battle of hussainiwala

PA 389482nd LT SHAHID

YOs 23

CAPT C/ADV

AQEEL SIGS

DS REMARKS

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Teaching Points Remarks

BATTLE OF HUSSAINIWALA

Introduction

1. 106 Bde was given the task of defending the area of responsibility

from incl Sheikhpur Nao to incl vill Rangewala. To hold the area of

responsibility, coys of 41 Baloch were depl on the FDLs and on

Dipalpur Canal as Bde res. Other supporting units were 3 Punjab, coy

R& S and 95 Fd Engrs (on Inf role).

2. The units after arrival in the conc area carried out extensive recce

and were ordered to gradually prep their def posns. Altn of Def Works

Const Fund and provision of iron scrap under div arrangements from

West Pakistan Rly gave a further impetus to dev of the def, which were

completed by mid Nov 71. However, improvement of def incl laying of

mines cont till the end of Nov 71.

3. Concurrently with the main task of defending its area of

responsibility, 106 Bde was asg the additional task of elimination of

Hussainiwala enclave on the outbreak of hostilities. This msn set in

motion a new round of recce and planning at all levels. Comd 106 Bde

presented the attack plan on 26 Oct 71 to GOC 11 Div, which was

approved. It may be of interest to mention here that Gen A M Yahya

Khan then President of Pakistan and Gen Abdul Hamid Khan then

COAS of Pakistan Army visited 11 Div on 4 Nov 71 and were apprised

of the plan. Gen Abdul Hamid Khan remarked “It is a tough nut to

crack, I wish you best of luck”.

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4. Aim . To study and analyze the Battle of Hussainiwala.

5. Sequence of Presentation . The scheme of my presentation will be:-

a. Area of Ops

b. Orbat

c. Attk Plan

d. Phases

e. Conduct of Battle

f. Lessons Learnt

Area of Ops

Hussainiwala enclave is sit North and NW of the river Sutlej engulfing

Hussainiwala Headworks and portion of Kasur-Ferozepur rd. It has an

area of about 18 sq miles and consists of 16 vills. Terrain in close

vicinity of rd Kaur-Ferozepur consists of numerous bunds, which

provide good obsn and firing posns. The area two creeks, which run

through the middle of this enclave from NE to SW. These creeks

contain water in rainy season but remain dry in winter months.

Hussainiwala Headworks has 29 gates that regulate the flow of River

Sutlej. Two canals, namely Eastern Canal and Bekaner Canal (Gang

Canal) originate from the southern side of the Headworks and irrigate

Ferozepur-Fazailka-Abbhusar areas. The regulator of old Dipalpur

Canal is loc on the Northern side of the Headworks that was closed

under an agreement between two countries. There are two brs (one rd

and one rly) over the Headworks. Rd br acts as a link between

Ferozepur and enclave area and is cl 70. Rly br is at present not op but

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6. can be used as an altn br with some improvement. Other important

tac features are: -

a. Perimeter

b. Guide Bund

c. Rly Bund

d. Banks of disused Dipalpur Canal

e. Qaiser-e-Hind

f. Abutment Bund

g. JCP (Joint Check Post)

h. Hockey spur

j. Indian Ulleke Bund

k. Ulleke Post

l. Rajoki Post and Vill

m. Shameke Post

n. Chandi Wala vill

o. Area watch Tower no 9

Hussainiwala Enclave provided a good springboard to the en for

launching an offensive with a sizeable force towards Kasur and then

either towards Raiwind or Lahore. The en build up in Ferozepur area

particularly the conc of his First Armd Div in area Farid Kot-Kot

Kapura-Muktasar prior to war indicated that there was a possibility of

en taking advantage of this enclave for any offensive. Therefore the

elimination of Hussainiwala Enclave became more important with a

view to improving our def and denying the use of existing br H to the

en.

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Orbat

7. En. Info gathered through various sources indicated that

Hussainiwala Enclave was held by two bns; one being regular bn and

the other a BSF bn. Through Pws captured during the battle of

Hussainiwala it came to lt that 35 Inf Bde which was a part of 14 Indian

Inf Div was responsible for the def of Hussainiwala area. The depl was

as fols: -

i. 15 Punjab

(1) One coy - Area perimeter – Both banks

of old

Dipalpur canal.

