Battle of Mogadishu Anatomy of a Failure

A Monograph by

Major Roger N Sangvic Military Intelligence

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth Kansas

First Term AY 98-99

Approved fur lrsquoulilic Itelease I)istrihiitiuii is llnliinitecl

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Maior Roaer N Sanavic

Title of Monograph Battle of Mogadishu Anatomy of a Failure

Approved by

cL- amp Monograph Director COL Joseph A Bolick MA MMAS

Director School of Advanced LTC Robin P Swan MMAS Military Studies

Director Graduate Degree Philip J Brookes PhD Program

Accepted this 16th Day of December 1998

-ABSTRACI

BAT1IE OF MOGADISIIIJ ANATOMY O F A TAIIIJRE by M4l Rogcr N Sangvic [JSA 48 pages

By applying Colien and Gooclis model to tlic Battlc of Mogadishu this papcr has sliows that the failure of the IFR iiiission on 3-4 October I993 was the result o f a systcni IBilurc Secrctary Aspin rcccivcd far more hlamc than lie dcscrvcd Ibr making the decision Mispcrccption of tlic rcal impact hnks and AICs could liavc had on the ovcrall mission is tlic real ciiiisc of this disproporlionatc blaliic (iEN Hoar and GEN Powcll i i i addition hear iis niucli rcsponsibility as Secrctary Aspin k)r the decision Ncithcr of thcsc gcncrals strongly advocatetl the dcploynicnt to Aspiii cvcn though thc worscning situation on tlic ground mcrited their strong support Both Iloar antl lowclls approval recoinmciitlatioiis can hc cliaractcrizctl as lukc warm Aspins real Pailurc was of not k i n g niore critical oltlic conduct of the TFIl operations I n light o f Sccrctary Aspins ackiiowlcdgcd concern over thc nuiiibcr of siinilar operations conductcd by TFlZ and his knowlcdgc that the Atlministration was seeking a political solution lie should liavc notilictl M( Garrisoii of tlic policy sliilt though tlic JCS and CTNCCENT ant1provided iidditional guitlancc on risk I-lad Aspin cithcr rcasscsscd thc risk of cacli llllt opclation morc thoroughly o r donc ii hcttcrjob coordiniiting tlic policy shill in light ofthc increascd risks it is likely that the thrcc Octobcr raid would not hovc occurred

WhiIc bcttcr policy coordination fYom the Sccrctary of Dcfensc down to IFR could have prcventcd thc 3 October 1993 raid from occurring IlR did haw all tlic ineiuis in Mogadishu to succcssfiilly accomplish the mission I-lowevcr overconlidcncc i n IITRs capabilities and undcrcstiniation o f tlic enemys ability to find and attack T1R vulnerabilitics wcrc critical fiiilurcs that Icd to ii serics ofother failurcs First IFR did not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Second LPK contluctctl the 3 Octohcr raid without protecting its vulnerablc helicopters Third TI planncrs fiiilcd to utilize all their aviiilable rcsourccs ant1 intcgratc thcsc rcsot~~ccsinto a plan that could be llcxihlc cnough to handlc the threat and all the rriction in this risky opcrition

This papcr tlcmonstralcs that TI Itangers 3 October mission failed as ii rcsult of tlic organization not thc decisions of Sccrctary Aspin alone As Colicn and Goocli observed military niisforlunc is not mcrcly the rcsult of an individual mistake but rather thc rcsult ofscrics ofniistakcs throughout a systcni Ultimatcly Wlltant1 tlic system i t wiis working i n liilctl to anticipate and adapt

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Scction 1

Scction 11

Scction 111

Scction 1V

Scction V

Section VI

Scction V I I

Section V1I1

Scction IX

Irsquoagc Introtluction 1

Cohen and Goochrsquos Mcthociology for Analyzing Military Misforluncs 0

Discovcry ollsquoFacts 5

Why Task Forcc Rangcr Was Callcd to Somaliii 5 What happcnctl oii 0-4 Octoher I993 13

The Nature of thc Failurc 19

Critical TasksCritical Lapscs 25

Inycred Analysis 30

Discussion of Ihc Analytic Matrix Thc Matrix 40

Aggregale Iaailurc 44

Conclusion 46

Endnotcs 40

Bibliography 5 0

liitrodiictioii

Failurc is something that most organizations have grcat difficulty dcaling with

llic military as an organization has an especially difficult challcngc i n dealing with

failurc because military failures normally rcsult in morc than lost dcbatcs dollars

resources o r market sliarcs Military misforluncs rcsult in livcs being lost soldiers being

crippled and mainictl fulurc policies being altered and hard earned prestige and

credihility tliminishcd Thcsc wercjust ii few of thc conscqucnccs of llic failcd 1JS-led

cffori lo capture tlic Somali warlord Mohainnicci Farah Aiclccd on 3-4 October 1993 i n

a n cllorl to shore up tlic foundcring IJnitcd Nations Operation Somalia I I (UNOSOM 11)

Regardless of how diflicult failurc is to tlcal with cmolionally undcrstanding the naturc

of military Ihilures is csscntial for tlic USmilitary to learn its hard gained Icssons and

develop systems to prevent the rcoccurrcncc of similar failures A detailed critical

analysis of military fiiilurcs likc Ihc Battle of Mogadishu is required to avoid

emotionalism and the natural tcndency to seek I simple cat~sc for the failure

Clausewitz advocatcd detailed critical analysis o f a battle in order to understand i t

in its totality and complcxity rather than analyzing many battles i n only ii supcrficiil

manner Clauscwitz probably undcrstood lhe complexity of war Par bcttcr than most

military tlicorists did Allhougli his pcrspcctivc was mainly the Napolconic campaigns of

his cra his advocacy olcritical analysis is jus t as valid for todays urban combat miics iis

it was for the ficlds ofhattlc i n his day Critical analysis ofihc Battle of Mogadishu is

cspccially important becausc USforces inay liavc to tlcal with combat circunistanccs

similar 10 what Task Iorcc kungcr (TFR) and llic 10th Mountain Divisions Quick

Rcaction 1orcc (QKV) encountcrcd in lhc US Armys largest single fire fight sincc

Vietnainrsquo lsquoIlsquoIiccvcnts leading up to this battlc providc an important case study of how

tlccisions at (he lactical opcritional and slratcgic lcvcl intcractctl to achicvc t l lc

unintcndcd cnd statc -- a withdrawal o f US support for UNOSOM I I a ruturc reluctance

orthe Clinton Administratioii to intcrvcnc militarily in placcs such as Rwanda Haiti and

Bosnia and an cvcn greater iivcrsion for US troops to be undcr 1JN control i n othcr

risky operations

lsquolrsquohismonogriiph iiivcstigates thc causcs for the fiiilurc expcricncctl hy Ihc 1JS

inililary in attcniptiiig to capturc thc Somali warlord Mohamnicd Farah Aitlced in

Mogadishu Somalia on 3 Octobcr 1993 Using thc systematic Clauscwitzicin mclhotl

laid out by Eliot A Cohcn and John (iooch in their book Military Mislixluncs lsquoIrsquohe

Anetomy of Failure i n War this papcr analyzes soinc ofthe key actions taken at the

lactical operational and strategic lcvcls that Icd to thc railtire o f the Task Force Rangcr

(TFR) mission and ultiinatcly 1hc cntirc UNOSOM IIopcration Thc kcy to this nicthod

oranalysis is tlctcrniining at what point in the Battlc of Mogadishursquo i t became ci military

failurc Once this point is determinctl the papcr discusscs if thc requcstcd tanks and

Arinorcd Pcrsonnel Carriers (AIrsquoCs) could have prcvcntctl this failure given the

cstablishctl chain ofconiniantl and the situation While tlic focus of tlic paper is oil the

cffect that the additional tanks and APCs could havc had on thc outcome lo Ihc Battlc of

Mogadishu just iis important iin analysis using Colicn iuid Goochrsquos nicthodology will

also lead to [tic itlcntification of othcr critical failures associatcd with this operation at all

lcvels of wiir

lsquollsquohis type or critical analysis is ncccssary I)ecausc too much cmphasis has been

placed on then Secretary of Dcfensc Les Aspinrsquos role in lhc failure ofthc Task Force

2

Ranger mission lo capturc Aitlccd and not cnougli clfort has bccii placcd on critically

analyzing how all of the tactical opcrational and stratcgic decisions anti actions Icd to

the failurc Sincc it was widely pcrccivcd that Secrclary Aspin lost his job as a rcsult ol

his failurc to approvc tanks and APCs for Somalia in Scplcmbcr 1993 inany pcoplc iiifcr

that llic tiinks and APCs would havc significantly cliangcd the outcomc of tlic baiilc iind

thus thc s~icccss of UNOSOM II That may not he tlic case According lo Cohen and

Gooch iiiilitary niisfortunc occurs as a rcsult of fiiilures i n systcms and organizations no1

simply bccausc of onc indivitlual By using Colien and Goochs method ofanalysis this

piipcr seeks to discover whctlicr Lcs Aspins disapproval was thc critical lapse tliat lctl to

(tic failctl mission or whether llicrc wcrc a number of critical lapses i n llic systcin and

organization [hat workctl in concert to rcsult i n failure ro conduct this analysis this

paper discusses sonic of tlic kcy decisions madc at tlic tactical opcrational antl slratcgic

lcvcls that ultimately intlucnccd what happcncd on h e ground during thosc two days i n

Octobcr 1993 Through Cohen antl Goochs systcmatic analysis this monograph

dctcrniines what all the critical lapsestasks wcrc and i1Secretary Aspins decision not to

approve additional tanks antl APCs w a s one oIthcm

Colicn and Goochs hletliodology for Analping Military hlisfortunes

Cohen and Goochs mcthotlology provitlcs a compreliensivc mcthod of analyring

militaiy misfortuncs IJniIerlining thcir mcthodology is thcir bclief that militiry

organizations are complcx adaptive organizations As such misforluncs arc the rcsult oI

systcinic and orgiuiizational Iailurcs that can be categorized i n three ways failure to

learn failure to anticipatc and failure lo adapt Failure to Icarn is charactcrixcd by thc

organizations fiiilurc 10 apply lessons lioin thc past Iailurc to anticipatc is tlic rcsult o f

3

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Maior Roaer N Sanavic

Title of Monograph Battle of Mogadishu Anatomy of a Failure

Approved by

cL- amp Monograph Director COL Joseph A Bolick MA MMAS

Director School of Advanced LTC Robin P Swan MMAS Military Studies

Director Graduate Degree Philip J Brookes PhD Program

Accepted this 16th Day of December 1998

-ABSTRACI

BAT1IE OF MOGADISIIIJ ANATOMY O F A TAIIIJRE by M4l Rogcr N Sangvic [JSA 48 pages

By applying Colien and Gooclis model to tlic Battlc of Mogadishu this papcr has sliows that the failure of the IFR iiiission on 3-4 October I993 was the result o f a systcni IBilurc Secrctary Aspin rcccivcd far more hlamc than lie dcscrvcd Ibr making the decision Mispcrccption of tlic rcal impact hnks and AICs could liavc had on the ovcrall mission is tlic real ciiiisc of this disproporlionatc blaliic (iEN Hoar and GEN Powcll i i i addition hear iis niucli rcsponsibility as Secrctary Aspin k)r the decision Ncithcr of thcsc gcncrals strongly advocatetl the dcploynicnt to Aspiii cvcn though thc worscning situation on tlic ground mcrited their strong support Both Iloar antl lowclls approval recoinmciitlatioiis can hc cliaractcrizctl as lukc warm Aspins real Pailurc was of not k i n g niore critical oltlic conduct of the TFIl operations I n light o f Sccrctary Aspins ackiiowlcdgcd concern over thc nuiiibcr of siinilar operations conductcd by TFlZ and his knowlcdgc that the Atlministration was seeking a political solution lie should liavc notilictl M( Garrisoii of tlic policy sliilt though tlic JCS and CTNCCENT ant1provided iidditional guitlancc on risk I-lad Aspin cithcr rcasscsscd thc risk of cacli llllt opclation morc thoroughly o r donc ii hcttcrjob coordiniiting tlic policy shill in light ofthc increascd risks it is likely that the thrcc Octobcr raid would not hovc occurred

WhiIc bcttcr policy coordination fYom the Sccrctary of Dcfensc down to IFR could have prcventcd thc 3 October 1993 raid from occurring IlR did haw all tlic ineiuis in Mogadishu to succcssfiilly accomplish the mission I-lowevcr overconlidcncc i n IITRs capabilities and undcrcstiniation o f tlic enemys ability to find and attack T1R vulnerabilitics wcrc critical fiiilurcs that Icd to ii serics ofother failurcs First IFR did not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Second LPK contluctctl the 3 Octohcr raid without protecting its vulnerablc helicopters Third TI planncrs fiiilcd to utilize all their aviiilable rcsourccs ant1 intcgratc thcsc rcsot~~ccsinto a plan that could be llcxihlc cnough to handlc the threat and all the rriction in this risky opcrition

This papcr tlcmonstralcs that TI Itangers 3 October mission failed as ii rcsult of tlic organization not thc decisions of Sccrctary Aspin alone As Colicn and Goocli observed military niisforlunc is not mcrcly the rcsult of an individual mistake but rather thc rcsult ofscrics ofniistakcs throughout a systcni Ultimatcly Wlltant1 tlic system i t wiis working i n liilctl to anticipate and adapt

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Scction 1

Scction 11

Scction 111

Scction 1V

Scction V

Section VI

Scction V I I

Section V1I1

Scction IX

Irsquoagc Introtluction 1

Cohen and Goochrsquos Mcthociology for Analyzing Military Misforluncs 0

Discovcry ollsquoFacts 5

Why Task Forcc Rangcr Was Callcd to Somaliii 5 What happcnctl oii 0-4 Octoher I993 13

The Nature of thc Failurc 19

Critical TasksCritical Lapscs 25

Inycred Analysis 30

Discussion of Ihc Analytic Matrix Thc Matrix 40

Aggregale Iaailurc 44

Conclusion 46

Endnotcs 40

Bibliography 5 0

liitrodiictioii

Failurc is something that most organizations have grcat difficulty dcaling with

llic military as an organization has an especially difficult challcngc i n dealing with

failurc because military failures normally rcsult in morc than lost dcbatcs dollars

resources o r market sliarcs Military misforluncs rcsult in livcs being lost soldiers being

crippled and mainictl fulurc policies being altered and hard earned prestige and

credihility tliminishcd Thcsc wercjust ii few of thc conscqucnccs of llic failcd 1JS-led

cffori lo capture tlic Somali warlord Mohainnicci Farah Aiclccd on 3-4 October 1993 i n

a n cllorl to shore up tlic foundcring IJnitcd Nations Operation Somalia I I (UNOSOM 11)

Regardless of how diflicult failurc is to tlcal with cmolionally undcrstanding the naturc

of military Ihilures is csscntial for tlic USmilitary to learn its hard gained Icssons and

develop systems to prevent the rcoccurrcncc of similar failures A detailed critical

analysis of military fiiilurcs likc Ihc Battle of Mogadishu is required to avoid

emotionalism and the natural tcndency to seek I simple cat~sc for the failure

Clausewitz advocatcd detailed critical analysis o f a battle in order to understand i t

in its totality and complcxity rather than analyzing many battles i n only ii supcrficiil

manner Clauscwitz probably undcrstood lhe complexity of war Par bcttcr than most

military tlicorists did Allhougli his pcrspcctivc was mainly the Napolconic campaigns of

his cra his advocacy olcritical analysis is jus t as valid for todays urban combat miics iis

it was for the ficlds ofhattlc i n his day Critical analysis ofihc Battle of Mogadishu is

cspccially important becausc USforces inay liavc to tlcal with combat circunistanccs

similar 10 what Task Iorcc kungcr (TFR) and llic 10th Mountain Divisions Quick

Rcaction 1orcc (QKV) encountcrcd in lhc US Armys largest single fire fight sincc

Vietnainrsquo lsquoIlsquoIiccvcnts leading up to this battlc providc an important case study of how

tlccisions at (he lactical opcritional and slratcgic lcvcl intcractctl to achicvc t l lc

unintcndcd cnd statc -- a withdrawal o f US support for UNOSOM I I a ruturc reluctance

orthe Clinton Administratioii to intcrvcnc militarily in placcs such as Rwanda Haiti and

Bosnia and an cvcn greater iivcrsion for US troops to be undcr 1JN control i n othcr

risky operations

lsquolrsquohismonogriiph iiivcstigates thc causcs for the fiiilurc expcricncctl hy Ihc 1JS

inililary in attcniptiiig to capturc thc Somali warlord Mohamnicd Farah Aitlced in

Mogadishu Somalia on 3 Octobcr 1993 Using thc systematic Clauscwitzicin mclhotl

laid out by Eliot A Cohcn and John (iooch in their book Military Mislixluncs lsquoIrsquohe

Anetomy of Failure i n War this papcr analyzes soinc ofthe key actions taken at the

lactical operational and strategic lcvcls that Icd to thc railtire o f the Task Force Rangcr

(TFR) mission and ultiinatcly 1hc cntirc UNOSOM IIopcration Thc kcy to this nicthod

oranalysis is tlctcrniining at what point in the Battlc of Mogadishursquo i t became ci military

failurc Once this point is determinctl the papcr discusscs if thc requcstcd tanks and

Arinorcd Pcrsonnel Carriers (AIrsquoCs) could have prcvcntctl this failure given the

cstablishctl chain ofconiniantl and the situation While tlic focus of tlic paper is oil the

cffect that the additional tanks and APCs could havc had on thc outcome lo Ihc Battlc of

