bank capital requirements: a quantitative analysis · 2014. 3. 24. · introduction motivation...
TRANSCRIPT
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Bank Capital Requirements: A Quantitative Analysis
Thiên T. NguyễnThe Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
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Introduction Motivation
Motivation
I Key regulatory reform: Bank capital requirements
I Policymakers: Strong consensus for higher bank capital requirements
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Introduction Motivation
Motivation
I Key regulatory reform: Bank capital requirements
I Policymakers: Strong consensus for higher bank capital requirements
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Introduction Motivation
Motivation
I In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Raised Tier 1capital requirement from 4 to 6 percent
◦ Tier 1 → common stock + retained earnings
I In July 2013, the Fed adopted the same Tier 1 capital requirement forall U.S. banks.
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Introduction Motivation
Motivation
The Ben S. Bernanke on regulatory capital framework:
“[T]his framework requires banking organizations to hold more and higherquality capital, which acts as a financial cushion to absorb losses, whilereducing the incentive for ... [banks] to take excessive risks.”
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Introduction Motivation
Motivation
I “Do new bank-capital requirements pose a risk to growth?”–The Economist, 8/20/2010
I Is imposing higher bank capital requirements beneficial?
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Introduction Motivation
Motivation
I “Do new bank-capital requirements pose a risk to growth?”–The Economist, 8/20/2010
I Is imposing higher bank capital requirements beneficial?
4
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Introduction Question
Question
I What are the welfare implications of bank capital requirements?
I I propose a general equilibrium banking model to study this question.
In this paper, bank capital affects growth and risk:I Dynamic banking sector
◦ Banks risk-shift due to government bailouts.◦ Banking regulation→ reduces risk-shifting incentive, fostering growth
I Endogenous growth
◦ Concerns about growth◦ Funding for investment comes through banks→ regulating banks affects investment and hence growth
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Introduction Question
Question
I What are the welfare implications of bank capital requirements?
I I propose a general equilibrium banking model to study this question.
In this paper, bank capital affects growth and risk:I Dynamic banking sector
◦ Banks risk-shift due to government bailouts.◦ Banking regulation→ reduces risk-shifting incentive, fostering growth
I Endogenous growth
◦ Concerns about growth◦ Funding for investment comes through banks→ regulating banks affects investment and hence growth
5
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Introduction Question
Question
I What are the welfare implications of bank capital requirements?
I I propose a general equilibrium banking model to study this question.
In this paper, bank capital affects growth and risk:I Dynamic banking sector
◦ Banks risk-shift due to government bailouts.◦ Banking regulation→ reduces risk-shifting incentive, fostering growth
I Endogenous growth
◦ Concerns about growth◦ Funding for investment comes through banks→ regulating banks affects investment and hence growth
5
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Introduction Question
Question
I What are the welfare implications of bank capital requirements?
I I propose a general equilibrium banking model to study this question.
In this paper, bank capital affects growth and risk:I Dynamic banking sector
◦ Banks risk-shift due to government bailouts.◦ Banking regulation→ reduces risk-shifting incentive, fostering growth
I Endogenous growth
◦ Concerns about growth◦ Funding for investment comes through banks→ regulating banks affects investment and hence growth
5
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Introduction Contribution
My contribution
I Focus: bank risk-shifting due to bailouts→ highlighted in theoretical banking literature
I First step to push the policy debate toward a more quantitativediscussion→ provide a coherent way to quantitatively think about optimal bankrequirement
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Model Overview
Outline of the model
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
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Model Overview
Outline of the model
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
Capital
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Model Overview
Outline of the model
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
Capital
Loans
Interest
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Model Overview
Outline of the model
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
Capital
Loans
Interest
Deposit
Equity
