bauman

Zygmunt Bauman: an Adorno for ‘liquidmodern’ times?

Ali Rattansi

Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid ModernityZygmunt Bauman and Leonidas Donskis, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013,paper £15.99, 218pp.

Does the Richness of the Few Benefit Us All?Zygmunt Bauman, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013, paper £9.99, 101pp.

State of CrisisZygmunt Bauman and Carlo Bordoni, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2014, paper£15.99, 164pp.

Is Bauman a sociologist? Many sociologists have been perplexed by just thisquestion.‘Bauman’,Donskis says in the introduction to his epistolary exchange,Moral Blindness, ‘is not a typical sociologist’, although he groups him togetherwith Giddens and Beck as one of the ‘living greats’ of sociology. What distin-guishes Bauman from his contemporary sociologists, according to Donskis, isthat his is ‘a sociology of the imagination, of human relations – love, friendship,despair, indifference, insensitivity – and of intimate experience’.Donskis fails tomention that both Beck and Giddens have also written about love and intimacy,but he is no doubt right to point out that there is something different aboutBauman. And the contrast between conventional academic sociology andBauman is nowhere more clearly exemplified than in this e-mail epistolarydialogue, for it consists of a series of meditations about ‘Evil’, not a categorymuch used by sociologists, although Michel Wieviorka (2012) has recentlyventured into this territory. For Donskis, Bauman is also distinctive in that hewrites for ‘the little man or woman – the persons whom globalization and thesecond (liquid) modernity has displaced’, and here he groups him with histo-rians such as Greenblatt and Ginzburg, rejecting ‘history as a grand narrative’,writing, instead, meaningful narratives about ‘actual people: une petite histoire’.

There is enough to disagree with in this characterization of Bauman. As Iargue in my forthcoming book on him, Bauman has certainly not abandonedgrand narratives, and indeed his distinction between ‘solid’ and ‘liquid’ moder-nity, just as much as his earlier epochal division between ‘modernity’ and

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The Sociological Review, Vol. 62, 908–917 (2014) DOI: 10.1111/1467-954X.12214© 2014 The Author. The Sociological Review © 2014 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review. Publishedby John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, 02148,USA.

‘postmodernity’, is nothing if not an ambitious grand narrative.1 Moreover, itis archetypes such as ‘strangers’, ‘nomads’ and ‘vagabonds’ who populateBauman’s world, not the concrete individuals of Ginzburg’s history. And as Ialso argue in my book, Bauman is best seen as a latter day critical theorist inthe Frankfurt School mode, albeit absorbing much from a huge variety ofsources ranging from Bourdieu to Rorty. But Donskis has a point when he saysthat what distinguishes Bauman is that his ‘sympathy is manifestly on the sideof the losers of modernity’, and that his books make a powerful ethicaldemand upon the reader, traits very clearly manifest in the books underreview.

Moral insensitivity in liquid modernity

There is no systematic itemization of the evils of liquid modernity in MoralBlindness, although gross inequalities and regimes of state or organizationalbrutality and violence come in for particular opprobrium (both the Holocaustand Abu Ghraib are mentioned, together with loss of privacy in the Internetage). Bauman is particularly concerned to identify what he has often dubbed‘adiaphorization’, that is, ‘strategems’ which intentionally or by default placecertain ‘acts and/or omitted acts regarding humans outside the moral-immoralaxis – that is, outside the “universe of moral obligations” and outside the realmof phenomena subject to moral evaluation’. Bauman refers to stratagems suchas the ‘ends justify the means’ or ‘evil as the act might be, yet it was necessaryto defend a greater good’ (p. 40). Sometimes it seems as if both the stratagemand the immoral acts are forms of evil, so that ‘evil’ appears to be a categorythat functions in a dual manner. Moreover, Donskis argues, the ubiquity ofambivalence in modernity means that it is difficult to interpret the world ‘interms of the categories of good and evil’ (p. 5), thus also introducing ambiva-lence into the heart of their joint project. Setting these possible confusionsaside (is one supposed to be ambivalent about the Holocaust and AbuGhraib?), Bauman, of course, has a well honed answer to the question of theunderlying causes of modern moral insensitivity; as he puts it, ‘in solid moder-nity bureaucracy was the principal workshop in which morally loaded actswere remodelled as adiaphoric.Today . . . it is the markets that have taken overthat role.’

