battle for moscow

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ATSS-BAR 5 October 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR THESIS SUBJECT: Thesis Statement 1. Thesis Statement: The loss of The Battle for Moscow (October-December 1941) was of direct result of environmental conditions, not a superior Russian Army. a. Broad Subject: Effects of weather and terrain in combat. b. Narrowed Topic: Battle for Moscow c. Group Members: AHMED HUSSEIN ANDREW J SCHEUERMANN BRIAN K. KINSEY MATTHEWD. KEMPER TABITHA L. HODGE 2. Request approval/disapproval of this Haines paper topic. . .LAN K. KINSEY SGM, USA Group Chairperson I approve / disapprove this topic. WILLIE BRITTON SGM, USA ROI Faculty Advisor

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The loss of The Battle for Moscow (October-December 1941) was of direct result of environmental conditions, not a superior Russian Army.

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Page 1: Battle for Moscow

ATSS-BAR 5 October 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THESIS

SUBJECT Thesis Statement

1 Thesis Statement The loss of The Battle for Moscow (October-December 1941) was of direct result of environmental conditions not a superior Russian Army

a Broad Subject Effects of weather and terrain in combat

b Narrowed Topic Battle for Moscow

c Group Members

AHMED HUSSEIN ANDREW J SCHEUERMANN BRIAN K KINSEY MATTHEWD KEMPER TABITHA L HODGE

2 Request approvaldisapproval of this Haines paper topic

~JLAN K KINSEY SGM USA Group Chairperson

I approve disapprove this topic

WILLIE BRITTON SGM USA ROI Faculty Advisor

2

Haines Paper Outline How Weather Can Effects Combat Operations

ROt SGMBRITTON

Thesis Statement The loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct

result of environmental conditions not a superior Russian Anny

I The Soldier MSGHodge

A Soldier Morale

B Clothing

II The Partisan effort SGM Hussein

A Contributions

B The Right to Bear Anns

III Terrain SGMKinsey

A Terrain Features

B Lines of Communication

IV Annaments SGMKemper

A Weapons

B Effects of Weather on Employment of Weapons

V The Opposing View MSG Scheuermann

A Adolph Hitler

B The Military Decision Making Process

VI Conclusion

3

On the night of June 22 1941 more than 3 million German soldiers 600000 vehicles

and 3350 tanks were positioned along a 2000km front stretching from the Baltic to the Black

Sea Their sites were all trained on Russia For Hitler the inevitable assault on Russia was to be

the culmination of a long standing obsession He had always wanted Russias industries and

agricultural lands as part of his living space for Germany and their Thousand Year Reich While

the Russians were well aware of German preparations and were tipped off to the impending

invasion by both their own intelligence as well foreign sources the Germans achieved total

surprise The Germans employed three army groups North Center and South and planned to

destroy all Soviet resistance in swift advances on Leningrad Moscow and Kiev Hitler threw

183 divisions into the assault while the Nazis faced 170 divisions which represented 54 percent

of the Red Armys total strength

Coupled with the element of surprise the Germans possessed better training more

extensive experience and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for

attack The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment were poorly deployed to meet the

attack and lacked defensive positions As a result the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and

the Germans achieved penetrations in many places By 16 July 1941 the Germans had captured

Smolensk which was less than 250 miles from Moscow and Army Group Center alone had

captured about 600000 men and 5000 tanks By the end of July the Germans controlled an area

of the Soviet territory more than twice the size of France

The failure of Typhoon almost entirely due to its lateness According to schedule

Moscow would be captured during the early part of the month ofAugust long before the cold

winter could set in In reality the German invasion armies had been held back by variables that

Hitler and the German General Staffhad not anticipated such as supply problems local

4

resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions

had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the

unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow

The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that

the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department

or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place

Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops

were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines

excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet

Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover

for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the

German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by

communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)

Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their

own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler

had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the

climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large

amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to

powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to

function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep

mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots

sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they

were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well

5

These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by

destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible

While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold

figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh

general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow

the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to

survive let alone fight

During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and

will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains

contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the

combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads

to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves

marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the

soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread

through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy

and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these

conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21

1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness

In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the

temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching

through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The

soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves

infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers

6

desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the

soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed

to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold

At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow

the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one

partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In

order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains

monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The

leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food

for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision

was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the

cold than from combat operations

As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse

Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became

their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they

could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper

was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered

with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other

warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December

it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid

while trying to keep warm

The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost

Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every

7

engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is

inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow

down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him

There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the

French Soldier in 1812

The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet

soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and

horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier

they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived

with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and

eventually out fight the German army

The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the

advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was

required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet

soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of

travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on

the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread

In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from

Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers

proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to

move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of

Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 2: Battle for Moscow

2

Haines Paper Outline How Weather Can Effects Combat Operations

ROt SGMBRITTON

Thesis Statement The loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct

result of environmental conditions not a superior Russian Anny

I The Soldier MSGHodge

A Soldier Morale

B Clothing

II The Partisan effort SGM Hussein

A Contributions

B The Right to Bear Anns

III Terrain SGMKinsey

A Terrain Features

B Lines of Communication

IV Annaments SGMKemper

A Weapons

B Effects of Weather on Employment of Weapons

V The Opposing View MSG Scheuermann

A Adolph Hitler

B The Military Decision Making Process

VI Conclusion

3

On the night of June 22 1941 more than 3 million German soldiers 600000 vehicles

and 3350 tanks were positioned along a 2000km front stretching from the Baltic to the Black

Sea Their sites were all trained on Russia For Hitler the inevitable assault on Russia was to be

the culmination of a long standing obsession He had always wanted Russias industries and

agricultural lands as part of his living space for Germany and their Thousand Year Reich While

the Russians were well aware of German preparations and were tipped off to the impending

invasion by both their own intelligence as well foreign sources the Germans achieved total

surprise The Germans employed three army groups North Center and South and planned to

destroy all Soviet resistance in swift advances on Leningrad Moscow and Kiev Hitler threw

183 divisions into the assault while the Nazis faced 170 divisions which represented 54 percent

of the Red Armys total strength

Coupled with the element of surprise the Germans possessed better training more

extensive experience and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for

attack The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment were poorly deployed to meet the

attack and lacked defensive positions As a result the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and

the Germans achieved penetrations in many places By 16 July 1941 the Germans had captured

Smolensk which was less than 250 miles from Moscow and Army Group Center alone had

captured about 600000 men and 5000 tanks By the end of July the Germans controlled an area

of the Soviet territory more than twice the size of France

The failure of Typhoon almost entirely due to its lateness According to schedule

Moscow would be captured during the early part of the month ofAugust long before the cold

winter could set in In reality the German invasion armies had been held back by variables that

Hitler and the German General Staffhad not anticipated such as supply problems local

4

resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions

had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the

unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow

The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that

the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department

or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place

Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops

were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines

excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet

Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover

for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the

German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by

communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)

Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their

own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler

had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the

climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large

amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to

powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to

function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep

mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots

sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they

were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well

5

These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by

destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible

While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold

figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh

general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow

the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to

survive let alone fight

During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and

will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains

contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the

combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads

to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves

marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the

soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread

through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy

and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these

conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21

1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness

In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the

temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching

through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The

soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves

infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers

6

desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the

soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed

to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold

At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow

the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one

partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In

order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains

monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The

leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food

for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision

was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the

cold than from combat operations

As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse

Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became

their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they

could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper

was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered

with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other

warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December

it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid

while trying to keep warm

The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost

Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every

7

engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is

inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow

down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him

There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the

French Soldier in 1812

The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet

soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and

horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier

they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived

with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and

eventually out fight the German army

The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the

advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was

required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet

soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of

travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on

the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread

In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from

Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers

proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to

move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of

Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 3: Battle for Moscow

3

On the night of June 22 1941 more than 3 million German soldiers 600000 vehicles

and 3350 tanks were positioned along a 2000km front stretching from the Baltic to the Black