Mogadishu just iis important iin analysis using Colicn iuid Goochrsquos nicthodology will

also lead to [tic itlcntification of othcr critical failures associatcd with this operation at all

lcvels of wiir

lsquollsquohis type or critical analysis is ncccssary I)ecausc too much cmphasis has been

placed on then Secretary of Dcfensc Les Aspinrsquos role in lhc failure ofthc Task Force

2

Ranger mission lo capturc Aitlccd and not cnougli clfort has bccii placcd on critically

analyzing how all of the tactical opcrational and stratcgic decisions anti actions Icd to

the failurc Sincc it was widely pcrccivcd that Secrclary Aspin lost his job as a rcsult ol

his failurc to approvc tanks and APCs for Somalia in Scplcmbcr 1993 inany pcoplc iiifcr

that llic tiinks and APCs would havc significantly cliangcd the outcomc of tlic baiilc iind

thus thc s~icccss of UNOSOM II That may not he tlic case According lo Cohen and

Gooch iiiilitary niisfortunc occurs as a rcsult of fiiilures i n systcms and organizations no1

simply bccausc of onc indivitlual By using Colien and Goochs method ofanalysis this

piipcr seeks to discover whctlicr Lcs Aspins disapproval was thc critical lapse tliat lctl to

(tic failctl mission or whether llicrc wcrc a number of critical lapses i n llic systcin and

organization [hat workctl in concert to rcsult i n failure ro conduct this analysis this

paper discusses sonic of tlic kcy decisions madc at tlic tactical opcrational antl slratcgic

lcvcls that ultimately intlucnccd what happcncd on h e ground during thosc two days i n

Octobcr 1993 Through Cohen antl Goochs systcmatic analysis this monograph

dctcrniines what all the critical lapsestasks wcrc and i1Secretary Aspins decision not to

approve additional tanks antl APCs w a s one oIthcm

Colicn and Goochs hletliodology for Analping Military hlisfortunes

Cohen and Goochs mcthotlology provitlcs a compreliensivc mcthod of analyring

militaiy misfortuncs IJniIerlining thcir mcthodology is thcir bclief that militiry

organizations are complcx adaptive organizations As such misforluncs arc the rcsult oI

systcinic and orgiuiizational Iailurcs that can be categorized i n three ways failure to

learn failure to anticipatc and failure lo adapt Failure to Icarn is charactcrixcd by thc

organizations fiiilurc 10 apply lessons lioin thc past Iailurc to anticipatc is tlic rcsult o f

3

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

-ABSTRACI

BAT1IE OF MOGADISIIIJ ANATOMY O F A TAIIIJRE by M4l Rogcr N Sangvic [JSA 48 pages

By applying Colien and Gooclis model to tlic Battlc of Mogadishu this papcr has sliows that the failure of the IFR iiiission on 3-4 October I993 was the result o f a systcni IBilurc Secrctary Aspin rcccivcd far more hlamc than lie dcscrvcd Ibr making the decision Mispcrccption of tlic rcal impact hnks and AICs could liavc had on the ovcrall mission is tlic real ciiiisc of this disproporlionatc blaliic (iEN Hoar and GEN Powcll i i i addition hear iis niucli rcsponsibility as Secrctary Aspin k)r the decision Ncithcr of thcsc gcncrals strongly advocatetl the dcploynicnt to Aspiii cvcn though thc worscning situation on tlic ground mcrited their strong support Both Iloar antl lowclls approval recoinmciitlatioiis can hc cliaractcrizctl as lukc warm Aspins real Pailurc was of not k i n g niore critical oltlic conduct of the TFIl operations I n light o f Sccrctary Aspins ackiiowlcdgcd concern over thc nuiiibcr of siinilar operations conductcd by TFlZ and his knowlcdgc that the Atlministration was seeking a political solution lie should liavc notilictl M( Garrisoii of tlic policy sliilt though tlic JCS and CTNCCENT ant1provided iidditional guitlancc on risk I-lad Aspin cithcr rcasscsscd thc risk of cacli llllt opclation morc thoroughly o r donc ii hcttcrjob coordiniiting tlic policy shill in light ofthc increascd risks it is likely that the thrcc Octobcr raid would not hovc occurred

WhiIc bcttcr policy coordination fYom the Sccrctary of Dcfensc down to IFR could have prcventcd thc 3 October 1993 raid from occurring IlR did haw all tlic ineiuis in Mogadishu to succcssfiilly accomplish the mission I-lowevcr overconlidcncc i n IITRs capabilities and undcrcstiniation o f tlic enemys ability to find and attack T1R vulnerabilitics wcrc critical fiiilurcs that Icd to ii serics ofother failurcs First IFR did not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Second LPK contluctctl the 3 Octohcr raid without protecting its vulnerablc helicopters Third TI planncrs fiiilcd to utilize all their aviiilable rcsourccs ant1 intcgratc thcsc rcsot~~ccsinto a plan that could be llcxihlc cnough to handlc the threat and all the rriction in this risky opcrition

This papcr tlcmonstralcs that TI Itangers 3 October mission failed as ii rcsult of tlic organization not thc decisions of Sccrctary Aspin alone As Colicn and Goocli observed military niisforlunc is not mcrcly the rcsult of an individual mistake but rather thc rcsult ofscrics ofniistakcs throughout a systcni Ultimatcly Wlltant1 tlic system i t wiis working i n liilctl to anticipate and adapt

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Scction 1

Scction 11

Scction 111

Scction 1V

Scction V

Section VI

Scction V I I

Section V1I1

Scction IX

Irsquoagc Introtluction 1

Cohen and Goochrsquos Mcthociology for Analyzing Military Misforluncs 0

Discovcry ollsquoFacts 5

Why Task Forcc Rangcr Was Callcd to Somaliii 5 What happcnctl oii 0-4 Octoher I993 13

The Nature of thc Failurc 19

Critical TasksCritical Lapscs 25

Inycred Analysis 30

Discussion of Ihc Analytic Matrix Thc Matrix 40

Aggregale Iaailurc 44

Conclusion 46

Endnotcs 40

Bibliography 5 0

liitrodiictioii

Failurc is something that most organizations have grcat difficulty dcaling with

llic military as an organization has an especially difficult challcngc i n dealing with

failurc because military failures normally rcsult in morc than lost dcbatcs dollars

resources o r market sliarcs Military misforluncs rcsult in livcs being lost soldiers being

crippled and mainictl fulurc policies being altered and hard earned prestige and

credihility tliminishcd Thcsc wercjust ii few of thc conscqucnccs of llic failcd 1JS-led

cffori lo capture tlic Somali warlord Mohainnicci Farah Aiclccd on 3-4 October 1993 i n

a n cllorl to shore up tlic foundcring IJnitcd Nations Operation Somalia I I (UNOSOM 11)

Regardless of how diflicult failurc is to tlcal with cmolionally undcrstanding the naturc

of military Ihilures is csscntial for tlic USmilitary to learn its hard gained Icssons and

develop systems to prevent the rcoccurrcncc of similar failures A detailed critical

analysis of military fiiilurcs likc Ihc Battle of Mogadishu is required to avoid

emotionalism and the natural tcndency to seek I simple cat~sc for the failure

Clausewitz advocatcd detailed critical analysis o f a battle in order to understand i t

in its totality and complcxity rather than analyzing many battles i n only ii supcrficiil

manner Clauscwitz probably undcrstood lhe complexity of war Par bcttcr than most

military tlicorists did Allhougli his pcrspcctivc was mainly the Napolconic campaigns of

his cra his advocacy olcritical analysis is jus t as valid for todays urban combat miics iis

it was for the ficlds ofhattlc i n his day Critical analysis ofihc Battle of Mogadishu is

cspccially important becausc USforces inay liavc to tlcal with combat circunistanccs

similar 10 what Task Iorcc kungcr (TFR) and llic 10th Mountain Divisions Quick

Rcaction 1orcc (QKV) encountcrcd in lhc US Armys largest single fire fight sincc

Vietnainrsquo lsquoIlsquoIiccvcnts leading up to this battlc providc an important case study of how

tlccisions at (he lactical opcritional and slratcgic lcvcl intcractctl to achicvc t l lc

unintcndcd cnd statc -- a withdrawal o f US support for UNOSOM I I a ruturc reluctance

orthe Clinton Administratioii to intcrvcnc militarily in placcs such as Rwanda Haiti and

Bosnia and an cvcn greater iivcrsion for US troops to be undcr 1JN control i n othcr

risky operations

lsquolrsquohismonogriiph iiivcstigates thc causcs for the fiiilurc expcricncctl hy Ihc 1JS

inililary in attcniptiiig to capturc thc Somali warlord Mohamnicd Farah Aitlced in

Mogadishu Somalia on 3 Octobcr 1993 Using thc systematic Clauscwitzicin mclhotl

laid out by Eliot A Cohcn and John (iooch in their book Military Mislixluncs lsquoIrsquohe

Anetomy of Failure i n War this papcr analyzes soinc ofthe key actions taken at the

lactical operational and strategic lcvcls that Icd to thc railtire o f the Task Force Rangcr

(TFR) mission and ultiinatcly 1hc cntirc UNOSOM IIopcration Thc kcy to this nicthod

oranalysis is tlctcrniining at what point in the Battlc of Mogadishursquo i t became ci military

failurc Once this point is determinctl the papcr discusscs if thc requcstcd tanks and

Arinorcd Pcrsonnel Carriers (AIrsquoCs) could have prcvcntctl this failure given the

cstablishctl chain ofconiniantl and the situation While tlic focus of tlic paper is oil the

cffect that the additional tanks and APCs could havc had on thc outcome lo Ihc Battlc of

Mogadishu just iis important iin analysis using Colicn iuid Goochrsquos nicthodology will

also lead to [tic itlcntification of othcr critical failures associatcd with this operation at all

lcvels of wiir

lsquollsquohis type or critical analysis is ncccssary I)ecausc too much cmphasis has been

placed on then Secretary of Dcfensc Les Aspinrsquos role in lhc failure ofthc Task Force

2

Ranger mission lo capturc Aitlccd and not cnougli clfort has bccii placcd on critically

analyzing how all of the tactical opcrational and stratcgic decisions anti actions Icd to

the failurc Sincc it was widely pcrccivcd that Secrclary Aspin lost his job as a rcsult ol

his failurc to approvc tanks and APCs for Somalia in Scplcmbcr 1993 inany pcoplc iiifcr

that llic tiinks and APCs would havc significantly cliangcd the outcomc of tlic baiilc iind

thus thc s~icccss of UNOSOM II That may not he tlic case According lo Cohen and

Gooch iiiilitary niisfortunc occurs as a rcsult of fiiilures i n systcms and organizations no1

simply bccausc of onc indivitlual By using Colien and Goochs method ofanalysis this

piipcr seeks to discover whctlicr Lcs Aspins disapproval was thc critical lapse tliat lctl to

(tic failctl mission or whether llicrc wcrc a number of critical lapses i n llic systcin and

organization [hat workctl in concert to rcsult i n failure ro conduct this analysis this

paper discusses sonic of tlic kcy decisions madc at tlic tactical opcrational antl slratcgic

lcvcls that ultimately intlucnccd what happcncd on h e ground during thosc two days i n

Octobcr 1993 Through Cohen antl Goochs systcmatic analysis this monograph

dctcrniines what all the critical lapsestasks wcrc and i1Secretary Aspins decision not to

approve additional tanks antl APCs w a s one oIthcm

Colicn and Goochs hletliodology for Analping Military hlisfortunes

Cohen and Goochs mcthotlology provitlcs a compreliensivc mcthod of analyring

militaiy misfortuncs IJniIerlining thcir mcthodology is thcir bclief that militiry

organizations are complcx adaptive organizations As such misforluncs arc the rcsult oI

systcinic and orgiuiizational Iailurcs that can be categorized i n three ways failure to

learn failure to anticipatc and failure lo adapt Failure to Icarn is charactcrixcd by thc

organizations fiiilurc 10 apply lessons lioin thc past Iailurc to anticipatc is tlic rcsult o f

3

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Scction 1

Scction 11

Scction 111

Scction 1V

Scction V

Section VI

Scction V I I

Section V1I1

Scction IX

Irsquoagc Introtluction 1

Cohen and Goochrsquos Mcthociology for Analyzing Military Misforluncs 0

Discovcry ollsquoFacts 5

Why Task Forcc Rangcr Was Callcd to Somaliii 5 What happcnctl oii 0-4 Octoher I993 13

The Nature of thc Failurc 19

Critical TasksCritical Lapscs 25

Inycred Analysis 30

Discussion of Ihc Analytic Matrix Thc Matrix 40

Aggregale Iaailurc 44

Conclusion 46

Endnotcs 40

Bibliography 5 0

liitrodiictioii

Failurc is something that most organizations have grcat difficulty dcaling with

llic military as an organization has an especially difficult challcngc i n dealing with

failurc because military failures normally rcsult in morc than lost dcbatcs dollars

resources o r market sliarcs Military misforluncs rcsult in livcs being lost soldiers being

crippled and mainictl fulurc policies being altered and hard earned prestige and

credihility tliminishcd Thcsc wercjust ii few of thc conscqucnccs of llic failcd 1JS-led

cffori lo capture tlic Somali warlord Mohainnicci Farah Aiclccd on 3-4 October 1993 i n

a n cllorl to shore up tlic foundcring IJnitcd Nations Operation Somalia I I (UNOSOM 11)

Regardless of how diflicult failurc is to tlcal with cmolionally undcrstanding the naturc

of military Ihilures is csscntial for tlic USmilitary to learn its hard gained Icssons and

develop systems to prevent the rcoccurrcncc of similar failures A detailed critical

analysis of military fiiilurcs likc Ihc Battle of Mogadishu is required to avoid

emotionalism and the natural tcndency to seek I simple cat~sc for the failure

Clausewitz advocatcd detailed critical analysis o f a battle in order to understand i t

in its totality and complcxity rather than analyzing many battles i n only ii supcrficiil

manner Clauscwitz probably undcrstood lhe complexity of war Par bcttcr than most

military tlicorists did Allhougli his pcrspcctivc was mainly the Napolconic campaigns of

his cra his advocacy olcritical analysis is jus t as valid for todays urban combat miics iis

it was for the ficlds ofhattlc i n his day Critical analysis ofihc Battle of Mogadishu is

cspccially important becausc USforces inay liavc to tlcal with combat circunistanccs

similar 10 what Task Iorcc kungcr (TFR) and llic 10th Mountain Divisions Quick

Rcaction 1orcc (QKV) encountcrcd in lhc US Armys largest single fire fight sincc

Vietnainrsquo lsquoIlsquoIiccvcnts leading up to this battlc providc an important case study of how

tlccisions at (he lactical opcritional and slratcgic lcvcl intcractctl to achicvc t l lc

unintcndcd cnd statc -- a withdrawal o f US support for UNOSOM I I a ruturc reluctance

orthe Clinton Administratioii to intcrvcnc militarily in placcs such as Rwanda Haiti and

Bosnia and an cvcn greater iivcrsion for US troops to be undcr 1JN control i n othcr

risky operations

lsquolrsquohismonogriiph iiivcstigates thc causcs for the fiiilurc expcricncctl hy Ihc 1JS

inililary in attcniptiiig to capturc thc Somali warlord Mohamnicd Farah Aitlced in

Mogadishu Somalia on 3 Octobcr 1993 Using thc systematic Clauscwitzicin mclhotl

laid out by Eliot A Cohcn and John (iooch in their book Military Mislixluncs lsquoIrsquohe

Anetomy of Failure i n War this papcr analyzes soinc ofthe key actions taken at the

lactical operational and strategic lcvcls that Icd to thc railtire o f the Task Force Rangcr

(TFR) mission and ultiinatcly 1hc cntirc UNOSOM IIopcration Thc kcy to this nicthod

oranalysis is tlctcrniining at what point in the Battlc of Mogadishursquo i t became ci military

failurc Once this point is determinctl the papcr discusscs if thc requcstcd tanks and

Arinorcd Pcrsonnel Carriers (AIrsquoCs) could have prcvcntctl this failure given the

cstablishctl chain ofconiniantl and the situation While tlic focus of tlic paper is oil the

cffect that the additional tanks and APCs could havc had on thc outcome lo Ihc Battlc of

Mogadishu just iis important iin analysis using Colicn iuid Goochrsquos nicthodology will

also lead to [tic itlcntification of othcr critical failures associatcd with this operation at all

lcvels of wiir

lsquollsquohis type or critical analysis is ncccssary I)ecausc too much cmphasis has been

placed on then Secretary of Dcfensc Les Aspinrsquos role in lhc failure ofthc Task Force

2

Ranger mission lo capturc Aitlccd and not cnougli clfort has bccii placcd on critically

analyzing how all of the tactical opcrational and stratcgic decisions anti actions Icd to

the failurc Sincc it was widely pcrccivcd that Secrclary Aspin lost his job as a rcsult ol

his failurc to approvc tanks and APCs for Somalia in Scplcmbcr 1993 inany pcoplc iiifcr

that llic tiinks and APCs would havc significantly cliangcd the outcomc of tlic baiilc iind

thus thc s~icccss of UNOSOM II That may not he tlic case According lo Cohen and

Gooch iiiilitary niisfortunc occurs as a rcsult of fiiilures i n systcms and organizations no1

simply bccausc of onc indivitlual By using Colien and Goochs method ofanalysis this

piipcr seeks to discover whctlicr Lcs Aspins disapproval was thc critical lapse tliat lctl to

(tic failctl mission or whether llicrc wcrc a number of critical lapses i n llic systcin and

organization [hat workctl in concert to rcsult i n failure ro conduct this analysis this

paper discusses sonic of tlic kcy decisions madc at tlic tactical opcrational antl slratcgic

lcvcls that ultimately intlucnccd what happcncd on h e ground during thosc two days i n

