bates 1971 the role of the state in peasant nomad mutualism

8/2/2019 Bates 1971 the Role of the State in Peasant Nomad Mutualism

1/24

The Role of the State in Peasant-Nomad MutualismAuthor(s): Daniel G. BatesSource: Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 3, Comparative Studies of Nomadism andPastoralism (Special Issue) (Jul., 1971), pp. 109-131Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic ResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3316933

Accessed: 23/06/2009 11:04

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ifer.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research is collaborating with JSTOR to

digitize, preserve and extend access toAnthropological Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3316933?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=iferhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=iferhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3316933?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/24

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PEASANT-NOMADMUTUALISAM

DANIEL G. BATESHunterCollege,CityUniversityof New York

Patterns of mutual land use between ethnically distinctnomadic pastoral and sedentary agricultural populationsoccur in some areasof the Near East. The niches occupiedby such groups may appear to be non-competitivein thatdifferentseasonalschedulesof land useand differentmodesof production permit the joint exploitation of commonterritory. However, such land use relationships are in-herentlyunstable becausethe limitsof the politicaleconomyof either ethnically defined mode of productionare rarelycoterminouswith the distributionof the resourcesa popula-tion could exploit if it had access to them. Therefore, it iscontended that peasant-nomad expressions of land-usemutualism and symbiotic exchange are best viewed as afunction of a balance of power, and not as the result ofthe exploitation of intrinsically non-competitive niches.In the Near East, the state, by interferingin these powerrelations even beyond the limits of its full sovereignty, isoften a more critical factor in determiningland use rela-tions than the local ecology.

This paper will examinepeasant-nomadnteractionwith re-spect to joint land-use and exchange,and will attemptto makeexplicit the primaryconditionswhich a valid, comprehensivemodel of these relationshipsmust fulfill. Specifically, his paperproposesto show that the relationshipof a nomadic pastoralsociety to a sedentary population, where these are ethnically dis-tinct, does not depend solely nor even predominantlyupon factorsof the local ecology. Rather, the interaction of societies pursuing

1 This paper has substantially profited from the critical comments andadvice of many readers. An earlier draft was extensively revised in the lightof detailed and valuable suggestions made by W. Gary Clevidence, WilliamD. Schorger and Eric R. Wolf. In particular. I would like to thank RaymondC. Kelly who has painstakingly gone over the present text and who hasoffered numerous helpful criticisms both regarding the style and argumentspresented.109


3/24

ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLYspecialized modes of production represents the resolution of ex-ternal forces which engender local competition and cooperation.Any accurate representation of inter-ethnic exchange, quite apartfrom how it handles local social and economic processes, willhave explicitly to account for external political relations-sincethe interaction of local social entities in the Near East is oftena function of how each articulates with such extra-local sourcesof political power as the state.Processes which affect the distribution of populations over re-sources, such as inter-group exchange and the common use of aterritory by nomadic pastoral and farming communities, are oftenbest analytically framed as ecological systems (cf. Barth 1956:1079). In instances of interspecific exchange the concept ofsymbiosis can be usefully employed as a generic designator forall continued effects on population growth and survival arisingfrom the interaction of two or more populations (cf. Odum1959:226). Mutualism focuses on the beneficiality of these effectson both populations. This focus is appropriate to the analysis ofexchanges between peasant and nomadic populations in systemsof joint land-use where our concern is to evaluate the degree ofreciprocity and value-equivalence. Available studies reveal agreat diversity in the degree of mutualism characteristic of inter-population exchanges where groups, specialized in nomadicanimal husbandry, acquire goods and services outside the limitsof their own political economies (e.g. Barth 1960:341-355).Anthropological models of ecologic relationships usually focuson the material transfers (and concomitant social parameters)among one ethnically defined human population, animal popula-tions and other biotic resources occurring within a circumscribedlocality. However, many ethnographically interesting situationsinvolve more than one culturally defined population. Oftenseveral communities are closely integrated in regional systems ofland-use with ethnicity of other cultural markers distinguishingmodes of production and delineating the resources to which socialunits will have access in a shared territory. Analytic models ofland-use which are directed to spatially discrete human popula-tions will not benefit investigations of ecological relations in areasdominated by state political structures. Furthermore, modelswhich focus on exchanges arising from one population's interac-tion with its immediate environment may well obscure the dy-

110


4/24

ROLE OF THE STATEnamics of overall resource allocation among specialized com-munities.

The approach suggested here argues that the relationship es-tablished in situations of peasant-nomad shared land-use is bestanalyzed as though it were predicated upon two distinct butclosely related levels of interaction. The level immediate to thecontact groups is the local ecological system, which indudes thepopulations in question and their cultural adaptations togetherwith the physical environment which they exploit. In this con-nection such factors as land tenure practices, local social andpolitical organization, relative military strength, population sizeand density, modes of production and redistribution are relevant.The second level of interaction concerns how the local systemrelates to a wider economic and political milieu.

Ecological studies of nomadic pastoralism are not all narrowlycast. Barth (1956), using an ecological idiom, analyzes the dis-tribution of specialized ethnic groups and patterns of shared land-use involving nomads in Swat, West Pakistan. Treating Swat asan ecological system, he demonstrates that ethnic specializationsin concentrating on selected portions of the "total environment,"leave open other contiguous or even politically incorporated areas(niches) for other populations (including nomads) to exploit(Barth 1956: 1079, passim.)2 In another study, perhaps the mostcomprehensive discussion of mountain nomadism available, Barthshows that throughout Southwest Asia ".. . nomads become tied2 Barthsummarizes his for the distributionof three ethnic groupsin Swat(1956). He notes that Pathan and Kohistani agriculturalistswere in directcompetitionfor resources,and that the latter were militarilyforced to retreatto beyond the altitudinal limits of double cropping on which the Pathanpolitical economy depends. The Kohistanis could readily adapt to thisrestriction in their territory as their economy combines agriculture andtranshumantherding. The third population, the Gujars, occupy a nichewhich territoriallytraversesboth Pathan and Kohistani spheres of politicalcontrol. Although the Gujars are by no means uniform in their economicadaptation, they, in many instancesare able to pursuelong-rangenomadicpastoralismby utilizing Pathan territoryfor valley-bottomwinter pasturesand Kohistani mariginal summer pastures.which the latter are unable tomake use of as transhumants.Access to winter grazingin Pathan dominatedregionsis attained without conflict as the Gujars are exploiting what Barthterms a non-competitive niche; one which complements certain Pathanrequirements or Gujar goods and services. In summerGujar herds attainhigh pastureswhich are left vacant by the restrictionson Kohistani trans-humant pastoralismset by the availability of winter forage, thus keepingherd sizes well below the amountsthat could be carriedduring the summermonthson nearbygrasslands.