Sea Their sites were all trained on Russia For Hitler the inevitable assault on Russia was to be

the culmination of a long standing obsession He had always wanted Russias industries and

agricultural lands as part of his living space for Germany and their Thousand Year Reich While

the Russians were well aware of German preparations and were tipped off to the impending

invasion by both their own intelligence as well foreign sources the Germans achieved total

surprise The Germans employed three army groups North Center and South and planned to

destroy all Soviet resistance in swift advances on Leningrad Moscow and Kiev Hitler threw

183 divisions into the assault while the Nazis faced 170 divisions which represented 54 percent

of the Red Armys total strength

Coupled with the element of surprise the Germans possessed better training more

extensive experience and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for

attack The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment were poorly deployed to meet the

attack and lacked defensive positions As a result the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and

the Germans achieved penetrations in many places By 16 July 1941 the Germans had captured

Smolensk which was less than 250 miles from Moscow and Army Group Center alone had

captured about 600000 men and 5000 tanks By the end of July the Germans controlled an area

of the Soviet territory more than twice the size of France

The failure of Typhoon almost entirely due to its lateness According to schedule

Moscow would be captured during the early part of the month ofAugust long before the cold

winter could set in In reality the German invasion armies had been held back by variables that

Hitler and the German General Staffhad not anticipated such as supply problems local

4

resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions

had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the

unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow

The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that

the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department

or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place

Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops

were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines

excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet

Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover

for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the

German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by

communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)

Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their

own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler

had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the

climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large

amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to

powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to

function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep

mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots

sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they

were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well

5

These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by

destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible

While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold

figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh

general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow

the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to

survive let alone fight

During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and

will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains

contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the

combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads

to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves

marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the

soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread

through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy

and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these

conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21

1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness

In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the

temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching

through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The

soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves

infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers

6

desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the

soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed

to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold

At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow

the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one

partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In

order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains

monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The

leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food

for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision

was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the

cold than from combat operations

As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse

Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became

their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they

could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper

was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered

with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other

warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December

it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid

while trying to keep warm

The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost

Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every

7

engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is

inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow

down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him

There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the

French Soldier in 1812

The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet

soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and

horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier

they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived

with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and

eventually out fight the German army

The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the

advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was

required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet

soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of

travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on

the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread

In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from

Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers

proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to

move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of

Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 4: Battle for Moscow

4

resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions

had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the

unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow

The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that

the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department

or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place

Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops

were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines

excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet

Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover

for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the

German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by

communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)

Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their

own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler

had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the

climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large

amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to

powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to

function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep

mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots

sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they

were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well

5

These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by

destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible

While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold

figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh

general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow

the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to

survive let alone fight

During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and

will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains

contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the

combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads

to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves

marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the

soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread

through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy

and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these

conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21

1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness

In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the

temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching

through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The

soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves

infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers

6

desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the

soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed

to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold

At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow

the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one

partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In

order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains

monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The

leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food

for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision

was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the

cold than from combat operations

As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse

Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became

their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they

could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper

was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered

with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other

warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December

it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid

while trying to keep warm

The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost

Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every

7

engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is

inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow

down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him

There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the

French Soldier in 1812

The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet

soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and

horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier

they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived

with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and

eventually out fight the German army

The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the

advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was

required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet

soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of

travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on

the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread

In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from

Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers

proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to

move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of

Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 5: Battle for Moscow

5

These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by

destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible

While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold

figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh

general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow

the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to

survive let alone fight

During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and

will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains

contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the

combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads

to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves

marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the

soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread

through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy

and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these

conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21

1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness

In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the

temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching

through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The

soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves

infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers

6

desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the

soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed

to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold

At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow

the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one

partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In

order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains

monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The

leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food

for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision

was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the

cold than from combat operations

As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse

Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became

their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they

could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper

was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered

with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other

warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December

it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid

while trying to keep warm

The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost

Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every

7

engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is

inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow

down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him

There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the

French Soldier in 1812

The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet

soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and

horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier

they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived

with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and

eventually out fight the German army

The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the

advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was

required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet

soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of

travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on

the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread

In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from

Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers

proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to

move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of

Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 6: Battle for Moscow

6

desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the

soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed

to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold

At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow

the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one

partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In

order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains

monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The

leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food

for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision

was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the

cold than from combat operations

As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse

Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became

their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they

could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper

was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered

with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other

warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December

it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid

while trying to keep warm

The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost

Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every

7

engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is

inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow

down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him

There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the

French Soldier in 1812

The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet

soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and

horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier

they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived

with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and

eventually out fight the German army

The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the

advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was

required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet

soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of

travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on

the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread

In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from

Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers

proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to

move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of

Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 7: Battle for Moscow

7

engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is

inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow

down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him

There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the

French Soldier in 1812

The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet

soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and

horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier

they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived

with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and

eventually out fight the German army

The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the

advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was

required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet

soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of

travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on

the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread

In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from

Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers

proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to

move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of

Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 8: Battle for Moscow

8

Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has

proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars

The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the

Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions

any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be

more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of

frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier

best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above

that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)

The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July

1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground

movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941

the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military

mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and

industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance

of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist

regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from

propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day

The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the

occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and

military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other

functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 9: Battle for Moscow

9

and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the

long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)

Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to

combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges

railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied

region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They

were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies

closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples

Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of

Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the

scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were

to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty

from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied

diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often

lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by

requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large

quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small

amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low

standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as

tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did

without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned

to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 10: Battle for Moscow

10

methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of

partisan efforts

The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the

party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people

literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility

for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a

common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the

Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country

motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year

transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans

kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey

1975)

An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans

proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their

weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people

themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country

it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on

weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people

The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a

bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up

arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power

and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of

gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 11: Battle for Moscow

11

make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that

all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall

by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans

1990)

The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of

a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their

country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of

Gennanys downfall

During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with

their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at

Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of

weather not a superior Russian military force

During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers

fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the

Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army

After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop

them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the

Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas

1992)

The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on

the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16

November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr

1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 12: Battle for Moscow

12

flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid

October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans

noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain

effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the

[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)

Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since

the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the

battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural

obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and

land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The

majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the

Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)

The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of

knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became

soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated

the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting

ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological

strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain

(CMH 104-2)

The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The

Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the

Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading

slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 13: Battle for Moscow

13

and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of

his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task

force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the

Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The

Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and

with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard

and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr

50)

On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By

this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20

degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive

counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5

(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On

December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German

battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is

impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)

The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of

October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly

December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October

the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost

even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start

of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would

1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 14: Battle for Moscow

14

dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not

fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were

astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat

ineffective

Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the

first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out

as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of

cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and

motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero

(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On

December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal

under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow

and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies

could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold

It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect

After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and

equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian

counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by

the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~

from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and

could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly

designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 15: Battle for Moscow

15

Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements

hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of

locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few

available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians

must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled

units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give

them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to

exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)

Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized

and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their

useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet

winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began

they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and

h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning

of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer

Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million

ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth

of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and

7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-

German surrender in April of 1945

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 16: Battle for Moscow

16

The Opposing View

The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December

1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my

opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy

the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than

those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the

ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat

The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with

all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to

he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision

of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand

years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his

inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to

impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed

opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys

nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse

The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final

Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews

bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during

WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 17: Battle for Moscow

17

many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass

uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies

Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and

it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the

sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over

such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy

supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff

asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once

the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the

Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High

immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by

Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in

The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t

(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)

discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved

invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall

fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl

Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war

with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of

Victory signifying the political feelings of the day

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 18: Battle for Moscow

18

A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding

offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks

regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The

Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the

Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons

learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so

overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an

txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter

months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely

separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not

1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned

Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers

were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the

Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had

reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man

Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history

would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the

knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury

In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 19: Battle for Moscow

19

that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly

indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth

Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case

the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred

While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a

they suffered in The Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987

Page 20: Battle for Moscow

20

WORKS CITED

New York St Martin s Press 1986

===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s

Washington DC 1986

Washington DC 1986

Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military

Reviev 97 D ecember 1991

Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944

Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk

Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and

Day 1975

Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969

History 1987