast his vote. This could be problematic for two reasons: one, because the ink might stain the ballot rendering it invalid; or two, the voters could be accused of having voted already. There have been several reports on the rejection of ballots. In Tandag City, Surigao del Sur and in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, a number of ballots were rejected for some reasons not known to the monitors. In Polopina, IloIlo, some ballots were rejected because of ambiguous marks. But since the voter or the BEI do not know the exact procedure on ballot rejection, the voters left the precinct without correcting the marks for it to be counted. Sec. 41 provides that 14th copy of the National Election Results and the 7th copy of the Local Election results should be posted on a conspicuous area in the precinct for public viewing. Some of the precincts in Visayas region did not post the returns. BEIs only read aloud the results and did not post a copy for public viewing. In addition to the adherence to the COMELEC instructions, the General Instruction does not include a procedure on the use of the UV lamp to verify ballot authenticity precisely because the use of the UV lamp was only adopted a few weeks before the elections when COMELEC decided to shut down the PCOS UV ink reader due to the UV ink printing problem on the ballots. The late instructions as well as the delivery of the UV lamps to the BEIs could be the reasons many of the BEIs did not use the UV lamp for ballot verification. Only quite a few made use of it, and others thought it was a back up lamp in case of brown out. In Ilagan, Province of Isabela, the BEIs complained about a paraphernalia (UV lamp) given to them without teaching them how to use it. C. Performance of Automated Election System Most PCOS machines performed as expected, and within the projected margin of error, this after the Smartmatic replaced 76,000 Compact Flash Cards (CFC), which the COMELEC recalled after the machines failed to read and tally the votes during the Final Testing and Sealing process. A total of 450 PCOS machines failed, which represents a failure rate of 0.6% far below the 2.75% estimate of the COMELEC and CAC. PCOS machine failures were reported to have happened in areas like Taguig, Caloocan, Pasay City, Davao City, Cauayan City, Isa., Rivera Vill. Pasay City, Tarlac, Naga City, Bulacan, Iloilo, Zamboanga, Abra, Quezon City, Makati City, Agusan del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Lipa, and Isabela, Basilan. There were some areas though that complained of machine malfunction and some, failure. These areas include Mauban, Quezon where the machine stopped functioning for an hour; Estancia and San Roque towns in Iloilo where the machines had trouble transmitting the results; Mat-I Elementary School in Surigao del Norte where the machine rejected 80% of the ballots; Zone 1 and Coronon precincts in Davao where problems ranged from memory

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card failure, machine breakdowns, delay in initialization, paper jams, failure in transmission, and ballot rejections. It was observed further that the PCOS machines did not have time or date logs. This would frustrate efforts to conduct a forensic audit of the machine. Ballot Handling The most common violation in ballot handling is the absence of ballot secrecy folders. There were many precincts, particularly in remote areas that did not bother to use any folder at all to maintain the “secrecy” of ballots. Some precincts though made use of ordinary folders to shield their votes. Many BEIs have committed violations in preserving the sacredness of the ballot. In a precinct in Sabuanan, Sta Lucia, Ilocos Sur, and in Cavite, several watchers reported that some BEI’s filled up the ballots for the voters and fed them to the machines themselves, while some put marks on the ballots before handing it over to a voter, thereby causing the rejection of the ballot when fed to the machine due to unauthorized markings. In Lanao del Sur, most ballots, which were “pre-shaded”, were fed to the machine by the BEIs themselves. In Davao, some ballots were entered into the machine even after the memory card was removed, thus causing the votes not to be electronically registered.

Printing of Election Results The official thermal paper provided by COMELEC bears a security feature with its logo at the back of the paper. Each PCOS machine kit delivered at each precinct contains 5 thermal paper rolls (1 installed in the machine and 4 reserves). Reports from the Bantay Eleksyon observers show that there were different types of thermal paper used in the printing of the election returns in the precincts. There were some precincts that used commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) thermal paper rolls. Notably, most of the ERs that used COTS thermal paper were on local elections. According to COMELEC the shortage of the official thermal paper roll in some precincts were brought about by accidental over-printing of copies of ERs when the BEIs wrongfully entered their PIN codes instead of number of copies. However, in the case of North Cotabato, both the municipalities of Kidapawan and Midsayap used a thermal paper roll from Citibank for their local election results. The use of different thermal paper rolls for the printing of the election returns consequently raised a lot of questions on the authenticity of the copies of the ERs distributed to the stakeholders. In addition to the usage of different ERs, there were also reports that the official thermal paper used by COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM for the printing of election returns fades quickly than the COTS thermal paper rolls. This is in contrast to the supplier’s word that their thermal paper would last for 5 years.