Readers who know Bauman’s famous argument in Modernity and the Holo-caust (1989) will recognize the first ‘workshop’, bureaucracy, and readers ofBauman’s work on postmodernity and ‘liquid modernity’ will also know thatfor Bauman it is the corrosive effect of the commodification of all relation-ships, the marketization of everything, that is the main ‘evil’ force creatingmoral indifference by swallowing up scruples and consciences in a deluge ofconsumerism and corporatization. In ‘liquid modern’ times individuals areconsumers before they are citizens, more interested in marketing themselvesby purchasing the right commodities than in agonizing over the morality of

Zygmunt Bauman: an Adorno for ‘liquid modern’ times?

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their actions or participating in politics. Indeed the death of Politics with acapital ‘P’ is one of the main themes of the epistolary conversations.

The death of Politics has been the subject of a book by Bauman, In Searchof Politics (1998).And herein lies the problem with Moral Blindness. It consistsprimarily of a reiteration, in conversational and anecdotal mode, of argumentsthat Bauman has already expounded at greater length in Liquid Modernity(2000), Liquid Love (2003), Consuming Life (2007), Does Ethics Have aChance in a World of Consumers (2008) and other texts on the shallownessof lives dominated by consumerism (a theme already present during his‘postmodern’ phase). Not surprisingly, a host of familiar examples and argu-ments make their reappearance, including a critique of Giddens’s idea of the‘pure relationship’, which Bauman sees only as a pure form of commodifica-tion of intimate relationships, in which the partners stay together only for solong as their needs and expectations are being met, to be discarded in favourof another partner and relationship if not, much as one mobile phone is junkedfor a newer model which supposedly promises more, in an endless orgy ofconsumption, of relationships as much as of objects supplied by the market(pp. 148–149).

As set out in greater detail in previous books, moral sensitivities and sen-sibilities are said in Moral Blindness to be numbed by a ‘nowist’ culture(p. 143), short on memory, in which ‘the tsunami of information, opinions,suggestions, recommendations, advice, and insinuation’ pouring forth from themass media, results in the ‘blasé attitude’ that Simmel – another key influenceon Bauman – had identified as a product of the modern metropolis. Theconstant diet of catastrophes and images of poverty fed by the media over-whelm citizens of ‘liquid modernity’, leading to ‘compassion fatigue’ (anothercommon theme). Mass culture – a term more used by Donskis than Bauman,though the idea is common to both – results in an ‘emaciating and enfeebling’of solidarity with the victims, those suffering the ‘wasted lives’ of market-dominated societies.

But suffering fails to ennoble (another familiar argument). Bauman pointsto the Israeli oppression of Palestinians as an example of how the lesson learntfrom the tragedy of the Holocaust seems not to be the need for kindness andjustice, but ‘that the one who strikes first comes out on top, and as long as hestays on top, he also stays unpunished’ (p. 35), unleashing a ‘schismogeneticchain’ in which tit-for-tat actions ‘deepen the doggedness and pugnacity ofboth sides at each stage and widen the abyss that divides them’.

Facebook,Twitter, television’s reality and chat shows, the transformation ofnews into a catalogue of scandals and ‘infotainment’, and other products ofcontemporary popular culture come in for much criticism from both Donskisand Bauman for leading to a sound-bite era, the death of privacy, an ease ofsurveillance by the state and all manner of other ‘evils’ which in turn create aculture that increasingly suffers a disastrous deficit of moral sensitivity. Thedistaste for popular culture is highly reminiscent of the Frankfurt School’scritique of the popular culture of their day.

Ali Rattansi

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The ‘occupy’ movement and the Arab Spring, and the role of the new socialmedia in facilitating both, do not inspire much hope; their failure, for Bauman,lies in an inability to articulate any serious alternative vision (p. 62). Mean-while, liberalism in Europe is excoriated for its moral panic over immigrationand its inability to adjust to more diverse societies, whilst fears stemming fromthe enfeeblement of the nation-state in the face of globalization is wronglydisplaced onto immigrants, although this is not in any way linked by Baumanwith the endemic racism of Europe and its imperial past.