Octobcr 1993 Through Cohen antl Goochs systcmatic analysis this monograph

dctcrniines what all the critical lapsestasks wcrc and i1Secretary Aspins decision not to

approve additional tanks antl APCs w a s one oIthcm

Colicn and Goochs hletliodology for Analping Military hlisfortunes

Cohen and Goochs mcthotlology provitlcs a compreliensivc mcthod of analyring

militaiy misfortuncs IJniIerlining thcir mcthodology is thcir bclief that militiry

organizations are complcx adaptive organizations As such misforluncs arc the rcsult oI

systcinic and orgiuiizational Iailurcs that can be categorized i n three ways failure to

learn failure to anticipatc and failure lo adapt Failure to Icarn is charactcrixcd by thc

organizations fiiilurc 10 apply lessons lioin thc past Iailurc to anticipatc is tlic rcsult o f

3

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

liitrodiictioii

Failurc is something that most organizations have grcat difficulty dcaling with

llic military as an organization has an especially difficult challcngc i n dealing with

failurc because military failures normally rcsult in morc than lost dcbatcs dollars

resources o r market sliarcs Military misforluncs rcsult in livcs being lost soldiers being

crippled and mainictl fulurc policies being altered and hard earned prestige and

credihility tliminishcd Thcsc wercjust ii few of thc conscqucnccs of llic failcd 1JS-led

cffori lo capture tlic Somali warlord Mohainnicci Farah Aiclccd on 3-4 October 1993 i n

a n cllorl to shore up tlic foundcring IJnitcd Nations Operation Somalia I I (UNOSOM 11)

Regardless of how diflicult failurc is to tlcal with cmolionally undcrstanding the naturc

of military Ihilures is csscntial for tlic USmilitary to learn its hard gained Icssons and

develop systems to prevent the rcoccurrcncc of similar failures A detailed critical

analysis of military fiiilurcs likc Ihc Battle of Mogadishu is required to avoid

emotionalism and the natural tcndency to seek I simple cat~sc for the failure

Clausewitz advocatcd detailed critical analysis o f a battle in order to understand i t

in its totality and complcxity rather than analyzing many battles i n only ii supcrficiil

manner Clauscwitz probably undcrstood lhe complexity of war Par bcttcr than most

military tlicorists did Allhougli his pcrspcctivc was mainly the Napolconic campaigns of

his cra his advocacy olcritical analysis is jus t as valid for todays urban combat miics iis

it was for the ficlds ofhattlc i n his day Critical analysis ofihc Battle of Mogadishu is

cspccially important becausc USforces inay liavc to tlcal with combat circunistanccs

similar 10 what Task Iorcc kungcr (TFR) and llic 10th Mountain Divisions Quick

Rcaction 1orcc (QKV) encountcrcd in lhc US Armys largest single fire fight sincc

Vietnainrsquo lsquoIlsquoIiccvcnts leading up to this battlc providc an important case study of how

tlccisions at (he lactical opcritional and slratcgic lcvcl intcractctl to achicvc t l lc

unintcndcd cnd statc -- a withdrawal o f US support for UNOSOM I I a ruturc reluctance

orthe Clinton Administratioii to intcrvcnc militarily in placcs such as Rwanda Haiti and

Bosnia and an cvcn greater iivcrsion for US troops to be undcr 1JN control i n othcr

risky operations

lsquolrsquohismonogriiph iiivcstigates thc causcs for the fiiilurc expcricncctl hy Ihc 1JS

inililary in attcniptiiig to capturc thc Somali warlord Mohamnicd Farah Aitlced in

Mogadishu Somalia on 3 Octobcr 1993 Using thc systematic Clauscwitzicin mclhotl

laid out by Eliot A Cohcn and John (iooch in their book Military Mislixluncs lsquoIrsquohe

Anetomy of Failure i n War this papcr analyzes soinc ofthe key actions taken at the

lactical operational and strategic lcvcls that Icd to thc railtire o f the Task Force Rangcr

(TFR) mission and ultiinatcly 1hc cntirc UNOSOM IIopcration Thc kcy to this nicthod

oranalysis is tlctcrniining at what point in the Battlc of Mogadishursquo i t became ci military

failurc Once this point is determinctl the papcr discusscs if thc requcstcd tanks and

Arinorcd Pcrsonnel Carriers (AIrsquoCs) could have prcvcntctl this failure given the

cstablishctl chain ofconiniantl and the situation While tlic focus of tlic paper is oil the

cffect that the additional tanks and APCs could havc had on thc outcome lo Ihc Battlc of

Mogadishu just iis important iin analysis using Colicn iuid Goochrsquos nicthodology will

also lead to [tic itlcntification of othcr critical failures associatcd with this operation at all

lcvels of wiir

lsquollsquohis type or critical analysis is ncccssary I)ecausc too much cmphasis has been

placed on then Secretary of Dcfensc Les Aspinrsquos role in lhc failure ofthc Task Force

2

Ranger mission lo capturc Aitlccd and not cnougli clfort has bccii placcd on critically

analyzing how all of the tactical opcrational and stratcgic decisions anti actions Icd to

the failurc Sincc it was widely pcrccivcd that Secrclary Aspin lost his job as a rcsult ol

his failurc to approvc tanks and APCs for Somalia in Scplcmbcr 1993 inany pcoplc iiifcr

that llic tiinks and APCs would havc significantly cliangcd the outcomc of tlic baiilc iind

thus thc s~icccss of UNOSOM II That may not he tlic case According lo Cohen and

Gooch iiiilitary niisfortunc occurs as a rcsult of fiiilures i n systcms and organizations no1

simply bccausc of onc indivitlual By using Colien and Goochs method ofanalysis this

piipcr seeks to discover whctlicr Lcs Aspins disapproval was thc critical lapse tliat lctl to

(tic failctl mission or whether llicrc wcrc a number of critical lapses i n llic systcin and

organization [hat workctl in concert to rcsult i n failure ro conduct this analysis this

paper discusses sonic of tlic kcy decisions madc at tlic tactical opcrational antl slratcgic

lcvcls that ultimately intlucnccd what happcncd on h e ground during thosc two days i n

Octobcr 1993 Through Cohen antl Goochs systcmatic analysis this monograph

dctcrniines what all the critical lapsestasks wcrc and i1Secretary Aspins decision not to

approve additional tanks antl APCs w a s one oIthcm

Colicn and Goochs hletliodology for Analping Military hlisfortunes

Cohen and Goochs mcthotlology provitlcs a compreliensivc mcthod of analyring

militaiy misfortuncs IJniIerlining thcir mcthodology is thcir bclief that militiry

organizations are complcx adaptive organizations As such misforluncs arc the rcsult oI

systcinic and orgiuiizational Iailurcs that can be categorized i n three ways failure to

learn failure to anticipatc and failure lo adapt Failure to Icarn is charactcrixcd by thc

organizations fiiilurc 10 apply lessons lioin thc past Iailurc to anticipatc is tlic rcsult o f

3

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

Vietnainrsquo lsquoIlsquoIiccvcnts leading up to this battlc providc an important case study of how

tlccisions at (he lactical opcritional and slratcgic lcvcl intcractctl to achicvc t l lc

unintcndcd cnd statc -- a withdrawal o f US support for UNOSOM I I a ruturc reluctance

orthe Clinton Administratioii to intcrvcnc militarily in placcs such as Rwanda Haiti and

Bosnia and an cvcn greater iivcrsion for US troops to be undcr 1JN control i n othcr

risky operations

lsquolrsquohismonogriiph iiivcstigates thc causcs for the fiiilurc expcricncctl hy Ihc 1JS

inililary in attcniptiiig to capturc thc Somali warlord Mohamnicd Farah Aitlced in

Mogadishu Somalia on 3 Octobcr 1993 Using thc systematic Clauscwitzicin mclhotl

laid out by Eliot A Cohcn and John (iooch in their book Military Mislixluncs lsquoIrsquohe

Anetomy of Failure i n War this papcr analyzes soinc ofthe key actions taken at the

lactical operational and strategic lcvcls that Icd to thc railtire o f the Task Force Rangcr

(TFR) mission and ultiinatcly 1hc cntirc UNOSOM IIopcration Thc kcy to this nicthod

oranalysis is tlctcrniining at what point in the Battlc of Mogadishursquo i t became ci military

failurc Once this point is determinctl the papcr discusscs if thc requcstcd tanks and

Arinorcd Pcrsonnel Carriers (AIrsquoCs) could have prcvcntctl this failure given the

cstablishctl chain ofconiniantl and the situation While tlic focus of tlic paper is oil the

cffect that the additional tanks and APCs could havc had on thc outcome lo Ihc Battlc of

Mogadishu just iis important iin analysis using Colicn iuid Goochrsquos nicthodology will

also lead to [tic itlcntification of othcr critical failures associatcd with this operation at all

lcvels of wiir

lsquollsquohis type or critical analysis is ncccssary I)ecausc too much cmphasis has been

placed on then Secretary of Dcfensc Les Aspinrsquos role in lhc failure ofthc Task Force

2

Ranger mission lo capturc Aitlccd and not cnougli clfort has bccii placcd on critically

analyzing how all of the tactical opcrational and stratcgic decisions anti actions Icd to

the failurc Sincc it was widely pcrccivcd that Secrclary Aspin lost his job as a rcsult ol

his failurc to approvc tanks and APCs for Somalia in Scplcmbcr 1993 inany pcoplc iiifcr

that llic tiinks and APCs would havc significantly cliangcd the outcomc of tlic baiilc iind

thus thc s~icccss of UNOSOM II That may not he tlic case According lo Cohen and

Gooch iiiilitary niisfortunc occurs as a rcsult of fiiilures i n systcms and organizations no1

simply bccausc of onc indivitlual By using Colien and Goochs method ofanalysis this

piipcr seeks to discover whctlicr Lcs Aspins disapproval was thc critical lapse tliat lctl to

(tic failctl mission or whether llicrc wcrc a number of critical lapses i n llic systcin and

organization [hat workctl in concert to rcsult i n failure ro conduct this analysis this

paper discusses sonic of tlic kcy decisions madc at tlic tactical opcrational antl slratcgic

lcvcls that ultimately intlucnccd what happcncd on h e ground during thosc two days i n

Octobcr 1993 Through Cohen antl Goochs systcmatic analysis this monograph

dctcrniines what all the critical lapsestasks wcrc and i1Secretary Aspins decision not to

approve additional tanks antl APCs w a s one oIthcm

Colicn and Goochs hletliodology for Analping Military hlisfortunes

Cohen and Goochs mcthotlology provitlcs a compreliensivc mcthod of analyring

militaiy misfortuncs IJniIerlining thcir mcthodology is thcir bclief that militiry

organizations are complcx adaptive organizations As such misforluncs arc the rcsult oI

systcinic and orgiuiizational Iailurcs that can be categorized i n three ways failure to

learn failure to anticipatc and failure lo adapt Failure to Icarn is charactcrixcd by thc

organizations fiiilurc 10 apply lessons lioin thc past Iailurc to anticipatc is tlic rcsult o f

3

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

Ranger mission lo capturc Aitlccd and not cnougli clfort has bccii placcd on critically

analyzing how all of the tactical opcrational and stratcgic decisions anti actions Icd to

the failurc Sincc it was widely pcrccivcd that Secrclary Aspin lost his job as a rcsult ol

his failurc to approvc tanks and APCs for Somalia in Scplcmbcr 1993 inany pcoplc iiifcr

that llic tiinks and APCs would havc significantly cliangcd the outcomc of tlic baiilc iind

thus thc s~icccss of UNOSOM II That may not he tlic case According lo Cohen and

Gooch iiiilitary niisfortunc occurs as a rcsult of fiiilures i n systcms and organizations no1

simply bccausc of onc indivitlual By using Colien and Goochs method ofanalysis this

piipcr seeks to discover whctlicr Lcs Aspins disapproval was thc critical lapse tliat lctl to

(tic failctl mission or whether llicrc wcrc a number of critical lapses i n llic systcin and

organization [hat workctl in concert to rcsult i n failure ro conduct this analysis this

paper discusses sonic of tlic kcy decisions madc at tlic tactical opcrational antl slratcgic

lcvcls that ultimately intlucnccd what happcncd on h e ground during thosc two days i n

Octobcr 1993 Through Cohen antl Goochs systcmatic analysis this monograph

dctcrniines what all the critical lapsestasks wcrc and i1Secretary Aspins decision not to

approve additional tanks antl APCs w a s one oIthcm

Colicn and Goochs hletliodology for Analping Military hlisfortunes

Cohen and Goochs mcthotlology provitlcs a compreliensivc mcthod of analyring

militaiy misfortuncs IJniIerlining thcir mcthodology is thcir bclief that militiry

organizations are complcx adaptive organizations As such misforluncs arc the rcsult oI

systcinic and orgiuiizational Iailurcs that can be categorized i n three ways failure to

learn failure to anticipatc and failure lo adapt Failure to Icarn is charactcrixcd by thc

organizations fiiilurc 10 apply lessons lioin thc past Iailurc to anticipatc is tlic rcsult o f

3

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

failing to anticipatc the ftlttlrc Failurc to adapt iniplics tlic inability of an organization to

deal with the changing prcscnt rsquo Any two oCllicsc failures working togethcr will result in

an aggrcgatc Isilurc All three failurcs combined will result i n a catastrophic Igilurcs

In order to dctcrminc tlic roots ofthcsc failures Cohcn and Gooch advocate that

military misfortuncs bc cvaluated holistically ie a ldquoClauscwitzian Kritikrdquo According

10 Cohcn and Gooch the Clauscwilian Kritik has thrcc stcps ldquothc discovery ollsquoPacts

thc tracing of efforts to causcs and the invcstigation and evaluation ofli1catisrdquordquo rsquolrsquohis

malysis should includc cvaluation of what if sccnarios to gain insight into what could

have bcen Ihally this nicthod atlvocatcs a multi-layercd approach that sceks to enalyzc

thc effects or all levcls ofdccisions and actions on thc failurcrsquordquo

This papcr USCS this methodology to analyze the M u r c ofthe Battle o r

Mogadishu Thc first stcp i n the methotlology is thc discovcry of thc facts dctcrmining

what exactly happenctl I n this stcp the papcr discusscs some ollsquothc pcrtincnt

background history leading to lsquoIlsquoFRs dcployment mid providcs ii dctailed account oflsquowhnt

happened on thc 3-4 Octobcr mission lsquofhc sccoiitl stcp is to dctcrminc the naturc oTtlic

failure In this stcp countcrfactual analysis is conductctl to tlctcrniinc what was rcquircd

Tor the battle to havc hccn lcss than a hilure I n othcr words this stcp tlctcrmines wliiit

nccded to he accomplished for thc mission to havc bccn considered a SLICCCSSor at least

not a failurc This counterlgctual portion ofthc analysis includcs ldquowhat ilrdquo sccnarios

lrsquohe third stcp is to dctcnninc the ldquocritical tasksrdquo that went uti~tillilledor wcrc incomplctc

that led to the military misfortunc lsquolrsquohe fourth stcp is thc ldquolaycrcd analysisrdquo which

cxainines all the levels of thc organization and how they coniributctl to the failurc lsquollsquohe

last stcp is to draw up an ldquoanalytical matrixrdquo lo graphically depict thc ldquopathways to

4

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

inisfortunc llie matrix shows how thc failures at diffcrcnt lcvels rclatc to each other hy

itlcntifying the critical path that led ti military misfort~~nc By using this cntirc methotl

this papcr tletermines ifthc failure ofthc Battle of Mogadishu wiis tlic result ofa hilurc

to anticipate to learn to adapt ii combination of tvo these failures (an aggregate fhilure)

or ii combination of all three (a catastrophic failure) Afler revealing the nature of the

US fiiiliirc i n the Battlc of IMogadisliu this papcr concludes with sonic lessons that caii

bc learned from analyzing thc US fhilurc i n the Battle of Mogadishu

Discovery of Facts

lhe Discovery of facts must include a brief history of why lask Force Itanger

was callcd to Somalia and what happcnctl on 3-4 October The prc-tleploymcnt history

providcs a context for what happenctl during the actual raid I t describes some of thc

policy decisions that inatlvertcntly lctl to the 1111 tlcploymcnt It rccounts the UNs

unsuccessful attcinpts to capture Aitlectl the use of AC- 130s and their withdrawal thc

cscalatioii of violence by both sidcs and the NCAs decision to send IYR Ihc tlelailctl

tlcscription orthc iictual biittle is ncccssaty to understand the timing ofevciits iis they

rclate to the ability of additional tanks and APCs to have prcventcd faailurc ofthc inission

The battle narrative also serves the purpose of illuminating various critical failures

Why Task Force Itanger Was Called to Somelir

American involvcinent in Soindia goes back long beforc 1993 Bcforc Soinaliii

had hccome ii fiictionalizcd fai lctl s t a u tlominatetl by clan-based competing warlords the

United Slates hilt1 supported the former dictator Siad Darre whom Aitlectl had

succcssliilly ovcrlhrown i n 109 I

5

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

lsquoThe IJS gave relatively little attention to Somalia until I902 when the htniian

suffering brought on by 18nninc and lighting became headline news Amcrican was

focused on dcfcating Iraq i n the Gulf War and on dealing with the allcriiiath of this

tlcfcat lrsquohc 1JS was inorc concerned with executing Operation Provide Comlbrt i n