Interest
Dividend
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Model Overview
Outline of the model
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
Capital
Loans
Interest
Deposit
Equity
Interest
Dividend
Labor
Wage
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Model Households
Households
I Representative household
U0 = E0
∞∑t=0
βtC
1−1/ψt − 1
1− 1/ψ
I Endowed with 1 unit of labor → supply inelastically
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms (j = island, f = firm)I Large number of islands indexed by j: state or industry
I Firms are short-lived
I it: required investment today for production tomorrow
I Two types of firms
◦ Normal firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · it
◦ Risky-low-productivity firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · εjf,t+1 · it
log εjft ∼ N(−µ− 1
2σ2ε , σε
)∀j, f, t
I Compactlyzj,t+1 · [χεjf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms (j = island, f = firm)I Large number of islands indexed by j: state or industry
I Firms are short-lived
I it: required investment today for production tomorrow
I Two types of firms
◦ Normal firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · it
◦ Risky-low-productivity firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · εjf,t+1 · it
log εjft ∼ N(−µ− 1
2σ2ε , σε
)∀j, f, t
I Compactlyzj,t+1 · [χεjf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms (j = island, f = firm)I Large number of islands indexed by j: state or industry
I Firms are short-lived
I it: required investment today for production tomorrow
I Two types of firms
◦ Normal firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · it
◦ Risky-low-productivity firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · εjf,t+1 · it
log εjft ∼ N(−µ− 1
2σ2ε , σε
)∀j, f, t
I Compactlyzj,t+1 · [χεjf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms (j = island, f = firm)I Large number of islands indexed by j: state or industry
I Firms are short-lived
I it: required investment today for production tomorrow
I Two types of firms
◦ Normal firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · it
◦ Risky-low-productivity firm
capital produced tomorrow = zj,t+1 · εjf,t+1 · it
log εjft ∼ N(−µ− 1
2σ2ε , σε
)∀j, f, t
I Compactlyzj,t+1 · [χεjf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms
I Small operating cost = o · it→ internal fund
I Funding need from bank it
I Net income tomorrow =
pIt+1zt+1 · [χεf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Revenue
− Rl(χ, zt) · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Debt repayment
I Zero-profit condition
EtMt+1
Default option︷ ︸︸ ︷max{0,Net income tomorrow} = Current operating cost
I Firm’s default cutoff: zt+1(zt, χ, εf,t+1)
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms
I Small operating cost = o · it→ internal fund
I Funding need from bank it
I Net income tomorrow =
pIt+1zt+1 · [χεf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Revenue
− Rl(χ, zt) · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Debt repayment
I Zero-profit condition
EtMt+1
Default option︷ ︸︸ ︷max{0,Net income tomorrow} = Current operating cost
I Firm’s default cutoff: zt+1(zt, χ, εf,t+1)
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms
I Small operating cost = o · it→ internal fund
I Funding need from bank it
I Net income tomorrow =
pIt+1zt+1 · [χεf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Revenue
− Rl(χ, zt) · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Debt repayment
I Zero-profit condition
EtMt+1
Default option︷ ︸︸ ︷max{0,Net income tomorrow} = Current operating cost
I Firm’s default cutoff: zt+1(zt, χ, εf,t+1)
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Model Capital-Producing Firms
Capital-producing firms
I Small operating cost = o · it→ internal fund
I Funding need from bank it
I Net income tomorrow =
pIt+1zt+1 · [χεf,t+1 + (1− χ)] · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Revenue
− Rl(χ, zt) · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Debt repayment
I Zero-profit condition
EtMt+1
Default option︷ ︸︸ ︷max{0,Net income tomorrow} = Current operating cost
I Firm’s default cutoff: zt+1(zt, χ, εf,t+1)
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Model Road map
Road map
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
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Model Road map
Road map
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
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Model Road map
Road map
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
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Model Bank
Banks
I Each bank chooses one firm to finance
I Bank’s net cash at the beginning of next period
πt+1(χt, zt, zt+1, εf,t+1) = it
[Rl(χt, zt) · 1{zt+1≥zt+1}
+
Liquidated asset value︷ ︸︸ ︷η · pIt+1zt+1[χtεf,t+1 + (1− χt)] ·1{zt+1<zt+1}
]
− Rbt+1bt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸Deposit liability
I Recovery rate η
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Model Bank
Banks
I Each bank chooses one firm to finance
