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Prepared to teach?J.A. Rowell a & C.J. Dawson aa Department of Education , University of Adelaide , South Australia 5001Published online: 07 Jul 2006.

To cite this article: J.A. Rowell & C.J. Dawson (1981) Prepared to teach?, Journal of Education for Teaching: Internationalresearch and pedagogy, 7:3, 315-323, DOI: 10.1080/0260747810070310

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Prepared to teach?J.A. ROWELL AND C.J. DAWSONDepartment of Education, University of Adelaide, South Australia 5001

In a recent series of articles in this journal, McNamara and Desforges (1978; Desforges &McNamara, 1977, 1979) have presented a case for excluding any formal consideration ofpsychological theories from the education of prospective teachers, replacing it by an academicconcern for the craft knowledge (practical competence) and procedures of practising teachers. Itis argued here that their approach is beset by a number of important, unanalysed problems ofpractice and theory. For example, there are problems associated with generating a newunderstanding of craft knowledge, and there are associated problems with the criterion that thisknowledge should 'work'. It is concluded that the arguments of McNamara and Desforges donot depose psychology from teacher education and that, as currently articulated, their approachhas many major obstacles to overcome before it can provide an effective substitute.

INTRODUCTION

Dramatis personae: Teacher, class of thirty or more students, student teacherobserving.

Act 1, scene 1: a science laboratory.Enter a teacher followed (preceded, surrounded) by a crowd (class) of thirty ormore grade eight, or possibly grade nine, children. The teacher confronts thecrowd and does (does not) organize them. The topic for his soliloquy (fordiscussion, for demonstration, for discovery, for . . . you name it), is 'thedetermination of the volume of an irregular solid'. Thirty minutes pass. Exeunt.

Precisely what did take place? What did our trainee drama critic (studentteacher) record? There is no set dialogue (monologue), just a message for thecrowd. Did they get it? Every one of them? How competent a performance didthe principal actor (teacher) give? And what does he understand by compe-tence in this context? What does our trainee critic understand by it? Thankgoodness there will be some dialogue backstage. What will the actor say he did?What will he think he did? What will the crowd think he did? What will ourcritic make of it?

Variations on the same theme are being played by other companies onmany other stages -each according to their own interpretation -and the noticespile up. Was Bacon right, can we get a theory of acting (teaching) from ourmountain of 'observations', and will it provide us with the possibility ofdeductive certainty?

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In a recent series of articles McNamara and Desforges (1978; Desforges &McNamara, 1977,1979) have argued the case that as 'traditionally' presented,and in most teacher-training institutions that means as currently presented, thesocial sciences contribute little if anything of value to the preparation of intend-ing teachers. In place of such programmes they suggest a much deeper andmore academic concern for classroom competence, to be achieved via anobjectification and refining of the craft knowledge and procedures of practisingteachers. The data base is to be the classroom its artefacts and teachers'accounts of the use of artefacts and diagnostic and intervention skills. Thesedata are to be treated as sources of hypotheses for the direct development ofimproved materials and for the longer term development of general theories ofinstruction' (McNamara & Desforges, 1978; p. 27).

How convincing are the arguments presented? The topic is of such impor-tance that further close consideration is almost mandatory - particularly forthose who believe that psychology has something worth saying to studentteachers, and who continue acting in that way.

Let us start by agreeing with McNamara and Desforges that the goal ofteacher education should be 'professional competence'. And let us agree alsonot to attempt to define precisely what it is that we mean by this term at thistime.1 Indeed what is, or can be, meant is the substance of the possiblecontroversy outlined for resolution here.

If 'professional competence' is to be our aim what is it that is wrong withthe traditional attempted articulation of psychological theory and its applica-tion to educational practice? Is it the theories themselves, is it their educationalimplications (or lack of them), is it the problems involved in making predic-tions, is it the failure of student teachers to understand the theories (forwhatever reason)? Desforges and McNamara (1977) find no fault in the originaltheorists. And they agree with Broadbent (1975) that cognitive psychology is astudy of 'the complicated processes which underlie the intellectual side ofhuman life'. Their criticism centres on the diffuseness, complexity, and level ofabstraction of psychological theory, and on the concomitant difficulty involvedin 'selecting the key concepts and theories . . . communicating them to non-specialists and . . . spelling out the implications of these issues' (Desforges &McNamara, 1977; p. 30).