Dystopian novels, from Orwell’s 1984 (2013) to Houellebecq’s The Possibil-ity of an Island (2006) come in for much praise. It is no surprise, and in keepingwith my interpretation of Bauman as something of a latter-day Adorno, that heturns to Adorno’s thoughts from Minima Moralia for some guidance, citing hispessimistic conclusion that ‘for the intellectual, inviolable isolation is now theonly way of showing some measure of solidarity . . . the detached observer is asmuch entangled as the active participant; the only advantage of the former isinsight into his entanglement, and the infinitesimal freedom that lies in knowl-edge as such’ (p. 47).

Bauman, though, still sees some hope that a Europe that is becoming a‘mosaic’ of diasporas or ‘a collection of overlapping and intersecting ethnicarchipelagos’ (p. 191) will find a way of peaceful co-habitation both withinitself and with its neighbours, as long as there is no policy of ‘forceful assimi-lation’. The faint optimism notwithstanding, the overall tone of the conversa-tions seems distinctly pessimistic, echoing the post-war Frankfurt School’sgloomy mood. Bauman would have been even more pessimistic if he hadacknowledged the growing moral panics over Islam and Muslims in Europeand the USA, which make the prospect of any overall increase in inter-ethnic‘conviviality’ (a term he uses in Richness, having borrowed it from Ivan Illich)even more problematic. Interestingly, the hopes surrounding the survival ofScandinavian-style social democracy and the resurgence of the left in LatinAmerica which Bauman had expressed in Consuming Life (2007: 142–143)seem to have been abandoned.

Anyone wanting an easy to read digest of Bauman’s current thinking couldcertainly read Moral Blindness, although I would suggest that Consuming Lifeand Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? have much more tooffer by way of rigorous argument and detailed analysis. Moral Blindness addslittle that is new, but has the merit of readability and Bauman’s usual sparklingprose.

Understanding the crisis

Unfortunately, State of Crisis, another set of e-mail exchanges, this time withCarlo Bordoni, is more disappointing. The title promises much, but any readerwanting a serious analysis of current crises in Europe and the USA, and theglobal fallout from them, will have to turn elsewhere, for example to books by



Colin Crouch (2011, 2013), to mention only one amongst a host of authors whohave written about these urgent questions.

The book is divided into three parts. The first, entitled ‘Crisis of the State’,has one key idea (explored many times previously), which is filled out withmuch padding here: that intensified globalization and the freeing of capital toroam the planet, seeking profit wherever it sees opportunities, has led to adisconnect between power and politics. The former is now in the hands offinancial capital, while politics remains ineffectively rooted in nation-statesthat have lost almost all semblance of sovereignty when faced with extra-territorial and fleet-footed corporations and wealthy elites. In this respect,Bauman falls into the fatalistic ‘hyperglobalist’ tendency that Andrew Gamblecriticizes in his Politics and Fate (2000).

The second part, entitled ‘Crisis of Modernity’, reprises much old ground onthe debate around postmodernity and postmodernism. Those who do notalready know why Bauman moved on from a postmodern perspective to onethat privileges the metaphor of ‘liquid modernity’, will at least learn whatBauman has explained in interviews, which they may not have read (Baumanand Tester, 2001: 96–98; Bauman, 2004: 17–19); especially, that he was dis-mayed by commentators and critics who assumed that for him postmodernitymeant the end of modernity, when in fact for Bauman postmodernity was aphase within modernity, but which signalled a phase in which the illusions ofmodernity, stemming from the Enlightenment belief in endless progress andbetterment of the human condition, were finally laid bare for what they hadalways been: illusions. Especially, ‘total, all-embracing projects’ have had theirday; instead, the ‘modern spirit is now following Karl Popper’s recommenda-tion to render progress “piecemeal”, taking one thing at a time and, as far asthe distant bridges are concerned, not worrying about crossing them until theyhave been reached’ (p. 60).