111


5/24

ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLYin relations of dependence and reciprocity to sedentary com-munities in the area-their culture is such as to presuppose thepresence of such communities and access to their products (Barth1960:345)." Going on to describe the relations of a variety ofnomadic adaptations to sedentary societies, he notes that thequality of exchange and joint land-use will be the outcome, inpart, of the potential for expansion of the militarily dominantpopulation (Barth 1960:346; also 1956:1088).Force alone, however, does not bear the primary burden ofdetermining the degree of mutuality achieved in peasant-nomadexchange systems, nor does it entirely set the distribution ofethnically defined modes of production in a region. In an analysisof Swat (1956), in other discussions of nomadic pastoralism(e.g. 1960) and with reference to the functions of ethnicity(1969: 19-20) Barth proposes that stable patterns of co-residenceexpressed in niches (in ethnically heterogeneous systems) arisefrom differing but complementary modes of production. Eachof these is delineated by political and social usages which estab-lish the boundaries of the niche. With respect to the nomadicpastoralist niche, he states that ". .. there are no competingand more effective means of utilizing the seasonal pastures onwhich the nomadic adaptation is based; it remains the onlyeconomically viable form (Barth 1960:353)." Further, he stressesthat the exchanges themselves generate this stable relationship, ifthey are phrased as value equivalent ...

In areas where pastoral nomadism has been developed as acompletely full-time specialization, and all agricultural andindustrial goods are obtained in exchange for value equiva-lents in pastoral produce, a relatively peaceful and closemarket relationship is established between the two segmentsof the society, even without effective controlling mechanisms(Barth 1960:354).

It is not the purpose here to give a critique of Barth's work.However, Barth rasies a number of questions which are centralto an attempt to specify the minimal conditions of peasant-nomad land-use mutualism; viz. the importance of relative powerof the specialized ethnic groups in contact, the stability of theexchange system, and how the degree of exchange mutuality isrelated to other socio-economic variables within either political

112


6/24

economy. Also, without faulting the overall thrust of the analysisquoted from above, it would seem that the logic of power in con-junction with the common need on the part of nomadic popula-tions to secure grazing in potentially arable areas makes it tauto-logical to posit value equivalent exchange as the independentvariable and a close market relationship as the dependent one.Rather, as Barth himself suggests, reciprocity or value equivalencein exchange is affected by the relative power of the groups en-gaging in the different modes of production (Barth 1960:346;1956:1088).Also, it must not be taken as given that ethnic specialization oreven high land-use mutually makes for the most effective orefficient use of resources in a region, as is perhaps the case forSwat. This teleoloical aspect of the model is implicit in thegeneral assumption that as a cultural system (like that of thePathans) expands to the limits of its political economy, so theselimits will coincide with the extremes set by the peak efficiency ofthat population's major mode of production due to the materialrequirements of the social organization (cf. Barth 1.956:1081).It is rare, however, in the Near East for any society to be organi-zationally so committed to one level or one mode of productionthat it cannot easily accommodate great variations in the basicadaptation without lass of its political coherence. Certainly thesegmentary tribal structures, of all types, commonly associatedwith nomadic pastoral societies and many village communitieslack this rigidity, and very often a tribal unit will encompass con-siderable diversity in modes of production.This will be made clearer when we examine the concept ofpeasant-nomad mutualism in terms of the minimal conditionswhich must obtain for value equivalent exchange to be ap-proached. The adjustment described by any set of inter-popula-tion relations is necessarily temporary. Each of the contiguouspopulations, agricultural or nomadic pastoralist, reacts dynami-cally to selective pressures internal as well as external to itssocio-economic structure. Just as each group might react differ-ently to changes in its external environment, so might each handlechanges in its own domnesticpolitical economy differently. Demo-graphic pressures,for example, are often treated differently amongpastoralists than among their settled agricultural neighbors in the

ROLE OF THE STATE 113


7/24

ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLYsame ecosystem, reflecting the different limitations inherent inland and animals as property.

Although nomadic pastoralism as a full-time specialization hasmany requirements for non-pastoral products, and usually canoffer products and services needed by sedentary populations inreturn, any such system of exchange or joint land-use representsthe resolution of a number of potentially disruptive forces. Thesedisruptive forces reflect the differences in the adaptations to ani-nals and land as primary resources,and the nature of ethnicity asa boundary-keeping mechanism.Foremost among processes which reduce the potential for highmutuality is direct competition for access to land. In any ecologi-cal setting, the farmer is exploiting land that would be, or couldbe utilized by nomadic pastoralists as pasture. There is usually aclear limit to the expansion of agriculture in a region, marked bysuch physical characteristics as soil or rainfall. The converse israrely true. Rather political boundaries, the barriers erected byforce or political convention restrict nomadic incursion intoarable lands.

In virtually every area of peasant-nomad contact, crop damagedue to nomad animals is a matter of local contention and theadjudication, if done at all, is a matter of conflict.