How then are we to interpret the suggested elimination of psychologicaltheory from courses for intending teachers? Is it that teacher education is to bedivorced from any study of 'the intellectual side of human life'? In any formalsense the answer provided by Desforges and McNamara is a clear yes. Currentpsychological theory, they maintain, is so limited as a guide to planning ordecision making in education that the 'teacher might be better advised to adoptanother model entirely for all his most important undertakings' (Desforges &McNamara, 1977; p. 30). The model suggested is that of 'professional compe-tence' to be achieved through a close study of current practice - a form of study

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in which the various objectivations (Berger & Luckman, 1971; p. 49) of teachingactivity, as well as the activity itself, are observed by students, discussed withteachers (the producers and users), then pooled and discussed further betweenthemselves with the aid of a tutor. Further, this model is to take 'seriously thepractical constraints of the job and offer resolutions which, for the majority ofteachers, children, parents and other interested parties actually work' [sic](McNamara & Desforges, 1978; p. 24). Clearly, McNamara and Desforges'definition of 'competence', whether qualified by them as 'professional', 'practi-cal' or 'classroom', bears some resemblance to that involved in activities suchas, for example, predicting tide heights and times, where a detailed study ofobservations provides a more exact basis for prediction than the complex andabstract laws of physics. Just as the producers of tide tables have no need ofphysicists so, it might be argued, teachers have no need of psychologists. Bothcan achieve their objectives through craft knowledge and commonsenseunderstanding.

There is no doubt that 'practical competence' is important. But beforesimply agreeing with what appears to be the McNamara and Desforges'interpretation of what this entails, the question must be asked 'What is thefunction of theory?' After all, even McNamara and Desforges are loathe todispense with theory totally, and hope for the 'longer term development ofgeneral theories of instruction' (McNamara & Desforges, 1978; p. 27). Perhaps,then, an examination of this topic will provide more information about why thetheories of psychology have been so assiduously included in pre-serviceteacher-education courses.

Toulmin (1961; pp. 18-43) goes a long way towards providing us withanswers in his masterly, and highly readable, examination of forecasting andunderstanding in science. The competence of which McNamara and Desforges(1978) speak is akin to forecasting (which, indeed, it involves) and is a craft ortechnology. Toulmin describes how, in science

If a technique of forecasting is successful, that is one more fact whichscientists must try to explain, and may succeed in explaining. Yet a noveland successful theory may lead to no increase in our forecasting skill,while, alternatively, a successful forecasting technique may remain forcenturies without any scientific basis. In the first case, the scientific theorywill not necessarily be any the worse; and, in the second, the forecastingtechnique will not necessarily become scientific, just because it works.

If we have a forecasting technique which not only works, but worksfor explicable reasons, that is, of course, doubly satisfactory. (Toulmin,1961; p. 36)

In other words, Toulmin is making a distinction between what might be called'scientific knowledge' and 'craft knowledge' respectively. The former, as dis-cussed by Maxwell (1974) who makes this distinction quite explicit, is a product

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of the pursuit of understanding, the search for explanations for puzzlingphenomena rather than technological usefulness. General relativity theory, forexample, is highly valued for its contribution to understanding though itstechnological spin-off is nil. Craft knowledge, on the other hand, has verydifferent aims and values; its aim is that it should 'work', and it is valuedaccording to the extent that it does so. Which is not to say, of course, thattheories specially valued from the viewpoint of pure science should not, whenrelevant, be similarly valued from the standpoint of technology - the fact is thatthey are.

By their rejection of current behavioural scientific theories McNamara andDesforges create, perhaps they would claim elucidate, the problem of a lack ofscientific knowledge appropriate to understanding - the 'works for explicablereasons' of Toulmin. The value of understanding, however, appears not to bein question as a desirable, if currently unavailable, abstraction from the primaryobjective for student teachers of craft knowledge - a matter possibly reflected inMcNamara and Desforges' vacillation between such arguably non-equatableterms as 'professional', necessitating understanding, and 'practical' or 'class-room' for qualifying competence. To fill the gap they propose the futuredevelopment of general theories of instruction. In the meantime the applicationof commonsense to 'objectified craft knowledge' is to suffice as a procedure forimparting insight into 'the vague and unarticulated theories which may be usedto conceptualize teachers' skills' (McNamara & Desforges, 1978; p. 25).

How successful can McNamara and Desforges' proposed solutions to theirproblem be? Consider first the problem of understanding as this relates to thebehavioural sciences. It is an uncontestable fact that there is no one theorywhich is accepted as providing the basis for an understanding of matterspsychological. There are good reasons why this is so, as readers of this journalare probably already aware and hence these will not be elaborated here (con-sider, for example, Lakatos, 1974). But if there is no uncontestable theory thereis no uncontestable understanding either, and no reason to expect the situationto be changed by McNamara and Desforges' hoped for general theory ofinstruction. There are many ways of making sense of matters concerned withlearning and development, and no one way of making sense of them all. Eachtheory provides its own understanding and each incorporates assumptionsabout man, knowledge and their relationship. Desforges and McNamara (1977)criticize the model of mental functioning whose image of man is that of alimited capacity information processing system'. But whatever theory is cre-ated the understanding which it allows will always be open to criticism on thegrounds of the assumptions which it makes. McNamara and Desforges' prop-osed theory cannot be proved different in this respect.