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Transmission The transmission of results was unexpectedly faster. Within five (5) hours after the voting process was closed, almost 58% or a total of 44, 592 clustered precincts have already transmitted their election results, and election returns were already canvassed and consolidated at the municipal level. On the next day around 80% of the results had already been transmitted which surprised everyone especially the candidates, and later prompted some them to concede within 24 hours after the closing of the polls. However, the transmission of results slowed down when it reached a little over 80%. The delay was attributed to areas that encountered machine problems which extended the voting hours, the 30 meter rule that accommodated the voters causing the late closing of the polls, and those precincts which resorted to manual transport of the CF cards to the municipal canvassing center because of transmission problem. According to NAMFREL, some 7,500 PCOS machines failed to transmit reports at the close of elections. This means that the data never made it to PPCRV or KBP servers and the two main political parties, and as such, said results were not made known to the public. Specifically, the following areas were reported to have transmission problems: Masbate, Ilocos Region, Cordillera, Samar, Ilocos Sur and Norte, Nueva Ecija and Abra. Consolidation and Canvassing Reportedly, there were four (4) laptops that failed on Election Day out of the 1,717 units deployed at the municipal and provincial canvassing centers. The figure represents a failure rate of 0.2%. Aside from the canvassing unit failure, another problem in the consolidation and canvassing of result were brought about by the flagging down of the Election Day result at the COMELEC Central Server (CCS) because it had already stored a previous result of 10 votes which was caused primarily by the BEIs who, not following the Final Testing and Sealing (FTS) day procedures, attempted to transmit the FTS results or directly uploaded it to the CCS. There were approximately 262 clustered precincts that were affected by this problem. An example of this was Clustered Precinct 0014A – 0015A in Tineg, Abra. COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM corrected this problem by running a script to the affected canvassing laptop and directly changing the results in the CCS. The COMELEC Advisory Council had strongly opposed the decision of COMELEC because it would be introducing a manual intervention to the CCS and compromising its integrity. CAC recommendation was a manual reconciliation of precincts’ result affected by this FTS glitch.

Continuity Procedures

Section 11 and 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 required a continuity plan in case of a systems breakdown resulting in delay, obstruction, or non-performance of the automated election system.

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Given the glitches during the preparations of the AES for the 2010 elections and its technical limitations such as transmission capability, administrative weaknesses, as well as BEI and voters’ knowledge of the new system, it is but logical to expect problems during the implementation and continuity plans/procedures will be resorted to. The Bantay Eleksyon 2010 was able to monitor 1,596 precinct-related Election Day incidents of which 49% of these cases prompted for continuity procedures. Out of the 1,596 precinct-related incidents, 793 were PCOS machine-related including its components, 477 were voters-related, 197 were BEI-related, 75 were election monitor-related and 54 were external factor-related. Examples of the external-related incidents involve intimidation, harassment, power failure, bad weather, etc.

From the 793 incidents involving PCOS machines and its components, Bantay Eleksyon was able to record 254 cases of PCOS malfunction and 203 transmission problems. Other machine-related incidents include paper jam, ballot rejection handling and PCOS components concerns such as battery shortage.

