Barclays Capital Tuesday Credit Call

Jeff MeliJigar PatelJustin Luther

September 20, 2011

Please see analyst certifications and important disclosures starting after slide 18.

The Fed may do the twist…will markets dance?

1

Agenda

Conference Call Information

Tuesday, 7:45am (EST)

Conference ID: 25800338

Dial-in:

+1-866-644-3260

+1-706-634-9973

Replay: Live.barcap.com

Credit

Conference Calls

Credit StrategyJeff Meli’s Piece

Credit ResearchJonathan Glionna – Head of Global Bank Credit Research

Corporate Bonds/CDS TradingAndrew Layng – Financials CashYoni Gorelov – Yankee Credit

Yana Bouchkanets – Barclays Capital Live

2

Last week, credit performance was mixed with CDS tighter and IG cash wider

CDX IG (9/12–9/19, bp) CDX IG and US Credit Index OAS (bp)

CDX HY and US HY Index OAS (bp)CDX HY (9/12–9/19, $)

___________________________Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

380

480

580

680

780

880

Aug-09 Feb-10 Aug-10 Feb-11 Sep-11440

540

640

740

840

CDX HY US HY OAS (rhs)

75

85

95

105

115

125

135

Aug-09 Feb-10 Aug-10 Feb-11 Sep-11125

145

165

185

205

225

CDX IG US Credit OAS (rhs)

122.0124.0126.0128.0130.0132.0134.0136.0138.0140.0

9/12 9/13 9/14 9/15 9/16 9/19Intraday Range Close

89.0

90.0

91.0

92.0

93.0

94.0

95.0

9/12 9/13 9/14 9/15 9/16 9/19Intraday Range Close

w/w chg: +4bp

w/w chg: -6bp

w/w chg: -5bp

w/w chg: -67bp

w/w change in price

CDX HY: +$2.40

HY Index: -$0.32

Yest:

+2.25bp

From the wides on 9/12, IGs have tightened ~11.5bp

Yest:

-$0.25

3

5.35%

0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%

TechConsDisc

IndFinS&PUtilMatTelcoEnergyHcareConsStp

Other risk assets performed well as equities rose sharply and volatility declined. Last week’s moves, however, were partially reversed yesterday amid renewed risk aversion

___________________________Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

1.90

2.10

2.30

2.50

2.70

2.90

8/1 8/4 8/9 8/12 8/17 8/22 8/25 8/30 9/2 9/7 9/12 9/15

10y yield rose 13bp last week, but largely

reversed the move yesterday

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

8/1 8/4 8/9 8/12 8/17 8/22 8/25 8/30 9/2 9/8 9/13 9/16

VIX has continued to find support at the 30 level

OutperformedUnderperformed

S&P 500 Sectors (w/w Change) Global Equity Indices Performance

VIX Intraday (since Aug 1) 10y UST Yield Intraday (%, since Aug 1)

(4%)

(2%)

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

S&P 500 DAX CAC 40 FTSE 100 NikkeiLast Week Yesterday

Last week’s strong performance was partially

reversed yesterday; France was a notable underperformer

4

4045505560657075808590

Jan-10 Aug-10 Mar-11Current Conditions Consumer Expectations

US macro data continue to point to a slowdown, and recent confidence surveys indicate a dampened outlook across both consumers and executives

___________________________Source: Commerce Department, Philadelphia Federal Reserve, NY Federal Reserve, University of Michigan/Thomson Reuters, Duke University/CFO Magazine, Haver Analytics, Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

(40)(30)(20)(10)

01020304050

Jan-10 May-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 May-11 Sep-11Philadelphia Fed Empire State Manufacturing

(1.0)

(0.5)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

Jun-10 Aug-10 Oct-10 Dec-10 Feb-11 Apr-11 Jun-11 Aug-11Survey Actual

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

3Q06 1Q07 3Q07 1Q08 3Q08 1Q09 3Q09 1Q10 3Q10 1Q11 3Q11

More Optimistic on US Economy More Optimistic on Own Firm

Advance Retail Sales (m/m, sa %) Regional Business Surveys

Duke/CFO Magazine Survey: % More OptimisticUniv of Michigan Consumer Confidence Survey