Nortlicrn Iraq adtlrcssing tlic potcntial nuclear thrcat i n North Korcu tleciding its role i n

tlic formcr Yugoslnvia ilcciding what NAlrsquoOrsquos role should be i n the post-Cold War cra

and using the Gulf War as ii catalyst to bring about an improved peace agrccment in the

Middlc Eastrdquo

On 4 May 1993 the United Nations Operation Somalia I1 (UNOSOM 11) took ovcr

responsibility liom IJNIrsquoIrsquoAI~lJNOSOM 11rsquos niiindatc included the ambitious task of

nation building while UNITAF had only heen rcsponsiblc for providing the conditions

necessary Tor the tliskibution of humanitarian aide UNOSOM was unprepared in both

organization ind force Icvcls to asslime the mission i t wiis given undcr IJNSCLZ ti814

lJNOSOM II had less combat power to impose its wi l l on the warlords antl its starfwils

new antl undcrmanncd Furtherniorc planning coordination iiiid implcmenhtion woultl

bc more difficult since not all the forces had worked together Yet IJNOSOM I I under

Ambassador Jonathan Howc and Lieutenant General Cevic Hir embarked upon ii path that

would lead them into direct conllict with Aidccd ii confrontation that the UNITAF

leaders Ambassador Robert Oakley iind Lieutcnmt General Robert Johnston had felt

wise to avoid cvcn with their larger rorce and unilied commancirsquoJ

lsquoIlsquocnsionbegan to increase alinost immediatcly between UNOSOM I I and

Aitlcctlrsquos Somalia National Alliance (SNA) Ambassador I-lowc U N Special

Representative for 1JNOSOM I I and hiuncl sclccted by National Security Advisor Anthony

0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

Lake Tor tlic posilion tried to isolate and inarginalizc Aicieed from tlic start This was i n

contrast to tlic cngagenicnl policy o r Ambassador Oaklcy Aitlced incrcasingly fclt that

I-lowc antl tlie IJN could not he Irusteci to he fair hrokcrs becausc of their policy ol

iiiarginalizatioii of him and unfair iin~~leiiiei~talion lieorlhc Adtlis Abaha I1 Accorcls

uscd Radio Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the IJN Among other things Iic

claimed thal the U N had become Somalias ncw colonists iind incited liis lbllowcrs to

rcsist the UNs nation building attcmpls

Concerned with Aitlecds vitriol Licutcnant Gencral Bir tlircctctl sonic of his siafl

lo dcvelop some options as to how to shut down Aitleetls radio station Wiih civilian

Somali spics throughout UNOSOM 11Iicadquarters il is likely that Aitlcctl knew tlic U N

was making plans lo harm his organization So wlien Pakistani Iorccs on shorl notice

arrivcd on 5 June 1993 to conducl authorized arms inspections at tlie SNA arms cache

collocatcd at tlic radio station mdother locations Aidcctl may havc helicvcd that thc

Pakistanis wcre there to shut down his radio station ii major sourcc of liis power1xAs ii

rcsult of lhcsc fcars a desire to conliant thc (IN or both Aideed ordcred liis SNA Ibrccs

to conduct a scries orcoordinatcd attacks againsl tlic Pakistanis I n thesc actions

Aitleeds forccs killctl 24 antl wountletl 57 Pakistani lroops and woundcd one Italian antl

lhree Amcrican soldiers

On 6 Junc 1003 the Unitcd Nations Security Council unanimously piisset1

Resolution 837 which hasically dcclared war on Aidcctl in all hut nanic lhc rcsolulion

callcci for the invesligation and prosccution of lhc intlivitluals rcsponsihlc ror the

Iakistani amhushcszl lJNOSOM 11 had thus transitionctl rrom ils ncutral role i n peiicc

cnforccmeni to taking sides and fighting a counter-insorgency campaign2 IN

7

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

Ambassador Madelcinc K Albright i n consultation with Anthony (Tony) Lakc iiiid

Ambassador Howc hastily drew up the rcsolution GEN Colin Powell was not

consultetl21 The National Security Council principals ncvcr discussed thc policy

implications of this resolution for US involvcnicnt i n Somaliirsquo4 The resolution woultl

hasically commit US forccs to fighting ii couiitcr-iiisurgcncy2rsquo

Even so Howc had the choice of how to implemcnt the resolution since Aidccd

was not nicntionetl by natnc i n the resolution The day afkr the 5 June 03 SNA ambush

oflhe Pakistanis Howc began lobbying his old boss Anthony Iakc Irsquorcsitlcnt Clintonrsquos

National Security Advisor for the Dclta Force to bc sent to capture Aitleeti I Ic

originally envisioned a sinall forcc that woultl deploy secrctly i d capture Aidceti while

hc wiis still out in the opciirdquorsquo Failing to get Pentagon support for Dclta on 12 Iuiic 1903

Howc and Bir attcniptcd to destroy Aideedrsquos capabilities through thrcc days ollsquoAC- 1301-1

AH- I hclicopter attacks and QIlF raids on his acknowledgctl and iinacknowlctlgctl

weapon storagc sites chop shops containing thirty ldquotec~inica~srdquordquoaiid radio sta~ionrsquoldquo lsquorhc

1JSsupplicd the asscis and support to conduct thcsc attacks

This phase of military operations against the SNA cndetl on 17 lime I993 when

another significant escalation occurred 1lcrc [JNOSOM I1 mounted ii major C~rly

morning cordon and scarch opcration that ncarly resulted in the capture of Aitlccd lsquoIlsquoIic

SNA warlord escaped by having his forccs conduct ii diversionary attack on the

pcriinetcrrsquordquo SNA conductcd p x t of the attack froin Digfer Hospital a suspected hut

undeclared SNA weapons storagc site UNOSOM I I forccs rclurned fire on thc SNA

snipers on top oftlic hospital But in doing so lJNOSOM 11tlamagcd its own Icgitimacy

8

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

in the cycs of thc intcrnational press Press covcragc of the collateral damage koni thc

USsupplicci AC-I 30s trsctl in tlic operation led to the gunships recall liom tlicatcr

Alter failing to capturc Aideetl on 17 lune 1003 Howe with the concurrence of

Licutenant General Rir Force Commanclcr UNOSOM 11 and his dcputy and

Commancicr of USForces Somalia Major General Thonias Monlgomcry postctl a

twenty-five thousand dollar rcwml for information leading to the capture o f Aitlectl In

rctrospcct the reward had Ihc opposite cflcct to that which i t was inlcntled to have SNA

mcnibcrs considered the UN rcward an insult hccause i t was so small The reward

reinforced what Aidccd told his clan members the IJN was interrering in Somalias

internal struggle Instead of weakening Aideed the sniiill rcwartl furihcr unilicd Somali

support for Aidccd Ihc USs rcdcployment of tlic AC-I~OI-IScffcctively gave Aitlccti

another victory fhe IJS had i n effect backctl down hy removing its biggcst and most

fcarcd wcqon

Without lhe psychological and military cffect orlhc AC- IBOI-ls Howe decidctl

that UNOSOM I I forccs should keep a low profile in Mogadishu and wait to scc the

cfficct of his award Mcanwhile llowc continued to lobby his contacts i n Washington

DC for Delta lo he scnt

Many critics of UNOSOM 11s pcrformance believe that I-lowe mndc ii inistakc by

pillling a small rcwartl on Aided s hcad and then waiting to see the impact ofthis

reward Instead critics contend that Howc should have uscd his position o f strength aflcr

conducting tlic impressive 17 June 1993 cordon autl search mission lo get Aitlcctl lo

negotiate Aitlecd wiis on the run and fccling the pressure of [NOSOM 11 I-Ic had lost

ii signilicanl amount of his inns and wiis afraid of the AC- 130s

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

Instead UNOSOM I I forccs hunkcrcd down and waitcd for the reward to produce

Aidecd Thc clusivc wiirlord for his part bccainc more aggrcssive as UNOSOM

remaincd more passivc UNOSOM bccame so focused on capturing Aidced that it wiis

not ithlc to focus on its political reconciliation tasksrdquo UNOSOM I I had cffcctivcly

bccomc isolatcd i n southern Mogadishu Ry thc bcginning of July Aidced had startcd to

incrcasc tlic numhcr of aggressive actions ambushes vchicular mines hclicopter atlacks

rocket propelled Grenatlc (RPG) rounds fircd and mortar rounds fircd3ldquo

While UNOSOM IIcommanders waitcd thcy fiiced ini unity of enbrt problem

with thcir contributing nations Italy and Irsquoakistan two ofthe largcst contributors to

lJNOSOM 11 wcrc satislicd with thc amount or retribution paid to thc SNA

Disagrccmcnt ovcr the largely 1JS and Boutros Houlros-(hali sopportcd hun t Ibi Aidcctl

prcvcntcd UNOSOM I I kom achicving the ncetlcci unity ofcommaoci and cffort Italian

forces ultiinatcly macle separatc pciicc with Aidccd and the SNArdquo

Howc rcjcctcd thc idea of any rcsolution i n Somalia iiiclutling a criminal like

Aideecl So I-lowc continucd in his efforts to seek atltlitioiial forces to capture Aidccd or

to tlcstroy his organization with thc forces that wcrc available to him When thc dccisioii

to scntl lsquoTIK to Somalia wiis first discusscd i n Junc 93 Ambassador I-Iowc advised tlic

National Coniniand Authority (NCA) that thc spccial operations forcc had a nincty

pcrcent chance of capturing Gciicral Aitlcctl Ambassador llowcrsquos asscssnicnt wiis bascd

upon thc situation at that time Aitlccd was not i n hiding iuid lJNOSOM I1 had not

attcmptctl to capture him So Howc believcd that ii small spccial opcrations un i t coultl

hnvc casily conciuctcd a covert night opcriition to ciipturc ii sleeping and unsuspecting

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

Aidced Iowcll antl I loar resistcd any such deploymcnt and were supportctl hy tlic

White ~~otisc

I n tlic meantime I lowc thought hc had a chancc to eliminatc thc most radical of

Aitlceds clan wliilc they mct in an SNA lieadquarters building known as tlic Abtli I-lousc

on 12 July 1903 SNA modcrates wcrc supposctl to hc mceting at it tliffcrcnt building at

thc same timc Without any prior warning Cobra helicopters fircd 1 1 TOW missiles

into the building and killed hetwccn 20 and 2 IS iccording to tlic International Rctl

Cross

This UNOSOM I1 escalation had a numbcr of tniintcntled consequcnccs First i t

caused tlic Italians to tlircaten to ptiI1 out of IJNOSOM11 Sccontl instcad ordcstroying

Aidccds organization it grcatly strcngthencd it Clan motleralcs and inlcllcctuals who

had supportctl a negotiatcd settlcmcnt with UNOSOM 11 werc now firmly behind Aitlccd

against [JNOSOM II42 lliird the SNA incrcascd its combat opcrations against llic U N

specifically Americans fhus tlic attack against tlic Abdi Housc was a major turning

point ror lJNOSOM 11antl tlic next slcp in the cscalation that would lcad to thc

deploymcnt ofIFR

By 8 August I003 it was cvitlent that tlic SNA wcre focusing its attacks on

Americans Aitleed had successfiilly uscd coiniiiantl-dctonatctl mines to Iti II fouI

SNA command tlclonatetl niincs woundcd rbur more Americans on I 0

August 1093 Iwo days latcr on 21 August 1993 (EN Iowcll callcd Secretary Aspin

and reluctantly recoinmcnded that the TFR he sent to Somalia Powcll wiis reluctant to

scnt ITR bccause lic undcrstood tlic risk involvcd i n conducting such mission Iowcll

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0

felt that somcthing had lo be donc given thc incrcasing casualtics inllictcd hy ihc SNA

With Powclls opposition liltcd approval was swilt

Aspin concurrcd along with Warrcn Christopher cind Anthony Lake When Iakc

notified Prcsidcnt Clinton tlic next clay ahout the tleploymcnt hc did not ol+xt Aspin

however urgcd Ilowell] that at the samc timc tlic visihility ofthe USclfbrt shoul~lI)c

reduc~d~~Iowell intcrpretcd this to incaii that WIl should bc kept to the minimum

force required This was the guidancc given to GEN Downing MG Garrison advisccl

GEN Downing that thc mission could he accomplishctl without thc AC- 130s and tlic

cxtra platoon for local sccurity MG Garrison had not rcquested lhc AC-130s during the

time hc had been in Somalia Sincc GEN Hoar w a s against thc dcployiiicnt lironi tlic

hcginning Iic atlvocnted sciiding only thc necessary forces rcquired to do the missioii --

no more no less Thc cxtra platoon for local security wiis outsitlc thc mission

rcquircments of Task Force Rsiiigcr hecausc local sccurity was thc responsibility of thc

A I I ics)

By thc tiiiic TFR wiis ortlercd to Somalia in the end or August 1093 tlic situiitioii

i n Mogadishu had cornpletcly changetl Aitlecd wiis i n hiding ant1 knew TFR wiis in

Mogadishu to capture him By soiiic accounts hc was moving every two hours changing

his nicans of trawl wearing disguises slccping at a dincrent locations cnch night 10

dcal with thc incrcased threat GEN Downing rcconimended a Iiirger forcc that iiicluded

thc deploycd TFR AC- I N S and an cxtra ground reaction platoon

When the National Coiiimintl Authority approved thc mission based upon tlic

recommendntion olGencrii1 Powell it did so with the undcrstanding that while TFR was

conducting a high-risk operation in trying to caplurc Aidcccl there was 110 possihility o f a

12

catastrophic failurerdquo lsquoIrsquohc NCA supporletl lhc continuation of the missions without a

serious rcasscssmcnt of risks alter each missionrdquo

What is apparent from this background narrative is that TFRrsquosdeploymcnl wiis thc

last i n a scrics ofstcps taken by 1he Clinton Administration to salvage the ambilious [JN

led iiiission i n Soiiialia The decision to deploy rsquoLlsquoFRhad its roots in the A(imiiiistrationrsquos

support of IJNSCR 1837 which all but called Tor Aidcccirsquos arrest by name for ambushiiig

the Pakistanis and in its dcsire to limit rcsources Tor the Somali prohlcm As UNOSOM

I I proved itself not up to thc task of confronting and capturing Aitlecd the

Atlniinistralion in the fiicc of increasing casualties tlccitlctl lo give lsquoIrsquoFR a try Thc major

policy problcm was that the TFRrsquos military actions were uiicoordinated wilh any

diplomatic cfforl And iis the nexl seclion ofthe paper will show the niililary force illonc

was loo litllc too late

What linppened on 3-4 October 199353

Ilaving discussed thc cvents leading up to the dcploymcnt o f WR it is time to

ctcscrihc the TFR raid itsclf specifically lhc cvcnls leading to thc successful Somali

attack on Crash Site 112 lsquoThetiming oTthc events is important to dctcrininc ifat1ditionil

tanks and APCs could have prevented Crash Sitc f12 Trom being over run and thus

prcclutlcd thc failure of the TFR mission Untlcrstnnding what happened is a prcrcquisitc

Tor dctcrmining the nature orthe failurc and identifying tlic critical failures

With oniinous forcshactowing i n late Scptcmhcr 1993 MG Garrison Commander

of Task Force Ranger predictcd ldquoIfwe go into the vicinity of tlic Bakara Market thcrcrsquos

no qucstion wcrsquoll win lhc gunfight But w c might lose the warrdquordquo

13

111 its scvcnlh raid sincc arriving in country on 26 August 1993 with the mission to

capturc Aidced TFR launched a raid on a building i n lhc heart ofldquolndian counlryrdquo lhree

niilcs from tlic TFli compound at the Mogaciishu airport and near thc Olympic Motcl i n

the vicinity ofthe siunc Bakara niarkct that Garrison knew posed a great thrcal lsquoLlsquoo

compcnsiitc for thc inhcrcnt risks of conducting a daylight raid in Aidccdrsquos own

backyard Garrison for the Iirsl time ldquoordcretl his A H 4 ldquolittlcbirdrdquo attack helicoplcrs to

carry rockets as well to shoo1 ilny threatcning Somali gunman rathcr than givc theni ii

chancc to surrender ltjatrsquoiison knew how fast the Soinalis had rcactctl lo his prcvious

six missions Ilc planned to fiirlhcr reducc risk by bcing on the large1 for only aboul ouc

Iioul speed equaled sccurityrdquorsquo

A1 I300 MG Garrison reccivcd actionablc intelligcncc llsquoroin ii Soninli agcnt lsquoIlsquohc

W R rsquo s spy rcported lhiit Aidcedrsquos licutcnants would bc inecting i n ii building on

I-lawlwadig Road a block over from the Olympic Hotel iicar the Hakara niarkct ii densely

populated SNA controllccl iirca The targcl house reinaincd under constant survcilliincc

vidco and photography by OH 58 helicoptcr a n d 1rsquo-3 Orion spy pliac ISTFR preparcd

llsquoor thc missionrdquo At 1540 two A H 4 gun ships flew ovcr the targct building for tlic f i n i d

check Innnediatcly altcr this four MI 1-6rsquos touched down close 10 thc building long

cnough for I6 dclta soldiers to jump off and assault the targel Two MH-60 hclicopters

droppcd o f f 3 0 inorc spccial operotions soldicrs to conduct close-in sccurity and assist the

assault team tivc inintiles latcr four inorc M11-60 hclicoptcrs carrying about sixteen

Kiingcrs c x h arrived lo provide outcr security Chalk Onc was Icd by 1lT Larry Irsquocrino

and CPlsquoT Mikc Slccle fast ropcd in at thc southcast road iiitcrscction closest to the targcl

building Chalk Two Icd by 111lsquo Tom I)iToinasso fast ropctl i n at the northeast road

