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Battle Study: Operation GOODWOODStarted by dbf , Dec 21 201 1 02:1 1 PM

w o 291/965,

dbf

WO 291/965 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?

CATLN=6&CATID=2449508&SearchInit=4&SearchType=6&CATREF=WO+291%2F965)

Quote

Context: Ministry of Supply and War Office: Military Operational Research Unit, successors and related bodies: Reports

and Papers, MILITARY OPERATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT (MORU)

Scope and content: Operation "Goodwood": battle study

Cov ering dates: 1 946

See also:

http://www.ww2talk.c...in-liddell.html (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/brigade-guards/41587-notes-op-

goodwood-general-dempsey-lieutenant-colonel-jackson-captain-liddell.html)

Edited by dbf, 30 December 2011 - 03:54 AM.

Posted 2 1 Decem ber 2 01 1 - 02 :1 1 PM

dbf

Department of The Scientific Adviser to The Army Council

MILITARY OPERATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT, Report No. 23

Battle Study: OPERATION "GOODWOOD".

October 1946

INDEX

FOREWORD (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463929-post3.html)

ABSTRACT (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463930-post4.html)

PART I OBJECT & INTRODUCTION (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463931-post5.html)

PART II PLAN & NARRATIVE

- Order of Battle - Outline (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463934-post6.html)

- The Plan (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463936-post7.html)

- Map (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463937-post8.html)

- 18th July (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463941-post9.html)



- 21st July - 2 Cdn Corps (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463946-post12.html)


http://ww2talk.com/forums/

http://ww2talk.com/forums/forum/125-unit-history-war-diaries-documents/

http://ww2talk.com/forums/forum/25-unit-history-war-diaries-and-documents/

http://ww2talk.com/forums/forum/74-the-brigade-of-guards/

http://ww2talk.com/forums/tags/forums/%2Bwo%2B291%252F965/

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=2449508&SearchInit=4&SearchType=6&CATREF=WO+291%2F965

http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/brigade-guards/41587-notes-op-goodwood-general-dempsey-lieutenant-colonel-jackson-captain-liddell.html

http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463929-post3.html












- Final Summary (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463949-post13.html)

PART III AIR OPERATIONS

- Outline of Plan (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463950-post14.html)

- Target Areas (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463951-post15.html)

- Effects on Targets (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463952-post16.html)

- Discussion (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463953-post17.html)

- Conclusions (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463954-post18.html)

PART IV ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS

- Details of Barrage Densities (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463955-post19.html)

- Discussion (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463956-post20.html)

PART V CASUALTIES

- Total no.s: personnel (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463957-post21.html)

- Percentage by Arms. (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463958-post22.html)

- Total no.s: tanks (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463959-post23.html)

- Ratio of Crew Casualties 29 Arm. Bde. (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463960-post24.html)

- Conclusions (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463962-post25.html)

PART VI SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463963-post26.html)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - References (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463965-post27.html)

APPENDIX B - Tank casualties (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463966-post28.html)

APPENDIX C - Ratio of Crew Casualties 29 Arm. Bde. (http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/463968-post29.html)

Edited by dbf, 21 December 2011 - 03:28 PM.

dbf

The Battle Studies produced by the Department of the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council have as their objective

the recording of factual information from this war on various aspects of battle. The intention is less to present an

historical record than to provide a basis of fact on which future doctrine may be built.

The studies are of two main kinds:-

(a) Studies of particular actions or operations in all or many of their aspects.

( Studies of particular subjects derived from all the operations of which useful records exist.

Many of the studies are very incomplete, largely because the amount of factual information as opposed to more or

less unreliable opinion) about the chose subject is very small. In general the amount of reliable information on

almost any aspect of battle tends to be much smaller than is often supposed. It has been felt, however, that it is

almost as important to be sure of what we do not, as to records what we do know. These studies illustrate how slender

is the basis on which much of the theory of war depends, and emphasise the need for more knowledge in many

directions. it is not enough for a modern Army to base its practice on individual opinions and traditional beliefs. It

must have facts. Attempts have been made in this war, to records some of the facts of battle. These studies show that

whilst such recording has been a valuable step in the right direction, it has been quite inadequate both in quality and

quantity.

Within these limitations, however, it is believed that they will do something to preserve some of the accumulated

knowledge and experience which would otherwise ten to be lost as the war-time Army disperses.


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Operation GOODWOOD was mounted by 2 ARMY in mid-July, in the bridgehead East of River ORNE, North of





















CAEN. On 18 July 1944, an armoured CORPS of three Armoured Divisions, attempted to break out of the

bridgehead with the object of inducing the enemy to commit their strategic mobile reserves, and thereby prevent

their use against the real breakout of the American forces on the Right flank. The Operation was immediately

preceded by a very heavy aerial bombardment from strategic bombing forces.

This report analyses the Operation and attempts to assess the effectiveness of the aerial bombardment in terms of

the bomb density achieved in the target areas and the extent to which the enemy's morale was reduced in those areas.

The report also includes a detailed account of the Operation and records such factual data as was available from the

sources consulted.

(a) The main conclusions drawn are as follows.

( A bomb density of 0.56 lbs equivalent 25 pounder per square yard put down in 45 minutes, followed by an

artillery bombardment of 0.1 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard succeeded in breaking down the morale of

troops occupying open defences in urban areas.

© Coupled with an armoured attack a bombardment density of 0.17 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard produced

a considerable diminution of resistance.

(d) There is some evidence that troops subjected to heavy bombing gradually regain morale when the bombardment

ceases.

(e) The following data has been extracted regarding our own casualties

- (a) 5.14% of personnel and 36% of tanks became casualties during the Operation.

- ( Compared with Other Ranks Officers had a higher casualty rate in all arms.

- © Officer casualty rates were highest in Infantry followed by Armoured Regiments than motor-battalions.

- (d) Other Ranks casualty rates were highest in Infantry followed by motor Battalions then armoured regiments.

NOTE: This report is largely based on a detailed study of the War Diaries of the Units taking part in the Operation.

These data are contained in Appendices D and E which contain Operation Orders and Brigade Narratives

respectively. As these are too bulky to reproduce in full and cannot usefully be summarised further, they are being

held in M.O.R.U. files and can readily be made available to any interested Branch or Person.

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1. The object of this report is to analyse Operation GOODWOOD, 18 - 21 July 44, with especial reference to the effect

of the aerial bombardment.

2. The facts analysed in the report were gleaned from various reports of R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND and the War

Diaries of all units engaged in the Operation. The accounts in the War Diaries at times gave a conflicting picture of

the events, as many inaccuracies were included. All facts that have been included have been verified as far as

possible.

3. Operation GOODWOOD was mounted in NORMANDY in mid-July 44, by 2 Army. The events leading up to the

battle are outlined to give a complete picture of the Operation and to provide a background against which the facts

may be analysed.

4. After the initial landings in NORMANDY in JUNE 44, German resistance hardened considerably on our Left flank

and progress was very slow around CAEN. The German policy of reinforcing CAEN was dictated by their strategy of

holding the LOWER SEINE rather than the PARIS area. Quoting General D. EISENHOWER - "Hence every foot of

ground gained at CAEN was like ten miles elsewhere. The German, since he had decided on the course of coming

across the SEINE, was determined to hold CAEN, and the first thing he did was to throw in every Panzer in that

region to hold that area. In behind that area he organised the strongest defences he had on that front. He did not pull

the Panzers out of the gap until it was too late to stop the break through."

5. By June 30, 2 Army had taken CAEN and General MONTGOMERY issued a directive indicating the intention of

holding on the Left and breaking through on the Right. British forces were to hold down the greater part of the




enemy's forces. This was a decision brought about by the German reaction at CAEN. Generals EISENHOWER and

BRADLEY agreed in Conference that, if an early breakthrough was expected, U.S. forces would have to do it on the

Right, while the British attracted all the German reserves to their front. On July 7th, it was decided at S.H.A.E.F. H.Q.

that the British would first launch a very heavy armoured offensive on the Left, with the primary intention of forcing

the enemy to engage their mobile reserves and a secondary intention of achieving a breakout, if possible, on their

own account.

6. A bridgehead East of the River ORNE was already held by 1 CORPS with 51 (H) DIVISION and 6 AIRBORNE

DIVISION. From their restricted bridgehead, it was planned to launch the offensive Southwards. On the main axis of

the advance the country consisted of fairly open agricultural land, studded with a number of compact, well-built

stone villages. The villages and their immediate surroundings were usually enclosed by high-fenced fields and

orchards with closely growing large trees. At right angles to the line of advance were three main roads which were

fenced and lined with large trees in many places, and two railway lines with high embankments. In the direction of

the line of advance was a third railway line, also with a high embankment, roughly intersecting the area of advance.