Conduct of Random Manual Audit (RMA) The main issue on the conduct of Random Manual Audit (RMA) is delay. COMELEC Resolution No 8837 mandates the immediate RMA of precincts immediately after the transmission of results. In many key areas, RMA was still on going almost three weeks after the elections, resulting to allegations of fraud, tampering of ballots, interventions, and petition/s for restraining order against the COMELEC before the Supreme Court. In Davao City in particular, a group of teachers assigned to audit the ballots complained that it was only in the afternoon of May 11, 2010 that they were instructed to proceed to their assigned precincts. When they arrived, at least 80 percent of the ballot boxes were already taken to Almendras gym for the city canvassing that had started at the city council building the night right after the elections. Secondary to the issue of delay is COMELEC’s failure to adhere to the procedures it laid down in their own Resolution No 8837, as well as Republic Act 9369. Both laws require the conduct of RMA in one precinct per congressional district randomly chosen (emphasis ours) by the poll body in each province and city (COMELEC later increased this to five per legislative district, or 1,145 precincts nationwide). There had been allegations that some precincts were pre-selected prior to the day of the election, thus raising concerns on the integrity of the ballots. This opened speculations of auditing tampered ballots. Further, COMELEC excluded from the list of precincts to be audited far-flung Barangays (referred to as Least Accessible Barangays), in violation of the randomness nature of the audit prescribed by law. In addition to the list of violated procedures, many audits were conducted outside of the precinct and without the presence or attendance of election watchdogs, stakeholders, and political parties and their representatives. Overall, there seem to be minimal discrepancies in the audit, the difference between the transmitted and printed election returns being limited to double digit variances in 29 places. There was however, a three-digit variance reported in Valenzuela City. The margin of error is reported to be 0.007% and the National Statistics Office (Agency that

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replaced the Commission on Audit who backed out a month before the elections) said that the discrepancy rate might still go down after the completion of the RMA. More than two months after 2010 elections, the RMA Committee released its final report giving a 99.6% accuracy rating to the automated election results. Pre-Proclamation Protest Given the rapid transmission and canvassing of results, there was almost practically no room for pre-proclamation protests because even before a losing candidate could file complaint, the winning candidate had already been proclaimed. This situation could be partly attributed to the lowering of the thresholds to facilitate proclamation in local contests. Accordingly, there were municipalities that were quick to lower their threshold as long as the remaining votes would not alter the ranking of candidates, but there also were municipalities which refused to lower the threshold despite a huge lead by one candidate enough to be proclaimed as the winner. Consequently, most of the cases filed in COMELEC were post-proclamation protests. According to COMELEC, there were more post-proclamation cases filed by the losing candidates under the 2010 automated election system compared to the 2007 manual elections. To date, the COMELEC received a total of 96 protest cases, while it only handled 73 protest cases in the 2007 elections. The increase in number of protest cases with allegation of poll fraud, vote rigging, vote buying and discrepancies in the election results was expected because this was the only recourse of the losing candidates to discredit the integrity of the results and to open the possibility of altering the proclamation. VII. Election Fraud and Other Anomalies Based on the testimonies of the losing candidates in the House of Representatives investigation, there were actual cases of election fraud such as vote shaving in an automated way. A number of losing candidates have raised their concern on the automated cheating yet the complainants were not able to substantiate their claim. However, incidents in Antipolo City where 60 PCOS machine were found in the residence of the Smartmatic technician, and in Cagayan de Oro where election paraphernalia and other election material were found in the junk yard, were causes for concern because there seems to be violations in terms of protocol in safekeeping the election paraphernalia and PCOS machine. Accountability should be exacted to those who did not do their job. Most cases of the election fraud reported by the Bantay Eleksyon field monitors were incidents of vote buying in areas like Puerto Prinsesa, Bohol, Surigao del Norte and Surigao del Sur, Agusan Norte, Agusan Sur and Bukidnon. In Puerto Prinsesa the price ranges from P1000 to P3000 per voter. Nowadays, vote buying has evolved in various forms. A classic vote buying strategy is offering money, goods or favour to a voter in exchange of a vote. But in areas identified as bailiwicks of the opponent, cheaters usually resort to vote denial by offering an amount of money to the supporters of the opponent candidates and preventing them from going to the