Surveys continued to indicate contraction

Retail sales were flat in Aug, and July was revised lower

While consumers’

assessment of current conditions rebounded, their expectations for 6

months from now hit the lowest level since 1980

5

In light of the weak data and persistently high unemployment, our economists expect the most likely outcome of the upcoming FOMC meeting will be a maturity extension of the Fed’s portfolio

The debate at this week’s 2-day FOMC meeting will likely hinge on the relative risks of long-term unemployment vs. inflation

Headline CPI inflation rose 3.8% y/y in August, boosted by a gain in gasoline prices. Our economists expect this factor to moderate, however core CPI still rose 2.0% y/yLong term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment is high with nearly half of the unemployed having been unemployed for 27 weeks or longer. This poses a significant risk that this population could face a gradual erosion of marketable job skills

Our economists believe the most likely FOMC meeting outcome will be a maturity extension of the Fed’s portfolio, or “Operation Twist”. Another option would be to reduce the interest paid on excess reserves (IOER). However, we view this option as less likely due to its asymmetric risk/reward profile1

Cutting IOER from 25bp would be unlikely to have a significant stimulative effect as FDIC insurance already discourages US banks from stockpiling excess reservesWith short-term yields already low, cutting IOER could possibly destabilize the already stressed short term funding market

FOMC Meeting 9/20/11-9/21/11 Core and Overall CPI (% y/y)

Long Term Unemployed, % of Total Unemployed

___________________________1.

“Fed set to ease further despite firming inflation.”

Global Economics Weekly, September 16th, 2011.Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

-3-2-10123456

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110

0.5

1

1.52

2.5

3

3.5

CPI Core CPI (rhs)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

6

Headlines out of the euro area continue to be a key driver of market activity, as mostly positive news supported the risk asset rally

On Wednesday, Moody’s downgraded the long-term debt rating of Societe Generale, citing funding and liquidity issues, and Credit Agricole, citing Greek exposure.

Following a conference call with Greek PM Papandreou, German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy announced they are “convinced”Greece will remain in the Euro area

The ECB announced in coordination with the Fed, BOE, BOJ, and SNB that it would conduct three USD liquidity operations with maturity of three monthson Oct 12, Nov 9, and Dec 7, in addition to the existing 1-week USD liquidity operations. Following the announcement, Euro basis swaps and the 3m Euribor-Eonia spread declined

Markets appeared hopeful ahead of the weekend’s ECOFIN meeting, However, the meeting yielded no new significant announcements

Last Week’s Key Events iTraxx Main and SnrFin w/w Change (bp)

MTD Change in 5y Sovereign CDS (bp)

___________________________Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

1-Apr 29-Apr 27-May 24-Jun 22-Jul 19-Aug 16-Sep

020406080

100120140160

31-Aug 4-Sep 8-Sep 12-Sep 16-Sep

Germany France Spain Italy

CDS moved wider yesterday across the core and periphery, reversing

some of last week’s tightening

Last week was the best week for European CDS

indices since July

Largely reversed

yest.

Last week

7

However, concerns around the Greek debt situation remain, and virtually every potential outcome or solution appears marginal at best

Event / Outcome Implication6th

tranche (€8bn) of 2010 bailout is released

Should provide enough funding for Greece into Dec; but only amounts to a near-term band aid

PSI is successful Would put Greece’s debt/GDP on a borderline sustainable path1; assumes Greece can meet fiscal targets in the future

PSI is not successful Would likely result in the collapse of the 2nd

bailout package and greater writedowns for the private sector; German Chancellor Merkel has said she would not let Greece go into “uncontrolled insolvency”

Orderly Default “Orderly”

assumes measures have been put in place to safeguard/recapitalize banks and stem contagion to Italy and Spain; no visibility on this yet

Disorderly default Difficult to quantify; could be characterized by a further (severe) risk asset sell-off, a sharp rise in funding costs for sovereigns that are perceived as stressed, bank runs, and increased fear of bank failures; presumably, the market panic would spur euro area officials to take action