These roads and railways mostly proved obstacles to movement, slowing up the advance and requiring preparation

for smaller tracked vehicles and wheels and they provided the enemy with good gun and observation positions. The

ground rises gently from the Start Line of the attack in a series of slight undulations to the BRAS (0663) -

BOURGEBUS (0761) ridge, which gave the enemy the benefit of complete observation of the area of the armoured

advance, long fields of fire and concealed lines of approach. The lie of the villages gave the enemy a series of

mutually supporting strong points in the corridor of the advance, supported on the East by the long ridge running

South from BOIS-DE-BAVENT to EMIEVILLE and on the West by the factory areas of COLOMBELLES and

MONDEVILLE. The ridge was crowned with a series of artillery positions, dug-in and facing West. These positions

commanded the corridor, part of the existing bridgehead, the bridges and approaches to the bridgehead. In addition,

the position on the ridge and in the factory areas made manoeuvre on the flanks of the corridor extremely difficult.

Finally, entrance to the corridor from the British bridgehead was restricted by a British defensive minefield, through

which only a few gaps could be cleared before the Operation commenced.

7. As a result of all these factors, it was decided that maximum air and artillery support must be given to the attack. A

maximum effort had to be made to neutralise enemy positions, not only in the corridor but especially on the flanks,

in the factory area and wooded ridges. The entire attack was made dependent on this support, of which the air was

the major factor. If the air support could not be provided, the Operation would not be commenced. As a corollary

neither H-hour nor D-day could be fixed with any certainty much before the attack started, but for planning

purposes D-day was taken to be 18 July, and H-hour, the moment that the close air support ceased, to be 0745.

8. Information prior to the attack about the enemy was as follows:-

(a) Between BOIS-DE-BAVENT 1470 and the River ORNE (COLOMBELLES 0700 - MONDEVILLE 0667 -

FAUBOURG DE VAUCELLES) were disposed 16 GAF DIV. and 25 SS PGR (from 12 SS Pz. Div.)

( In area BRETTEVILLE-SUR-LAIZE

1 SS Pz. Div. (possible ST. ANDRE-SUR-ORNE) estimated 100 tanks.

12 SS Pz. Div estimated 50 tanks.

© Area ARGENCES

21 Pz. Div. estimated 50 tanks, 35 Assault Guns.

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9. ORDER OF BATTLE

8 CORPS

- 11 Armd Div.

- - 29 Armd Bde.

- - 159 Inf. Bde.

- 7 Armd Div.

- - 22 Armd Bde.




- - 131 Inf. Bde.

- Guards Armd Div.

- - 5 Gds Armd Bde.

- - 32 Gds Bde.

I CORPS

- 3 Br Ind Div.

- - 8 Br Inf Bde.

- - 9 Br Ind Bde.

- - 185 Inf. Bde.

- - 152 (H) Inf. Bde.

- - 27 Armd Bde.

- 2 Cdn CORPS

- - 2 Cdn Inf Div.

- - 4 Cdn Inf Bde.

- - 5 Cdn Inf Bde

- - 6 Cdn Inf Bde

- 3 Cdn Inf Div

- - 7 Cdn Inf Bde

- - 8 Cdn Inf Bde

- - 9 Cdn Inf Bde

- 2 Cdn Armd Bde

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THE PLAN.

10. The general plan was for the three BRITISH armoured division then in NORMANDY, 7, 11 and GUARDS to be

grouped into 8 CORPS and then to thrust South in the middle of July from the bridgehead East of the River ORNE. 1

CORPS and 2 Cdn CORPS would also attack on either flank. To aid this plan 12 and 30 CORPS on the Right flank

would stage diversionary attacks of divisional strength several days before the main attack, which was known as

GOODWOOD.

11. An extremely heavy air offensive was prepared to give direct support to the Operation. For details of targets, etc.

see para 42-48. In general the plan was for heavy bombers of BOMBER COMMAND to isolate the narrow corridor,

down which 8 CORPS would advance, by heavy attacks soon after dawn. These would be followed soon after by

U.S.A.A.F. bombers, which would cover the 'floor' of the corridor with a carpet of fragmentation bombs, with the

object of reducing enemy opposition to the first stage of the armoured thrust. Soon after the thrust was under way,

H-hour being the moment the last bomb of the carpet was dropped, another U.S.A.A.F. force would bomb areas to

the South of the advance, to harass gun-areas and reinforcements.

12. On the ground, at H-hour 8 CORPS would advance one up in the order 11, GUARDS, 7 Armoured Divisions

through the South face of the bridgehead.

11 ARMOURED DIVISION would move South behind artillery barrage towards BRAS 0663 - ROCQUANCOURT

0558 - BEAUVOIR FERME 0461 and established a firm position.

GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION would follow behind 11 ARMOURED DIVISION to the area CAGNY 1164 and

then continue to advance and establish a firm base at VIMONT.

7 ARMOURED DIVISION would move behind GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION and advance into the area between

11 and GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISIONS West of CAGNY as far South as LA HOGUE - woods North-East of ST

AIGNAN DE CRAMESNIL 0956.

13. 2 Cdn CORPS would attack with one division on the Right of 8 CORPS, between 8 CORPS and River ORNE and

take FAUBOURG DE VAUCELLES, thereby protecting the advance of 8 CORPS on the Right flank. The area of

advance would have been subjected to the preliminary aerial bombardment.




14. 1 CORPS would attack along the high ridge on the Left of 8 CORPS, with one division towards EMIEVILLE,

protecting the Left flank of 8 CORPS advance. The area of advance would have been subjected to the preliminary

aerial bombardment.

15. Debouchement from the bridgehead was restricted due to an old BRITISH minefield further South, through

which only sufficient gaps had been cleared to allow the passage of one armoured regiment at a time. There were two

'entrances' into the bridgehead across the double obstacle of River and the Canal. There was one pair of bridges at

0176 and two paris near BENOUVILLE (0974). The bridgehead was so small and congested that only the lorried

infantry brigade of the leading armoured division could be accommodated before the attack. The remainder of 8

CORPS assembled on the approach routes during the night 17/18 July.

16. The whole plan depended on the aerial bombardment and therefore D-day had been fixed only tentatively for 18

July. At about midnight on 17/18 July meteorological information indicated that conditions would be suitable next

morning and the order was passed to all commanders that the attack was "on" for the 18th and H hour would be

0745 hours.

11 ARMOURED DIVISION then formed up on the South face of the bridgehead and 3 BRITISH INFANTRY

DIVISION moved across the bridges in 0176 to their starting areas near ESCOVILLE. A brigade of 51 (H) DIVISION

was placed under command of 3 BRITISH INFANTRY DIVISION, as well as 27 ARMOURED BRIGADE, giving

them a strength of four Infantry Brigades and one Armoured Brigade. Two brigades of 3 Canadian Infantry Division

and 7 ARMOURED DIVISION formed up behind the SOUTH BENOUVILLE bridges and GUARDS ARMOURED

DIVISION behind the NORTH BENOUVILLE bridges. It was intended that the Canadian brigades would cross over

the bridges one at midnight 17/18 July and one at H hour. GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION would cross at H

hour and proceed immediately to the gaps in the minefield, to follow 11 ARMOURED DIVISION who would advance

behind the barrage at H hour.

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(See Map)

18th July

17. At 0545 hours R.A.F. heavy bombers flew over to attack their designated targets on the flanks of the corridor. By

0630 their mission was completed. Between 0700 and 0745 hours U.S.A.A.F. bombers put down the carpet of

fragmentation bombs in the path of the armoured attack, and also attacked the area near TROARN. At 0745 hours

the last bomb of the carpet was dropped and the leading regiment of 8 CORPS commenced the advance behind a

moving artillery barrage. On the flanks 1 CORPS and 2 Cdn Corps started their advance.

(See Map)

8 CORPS

18. At 0745 hours the last bombs were dropped and 11 ARMOURED DIVISION advanced South under cover of a

heavy artillery barrage. CUVERVILLE and DEMOURVILLE areas were quickly over-run and the advance continued

across the CAEN - TROARN railway. Nearly all enemy met with were very dazed! Practically no opposition was

encountered by either the tanks or infantry as they advanced. GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION followed 11

ARMOURED DIVISION through the bridgehead and down the centre line towards CAGNY.

19. After crossing the CAEN - TROARN railway, 11 ARMOURED DIVISION turned to the South-West and advanced




behind the artillery barrage to the CAEN - VIMONT road, where the barrage ended. Units crossed the road at about

0920 hours. Enemy opposition increased in front and from the flanks, especially at CAGNY, presumably as the

effect of the bombardment wore off and fresh enemy troops, particularly SP guns, moved up from the rear reserve

areas. GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION reached CAGNY at about 1015 hours and were checked. Attempts were

made to swing round to either side of the town, but these were also checked. Considerable time elapsed between the

checks and attacks being mounted, due apparently to the congested state of the battle-field.