Is there any way in which McNamara and Desforges' theory could beproved different from those current in psychology? There is a possibility, andagain Toulmin provides us with a provocative analogy from pure science. In his

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discussion of the demise of Aristotelian physics, Toulmin (Toulmin & Good-field 1963; pp. 112-13) considers the question of the obstacles which had to beovercome before Aristotle's ideas could be replaced by a more comprehensivealternative. His answer is as follows:

It was not enough to make more observations or perform more experi-ments: for . . . these might just as likely have reinforced as told againstAristotle's views. What mattered, rather, was the way in which theobserved facts were interpreted. A more adequate interpretation thanAristotle's called for a complete new battery of concepts and distinctions.(Toulmin & Goodfield, 1963; p. 113)

If the theories of psychology are too inadequate to provide an understand-ing of classroom-based learning and development, as McNamara andDesforges maintain, it would seem that what is required is not further articula-tion and reorganization of current concepts but a 'complete new battery ofconcepts and distinctions' (Toulmin & Goodfield, 1963; p. 113). What formthese might take, of course, is currently impossible to say. Nor can we saywhether such a theory would prove more teachable, less diffuse, abstract andcomplex. It is one thing to require such a theory, it is another to produce anduse it.

The question of production raises another question relevant to McNamaraand Desforges' thesis. It is this, 'What is the likelihood of a linear relationshipbetween the classroom-based data, the methodology for producing under-standing suggested by McNamara and Desforges, and the longer termdevelopment of general theories of instruction?' Consider, as a starting point,the following quote:

The tutor's crucial task . . . is to demonstrate that the ways in whichteachers actually respond to dealing with their work under real timeconditions and constraints, and the reasons and explanations which theyput forward to account for their behaviour, provide the basis for makinginferences about the implicit theories and assumptions which underlieclassroom practice. It is an examination which is both practically based andrealistic in that it recognizes the exigencies under which teachers work. Onthe other hand, it leads to a process of making explicit the theories which infact inform practice and permits the critical examination of these theories.(Desforges & McNamara, 1979; pl51).

How are these 'implicit theories' which inform practice to be made explicit?Following the arguments presented earlier a fundamental question concernsthe conceptual categories which give form to the theories. McNamara andDesforges (1978; p. 25) refer to the 'unarticulated implicit theories which may beused to conceptualize teachers' skills . . . [as] . . . "theories" of intellectualdevelopment, learning, memory, structure of knowledge, social interaction,

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etc ' But these are the categories current in the psychological theorizing whichMcNamara and Desforges so vigorously disclaim. What then is likely to resultfrom making the implicit theories of teachers explicit in these terms? Almostcertainly what will emerge, and in a normative sense, certainly what willemerge, will be commonsense understanding, that is understanding in termsof psychologically flavoured generalities which have become absorbed into thenatural habits of thought. More observation, as Toulmin (Toulmin & Good-field, 1963) points out, is unlikely to achieve any truly significant change. Oncethe categories have been made explicit the tendency will be to observe, recordand refine within them. In other words, it seems unlikely that proceduressuggested by McNamara and Desforges will result in the kind of theoryneeded. The more likely result will be the reinforcement of a naive psychology.There is another argument too which militates against the possibility of theproduction of original ideas by the methodology suggested by McNamara andDesforges. If experience teaches us anything in this respect it is that new ideasare usually the product of a single brain. As Mackworth (1965) puts it,

The individual inventor is often more important than any corporateresearch by a team of people. The man who found penicillin felt that a teamof people was fine when you had something to go on, but when you hadnothing to go on, a team was the worst possible way of starting, (p. 53)

Thus far, analysis of McNamara and Desforges' framework for teachereducation has been concerned with the understanding of craft knowledgewhich they equate with practical competence. Next, let us consider craft know-ledge itself, McNamara and Desforges' primary objective. The points which wewish to clarify are concerned with the extent to which craft knowledgeembodies commonsense and is limited by it. The matter can be broached by abrief consideration of what is to count as problem 'resolutions which, for themajority of teachers, children, parents and other interested parties, actuallywork' (McNamara & Desforges, 1978). Earlier an analogy was made with thecraft knowledge involved in producing tide tables. There are some similarities.But there are important differences too. Tides occur at particular times withdefinite heights, hence agreement is not difficult to reach on what is to count asa technique which works. But what of student learning? To illustrate thedifficulty, and the involvement of theory in a way not evident in our tideanalogy, we turn to the topic of our introductory 'play', the determination ofthe volume of an irregular object by the method of displacement. The first pointto note is that the criterion of 'works' will be a set of questions closely tied to theobjectives, content and manner of presentation used. For example, the ques-tions asked, and concomitantly the content and presentation, would differaccording to whether we wanted students simply to be able to repeat theexercise with a differently shaped object, or whether we wished them todemonstrate an understanding of why the method is applicable. But what is to