(2) One coy - Area Rly Bund

(3) One coy - Area Qaiser-e-Hind

(4) One coy - Area Guide Bund

j. 25 BSF Bn

(1) One coy - Area Hockey Spur

(2) One coy - Area Ulleke Post

(3) One coy - Area Rajoke Post

(4) One coy - Area Shameke Post

(5) One coy - Area Watch Tower

k. 13 Punjab . In area Barke across River Sutlej.

l. 15 Dogra . Bde res in Ferozepur

m. Sqn of Tks . Area South of Fakhr-e-Hind

n. Arty

4. DS Regt of 35 Inf Bde.

5. Some regts of Div/Corps Arty in area Ferozepur.

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8. En def works consisted of pillboxes, concrete emplacement and

bunkers. En had laid extensive minefd, and barbed wire obs around

their posns. An A/Pers ditch (10’ deep and 7’ wide) and about 40 yds

long was const by the en parallel to the left bank of old Dialpur Canal to

act as a trap for aslt Inf from that dir. 15 Punjab posn was very compact

and was org as a bn str pt in the most vital areas of Hussainiwala

Enclave i.e area br, Perimeter and Qaiser-e-Hind. 25 BSF was covering

a wider frontage and their def was org on coy strong pt basis. A 100 ft

steel tower in area Fakhr-e-Hind across the river, Qaiser-e-Hind and

Watch Tower No 9 provided good obsn to the en over the entire area.

En def were mostly based on various bunds posts and other built up

areas.

9. En had dumped lot of ammo, rats and other stores in the area,

which indicated that en was planning to fight to the last.

10. Own. 106 Bde had fol grouping for the asg task: -

a. Under Comd

6. 41 Baloch

7. 3 Punjab

8. 9 Punjab

9. B Coy ex 26 Punjab (R&S)

10. 95 Fd Coy Engrs

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Teaching Points Rema

rks

11. Hussain Khan Wala Mjd Coy

12. Khudian Mjd Coy

13. Two Coys Rangers

b. In DS . 45 Fd Regt Arty

c. In Sp . Div Arty in Range

12. Attk Plan.Wng O for attk on Hussainiwala was received b y Comd 106

Bde at about 1500 hrs on 3 Dec 71. He immediately issued his Wng O to the

units and then attended GOC’s O gp that was held at Kasur at 1600 hrs on 3

Dec 71. It may be stated here that GOC had received info regarding PAF sir

strikes against Indian air bases from Corps Comd at about 1455 hrs that day,

which indicated that war to start by the evening 3 Dec 71. Gist of GOC’s

orders is as under: -

a. 106 Bde to capture Hussainiwala Enclave as per plan ASP.

b. No change in atts and dets.

c. H hr 1800 hrs. Later on changed to 1830 hrs.

d. B-sqn ex 4 Cav to op under orders comd 106 Bde.

e. Fire SP plan – attk to be silent. Fire SP to be provided on call.

orders comd 106 Bde.

f. Fire SP plan – attk to be silent. Fire SP to be provided on call.

g. Comd 106 Bde held his O gp at Ganda Singh Wala at 1700 hrs

3 Dec 71. Briefs confirmatory notes of the orders for the actual

attk were issued to the units before H hr.

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h. Since, the Div Arty Regts were not depl in their actual

posns to sp 106 Bde attk due to security reasons, it

was not possible for them to be able to come into

action at the given H hr i.e. 1800 hrs. The

readjustment of the gun posns and other essential

coord req some more time. In view of this the H hr

was changed from 18oo hrs to 1830 hrs and it was also

decided to make it a noisy attk and timed programmed

(H-15 to H+35).

13.Phases . CO 41 Baloch plan for capture of asg obj is as under: -

a. A coy to capture right bank of Dipalpur Canal incl

Dipalpur Canal br.

b. B coy to capture area Rly Bund to incl Qaser-e-Hind.

c. C coy to capture area astride rd Kasur-Ferozepur from

JCP upto Dipalpur Canal br.

d. Bn Tac HQ was to mov behind A coy.

14. Conduct of Battle

a. A coy under comd Maj Muhammad Hanif (Shaheed),

started the aslt at the given H hr. Soon afterwards the coy came

under hy en auto fire from both banks of the canal and other

adjoining locs. The coy inspite of hy en firing and shelling kept

up the momentum of the aslt and cleared en bunkers one by one

with hand-to-hand fighting right through the obj. During the aslt,

the comd, Maj Muhammad Hanif got a burst of MG fire and fell

martyred. Sub Muhammad Iqbal, SJCO of the coy immediately

took over the comd of the coy and personally

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led the aslt tps right up to Dipalpur Canal br and captured the asg obj.

b. Capture of Qaser-e-Hind

1. B coy under comd Maj Zahid Yasin started the

attk from the dir of JCP at the given H hr.