I Bank’s net cash at the beginning of next period
πt+1(χt, zt, zt+1, εf,t+1) = it
[Rl(χt, zt) · 1{zt+1≥zt+1}
+
Liquidated asset value︷ ︸︸ ︷η · pIt+1zt+1[χtεf,t+1 + (1− χt)] ·1{zt+1<zt+1}
]
− Rbt+1bt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸Deposit liability
I Recovery rate η
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Model Bank
Banks
I Bank monitoring cost: m per unit of investment
I dt: net equity payout
I Bank’s budget constraint
πt︸︷︷︸Current net cash
− m · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Monitoring cost
+bt+1 = it︸︷︷︸Lending
+dt
I Net distribution to bank shareholders:
dt − Φ(dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸Equity issuance cost
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Model Bank
Banks
I Bank monitoring cost: m per unit of investment
I dt: net equity payout
I Bank’s budget constraint
πt︸︷︷︸Current net cash
− m · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Monitoring cost
+bt+1 = it︸︷︷︸Lending
+dt
I Net distribution to bank shareholders:
dt − Φ(dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸Equity issuance cost
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Model Bank
Banks
I Bank monitoring cost: m per unit of investment
I dt: net equity payout
I Bank’s budget constraint
πt︸︷︷︸Current net cash
− m · it︸ ︷︷ ︸Monitoring cost
+bt+1 = it︸︷︷︸Lending
+dt
I Net distribution to bank shareholders:
dt − Φ(dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸Equity issuance cost
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Model Bank Equity Valuation
Bank equity valuation
Bank’s problem
V (zt, πt) = max{0, πt, maxbt+1,χt,dt
dt − Φ(dt) + EtMt+1V (zt+1, πt+1)}
subject to the budget constraint and loan demand
Three cases: (1) Default, (2) Exit but not default, and (3) Operate
and the capital requirement constraint
Retained earnings︷ ︸︸ ︷πt −m · it −
Equity payout︷︸︸︷dt
it≥ e
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Model Bank Equity Valuation
Bank equity valuation
Bank’s problem
V (zt, πt) = max{0, πt, maxbt+1,χt,dt
dt − Φ(dt) + EtMt+1V (zt+1, πt+1)}
subject to the budget constraint and loan demand
Three cases: (1) Default, (2) Exit but not default, and (3) Operate
and the capital requirement constraint
Retained earnings︷ ︸︸ ︷πt −m · it −
Equity payout︷︸︸︷dt
it≥ e
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Model Deposit Valuation
Bank deposit valuation
I Bank default: bailed out with probability λ
I Bailouts are financed with lump sum taxes
I If not bailed out, recovery rate θ
I Required return for depositors, Rbt+1(zt, πt), satisfies the condition
bt+1 = EtMt+1
Bank not default︷ ︸︸ ︷
Rbt+1bt+1 · 1{Vt+1>0}+
Bank default–bail out︷ ︸︸ ︷λRbt+1bt+1 · 1{Vt+1=0}
+ (1− λ)θ · Revenuet+1 · 1{Vt+1=0}︸ ︷︷ ︸Bank default–not bail out
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Model Deposit Valuation
Bank deposit valuation
I Bank default: bailed out with probability λ
I Bailouts are financed with lump sum taxes
I If not bailed out, recovery rate θ
I Required return for depositors, Rbt+1(zt, πt), satisfies the condition
bt+1 = EtMt+1
Bank not default︷ ︸︸ ︷
Rbt+1bt+1 · 1{Vt+1>0}+
Bank default–bail out︷ ︸︸ ︷λRbt+1bt+1 · 1{Vt+1=0}
+ (1− λ)θ · Revenuet+1 · 1{Vt+1=0}︸ ︷︷ ︸Bank default–not bail out
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Model Policy Functions
Bank’s policy functions: Risk-shifting (on one industry/zj)
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Exit decision
−0.5 0 0.5 1−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Net cash
Equity payout−asset ratio
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Net cash
Deposit−asset ratio
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Model Policy Functions
Bank’s policy functions: Risk-shifting (on one industry/zj)
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Exit decision
−0.5 0 0.5 1−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Net cash
Equity payout−asset ratio
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Net cash
Deposit−asset ratio
20
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Model Policy Functions
Bank’s policy functions: Risk-shifting (on one industry/zj)
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Exit decision
−0.5 0 0.5 1−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Net cash
Equity payout−asset ratio
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Net cash
Deposit−asset ratio
20
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Model Policy Functions
Bank’s policy functions: No risk-shifting (different zj)
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Exit decision
−0.5 0 0.5 1−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Net cash
Equity payout−asset ratio
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Net cash
Deposit−asset ratio
21
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Model Policy Functions
Bank’s policy functions: No risk-shifting (different zj)
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Exit decision
−0.5 0 0.5 1−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Net cash