7 ARMOURED DIVISION were very much held up in their advance by traffic james caused by the bottlenecks in the

BRITISH defensive minefield already referred to.

When the 22 ARMOURED BRIGADE did succeed in getting through the minefields, the congestion around

CUVERVILLE prevented them moving forward. The leading armoured regiment of 22 ARMOURED BRIGADE

reached CUVERVILLE at 1200 hours, and, in spite of continuous urging from 8 CORPS headquarters, this leading

regiment did not reach GRENTHEVILLE a distance of 3 1/2 miles, until 1700 hours, while the remainder of the

Brigade was still North of DEMOUVILLE. The main cause of the congestion was definitely that the GUARDS

ARMOURED DIVISION had moved too far West and there was no room for 7 ARMOURED DIVISION to deploy,

though G.O.C. 8 CORPS is of the opinion that more 'thrust' migth well have been displayed by 7 ARMOURED

DIVISION to get their regiments forward, piecemeal if necessary, to the aid of 11 ARMOURED DIVISION.

20. 11 ARMOURED DIVISION had pushed as far South as the outskirts of BOURGEBUS 0761 and LA HOGUE by

noon but enemy resistance from the ridge in front on on both sides had stiffened considerably as the reserve SS

Panzer unit arrived, and 11 ARMOURED DIVISION, unsupported on either flank, were forced to withdraw slowly.

GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION had still failed either to take CAGNY or by-pass it. The enemy seemed to have

established a very strong A/Tk screen from EMIEVILLE through FRENOUVILLE to BOURGEBUS area.

21. By 1500 hours the bulk of 11 ARMOURED DIVISION were behind CAEN - VIMONT railway, where they

maintained their position in the face of fierce enemy counter attacks. At 1730 hours GUARDS ARMOURED

DIVISION attacked CAGNY finally, only to find that the enemy had withdrawn South. The villages to the immediate

South, FRENOUVILLE and LE POIRIER were still held and no progress could be made. The leading regiment of 7

ARMOURED DIVISION had reached the outskirts of GRENTHEVILLE and FOUR 0962, but were only slightly

engaged. By last light 11 ARMOURED DIVISION had suffered extremely heavy tank casualties, having had the

major part of the battle and were grouped about the CAEN - VIMONT railway around GRENTHEVILLE, while

GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION were grouped in and around CAGNY. 7 ARMOURED DIVISION had their

Armoured Brigade around DEMOUVILLE and their Infantry Brigade was still crossing River ORNE. Enemy aircraft

made several attacks over the area at last light, including a heavy attack on the bridges over the River ORNE.

Casualties were very slight as a result of this attack, and negligible damage was caused to the bridges.

2 CANADIAN CORPS

22. On night 17/18 July 3 Canadian Infantry Division moved one brigade over the River ORNE into 1 CORPS

bridgehead preparatory to attacking South along the East bank of the River ORNE next morning. A second brigade

was moved near the bridges, ready to cross at H-hour and follow the leading brigade, while the third brigade

remained in CAEN, ready to cross the river and seize FAUBOURG DE VAUCELLES if ordered to do so by CORPS. 2

Canadian Infantry Division were prepared to cross the River ORNE in CAEN and attack South when ordered, with on

brigade to attack on the Right flank at LOUVIGNY 0165 as a protective measure.

23. Next morning following the enormous air bombardment the two brigades of 3 Canadian Infantry Division

attacked South through COLOMBELLES. Resistance was fairly heavy, particularly in the Chateau area, and

movement of vehicles was hampered by craters caused by the intensive bombardment. During the morning 3

Canadian Infantry Division were ordered to prepared to move one battalion from CAEN to FAUBOURG DE

VAUCELLES, if patrols reported it clear. The patrol crossed at 1300 hours and reported one area clear. Preparations

were made to cross one battalion at 1715 hours following an artillery barrage. During the afternoon resistance in the

factory and Chateau areas of COLOMBELLES was overcome and the troops pushed South towards FAUBOURG DE

VAUCELLES.

24. At 1900 hours 2 Canadian Infantry Division attacked LOUVIGNY with one battalion and succeeded in entering

an orchard to the North of the village by last light. In the evening another battalion of a second brigade forced a



crossing of the River ORNE in CAEN to the West of the one already secured by 3 Canadian Infantry Division.

25. Bridging operations were carried out during the night in CAEN, 2 Canadian Infantry Division constructing one

Class 9 bridge and 2 Class 40 rafts in this area, and 2 Canadian CORPS Engineers constructing one Class 9 and one

Class 40 bridge in the 2 Canadian Infantry Division area.

1 CORPS

26. At H-hour 8 British Infantry Brigade of 3 British Division attacked towards PREBARON and TOUFFREVILLE

and 153 (H) INFANTRY BRIGADE which had been placed under command of 3 British Infantry Division, attacked

towards the triangle 1370. At -815 hours 8 BRIGADE were held up in sandpits 134702 and at 0930 hours they

reached TOUFFREVILLE which was determinedly held by snipers yet the Brigade pushed on to take SANNERVILLE

and BANNEVILLE LA CAMPAGNE at 1600 hours and TOUFFREVILLE at 1800 hours. 152 (H) BRIGADE took the

road triangle by 0945 hours and pushed on to take the crossroads 127693 and CHATEAU 1470. At 0930 hours 185

BRIGADE advanced towards LIROSE which fell at 1000 hours, then on to MANNEVILLE where they were held up.

An attack went in at 2000 hours and at last light the Brigade were 200 yards short of MANNEVILLE. At 0845 hours

9 BRIGADE advanced though LE MESNIL and HEROUUVILLETTE and at 1600 hours commenced their advance to

TROARN and after difficult fighting had captured BRICKWORKS 146647, T-JUNCTION 151683 and LA CROIX DU

PIERRE.

27. At last light 3 DIVISION had captured TOUFFREVILLE, SANNERVILLE, BANNEVILLE LA CAMPAGNE but

were held up at MANNEVILLE and TROARN.

28. At the need of the first day's fighting, fairly considerable gains had been made in the centre, by 8 CORPS, though

the forward troops had been forced to retire during the afternoon by the arrival of fresh SS Panzer troops around

BRAS and FRENOUVILLE. From identifications secured on the field, it was established that 16 GAF had held the

area of the corridor, particularly around CUVERVILLE and DEMOUVILLE. They were also located in the factory

area at COLOMBELLES, supported by Panzer Grenadiers from 21 SS Panzer Division. Elements of 21 SS Panzer

Division were also located near CUVERVILLE and their reinforcement group appeared to be identified in CAGNY.

On the Right flank 272 Infantry Division were identified at LOUVIGNY and on the Left flank 346 Infantry Division

were found at TOUFFREVILLE. During the day, as resistance stiffened, it became clear that elements of 21 SS Panzer

Division were reinforcing the 1 CORPS front, overlapping onto GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION sectors around

EMIEVILLE and CAGNY. 1 SS (Adolf Hitler) Panzer Division arrived around BRAS and BOURGEBUS in the late

morning and were engaged, with Assault gun units, all day in stemming the advance of 8 CORPS.

29. Final results of the first days advance was to push the South face of the bridgehead roughly to the CAEN -

VIMONT railway line from FAUBOURG DE VAUCELLES to CAGNY, thence North to TOUFFREVILLE along the

wooded heights, to the old front-line. This represented an advance of about 18 square miles at a cost of about 270

tanks and 1517 personnel casualties.

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19th July

30. The morning was spent on all three CORPS fronts in mopping up and preparing for future efforts to extend the

bridgehead. These were mostly limited to local attacks during the afternoon and evening in an attempt to improve

the immediate positions of formations, thought 7 ARMOURED DIVISION on 8 CORPS front were directed to push

South if possible. Enemy resistance proved too strong however, more Anti-Tank guns and troops having arrived in

the night. 12 SS Panzer Division were identified near BRAS, so that all mobile reserves East of the River ORNE

appeared to have been committed. To the West of the Canadians 271 Infantry Division and 9 SS Panzer Division had

been put into the line to check the diversionary attack on 12 and 30 CORPS. 2 Canadian Infantry Division were

brought into the battle during the afternoon and attacked South from FAUBOURG DE VAUCELLES on the East of

the River ORNE, making the only large advance of the day.

31. 8 CORPS.

The morning was spent in regrouping by all Divisions. 7 ARMOURED DIVISION moved up with 131 Infantry

Brigade grouped about DEMOUVILLE and attacked SOLIERS 0862 and FOUR with 22 ARMOURED BRIGADE. A




plan of GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION to strike towards VIMONT was cancelled, and plans were made to

improve the present position of the armoured divisions while flanking formations continued their attacks to link up

with the advance of 8 CORPS. Therefore attacks by each Division were timed for about 1700 hours, when 11

ARMOURED DIVISION would capture BRAS 0663 and HUBERT FOLIE 0662. 7 ARMOURED DIVISION would

occupy BOURGEBUS and be prepared to exploit South between HUBERT FOLIE and BRAS as soon as these were

cleared by 11 ARMOURED DIVISION. GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION would hold fast in the CAGNY area, but

would occupy LE POIRIER. These attacks were staged with some success. After heavy fighting 11 ARMOURED

DIVISION had cleared both BRAS and HUBERT FOLIE, but it was too late for 7 ARMOURED DIVISION to exploit.