Demographic pressureon resourcesarising within either society,can dictate territorial expansion as an attractive alternative toa redistribution of resources already available in a given politicaleconomy. Ethnic distinctions often make the land of neighboringgroups prime targets in the relieving of demographic imbalances(cf. Barth 1959:20). Also nomads whose herds fail to meet theminimum requirements for household self-sufficiency are oftenforced to settle (Barth 1960). Often (as in Turkey) nomads whosettle must interject themselves into ethnically different andinitially hostile communities (Bates 1971).No ethnic economic specialization is immutable because a so-ciety can drastically vary its basic mode of production in an ex-tremely short period. There are many instances where nomadictribes have settled, displacing ethnically different agriculturalpopulations. Ethnic stereotypes are not sufficient in themselvesto reserve a mode of production from possible inroads by othergroups. The much discussed nomadic antipathy for peasants is

114


8/24

ROLE OF THE STATE 115usually an expression of ethnic hostility. Should nomadic animalhusbandry become economically a poor allocation of householdcapital, such hostility is rarely a-substantial barrier to settlementand agriculture (cf. Bates 1971). Likewise, it is not at all un-known for sedentary communities to spawn nomadic pastoralhouseholds, even in areas where nomadic pastoralism is asso-ciated with a different ethnic group (Haaland 1969:59-73).Furthermore, there is in most situations a marked inability tocontrol inter-ethnic conflict. The segmentary political systemsmost often seen in the Near East tend to ramify external opposi-tion through as wide a political network as possible, thus makingconflict, once started, difficult to dampen. Similarly, there maybe a tendency to emphasize short-term economic gain in trans-actions with cross-ethnicor narrow community boundaries whichagain would mitigate against mutualism in systems without over-arching political control directed to this end. Collectively theabove are disjunctive factors which tend to lessen reciprocity, toput pressureon respective niche boundaries and thus to erode theeconomic basis for complementarity in production.

Exchange or mutuality is affected not only by divisive condi-tions mentioned above, but by the potential for complementaryexchange between two specializations. Potential for reciprocalpeasant-nomad exchange is, largely, inversely proportional to theself-sufficiencyof each population with regardsto the productionor services of the other.

Peasant communities vary greatly in the amount of animalhusbandry practiced in conjunction with agriculture, but mostneed not rely on external sources of animal products to meetminimum demands for protein and dairy goods. Probably moreimportant are secondary nomadic services such as transportationof commercial crops to market as was the case in southeasternTurkey prior to World War II (Bates 1971), in providing ferti-lizer for fallow fields (cf. Kolars 1963) and for protection fromthe predation of other nomads (cf. Musil 1928). In recent years,payment for grazing rights is a contribution to certain sedentarycommunities made by nomadic groups in Turkey (cf. Kolars1963; Bates 1971).However, the point to be stressed in this context is that peasant-nomad land-use and exchange systems are often less reciprocal or


9/24

ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLYmutual than is potentially feasible. This is to say that actualrelations do not represent a simple balance of local processes ofeconomic adjustment, nor do they display a teleologic tendencyfor maximum efficiency in land-use systems involving ethnicallydifferent specializations. Each population, it may be assumed,is interested in increasing its own production and security asevaluated in the short-run. This renders the structure created bya system of peasant-nomad interaction extremely sensitive toshifts of power, whether instigated by forces outside the regionor from pressures within either society. There is a potential or,perhaps, even a centrifugal tendency towards degrading the sys-tem, to reduce any region of shared co-exploitation to one wherea single ethnic specialization dominates to the exclusion or re-striction of others. Successful adaptations of one society are takenover by other groups, and security is often given precedence overproduction and profitable exchange.

The reasons for this devolve on the question of coordinatingeconomic processes within the ecosystem, and how power fromthe outside affects these regulatory processes.In the examples given by Barth for Swat it seems assumedthat peasant-nomad exchange and land use tended to producehomeostasis; that regulation is located in the ecosystem itself(Barth 1956). He makes reference to the absence of state au-thority (until 1917) and attributes the stability of the system tothe fact that the fullest expansion of the dominant society hadalready occurred, and that there was little direct competition(Barth 1956:1079; 1960). At the same tine sedentary agricul-tural communities could not raise sufficient animals to exploitdistant pastures as relatively stationary herds are limited by theamount of grain and stored forage needed to carry them throughthe winter in the village (Barth 1956: passim).

However, although the nature of the terrain and the vegeta-tional cycles establish the outer limits of migration and providethe direct economic impetus for mountain nomadic pastoralism,it is incorrect to view every schedule of migration as a predictableresponse only to available but marginal grazing land. Further-more, it might with equal accuracy be interpreted as a politicalresponse of a community which is less powerful as it adapts itscycle of movement to the economic round of activities of a

116


10/24

ROLE OF THE STATEdominant society. Or, in some areas, the response itself may lie indominating and restricting a weaker sedentary mode of produc-tion.

With an ecological approach to peasant-nomad interaction onemust consider that high mutualism does not arise from the ex-ploitation of non-competitive niches, but rather from the controlof conflict generated by often antithetical social and economicprocesses associated with the different patterns of land-use. Suchcontrols are often a function of how each society articulates withextra-regional polities, including ethnically similar populations ofwhich each is the local representative.We have mentioned that the power of the state in most of theMiddle East is of importance in determining local forms of inter-population exchange. Somewhat more information is called for atthis point. But before continuing it is necessary to note thatnothing more than a general outline can be provided, as notonly is the ecology of the region complex, but also the forms ofstate or "national" authority vary greatly from place to place,as they have through history.It is, I think, useful to distinguish as Coon does betweensovereignty and suzerainty with regards to the Near Eastern state(Coon 1951:262-268). Since very early historical times no areahas fallen outside the claimed political borders of some centralgovernment. However, the amount of authority exercised by anystate, or feudal kingdom, varies considerably. Often the politicalclaims of erstwhile powerful governments amount to little in theday-to-day governing of distant or geographically inaccessibleprovinces (e.g. Coon 1951 ). But no matter how tenuous the state'ssuzerainty, its formal claim to rule makes it amenable to manipu-lation by local political, often tribal, forces, each eager to tap whatsources of power are available. This is somewhat different thanthe traditional picture of state and local community relations,according to which the village or tribe is held to be the passivesubject of the wider political aims of the central government. Asoften as not, the local power structures at a village or tribal levelare concerned with transforming public force in the name of thestate to personal or narrow community ends. When the state isable, there is little hesitation for it actively to intervene in theallocation of resources and territories among competing factions.