Immediately after crossing the start line the coy

came under hy en auto fire from en bunkers in

area Rly Bund. However, the coy kept on aslt

posn and got engaged in hand-to-hand fight

with the en from bunkers. After tough fighting

the coy captured the Rly Bund in disused

Dipalpur Canal br. The coy comd, Maj Zahid

Yasin, realizing that he had over shot his own

obj and yet had to attk Qaiser-e-Hind about and

mov back in the dir of Qaiser-e-Hind.

2. The gallant soldiers of B Coy were struggling

to enter the mighty fortress under hy en auto

fire from the top and base of Qaiser-e-Hind,

when Maj Muhammad Ashraf, another Coy

Comd arrived with a depleted str of one pl and

joined his comrades of B Coy. The Western

Face of this fortress would defy even the most

determined onslaughts as it had a huge wall

with numerous firing holes spread all over it. A

no of attempts to enter the mighty fortress had

not born fruits as the apch to the fortress was

exposed to en obsn in a clear moonlight ni. The

Indian arty shelling further compounded the sit.

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The B Coy comd Maj Zahid Yasin,SJ had

already requested the Bde HQ toto push fwd the

tks that were to knock out the inf to go through

it. After a lapse of about half an hr or so, when

the tks still had not arrived the two coy comd

decided to make another suicidal attempt

without the tks.

3. The en inside and on the top of Qaiser-e-Hind

was not only stubborn but also desperately and

courageously sticking to the pride of its def, the

“Qaiser-e-Hind”. The tks were still awaited. En

guns after a few mins of silence would again

start roaring. Another similar attempt was again

conceived but this time with a change in

selection of pers who would now make the

attempt. New volunteers were asked for. A

complete silence prevailed. Since no of attempts

to enter “Qaiser-e-Hind” had already failed. No

one was now willing to put himself in the jaws

of death. After a lapse of a few moments, Maj

Muhammad Ashraf who had conceived the plan

decided to exec it himself. He knew that the loss

of his life would not jeopardize the op as his

other comrade Maj Zahid Yasin,SJ , present

with him might still survive to complete the task

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4. At about 2000 hrs in a clear moon lit ni, after

the sec Super Energa had been fired Maj

Muhammad Ashraf dashed fwd with a hand

gren in his right hand and a sten in left for

accomplishing the sacred and onerous task that

he had set upon himself. The dash brought him

immediately close to the southern portion of the

mighty fortress where he suddenly loc stairs

leading up into the base of the fortress.

Instantaneously the first gren was flying in the

air and landing inside. Shrieks and cries of the

en from inside echoed in the air. While running

and climbing the stairs Maj Muhammad Ashraf

lobbed yet another two grenades and then he

were at the entrance of the main hall. Luck that

was still with him now appeared to be leaving

him. When he tried to spray the area inside, his

sten refused to fire. He changed the magazine

but without any success. He really now could

not help but smile at the irony of fate.

5. On immediate recovering from the shock of this

serious set-back, Maj Muhammad Ashraf

lobbed the remaining three grenades, Maj

Muhammad Ashraf now rightly presumed that

the en must have completely been wiped out

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from the base but he was mistaken. With the explosion

of the last grenade four/five en survivors rushed out of

the northern entrance who were instantaneously

ambushed and killed by Maj Zahid Yasin ,SJ from

outside, while Hav Mansab Dar stood guard on the

Southern entrance. After some interval the surviving

en soldiers inside again suddenly became alive and

facing a very dangerous sit. Ironically he after having

succeeded in entering the mighty Qaiser-e-Hind had

no other altn but to retrace his steps. Therefore, He

had to rush out of Qaiser-e-Hind but he became still

more determined to accomplish the msn that he had set

upon himself. He now exchanged his sten with a rifle,

armed himself with more grenades and made yet

another desperate and last attempt. The complete base

was again sprayed with fire. It appeared that the en

was now completely annihilated from the base.

6. En was still holding on to top of Qaiser-e-Hind and

engaged this coy with MG fire from the top floor. Maj

Zahid Yasin with some selected men tried to go on top

Qaiser-e-Hind but en tps from the top started bringing

down hy auto fire and also threw hand grens.