___________________________1. See “Global Synthesis: Europe contemplates a “controlled insolvency”,“

Global Economics Weekly, September 16, 2011.Source: Bank of Greece, Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

Greek Government Bond Yields (%) Implications of Potential Greek Outcomes

Dom. Deposits Households & Businesses (€bn)

150

170

190

210

230

250

Sep-05 Feb-07 Jul-08 Dec-09 May-11

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jul-11 Sep-111012141618202224262830

2y 5y (rhs)

8

Within credit, our analysts have re-initiated coverage on European banks with an underweight. While capital ratios and financing sources have improved, questionable asset quality limits the potential upside

___________________________Source: SNL, Company Reports, Bloomberg, Barclays CapitalFor details, see “European Banks: Reinitiating Coverage –

Underweight,”

by Jonathan Glionna, Miguel Angel Hernandez, and Conor Pigott, September 13th

2011.

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

Q1 11Q3 10Q1 10Q3 09Q1 09Q3 08Q1 081,700

1,750

1,800

1,850

1,900

1,950

2,000

GDP (euro 16, €bn) NPL Ratio (rhs)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2006H1 2007H1 2008H1 2009H1 2010H1 2011H11

1.05

1.1

1.15

1.2

Aggregate Deposits Loan / Deposit Ratio (rhs)

0%2%4%6%8%

10%12%14%16%18%

UB

SN

CS

GN

RB

S

HS

BA

DB

K

ISP

LLO

Y

CB

K

BN

P

GLE

SA

N

BB

VA

AC

A

UC

G

1H07 1H11

European Banks Core Tier 1 % Eur. Bank Deposits (€bn) and Loan/Deposit Ratio

Euro Area GDP and Non-Performing Loan RatioLoan / Deposit Ratio, Global ComparisonBank asset quality is the primary concern

European banks have decreased their reliance on

wholesale financing in favor of more stable deposit funding

50%

60%70%

80%90%

100%110%

120%

1Q06 3Q06 1Q07 3Q07 1Q08 3Q08 1Q09 3Q09 1Q10 3Q10 1Q11

Europe Canada U.S. Japan

However, they remain reliant on wholesale financing relative to other regions

Core Tier 1 Ratios are improved across the

board vs. 1H07

9

Indeed, euro area banks continue to have significant sovereign debt exposure. This risk could potentially be mitigated using the EFSF, either through capital injections or debt guarantees

Recently, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has called for capital injections to European banks, possibly via the EFSF1

A direct EFSF injection could position European banks to withstand large haircuts to SGIIP debt but would require ~€230bn and leave many SGIIP banks semi-nationalized

A guarantee would be less burdensome but would be riskier and might be too stressful on several individual countries

EFSF Options for Supporting Euro Banking

Potential EFSF Injections, % Core Tier 1

Exposure to SGIIP 50% Haircut, % Core Tier 1

Potential Commitments in a Guarantee, % GDP

___________________________1.

“Lagarde

sees global crisis of confidence.”

Financial Times, September 15, 2011.Source: ECB, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg, Barclays Capital Equity

ResearchFor details, see “Thinking the Thinkable?: What saving the euro means for European

banks.”

Barclays Capital European Banks Equity Research, September 15, 2011.

0%20%40%60%80%

100%120%140%

Gre

ece

Luxe

mbo

urg

Cyp

rus

Spa

inIta

lyP

ortu

gal

Bel

gium

Irela

ndG

erm

any

Fran

ceN

ethe

rland

sS

love

nia

Aus

tria

UK

Mal

taS

wed

enFi

nlan

dD

enm

ark

Hun

gary

Nor

way

Pol

and

Portugal / Ireland / Greece Italy / Spain Sector Aggregate

0%20%40%60%

80%100%120%

Gre

ece

Irela

ndS

pain

Italy

Por

tuga

lLu

xem

bour

gS

love

nia

Bel

gium

Ger

man

yA

ustri

aN

ethe

rland

sD

enm

ark

Finl

and

Fran

ce UK

Hun

gary

Mal

taN

orw

ayP

olan

dS

wed

en

Private ownership of several SGIIP banking systems would

be called into question following a direct injection

0%50%

100%150%200%250%300%350%

Icel

and,

'08

Irela

nd, '