117


11/24

ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLYBut in every situation state power is a resource to be exploitedby local contenders for supremacy or economic dominance.It is difficult to generalize for an area as large and varied as isthe Near East. What follows is only an attempt to suggest direc-tions for possible detailed inquiry.For example, in areas where the state's control is absolute, ornearly so, it is usually interested in maximizing total productionand hence the tax base, in any region. This is done usually with-out regard to which ethnic group, if any, monopolizes the relevantmodes of products.The border reaches of Near Eastern states have witnessed vir-tually every strategem of political control or manipulation. Forexample, in those border regions which were difficult to control,Ottoman policy was aimed continually at shifting support amongethnic groups, allowing none to achieve supremacy or to es-tablish stable exercise of authority which might jeopardize theclaim of sovereignty of the state.If the region controlled or secured lay on critical internal traderoutes, such as across Syria in Ottoman times, the state might tryto achieve stability at the expense of production by supporting themilitarily dominant local political force. For example, agriculturewas frequently sacrificed for security of communications as thegovernment (Ottoman) allied itself with powerful Bedouintribes. Such support was rarely consistent because the ultimateobjective was always complete control. At the same time thegovernment strived to prevent any tribe or ethnic group fromsetting up a reliable power base which could not be destroyed byshifting alliances.The exercise of this power, even if through less than full con-trol of local political apparatuses, has an important effect on thelocal ecosystem, as will be shown in the following examples.

Irrigation Agriculture: Large-scale River ValleyIrrigation plays a vital role in the agriculture of the Near East;more so where exotic rivers serve as the source of water. Every-where such large-scale hydraulic works are associated with rigor-ous state control, high population density and labor intensivecommercial cropping geared to a relatively efficient transporta-tion system. Egypt, Sudan and Iraq supply traditional examples,

118


12/24

ROLE OF THE STATEwith new developments in Syria and Iran soon to present similaraspects. Large-scale irrigation usually presents clear ecologicalboundaries between crop land and the desert. There is little fringearea capable of supporting nomadic small animal husbandry asfound on the Syrian Steppe or Zagros foothills.The camel pastoralists of the inner desert tend to articulate di-rectly with the central government. The government is concernedalways with presenting itself as a buffer between its peasant popu-lation and forces from the outside.3 The great disparity in popu-lation size makes the effects of nomadic demands for agriculturalproducts negligible on the system.4 The peasant has slight needfor pastoral products. His demands for meat are minimal, andhe can supply animal traction better by stall feeding on grassgrown intensively by irrigation. The nomad formerly did have asecondary impact on the peasantry in that defense against possiblepredation resulted in increased taxation or military levies.

When there is direct peasant-nomad contact it historically hasresulted in the destruction or reduction of irrigation works, butnot in an institutionalized system of exchange. The potential forcomplete mutuality is very low through shared use of land, al-though exchange via trader intermediaries is important fornomadic groups. An economic analysis would show that thepeasant community requires little of what the nomad produces;irrigation leaves little of the arable landscape open to pastoralism.Nomadic requirements for urban goods are supplied through in-termediaries.

However, as I shall point out for other areas, this lack of aclose economic fit need not entirely preclude mutuality in land3 Evans-Pritchard gives a good account of how surplus animal productsfrom Cyrenaica flowed to Egyptian markets via urban-based traders. Henotes, too, the pains taken by the Egyptian government to forestall anydirect nomadic contact in strength with local sedentary populations (Evans-Pritchard 1948:29-65). Musil cites a similar situation whereby Rwala camelsare sold in Egyptian markets via intermediaries (Musil 1928). Related tothis, the pastoral nomadic economy developed in the Sinai and ArabianPeninsula, as well as in Cyrenaica, had certain urban-mercantile require-ments. Musil writes that weaponry and articles of apparel must be procuredfrom traders. Also approximately one camel load of grain (150 lbs.) peradult and 50 loads per chief is needed annually (Musil 1928:90). The Rwalasupply most of this from tributary villages.4 While the requirements for agricultural products by pastoral nomads maybe insignificant in the total market structure, they may be important for

communities in direct contact with nomadic tribes.

119


13/24

ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLYuse. The crux of the problem seems to lie in the respective politicalstructures of the two groups. Large-scale irrigation agriculture re-quires sufficient central control to maintain upstream canalsystems. The segmentary tribal organization of the camel pastoral-ist facilitates the formation of large political groups in response toexternal threat, but stable groupings with strong leadership arenot easily arrived at otherwise. Strong central control, if ever,is exercised only in times of war or raiding, and is of short dura-tion. Although camel pastoralistscan incorporate oasis settlementsand isolated villages as tributary dependencies, the greater popu-lation size and administrative sophistication associated with statescontrolling large-scale irrigation systems is usually beyond thescope of descent-based segmentary political integration. If theyshould militarily conquer such a state, they either rapidly acquirethe accoutrements of an urban elite, or they maximize the shortrun benefits by destroying the system altogether (cf. Lattimore1962). Here peasant-nomad mutualism falls at the negative endof the continuum since direct contact usually results in the de-struction of the militarily weaker mode of production rather thanits incorporation into a common polity, or the establishment ofstable patterns of joint land use.

Rainfall Plains Agriculture: North Syrian SteppeAlthough the Northern Syrian Steppe (ca. 8" rainfall limits)marks the limits of grain agriculture to the peasant farmer, it also

represents prime grazing to a variety of nomadic pastoralists.Mountain nomads such as the Kurdish and Tiirkmen tribes ofsoutheastern Turkey and Syria use the steppes as winter grazing,while small-animal herding Arab tribes on the fringes of theSyrian desert approach the best watered foothill regions in timesof summer drought and likewise for winter grazing. The muchcommented upon tell remains of former villages give testimony tothe historical ebb and flow of desert and sown land. This varia-tion cannot be attributed to known climatic fluctuations, althoughperiodic drought does make the agricultural economy more pre-carious.