14

intcrscction closcst to tlic target building Chalk Three led by SFlsquoC Sean Watson list

roped in on I-lawlwadig Road at thc southwest road intersection While still in thc

helicoptcr Chalk Four startcd to receivc lirc An RPG round cxploded iicar thc MI-I-00

Under tire SGT Matt Eversmann had his Chalk Four fast rope in about a block too Ihr

north oflsquoits intcntlcd drop point at the northwcst corncr road intcrscction One oflsquotlic

rangers (PFC Blackburn) in Chalk lour inisscd Ilic ropc and crashed to thc ground

Rangcrs starlctl rccciving firc almost immcdiatcly carlicr than in prcvious missions

The ground convoy let1 by LTC McKnight arrivcd iit the target building to load up

thc prisoncrs LTC McKnight ordcrcd that Blackburn he eviicuatcci back to Ixisc whicli

should haw been ii five-miiiutc drivc with a cargo llMMWV and two gun mountcd

I-IMMWVs to providc sccurityrsquos The column successfLilly fought through imhushcs lo

savc Blackburn but anothcr soldier (SGT Dominick Pilla) was killed i n thc process

Mcanwhile Chalk 4 had taken thrcc more casualtics in addition to Blackburn from the

growing iitiinbcr of attacking Somalis

Soon a h r Blackburnrsquos mcdical cvacuation convoy dcpiirtcci and the 24 prisoncrs

startcci to get loatlcci in LTC McKnightrsquos vchiclc convoy a MH-00 dcsignated Super 61

was shot clown at I620 by iiii RIrsquoG uid crashed about 300 yards from the targct Ihouse

Supcr 61 had just finishctl trying to providc firc support with its on board snipers whcn i t

was hit by thc RPG Half of I LT Dilrsquoomassorsquos Chalk Two and part of Chalk One Irsquoiin to

scctirc thc crash sitc During thc movcmciit scvcral wcre wountlctl ( I seriously - dies at

2027 at Crash Site I ) and onc was killed ILT DiTomassorsquos squad arrivctl at the crash

sitc just alter an M11-6 landctl iit Crash Site 111 to recover two woundctl i l l action (WIA)

the two pilots were killcd in the crash (onc ofthc WIA later dictl ofwounds) 11T

15

DiTomasso reestablished ii pcrimctcr around Supcr 61 to allow the woundcd to be

evacuated on the MH-6 and prevent Somalis fioni desecrating thc bodies o f the two dead

pilots Supcr 02 provided sccurity overhead Meanwhile at 1626 the Joint Operations

Center (lO()orcicrcd the ground rcaction force (GRFI) (LIC McKnight) to move with

the assault force and prisoncrs to Crash Site I to collect the rest ofhis unit and the

bodies of the dead pilols (CSAR Team DiIomassos Chalk CIT Steclcs Chalkantl

Dclta soldiers total about 90)

Super 68 arrived at Crash Site I at 1628 with the coinhat search and rcscuc

(CSAR) tcam I I I the process Supcr 68 was hit by an RPG antl returned iinmcdiatcly to

base Approximately 90 soldiers movctl to secure Crash Site I while the CSAR t c m

extracted only onc o f the dcaci pilots from the wreckage-the other could not hc rcmovetl

without additional equipment The Somalis continued to conduct persistent attacks on

the sccurity pcrimctcr while soldiers antl helicopters kept them hack until the rclicf

column arrived the next morning

At 1620 the 10th Mountain Quick Reaction Force (QRF) company was tlircctctl

to tlcpart the university compound antl conduct a link u p with TFR at thc airport To get

thcrc the QRI was ordered to take a long route to avoid SNA controlled areas This look

until 1724 nearly an hour

Mcanwhilc I TC McKnight began moving with his assault force prisoncrs antl

convoy to Crash Site t f l ahout 4 blocks away~ Although Crash Site I was only 300

yards away LICMcKnight had not seen where the lirst hclicoptcr had gone clown and

nccded the assistance of the P3 Orion to direct the convoy to Crash Site I to secure the

rest of his force Bcforc hc could get to the first crash site the Somalis uscd R I G S to

16

shoot down a third liclicopter Supcr 04 as i t orhited to provide firc support for Crash

Site 111 At 1640 Super (14crashcd about a half-mile south oTCrash Sitc f f l Ihc two

pilots and crcwmcmhcrs survivcd thc crash and procccdcd to sct up security i n tlic hopc

that help would soon arrivc

Now McKnight was dirccted to rcscue thc soldicrs at Crash Sitc 2 aftcr

completing the sanic (ask at Crash Sitc H I lhis may sccin casy hy thc distanccs alone

bu t McKniglit was receiving timc-dcliiyctl dircctions Itom the P-3 when seconds

countcd I-lc was not able to talk directly to the 13 crcwmemhcr giving tlircctions As ii

rcsult Iic kcpt missing the corrcct turn Furthcr complicating tlic routc to tlic Crash Sitc

1 was the fact that thc P3 was giving him dircctions that would help him avoid various

roadhlocks tlic ShA and Somalis werc cmplacing 111 addition McKnight had not told

any or his other drivcrs wherc tic was going so that ifthe lcad vchiclc got hit tlic convoy

couki coiitinucs

Codusing late tlircctions wcrc compoundcd by stcady pcrsistcnt altaclts Igtythe

Somalis with rifles and RPGs -- cspccially when thc coiivoy crossctl any road

intersection Fog and Liiction wcrc directly impacting on mission ~cconipl~sliment Aftcr

45 minutes ofwandcring through thc hostilc strccts of the SNA McKnight ciided up - ill

liiorit olthc Olympic I lotcl with too riiany casualties and too many dunaged vcliicles to

successfully rcach either crash site This convoy would finally makc it back to the

airfield with ninny woundetl Iour killcd in action (KIA) and thrce Somali prisoncrs

killcd

By the limc McKnights convoy was ordered back to the airport (about 1715 ) an

ad lioc ground reaction force (GRF2) (consisting of twenty-scven rangcrs two 5-Toii

17

trucks antl six HMMWVs) had movcd out from the airport to sccure Crash Sitc 2 -

Supcr 64

As GKF2 Icd by SSG Struckcr dcparted the compound at 1703 it was

immediately unbushcd Thc GRF2 rought through and tricd various roulcs to makc it to

Crash Sile 112 An earthen berm blockcd thc first routc At 1720 a burning tire obstacle

and Soniali ambush prcvcntcd thc GRF2 from reaching Crash Sitc 2 Thc rangers of

CiIlF2 had goltcn close enough for thcm to scc onc orthc helicoptcr smoldering on I hill

Without any arinor thcy could not light through the ambush Whilc trying to lind still

anothcr routc GRF2 met up with GRFI just north ofK4 circlc on Via I x n i n Afler cross-

loading casualtics from GRFI to GRF2 vehicles and destroying onc ofthc GRFI disabled

cargo NMMWVs with inccntliary grcnatlcs both tlic GKls were orclered back lo thc

airport

IMeanwIiile at 1727 a fourth helicopter Super 02 was hit with ii RPG and crash-

landed at New Port Thc C Company QRF which had ciirivecl at thc IFR compound at

1710 was briefed on its mission to secure Crash Site K and a1 1735 movctl ou t to do so

Within tcn niinutcs the QIIF got in its first fire fight south of 1lt4 circlc At 1810 thc

QRF rcporlcd that i t was pinncd down at K4 circlc By 1830 thc QRF was ortlcred to

rcturn to TFR compound

By this time it made sense to regroup and miikc it dclibcratc plan to rcsctic thc

soldicrs at Clash Sitc I I Crash Site 2 had already been ovcr run by Somalis By niic

rcporters account thc hclicoptcr crcw antl two Special Forccs snipers SIC Ilandy

Shughart antl MSC Gary Gordon wcre able to keep the Somalis at bay for about twn

hours Givcn Gordon and Shugharl wcrc placcd down by Super 6 2 ten miiiutcs bcforc it

18

was shot down it 1727 (rash Site l i2 was secure unt i l around 1917 Another reporter

who believes that Shughart and Gordon secured the sight for only 20 minutes contradicts

this timing That incans Crash Site 2 was over run at 1707 i t you use as a gauge whcn

Super 62 was shot down Given the extraordinary efforts TFR antl the QRF made to

sccure Crash Site 2 i t is unlikely that tlie QRF would have bccn rccallcd herore Clash

Site 2 was overrun Therefore i t appears morc likcly that tlie second crash site wiis over

run closcr to 1737 than 1917 sincc tlic QKl was recallcd bcforc 1017

Given the multiple unsuccessftil altcmpts lo rcscuc tlic soldiers in Crash Sites I

and 2 and desiring that no morc casualtics he taken MG Montgomery tlirccted Brigadier

General Giles to develop I deliherate rclicf plan Whilc tlic plan was heing put togcthcr

onc othcr soldier dicd of aountls rcccivcd wliilc moving to Crash Sitc I This dcliberatc

rclicf effort woultl include ahout 70 vcliicles -- Pakistani tanks Malaysian APCs S-ton

trucks and HMMWVs By tlic time the reliefcolumn had complclctl its mission at 0700

the next morning two more Americans would die and scvcral morc would be woundcd

Iliis antiseptic description docs not cxprcss the incredihlc stress dangcr and

rangc olcmotions cxpcricncctl by tlic participants llic purposc of this description is not

LO extol tlic hriivcry oltlic individual participants If it were thcrc is niiicli tliat could be

written about i t Tlic narrativcs purpose is instead to recotint tlic cvcnts that arc

important to understanding at what point in the hattlc ktilurc occurred and wlicthcr

enough time was available [or additional tanks antl APCs to have prevented that failure

Tlic Nature of the Failure

I laving described the cvcnts leading to tlie deployment oflFR and the actual

events of tlie raid i t is time to analyzc these events to determinc tlic nature ofthc failurc

I9

In ordcr to do this it is necessary to dctcrniine wliiit actions should havc hcen tiikcn it

each level for something othcr than failure to be acliicvctl llctcrmining thesc actions will

Icaci to undcrstiinding the ovcriill military failurc so that this can bc ftlrthcr aiialyzed to

dctcrininc thc spccilic critical lapses that occurrctl

Ovcrall the Battle oTMogadishu is considered a failure bccausc iinagcs of an

Amcrican prisoncr o r war (POW) tclcvised pictures of dcad soldiers bcing dragged

through thc strcets of Mogadishu and tlic high numbcr or casualties highlightcd tlic

Clinton Administrations lack of a coherent policy in Somalia Ihe lack of ii viable

stratcgy for Somalia was further reinforced to Congress when Secretary Aspin and

Secrctary Christopher briefed them in tile aflcrmath or tlic battle In thc end this

unanticipated inlensc battle rcsultcd i n Prcsident Clinton announcing an early pullout of

US support for (JNOSOM 11 regiirdlcss olwhcther or not the UNOSOM I 1 objcctivcs

had heen achicved Although scrious policy failurcs had a part i n IFRs disproportionate

clTcct on tlic fate of U S policy toward Somalia tactical antl operational dccisions had an

cqually important role in what happcnctl during the baltle There wcrc opportunities at

tliesc lcvcls to havc chuigeti tlic end rcsult of tlic Battle of Mogadishu antl tlius the

ovcrall failurc ofthe 1jS policy in Somalia

Txtically onc ciin arguc that i t was ii success TFR succcssfully capturcd 24

suspectcd supporters olAidecti including some olhis Lieutcnanls I n the light to S C C L I ~ C

two helicopter crash sites i t had significantly Imrt Aideeds warfighting ability by killing

300 - 1000 of Aitlccds militia nien antl wounding about ii 1000 niorc The cost Ibr TFR

and tlic 10th Mountain QRF was I X tlcad 78 woundcd I POW five downed M11-00s

and nunicrous daniagcci vehicles

20

Ancr thc 3-4 Octohcr I993 battlc with TF Ranger iind the 10th Mountain QRF

Aitlcctl called a tinilatcral ceasc-lire According to LTG Anthony Zinni who met with

Aidccd and his militia Icaders soon alter thcy were visihly shaken by the incidcnt antl did

not want thc fighting to continue Thcy had hiid cnoughrdquo This suggests that the Hattlc

of Mogadishu provided tlic US an cxcellent opportunity to ticclare victory and to coinpcl

Aidceci cooperatc with UNOSOM 11 Instead Clinton chosc to build up troops sct a

dcadline to gct out ( I Mar 94) give thc 1JN a chance to ncgotiate 21 political scttlemcnt

and avoid furtlicr inilitiiry conlrsquorontationsrdquo This option would havc tlic appearance of

strength and rcsolve (morc troops) but would in rcality cut losses by pulling out in four

months I t basically xlmittctl that Somiilia was a failctl policy

Opcrationiilly tlic Task Forcc Kangcr raid could bc consitlcrcd ii fdu re Thc

national policy for Somalia was to keep prcssure on Aidcetl with lsquoWR whilc seeking I

political solution at thc same timc the intcnt of the policy WIS not to cscalate tlic conflict

but to limit causalitics Tlic Inorc casualtics US forces rcceived in Sonialia the grcatcr

tlic Congressional cry to pull out of Somiilia The problcm was that Sccrctary Aspin

failed to communicatc this dual approach for dcaling with Aitlecd to TFR through tlic

JCS antl CINCCENT

But at what point in tlic battle did the mission llsquoail Was it the number of

Anicricaii soldiers killctl imtl wountlcd Was it the numbcr of Amcrican hclicopters shot

downlsquo How many casualties would haw liccn considcrctl acccptable Was the imagc of

the bodics of dead soldicrs bcing dcsecratcd on nationd television Was i t thc imagc of ii

capturcd and beatcn Army pilot on national television symbolic ollsquothc missionrsquos fiilurc

21

TFR would havc heen consicicrctl a success had it not contiuctctl the 3-4 October

mission and hatl Ambassador Howc successfiilly ncgotiated a ccasc-fire with Aidced

This was definitely achievahlc since Aictecti had sent mnncrotis messagcs thd he was

willing to ncgotiatc TFR had been succcssfiil i n applying pressure to Aideetl and his

SNA organization

IFK would lave achicvcd siiccess had Ilic 3 October raid bccn conduckit with no

hclicoptcrs bcing shot down Had no helicoptcrs bccii shot down TFR could havc

cxtractctl tlic 24 Somali prisoners incrcascd thc pressurc on Aideetl to ncgotiatc with tlic

UN probably lost lcss than six soldicrs and reccivcd far less prcss covcrage The sciiii-

covert iialurc of tlic opcration would havc limited tlic ncgativc prcss and thus prcventctl

a policy crisis for the Clinton Administration

TFR could have achicvcd limited SLICCCSS at a higher cost had only thc first

helicoptcr crashcd In this case fivc to seven morc soldicrs might havc been killctl

tlepcnding on whcther the G W I would have found Crash S ik I and been able to cxtract

thc pilots body without the hclp olthc 10th Mountain Division QRF Again the scmi-

covcrt naturc of tlic operatioii would have limited thc ncgative press and thus prcvcntctl

it policy crisis Tor the Clinton Adminislration

IbX could cven havc achicvcd an even morc limitcd siicccss altcr the second

hclicoptcr craslicd hatl GRFI lhc sccond GRF or tlic Qlil heen ablc to securc the sitc

hcfore it was overrun This would have prcvcntcd the Sonialis from capturing thc

Amcriciin pilot and dcsccratiiig bodies of thc killcd soldiers at Crash Site 2 Both or

thcsc events as carried into the homes of millions of Aincricans shocked an

unsuspecting public mid Coiigrcss into rcalizing that the environment i n Somalia had

22

changed tlramatically lsquofhe last time most Amcrican hcard news of Somulia i t wiis that

tlic 1JS was lcading an effort to stop a famine Sccing Amcricans bcing abusctl by thcsc

same Somalis caused cvcryonc to question what had happened to changc tlic situation so

drastically

Operationally thc TFR mission hccanie a near coniplctc fiilurc when the second

hclicopter crash site could not bc sccurcd antl was ovcrrtin This allowcil the Somalis to

use ttic captured pilot antl dcad bodies as a political weapon With the help ollsquotlic news

media what had becn intended is a covcrt opcration would be under thc scrutiny of the

nation and world

Stratcgically tlic TFK mission was a Igiliirc bccause tlic Clinton Administration

did not liavc a coliercnt policy for Somalia The Administration had failctl to gain

Congrcssional support for its strategy to go altcr Aidcctl I t 1iid failctl to cxplairi to thc

American public why we supported a policy that marginalized thc warlords i n gcncral

and Aidced in parlicular It had failcd to sell its policy for hunting Aidccd to tlic

American public As a result America and Congress wcre shocked at the levcl of

violcncc the US forces wcrc involvctl in Any possibility to tiikc advantage of tlic

tacticill victory was lost at this lcvcl in tlic days following tlic raid

lsquoIrsquohislack o fn colicrcnt policy becinnc cvidcnt to congrcssional menilicrs wlicn

Aspin and Cliristophcr bricfed thcm immcdialely following ttic 3 Octobcr raid Aspin

basicilly solicitcd congressional mcmbers for idcas of where to go next They wcrc

complctcly unimprcssed with Aspinrsquos imd Cliristoplicrrsquos command of thc policyrdquorsquo lsquoLlsquohis

unimpressive performance made Congress wen niorc skeptical about tlic ability of tlic

Atlministration to Ibrniulitc a coliercnt policy i n Somalia

23

With no cohcrcnt stratcgy Tor ii long-tcrm solution in Somalia thc Clinton

Administration would havc had ii difficult sell to Congrcss iuid the American public to

reinforcc Somalia sufficiently to iniposc ordcr to thc level achicvetl undcr UNITAF

Public opinion polls only supported the tcmporary incrcase i n forccs in Somalia With