7 ARMOURED DIVISION had occupied SOLIERS during the morning and FOUR by 2100 hours. Leading troops

were on three sides of BOURGEBUS but had not penetrated into the village. GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION had

occupied LE POIRIER.

32. 2 CANADIAN CORPS

2 Canadian Infantry Division moved one brigade over the bridges as soon as they were completed early in the

morning, and prepared to attack South from FAUBOURG DE VAUCELLES. 3 Canadian Infantry Division pushed on

South from MONDEVILLE to FAUBOURG DE VAUCELLES and mopped up in GIBERVILLE. At 1300 hours 2

Canadian Infantry Division attack started and by midnight the leading brigade held from FLEURY SUR ORNE to

IFS. 3 Canadian Infantry Division pushed a brigade in the evening toward CORMELLES and consolidated.

33. 1 CORPS

8 BRIGADE took over in SANNERVILLE, BANNEVILLE LA CAMPAGNE and BRICKWORKS 146647, 152 (H)

BRIGADE pushed patrols into BOIS DE BAVENT and along the road towards TROARN. 185 BRIGADE continued

their advance towards MANNEVILLE and CUILLERVILLE and found the enemy had withdrawn. At 1600 hours an

enemy counter attack by 2 companies Infantry and 6 Tanks from EMIEVILLE was beaten off and by last light the

Brigade were established in MANNEVILLE, CUILLERVILLE and the plain to the North. 9 BRIGADE moved on

TROARN meeting strong opposition. At 1000 hours an attack on the Station and Crossroads, 161676 failed and at

1200 hours the Church 156693, a threat to the Left flank, was taken but not held. At 1800 ours an attack was put in

on TROARN and at last light the Brigade were in a semi-circle West of TROARN. At last light the line had been

straightened out to run from LOUVIGNY through IFS - BRAS - BOURGEBUS - CAGNY to CUILLERVILLE -

outskirts of TROARN - then North to the old front line.

This was an advance of about 11 square miles at a cost of 131 tanks and about 1128 casualties.

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20th July

34. 1 CORPS made no further effort to advance, but improved their local positions. They suffered heavy shelling. 8

CORPS also made only local advances, and prepared for relief by 3 Canadian Infantry Division on the Right and 51

(H) DIVISION on the Left. 2 Canadian Infantry Division during the afternoon continued the attack South from IFS

and made considerable local gains, but late in the evening met extremely heavy opposition and failed to gain their

final objectives. Extremely heavy rain broke at 1600 hours which reduced all earth tracks to morasses and

considerably hindered cross-country movement.

35. 8 CORPS.

7 ARMOURED DIVISION exploited at first light towards VERRIERES 0560 with one armoured regiment, while

GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION attacked FRENOUVILLE with one Battalion, occupying the village without

opposition. At 1130 hours 7 ARMOURED DIVISION were ordered to withdraw all troops North of CAEN -

FAILAISE road, as Canadians were going to bombard VERRIERES preparatory to attacking it. Plans were now

altered, as 8 CORPS were to be temporarily withdrawn while the armour regrouped and refitted. 11 ARMOURED

DIVISION would hand over this position to 2 Canadian CORPS. 7 ARMOURED DIVISION, who had occupied

BOURGEBUS at first light, would hold their forward positions with their Infantry Brigade and pass under command

2 Canadian CORPS. GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION would also hold their position with their Infantry Brigade, but

would remain under command of 8 CORPS. GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION would be relieved that night by 51 (H)

DIVISION, whereupon 8 CORPS would be in reserve to refit in the COLOMBELLES 0770 - DEMOUVILLE area. A




heavy thunderstorm broke during the afternoon and heavy rain continued for the rest of the day, turning the terrain

into mud and making all wheeled movement very difficult. As a result the relief of GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION

had to be postponed, but the Armoured Brigades moved to the rest area to refit.

36. 2 Canadian CORPS.

2 Canadian Infantry Division were relieved on their Right flank West of the River ORNE by a brigade from 43

DIVISION, and pushed another brigade over the River ORNE to attack South to ST. ANDRE SUR ORNE and

VERRIERES, the attack to start at 1500 hours. 3 Canadian Infantry Division relieved 11 ARMOURED DIVISION

around BRAS and HUBERT FOLIE with one brigade, the remainder standing firm. At 1500 hours 2 Canadian

Infantry Division attacked and rapidly gained their first objectives. A strong enemy armour counter-attack in the

centre at about 1800 hours broke through the forward companies and destroyed the supporting Anti-Tank guns as

they were moving up. The Battalion was unable to make an effective defence in the shoulder-high grain, but our

supporting tanks prevented the enemy breaking through to rear areas. Counter-attacks developed along the 2

Canadian Infantry Division front but were held after some fighting. By last light 2 Canadian Infantry Division held a

line from LOUVIGNY 0165 South along the River ORNE to ST. ANDRE SUR ORNE then East to TROTEVAL FARM

0561. 3 Canadian Infantry Division held a line from HUBERT FOLIE 0662 North through CORMELLES 0565 to

GIBERVILLE 0967.

37. 1 CORPS

There was no change in position from the 19th but the Division experienced heavy shelling and mortaring.

38. By last light GOODWOOD had ceased for both the BRITISH CORPS, 1 and 8, but 2nd Canadian CORPS were

entrusted with the task of moving further South onto the high ground. During the 20th the attacking CORPS gained

about 5 1/2 square miles, at a cost of 68 tanks and 1013 casualties.

Their operations for 21st are included in this account, as they fought a defensive battle to hold the South edge of the

limit of advance in the face of an extremely vicious, though localised, enemy armoured counter-attack.

dbf

21st July

39. 2 Canadian CORPS.

During the early morning 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments was placed under command 2

Canadian Infantry Division to restore the situation. An enemy armoured counter-attack overran the reserve

battalion of the forward brigade in 2 Canadian Infantry Division area about 0800 hours, just North of the previous

night's fighting, in 0361. Our supporting tanks again prevented a breakthrough and a counter attack by a fresh

battalion at 1800 hours supported by one armoured regiment restored the lost ground. The Right hand flank

underwent strong attacks all day but held firm. On the Left the forward companies were overrun at 2200 hours but

the remainder of the battalion held firm and beat off all attacks. 3 Canadian Infantry Division relieved 7

ARMOURED DIVISION in the GRENTHEVILLE - BOURGEBUS area during the afternoon. By last light 2 Canadian

Infantry Division held substantial the same area as before, but 3 Canadian Infantry Division had extended their line

from CORMELLES Eastward to BOURGEBUS - FOUR - GRENTHEVILLE.


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40. During the four days of the offensive, the bridgehead had been extended 34 1/2 miles, at a cost of 493 tanks and

4011 casualties.

In addition the enemy had been forced to commit his mobile reserve known to be in that area, namely 1, 12 and 21 SS

Panzer Divisions, while the cover plan had forced him to commit 9 SS Panzer Division on the Right.

41. General EISENHOWER states, as already noted, that the enemy did not pull out the Panzer troops, once

committed, until too late to affect the battle of the FALAISE GAP. However, S.H.A.E.F. also states that after General

BRADLEY had broken out near MORTAIN, the Germans managed to move some of their armour over. While all the




local mobile reserve was committed there is no evidence to suggest that any troops were brought from West of the

River ORNE.

42. The presence of the British minefield in the South face of the bridgehead appears to have restricted movement

considerably, and to have been a bottle-neck throughout the first day, channelling all forward movement. The

enemy laid harassing fire on the gaps from an early hour, and while casualties were never heavy, there was a fairly

continuous toll during the first few hours. Furthermore, the congestion caused by the restrict area of debouchment

from the bridgehead appears to have been continued further South, leaving little room between 11 and Armoured

Divisions, in which 7 ARMOURED DIVISION were supported to deploy. No clear boundaries for divisions appear to

have ben specified in orders, except that 5 GUARDS ARMOURED BRIGADE laid down explicitly that routes would

keep to "East of paddock in 1168". Centre lines were marked by Provost sections, but there is no evidence either way

to show whether troops and vehicles kept to the centre-lines, or that the centre lines were marked out sufficiently far

apart to avoid congestion.