Scholars dealing with the Levant have been careful to note thepositive correlation between the strength of the sovereign centralgovernment and the expansion of grain agriculture into the desert

120


14/24

ROLE OF THE STATEperiphery,parallelingthe sedentarization f formerpastoralists(cf. Hitti 1960; Sweet 1960; Ashkenazi 1938). This modelmight be further expanded to encompass the Bedouin of theinner desert. Musil states that during periods of increased gov-ernmental control and agricultural expansion, poorer segmentsof Bedouin camel herding tribes are sloughed off into sheep/goatpastoralism, thus replacing the forner small animal herders ab-sorbed by agriculture (Musil 1929:45). Presumably a reversetrend is possible in times of governmental weakness, although it islittle documented in the literature.There is adequate documenta-tion that land under cultivation declined in the period followingOttoman conquest (1517) and that pastoral nomadic groupsfrom elsewhere infiltrated the area (Sweet 1960.43 ).5Ottoman pashas sent out from Constantinople had a freehand in governing their districts during their short tenures andnormally operated through local chieftains to collect tax levies inkind. However, frequently a tribe would be paid by the govern-ment to maintain security and trade (Sweet 1960:43). In thenineteenth century the Ottomans began a programof agriculturaldevelopment and forced settlement of nomadic groups. Apartfrom Midhat Pasha. such governors as Dervish Pasha and CevdetPasha were extremely effective in forcibly settling Kurdish, Araband Tiirkmen tribes by bringing the full brunt of the militaryto bear on individual tribes while at the same time offering triballeaders title to large tracts of land (Siimer 1967). Peasant groupsfrom elsewhere, including Circassians, were settled in the area.The Mandate and sul)sequent regimes continued this policy. Thepresent settlement pattern in northwest Syria and southeasternTurkey is one of interspersedtribal, non-tribal villages, and mixedvillages.6

5 "During the first three centuries of Ottoman rule both population andeconomic conditions steadily declined. In the late 18th century over 400taxable villages were left in the Aleppo area of the 3200 counted at thebeginning of Ottoman rule" (Hitti 1951:674 quoted in Sweet 1960:43)."During this period nomadic shepherd peoples and camel Bedouin began tomove into northern Syria" (Sweet 1960:43).6 "Because it (Tell Toqaan) lies within a zone of recent competition be-tween cultivation and nomadic pastoralism, peoples representing both systemsor subcultures have sought control of it and its well-watered lands.". .."As a result, the most distinctive fact concerning Tell Toqaan, now, is thepresence in the village of two subcultures: what remains of nomadic shepherdpastoral tradition in a sedentary community and what remains of agricul-tural peasant tradition in a culturally heterogeneous community" (Sweet1960:226).

121


15/24

122 ANTHROPOLOGICALQUARTERLYTell Toqaan, a village in this area, was established during thelate nineteenth century and was non-tribal in political structure

(Sweet 1960).7 Following the upheavals of the early Mandateera it was taken over by the elite of the Bu Layle tribe but con-tinued sedentary agriculture as a "mixed" tribal village withnon-tribal sections (Sweet 1960).There are still nomadic pastoralists in the Tell Toqaan areaand a high degree of mutuality obtained between them and boththe tribal and non-tribal peasants at the time of Sweet's study(1954). The peasant makes contractual arrangements wherebynomads herd village flocks. The village allows nomad flocks tograze on fallow fields and to pass through village lands duringmigration. Some grain and manufactured items are sold to thenomads, but the preferred payment for herding is in sheep. Thecontracts are considered equitable and are freely entered into.This situation is clearly related to the presence of the nationalgendarmerie adding to the local power of the sedentary popula-tion.8

Formerly this was not the case. During times of pastoral no-madic dominance, such agricultural villages as remained intacteither paid tribute to a pastoral tribe or were maintained as seg-ments of a strong tribe (Sweet 1960:191). Village contacts withcamel nomads were limited to sporadic raids, and formalizedtributary relationships were mainly with sheep pastoralists.In short, the equilibrium established between the two modesof production is a function of the manner in which power entersthe system from the outside In Tell Toqaan mutuality is notgenerated by the complementary nature of the two modes ofproduction. The peasant is virtually self-sufficient and can pro-vide for his own animal requirements. Nomadic demands for theproducts of agriculture can be supplied better through tributeand urban trade. Although at the time of Sweet's study thepeasant-nomad pattern of land-use and exchange was highlymutual, this is a transitory state and can be expected to change

7 The following description is taken from Sweet's. village study in TellToqaan, 1960.8 "Competition for and cooperation in land usage between sedentary agri-culture and nomadic pastoralism have developed between the two systemsterms of contract or political relations which reflect the relative strength ofone or the other in control of the land" (Sweet 1960:4).


16/24

ROLE OF THE STATEto the furtherdetrimentof the nomad as the presentgovernmentextends its control (cf. Awad 1960: passim). The governmentviews tribal power as a threat and normallytakes steps to en-sure the extensionof a tax-payingbodyof peasantry n areasitcan control.However,if it lackssufficient trengthto do this, itwill treat with tribal leadersfor a minimalconditionof security.The beneficiaryof village-nomad elationships largelydeter-mined by the nature of their articulation with the government,and the policies of the government. Where the government isforced to depend upon tribal force for the maintenance of se-curity, the peasant sector of the area involved will suffer, andeven the remaining tribal villages will be likely to become tribu-tary to more powerful groups.9 Unlike inter-tribal warfare, raidsagainst non-tribal village populations for territoryare moresanguinary (Musil 1928:577-632; Irons 1965:400). As thepastoralists"represent"he government n such cases, there islittle appeal for protection except to rival tribal groups. Theexistence of this option would seemingly encourage less stableand more predatory peasant-nomad relations. The upshot is thatthe limits of effective agriculture recede to the outer peripheryof governmental control.