Scnator Rohcrt C Byrtl (Igt-WV) calling for U S troops to be piillctl out by I Deccmhcr

1993 Prcsidcnt Clinton iiccomplishcd all he could iii kcepiiig US liorccs i n Somalia until

the cnd of March 19947s In atltlilion with a large Bosnia commitmcnt lurking over the

horizon tlic Administration rcalizetl that tlic Somalia effort would rcquirc f i r greater

resotirccs tlian thc lJSs liinitcd intcrcsts varrantcd

lhc overall naturc ofthe failurc it tlic stratcgic level is onc of policy TIic Clinton

Atlministration nevcr clcarly articulatctl a cohercnt policy Tor Somalia to Congress or the

American pohlic Ihc Administration attemptctl to achieve success i n Somalia tising in

almost cxclusivcly military solution to iiti inherently political problem Evcniually thc

Atlniinislration rcalizetl that ii more tliplomatic approach was ncccssary hut it did not

changc its orders o r guidance to lhc commanders in thc licltl

lhe iiatiire of tlic failure at tlic tactical and operational levels was that the capturc

or Aideeds licutcnants was accomplislicd with an unacccptablc cost i n litiman lire

casualtics ant1 bad prcss Thc Atiininistratioiis intciit was lo contluct tlic mission with

minimum ciisualtics on hoth sidcs and as discretely as possible llic raid hilctl to

accomplish the Administrations intent of a low-cost tliscrctc opcration

All tlic critical lapses discussctl in thc ncxt section arc related to the policy

coortlination failurc at the stratcgic level or to thc tinacccptablc casualty rates and public

24

exposure at tactical Icvcl I-lad railurc been avoitlctl at either of these levels overall

failure coultl have been avoitlcd

Critical TaskdCritical Iapscs

All the critical lapses that resulted i n tlie overall failure oftlie Battle of

Mogadisliu can bc catcgori7cd into fivc broad areas command control conimunications

and coordination unclerstandiiig the enemy nct assessment allocation ofresourccs and

leading and planning All these calegorics except ldquonet assessmentrdquo should be sell-

cxplanatory Net assessment is the overall untlcrstanding ollsquohow cnemyrsquos plan iuid

capabilities match up wit11 tlic friendly forcersquos plan and capabiliticsrsquox Tlicsc categories o l

critical liipscs occurred at varying cicgrces at the strategic operational and tactical Icvcls

Thc purpose oftliis sectioii is to discuss what the specific critical lapses wcrc and

why they arc considered critical hi general all these critical lapses contributed to the

overall nature ofthc fdllsquo I urc

Part oftlie policy failure was causcd by a critical lapse i n coordination

Spccilically Secretary Aspin niiidc a critical error in not iiillsquoorining MG Garrison through

the JCS uid CINCXENT that the National Security Council (NSC) hatl dccitled that the

primary stratcgy would be lo seek a diplomatic solution with Aitleeci Since the greatcst

SLICCCSSwould have bccn achieved hatl the raid not occurred calling olfthc mission

entirely would have resulted i n tlic highest level of success Failure could have been

avoided had the NCA inforiiictl Garrison that the snatch operation was in support of tlic

Aidccd negotiations and therefore that he should limit inission risk as niticli iis possible

This would have been the reasonable cotirsc of action to take givcn tlic NSCrsquos consensus

decision at tlie end ollsquoScptcnibcr 1903 lo seek negotiation with Aidcctl (which Aidccd

25

wanted because of the prcssurc rsquoIrsquoFR had put on him) antl to simultancously try to capturc

him to keep (tic pressure on him to negotiate Irsquorcssure could have becn kept on him hy

continuing thc numerous profilc flights that kept liini on the move cvcry twro Iioursrsquordquo

Had Aspin appreciatcci the possibility of catastrophic failure iii the mission Aspin coulcl

have rccommcndetl to tlic NSC that real missions be hcld i n abcyance while kceping

profile flights going Aspiii might hwe rcalized thcsc incrcasctl risks i f he or is stalSlsquoliatl

been more closcly monitoring each mission^ Finally Sccrctary Aspin could liavc

rcquestcd a Ibrmal policy review to rcussess tlic overill policy heforc the 3 Octobcr raidldquo

lsquoIrsquohcnext lcvcl of succcss could have bcen achieved had no hclicoptcrs hccn shot

down To prevent any of its hclicoptcrs lioiii being shot down TIrsquoR ncecletl to

undcrstantl thc cnemy threat Hascd upon the previous wcckrsquos downing ofa UI1-60

Ilying 130 knots rooliop levcl it night i t was clcar that UH-60s wcre vulncrablc to RPG

fircsrdquo During the sixth raid on 2 I Septcniber 1093 that captured Osman Atto about

liftcen IltIrsquoGs wcre fircd on W R hclicoptcrshrsquo lsquoThisincant that the Somalirsquos were trying

to attack the TFR helicoptcrs lsquollicreforc TFR ncccicd to protect thc helicopters thc best

they could TFR apparently did not apprcciatc tlie SNA capabilities or ovcrcstiiiiatcd its

own for n critical lapsc i n net asscssmcnt

lsquolrsquohcsc lapscs i n iinclcrstaiiding tlic cncmy antl iict assessment Icd to the next

critical lapsc in leading and pliinning TFR failcd to tlcvclop a pliin and cxccutc an

operation that protcctccl its tactical dccisive point -- its hclicoptcrs MH-00 tlic most

vulncrablc helicoptcr was kept in orbit within Soniali RPG rangc for forty minutes

(1 540-1620) aftcr tlie initial assuilt antl security forces wcre movcci into the target area

While tlic ground force was coming under sporadic fire no crisis existed on tlic ground

26

that rcqtiircci MI-1-60sto bc used iii thc ground support rolc Al-1-6s with mini-guns or

MH-6s with snipcrs could havc heen iiscd instcatl if necessary MH-6s ant1 AH-6s arc

much smaller fitstcr niorc niancuverablc and would have bccn much more difficult for

thc Somalis to hit with ItPCis

Aner the first MI-1-60 went down four blocks from the targct building there wiis

another chance to avoid catastrophic failure Evcn though Mci (iarrison knew hc liad

only onc CSAR team and a coiitingcncy plan for only one hclicoplcr going down he

pcrsistcci i n putting the RPG-vulnerablc M 11-60 i n harm way to support tlic ground force

and CSAR team at Crash Site I (Supcr 61) although MH-6 and AH-0s with mini-guns

rockcts and snipers wcrc available

Supcr 64 was shot down twelvc minutes aflcr Super 68 (CSAR) wiis shot and

damaged inserting thc CSAR tcam at Crash Sitc t f l TFK fiiletl to adapt its tactics to the

threat thcy wcrc facing Two weeks aftcr Sonialis tricd to shoot RPGs i it the hclicoptcrs

on Osniim Atto a wcck aftcr thc 10th Mountain Divisions IJ I 1-60 was shot down with

RPGs wliilc Ilying 130 knots roonop lcvel at night one hour altcr ItIGs are spoltctl iintl

nearly hit tlic insertion birds twenty minutes aftcr Super 61 is shot down twclvc miinites

altcr Super 68 is shot down and yct Super 64 is still flying i n range of ItlGs Why was

therc no immcdiatc action by M11-00s to gct out of RPG range wlicn they first ciinie

under RPG fire or when one MH-60 got shot down Supcr 68 had to conduct tlic risky

insertion of thc CSAR tcam Alter this insertion however cvitlcnce suggcsts that thcrc

wiis not any ininicdiate action drill to movc the othcr Mtl-60s out of RPG range

I I X could hiivc planncd it more succcssliil mission with its available rcsourccs

As mentioned earlier i t was a planning error not to anticipate that Aideetl would focus his

27

IWGs on thc largcr slowcr less nianeuvershlc Mtl-60s Thcrc wcre scvcral plimning

crrors madc concerning the nccd to protcct this tlecisivc point hctter

I Icrc arc sonic additional actions that TFR could have planncd with its cxisting

rcsourccs to increase its chanccs Tor success First ifthc ncw threat had bccn

acknowledged TFR could hwc conligurcd ii second CSAR t c m to secure 21 second crash

sitc andor formctl another GRF that could have becn skinding by These actions could

havc prcvcntcd Crash Site 2 from bcing ovcrrun Sccontl Mclltnight could havc had thc

ability to spcak dircctly lo the EP-3 and avoid cotiftising tlirectivcs Third LFII could

havc coordinaletl for the QRF to be at thc airlield at all limcs and inclutlcd it in 1hc

contingency planning so that [hey could have eithcr Iiunichcd imnicdiatcly to Crash Sitc

112 bcforc thc SNA were ablc to rcact or been prc-positioned closcr to the targct iirca to be

rcady to secure the second crash site Given Crash Sitc 2 was securctl for at least one

hour by the crew and lhc two SF snipcrs and was less than tlircc milcs away from tlic

Mogadishu airport had thc QRF been hcltcr integrated inlo thc T r l l operation it is

possible that thc QRF could have sccurcd Crash Sile H2 hcforc it was ovcrrun

Even lhough it appcars that TFR had all lhc ncccssary resources to successfully

accomplish thc mission allocation o T resourccs still needs 10 bc consitlcrcd another

critical lapsc I lad AC- 130s bccn part of thc Lbrcc package that was sent to support TFR

il is less likely that MI-60s would havc bccn ncetletl to providc lire support imdthus

cxposc thetiisclves to RPG fires In this case thcrc might have bccn no losscs of MII-

60s But this would havc rcquired 7FR to change the way it operated It is rcasonablc to

bclievc that the AC-I 30s could haw provitletl adtlilional covcr for the MH-00s ilthey

still were needed to opcratc within RPCi range Rut it is unlikely tlvat thc AC-130 would

28

have heen ablc to cliniinate the thrcat from ground tirctl RPGs Ncverthclcss AC- 130s

would have reduccd thc likclihood that thc 1M1-1-60~ would havc bccn shot down

Even ifonc MH-60 had bccn shot down AC-I 30s could have bccn used to scct~rc

Crash Site Iwithout any hclp from MH-60s and tlius would hiivc prcvcnteti tlic Super

64 llsquorom hcing shot down The AC-I 3 0 could havc providcd supprcssivc lire that could

liavc prcvcnlcd thc Supcr (18CSAR hclicopter koin bcing Iiit

In addition AC- 130s coiild havc provided tlic dircct lirc support mid directioiis to

McKnightrsquos GRF to get dircctly to Crash Sitc I 1iiiisoii officers i i i thc AC-I 30s could

havc talkcd directly to I1rsquoCMcKnight without the time ticlay and confusion ollsquomulliplc

tlircctions going through tlic IOC first Using thc JOC iis an intermediary with dircctivcs

ciursctl conflision fius(ratioii and added casualtics lsquoIrsquohc AC- 130s could h w c providctl

the necessary fircpowcr to prevenl Somalis froni putling obslaclcs in thc way of

McKnightrsquos convoy and thus specdcd his arrival at Crash Site 1 bind rctluce casualtics

Even if Supcr 64 had been shot down as well thc AC-130s could have sccurcd the Crash

Sitc 112 for hours and givcn time for tlic GKFL GRF2 or the QRF to rcinrorcc and secure

thc crash sitc Hcrc too tlic AC- 130s could liavc sccurcd a routc For thcse reaction Ibrccs

to gct to the Crash Sitc 2 and prcventcd Somalis from coustructing obstxlcs AC- 130s

could havc cvcn givcn lsquoWR enough timc to get tank and Armorcd Pcrsonncl Carrier

(APC) supporl from thc Pakistanis and Malaysians

I lid Sccrctary Aspin approvcd thc requcst for four M I s and 14 M2s on tlic 27

Scptcniber 0 3 MG Montgoinery intciidcd to usc thcrn to augment the QRFrdquordquo This armor

could have been rcady to go on tlic 3 October raid ant1 would havc been uscdrdquoS Givcn

that the QRF wiis not actively incorporated into thc contingency planning for the TFR

niissions howcvcr it is unlikely that tlicsc arnior forccs would have Tlicrcforc likc tlic

QIIF thc armor force would have hatl to waslc ncarly an hour lo move l h n the

Ilnivcrsity compound to the airport and woultl have hatl littlc timc lelt to sccure tlic

secoiitl crash silc TFR would havc necded to incorporate thc armor team into its

contingency plans for it to hwe had a high probability ofsccuring Crash Site 142 in tinic

Had the AC-130s been availahlc however i t is likely that Crash Sitcs I ant1 112

could havc bccn sccurcd intlclinitcly This would have given the standard Q R F or

armorcd QRF cnough timc lo sccurc the sitcs and avert total failure

As stated above the lirst critical lapsc was ii lack of policy coordination

Although 1akc slated ldquoThe policy was never to stop lrying to get Aitlcedrdquo Aspin

undcrstooci that the ldquopolicy was lo niovc to more diploinah efforts but snatch Aitlcctl 011

thc side iIlsquo you lsquoIrsquohischange in policy was nevcr rclayed down to lsquoIlsquoFR With

negotiation bccotiiing tlic lead strategy Garrison might not have cvcii conduclctl tlic

high-risk mission cspccially i f hc knew hc hati known lie could have achicvcd succcss

simply by pressuring Aitlced and avoiding the highcst risk operations

The next critical lapsc was no1 undcrstanding the cncinyrsquos capability to shoo1

down TFR hclicoptcrs lsquofhis undercstinialion or the cncmyrsquos capabilities and the succcss

ofprcvious TFR missions Icd to tlic critical Iiipsc of net asscssmcnt lsquoIlsquolicsclapses in turn

led lo iiisufticicnt allocation of resources and planning

Iayered Aiinlysis

Now that all thc critical lhilurcs have becn addressed thc next stcp is lo conduct

layered analysis lsquollsquohis analysis will look at thrcc scparatc levels that impaclcd on the

ovcrall failurc ofthc Hattlc of Mogadishu The stnitcgic level includcs Irsquoresidcnt Clinton

30

his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake Secretary of Statc Warren Christopher

Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc Lcs Aspin antl CJCS Gcncral Colin Irsquoowell This lcvel inadc the

critical dccision to emphasize ii diplomatic solution to Somalia All playcrs at this lcvcl

knew or should have known itbout the change in policy yet this subtle policy change was

not convcycd to MG Garrison through CiEN Hoarrdquo

I t also wiis iit this level that force limilatioiis wcrc placed upon TFR iis ii result of

undcrcstimating tlic capabilities ofthc SNA and not recognizing the potentid for

catastrophic failure Colin Irsquoowll translatctl Lcs Aspinrsquos guidance of minimum footprint

i n Somalia to mean no AC-I 30s and no cxtra platoon even though tlic AC-130s would

not he stationed in Somalia Irsquoowcll was rcluctant to sent the AC-I 30s bcciusc the

collatcral damagc they caused had produced soinc had press covcriigchs Thc combination

of these two assets could have preventcd the ciitirc mission Ihin failing-if AC-I 30s had

bccn usccl for firc support instcad ofthe MI-1-00s This is also tlic levcl that MG

Montgomcryrsquos requcsl for four MI s and fourtccn M2s met with disapproval Although

thc Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc ultimately said no to the request bccausc it was counter to the

idministrationrsquos policy of drawing down 1JS prcsc~icc and Ictting the UK take the lead

Gcncral Coliii Powcll Gcncral I loar iind MG 1Montgomcry (lid iiot strongly argue for

iiecessity of having the tanks despite the h c t that thc sccurity in Mogadishu had cliangctl

so radically for thc worse lsquolhcy failcd to properly articulate the iicccssity Tor having

thcsc assets in Mogadishu Thc request did not give adcquatc justification for making iin

cxccption to tlrawtlown policy The reqiicst did iiot rclatc thc iieetl for armor to suppor~

for the TFR operation for which it would have been tisedrdquo) As tlic Scnatc rcport antl the

J C S study coiicludcd tanks may have hccn hclpful but not decisive i n preventing the

31

fiiilurc of tlic mission Failure to propcrly rcsoiircc MG Garrison with tlic AC- 130s antl

an extra platoon and MG Montgomcry with tlic MIS ant1 M2s may have resultcci in tlic

ovcrall hilure in tlic mission

Prcsident Clinton did not conduct an ovcrall policy rcview with the Principals of

thc NSC until after the 3 October raid A coniprehensivc policy rcvicw could have

rcvicwcd the incrcasctl risks to TFR and thus lcci to a mission changc for IFR that

wot~lcl have rcducctl its operational risk Thc policy rcvicw also could have lctl to a bcttcr-

integrated military antl diplomatic policy TFRs military operations wcrc not

coortlinatcci with tlie limilctl tliploniatic cffort Thc NSA Tony Lake failed to accomplish

this Finally Sccretary Aspin ant1 General Powcll did not conduct a detailcd risk

assessincnt altcr each llangcr niission Cessalion of tlie missions or thc addition of AC-

130s and additioncil rcaction units could have eliminatcd or at Icast rcduccd the risks

Ihc operational lcvcl includes G E N Hoar CINCCENT ind GEN Downing

CINCSO( At this lcvcl GEN IIoar hcars Ihe grcatcst rcsponsibility Ibr not cnsuring

unity ofcllort betwccn IMG Garrison and MG Montgomery Hc was the only one that

had tlie authority untlcr tlie Goltlwatcr-Nichols Act ol 1986 to coordinatc thcsc efforts

Hc hiled to hecornc actively involvctl in ensuring that the QRF was intcgrated inlo the

TFll opcration to coinpcnsate for thc loss oftlie extra Ranger platoon Hc hiled to bc

scnsitivc to tlic incrcised risks TFR was biking aller six similarly cxccuted missions I-lc

failed to assess the incrcascd vulnerability of TFR aftcr tlie 10th Mountain Divisions