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precinct to vote. Others apply indelible ink to the voters upon giving the money so that the voter will no longer be qualified to vote. These forms of vote buying however will not work without resorting to violence such as harassment or intimidation. In Cagayan de Oro, Bohol, Pangasinan and Quezon City, there were reported cases of pre-shaded ballots on the mayoralty race before these were given to the voters. VIII. Election Violence With the new automated system, the cheats had difficulty of doing their craft without the risk of being caught; nor could they simply do anything to the system unless they were in cohorts with COMELEC or Smartmatic people. The most viable options available for them to further their interest were to buy votes or to resort to violence--from mere intimidation or harassment to assassination. The highly-controversial Maguinadao massacre, is an extreme example of election-related violence aimed not merely at winning the elections over the opponents, but at removing the opponents themselves to maintain the incumbent in power. Based on the data of Vote Peace, a peace advocacy and election-related violent incident (ERVI) monitoring project of the Consortium on Electoral Reforms, they were able to monitor one hundred fifty (150) incidents of election-related violence from January 10 - June 9. From these incidents, there were one hundred thirteen (113) fatalities and one hundred twenty-eight (128) wounded. On the same period, the Philippine National Police (PNP) was able to record one hundred eighty (180) incidents of ERVIs with one hundred fifty five (155) casualties, which includes both fatalities and wounded. On the whole, a significant number of these incidents were conducted in an organized manner with clear target and an intention to kill, which is evident in the nature of incident (assassination). However, there was a significant decrease of ERVIs in the traditionally-labelled critical areas during elections such as Abra, Nueva Ecija, Masbate, Samar, Maguindanao, Basilan and Sulu. The decrease could be attributed to the various peace efforts of the organizations and sector in society. Credit is also due to the effective campaign of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) against private armed groups (PAGs) that were hired by the politicians as their private armies, and the strict implementation of total gun ban. IX. Overseas Absentee Voting Base on the estimate, there are about ten million overseas Filipino workers abroad. Out of the ten million, 589,830 are the registered voters for 2010 elections. And, of the 589,830 registered voters, only 153,323 casted their votes through the Overseas Absentee Voting (OAV) in the May 2010 election, a total 26% voter turn out. The 2010 elections voters turn out is almost twice as much than the 2007 elections but barely one third of the total overseas absentee voters turn out in 2004 elections that recorded 85%.

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In most of the countries, voting was done personally through precinct, or through postal voting. Only Hong Kong and Singapore benefited from the automated elections. Voters availability, in terms of time and date, as well as cost of voting where considered major reasons for the low OAV turn out in the 2010 elections. X. Party-List System The flawed Party-list System Act or RA 7941 had opened doors for abuses and circumventions, there being no hard and fast rule on what exactly is “marginalized”. There were a total of 187 party list groups listed on the ballot, which accounts for the extraordinary length of the ballots. Based on a 2006 memorandum released by the Malacanang Office of External Affairs, the following party- lists are identified as “pro – administration”: ANG GALING PINOY (first nominee is Rep. Juan Miguel Arroyo- who faces several petitions for disqualification), ABONO (first nominee is Jacky Lomibao, wife of ex PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao), 1-UTAK (first nominee is former Energy Sec. Angelo Reyes); BABAE KA, KALAHI, LYPAD, KASANGGA, AGBIAG and AGING PINOY. Most of the new party-list groups were approved by the Comelec second division. A review of the initial batch of nominees (73 party list groups) submitted to the COMELEC revealed that there are 25 government officials (uniformed men, politicians and their relatives) vying for party-list seats. As per Comelec resolution 10-009 released on May 31, 2010 the proclamation of eleven (11) of the first thirty-nine (39) party-list groups shall be deferred until final resolution of their respective cases. Eight (8) party-list groups are on the petition for cancellation of registration; Ako Bicol political party, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, First Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption, LPG Marketers Association, Inc., Ang Asosasyon Sang Mangunguma nga Bisaya – OWA Mangunguma, Inc., and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives. Three (3) party-list groups are on the Petition for disqualification of party-list nominee; 1-UTAK, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment through Action Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Butil Farmers Party. Twenty-eight (28) party-list groups were initial winners in the party list elections of May 10, 2010, involving a total of thirty-five (35) guaranteed and/or additional seats, without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to be entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or additional seat. XI. Election Monitors Both the domestic and foreign election monitors played a crucial role in the success of the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections as they have done in the 2007 national and local elections. The various efforts of the different organizations and institutions in monitoring