Equity payout−asset ratio
−0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Net cash
Deposit−asset ratio
21
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Model Distribution of Banks
Distribution of banks
I Banks are heterogeneous only in terms of their idiosyncratic shocksand net cash:
Bt︸︷︷︸Mass
·Γ(zt, πt)︸ ︷︷ ︸cdf
I Bank entry cost: e · it
e · it ≤ EzVt(zt, πt = 0)
I If bailed out, banks can continue to operate with πt = 0
22
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Model Distribution of Banks
Distribution of banks
I Banks are heterogeneous only in terms of their idiosyncratic shocksand net cash:
Bt︸︷︷︸Mass
·Γ(zt, πt)︸ ︷︷ ︸cdf
I Bank entry cost: e · it
e · it ≤ EzVt(zt, πt = 0)
I If bailed out, banks can continue to operate with πt = 0
22
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Model Equilibrium Capital Production
Equilibrium capital production
I Capital produced next period
Ist+1 = it
∫ ∫zt+1[χtεf,t+1 + (1− χt)] · (Adjustments due to bankruptcies)
× dP (εt+1|zt+1, πt+1)Bt+1dΓt+1
23
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Model Road map
Road map
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
24
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Model Road map
Road map
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
24
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Model Road map
Road map
Banks
Households
Capital producing firms
Final good producers
24
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Model Final Good Producer
Final good producer
I A measure one of final good producers indexed by u ∈ [0, 1]
I Technology
yut = Atkαut(Ktlut)
1−α
I Investment demand idutI Investment adjustment cost
a
2
(idut
ku,t−1
)2
ku,t−1
25
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Model Final Good Producer
Final good producer
I A measure one of final good producers indexed by u ∈ [0, 1]
I Technology
yut = Atkαut(Ktlut)
1−α
I Investment demand idutI Investment adjustment cost
a
2
(idut
ku,t−1
)2
ku,t−1
25
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Model Final Good Producer
Equilibrium Growth
I Aggregate outputYt = AtKt
I GrowthYt+1
Yt=At+1
At
Kt+1
Kt
I Aggregate capital accumulation
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + Idt
I Capital market clearing ∫ 1
0idutdu = Idt = Ist
26
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Model Final Good Producer
Equilibrium Growth
I Aggregate outputYt = AtKt
I GrowthYt+1
Yt=At+1
At
Kt+1
Kt
I Aggregate capital accumulation
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + Idt
I Capital market clearing ∫ 1
0idutdu = Idt = Ist
26
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Quantitative Assessment
Quantitative Assessment
I Calibrate the model to U.S. regulation: e = .04→ Benchmark
I Welfare calculations are relative to this benchmark
27
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Calibration
Calibration
I Period = quarter
I No aggregate uncertainty
Description Symbol Value Source/TargetTFP level A 0.11 Match consumption growthSubjective discount factor β 0.987 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Income share of capital α 0.45 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 1.1 Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2013)Loan recovery parameter η 0.8 Gomes and Schmid (2010)Investment adjustment cost a 5 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)Monitoring cost m 0.02 Philippon (2012)Bank deposit recovery parameter θ 0.7 James (1991)Equity issuance marginal cost φ 0.025 Gomes (2001)Probability of bailout λ 0.9 Koetter and Noth (2012)
I Equity issuance cost: Φ(d) = −φ · d · 1{d<0}
28
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Calibration
Calibration
I Period = quarter
I No aggregate uncertainty
Description Symbol Value Source/TargetTFP level A 0.11 Match consumption growth
Subjective discount factor β 0.987 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Income share of capital α 0.45 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 1.1 Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2013)Loan recovery parameter η 0.8 Gomes and Schmid (2010)Investment adjustment cost a 5 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)Monitoring cost m 0.02 Philippon (2012)Bank deposit recovery parameter θ 0.7 James (1991)Equity issuance marginal cost φ 0.025 Gomes (2001)Probability of bailout λ 0.9 Koetter and Noth (2012)
I Equity issuance cost: Φ(d) = −φ · d · 1{d<0}
28
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Calibration
Calibration
I Period = quarter
I No aggregate uncertainty
Description Symbol Value Source/TargetTFP level A 0.11 Match consumption growthSubjective discount factor β 0.987 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Income share of capital α 0.45 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 1.1 Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2013)Loan recovery parameter η 0.8 Gomes and Schmid (2010)