UII-00 helicopter was shot down on 25 Scptcinher 1903 Hoar did not aclvocatc strongly

011 1)clialf of MG Montgonicrys rcqucst Ilis cndorscment citctl hotli the positive iind

negativc aspects ofdcploying the additional iirinor Overiill lic prescntctl a slightly better

32

than neutral entlorscmcnl oftlic request He was not adiniant about the critical iicctl for

tliesc iissetsrdquoJ He should have made the argument for the amiorrsquos use in the QRF to

support TFR Both Hoar antl Downing let TFR begin the operation with no AC-I 30s and

no extra platoon The coinbinttion of the failure to coordinate actions in Somalia

between TFR and QRF and the failure lo resource properly TFII and the QlIF were

critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of tlic 3 October TFR mission llatl

better coordination antl rcsourcing taken placc at this Icvcl it is likely tliiit far fcwcr LS

casualtics would have bccn sustained and unlikely a sccoiid crash site would have

occurred or iroccurrctl would have bccii overrun

The tactical level includes the commanders on the ground in Somalia MG

Giirrison MG Montgomcry antl I1lsquoC McKnight 11 is it this level that most oftlic

critical failures occurred The key critical failures rcvolvc around ii combina~ionof

overconiidcncc i n the TFKrsquos capabilities antl undcrcstiniating the cneniyrsquos capabilities

The combination of tlicsc lwo critical factors led to critical failures in allocating liniilcd

rcsoiirces establishing clllsquocclive command and control procedures and planning for

conlingcncics lhcse Ihilurcs Icd to the deaths of ciglitcen Aincricans and seventy-eight

inorc woundctl and five helicopters being shot down -- two in cncmy territory

MG Garrison did not want llic AC-130s and cxlra platoon lo be rcinovcd froin his

force package lnstcatl ollsquolioltling firm on the need for llic coliiplele package I1c had

trained and rchcarscd will1 before nrriving in Somalia Ilc relented to tltc pressurc antl

accepted tlic mission witliout the A(-130s and the extra platoon whicli woultl haw giveii

TFR added llexibility and tircpowerrdquo4 I n hindsight not iipproving tlic full TIrsquoII package

was a critical failure But this was understautlablc given Garrisonrsquos limitcd knowledge

33

of tlic SNA iintl Aitlcctl As the SNA adaptcd aiid modified its rcsponse to tlic TFR

tactics howcvcr Garrison should have rcalizcd that lic needed to kccp the MH-60 out of

RPCi rangc and arrangc for additional lircpowcr to coiiipensatc Hc coultl haw rcqucstctl

thc A(- l3Os iitlditional AH-6s and MI-I-6s and tlic cxtrii platoon had lic pcrceivetl tlic

incrcascd tlircat Garrison ultimately Lgilcd to anticipatc the enemyrsquos reactions aiid to

adapt to the enemyrsquos incrcascd Ictliality

Evcn though lsquoITX was operating with ii sub-optimal forcc its planning staff (lid

not make erfective use oftliosc asscts that wcrc available lrsquohc 1 0th Mountain Division

QRF was not in placc mid hricfcd up at the start of tlic mission TFR only had onc CSAR

helicoptcr and no atlditioniil GRF rcatly to go besides the onc with tlic mission to sccurc

tlic prisoners it tlic target site N o prior coordination WBS ever made for allied armor

supportrdquo MI 1-60s wcrc kept in orbit within SNA 1WG rangc after Somali tactics wcrc

confirmed i n Ostiian Atto raid (Mission 6) and Somali success with ItPCis against

13lackliawk helicopters was tlcmonstratcd a wcck lalcr Ilitting this Iiclicopter was more

difficult than iin orbiting MH-60 in the dayliinc in the micidlc of an altack Even aflcr

two liclicoptcrs wcrc shot down that day tlic plan or stantlard operating procetlure did not

call for MI 1-60s to get out ofRPG rangc

Linkcd to tlic poor contingcncy planning were llie Ihilurcs i n command and

control Tlicrc wcrc no plans for EP-3s to talk directly with tlic ground comiiiandcr L1rsquoC

McKniglilrdquoldquo Hc ncctlctl that capability to avoid gctting lost I-lercrsquoswhcrc tlic AC- I30

coultl havc bccn cspccially cffcctivc As Lcc A Ryscwyk opined ldquo[Thc AC- I BOs] would

liavc givcn cxccllcnt firc support and would havc hccn able to vcctor GRFl to eitlicr

crash sitc instcad ofjust driving in circlcs and collccting casunlticsrdquordquorsquo A(- 130s

34

habitually communicatc directly with the lire support clcments organic to the Itangcr

ground forcc8 All transmissions going through tlic JOC causctl confusion and provctl

incffcctivc for thc fiist paccd naturc of urban combat Thc JOC only delaycci thc time

critical directions being givcn by thc EP-3 to McKnight GRFI commandcr LTC

McKnight may have madc his job inore difficult by dccitling to rely on directions from

above and not making his own mission plan with thc othcr vchiclc commanders The

convoy i n retrospect may havc bccn morc succcssful using their own inhcrcnt initiative

antl knowledgc ofthc location orthc crash site since it was only four blocks away rathcr

than using tlic EP-3 to try 10 givc directions through tlic JOC i n the niidst o f a chaotic

fight Finally fFR did not sulliciently use thc capabilities olthe 10th Mountain

Division QKI lack of prior training coordination and integration prevented thcir timely

employment

lhc tactics uscci by the hclicoptcrs throughout thc opcration dcmonstriitcd

overconfidence Thcsc tactics assumed tha l thcy were not as vu1ncrible to RPG fircs as

thc 10th Mountain Division hclicoptcrs cvcn though WR hclicoplcrs w e flying (luring

thc day i n thc mitltlle of ii battle antl tlicy were supporting a rclativcly small targct arca

where RPGs could be miiss fired onto the helicoptcrs path

Allhougli rctrospectivcly not scnding the AC-I 30s ond cxtra platoon can bc

tlctcrminctl as a critical hilurc was tlicrc evitlcncc at the timc that suggestctl W R nccdctl

tlic full forcc packagc Thc cvidcncc suggests that i t was ii judgmcnt call Although tlic

A(-I 30s antl cxlra platoon ccrtainly would havc hecn uscful for all thc missions fFR

successfully exccutcd the lirst six missions without them But nonc ofthcsc missions

were in the midtllc olSNA tcrritory i i i thc mitltllc ofthe day ITR raid 6 wiis conciuctctl

35

i n thc (lay but on the outskirts ofSNA territory Only Dclta soldiers wcre on thc ground

capturing Osmiin Alto Other Itangers were stancling hy to providc assistance i f

necessary CPr James Ixchncr (he fire support officer (FSO) for TFR provides

insight to TFRrsquos asscssmcnt ofthe opcration and the risk in conducting future missioiis

This mission Icd us to a numbcr of conclusions Thc assault clcmcnt had remained on thc ground just untlcr an hour Bascd upon prcvious missions w e had deterniincd that the SNA could not react cffcctively if w c stuck to about o w hour on the ground This mission conlirmed this Tor us We iilso concluded that wc could strike anywhere i n Mogadishu and complete our mission successfully I had ohservcd from my position tliiil our aircrzifi had been undcr light lire ovcr thc target As it turned out the Sonialis had dirccted at least 15 RPG rounds and numerous small arms at our hclicoptcrs I rashly bclicvcd based upon cncmy proficiency iintl the capabilities of our pilots and aircraft that we were rclativcly iinpcrvious to ground lire I niaintainccl this belief cvcn aficr the following wcek when onc of the hclicoptcrs flying ldquoEyes ovcr Mogadishuldquo was brought down by an [sic] RPG killing thrcc Americansrsquordquorsquo

Irsquovcn if the AC-130s and the cxtra platoon were not ncccssary for the first six lsquoWR

missions Mission $10on 2 1 Septenibcr I993 and the tlownctl hclicoptcr on 25 September

I993 providccl sufficient evidence ollsquoSNA desires and capahilitics to shoot dow11US

helicoptcrsldquordquo Bcforc thc 3 October raid thcrc was sufficient cvitlcncc to suggest that tlic

risk to liiturc TFR opcrations was incrcasing l~urthcr TFR would need to modify its

tactics indor rcqucst ndditional support to mitigate thc risk

Given the tlcmonstratcd threat to liclicoptcrs from ItIrsquoCls it is reasonitblc thc MG

Garrison should have ordered morc signilicuit changcs to his tactics for tlic 3 Octobcr

I903 raid than simply adding rockcts to the AH-6s and loosening thc ROE At ii

niiniiiiuni MG Garrison should havc requested thc AC- 130s and thc cxtra platoon Aftcr

Mission M)the downctl hclicoptcr and the intcnsc light given to thc QRF at thc crash

sitc hc had justification to rciluest thein

36

The SNA threat to TFR hclicopters and thc increased ferocity of SNA tittacks

should havc prompted IIX planncrs to further modify its tactics to protcct its center of

gravity - i ts helicoptcrs rhis could havc heen achicvetl hy replacing tlic MII-60s with

AC-I 30s andor niorc AH-0s This would have minimized the RPG thrcat to the task

torccs most vnlncrablc aircran whilc maiiikiining adequate firepowcr Since the multiplc

downed hclicoptcr sccnario posed the greatest danger to any mission planners should

liiivc had other ground rcxtion Ibrccs rcady at the start of each mission Oncc the first

hclicoptcr was shot down there was no immctliatc action drill to inovc MH-60s out o f

threat rangc of RPGs Mil-60s wcrc iisctl for non-esscnliul lire support Only oiic CSAll

helicopter was plannetl Thc QRF w a s not liilly inkgratctl into thc planning although

they could havc hccn The QRF at thc Univcrsity compound only lclt for the airport

allcr thc first helicopter wcnt down As stated earlier ifl1Ii had talten the SNA more

seriously IFli would havc iiitcgratcd tlic QKI niorc thoroughly into tlic opcrition

lichcarsals would havc hccn conductcd with all thrcc QRI companies

Even within thc conskiiiits or the QIiFs other missions the QRl compeny 011

call could hwc always been collocated with TFR Having a separatc reaction force was

in the original coiiccpl of tlic opcration This was supposctl to hc thc mission ofthc

additional platoon that was cut lioni thc TFR Garrison could have reorganized to crcii~c

the additional ground rcaction forcc from organic asscts iis wcll as conductctl more

cffcctivc coordination with the QRF

This pliiiining and coordination prohlcm was a rcflcction ofthc command and

control problcms at this Icvcl Ilierc was n o onc on thc ground in Mogadishu to

coordinate the opcrations hctwcen MG Montgonicry md MG Garrison The CINCCENI

37

was back in IanipaFlorida While Gcneral Hoar monitored thc two operations hc did

not coordinate and integratc them which was his responsibility under Goldwater-

Nicliols~ Still nothing prevcntetl MG Citirrison froin bctter integrating and utilizing

MG Montgomerys QRL

I t appcars that TFli suffcrcd froin too much conlidcnce and not cnough

circunispcction Thc SNA had tlcmonstratetl their intcnt and capability to shoot dourn

Blackhawk liclicoptcrs within two weeks of the ill-fatcd 3 October mission The SNA

had demonstrated their intcnt and capability to quickly niass attacks against the forccs

sent to secure the downed liclicoptcr TFR kncw it was going into tlic heart of SNA

territory (luring thc day I n part hccausc of its overconfidencc TFR failctl to rccognizc

thc threat and to iltlapt to t11cn1

On tlic contrary HR was confident i t could successfiilly conduct its mission

anywhere i n Mogadishu - (lay or night It planned almost entirely for success TIR

soldiers ciirrictl no watcr although tlic tcinpcrature was ovcr a liuntlrcd dcgrees

1ahrcnheit They carricd no night vision devices or contingency loads Ihcy carricd no

extra batteries for their W R had no additioiial ground rciictioii lbrcc or CSAli

team to dcal with thc second helicopter criisli This ovcrconlidciicc contributed to

many ofthc other tactical failures TVR did not suflicicntly integrate the QRV into its

plan TFR did not significantly modify its tactics to avoid the KPG thrcat IFR did not

requcst the AC-130s and cxtra platoon to deal wit11 thc increasing thrcat TFR did not

tlevclop ii plan to clcal with cnough contingencics

This laycretl analysis suggests that opportunities for success cxistcd at each Icvcl

Decisions niatle on the strategic and opcrational lcvels had tlircct impact on the failure of

38

the mission Critical failures nt these lcvels did not howcvcr condcinn thc 3 October

I903 mission to failure Critical failures at the tactical level in undcrcstiniating the

SNAs capabilities antl IFRs own vulncrahilitics in ovcrcstiinating its own capabilities

i ind in failing to propcrly rcsource antl plan for contingencics ultimately ensured the

failure of tlic 3 Octobcr raid

Disciissioii of the Analytic Matrix

Having prcscnted at what lcvcl the critical failurcs occur this scctioii discusses

the pathways to misfortunc lhc lirst primary pathway to inisfortune bcgins at tlic

strategic level with the President When Presiclcnt Clinton tlecicled to pursuc a political

soltitioil at the end o r Septcmbcr he nevcr ordcred thc IYR missions to end though Iic

thought hc had I n fact Anthony Lake President Clintons National Security Advisor

belicvcd the TFR missions complcnienlcd the new diploniatic initiative According to

Aspin lhe Pcntagons undcrslanding of thc policy was to move to niorc diplomatic

clTorts but snatch Aidced on thc sitlc i f you can Given this undcrstanding Secretmy

Aspin tailcd to inotli fy the mission ortlcrs of MG Garrison Scnate tcstiniony confirms

that Aspin did not changc MG Garrison orders to capturc Aidccd This evidence suggests

that Aspin did not inform MG Garrison tlirough tlic 53 antl CINCCENT that the policy

roctls had changcd to a inore diplomatic approach than a military one

30

The Matrix

40

Given CiEN Hoars opposition to the IFR mission had he licartl of the policy

change it is likcly that he would have dirccted that thc mission to bc callcd off cntircly or

a t Icast that it bc liniitctl I-lad MG Garrison rcccivctl such guidance it is unlikcly that Iic

would havc attemptcd the 3 October mission rhough liis mission adjustnicnts wcrc

ultiniatcly inadequatc Garrison rcalizctl that the mission posed more risks than those

prcviously undertaken did Sccretaiy Aspins failurc to communicatc this essential policy

inlbrmation led dircctly to tlic order to launch the high-risk niission that endcd in failurc

The second primary pathway to niisloitunc originates at tlic tactical level but this

time with IFR I lerc MG Girrison and his staffcompletcly undcrestiinatcd the SNAs

capabilities i n live important ways First IFR untlcrcstimatetl (lieSNAs ciipabilitics to

usc RPGs to shoot down tlicir MH-60s Sccontl ITR assumcd based on the previous

six missions conducted outside the SNA stronghold that tlic SNAs most likcly course of

xt ion would be to rctrcat lbllowctl by probing sniping from crowds antl shooting ii few

RPGs Tl Ranger was unpreparccl for the immediate wIunic of fire - cspecially the

largc nunibcr orRPGs lircd Third TFR undercstimatcd the total number of SNA militia

and supporters sonic indications o r SNA strength and determination could havc hccn

found in the 2-3 hour lire figlit with the SNA by the OR) to rccovcr the hodics antl the

cquipincnt of tlic lielicoptcr ii wcek prior to the 3 October niission Fourth fFR did not

ipprcciiitc [tic capabilities and dctcrminition o f the SNA militiamen and supporlcrs

Iifth WR did not view thc SNA as a thinking learning adapting organization that cot11d

analyzc the prcvious similar six missions and come up with a counter strategy

lhcsc unclcrcstimations suggcst that T I X failed to anticipatc the actions ofthc

SNA militia and its supporlcrs Failurc to anticipate what tlic encmy can antl will (lo is

41

only one hallolthc ncxt critical failure Tliesc untlercstimatioiis of tlie SNA must be

understood i n thc context olhow TFR vicwetl its own capabilities antl vulncrabilitics

IFRs oiitlercslimalion ofthc SNAs capabilities directly contrihutctl to the ncxt critical

failurc net nsscssinent

Net assessment requires onc to accurately assess tlic enemys capabilitics with

regard to ones own plan antl capabilities I t requires an Iioncst analysis of what tlie

encmy can and will do ant1 how what tlic fricndly does will countcr i t Iropcr nct

assessnicnt shoiild collie out of tlie wargaming stcp olthc Military Dccision Making

Iroccss (MDMP) [n the case of the Battle of Mogadishu [lie combination of

unqucstioncd assumptions about thc SNAs ciipabilitics overcon litlcnce i n their own

capabilities and intcntions and unilcrestiniation of their own vulnerabilitics led to WRs

critical failure i n nct assessment lhe csscntial task of iict asscssnicnt requirctl TFR to

objcctivcly analyze the cncmys capabilitics intentions and tlctermination to anticipate

how tlic SNA and local peoplc would rcact

As statctl previously TFK leaders antl planners fiilcd in this part ofthc iict

asscssnicnt This limitation was furthcr cxaccrbated by a corresponding overconlidcnce

i n their own capabilities Ihey had beconic ovcrconlidcnt ancr succcssfiilly completing

six missions without any downed hclicoptcrs mass resistance or significant cnsualtiesh

lhrec orthe previous six missions had bccn conducted (luring tlie day Evcn TFK

Mission H6 whcrc 15 RPGs wcrc fired at the Iiclicoptcr without cffcct reinforced tlic

pcrccption of iiivulneriibility to the TFR The downing orthe 10th Mountain

Divisions UH-00 a wcck beforc the ill-fited 3 October raid did not evcn register an

alarm I t appears that TF ICanger pilots considcred by many to be tlic best trainctl in thc