43. D.T.I. (War Office) who was C.C.R.A. 1 CORPS at the time of this Operation, has pointed out that this was the

first occasion on which GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION had operated as a complete formation and he suggests

that this accounts for some of the errors which cropped up. Also he was impressed at the time by the extreme

concentration of the various armoured columns debouching from our minefield. He discussed this on the spot with

the Brigade Commander, 5 GUARDS ARMOURED BRIGADE and his recollection is that the Brigade Commander

agreed that this concentration was unfortunate and a contributory cause of the slowness of the armoured advance.

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44. OUTLINE OF PLAN

The allocation of target areas between commands was as follows:-

(see map)

A. H. M. - R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND

P. Q. I. - 8th U.S.A.A.F.

C. D. E. F. G. - 9th U.S.A.A.F.


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45. TARGET AREAS

A.

Target Area - COLOMBELLES factory zone and MONDEVILLE, in which cratering was acceptable to the Army

Types of Bombs - 500 and 1000 lbs fused 0.25 seconds

Time of Attack - 0545 - 0630 hours

H.

Target Area - Strongly defend [sic] enemy villages TOUFFREVILLE, SANNERVILLE, MANNEVILLE,

BANNEVILLE, LA CAMPAGNE, in which cratering was acceptable to the Army.

Types of Bombs - 500 and 1000 lbs fused 0.25 seconds.


The attacks on A. & H. were intended to soften them and thus facilitate their capture by the infantry while the

ARMOUR moved South between them.

M.

Target Area - CAGNY

Types of Bombs - 500 and 1000 lbs fused instantaneously to soften the defences and allow the ARMOUR to pass

through and around CAGNY.


C. & G.

Target Area - C. - CUVERVILLE, D.E.F. BEMOUVILLE; G. - GIBERVILLE, contained enemy gun position and




formed the corridor through which the armour had to pass.

Types of Bombs - 500 lb GP and 260 FRAG fused nose instantaneously to avoid cratering to facilitate the passage of

the armour.


I.

Target Area - TROARN region

Types of Bombs - 100 GP fused no delay and 20 FRAG


P.

Target Area - The defended areas of GRENTHEVILLE, SOLIERS, BOURGUEBUS

Types of Bombs - 100 GP fused no delay and 20 FRAG


Q.

Target Area - Contained enemy gun positions.

Types of Bombs - 100 GP fused no delay and 20 FRAG.


The object of the attacks on I. P. & Q. was to disrupt enemy positions and prevent or delay counter attack.

The bomb line was 2,000 - 3,000 yards from the target areas and owing to the proximity of our own FDLs the

Operation was dependent on good visibility to allow visual bombing.

46. The bombs dropped by the attacking aircraft were as follows:-

R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND

Area A.

3432 x 1000 GP

4038 x 500 GP

Total = 2726 tons.

Fused .025 delay

Area H.

2550 x 1000 GP

5150 x 500 GP

Total = 2562 tons.

Fused .025 delay

Area M.

1100 x 100 GP

400 x 500 GP

Total = 650 tons

70% Nose Inst.

30% M.44 Pistol

8th U.S.A.A.F.

Area P.

5800 x 100 GP

34300 x 20 FRAG

Total = 633 tons

Area Q.



3120 x 100 GP

18500 x 20 FRAG

Total = 341 tons

Area I.

4020 x 100 GP

23700 x 20 FRAG

Total = 438 tons

All 100 GP bombs fused tail no delay.

9th U.S.A.A.F.

Areas C. D. E. F. G.

374 x 500 GP

576 x 250 GP

3505 x 260 FRAG

Total = 621 tons

47. The average densities achieved in the target were estimated from photo cover and areas were demarcated with

enclosed the main concentrations of bombs falling in and around the separated target areas. These areas are outlined

on the map. In the case of the 9th U.S.A.A.F. target area, the bombing was not sufficiently concentrated to enable

any definite area to be demarcated.

48. From these outlines, it will be seen that Area A. was satisfactorily covered, that the bomb pattern was somewhat

displaced in a South Easterly direction in Area H. and that it effectively covered Area M. Bomb patterns in Areas P.

Q. & I. coincided reasonably well but were in general larger than the assigned target areas. Those for C. D. E. F. G.

were dispersed largely due to the difficulties of target recognition.

49. The bomb densities in the main concentration areas were calculated from photo cover provided by the attacking

forces.

50. The following table gives the bomb densities which were planned for the various targets and those which were

actually achieved. Bomb densities are expressed in tons per acre and in pounds of equivalent 25 pounder per square

yard, the conversion factors used to calculate the latter figure being taken from M.O.R.U. Report No. 3 - "Effects of

Bombardment, Present State of Knowledge".

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EFFECT ON TARGETS.

51. TARGET A. COLOMBELLES - MONDEVILLE.

Average density of 0.56% lbs per square yard plus 0.1 lbs per square yard artillery barrage in the main concentration

area. The artillery barrage almost completely overlaid the aerial target area, except in the very Southern portion,

Posted 2 1 Decem ber 2 01 1 - 03 :03 PM

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but no separate conclusion can be reached about this portion as it was not occupied until 19th. The fighting was

severe here all day on the North edge. The main point of resistance was the Chateau outside the bombed area. This

point was reached an hour or so after H-hour and was not overcome until late in the afternoon, about seven hours

later, following an artillery concentration. Another unit, however, passed through the West portion of the target

area. All Prisoners of War captured spoke of the great effect of bombing at the time, and no reinforcements appear

to have been sent to this area, so that it may safely be concluded that all enemy troops engaged here were subjected

to the aerial bombardment. Our troops speak of the difficulty of moving up supporting vehicles, such as tanks,

caused by the craters in the roadways. The concentration here appears to have been sufficient to cause considerable

lowering of enemy will to resist, as beyond the strong points already mentioned, little strong resistance was met

elsewhere in the area.

52. TARGET H. TOUFFREVILLE - EMIEVILLE.

Average density 0.87 lbs per square yard in main concentration area. For the sake of clarity each village area will be

dealt with separately.

a. TOUFFREVILLE.

Was not bombed at all. Resistance here was extremely stiff and took about seven hours to overcome. The village was

touched by U.S.A.A.F. frag bombs, but they do not appear to have had much effect.

b. SANNERVILLE - BANNEVILLE.

Both villages were well within the bombed area, and offered very little resistance.

c. CUILLERVILLE.

The formation attacking here arrived about four hours after H-hour, and had heaving fighting until the next

morning. It is possible that this was due to the arrival of SS Pz reinforcements from ARGENCES area, though there is

no concrete evidence of this effect. The village was also dominated by fire from the Anti-Tank screen around

EMIEVILLE. CUILLERVILLE was in itself very closely bombed and a squadron of SS tanks was knocked out in the

orchard.

d. EMIEVILLE.

Not in target area, nor in the bombed area, this village dominated this portion of the battle field, holding up the

armour around CAGNY and the infantry around CUILIERVILLE by fire. It was not entered until the 21st. Here it is

almost certain that the screen was reinforced by elements of 21 SS Pz Division from ARGENCES.

53. TARGET G. GIBERVILLE.

Though a separate area, this target was not bombed at all. The unit scheduled to attack this position arrived outside

the village at about H + 2 without much resistance, but fought all day, supported by tanks, to clear the area as far as

the railway. This village caused some trouble to the 8 CORPS armour to the West as well, and had to be contained.

54. TARGETS C. D. E. F. The CARPET.

Average density 0.12 lbs per square yard. The idea here was to provide a carpet of fragmentation bombs to clear the

way for the armoured formations. Actually most of the bombs were scattered well beyond the limits of the target, but

some fell within, almost entirely on the villages of CUVERVILLE, DEMOUVILLE and LIROSE. These will be dealt

with separately.

a. CUVERVILLE.

Was the first objective of the infantry of 8 CORPS and was occupied with little resistance. Although only part of the

village was bombed, it was reached at H + 45 minutes and cleared 15 minutes later, demonstrating that the will to

resist was not great. Tanks were impeded by debris in the villages, but outside found no difficulty. The fragmentation

bombing was successful in not impeding the movement of armour. Large numbers of Prisoners of War were taken in

this area and all reports state that their morale had been shattered and referred to the aerial bombardment as

terrifying. It must be remembered that these troops were an Air Force Division, not SS Panzer troops and that they

had been by-passed by an armoured brigade.

b. DEMOUVILLE.



This village was reached at about H + 5 and cleared about 2 hours later. Resistance was slight, the enemy morale still

seemed depressed. No reinforcements had arrived here, the village was subjected to artillery concentrations and had

been cut off by the armoured advance, all of which much have contributed to the lowering of morale.

c. LIROSE.

Reached about H + 4 was rapidly cleared with slight resistance except on the railway, where a brisk fight took place.

Counter attack elements of 21 SS Panzer Division may have penetrated as far North as the railway, but there is no

evidence.