SoutheasternTurkey:YoriikMountainPastoralNomadsA final example,analagousto Barth'sdescriptionof Swat, isthat of the joint exploitationof the landscapein southeasternTurkeyby peasantand nomadiccommunities.The followingisfrom an area studiedby me (see also Hiittroth 1959, Kolars

1963).The area included in and lying between the winter and sum-mer pastures of the Saiikara Yoriik, and related tribes, representsa succession of ecological zones, each related to altitude as oneproceeds upward from the inland Amik Plains. This zonal di-versity is expressed in a series of village types. These range,roughly, from highly mechanized commercial wheat, cotton and!"Dickson and Musil mention tributary villages of camel nomads, but donot specify whether oasis or rain-fed agriculture is involved. Musil cites acase where the Rwala raid a village but are forced to return the loot andpay damages as the villagers were lucky enough to capture a number ofRwala camels (Musil 1928:47-60). The Rwala feel that the fellahin are

obliged to supply them with grain as tax or huwa (Musil 1928:60).

123


17/24

124 ANTHROPOLOGICALQUARTERLYrice growing villages in the lowlands which singularly or in aggre-gate are commonly dominated by large landlords, through foot-hill and middle slope communities which practice run-off irriga-tion and dry field grain agriculture and horticulture. At the high-est altitudes, both in Maras and in Kayseri Provinces, villages atthe upper limits of agriculture exploit a grain and mixed crop sub-sistence economy with limited irrigation, strongly supplementedby sedentary cattle and small animal pastoralism. Ethnic diversityis notable, but except when taken in the broadest sense does notcorrespond to differences in the local ecology. The lowlands arepredominantly settled by Barakli Turkmen and Sunni Kurdswho were forced to sedentarize in the 19th century. Villagesthrough the middle slopes are aga;n often Tiirkmen Avcar, Aleviand Sunni Kurds, Circassian and "Macar" (recent Turkish im-migrants from Eastern Europe). No ethnically defined popula-tion has a monopoly of any mode of production except for theYoriik who are nomadic pastoralists.Virtually all access to grazing is negotiated with non-Yoriik, asthere are only two Yoriik villages, both of which are in the areaof winter pasture and are open to grazing by members of thelocal lineages only. There is a certain amount of direct peasant-nomad exchange of foodstuffs, and nomads often purchase in-expensive manufactured products from village peddlers whilein the higher summer pastures. More commonly, Yoriik economictransactions take place in the market places along their migra-tory route, often with settled Yoriik shopkeepers who extendcredit.

The Yriik, quite like the mountain nomads discussed byBarth, have a migratory schedule that takes the herds throughvillages at times complementary to the agricultural cycle. Landfor winter pasture (Ki0lak) is rented for cash payment from vil-lage landlords in the lowland plain, and the animals are put onfallow grain, cotton or rice following harvest in September andOctober. The migration north to upland pastures (yayla) startsconcurrent with the impetus warm weather gives to nearly dor-mant winter wheat, and before the results of spring planting be-come as temptation to the sheep.Yoriik sheep, if unshorn, are driven early April up the routeto summer pastures; those which have been shorn follow a few


18/24

ROLE OF THE STATEweeks later. In moving upward, the animals graze along the road-way, utilizing grass that is not used by the villagers, includingfallow fields.The summer pastures are owned by Av?ar, Kurdish and Cir-cassian villages, usually as village commons (mer'a). This landis let for cash payment at public auction supervised by govern-ment officials, although in practice direct, illicit, dealings arrangedbetween village headmen (muhtar) and Y6riik are the rule.In fall, after harvest is nearly completed in the upland villagesthe longer, more leisurely migration to winter quarters in theAmik Plains begins. During this period the flocks graze on freshstubble and fallow, when the chance of damage to crops isvirtually non-existent until the actual winter quarters are reachedagain in October.It is clear that both the potential for exchange is great andthat a high degree of mutuality in land use is evidenced duringparts of the migratory schedule. Villages at either end of themigratory route cannot make full use of available grazing dueto the necessity to maintain sedentary flocks through all seasonson the same grasslands, thus limiting herd size by the amount offorage available at the worst season. Furthermore, this pastureis rented annually to the nomadic herders for cash payment,which represents an income either for individuals or for villagetreasuries that would not otherwise accrue. The herds move in aschedule that corresponds with the harvest and planting cycles ofthe villages so that damage to crops is minimized. If there isdamage, it is usually paid for.This high degree of mutuality is not the consequence of strictlyeconomic forces at work. The Y6riik entered the area at the turnof the century and migration into the region continued throughWorld War II. This was a result of pressure on traditionalYoriik grazing lands along the southern Anatolian coast. Priorto the arrival of the Yoriik, the forced sedentarization of Kurdishand Tirkmen tribes starting in 1865, had been largely accom-plished, a project which arose from the government's desire tobring politically threatening tribes under control. As in Iraq andelsewhere, the leaders of these tribes were given title to large tractsof formerly tribal land, and many of their descendents are foundamong the largest landlords of the region today. The Yoriik,