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count as understanding? The methodology suggested by McNamara andDesforges may reveal the answer as most teachers see it, and in those terms theextent to which the teaching 'worked'.2 But how many teachers are aware of thenature of the problems experienced by children in the course of developing anadult unified concept of volume - a concept required to understand the techni-que of determining volume by the method of displacement (Rowell & Dawson,1981)? It has taken the genius of Piaget to begin to unravel this knotty problem.But if the problems are not known, questions are not asked to reveal them andthe teaching is not designed to remove them. What student teachers areobjectifying, then, is seen to be a commonsense interpretation of understand-ing of the volume concept - and the technique is judged as 'working' in relationto that limited interpretation. Refinement of the technique does not overcomethe basic problem since its objective is to produce a more 'workable' sequence,not to change the interpretation of the problem.

How might these limitations be overcome? Perhaps it might be argued thatcertain of the techniques of psychologists working in accordance with particu-lar theoretical positions, also could become the targets for providing additionalcraft knowledge. Thus the techniques of, for example, Piaget's clinical analysis(see Pines, Novak, Posner & Van Kirk, 1978 for recent work), cognitive conflict,and conflict resolution (Inhelder, Sinclair & Bovet, 1974), Ausubel's advanceorganizers (Ausubel, 1978), cognitive maps and Gowin's 'vee' (Novak, 1979a;1979b), Gagne's hierarchies of skills (Gagne & Briggs, 1974) Hunt's conceptuallevel matching (Hunt, 1975) or Case's instructional technology (Case, 1978), toname a few possibilities, could all be included in the student teacher's armouryand, no doubt, given a degree of commonsense understanding. Perhaps, itmight be argued, that is the best that psychological theory can do for mostprospective teachers within the limitations of the system. If it is, we reject thosearguments and their place in teacher-education courses. Such techniques arenot theory-free as may be appreciated by a brief consideration of the methodol-ogy of potential conflict, and conflict resolution, as applied to the volumeproblem forming the subject of our 'play' (Rowell & Dawson, 1981). The usemade of the clinical interview, the notion of potential conflict between avail-able, but currently uncoordinated, mental structures, the manner of potentialresolution, indeed the whole approach, gains its meaning from the Piagetianresearch programme (to use Lakatos' (1974) terminology). Theoreticallobotomy removes the meaning. Change the theory and the transplant simplydoes not take. From a Gagne viewpoint, for instance, the same problem wouldbe approached in a very different manner, and what is learnt is regarded verydifferently too (see Gagne, 1968).

Of course it is true that what has been discussed here is only a part of ateacher's education. We have been concerned with the possibility of whatbehavioural science can add to that education in rationalist terms. There isanother important and inseparable aspect however, a second sort of know-

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ledge which Oakeshott (1962) calls practical 'because it exists only in use, is notreflective and (unlike technique) cannot be formulated in rules' (p. 8). Toparaphrase that author, 'in a practical art, such as teaching, nobody supposesthat the knowledge that belongs to the good teacher is confined to what is ormay be written down in a book on teaching; technique and practical knowledgecombine to make skill in teaching wherever it exists'. The technical knowledgeprovided by the behavioural sciences will not produce a metamorphosis ofstudent into teacher, but it may provide a basis for that change, aiding theacquisition of practical knowledge which can only come from apprenticeship,from teaching and, progressively as connoisseurship increases, from criticism.

Our reading of the position advocated by McNamara and Desforges is thattheir's is essentially a rationalist stance in Oakeshott's (1962) terminology.Their stated belief is that teaching can be objectified and converted into techni-cal knowledge which works; craft knowledge and practical knowledge are, forthem, identical, (or capable of identification). Our view, argued here, is thatthey have fallen between two stools. Objectification of classroom 'artefacts andteachers' accounts of the use of artefacts and diagnostic and intervention skills'(McNamara & Desforges, 1978; p. 27) fails to capture the essence of practicalknowledge which has its expression in practice. It also fails as a rationalistapproach in two ways, by adding nothing new to the categories of behaviouralscience and at the same time failing to capitalize on the wealth of their potentialas sources of understanding and related technique.

NOTES

1. McNamara and Desforges (1978) move readily in their terminology between 'professionalcompetence', 'practical competence', and 'classroom competence' which they explicitly equ-ate with craft knowledge.

2. There are some practical problems here of course. McNamara and Desforges consider thattheir techniques should work for the majority. Does this mean that 50% should get all answerscorrect, or does it mean that 50% should get more than 80% of the marks (i.e. a commonmastery criterion), or what? Presumably some agreement could be reached on such matters -but agreement by committee is a very different matter from the agreement available in ourtide-time analogy.

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