Considering only the first two villages, the bulk of the fragmentation bombing that fell in the target area came down

on these two villages, so that the figure for the density that actually fell on these villages should be much greater than

0.03 lbs. Very roughly, the bombs only fell in about a quarter of the target area, so if the figure be multiplied by 4, a

nearer appreciation of the density on the villages would be obtained, namely 0.12 lbs per square yard.

55. TARGET M. CAGNY

Average density 0.25 lbs per square yard. The bombing here was very accurate and neatly encircled the village. Our

armour reached the village at about H + 2 and were repulsed. CAGNY proved a thorn in the side of the armour to the

East as well, and was not entered until the evening, when it was taken without resistance, having been evacuated by

the enemy. From the very strong resistance, having been evacuated by the enemy. From the very strong resistance,

it seems probable that enemy reinforcements from 21 SS Panzer Division had entered the town before our troops

could arrive. The area in which our troops had to deploy was extremely cramped, and a long time was spent in

manoeuvre before any appreciable attacks could be mounted after the first repulse. The area was under fire from the

ridges behind CAGNY and EMIEVILLE.

56. TARGET P. GRENTHEVILLE - BRAS area.

Average density 0.08 lbw per square yard in main concentration area.

a. GRENTHEVILLLE was reached about H + 3 and by-passed by the armour. The village was only lightly bombed

but was occupied with only slight resistance later.

b. BRAS and HUBERT FOLIE - BOURGEBAS were first approached by light recce units in the morning, who found

devastation and little signs of resistance. However, when the armoured formations arrived around mid-day fresh

reinforcements of 1 SS Panzer Division from BRETTEVILLE SUR LAIZE had arrived and resisted fiercely. This

identification was from bodies in the area. The villages were not taken until late the next day.

c. SOLIERS

Was only by-passed on the first day, but fell after strong resistance on the second day.

d. FOUR Not bombed at all. Reached in the evening of the first day, resisted all the second day and not finally cleared

until late in the evening.

The report of the first recce is reliable, as the troops may have kept in hiding until the main forces arrived. But the

aerial bombardment had little effect on the outcome here, as the resisting forces had not been subjected to the

attack. The concentration would also appear to be much too low to have any great effect.

57. TARGET Q. Suspected gun area.

Average density 0.18 lbs. per square yard in main concentration area. This are was not occupied by our troops, so

little is known about it. Forces approaching LA HOGUE were strongly resisted and Anti-Tank guns situated in area

caused casualties, but these may well have come up after the bombardment.

58. TARGET I. TROAN

Average density 0.025 lbs. per square yard in main concentration area. The bombing here was very scattered. There

is no evidence that fresh reinforcements arrived here after the bombardment. Our advance moved rapidly until it

reached the outskirts of the town, passing through an area that had received fragmentation bombing though it was



not a target area. The town was not taken during the battle.

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DISCUSSION

59. In any accurate assessment of the extent to which enemy resistance was reduced by the bombardment it is, of

course, necessary to consider the strength in which positions were held by the enemy. Unfortunately in this case no

information can be obtained regarding the numbers of enemy troops holding the targets tested above. However, it is

clear from the narrative that all these areas were held in some strength and it is considered reasonable to assume that

where our troops encountered negligible or only slight resistance this was not due to any very great difference in

numbers and must therefore be attributed to the bombardment.

60. From the descriptions of effects on targets given above it will be seen that the strongest resistance was met in

those areas which had escaped the bombing completely viz:- the Chateau in COLOMBELLES, TOUFFREVILLE,

EMIEVILLE and GIBERVILLE.

61. The highest bomb densities were achieved in the areas COLOMBELLES - MONDEVILLE (0.56 lbs equiv. 25

pounder/square yard), SANNERVILLE - BANNEVILLE (0.87 lbs equiv. 25 pounder/square yard). In all these cases

the bombing lasted for 45 minutes. Enemy resistance was probably due to the fact that the objective was not

attacked until four hours after the bombardment ceased by which time the occupying troops had probably regained

their morale to some extent and they may have been reinforced.

62. In the centre the effect on enemy morale was great, particularly in the early stages, through the actual weight of

both bombs and artillery brought down on this area (about 0.17 lbs equiv. 25 pounder/square yard) would not

appear to be entirely responsible. It is very probable that the heavy bombing on both flanks, giving a feeling of

isolation, and the armoured attack were more responsible for the lack of opposition.

63. No. 2 O.R.S. with 21 ARMY GROUP inspected the target areas soon after the bombing. In their opinion the

choice of fragmentation bombs for the centre, to avoid craters, and cratering bombs for the flanks was justified. This

is borne our by a study of the effects on targets, except that cratering bombs did hinder armour in COLOMBELLES.

However, this had to be accepted if the strong-points were to be neutralised.

64. The weight of the bombardment was sufficient on both flanks to reduce the enemy's resistance to a few scattered

pockets in the bombed areas. It is definite that neither the factory area in COLUMBELLES nor SANNEVILLE -

BANNEVILLE were reinforced and here the enemy resistance was negligible. Most of the resistance encountered

came from strong-points located outside the bombardment area. It is noticeable that the morale gradually improved

as the day wore on, and resistance became more marked as the Canadians moved South. This was not due to

reinforcements, for none appear to have been sent. The resistance in EMIEVILLE, however, was more probably

stiffened by reinforcements. The case of CAGNY remains obscure. An appreciable weight of bombardment appears

to have been put down, but our troops on arrival 2 1/2 hours afterwards, met strong resistance. This may possibly

have been due to the arrival of fresh troops from rear areas, but as CAGNY itself was the reserve area for 21 SS

Panzer Division it is possible that the troops were already there.

65. It is apparent that the later bombing of targets South of the CAEN - VIMONT road had little effect on disrupting

the movements of enemy reserves.


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66. CONCLUSIONS.

a. A bomb density of 0/56 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard put down in 45 minutes, followed by an artillery




bombardment of 0/1 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard succeeded in breaking down the morale of troops

occupying open defences in urban areas.

b. Coupled with an armoured attack a bombardment density of 0.17 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard produced

a considerable diminution of resistance.

c. There is some evidence that troops subjected to heavy bombing gradually regain morale when the bombardment

ceases.

d. The craters produced in built-up areas by heavy bombs hindered mechanised movement to a considerable extent.

e. The attacks on reserve areas to prevent movement of reinforcements had apparently, no appreciable effect, as

reinforcements of 21. 1 and later 12 SS Panzer Divisions into the battle as effective fighting groups.

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67. DETAILS OF BARRAGE DENSITIES.

Conversion factors for weight of bombardment are taken from MORU Report No. 3, "Effects of Bombardment,

Present State of Knowledge".

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DISCUSSION.

68. It has been assumed that barrages fell in the areas laid down on the fire-plans, as there are no details in war

diaries of the actual fall of shot, merely that barrages were fired to plan.

69. The two sections of 8 CORPS barrage (Serials I, II) should have been superimposed on the fragmentation-bomb

"carpet", but the main part of the barrage, in fact, fell on ground that the bombs had missed. The barrage was more in

the nature of a "heads down" bombardment than anything else, to supplement the aerial bombardment. However,

the general effect of the aerial bombardment all around, coupled with the armoured advance, as already discussed,

led to morale break-down in the three defended villages. These villages did not come within the scope of the artillery

barrage, but troops in the orchards outside the villages came under the effect of the barrage. These troops

surrendered without resistance. It is not considered likely that the weight of the artillery barrage was an important

factor in their morale breakdown, compared with the other two factors, in view of the very small weight put down.

70. The two concentrations of 1 CORPS (Serials III, IV) were put down in orchards and woodland. No opposition

was encountered in this area.

71. The Canadian barrage must be linked with the aerial bombardment, which it almost completely overlaid. A total

density of 0.66 lbs of 25 pounder per square yard fell in the factory area, except for the Southern section, which was

only bombed. It is interesting to note that the North part of the barrage fell on ground not included in the aerial

bombardment area. Here the density was 0.107 lbs of 25 pounder per square yard and the area included the Chateau,

the centre of resistance on this sector. 0.1. lbs is definitely not a heavy enough concentration to effect troops in

underground strong points. The barrage stopped short of GIBERVILLE, which was supposed to be bombed, but was

not hit. The village was a centre of resistance all day.






72. The barrage in support of 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade on 19th appeared to be effective, but it is not clear how

strong were the enemy dispositions in the area of advance. Nearly all casualties were caused either by our own

barrage or by strong counter attacks from beyond the area of the barrage.

73. No very firm conclusion can be drawn from these figures. In this Operation the aerial bombardment far

outweighed the artillery, and in many places the two bombardments overlap, preventing any separate conclusion

from being drawn.