125


19/24

ANTHROPOLOGICALQUARTERLYwhen they came into the region, filled an economic niche ofpastoral nomadism which had been vacated for strictly politicalreasons. The grazing land still remained, as did open routes ofaccess between summer and winter pasture.The present high level of reciprocity in exchange is largely amatter of relative power. The Yoriik were permitted to enterthe region and to remain nomadic as they were never the threatto the state that the more powerful Tiirkmen and Kurdish tribeshad been. The Yoriik are in many ways representative of theadaptation of a politically weaker entity to the demands of astronger one.The Yoriik migratory schedule is adapted to the agriculturalcycles of the various villages, not because it is the optimum forgrazing, or because it coincides with other productive require-ments of the Yoriik. It is a political adjustment.The pasture fee is a similar matter, and represents the strengthof local law enforcement agencies, together with village interestin making maximum use of lands to which they hold title. Nohousehold or group of tents can acquire access to grazing byforce even though they might well be able to overpower an in-dividual village or owner should violence occur.Prior to 1949 grazing was, by all accounts, free in most areas,with payment, if any, consisting of inconsequential gifts of cheeseor butter. Now grazing fees exacted with government assistanceare a major form of capital outlay for the nomads, and the cashrequirements of grazing payments have led to elaborate on-goingcredit transactions within the tribes. It has also raised the mini-mun herd size needed to support a family unit from ca. 50 in theprevious generation to over 100 animals at the present time(average 268 sheep). This has pressured many families to settle.It is also likely that inflation of pasture fees will continue,

andthat total nomadic herd production might well be impaired,and that fewer animals will be maintained than can be supportedby the resources available.Yoriik animals would be often better served by staying longerin the lowlands than is presently possible due to the danger ofcrop damage. Grazing along the route to summer pastures is oftenpoor, although it would not be if village agriculture were notso extensive. If government control was not as finn as it is now,

126


20/24

ROLE OF THE STATEit would be safe to say that much marginal agricultural landwould revert to grazing as the risk of animal damage would makeit unprofitable. Furthermore, pastures now rented would almostcertainly be claimed by force.

Formerly, Yoriik tribes if not clearly dominant, were strongenough and mobile enough to avoid paying grazing fees andfines for crop damage. At that time the amount of land undercultivation in the area of both summer and winter pastures wasless, by local accounts, and that land which was cultivated wasrestricted to that of the best quality. Part of the increase in agri-culture is due to technological advances and the reclaiming ofswamp lands throughout the area. Another reason for pressureon grazing in the winter quarters is the increase in village popula-tion concomitant to the clearing of the land, and a rising birthrate due to the eradication of malaria within the last 20 years.But it is nevertheless true that if government control were notas effective as it is, the Yoriik migratory schedule would bedifferent in an attempt to make optimum use of grazing in eachof the altitudinal zones through which they pass. Optimal grazingtimes do not always coincide with harvest and fallow fidd cydes.

ConclusionThe sketches presented of different pastoral nomadic adjust-

ments to sedentary village populations in shared geographicareas suggest that the degree of land-use mutuality, and the ex-tent to which exchange is phrased in equivalent value dependson a balance of power. It is also the case that sources of powerfrom outside the immediate system are important in determin-ing the local equilibrium which often results in the politicaldominance of one or the other of ethnically specialized modes ofproduction.This is by way of saying that nomadic pastoralism is oftenbest intelligible as a political response to other communities andthe state.?1 The migratory cycle, residental pattern and evenaspects of internal organization often become clearer when ap-proached from this perspective.

10A number of papers given at the Symposium on Nomadic Pastoralism,American Anthropological Association Meeting, November 1969 are con-cerned with this problem, in particular those given by Bates, Irons andSalzman.

127


21/24

ANTHROPOLOGICALQUARTERLYA more generalalbeitnegativeconclusion s that it is incorrectto equate stable patternsof mutualityand cose equivalentex-change with the non-competitivenatureof cultural nichesusinga shared environment.The type of mutuality achieved locallydoes not seen to have as much to do with the potentialfor ex-changeofferedby differentmodes of production.Although my paper has disculsedthe apparenteffects of ex-ternalsourcesof poweron local patternsof symbiosis, t has notsketchedthe local channels throughwhich it flows, and otherlocal organizationalforms affecting the peasant-nomadstruc-ture. For example,variations n tribalstructuremightbe a func-tion of how differentsocieties relate to the outside; however,

many variationscan also be correlatedwith the requirements fspecific problemsof herding and the economy. This organiza-tion itself affects the manner in which a communityarticulateswith the external world therebydetermining he sortsof culturebrokeragewhich develop, and the individuals,be they chiefs,agas, mayors, saints or others, who serve in this role to relatethe localgroupto the outside(cf. Wolf 1956).The formaldemandsof a specificpoliticaland socialstructurenot only shape the responseof that societyto new stimulae,butmay also determine the limits of its territorialexpansion andability to maintain monopoliesof production,or to adopt newones. There are numerousexamplesof such non-economic peci-fication of niche borders n the Near East. The Gypsiesreservea wide varietyof tasksfor themselvesby virtueof their low castestatus and the culturaldefinitionsof the servicesin which theyspecialize. In areas of great ethnic heterogeneity nvolving no-madic pastoralists,even relativelyminor distinctionsof ritual,religiosity, anguage,and social usageare seizedupon to channeleconomic cooperation,fix settlementpatternsand circumscribemarriagesystems.Ethnicitythus narrowlydefines the limits ofcommunity. The ecological consequencesof this behavior aredear: the resourcesare divided among social groupingswhichculturalvalues as well as economic processes end to reinforce(cf. Barth1969: introduction).The total effectsof these,however,extendbeyondtheirpurelyregulatory function. Quite often the hostilities generated bygroup-definingculturalusages threaten the exchange networks

128


22/24

they help to condition. Religion and ritual practices are goodexamples. On one level they may restrict or portion off certainmodes, of production, separating the nomadic pastoralists fromthe sedentary population by a cultural barrier. On another level,they simultaneously increase the chances of overt conflict whichcould disrupt the entire system.Unlike those of animal populations, the boundaries of nichesdefined by cultural behavior are extremely elastic. Even themost specialized population can in whole or part change itsadaptation rapidly in response to new conditions or in order totake over a more profitable mode of production. No monopolyon the production of either animal or agricultural goods is com-pletely secure against outside encroachment. In parts of South-eastern Turkey, formerly nomadic populations have within onegeneration come to dominate certain types of commercial enter-prises, as well as to compete successfully with long-establishedfarmers in mechanized market-directed agriculture.Numerous other factors condition on-going adjustment toother communities by any pastoral nomadic society. One is, per-haps, the length and variability of the migratory route. A no-madic mountain tribe normally has relations with a series ofvillages along its route. The existence of alternative routes, aswell as variations in local production and defense, affects po-tential for symbiosis or conflict. One would suspect that relationswith infrequently encountered villages would tend to be morepredatory. Among the Saqikara Y6riik more conflict arises be-tween nomads and villagers closer to upper pastures where boththe government's control is somewhat less and there is more di-rect competition for pastures between nomads and villagers.Villagers often try to make use of land which they own or haverented out to the nomadic herders.