The final section, ‘Democracy in Crisis’, repeats much from the earlierparts of the book on the loss of sovereignty by nation-states, and Baumanadds to that analysis distinctly well-worn ideas on ‘glocalization’, with localterritories left to deal with problems that are globally generated and requiresolutions at a global level (pp. 124ff). Bauman’s empathy with ‘GenerationY’, a term borrowed from an article by Brafman in Le Monde of 19 May2013, is much in evidence. He reproduces her argument about the predica-ments of a generation that has never known a time before the Internet andlives a life of short-term projects and endemic insecurity as one section of anever-enlarging ‘precariat’ that has even begun to engulf growing sections ofthe middle class (pp. 135–139). The same argument, in almost identicalwording is also in Moral Blindness (pp. 152–156), this kind of verbatim rep-etition being an unfortunate tendency in Bauman’s later writings.2 What eco-nomic analysis there is, relies heavily on Streeck’s Buying Time (2014), andthis is no surprise: while Bauman and Bordoni fail to mention this, Streeeckwas a student at Frankfurt University, attended Adorno’s lectures, andretains from him, by his own admission, an ‘intuitive refusal to believe that

Ali Rattansi


crises will always turn out well in the end – an intuition that I certainly thinkI can find in Adorno too’ (Streeck, 2014: vii).

Many paragraphs in the concluding pages of State of Crisis, written byBauman, are reproduced from Moral Blindness, only serving to add to thesense of a weary book full of material and ideas from previous books(compare Moral Blindness, pp. 148–151 with State of Crisis, pp. 151–153).

Who benefits from inequality?

Readers of The Sociological Review will hardly need reminding that socialinequalities in recent times have been rising rapidly and that despite therecession that set in after the financial crisis of 2008, indeed to some degreebecause of that economic crash, have reached grotesque proportions bothwithin societies and between them. In Does the Richness of the Few Benefit UsAll? Bauman draws upon much readily available evidence on current inequal-ities from Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), Dorling (2011), Stiglitz (2012) andLansley (2012).

Given the availability of these books, therefore, Bauman seems to havewritten his short book for two main reasons. First, to point out to perhaps aneven wider readership what has been documented in these and other pub-lications: that the ‘trickle down’ theory, which states that the growth ofwealth and income at the top gradually spreads downwards because those atthe top create greater wealth and jobs for the economy and labour force asa whole, improve productivity, and so forth, is simply wrong. And second, tofind the causes of a puzzling phenomenon that follows upon the demonstra-tion of growing inequalities: why does some or other version of the ‘trickle-down’ theory still have a grip on the popular imagination when even themiddle classes have been reduced to the level of the precariat (p. 10)?Bauman argues that there are several reasons why the myth continues tohave credibility.

However, in setting out his analysis there are tensions between two sets ofdifferent propositions advanced by Bauman. On the one hand, Bauman’sdiscussion assumes that ‘we’ are all in thrall to the idea that the richness of thefew does benefit us all. However, he also argues that these prevailing views arenot that dominant after all. For instance, he cites an inquiry by the High PayCommission in the UK which showed that amongst members of the publicfour out of five of those questioned ‘believed the pay and bonuses for the topexecutives were out of control, while two-thirds did not trust companies to setpay and bonuses responsibly’ (p. 76). In other words, contrary to the ‘trickle-down’ view, most people believe that inequalities are actually out of control, thusundermining the basic thrust of the trickle-down theory as well Bauman’sbelief that everyone accepts it.

In addition he argues that few people now accept that those who havesucceeded in amassing large amounts of wealth or earn high incomes are



‘naturally’ more talented than the rest of the population (p. 77). This comes assomething of a surprise, because earlier in the book – and this sets up anothertension in his argument – he says that ‘we believe’ and ‘We have been trainedand drilled to believe that . . . Abilities . . . are unequally distributed by theirnature; some people are thereby predisposed to achieve what others couldnever attain however hard they tried’ (pp. 70–71). This belief prompts ‘us’ to‘reconcile ourselves to the eerie, uncannily swelling inequality . . . by alleviatingthe pain of surrender and resignation to failure, while stretching the oddsagainst dissent’ (p. 70). The tensions and self-contradictions in the analysis aresomewhat perplexing, to say the least.