10

Italy

Bel

gium

Ger

man

y

Fran

ce

Aus

tria

Mal

ta

Net

herla

nds

Cyp

rus

Spa

in

Finl

and

Slo

vaki

a

Slo

veni

a

Luxe

mbo

urg

Est

onia

Sovereign Debt Bank Term Debt Share of EFSF Guarantee

Potential liabilities in a guarantee could bring several nations’

liabilities close to levels of Ireland 2010 which required a bailout

10

In the UK, the ICB report was mixed for bondholders. Ring-fencing and loss absorption rules should allow banks to remain competitive, while depositor preference is a negative for unsecured bondholders

___________________________Source: ICB, Company Reports, Barclays CapitalFor details, see “European Banks: ICB Final Report –

Mixed for Bondholders,”

by Jonathan Glionna, Miguel Angel Hernandez, and Conor Pigott, September 15th, 2011.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Without depositor preference With depositor preference

Bank deposits, repos, CP/CD Covered bonds, securitisationsCustomer deposits Senior unsec. & cust. depositsSenior unsecured bonds Subordinated liabilitiesEquity

7.00% 7.00%

3.00% 2.50%

1.50%1.50%

2.00%2.00%

6.50% 7.00%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

Ring-fenced bank Bank groupBasel III T1 Common Ring-Fence BufferG-SIFI Buffer Basel III T1 Non-CommonBasel III Tier 2 Bail-In Bonds

Depositor preference, when implemented, will place senior

unsecured bondholders behind depositors

Under the ICB recommendations, capital requirements for the bank and group are similar

Depositor preference is a credit negative for unsecured bondholders

Lloyds illustrative priority of claims£bn

11

When comparing US banks to European banks, it is interesting to note that sub-senior spreads in US banks have compressed, while spreads in European banks have widened

___________________________Source: Barclays Capital

0100200300400500600700800900

DB RBS ISPIMSenior LT2

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

BAC C GSSenior Sub Holdco

US Banks, 1/01/2009, OAS (bp)

Euro Banks, 1/01/2009, OAS (bp)Average Sub-Senior

Spread: 216bp

Average Sub-Senior Spread: 91bp

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

BAC C GS

Senior Sub Holdco

US Banks, 9/16/2011, OAS (bp)

Euro Banks, 9/16/2011, OAS (bp)

0100200300400500600700800900

DB RBS ISPIM

Senior LT2

Average Sub-Senior Spread: 301bp

Average Sub-Senior Spread: 54bp

Narrower spreads reflect the limited benefit of seniority under Dodd-Frank

12

In the US, GDP growth expectations for 2011 have fallen, yet IG revenue expectations have not. However, this is not unusual, especially when viewed in a historical context

There is an inherent selection bias in a given IG credit index population reflecting the strength of those firms relative to the economy as a whole

IG constituents estimate revenue growth as a nominal dollar series, so inflation can influence revenue growth vs. real GDP growth

IG constituents also derive revenues from overseas. In a declining dollar environment, this should cause revenue growth to outpace nominal GDP growth

Factors Influencing IG Revenue Growth

Composition of Rev Growth

Historical Revenue Growth vs. GDP Growth

2012E Revenue Growth vs. GDP Growth

___________________________Source: Factset, Capital IQ, Bloomberg, Barclays CapitalFor details see: “Investment Grade: Revenue and GDP: More Than Meets the Eye,”

US Credit Alpha, September 16, 2011.