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74. TOTAL CASUALTIES AND STRENGTHS 18th - 20th

PERSONNEL

Casualties

Officers - 291

Other Ranks - 3720

Total - 4011

Strengths

Officers - 3738

Other Ranks - 72745

Total - 76213

Percentage

Officer Casualties - 7.78

Other Ranks Casualties - 5.12

Total Casualties - 5.26


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75. PERCENTAGE CASUALTIES BY ARMS

Armoured Regiments

Officer - 9.69

Other Ranks - 4.31

Total - 4.62

Motor Battalions

Officer - 7.34

Other Ranks - 5.9

Total - 6.23

Infantry Battalions

Officer - 12.33

Other Ranks - 8.85

Total - 9.0

R.A. in Armoured Division

Officer - 5.19

Other Ranks - 1.21

Total - 1.44

Field Regiment R.A.

Officer - 2.52

Other Ranks - 0.83




Total - 0.93

Anti-Tank Regiment R.A.

Officer - 3.7

Other Ranks - 2.75

Total - 2.81

ROYAL ENGINEERS

Officer - 2.2

Other Ranks - 1.37

Total - 1.40

Machine Gun Battalions

Officer - 2.3

Other Ranks - 2.04

Total - 2.06

dbf

76. TANKS

Total Casualties - 493

Total Strength at 0745 hours, 18th July 1944 - 1369

Percentage of Starting Strength - 36%


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77. RATIO OF CREW CASUALTIES 29 ARMOURED BRIGADE

Casualty figures for 18th and 19th were obtained from 29 ARMOURED BRIGADE H.Q. War Diary, and 2nd ARMY

Tank Stats.

Total tank losses 18th to 19th - 156

Total crew losses 18th to 19th - 167

Total tank commander losses 18th to 19th - 51

Ratio of crew losses to tank losses 1.07 : 1

Ratio of commander losses to crew losses 1 : 3.3

Ratio of commander losses to tank losses 1 : 3.26


dbf

78. CONCLUSIONS

5.14% of personnel and 36% of tanks became casualties during the Operation.

Officer casualties were always at a higher rate in all arms, though the difference between Officer and Other Ranks

varied with the arms. As might be expected the highest rate of Officer casualties was in infantry followed by

Armoured Regiments then Motor Battalions. For Other Ranks Infantry again had the highest rate followed by Motor

Battalions and Armoured Regiments. All the types of ROYAL ARTILLERY had a high ratio of Officer to Other Rank

casualties, stemming from the heavy rate of casualties amongst F.O.O.s; the rates for Other Ranks in ROYAL

ARTILLERY units showed, as might be expected, that Anti-Tank gunners are more liable to become casualties than

either SP gunners or those in normal Field regiments.




dbf

79. A bomb density of 0.56 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard put down in 45 minutes, followed by an artillery

bombardment of 0.1 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard succeeded in breaking down the morale of troops

occupying open defences in urban areas.

80. Coupled with an armoured attack a bombardment density of 0.17 lbs equiv. 25 pounder per square yard

produced a considerable diminution of resistance.

81. There is some evidence that troops subjected to heavy bombing gradually regain morale when the bombardment

ceases.

82.

a. 5.14% of personnel and 36% of tanks became casualties during the operation.

b. Compared with Other Ranks, Officers had a higher casualty rate in all arms.

c. Officer casualty rates were highest in Infantry followed by Armoured Regiments then Motor battalions.

d. Other Ranks casualty rates were highest in Infantry followed by Motor battalions then armoured regiments.

Note: This report is largely based on a detailed study of the War Diaries of the Units taking part in the Operation.

These are contained in Appendices D and E [not included] which contained Operation Orders and Brigade Narratives

respectively. As these are too bulky to reproduce in fill and cannot usefully be summarised further, they are being

held in M.O.R.U. files, and can readily be made available to any interested Branch or Person.

Signed R.E. STRONG,

Colonel,

Superintendent.

M.O.R.U.

Prepared by:-

Major D.B. WALLACE, ROYAL ENGINEERS

Captain H.N. CROMPTON, General List.


dbf

REFERENCES.

Documents examined in the compilation of this report included the following.

2 O.R.S. Report No. 6 Bombing in Operation GOODWOOD.

21 ARMY GROUP SA/0/15OPS of 3 August 1944. Report on Air Operation in support of Operation GOODWOOD.

R.A.F. Bombing Analysis Unit Report No. 22 Ground Survey of the Results of an attack by Heavy Bombers on a

German Tank concentration.

D.A.T. (Air Ministry) Tactical Bulletin No. 38 Operations by BOMBER COMMAND in Close Support of the Army -

CAEN 18th July 1944.

Scientific Adviser, A.E.A.F. Report of 4th August 1944. Preliminary Analysis of Operation GOODWOOD.

S.H.A.E.F. documents, including SAC despatch of 31 August 1944 and General Bedell Smith's Memoranda.




Casualty figures from 2nd Echelon (BRITISH and CANADIAN) for July.

In addition the WAR DIARIES and Appendices (for July) of following units and formations were examined.

21 Army Group

2 Army

1 Corps

8 Corps

2 Canadian Corps

4 AGRA

8 AGRA

2 Canadian AGRA

2 Canadian Infantry Division


3 British Infantry Division

7 Armoured Division

11 Armoured Division

Guards Armoured Division

4 Canadian Infantry Brigade






8 British Infantry Brigade

9 British Infantry Brigade

185 Infantry Brigade

152 (H) Infantry Brigade



32 Guards Armoured Brigade

5 Guards Armoured Brigade

22 Armoured Brigade

27 Armoured Brigade

29 Armoured Brigade

2 Canadian Armoured Brigade

11 Armoured Division

2 N. Yeo.

Inns of Court

22 Dragoons

23 Hussars

3 Royal Tank Regiment

2 F.F. Yeo.

8 R.B.

3 Mon.

4 K.S.L.I.

1 Hereford

2 Ind Machine Gun Company N.F.

13 R.H.A.

151 Field Regiment Royal Artillery

75 Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Artillery

13 Field Squadron Royal Engineers

147 Field Pk Squadron Royal Engineers


26 Assault Squadron Royal Engineers



18 Light Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps

179 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps

Guards Armoured Division

2 Armoured Recce Welsh Guards

2 Armoured Grenadier Guards

1 Armoured Coldstream Guards

2 Armoured Irish Guards

1 Motor Grenadier Guards

5 Coldstream Guards

3 Irish Guards

1 Welsh Guards

1 Household Cavalry Regiment








94 L.A.A. Regiment Royal Artillery



1 Ind Machine Gun Company N.F.

11 Hussars

7 Armoured Division



4 C.L.Y.

1 R.B.

1/5 Queen's

1/6 Queen's

1/7 Queen's

8 Hussars

3 Ind M.G. Company N.F.





3 RHA

5 RHA

15 L.A.A. Regiment Royal Artillery



3 British Infantry Division

2 Seaforth

5 Seaforth

5 Cameron

2 Warwick

1 Norfolk

2 K.S.L.I.

2 East Yorks

1 Suffolk

1 South Lancs Regiment

1 K.O.S.B.

2 R.U.R.

2 Lincolns

2 Mx



1/7 Mx

13/18 Hussars

Staffs Yeo

East Riding Yeo

141 Royal Armoured Corps

148 Royal Armoured Corps

1 Lothians


17 Field Company Royal Engineers




62 Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Engineers

20 Anti-Tank Regiment Royal Engineers









8 Canadian Recce Regiment CAC

TOR SCOT (MG)

RHC

R de Mais.

CALG Highrs.

CAMERONS of C.

S. SASK. R.

Fus M.R.

Essex Scot

2 Canadian Provost Company

4 Canadian Field Regiment RCA



2 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment RCA

6 Canadian AntI-Tank Regiment RCA

3 Canadian LAA Regiment RCA

1 Canadian Field Pk Company RCE

2 Canadian Br Pln RCE

2 Canadian Field Company RCE



10 Canadian Field Ambulance RCAMC



10 Canadian Armoured Regiment CAC




7 Canadian Recce Regiment CAC

R Wgg R.

1 C Scot R.

S.D. & G. Highrs.

Q.O.R. of C.

C.H. of O.



R. de Chaud.

N. Shore R.

Nth N.S. Highrs.

H.L.L. of C.

Reg. Rifles





3 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment RCA

3 Canadian Field Pk Company RCE




23 Field Ambulance RCAMC

dbf

TANK CASUALTIES.

Figures obtained from 2 ARMY Tank State, Appendix to War Diary for July 44.

P = Fit

Q = Out of Action, repairable in 24 hours.

R = Battle Casualty of last 24 hours, not repairable within 24 hours.

x = Estimate

Formation:-

1. 27 Armd Bde.

17 July - 220 P, 201 P

18 July - 6 Q, 18 R, 194 P

19 July - 4 Q, 4 R, 195 P

20 July - -Q,-R

2. 29 Armd Bde.

17 July - 214 P, 201 P

18 July - 13 Q, 115 R, 96 P

19 July - 12 Q, 16 R, 132 P

20 July - 5 Q, 9 R

3. 2 N. YEO.