It is no surprise to learn that another reason cited for the perpetuation ofthe current systems of injustice is the consumerism that has in his view com-pletely overwhelmed contemporary Western societies. And the ideology ofconsumerism is underpinned by another, which exalts economic growth as theoverriding goal of productive activity. From the many passages in the book onthe way consumption has taken over the lives of Westerners I will cite onlytwo. ‘We are all consumers now, consumers by right and duty.The day after the9/11 outrage, George W. Bush, calling on Americans to get over the trauma andgo back to normal, found no better precept than to “go back shopping” ’(p. 59). (Incidentally, Bauman gets the date of Bush’s extraordinary injunctionwrong: he actually said those words in 20063). ‘From cradle to coffin’, Baumancontinues, ‘we are trained and drilled’, ‘to treat shops as pharmacies filled withdrugs to cure or at least mitigate all the illnesses and afflictions of our lives . . .Fullness of consumer enjoyment means fullness of life. I shop therefore I am.To shop or not to shop is no longer the question’ (p. 60). Shopping, then, numbssensibilities to such an extent, presumably, that feelings of outrage at present-day inequalities are assuaged by the purchase of more and more commodities.Consumption takes over our psyches to the extent that they set standards ‘forboth entering into and exiting love affairs’; but electronic gadgets such asmobile phones and the kind of relationships they lead to are not ‘in the lastaccount . . . about love; products of consumer technology catch their clientswith the bait of . . . narcissism. They promise to reflect well on us’ (p. 51).

And those who are too poor to consume, the ‘failed’ and ‘flawed’ consum-ers, internalize an ideology in which they accept responsibility for their ownfailure; lacking the ‘talent, industry, persistence’ to be successful, ‘they tend toagree with the public verdict and blame themselves – at the cost of theirself-esteem and self-confidence’ (p. 55). So this, then, is another reason for thelack of dissent, that the ideology of blaming the victim has been internalized bythe victims of consumerism. Bauman does not provide any evidence that thisis indeed how all ‘failed’ consumers see themselves; the reader is simplyinvited to ‘consume’ Bauman’s views.

The urban disorders of 2011 in English cities provide more grist toBauman’s mill. For him, those who took part were merely ‘failed consumers’taking the opportunity to grab consumer goods that they could not afford, butwanted desperately because of an internalization of the dominant ideology of

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consumerism (pp. 57–59).There is clearly an important truth here, but Baumanignores the fact that for many of the black young men involved in the riots,resentment of the police and their heavy-handed stop and search methodsplayed a significant role (Murji and Neal, 2011; Briggs, 2012). Bauman’s failureto grasp the racialized character of the disorders is in keeping with his generalneglect of racism against British ethnic minorities, as I argue in my forthcom-ing book.

Consumerism and social inequality plant the seeds of ‘one-upmanship’. Ittotally undermines any possibility for ‘conviviality’ and ‘human-friendlycooperative togetherness’ (p. 87).The competitive, individualist fragmentationthat results from the present social arrangement creates ‘free floating fears’ready to turn into hostility to ‘stranger, passersby, neighbour or workmate’.The only alternative to this dystopia that Bauman points to, citing a Wikipediaarticle, is the Slow Food movement, our only hope against destroying theplanet in a ‘consumerist orgy’.

But how has consumerism taken hold? Bauman points to no particularagency, although the mass media and politicians’ speeches are vaguelyreferred to. In effect, the roots of this pathology appear to reside, with fewmediations, in capitalist relations of production and exchange and the accom-panying fetishism of commodities, something that Marx analyses in the firstchapter of Capital and which is generalized in Lukacs’s concept of ‘reification’and further taken up by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.4 There is thusa ‘transplanting’ of ‘the model of subject-object relations . . . on to the relationsbetween human beings’ (p. 82, emphasis in original). This leads to a mode oftreating human beings as commodities, dehumanizing them and ‘tendingtherefore to treat humans according to the pattern elaborated and reservedfor “things” ’ (p. 82).

Thus, we are left with an implied economic determinism, for it is this‘pattern of client-commodity or user-utility which is grafted upon human-to-human interaction and drilled into us all, consumers in society of consumers’(pp. 84–85).