42

world wcre still confident of their abilities and did iiot cliatigc their tactics significintly

for tlic 3 Octoher raid nor did planners augnicnt the TF with additionill ground reaction

force capihility Any major rcservations about conducting a daylight raid by tlie lsquoIrsquoFR

pilots appcar lo havc bcen minimized after tlic big sticccss on Mission 6 i n the dayliglit

lsquoIlsquoFR had caplurcd Aitlccdrsquos numbcr two man financier Osman Atto without ii scratch

After tlic success of Mission O the TF Rangcr FSO concludcd ldquo[W]c could strike

anywhcrc i n Mogadishu and complctc our mission succcssfully 1 rashly bclievetl based

upon enemy proficiency and the capabilitics o f our pilots and aircrafi that we wcrc

relatively itnpcrvious to ground tire

This ovcrconlidencc Icd TFR ti concludc Ilia1 its inhcrcnt resources wcre

sufficicnt and llic original rcquesl for AC-I 30s would iiot havc to bc rcassesscd MC

Garrison confirmcd this i i i his Senatc teslitnony whcrc lie statctl lsquo7 did not subniil ii

reqiicst for the AC-130s oncc we wcrc over thcre -- I donrsquot bclicve I cvcr considered

itrdquordquorsquo

The cumulative effcct of failing to anticipate onemy capabililics and friendly

vulncrahili~ics rcsullcd i n a Cnilurc to reqiicst or coorciinalc for sufficicnt forccs to dcal

with thc tlyiiamic hattlclield and tlie incvitahlc ctlsquolccts of friclion Thesc critical hilurcs

wcrc the respoiisihilities of the lsquoIlsquoFRcommanders and planncrs Tlicir failurc to anticipatc

thc SNArsquos potcntial lo shoot down the MH-00s in tlic daytimc led lo a plan tlial wiis

tloomcd to fiiilurc Hid lsquofIlsquoR planncrs rccognizcd thc thrcat 10 lhcir M H -00s lhcy woultl

havc made significant changcs to lhcir plan GEN I-loarGEN Downing and MG

Garrison all rcalizcd that thcre w a s a possibility of a hclicoptcr being shot down GEN

Ilowning stated i n his Senatc tcstimoriy ldquoI l o x and I wcrc not concernctl about losing a

43

helo[sic] The folks in DC wcre --thcy wanted to avoid press covcragc MG Garrison

and his planncrs must h a w rcalizcd a downed Iiclicoptcr was a possibility givcn tlicy

rchearsctl how to securc a downed hclicoptcr antl thcy had some limited contingency

plans to dcal with that cvcntuality Hascd upon how tlic battlc unfoltlcd it is apparent

that the commander and his planncrs wcrc not scnsitivc enough to the tactical

opcrational and strategic implications of such a downing iind its resulting ciisiiiiltics

Had TFR coniniiuider and his planncrs donc a bcttcr mission malysis and been inorc

scnsitivc to these implications they would havc taken greatcr prccautions to prevcnt such

an evcntuality In retrospect it is obvious that thc ITR coniniiuider antl his planners

failcd to opcrationalize thcir plan Ihcy lbilcd to link stratcgic objectivcs and conccrns to

the tactical plan Right or wrong the NCA was concerned with downctl helicopters antl

thc TFR operations should have rellcctcd those conccrns by limiting thc exposure ol

helicopters to RPG lircs

Aggrcgrte Frillire

The failurc ofthc 3 October TFR raid was the result of a failure to anticipatc and

adapt These two failures arc linkctl SNA actions prior to the 3 October raid

tlemonstratctl their capability o f shooting down ITR hclicoptcrs with RPGs I n

retrospect it is clear that thc SNA would havc thc satnc capobilitics when TIR launched

its daylight mission on 3 Octobcr TFK largcly discountcd thcsc inlcntions and

capnbilities basctl upon the success thcy iichieved in the prcvious six missions lliis

ovcrconlitlcncc was unjustilicd in light of GEN Iloars reali7ation that the Osnian Atto

raid nearly cncictl i n disaster ITR took the wrong lessons froni their succcssful capture

of thc Atto (EN Hoar atlmittcd he ncver contempiatcd the possibility that somcthing on

44

the magnitucle o f 3 Octobcr would cvcr occurrsquordquo This combination of undcrcstiiiiating

thc eiicmyrsquos capabilities iuid thcir own vulnerabilitics as a rcsult of ovcrconficlcnce let1 to

planning that could only dcal with tlic best case sccnario

TIrsquoRrsquos failurc to adapt was causcd by a planning failurc A key part ofthc

planniiig process is thc wargaming process whcre liiendly and encmy actions antl

reactions arc analyzed to tlcterminc potcntial branch and scquels to an opcnitioii Tlllt

commanders ancl planncrs failed to modify thcir tactics tcchniqucs and procctlurcs to

prcvcnt helicoptcrs From being shot down Oncc tlic first helicopter was shot down

commanders fiiilcd to take appropriate immediate actions to prevent othcr helicopters

from being hi t with an RPG IrsquoIinncrs failcd to have an additioiial branch which

incorporatctl ii ground reaction forcc or 10th Mountiiin QKI rcatly to (leal with tlic sccond

helicopter crash in the most timely manner Irsquolanncrs neglcctcci to adapt to the changing

thrcat when thcy hilctl to request tlic less vulncrablc AC- 130s lsquoIrsquohcsc aircriill could liavc

provitled tlic ncccssary lirc support antl psychological shock for TFK to hc more flcxiblc

and adapting

As discussed carlicr with AC- 130s lsquoIFR could have sccured both helicoptcr sites

atid hclpcd GKFI GRF2 and the QKF arrive in time to secure both crash sites by

providing supprcssivc lirc preventing obstaclc constructioii antl providing timcly

tlircctions

Tlic Rattlc of Mogadishu provides an examplc of an aggrcgate failurc Iailurc to

anticipatc and adapt Thc failure to anticipatc adcquatcly thc intcntions ancl capabilitics

of thc SNA to shoot down T I X hclicopters with R I G S lead to the failure lo atlapt By not

rully apprcciating tlic true vulnerability ofrsquoIlsquoFR helicopters planucrs could not see the

45

inadequacy of tlicir own contingcncy plans Their plan short of organic firc power not

vulncrablc to RPGs antl ii rcady ground rcaction forcc could not deal with niorc thui one

helicoptcr bcing shot down Had TFR anticipatctl SNA capability hcttcr and not been so

overconfidcnt i n its own capability it could I w e been bctter prcparcd in cquipnient

tactics tcchnicliics and proccdures (TIP) and contingencics plans Rcttcr preparation in

thcse arcas would have eiialilcd TPR to adapt better to thc SNA thrcat

Cuncl~isio~i

This analysis has shown that it is possible hut unlikely that the 4 M l s and 14 M2s

that Sccrctary Aspin disapprovcd i n late Scptembcr 1993would have cliangcd the

oulcoinc of the ill-htcd 3-4 Oclobcr fFR raid Ihcse tanks and APCs could h a w insured

liniitccl success for I l l lt had they bccn launchcd immcdiatcly to Crash Sitc -112 from tlicir

intendcd basc on the Univcrsity compound While possible il is unlikcly given IFIts

overconlidciicc and asscssincnt of SNA capabilities that ii QRF with tiinks iuid APCs

would liavc been Ixttcr iiitcgrated into tlic ITR 3 Octobcr mission With this closer

coordination thc tanks and APCs woulcl not havc had to rcport to the Mogadishu Airport

bcforc dcploying Himination ofthis hour delay would have permitted thc iirinor to

arrivc i n time to sccurc Crash Sitc 2 and thus prcvent thc capturc of downctl pilot antl

thc dcsecration of tlcad Americans on notional tclcvision

By applying Chhcn and Goochs niodcl to tlie Battlc o f Mogadishu this papcr

shows that the failure ofthcfFR mission on 3-4 Oclobcr 1993 wiis tlie rcsult oTa systcm

failure Secrctary Aspin reccivctl far more blame than lie tleservcd for niaking the

decision not to send the rcquested tanks and APCs Mispcrccption of tlic real impact

tanks and APCs could havc had on thc overall iiiission is tlic real causc ofthis

46

disproportionatc blamc GEN Hoar and CEN Powell in atltlition bcw as iiiucli

responsihility iis Secretary Aspin does for tlic dccision Neithcr ofthcse gcnerals strongly

atlvocatctl the dcploymcnt to Aspin cvcii thougli the worsening situation on tlic ground

mcritctl their strong support Both Hoar and Powcllrsquos approvcil rccommcndations can bc

c1iiractcrized as lukc-warm Aspinrsquos real fiiilurc wiis of not heing morc critical ofthc

conduct ofthc lsquoWR opcrations I n light ollsquoSccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlctlged concern over

tlic numbcr of siniilar operations contluctcd by lsquoIrsquoFR and his knowlctlge that the

Administration w a s sccking ii political solulion lie should havc noti lied MG Ciarrison o r

~licpolicy sliilt though the ICS and CINCCENIlsquoand provided atltlitional guidancc oii

risk Had he done so it is likcly that the thrcc October raid would not have occt~rrcd

Sccretxy Aspin made an cven more scrious mistakc by fiiliiig to ~CHSSCSSthc risk

or each lsquoIFRopcration and accepting GEN I loarrsquos cxplanation that the cacli mission was

diffcrent from tlic olhcrs Sccrctary Aspin stated in his Scnatc tcstiniony ldquoWc werc

worricd about tlic repetition o f Kiuigcr raids It lookctl to us likc each raid was ii cookie

cuttcr ollsquoevery otlicr raid GLN Hoar assured us that cacli raid was tlifllsquocrent iind they

wcrc using feints (signaturc flights) on a daily basis Hut we wcrc worriedrdquordquordquo

I n rcality Sccretary Aspinrsquos coiiccriis wcrc well foundctl ITelicopters had to bc

usctl for cvcry mission (lay or niplit to providc fire support Tlic issault Ibrccs uscd

liclicoptcrs to get to tlic objective livc out of the six missions lsquokassault forces used

liclicopkrs four out o f thc six prcvious missions to get ofllsquotht objcctivcrdquolsquo So from tlic

SNA pcrspcclive llic Rengcrrsquos rcliaiicc on Iiclicoptcr~liatl set a Aspinrsquos hilurc

was in not being morc critical of tlic coiiduct oftlie lsquoIlsquoFR operations

47

In light of Sccretary Aspinrsquos acknowlcdged conccrii over the numbcr or simi1ir

operations coiitluctctl by 1 F R and his knowledgc that the administratioii was seeking a

political solution Iic should havc notilied MG Garrison of tlic policy shin antl provided

additional guidance on risk Secrclary Aspinrsquos critical hilurc was his fidurc to inform

MG Garrison through JCS atid GEN 1 loar of tlic Administrationrsquos dccision to cniphasizc

a political solution ovcr a military solution This directly Icd to thc ticcision to launch the

mission

While bcttcr policy coordination lYom thc Sccretary of Dcfeiisc down to TFR

could liavc prcventetl the 3 Octobcr raid from occurring TFR did haw all the niciiiis i n

Mogadishu to succcssllsquoully accomplish the mission 1-lowcvcr overconfiilencc in TFRrsquos

cpabilitics antl untlcrestiniation orthe cncmyrsquos ability to find ant1 attack TFR

vulncrabilities wcrc critical lrsquoailurcs that led to a series ofothcr llsquoailurcs First lsquoIFR did

not rcqucst tlic AC-I 30s antl cxtra platoon Sccond lsquoIrsquoFR conductctl tlic 3 October raid

without protccting its vulncrablc helicopters Third TF plimners llsquoailcd to utilize a11 their

availablc rcsourccs and intcgratc these rcsourccs into a plan that could he Llcxihlc cnough

to handle tlic tlircat and all tlic friction in this risky opcration

lsquoIrsquohispapcr demonstrates that Ti-rsquo Rangerrsquos 3 October mission railed as it rcsult o f

the organization not the tlccisions of Sccrctary Aspin alonc As Cohcn antl Goocli

obscrved military misllsquoortunc is not mcrely tlic rcsult of an iiidividual mistake but rathcr

the result of series of mistakes throughout a systcm llltiniatcly TFR and the systcm it

was working in lbilctl to anticipate antl ailapt

48

I Tlicre arc a numbcr ofspcllings for Mohammed Farah Aidcctl This paper will follow tlie most con~nionspclling Aidecd is also spelled Aitlitl

Eliot A Colien i ind John Ciooch Military Misfortunes Tlie Anatomy of 1ailurc i n War (Ncw York Tlic Frcc Prcss 1990) 44-45 ind Carl von Clauscwitz On War (Princeton N1 Princcton Univcrsity Prcss 1976) 156-157

Wayne M Hall Military Intelligcncc in tlic XXlst Century lccture givcn to tlic CGSC Military liitelligcnce Officers i n Bell Hall For1 Leavcnworth KS Eisenhower I M l Fort Lcavcnworth KS 25 August 1998

4 llicse conclusions about tlic impact of tlic 13attle o f Mogadishu is takcn from Mark Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc 1envcs Lasting Scars Tlie Philadelpliia Inquircr ( N o Datc) - [On-liiic] availablc littplioiiiephillynewsconi~ck~igcs~soin~~li~nov I ()rangI6asp Thcsc samc conclusions liowcver havc been made by nunierous other writers ant1 scholars

5 According to accounts writtcn by mcmbcrs o f TFR tlic Battic olMogitdisliu is also known as thc Battlc of tlie Black Sea According to Mark Bowden tlic samc battlc is known by tlic Somalis its Ma-alinti llangcr or Tlic Day of the ILngers Thc anniversary of tlic battlc is now a iinnual day ofcelebration of thc victory fix thc Somalis or Mogadishu Mak Bowdcn Blackhawk Down Background A Dcfining Battlc Ixaves I ~ s t i n gScars Thc I~liiladelpliia Inquircr (No Date) - [On-linc] availablc littp~liomcpliillyiiewscoiiipackagessomalianov1Orang 1Oasp

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch Military Misfortuncs Tlic Anatomy ol1iilurc in War (Ncw York Ihc Free Ircss IWO) 26

Ibid 27

li Ibid

Ihid 45

b i d

I I This nicthotlology is pariiphrascd from ibid 46

I Elizabcth Drcw On tlie Edgc Tlic Clinton Prcsitlency (New York Touclislonc 1995) 315-337 I n this section ofhcr book shc prescnts a White llousc that is not focused on thc cvcnts o f Somalia Ilic Atlministration was ~ocusccion otlicr inorc prcssing niattcrs

40

Irsquo This paragraph is summariml from William J I)urch cd ldquolntrotluction to Anarchy Humanitarian Intcrvention and lsquoState-Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo i n IJN Peacekeeping Aincrican Policy antl the Uncivil Wars ofthc 1990s(New Zk St Martinrsquos Prcss 1996)335-341 More infomiation on the transilion bctwccn UNITAF and lJNOSOM I I can he found in Robert B Oakley antl John L Ilirsch Sonialia and Operation Rcstorc Hopc Rclleclions on Peaccmaking inti Peacekeeping (Washington I X Ilnitecl States Institute of Peace Prcss 1995) 1 11-1 14

Ilsquo Durch ldquolntrociuction to Anarchy Ilumanitariiin liilcrvcnlion and lsquoStatc- Buildingrsquo i n Somaliardquo 341

I s Aidcedrsquos perccplion is infcrred from ibid and Kohcrt BOaklcy and Johii I I lirsch Somalia and Operation Restore Ilopc Ilcflections on Peaccmaking and -Pcacekccping I 11-1 14

Ifrsquo Aidccdrsquos usc ollsquoRadio Mogadishu to disscminalc propaganda against UNOSOM can bc round iii ihitl 332 342 and Daniel P Bolger Savagc Pcacc Aincricans at War in the I O ~ O S (Novalo CA Presidio Irsquorcssy 1995) 299

17 Bolger 300

Irsquo Durch ldquoIntroduclion to Anarchy Hunianitarian Intervcntion antl lsquo S t a b Buildingrsquo in Somiiliardquo 342

If) This discussion of thc cvents Icacling to thc inspection of thc weapons storagc site is taken from Durch ldquoIntroduction to Anarchy Humanitarian Inlervcnlion antl lsquoStatc-Buildingrsquo in Somaliardquo 341 -342

lsquoIrsquo Ibid 843

zIUolgcr 300

rdquo Zinni Anthony (General) Dircctor of Operations for United Task Force Soiiialia (IJNITAElsquo) hetwccn Novcmbcr 1092 and May 1993 and Assistant 10 the Special Envoy Somalia (Ambassador Oaklcy) i n October 1903 in ncgoliations wilh Aicleed for ii irticc antl tlic relcasc o r captured rsquoIlsquoPR pilot Michael Durant ldquoAmbush in Mogadishu Inlcrview Gcneral Anthony Zinnirdquo interview by Frontline-Onlinc (unknown timc and placc) (3 October 1908) - [ OnLinc] available httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagcs frontliiicsliowsambusliintervicwsziniiilitml

rdquo US Congress Scnate Committee on Arnmcd Services M ~ i i i ~ r i ~ i t l ~ i i i iFor Senator Thunnond and Scnator Nunn From Scnator Wirner iiiid Senator I cvin Subject Review ofthc Circumstaiiccs Surrounding the Ranger Raid on Octobcr 3-4 1993 in Mogaclishu Somalia Dated Scpteinher 29 I995 (Washington DC GPO 1995) 41

5 0