Investment adjustment cost a 5 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)Monitoring cost m 0.02 Philippon (2012)Bank deposit recovery parameter θ 0.7 James (1991)Equity issuance marginal cost φ 0.025 Gomes (2001)Probability of bailout λ 0.9 Koetter and Noth (2012)
I Equity issuance cost: Φ(d) = −φ · d · 1{d<0}
28
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Calibration
Calibration
I Period = quarter
I No aggregate uncertainty
Description Symbol Value Source/TargetTFP level A 0.11 Match consumption growthSubjective discount factor β 0.987 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Income share of capital α 0.45 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 1.1 Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2013)Loan recovery parameter η 0.8 Gomes and Schmid (2010)Investment adjustment cost a 5 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)Monitoring cost m 0.02 Philippon (2012)
Bank deposit recovery parameter θ 0.7 James (1991)Equity issuance marginal cost φ 0.025 Gomes (2001)Probability of bailout λ 0.9 Koetter and Noth (2012)
I Equity issuance cost: Φ(d) = −φ · d · 1{d<0}
28
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Calibration
Calibration
I Period = quarter
I No aggregate uncertainty
Description Symbol Value Source/TargetTFP level A 0.11 Match consumption growthSubjective discount factor β 0.987 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Income share of capital α 0.45 Cooley and Prescott (1995)Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 1.1 Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2013)Loan recovery parameter η 0.8 Gomes and Schmid (2010)Investment adjustment cost a 5 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)Monitoring cost m 0.02 Philippon (2012)Bank deposit recovery parameter θ 0.7 James (1991)Equity issuance marginal cost φ 0.025 Gomes (2001)Probability of bailout λ 0.9 Koetter and Noth (2012)
I Equity issuance cost: Φ(d) = −φ · d · 1{d<0}
28
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Calibration
Calibration
Description Symbol Value TargetFirm’s operating cost o 0.023 Average return on loansStandard deviation of ε σε 0.363 x-std return on loansBank entry cost e 0.06 Exit rateReduction in productivity of risky firm µ 0.02 Average net interest marginPersistence of island specific shock ρz 0.95 x-std net interest marginVolatility of island specific shock σz 0.011 Default
log zt+1 = ρz log zt + σzεz,t+1
29
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Results
Main StatisticsMacro moments Data Model (e = .04)
∆c 0.49c/y 0.76
Bank moments Data
Top 1% Top 5% Top 10%Targeted moments
Return on loanmean 4.33 4.63 4.92x-std 2.95 3.51 3.99
Net interest marginmean 2.89 3.18 3.43x-std 3.05 3.55 4.03
Failure 0.33 0.29 0.28Exit rate 1.02 1.17 1.20
Other momentsNet charge-off rate
mean 2.70 0.93 0.76x-std 17.94 13.74 11.00
Fraction risk-shiftingLeverage ratio 7.74 8.29 8.51Tier 1 capital ratio 10.25 12.18 12.62Number of banks 113 564 1129
Source: Call Reports 1984-2010. Top x% column indicates statistics calculated from the top x% banks in term of total assets.‘mean’ is the time-series average of cross-sectional, and ‘x-std’ is the time-series average of cross-sectional standard deviation. 30
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Results
Main StatisticsMacro moments Data Model (e = .04)
∆c 0.49 0.49c/y 0.76 0.69
Bank moments Data
Top 1% Top 5% Top 10%Targeted moments
Return on loanmean 4.33 4.63 4.92 4.01x-std 2.95 3.51 3.99 5.23
Net interest marginmean 2.89 3.18 3.43 1.95x-std 3.05 3.55 4.03 6.09
Failure 0.33 0.29 0.28 1.07Exit rate 1.02 1.17 1.20 4.27
Other momentsNet charge-off rate
mean 2.70 0.93 0.76 2.86x-std 17.94 13.74 11.00 10.09
Fraction risk-shifting 4.14Leverage ratio 7.74 8.29 8.51 11.63Tier 1 capital ratio 10.25 12.18 12.62 11.63Number of banks 113 564 1129
Source: Call Reports 1984-2010. Top x% column indicates statistics calculated from the top x% banks in term of total assets.‘mean’ is the time-series average of cross-sectional, and ‘x-std’ is the time-series average of cross-sectional standard deviation. 31
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Results
Welfare implications
Let ct be the consumption-capital ratio
Ct = ctKt−1 = ∆kt−1 · c ·K0︸ ︷︷ ︸Initial level
32
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Results
Welfare implications
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2Welfare (%)
Minimum capital requirements
33
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.253
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5Exit rate
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.254
5
6
7
8
9Measure of banks
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.0298
0.0299
0.03Capital produced
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.48
0.485
0.49
0.495Consumption growth (%)
Minimum capital requirements
34
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.253
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5Exit rate
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.254
5
6
7
8
9Measure of banks
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.0298