Moreover, the sense that there is no alternative, no possibility of winningthe ‘war’ against the system appears to be another reason why a social arrange-ment predicated on endless growth and consumerism is self-perpetuating(p. 93). All we can do, before the catastrophe of climate change and resourcewars engulfs us is to ‘try: again and again, and ever harder’ to resist (p. 96).

There is much to sympathize with in Bauman’s critique of the deregulationof financial and other markets, grotesque inequalities, the endless pursuit ofeconomic growth, the ‘orgy’ of consumerism, and his argument for the need forconviviality. But this is an argument Bauman himself and many others havealready made. Bauman adds little that is novel. And his analysis of why thissystem persists, in my view, is simplistic and contains a whole host of assertions,especially about the numbing consequences of consumerism which lack thenuance suggested by the evidence (Sassatelli, 2007; Smart, 2010). Add to thatthe contradictions in the argument and the economic determinism of his



analysis and what the reader is left with is a surprisingly unconvincing bookwritten for the already converted, which rather undermines the probableintention of writing a short, punchy and compelling analysis for a wider publicpuzzled by the current and burgeoning inequality.

And on the evidence of these three volumes, it seems that Bauman’s hopesfor progressive social and political transformation have now drowned in anoverwhelming Adorno-esque pessimism. He is certainly not alone in feelingdespondent about the future and one does not need to be in any way influ-enced by Adorno to feel that way; it is just that in Bauman’s case, his critiqueof contemporary popular culture and his analysis of a total reification in whichsocial relations become nothing but relations between commodities is suchthat to see him as a latter-day Adorno is far from fanciful.

Visiting Professor of Sociology, City University, London

Notes

1 Zygmunt Bauman: A Critical Introduction (London: Bloomsbury Academic, in preparation).2 Bauman has also been involved in a controversy over his alleged plagiarism of Wikipedia: see

Jump (2014).3 See George W. Bush (2006), Press Conference, 20 December, cited in Smart (2010: 148, 229).4 See, for example, Jarvis (1998: 52–55).

References

Bauman, Z., (1989), Modernity and the Holocaust, Cambridge: Polity Press.Bauman, Z., (1998), In Search of Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press.Bauman, Z., (2000), Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press.Bauman, Z., (2003), Liquid Love, Cambridge: Polity Press.Bauman, Z., (2004), ‘Liquid Sociality’, in Gane, N. (ed.), The Future of Social Theory, London:

Continuum.Bauman, Z., (2007), Consuming Life, Cambridge: Polity Press.Bauman, Z., (2008), Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers?, Cambridge: Polity

Press.Bauman, Z. and Tester, K., (2001), Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman, Cambridge: Polity Press.Briggs, D. (ed.), (2012), The English Riots of 2011, Hook, Hampshire: Waterside Press.Bush, G.W., (2006), Press Conference, 20 December, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2006/12/20061220-8.html (accessed 7 by Smart, B., on 7 November 2008: seeSmart, B., (2010) below).

Crouch, C., (2011), The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, Cambridge: Polity Press.Crouch, C., (2013), Making Capitalism Fit for Society, Cambridge: Polity Press.Dorling, D., (2011), Injustice, Bristol: Policy Press.Gamble, A., (2000), Politics and Fate, Cambridge: Polity Press.Houellebecq, M., (2006), The Possibility of an Island, London: Phoenix.Jarvis, S., (1998), Adorno, Cambridge: Polity Press.Jump, P., (2014), ‘Zygmunt Bauman rebuffs plagiarism accusation’, Times Higher Education, 3

April.

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http://http:/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061220-8.html

http://http:/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061220-8.html

Lansley, S., (2012), The Cost of Inequality, London: Gibson Square Books.Murji, K. and Neal, S., (2011), ‘Riot, race and politics in the 2011 disorders’, Sociological Research

Online, 16 (4): 24–29.Orwell, G., (2013), 1984, London: Penguin Classics (Originally published by Secker and Warburg,

1949).Sassatelli, R., (2007), Consumer Culture, London: Sage.Smart, B., (2010), Consumer Society, London: Sage.Stiglitz, J., (2012), The Price of Inequality, London: Allen Lane.Streeck, W., (2014), Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, London: Verso.Wieviorka, M., (2012), Evil, Cambridge: Polity Press.Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K., (2009), The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always

Do Better, London: Allen Lane.



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