BARANDA VS GUSTILO

GR 81163, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:

FACTS: A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.

The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the names of petitioners Baranda and Hitalia.

The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517.

The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently acquired by Perez, Gotera and Susana.

Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was questioned by Perez and others so a motion for reconsideration was filed.

Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the execution of judgement in the resolutions issued by the courts.

In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the same properties. (NOTE: This time three cases na ang involve excluding the case at bar.)

The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.

In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.

However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title.

This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates.

Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

ISSUE:What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

HELD:Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD is ministerial in natureThe function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.

In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of RODThe elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.

Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

CASTRO,J.:FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds:

That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;

That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but

Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law.

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that the Mandamus does not lie because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151 dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

HELD: No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.

Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.

A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO

G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990

NARVASA,J.:FACTS:

The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 having an area of 33,950 hectares. Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded

1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;

2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;

3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and

4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.

The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have the March 5, 1981 decision annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that

1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration;

2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement;

3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;

4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.

The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land. According to them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:

1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;

2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;

3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;

4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents have registrable rights over Lot 7454. NoHELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrineall lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain.The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's(Estadistica de Propiedades)of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua.But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document, the(Estadistica de Propiedades,)cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private respondents.

It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA and LEON PASAHOLG.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:

FACTS:On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original owners and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and adverse possession by them tacked on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding 30 years.

Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an ongoing cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No. 444 was declared public land by CFI Bataan.

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision which granted the private respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering its registration in the names of the respondents.In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the decision of the appellate court as being contrary to law on the ground that it held that the subject land is agricultural and alienable land of the public domain and that the same can be subject to acquisitive prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and uninterrupted possession.The petitioner maintains that unless the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or disposable, its status as military reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of physical occupation and cultivation thereof can change it to agricultural land and bring it within the provisions of the Public Land Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a bona fideclaim of ownership as to entitle them to registration and title over the subject land. NOHELD:

The Supreme Court held that the fact remains that the subject land has not yet been released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and still has to be reclassified as alienable public land with the approval of the President of the Philippines as required by the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275.

Therefore, the SC cannot sustain the appellate court's ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of the military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to classify the same as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A proposal cannot take the place of a formal act declaring forest land released for disposition as public agricultural land. To sustain the appellate ruling would be to pre-empt the executive branch of the government from exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of the public domain.

It was ruled in the case ofDirector of Lands v. Court of Appeals,(129 SCRA 689, 692-693) that:

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition, This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979])

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicant may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.