Although the gr floor had been taken but it was not

possible to climb up as the en had blocked the stair

case eff. Firefight between own tps down below

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and en on the top cont throughout the ni. To destroy en

occupying the top floor of Qaiser-e-Hind with main

gun as a result of which the en posn was destroyed and

tps of B coy rushed upstairs and captured the top floor

by about 0700 hrs 4 Dec 71.

7. C Coy less pl under comd Sub Safdar Ali Shah

started the aslt from the JCP astride rd Kasur-

Ferozepur. The task given to this coy was to bring

flanking fire onto A and B Coys tps and also to clear

the rd with a view to enabling the tks to rush fwd

and secure the mouth of the br. As soon as they

crossed the SL they came under hy auto fire and

encountered opposn from area bks adjacent to the rd.

the Coy under the dynamic ldrship of Sub Safdar Ali

Shah went round the built up area and eliminated the

en with hand to hand fighting. After clearing the bks

area, they cont their aslt on either side of the rd and

successfully reached Dipalpur Canal br and lined up

with A coy which had by then captured the rt bank

of Dipalpur Canal upto the br.

8. 41 Baloch had created an adhoc coy of two pls under

comd Maj Muhammad Ashraf which was to stay

behind as res to be aval to the bn comd for reinforcing

any attacking coy or dealing with unforeseen. Coys had

suffered lot of cas this coy was employed to boost up

the fighting str of attacking tps. This coy successfully

assisted B coy in capturing Qaiser-e-Hind and

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During the later part of the ni secured

foothold in area Canal br and assisted A and C

coys of 41 Baloch and D coy of 3 Punjab in the

reorg phase. The coy comd Maj Ashraf was

wounded due to en air strafing on 4th morning

and was evac.

9. Throughout the attk of 41 Baloch the CO

displayed extra ordinary courage and moved

with the assaulting tps while they were fighting

through the obj. during the attk 41 Baloch wrls

comm. Between CO and Coy comds

completely broken down which created

problems of comd and con. Inspite of hy en

shelling and firing he kept on moving from one

posn to another exhorted his men thoughout the

aslt stage.

15. Honor And Awards. 14 Baloch and affiliated sp arms

were given fol gallantry awards in recognition of their courage, valour

and bravery: -

a. SJs 7

b. TJs 8

c. Imtiazi Sanad 1

16. CAS. 41 Baloch suffered fol cas in this op: -

a. Shaheed. 1xoffr and 66 OR.

b. Wounded. 120 all ranks.

c. En suffered hy cas.

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17.Captured Eqpt . Fol eqpt was captured: -

Wpns

Ammo

Vehs

106 MM RR

3

Carts 106 MM RR

15 Cwt Dodge

1

3” Mor

3

Bombs 3” Mor

¼ Ton Jeep

4

2” Mor

8

Bombs 2” Mor

1 Ton Dodge

2

7.62 MM MMG

5

Rkts 3.5”/83 MM

1½ Ton Truck

1

7.62 MM LMGs

8

Carts .303 (10 Trucks)

.303 LMGs

11

.303 MGs

5

3.5’ RLs

7

7.62 MM Rifles

77

.303 Rifles

75

9 MM Sten

41

9 MM Pistol

3

Pistol

10

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18. Lessons Learnt

a. Multi Directional attk. En def was mostly based

on Phil boxes, concrete emplacements and bunkers that

were interlinked. Qiaser-e-Hind with other few posns was

well fortified with fairly deep minefds. To overcome such

def, multi directional attk is the answers because en could

not eff engage the tps aslt from flank and rear. In addition

bunkers/wpns loc at beat back any aslt. Capture of Qaiser-

e-Hind is a good example to quote.

b. Recce. Thorough recce and briefing down to sec

level was carried out. The op was discussed in detail in

conf, on models and on the gr. Even they have gone to the

extent of rehearsing the attk plan. It was through

extensive recce that revealed most of en auto wpns with

numerous holes designed to provide firing slits in Qaiser-

e-Hind. Most of ptls were led by offrs incl coy comds.

Even during broad day light while wearing Rangers

Uniform offrs did the ptl in order to have a good look on

en def.

c. Motivation. Tps were fully motivated. All comds down

to sec comds and tps knew as to what was req of them

and what they were expected to achieve. Sub Manzoor

Hussain who was profusely bleeding on receiving a tk

burst on chest was forcibly evac from scene of battle to

Bn HQ. On seeing his CO, he managed to utter few

words with difficulty,” Sir, I have fulfilled my promise

given to you that I would bear the en bullet on my chest”

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d. Surprise. Since the attk was launched at 1830 hrs (an

unexpected time) complete surprise was achieved. En got

confused from multi directional attk and fight by small

aslt gps. Thus was unable to judge wt and dir of attk.