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the election process were instrumental in ensuring the credibility and integrity of the recently concluded automated national and local elections. Some of these domestic election monitors were the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (LENTE) that monitored election fraud and protests; the Pera’t Pulitika and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) that monitored campaign finance; the Vote Peace and the National Task Force HOPE that forged peace compacts and monitored election violence; the Bantay Bayan of NAMFREL, Kontra Daya 2010, Bantay Halalan, and Vote Report Philippines 2010 monitoring the poll irregularities; and the AES-Watch with the Center for Peoples’ Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) evaluating the performance of the automated election system. The groups like Cebu Citizen’s Involvement and Maturation in People Empowerment and Liberation (C-Cimpel) and Citizens Coalition for ARMM Electoral Reforms (CCARE) were local initiatives monitoring the elections process and poll irregularities in their own area of responsibility. The Bantay Eleksyon, as a domestic election observer mission, monitored the conduct of the entire election process and did a random sample count of the precinct results in relation to the COMELEC public website results. The Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), however, being an accredited citizens’ arm, performed as an extension of COMELEC by assisting the latter in all of its activities. It helped COMELEC in public information campaign, set up help desks at the polling centers, monitored the poll irregularities, conducted a parallel count of the election results and spearheaded the conduct of the Random Manual Audit as authorized by COMELEC. It practically assumed both the roles and duties of a citizens’ arm and a watch dog which were previously performed by separate organizations that have the long-standing track record and expertise in specific fields of election monitoring. The participation of various delegates of international observers in the 2010 automated elections contributed to the integrity of the electoral process. Their mere presence is already a deterrent to the cheats and attests to the interest of the international community over the success of the first automated elections and credibility of results. However, the weight of their findings and generalizations were limited by the scope and period of their observation mission. Nevertheless, their observations would inevitably affect the assessment of the international community on the credibility of the country’s transfer of political power vis-à-vis international relations. The media have also played an important role in the 2010 elections not only in the monitoring of the election process and reporting of the incidents but more importantly in the information dissemination about the new automated election system and in elevating the electoral issues to the public scrutiny. The domestic and foreign election monitors including the media complement in a way that they validate each others findings. The domestic election monitors observations are presumably wider in scope and deeper in analysis because of a firm grasp of the political and electoral background of the elections. However, in cases where the foreign observers’ findings agree with the domestic monitors’ observations, their conclusions would carry more weight because the data are verified and affirmed.

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During the Election Day, the Bantay Eleksyon 2010 was able to monitor 1,596 election related incidents from the field. (see graph below) 793

477

197

75 540

100200300400500600700800

PCOS-related

Voter-related

BEI-related

Monitor-related

ExternalFactors-related

XII. Bantay Eleksyon’s Random Sample Count of Precinct Results On May 10, 2010 Automated Elections, Bantay Eleksyon 2010 conducted a random sample count of the selected clustered precincts’ election returns nationwide and compared the data with the results transmitted to the COMELEC Central Database which were released through their public website. BE2010 focuses on the presidential results for this purpose. Out of the 34 provinces and 5 areas in Metro Manila, BE2010 monitors were able to get 700 clustered precincts results/election returns. However, only 593 these ERs were used for the data analysis. From the 593 elections returns, 314,788 voters voted out of 422, 659 registered voters, which is equivalent to 74.5% voter turn out. (See graph below)

Voters turn out

-50,000

100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000450,000

Voters voted Registered Voters

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From the 314,788 who have voted in the Election Day, the PCOS machines accepted a number 312, 674 valid ballots, which is 99.3% of the total ballots feed into the machines. (See graph below)

Valid ballots

311,500

312,000

312,500

313,000

313,500

314,000

314,500

315,000

Valid ballots Voters voted

Out of the 312, 674 valid ballots feed into the PCOS machines, about 96.7% or a total 302, 480 votes were counted in so far as presidential contest is concern. The remaining 3.4% is what constitute as null votes, which could either be a result of over-voting or non-voting/abstention. The BE sample count findings of 593 election returns show that there was no significant discrepancies between the precinct results and the transmitted results to the COMELEC data center. There may have been discrepancies brought about by the previously sent Final and Testing result that only recorded 10 votes in the COMELEC website, this did not alter the trend of the result tally. One could infer that attempts to rig the election results did not materialize, at least at the national level, and presidential contest to be specific. With this, BE2010 believes that the 2010 elections is indeed successful and credible. CONCLUSIONS Based on the above-mentioned data and information gathered by the Batay Eleksyon 2010 monitoring, the preliminary conclusions right after the May 10, 2010 elections are mainly reaffirmed and additional conclusions can be drawn, thus:

1. The automated election system (AES) performed as expected. It contributed to the speed, accuracy, and security of the whole electoral process. The observed errors related to the PCOS machines fall within the expected margins of error and did not prevent the count to take place. There is already an acceptance by the voters of the system and this basically closes the door to a return to the manual system.