17 July - 72 P, 46 P

18 July - 1 Q, 15 R, 35 P

19 July - 4 Q, 16 R, 46 P

20 July - -Q, 1 R

4. 148 RAC

17 July - 70 P, 70 P

18 July - -Q,-R, 70 P

19 July - -Q, 1 R, 70x P

20 July - NOT GIVEN

5. 22 Armd Bde

17 July - 216 P, 198 P

18 July - 10 Q, 8 R, 191 P

19 July - 11 Q, 4 R, 199 P




20 July - 12 Q, 3 R

6. 8 H.

17 July - 72 P, 67 P

18 July - 3 Q, 2 R, 62 P

19 July - 8 Q, 2 R, 70 P

20 July - -Q, -R

7. 5 Gds Armd Bde

17 July - 235P, 153 P

18 July - 1 Q, 62 R, 198 P

19 July - 15 Q, 18 R, 166 P

20 July - 5 Q, 27 R

8. 2 W.G.

17 July - 68 P, 63 P

18 July - 1 Q, 4 R, 68 P

19 July - 1 Q, 3 R, 66 P

20 July - 2 Q, 4 R

9. 2 Cdn Armd Bde.

17 July - 202 P, 191 P

18 July - 1 Q, 10 R, 186 P

19 July - 10 Q, 2 R, 185x P

20 July - NOT GIVEN P, NOT GIVEN R, 162 P

21 July - 7 Q, 17 R

TOTALS

17 July - 1369 P, 880 P

18 July - 36 Q, 234 R, 1000 P

19 July - 65 Q, 66 R, 1060 P

20 July - 24 Q, 44 R, 162 P

21 July - 7 Q, 17 R

All figures relate to 'last light' on each day.

It has been assumed that all figures shown at 'R' are casualties for the preceding 24 hours as stated in definition

attached to Tank States. Also that all vehicles at 'Q' are either repaired after 24 hours or backloaded. Therefore that

no vehicle that appears in 'Q' for one day appears in the ''Q total for the next day.

TOTAL CASUALTIES - 493

% of STARTING TOTAL - 36%

dbf

Casualty figures for units actually engaged in the fighting.

Figures have been arrived at after a comparison of the following sources of information:

Unit War Diaries

G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon Returns

Corps Casualty Returns, where they exist.

[For daily breakdown of statistics etc., 18th - 21st July inclusive see attached images

O = Officer

O.R. = Other Ranks

X = Killed




Y = ?Wounded

Z = ?Missing]

[please note I haven't yet completed partial transcription. original tables are attached for reference.]

1. 1 R. TANKS


O: 5, OR: 28

Unit Strength Total - 694

O: 43, OR: 651

2. 2. R. TANKS


O: 4, OR: 21


O: 37, OR: 645

3. 2 C.L.Y


O: 2, OR: 6


O: 41, OR: 568

4. 1. R.B.


O:2 , OR: 45


O: 31, OR:812

5. 8 H.


O: -, OR: 1


O: 46, OR: 656

6. 11 H.


O: 3, OR: 20


O: 57, OR: 715

7. 1/5 QUEENS


O: -, OR: 25


O: 32, OR: 771

8. 1/6 QUEENS


O: -, OR: 1


O: 38, OR: 804

9. 1/7 QUEENS


O: 2, OR: 11


O: 35, OR: 795



10. 3 Ind M.G. Coy N.F.


O: -, OR: 3


O: 9, OR: 205

11. 3 R.H.A.


O: -, OR: 2


O: 37, OR: 630

12. 5 R.H.A.


O: 1, OR: 3


O: 37, OR: 630

13. 65 A/T Regt R.A.


O: 1, OR: 10


O: 33, OR: 721

14. 4 Fd Sqn R.E.


O: -, OR: 4


O: 9, OR: 253

15. 621 Fd Sqn R.E.


O: -, OR: 1


O: 7, OR: 239

16. 23 H.


O: 4, OR: 51


O: 37, OR: 647

17. 3 R. TANKS


O: 10, OR: 66


O: 36, OR: 638

18. 2 F.F. YEO


O: 12, OR: 88


O: 39, OR: 673

19. 3 MON.


O: 10, OR: 154




O: 36, OR: 752

20. 8 R.B.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:

Unit Strength Total -

O: , OR:

21. 1 HEREFORD

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

22. 4 K.S.L.I.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

23. Ind M.G. Coy N.F.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

24. 2 N. YEO.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

25. INNS OF COURT

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

26. 22 DGNS.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

27. 151 Fld Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

28. 13 R.H.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

29. 75 A/TK Regt R.A.



Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

30. 13 Fd Sqn R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

31. 612 Fld Sqn R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

32. 26 Asslt Sqn R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

33. 2 Armd GREN GDS


O: 4, OR: 40


O: 38, OR: 670

34. 1 Armd COLDM GDS


O: -, OR: 10


O: 38, OR: 654

35. 2 Armd IRISH GDS


O: 3, OR: 30


O: 40, OR: 664

36. 1 Mot GREN GDS


O: 2, OR: 21


O: 39, OR: 800

37. 5 COLDM GDS


O: 2, OR: 52


O: 36, OR: 784

38. 3 IRISH GDS


O: 1, OR: 37


O: 36, OR: 813



39. 1 WELSH GDS


O: 1, OR: 27


O: 35, OR: 810

40. 1 Ind M.G. Coy N.F.

Total Casualties -5

O: 2, OR: 3


O: 9, OR: 200

41. 2 Recce WELSH GDS


O: 4, OR: 9


O: 41, OR: 657

42. 2 H.C.R.


O: -, OR: 1


O: 56, OR: 715

43. 55 Fd Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

44. 153 Fd Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

45. 21 A/Tk Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

47. 14 Fd Sqn R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

48. 615 Fd Sqn R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:




O: , OR:

49. 1 S. LAN Regt

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

50. 1 E. YORKS

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

51. 1 SUFFOLKS

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

52. K.O.S.B.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

53. 2 R.U.R.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

54. 2 LINCS.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

55. 2 K.S.L.I.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

56. 2 WARWICKS.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

57. 1 NORFOLKS.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

58. 2 SEAFORTH



Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

59. 5 SEAFORTH

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

60. 5 CAMERON

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

61. 13/18 H.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

62. STAFFS YEO

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

63. E. RIDING YEO

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

64. 148 R.A.C.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

65. 1 LOTHIAN

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

66. 141 R.A.C.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

67. 2 Mx

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:



68. 1/7 Mx

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

69. 7 Fd Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

70. 33 Fd Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

71. 76 Fd Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

72. 128 Fd Regt R.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

75. 246 Fd Coy R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

76. 253 Fd Coy R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

77. 17 Fd Coy R.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:




O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

79. R. Regt C.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

80. R.H.L.I.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

81. Essex Scot

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

82. R. Hghrs C.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

83. R. de Mais

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

84. Calg Highrs

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

85. Fus M.R.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

86. Camerons of C.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

87. S.S.R.



Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

88. Tor Scot

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

89. 8 Recce

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

90. 4 Fd Regt R.C.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

93. 2 A/Tk Regt R.C.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

94. 33 SP A/Tk Bty R.C.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

95. 1 Fd Pk Coy R.C.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

96. 2 Br Pln

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:



97. 2 Fd Coy R.C.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

98. 7 Fd Coy R.C.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

99. 11 Fd Coy R.C.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

100. 6 Cdn Armd Regt.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

101. 10 Cdn Armd Regt

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

102. 27 Cdn Armd Regt

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

103. Reg Rif

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

104. C Scot R.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

105. R Wpg R.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

106. R de Chaud

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:




O: , OR:

107. Q.O.R.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

108. N Shore R.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

109. S D & G Hghrs

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

110. Nth N S Hghrs

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

111. H.L.I. of C.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

112. C H of O

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

113. 7 Recce

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:


Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:




Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

117. 3 A/T Regt R.C.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

118. 6 Fd Coy R.C.A.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

119. 16 Fd Coy R.C.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

120. 18 Fd Coy R.C.E.

Total Casualties -

O: , OR:


O: , OR:

Attached Files


P2720235.JPG (http://ww2talk.com/forums/index.php?

app=core&module=attach&section=attach&attach_id=68406) 1.53MB 25 downloads



app=core&module=attach&section=attach&attach_id=68407) 1.52MB 1 6 downloads



app=core&module=attach&section=attach&attach_id=68408) 1.36MB 1 4 downloads



app=core&module=attach&section=attach&attach_id=68409) 715.11K 1 8 downloads

Edited by dbf, 21 December 2011 - 03:33 PM.

Pak75

HI Diane

Thanks very much for posting these BAOR studies.

I have all the Spectator editions so it was interesting to see extra info in Instructors versions.

It is a shame Bluecoat edition only covers first two days of the battle and does not include 11th Armoured action

around Chenodolle.

Cheers












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