Simultaneous attk on Dipalpur Canal br, Rly Bund and

Qaiser-e-Hind added to shock.

e. Aggressive. Repeated attempts to enter mighty

fortress under hy en auto fire from top and base of

Qaiser-e-Hind had failed. The Indian Arty shelling

further compounded the sit but tempo of attk was never

allowed to die down. Yet another suicidal attempt by Maj

Muhammad Ashraf and his team was made to enter

Qaiser-e-Hind forcibly which they managed. In this msn

prince was enormous but the prize was equally tempting.

f. Comds Well Fwd. All comds were well fwd. In

fact in most of cases were leading the aslt on en. Extra

ordinary courage and valour displayed by the Bn/Coy/Pl

Comds was one of the maj contributing factor in success

of this attk. One of the 41 Baloch obj was in close

vicinity of disused Dipalpur Canal and which was being

attk by A Coy. This could not have met success when

coy comd Maj Muhammad Hanif,SJ (Shaheed) received

the burst and was breathing his last. It was CO, Lt Col

Habib Ahmed,SJ who was fol close behind, decided to

lead the attk and fill up the vacuum created on Shahadat

of coy comd. Because name and pride of 41 Baloch and

country was at stake.

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g. Use of Tks . Tks was boldly used in this attk. En

Soldiers who had refused to surrender, barricaded

themselves in one of the tower, were eventually shot

down with tk fire personally dir by Bde Comd 106

Bde, Brig (Now Maj Gen) Muhammad Mumtaz

Khan,HJ.

h. Ldrship. When coy comds fell in battle, their JCO’s

and even CO was not found wanting and in total

disregard to their life went charging to complete the

unfinished task. Zahid Yasin,SJ to enter first in

Qaiser-e-Hind. Finally Maj Muhammad Ashraf

prevailed.

j. Fire Sp. Although detailed fire sp had been worked

out incorporating all wpns well before start of war but

due to late dumping of ammo at the gun ends and late

provision of tgt data to the GPO’s only 5 fire units

opened initially to sp the attk. 3 more joined later.

Despite all this en tps did not even remember where to

seek refuge.

k. Security. Through out the pd of 3 months, preceeding

the battle tps arriving in battle loc, dusk and dawn

recces and obsns were screened in such an appreciable

manner that en was totally un prep for this attk. So

much so that tps mov to respective FUP’s went

unnoticed.

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l. Fire and Mov. Tps conducted the CQB extremely

well but team craft i.e. fire and mov was missing.

Success came through surprise that had paralyzed en

tps. The aspect of fire and mov is still wanting in the

Army.

m. Re-Org. After the capture of obj reorg should be

rapid to face any C attk. Tps must be ready to repulse

such attempts by en. It was not done in remaining

phases of bn attk thus suffered hy cas.

n. A Tk Wpns. Long-range A Tk wpns that were depl in

FUP/fire base did not fire to sp the attk. Further upon

when, during battle thwarted by en built up defs and

tps in Qaiser-e-Hind these wpns were not brought fwd

to blast such opposn and create entrance.

o. Wpn Serviceability. Before leaving for battle loc,

one must test all wpns. Sten carried by Maj

Muhammad Ashraf did not fire when he had forced

his entry to Qaiser-e-Hind. Even on changing mags

sten still would not fire. Ironically he had to retrace his

steps. After exchanging his sten with a rifle, entered

again in Qaiser-e-Hind and completely annihilated en

from the base.

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19. Conclusions. On 3 Dec 71 at 1830 hrs 41st Baloch that had not

yet even completed its eight months of life was ordered to attk and

captures the “Exit of Hussainiwala Headworks” and “Qaiser-e-

Hind”. The bn suffered considerable cas but the en that was

equally stubborn could not deter the grim determination of the CO

Lt Col Habib Ahmed,SJ, the offrs, JCO’s and men of this young

but brave bn. The bn objs, “ The invincible Qaiser-e-Hind” and

the Exit of Hussainiwala Headworks were all successfully captured

by the bn but after having fought one of the fiercest and bloodiest

battles in the annals of history.

battle of hussainiwala

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