0.0299
0.03Capital produced
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.48
0.485
0.49
0.495Consumption growth (%)
Minimum capital requirements
34
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.253
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5Exit rate
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.254
5
6
7
8
9Measure of banks
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.0298
0.0299
0.03Capital produced
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.48
0.485
0.49
0.495Consumption growth (%)
Minimum capital requirements
34
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.253
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5Exit rate
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.254
5
6
7
8
9Measure of banks
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.0298
0.0299
0.03Capital produced
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.48
0.485
0.49
0.495Consumption growth (%)
Minimum capital requirements
34
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.253
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5Exit rate
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.254
5
6
7
8
9Measure of banks
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.0298
0.0299
0.03Capital produced
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.48
0.485
0.49
0.495Consumption growth (%)
Minimum capital requirements
34
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250
0.5
1
1.5
2Bank failure (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08Average productivity
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.0735
0.074
0.0745
0.075
0.0755
0.076Consumption−capital ratio
Minimum capital requirements
35
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250
0.5
1
1.5
2Bank failure (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08Average productivity
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.0735
0.074
0.0745
0.075
0.0755
0.076Consumption−capital ratio
Minimum capital requirements
35
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250
0.5
1
1.5
2Bank failure (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08Average productivity
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.0735
0.074
0.0745
0.075
0.0755
0.076Consumption−capital ratio
Minimum capital requirements
35
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250
0.5
1
1.5
2Bank failure (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08Average productivity
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.0735
0.074
0.0745
0.075
0.0755
0.076Consumption−capital ratio
Minimum capital requirements
35
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Results
Welfare implications
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250
0.5
1
1.5
2Bank failure (%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08Average productivity
Minimum capital requirements0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.0735
0.074
0.0745
0.075
0.0755
0.076Consumption−capital ratio
Minimum capital requirements
35
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Results
Welfare implications
Why welfare decreases after 8 percent?
1. Romer “learning-by-doing” externality
2. Equity issuance cost
36
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Results
Welfare implications
Why welfare decreases after 8 percent?
1. Romer “learning-by-doing” externality
2. Equity issuance cost
36
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Results
Role of equity issuance cost: φ
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
Minimum capital requirements
Benchmarkφ = 0
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.0297
0.0298
0.0299
0.03
Capital produced
Minimum capital requirements
37
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Results
Role of probability of bailout: λ
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2Welfare (%)
Minimum capital requirements
Benchmarkλ = .95
38
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Results
Role of productivity loss due to risk-shifting: µ
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
Benchmarkµ = .01
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5Bank failure (%)
Minimum capital requirements
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.250.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08Average productivity
Minimum capital requirements
39
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Results
Role of additional risk exposure due to risk-shifting: σε
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5Welfare (%)
Minimum capital requirements
Benchmarkσε = .37
40
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Conclusion
Conclusion
I Dynamic general equilibrium banking model
I The calibrated version of the model suggests an 8% minimum Tier 1capital requirement→ significant welfare improvement: 1.1% of lifetime consumption
I Punch-line: Optimal level is higher than in both Basel II and Basel III
I Broader level: The need to re-examine current bank capitalregulations
41