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11Excess Growth Nominal GDP Est. W. Avg. Revenue Growth

5.7% 6.6%4.0% 3.5%

6.4%

11.1%

6.2%

-12.3%

0.0% -0.2%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

IG Rev. Growth - Nominal GDP Growth Average

Average excess revenue growth for IG firms vs.

nominal GDP growth is 2.9%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

1Q11 2Q11 3Q11E 4Q11EReal GDP Growth Inflation FX Excess Growth

2012 revenue growth expectations are tracking much more closely with GDP

growth expectations than in 2011

13

In addition, given the strength of corporate fundamentals, it appears spread levels are not reflecting the current state, but rather appear to be indicating an increasingly binary outcome for IG credit

___________________________Source: Capital IQ, Barclays CapitalFor details, see “Focus: Beginning or End of the Sell-Off?,”

US Credit Alpha, September 9, 2011.

80

180

280

380

480

580

Jan-07 May-07 Sep-07 Jan-08 May-08 Sep-08 Jan-09 May-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 May-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 May-11 Sep-11

Current spread levels do not reflect IG fundamentals, but rather

appear to be indicating an increasingly binary outcome: either the debt crisis is resolved and spreads tighten to reflect fundamentals,

or the situation worsens and US credit trades wider with Europe

Feb 22, ’07

82bp

US IG Corporate Index Fundamentals

US IG Corp Index OAS (bp)

Summer 20112008

Credit Crisis2001/2002

Credit DownturnStart Date of Comparable Sell-off 7/26/11 6/17/08 6/21/02

Spread At Sell-off Start 152 237 172Spread 30d After Sell-off Start 213 283 201

Subsequent Wide Spread in Credit Cycle NA 618 266

Net Leverage at Sell-off Start 1.2x 1.2x 1.9x

Peak Net Leverage (ex. Financials) NA 1.6x 1.9xCash / ST Debt 5.1x 3.4x 3.1x

Cash / Total Debt 32.0% 10.7% 14.0%

Upgrade / Downgrade Ratio 1.87 1.18 0.67

Jan 18, ‘08

219bp

Mar 18, ‘08

298bp

Dec 3, ‘08

618bp

Jun 16, 09

303bp

Apr 15, ’10 139bp

Jun 10, 10

198bp

Apr 11, ’11 136bp

Sep 16, 11

220bp

14

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

260

280

300

1000 1050 1100 1150 1200 1250 1300 1350 1400

S&P 500

2010 Jan 2011 - July 2011 Aug 2011 - Present

IG Corp OAS (bp)

Notably, cash has underperformed both CDS and equities in the current sell-off

___________________________1.

Basis defined as CDX IG OTR spread minus US IG Corp OAS.Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

125

135

145

155

165

175

185

195

205

215

225

Jan-10 May-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 May-11 Sep-11(100)

(90)

(80)

(70)

(60)

(50)

(40)

(30)

IG Corp OAS Cash-CDS Basis (rhs)

Basis is the most negative it’s been since Jan ‘10

US IG Corp OAS vs. IG Cash-CDS Basis(1)

(bp) US IG Corp OAS vs. S&P 500

Relative to historic performance over the past

two years, IG cash has significantly

underperformed equities

May 2nd

Sep 16th

Apr 23rd, 2010

15

One potential explanation for the underperformance is that IG supply has been robust and new issue concessions have risen

IG and HY Weekly Supply ($bn) HPQ Outstanding vs. New Issue Spread (9/13,bp)

___________________________Source: Barclays Capital

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

7-Jan 11-Feb 18-Mar 22-Apr 27-May 1-Jul 5-Aug 9-Sep

HY IG

While the primary markets have been effectively closed for HY, IG supply

remains robust

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1.55

% '1

4

2.35

% '1

5

2.65

% '1

6

3.00

% '1

6

4.3%

'21

4.37

5% '2

1

Oustanding New Issue

New issue concessions have risen and have contributed to

the widening of secondary spreads

16

Industrial47%

Utility10%

Financial43%

Financials22%

Tech15%

Energy10%Healthcare

12%

Consumer Staples

9%

Consumer Discr11%

Industrials11%

Other10%

Financials14%

Tech20%

Energy12%Healthcare

12%

Consumer Staples

11%

Consumer Discr11%

Industrials10%

Other10%

Industrial54%

Utility11%

Financial35%

Another potential explanation is that the cash index continues to have a significant financial weighting, especially when compared to equities