All this makes it difficult to view mutualism as arising from theexploitation of non-competitive niches. It is often a result ofhow the groups in question relate to the central government, orotherwise establish a balance of power.Furthermore, where symbiotic relations develop betweenethnic groups, the structure is often so ridden with hostility, thatshould one community attain military dominance it might well



23/24

130 ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLYuse force to reduce mutualism, even to the detriment of its ownstandard of living. The peasant-nomad relationships where eachmode of production is ethnically defined, is normally so highlysensitive to shifts of power within it, that the threat of outsideintervention encourages each group to maximize its short-runbenefit. This is particularly exacerbated in frontier regions, thecharacteristic home of most mountain nomadism, where govern-ment control is the least consistent. It may also select for whatSalzman terms "multi-resource nomadism," the combining ofpastoralism with other modes of production within one tribalstructure (Salzman 1969).11The existence of most niches in the rural scene of the NearEast is as much a creation by forces exterior to the immediateareas, as the niches themselves are inherent in the landscape, oreven in the techniques of the peoples themselves. W'hetherspecificeconomies are in competition or cooperation in using a sharedarea, depends as much upon how they relate to the outside world,as upon how much they would be able to supplement each other'sdiet.

REFERENCES CITEDASHKENAZI, T.1938-Tribus semi-nomades de la Patestine du Nord. Paris: Libraireorientaliste Paul Geuther.ASWAD, B.1963-Social and ecological aspects in the origin of the Islamic state.Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and the Letters 47:419-422.1968-Land, marriage and lineage organization among sedentarizedpastoralists in the Hatay, Southern Turkey: a diachronic analysis.Ann Arbor: University Microfilms.ASWAD,M.1960-Nomadism in the arid lands of the Near East. In The problemsin the arid zone. Paris: UNESCO.BARTH, F.1953-Principles of social organization in southern Kurdistan. Oslo:

Brodrene Jorgensen.1956-Ecological relationships of ethnic groups in Swat West Pakistan.American Anthropologist 58: 1079-1089.11 The combining of sedentary agriculture and nomadic pastoralism withina common tribal political structure is quite common in the Near East. Insuch cases, not only can the requisite labor be easily assigned to the portionof the economy which needs it, but also, the two modes of production canpresent a common political front to the outside.In Islahiye, southeastern Turkey, the nomadic lineages most likely tocontinue profitable animal husbandry are those which have lineage membersin control of the two villages of settled Yoriik. The nomadic households areregistered as village dwellers, and have free use of village commons (mer'a).


24/24

1959-1960-Land use patterns of migratory tribes of south Persia. NorskGeografisk Tidsskrift 17:1-11.1960-Nomadism in the mountain and plateau areas of southwest Asia.In The problems of the arid zone. Paris: UNESCO.1961-Nomads of South Persia: the Basseri tribe of the Khamseh Con-federacy. New York: Humanities Press.1969-Ethnic groups and boundaries. F. Barth, ed., Boston: Little,Brown.BATES, D.1971-Shepherd becomes farmer: a study of nomadic settlement insoutheastern Turkey. In Turkish Society. P. Benedict andTumertekin, eds., Istanbul: University of Istanbul Press.COON, C.1951-Caravan: the story of the Middle East. New York: Henry Holt.DICKSON, H.1949-The Arab of the desert. London: Unwin.EVANS-PRITCHARD, .1949-The Senusi of Cyrenaica. Oxford: Clarendon Press.HAALAND,G.1969-Economic determinants in ethnic processes. In Ethnic groupsand boundaries. F. Barth, ed., Boston: Little, Brown.HITTI, P.1951-History of the Arabs. London: St. Martin's Press.HUTTEROTH, W. D.1959-Bergnomaden und Yaylabauern im mittlern kurdischen Taurus.

Marburg: Selbstverlag des Geographischen Institutes der Uni-versitlit Marburg.IRONS, W.1965-Livestock raiding among pastoralists: an adaptive interpretation.Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters 50:393-414.1969-The Yomut Turkmen: A study of kinship in a pastoral society.Ann Arbor: University Microfilms.KOLARS, J.1963-Season, tradition and change in a Turkish village. Chicago.LATTIMORE,O.1962-Inner Asian frontiers of China. Boston: Beacon.MUSIL, A.1928-Manners and customs of the Rwala Bedouin. New York: Amer-ican Geographical Association.ODUM, E.1959-Fundamentals of ecology. Philadelphia: Saunders.DE PLANHOL,X.1958-De la plaine Pamphylienne aux lacs Pisidiens: nomadisme etvie paysanne. Paris: Bibliotheque Archeologique et Historique del'Institut Francais d'Archeologie d'Istanbul.SALZMAN,P.1969-Mulitple resource nomadism in Iranian Baluchistan. Paper readat the American Anthropological Association Meetings, No-vember 1969, New Orleans.SUMER, F.1967-Oguzlar (Tiirkmenler): Tarihleri-Boy Teskilati-Destanlari. An-kara: Ankara tniversitesi Basimevi.SWEET, L.1960-Tell Toqaan: A Syrian village. Anthropological papers 14.Ann Arbor: Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan.WOLF, E.1956-Aspects of group relations in a complex society: Mexico. Amer-ican Anthropologist 58:6:1065-1078.


bates 1971 the role of the state in peasant nomad mutualism

Documents