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2. However, it is obvious that AES implementation needs a lot of fine-tuning, particularly with regards to interfacing the system to the non-AES side of the electoral process. The problem with unsustainable queuing should be solved since this became the outstanding source of the delay, frustration, and tension in many precincts and polling places.

3. The citizen-voters actually came in unprecedented large numbers and most of them

waited patiently – if not actively participating in the solution – as the various errors and problems of the AES were being addressed by COMELEC and Smartmatic technicians. Some went home and added to those disenfranchised earlier.

4. Election violence and pre-automation fraud are still significant factors in holding

the elections. However, these were confined to certain areas and did not affect the national elections. Election violence in many traditional hotspots were successfully muted down because of the multi-stakeholder approaches to combat it. However, there is still room to question even the national results because of the problems related to the security, conduct, and transparency of the AES process and its audit procedures, such as the Random Manual Audit.

5. The handling of the elections by the Commission on Elections has significantly

relaxed and this contributed to the high confidence that voters had with regards the AES. However, a review is called for regarding the management and administration of the whole AES as well as the entire election administration machinery itself considering the many errors, mistakes, and near-miss that sapped this same voter confidence in the past one year of the AES implementation. There is an urgent need to modernize the COMELEC in order to make it attuned to the requirements of the AES.

6. The party-list system proved to be very vulnerable to manipulation by various

interest groups who do not necessarily represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Ironically, it is in danger of becoming irrelevant or worse , another instrument for maintaining the same dominance of the traditional political elite.

7. The overseas absentee voting proved to be a continuing disappointment due to its

very low turn-out, both in registration and voting. Of course, the failure to remove provisions that deter more participation by overseas Filipinos contributes a lot to the situation.

8. The weak political party system, or rather the lack of genuine political parties,

strongly manifested in the elections through the confused alignments of factions or components of the various parties from the national to the local levels. On the other hand, the presidential candidacies and the political dynasties strongly influenced these alignments.

9. The presence of domestic and foreign observers contributed a lot to the credibility

of the elections. There is however a need for more cooperation and the

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establishment of ground rules to enable them to more effectively perform their functions.

10. Many provisions of various election laws proved to be outdated, ineffective or impractical to implement. There is a definite need to revisit them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Automated Election System (AES) should be immediately reviewed and

lessons drawn from the fresh experience of the 2010 national and local elections. It is also an imperative that preparations for the 2013 national and local elections be immediately started in order to give ample time for perfecting the system. This necessarily includes the appointment of the COMELEC Advisory Council and the upgrading of the Comelec IT department. RA 9369 should also be amended to reflect the lessons of the 2010 elections.

2. The Commission on Elections need to be modernized and its infrastructure and personnel developed further to adjust to the requirements of the AES.. It is necessary to weed out political appointees who do not have the necessary impartiality or skill competency for the work of the Comelec. There is also the need to professionalize the Comelec organization, raise salaries, promote on merits, and conduct necessary trainings of Comelec personnel.

3. The national voters list should undergo thorough cleansing, possibly through a

general registration and the biometrics record completed in time for the 2013 elections.

4. The political party reform bill should be passed by congress immediately so as

to strengthen the political party system.

5. The party-list law should be amended in the light of lessons learned not only in the 2010 elections but in earlier elections.

6. The overseas absentee voting law needs to be revisited to ensure its full

implementation in the next elections. Measures to educate overseas Filipinos should also be devised and carried out.

7. The Omnibus Election code should be amended to reflect the requirements of

election modernization as well as to address the weaknesses and loopholes of the present electoral laws.

8. The Comelec should be given the necessary capability to enforce election laws

and prosecute election violators.

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9. A program to combat warlordism and electoral violence should be launched and sustained, particularly in traditional hotspots throughout the country.

10. Citizen-voter education should be pursued and made a priority endeavour by

the government because of its strategic impact on strengthening Philippine democracy and in enhancing the quality of voter decision in elections. Citizen participation in the electoral process should be heightened and made on a continuing basis in order to make effective Philippine democracy.

be 2010 final report

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