US IG Corp Index Sector Weightings (%) S&P 500 Index Sector Weightings (%)

Jan 2007

Sep 2011

Jan 2007

Sep 2011

___________________________Source: Bloomberg, Barclays Capital

While the weighting of financials in the IG

Corp Index has declined by ~19% since

Jan ’07…

…the decline in the equity weighting has

been even greater (~39%)

17

Last week, IG cash underperformed the broad risk asset rally as both CDX IG and the S&P experienced their best week since the beginning of July

Macro data in the US continue to support the notion of a slowdown as August retail sales were flat, July retail sales were revised lower, and both the Empire State and Philly Fed surveys indicated contraction

Risk asset performance continues to be dictated by news out of the euro area. A somewhat better tone to the headlines supported positive performance last week

Our base case continues to be that there will be an orderly resolution of the European sovereign debt crisis. However, given the lack of clarity around a concrete plan to address contagion and questions around the level of political will to address the crisis, our conviction level remains low

The situation appears increasingly binary, were either we will avoid a near-term major systemic event and spreads will rally strongly, or we will see something akin to the fall of 2008 before officials step in decisively. We recommend investors focus on areas of the market where the upside-downside is appealing

In Summary

18

Date:

Thursday, 13 October 2011 at 4:30pm EST

Venue:

Barclays Capital 745 Seventh Avenue, New York City

Agenda:

4:30pm-4:35pm Opening Remarks (Paul Degen, Co-Head of US Credit Sales)

4:35pm-4:55pm Market Outlook

(Larry Kantor, Global Head of Research)

4:55pm-5:40pm Barclays Capital Live Demonstration

(Yana Bouchkanets, Barclays Capital Live Sales)

A cocktail reception will be held after the Demonstration

RSVP: Yana Bouchkanets, at +1 212 526 5537 or email yanabouchkanets@barcap.com

by Friday, 23 September 2011.

We look forward to seeing you there.

19

Analysts Certifications and Important Disclosures

Analyst Certification(s)We, Jeff Meli, Jigar Patel and Justin Luther hereby certify (1) that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect our personal views about any or all of the subject securities or issuers referred to in this research report and (2) no part of our compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this research report.

Important DisclosuresFor current important disclosures regarding companies that are the subject of this research report, please send a written request to: Barclays Capital Research Compliance, 745 Seventh Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10019 or refer to https://ecommerce.barcap.com/research/cgi-bin/all/disclosuresSearch.pl or call 212-526-1072.Barclays Capital does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that Barclays Capital may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Any reference to Barclays Capital includes its affiliates. Barclays Capital and/or an affiliate thereof (the “firm”) regularly trades, generally deals as principal and generally provides liquidity (as market maker or otherwise) in the debt securities that are the subject of this research report (and related derivatives thereof). The firm's proprietary trading accounts may have either a long and/or short

position in such securities and/or derivative instruments, which may pose a conflict with the interests of investing customers. Where permitted and subject to appropriate information barrier restrictions,

the firm’s fixed income research analysts regularly interact with its trading desk personnel to determine current prices of fixed income securities. The firm's fixed income research analyst(s) receive compensation based on various factors including, but not limited to, the quality of their work, the overall performance of the firm (including the profitability of the investment banking department), the profitability and revenues of the Fixed Income Division and the outstanding principal amount and trading

value of, the profitability of, and the potential interest of the firms investing clients in research with respect to, the asset class covered by the analyst. To the extent that any historical pricing information was obtained from Barclays Capital trading desks, the firm makes no representation that it is accurate or complete. All levels, prices and spreads are historical and do not represent current market levels, prices or

spreads, some or all of which may have changed since the publication of this document. Barclays Capital produces a variety of research products including, but not limited to, fundamental analysis, equity-linked analysis, quantitative analysis, and trade ideas. Recommendations contained in one type of research product may differ from recommendations contained in other types of research products, whether as a result of differing time horizons, methodologies, or otherwise.

20

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